HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 2
6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

January - June
1972

The EC-47 History Site

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THE HISTORY OF

DETACHMENT 2, 6994th SECURITY SQUADRON

1 JANUARY 1972 - 30 JUNE 1972

RCS: USS-D3

[redacted]

1 JULY 1972

[redacted]

Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron, APO San Francisco 96337

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THE HISTORY OF

DETACHMENT TWO, 6994th SECURITY SQUADRON

1 JANUARY 1972 - 30 JUNE 1972

Prepared by

Master Sergeant Carl A. Miller

[redacted]

Approved By:

William J. Shea, Captain, USAF
Commander

[redacted]

FOREWORD

This operational history of Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron is a narrative depicting the significant detachment accomplishments during the historical period 1 January 1972 thru 30 June 1972.

This history was prepared by Master Sergeant Carl A. Miller. However, credit must also be given Staff Sergeants Jerome E. Johnson and Dennis W. Reinhardt who volunteered to do much of the typing required and often worked many long hours of their own free time. All comments and suggestions are welcomed and should be directed to the Operations Officer, Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron, APO San Francisco 96337.

USS-D3

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

1 January 1972	Position	30 June 1972
Maj E. J. Ledet	Commander	Capt W. J. Shea
Capt K. J. Wegner	Operations Officer	Capt K. J. Wegner
Capt P. Loos	Materiel Officer	Capt O. Costello
TSgt R. L. Murdock	First Sergeant	TSgt N. T. Lee
SMSgt W. E. McCollough	NCOIC Operations	SMSgt W. E. McCollough
MSgt D. T. Burns	Communications	MSgt D. T. Burns
MSgt C. L. Turner	Mission Management	MSgt C. A. Miller
MSgt J. E. Gleen	Exploitation	MSgt G. E. Payne
MSgt B. Lockett	Flight Operations	MSgt R. E. Jasper
TSgt J. J. Nolan	Administration	SSgt S. Willis
Sgt C. L. Robinson	Personnel	TSgt R. O. Long
MSgt A. M. Brewer	Maintenance	MSgt A. M. Brewer
MSgt E. Jones	Security	TSgt E. Tutt
SMSgt C. K. Meeks	Supply	SMSgt C. K. Meeks
MSgt K. N. Owens	Plans	SSgt R. J. Pitre
TSgt W. E. Christian	SEFE	SSgt J. B. Luther

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USS-D3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

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USS-D3

CHRONOLOGY

3 January 1972	"Rocket Attack" DaNang Airfield received six 122MM rockets. Three EC-47 aircraft damaged.
17 January 1972	Detachment 2 tasked to provide communications manning assistance for Monkey Mountain.
21 January 1972	Pacific Security Region Standardization/ Evaluation Team visited Detachment 2.
9 February 1972	"Rocket Attack" twenty eight 122MM rockets impacted on DaNang Airfield. No damage to Detachment 2 facilities.
17 February 1972	"Special Mission" Detachment 2 was tasked with special mission in the Tri-Border area, specifically targeted against NVA tank activity.
19 February 1972	First successful mission against NVA tank activity. DF Fixes located NVA tanks in Southeastern Laos.
26 February 1972	DIRNSA authorized Detachment 2 to issue TACREPs on all NVA tank activity.
2 March 1972	First TACREP issued by Detachment 2 on NVA tank activity.
18 March 1972	Final reflection of NVA tank movement.
13 April 1972	Detachment 2 started providing manning assistance to Detachment 3, NKP Thailand.

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USS-D3

13 April 1972	"Rocket Attack" twenty four 122MM rockets impacted on DaNang Airbase, 2 EC-47s destroyed, Tail Nr's 51131, 01102, 2 EC-47 Aircraft slightly damaged, Tail Nr's 77254 and 76668.
14 April 1972	"Rocket Attack" all rockets fell short of DaNang Airbase.
15 April 1972	"Rocket Attack" twenty 122MM rockets impacted on DaNang Airbase, no damage to USAFSS facilities.
17 April 1972	Detachment 2 Analysts visited the Collection Management Authority (CMA) at Phu-Bai, RVN.
23 April 1972	"Rocket Attack" nineteen 122MM rockets impacted on DaNang Airbase, no damage to Detachment 2 facilities.
6 May 1972	"Rocket Attack" sixteen 122MM rockets impacted on DaNang Airbase, no damage to Detachment 2 facilities.
13 May 1972	"Rocket Attack" eighteen 122MM rockets impacted on DaNang Airbase, no damage to Detachment 2 facilities.
26 May 1972	Detachment 2 was visited by the 6994 Security Squadron Standardization/Evaluation Team.
9 June 1972	"Rocket Attack" six 122MM rockets impacted on DaNang Airbase, no damage to Detachment 2 facilities.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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USS-03

9 June 1972	Implemented new procedures for ARDF recovery report in compliance with change to TECHINS 3038.
10 June 1972	Tasked with communications support of 328th Radio Research Field Station.
13 June 1972	"Rocket Attack" six 122MM rockets impacted on DaNang Airbase, no damage to Detachment 2 facilities.
15 June 1972	"Rocket Attack"two 122MM rockets impacted on DaNang Airbase, no damage to Detachment 2 facilities.
16 June 1972	"Rocket Attack" four 122MM rockets impacted on DaNang Airbase, no damage to Detachment 2 facilities.
16 June 1972	Captain Shea assumed command of Detachment 2.
21 June 1972	"Rocket Attack" six 122MM rockets impacted on DaNang Airbase, no damage to Detachment 2 facilities.

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USS-D3

CHAPTER 1

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

MISSION

[redacted] Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron was an element of the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) stationed at DaNang Airfield, Republic of VietNam (RVN). The unit conducted Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) and Airborne Communications Intelligence (ACI) collection in support of the intelligence requirement of commanders responsible for tactical operations in Southeast Asia (SEA), and provided cryptologic operations with supplementary data to enhance the value and depth of their technical and analytical development.[1] This support was rendered by locating and maintaining surveillance of enemy radio transmitters and providing ACI on those targets which could not be adequately covered by ground-based intercept.[2] Special targets of interest were selected by the tactical commanders and tasked through the ARDF Coordination Center (ACC). ACC subsequently tasked the Detachment, and technical support was provided by the three Collection Management Authorities (CMA).[3] The Seventh Radio Research Field Station, Udorn, Thailand was responsible for part of SEA Area ten and eleven. The Eighth Radio Research Field Station, Phu Bai, RVN was responsible for part of SEA Area ten and SEA Areas eight and nine. The 330th

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Radio Research Company, Nha Trang, RVN was responsible for SEA Area seven and the other part of SEA Area ten.[4]

ORGANIZATION

(U) Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron was subordinate to the Commander, 6994 Security Squadron, Tan Son Nhut Airfield, RVN.[5] The Detachment had an integral support element consisting of administration, personnel, material supply and airborne equipment maintenance, communications, and security and law enforcement. The personnel requirements in support of the mission were provided by a Geographically Separated Unit (GSU) and the personnel records were maintained at the 6902 Support Squadron, Wheeler Air Force Base, Hawaii.

OPERATIONS:

(U) The Operations Branch, located in the southwest corner of DaNang Airfield, was the keystone for mission accomplishment and performed the vital functions of directing, coordinating and controlling resources to accomplish the mission. Close coordination was maintained between the Detachment and the 362d Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (TEWS), which operated and maintained the Pacific Air Force (PACAF) EC-47 aircraft based at DaNang.

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[redacted]

Operational Relationship:

[redacted] The operational relationship of the detachment with other units in the ARDF program is shown in Appendix VI, chart 3. The ACC was the hub on which the ARDF program revolved. It performed the coordinating function between the intelligence community, the customer and the supporting agencies. The customer stated the intelligence he desired, the intelligence community provided technical support necessary to gather the information and the supporting agencies provided the necessary equipment and personnel to perform the mission. In this sense Detachment 2 was both a member of the intelligence community and also a supporting agency. It provided technical knowledge and expertise as well as the personnel and equipment to perform the ARDF and collection functions. The 362d TEWS provided the airframes, maintenance, pilots and navigators to support the mission.

[redacted]

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USS-D3

CHAPTER II

SIGINT TASKING AND COLLECTION

TASKING

[redacted] The tasking was generated at the weekly meeting of Tactical Commanders and other agencies at the ACC. The appropriate CMA formally tasked the Detachment, VIA Control Messages (CONMSG). The CMA also generated Technical Data Lists (TDL) for those priority targets on which they held sufficient technical data to reasonably predict a schedule. The CMA tasked the airborne collection positions with specific communications entities which could not be effectively assigned to other, ground-based, SIGINT units.

TARGET PRODUCTIVITY

[redacted] ARDF target productivity is depicted on five charts in Appendix VII. The first chart shows the overall productivity[1] while the next four show trends in each of the SEA areas flown. Significant deviations are outlined below with reference to the applicable chart. The results by SEA area for January, February, and March are not available as the records containing this data were destroyed when this unit implemented

[redacted]

[redacted]

destruction of non essential classified documents during the NVA Spring Offensive.

ARDF Target Productivity SEA Area Seven

[redacted] Chart two shows the ARDF productivity in SEA Area seven.[2] Although more targets were worked and fixed during May and June there was a decrease in the percent of targets worked that were fixed, and an increase in the number of cuts obtained. The high cut rate was primarily caused by very short transmission times, adverse weather, and excessive standoff ranges caused by the presence of enemy artillery in the area.

ARDF Target Productivity SEA Area Eight

[redacted] Chart three shows the ARDF productivity in SEA Area eight.[3] Target productivity was very stable during April, May, and June. The number of targets worked and fixed was higher in April due to the sporadic coverage of the absolute area in the southwest portion. The detachment was not tasked with coverage in this absolute area in May and June.

ARDF Target Productivity SEA Area Nine

[redacted] Chart Four shows the ARDF productivity in SEA Area nine.[4] The decrease in target productivity in April and May was a result of missions being flown around a designated point over water, which hampered target working and fixing capability due to the excessive standoff range. Missions were flown over water for

* Each SEA Area is broken down into several absolute areas to allow for more specific tasking

[redacted]

flight crew safety due to the enemy Anti-Aircraft Artillery that was scattered throughout the area. The increase in June resulted from missions reverting to flying an over land orbit point, which allows optimum opportunity for working targets.

ARDF Target Productivity SEA Area Ten

[redacted] Chart five shows the ARDF productivity in SEA Area ten.[5] The significant drop in targets worked was caused by a decrease in the number of missions flown in this area. The primary responsibility for this area has been turned over to Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron, Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand.

RADIOTELEPHONE COLLECTION PRODUCTION

[redacted] Total radiotelephone collection productivity is shown in chart six.[6] Significant deviations are outlined below and concern increases in Allocated Minutes of Coverage (AMOC) and minutes of copy obtained. AMOC is determined by the amount of time the aircraft is flown in its absolute area of coverage. If the aircraft is flown with both Z1 and Z2 collection positions manned then the AMOC is doubled. The most common factors affecting collection are weather, an increase or lull in target activity, and the communications mode of enemy activity.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Radiotelephone Collection Productivity SEA Area Seven

[redacted] Chart seven shows the radiotelephone collection in SEA Area seven.[7] During May and June more collection missions were flown in this area and radiotelephone position manning increased. Enemy tactical activity, however, was generally low.

Radiotelephone Collection Productivity SEA Area Eight

[redacted] Chart Eight shows the radiotelephone collection in SEA Area eight.[8] The decrease in AMOC and collection during May and June was caused by discontinued coverage of the Southwest portion of the area and a slight decrease in enemy tactical activity.

Radiotelephone Collection Productivity SEA Area Nine

[redacted] Chart nine shows the radiotelephone collection in SEA Area nine.[9] AMOC and collection were stable in April and May. The increase in June resulted from increased position manning, more collection missions being flown, and a more optimum overland orbiting point.

Radiotelephone Collection Productivity SEA Area Ten

[redacted] Chart 10 shows the radiotelephone collection in SEA Area ten.[10] Since the primary responsibility for this area has been turned over to Detachment 3, the AMOC and amount of collection have been greatly reduced.

[redacted]

MANUAL MORSE COLLECTION PRODUCTION

[redacted] Total Manual Morse collection productivity is shown in chart 11.[11] The significant deviations are outlined below and concern increases or decreases in AMCC and minutes of copy obtained. Manual Morse minutes of copy constantly fluctuate, especially when the primary mission is ARDF. For example, the operator on the "Y" position, which is primarily responsible for supporting the "X" position and the ARDF mission, obtains more minutes of copy when ARDF Activity is low. The "Z2" position, which is primarily responsible for collection, is affected by an increase or lull in target activity.

Manual Morse Collection Productivity SEA Area Seven

[redacted] Chart 12 shows the Manual Morse collection in SEA Area Seven.[12] The increase in May was caused by more collection missions being flown as a result of generally good weather. In June, the Detachment was tasked with a great number of late evening and night missions in SEA Area Seven. The very low level of target activity during this time of day was the reason for the decrease in collection productivity.

Manual Morse Collection Productivity SEA Area Eight

[redacted] Chart 13 shows the manual morse collection in SEA Area eight.[13] The decrease in AMCC during May and June was due to [redacted]

the deletion of coverage in the Southwest portion of this area. Adverse weather and a low level of enemy tactical activity in June contributed to the decrease in copy time.

Manual Morse Collection Productivity SEA Area Nine

[redacted] Chart 14 shows the Manual Morse collection in SEA Area nine.[14] While the percent of effectiveness was stable, AMOC and copy time varied, especially during May. During that month, most of the orbits were flown over water and the number of missions reduced. Missions increased in June as orbits reverted to over land.

Manual Morse Collection Productivity SEA Area Ten

[redacted] Chart 15 shows the Manual Morse collection in SEA Area ten.[15] The primary responsibility for this area was turned over to Detachment 3 in May, and the AMOC and amount of collection has been greatly reduced.

POSITION STATUS REPORTS

[redacted] Position Status Reports (PSR) were required in accordance with TECHINS 1056 when a mission resource was unavailable for use in excess of 24 hours. During the 182 days of this period, the Detachment issued 49 PSR's for an average of eight per month. [redacted]

[redacted]

USS-D3

CHAPTER III

PROCESSING AND REPORTING

REPORTING

ARDF Recovery Report

[redacted] A change to TECHINS 3038 effecting an additional field after the "Information and Accounting" (I&A) line on the ARDF recovery report was received and implemented on 09 June. This change allows producers and users a more effective management tool for monitoring accuracy of the I &A lines on reports destined for computer processing.

PROCESSING

Identification Rate

[redacted] The identification rate of targets has risen to an average level of 51 percent. The levels remain constant and are due primarily to increased emphasis on low-level data base maintenance, effective use of identification change reports, and SEA Technical Summary Re-Ident reports. Increased emphasis placed on interception of high priority targets by airborne operators has enabled us to reduce the tremendous anount of traffic copied without callsigns and has resulted in a higher identification rate. However, we are still encountering continuous communications changes in some areas that are somewhat hampering the

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[redacted]

identification rates at this level. One very beneficial TDY performed by three Detachment personnel on 17 and 18 April resulted in mutual agreement on our need for improved TDL's.[1] More reliable information was received from USM-808, and the Detachment generated additional items for inclusion in the TDL's. With the new TDL's the identification rate exceeded 50 percent. Pursant along these lines, manning during April rose to its full peak, enabling the assignment of individual analysts to perform flights in specific areas of coverage, which resulted in increased familiarization of targets and operations in these areas and enabled the analysts to build up a great amount of experience upon which to base identification techniques. Additionally, on 26 January, the 6994 Security Squadron authorized this unit to carry additional analytical aids on board mission aircraft.[2] The provision was that the information carried aboard would not exceed Category II Comint. The working ability of airborne analysts was greatly enhanced with this authorization, allowing a concentrated effort to fulfill mission requirements in fixing identified high priority and special emphasis targets.

TDY Visit to CMA

[redacted] On 17 and 18 April, MSgt Daniel C. Mack, [redacted], TSgt Troy M. Roberts, [redacted], and SSgt Robert G. Baker,

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[redacted]

[redacted] performed a TDY trip to the Collection Management Authority (CMA) at Phu-Bai, RVN.[3] Items of discussion included the request for assistance in up-grading the quality of information we received from them, closer monitoring of identification techniques applied by both the Detachment personnel and the CMA, and the need for closer coordination between analysts working the same problem areas. The result of this meeting was the assignment of one Detachment 2 analyst to specifically monitor and up-date our technical data base.

TDY Manning Assistance

(U) Between 13 April and 21 June, Detachment personnel were called upon to augment vacant analysts spaces at the 6994 Security Squadron and Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron. Four analysts were TDY for a 30 day period to fulfill these requirements with no adverse effect noted in the analysis and reporting section.

[redacted]

CHAPTER IV

LOGISTICS

MAINTENANCE

Manning:

(U) Manning continued to plague the maintenance section during the first three months of this period. Manning assistance was still required during January, February, and March. In April the assigned strength reached a level that was sufficient to support and accomplish all maintenance requirements. The maintenance technicians continued to work a considerable amount of overtime. During May and June the Detachment provided TDY manning assistance to Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, in the form of 2 maintenance technicians.

Maintenance:

(U) The systems reliability was above the acceptable standards during this period. Routine maintenance functions were accomplished and no peculiar difficulties were experienced.

MATERIEL

Not Operationally Ready Supply (NORS)

(U) The new logistics procedures and controls which were implemented during the last half of 71, have continued to reduce the NORS outage rate. During the period 1 January thru 30 June 72,

the Detachment had only on NORS outage. We believe this to be a record in support of 100 positions on 30 Aircraft, and compares with the 43 NORS outages the Detachment had during the period 1 July thru 30 December 1971.

Supply Difficulties

(U) The Detachment continued to experience difficulty in obtaining some items. The items that we experienced the most difficulty with, were; memory modules, data processors, computers, receiver housing assemblies, oscillators and circuit cards. The only support on these items is through "turn-around" of repairables shipped to the repairing activity. Because of the non-availability of two types of memory modules, the Depot has recommended that we consider "non-repairable-this-station" (NRTS) action on the computers and return the complete item, rather than NRTS out the memory modules. The Depot has advised us that they can, in most cases, provide 30 day "turn-around" on the computer, and in most cases this has been accomplished.

Supply Levels for the AN/ALR-34 System

(U) During January the Materiel Section accomplished approximately 50 AF Forms 1996, to establish supply levels for the AN/ALR-34 system. The AN/ALR-34s were new at this unit, having arrived here in December 1971 when Detachment 1 and Detachment 2 were merged.*

*See: The History of Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron, USS-D3 for period 1 July thru 31 December 1971.

Manning

(U) In January the materiel control section implemented 24 hour a day, seven day a week operation. This was necessary in order to support the maintenance section which has the same schedule. In the supply field, the Detachment was authorized six personnel but only four were assigned. In order to attain 24 hour operation with this shortage the supply personnel were required to work 12 hour shifts. In February, after a thorough review of projected gains and losses, the Detachment asked the 6902 Air Base Squadron, Wheeler Air Force Base, Hawaii, to review the projected manning and provide assistance to alleviate this shortage. Since that time the Detachment has gained one SSgt and lost one TSgt and one SSgt, leaving the present strength at three.

[redacted]

CHAPTER V

SUPPORT

(U) Training, Standardization/Evaluation Flight Examiner (SEFE) Section, Communications, and Security Police all continued to support the mission within their specific areas.

TRAINING

Upgrade Training

(U) In January, the Detachment had a total of 19 airmen in upgrade training. There were six 29271s, two 20270s, two 81170s, two 32873s, one 30474, one 20330, three 29251s, one 20250, and one 32853. On 30 June, five personnel remained in upgrade training status.

Ground Training Program

[redacted] The Training Section conducted a ground training class for all airborne AFSCs covering common training areas such as aircraft emergency procedures, local operational policies, and common equipment. The Voice Processing and ARDF Reporting Sections trained their personnel in their respective functions. Failures at all levels of airborne upgrade training were at a very low level. The high degree of success can be attributed to the professionalism of the training instructors and their over-all knowledge of the

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[redacted]

systems that the Detachment was associated with. Since 1 January, there was only one initial upgrade training failure.

Category IV Seminar

(U) In February, the Detachment Training Section implemented a Category IV Seminar with an initial class of 15 Category III radio operators who had been recommended for upgrading to Airborne Mission Supervisors (AMS) and Instructor Radio Operators (IRO). Since the initial Seminar was conducted, there were 35 Category III operators graduated and upgraded to AMS or AMS/IRO.

STANDARDIZATION AND EVALUATION

(U) The Standardization/Evaluation Flight Examiner Section (SEFE) continued to review all aircrew members' Flight Records to insure that each aircrew member remained current in all areas of training. During this period, a total of 477 Standardization/Evaluation examinations were administered and 235 checkrides were conducted with 16 failures.

Pacific Security Region Standardization/Evaluation Team Visit

(U) During the period 21 thru 25 January, the Pacific Security Region Standardization Evaluation Team visited the Detachment.[1] Some discrepancies were noted within the Detachments SEFE section and were either corrected during the visit or as soon as possible after the team departed. In their over-all evaluation, the Detachment was rated as excellent. Also, during the visit team members flew seven

[redacted]

[redacted]

operational missions. They rated the crew performance as outstanding.

6994 Security Squadron Standardization/Evaluation Team Visit

(U) During the period 26 thru 30 May, the 6994 Security Squadron Standardization Evaluation Team visited the Detachment.[2] Team members flew four operational missions, and the over-all evaluation of the Detachment SEFE Section was rated as excellent.

Visit by Command Standardization/Evaluation Team Members

[redacted] During the period 31 May thru 5 June, two members of the United States Air Force Security Service Standardization/Evaluation Team visited the Detachment.[3] One of the more important items discussed during this visit was the possibility of a change to USAFSSM 55-7, Vol II, para 6-6. This portion of the Manual required Flight Examiners to fly as extra crewmembers when conducting examinations, but due to the fuel/weight limitations, especially during the summer months, this was not always possible at Detachment 2. The possibility of rewriting that portion of the manual or obtaining a waiver was to be a subject of discussion at Headquarters, 6994 Security Squadron.

COMMUNICATIONS

Support of project "Iron Horse" at Monkey Mountain

[redacted] On 17 January the Detachment was tasked by Pacific Security Region to provide TDY support to Monkey Mountain. The requirement was for three communications operators. This requirement still existed at the end of this period.

[redacted]

Communications Support of 328 Radio Research Field Station (RRFS)

[redacted] On 10 June the communications facility was tasked with support of a residual unit of the 328 RRFS due to "Stand-Down" of the parent unit. Two KY-8s were placed on loan to support their requirements and the Detachments circuitry was utilized to transmit and receive traffic destined for the unit.

Seek Silence

(U) As of 30 June, C-E Scheme 0043A3K0, Emergency Secure Air to Ground, Ground to Air requirement was about 95 percent complete. Allied support was complete with the exception of a 30 amp circuit breaker. The Engineering and Installation team was awaiting a project identifier and permission to enter country to complete the work.

[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-D3

CHAPTER VI

SPECIAL INTEREST ITEMS

North Vietnamese Tanks Enroute to Southern Laos and South Vietnam

[redacted] In February, this Detachment was tasked with a special ARDF/AIC mission, targeted specifically against North Vietnamese tank activity in Southern Laos. The first mission was flown on 17 February; the first positive results were obtained on 19 February.

[redacted] A minor equipment problem was encountered during the first few days, but it received immediate attention and was soon overcome. It was discovered during the mission on the 19th that, while the ARDF position was able to monitor and DF the voice signal in the AM mode, the AIC position was unable to obtain a legible recording of the communications. This problem was solved by replacing the long wire antenna, normally utilized on the Low VHF "E" Band, with the whip antenna which is normally utilized on the Medium and High VHF Bands.

[redacted] The first fully successfull mission was flown on 24 February and proved to be highly productive in both ARDF and collection. Three DF Fixes were obtained locating the tanks in Southeastern Laos in the vicinity of 15:26N 107:07E. The voice

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[redacted]

communications reflected a minimum of 19 vehicles, positively identified as tanks, involved in the movement southward. The intercepted communications indicated that this major group was divided into three smaller groups and that within these groups the individual tanks were maintaining an interval of one kilometer. Intercept also divulged that the planned parking area, following the movement for the night, would be area "A-3" (unlocated).

[redacted] Positive ARDF and voice collection results were again obtained on 25 February. The callsigns intercepted indicated a different group of tanks involved in this activity. Two DF Fixes placed this tank group in the vicinity of 15:06N 107:12E, a position slightly southeast of the previous days activity. The intercepted communications established the movement to be from "L-2" to "L-3", both unlocated parking areas.

[redacted] Only voice communications intercept was obtained on the mission of 28 February. This intercept revealed a minimum of eight groups of tanks moving southward. The mission was unable to obtain ARDF results and there were no references to locations in the voice communications.

[redacted] Further tank activity occurred on 2 March when ARDF results showed the southward movement of tanks to a location in the vicinity of 15:15N 107:17E. The intercepted voice communi-

[redacted]

cations reflected at least two groups of tanks enroute to a parking area designated as "A-6". (unlocated)

[redacted] During a mission flown on 3 March, two DF Fixes and one DF Cut located tank activity in the vicinity of 15:12N 107:12E and 15:10N 107:22E. Voice communications also reflected a third group of 19 tanks. Enemy communications indicated the destination would be parking area "A-3" (unlocated).

[redacted] The next reflection of tank activity was obtained during a mission flown on 13 March. Voice communications reflected the same groups of tanks that were active on 2 March, and that they were enroute through a "mountain pass". The ARDF fixes located this activity in the vicinity of 15:08N 107:26E, placing them somewhat east of the normal infiltration route in Southeastern Laos. It appears that the enemy was concerned about previous air activity and especially any current air activity in their general area of operation. Tank communications mentioned the twisting route of travel and the very slow progress, further substantiating their deviation into rougher terrain to lessen the possibility of detection.

[redacted] The final reflection of tank movement came during a mission flown on 18 March. No DF Fixes were obtained due to an inflight malfunction of the ARDF equipment. Throughout the period of activity the aircraft flew various patterns in an attempt

[redacted]

to determine, by aural signal strength, the approximate location of the tanks. Voice communications indicated there was a minimum of six groups of tanks moving in a southeasterly direction. Three of the groups had not been reflected previously. The conversations indicated there were still three vehicles remaining near the area "A-3" (unlocated) with maintenance problems and a minimum of three vehicles were proceeding to location "A-4" (unlocated). The text reflected that the six groups involved in the movement were to proceed to a location "A-6" (unlocated) to park and undertake camouflage actions. In general, the conversation indicated that a rather large parking area was involved. References were made to the utilization of various quadrants for parking purposes. The most important aspect, however, was the association of 100 vehicles already in place and the appearance of three new callsigns.

[redacted] An "in-Depth" analysis of all tank communications was undertaken upon the conclusion of the activity, the results of which were forwarded to DIRNSA for confirmation and comments.[1] The subsequent offensive in the "B-3" Front near Kontum, South Vietnam, confirmed the suspected large number of tanks that were located in the area.

Tactical Reporting (TACREP) of Tank Activity:

[redacted] After the first successfull mission was flown

[redacted]

[redacted]

against the tank activity on 24 February, it was evident that the voice communications contained extremely valuable intelligence. On 26 February DIRNSA authorized this Detachment to issue TACREPs on all tank activity. The first TACREP was issued on 2 March. In all, a total of four TACREPs were issued. No technical supplements were required, but to replace these, a Transcript Report containing a "verbatin" transcription of intercepted voice communications was issued. This function required the developement of working aids, consisting of all terminology associated with the tank activity. A thorough and comprehensive vocabulary list was generated which greatly reduces the transcription time and facilitated timely reporting.

Problems Encountered:

[redacted] Many of the missions flown against the tank activity encountered problems which had a direct bearing on the ARDF results and the continuity achieved by analysis of the voice communications. The problem previously mentioned concerning the proper antenna for the intercept and recording of the FM signal reduced the overall effectiveness until it was overcome. Once this problem was solved the intercept was normally good to exceptional in quality.

[redacted] The tanks utilized frequencies in the low VHF range, therefore the AN/ALR 38 with a frequency range of

[redacted]

[redacted]

2-190 MHZ was the only suitable system. The limited number of AN/ALR-38 systems available at this unit sometimes resulted in the non-availability of aircraft, late take-offs, reduced time over target, and, on rare occasion, a cancellation of the mission.

[redacted] Weather was also a factor that detracted from the overall effectiveness of the mission. During this time of the year, the Central Highlands experience weather build-ups which often restrict flying in areas not suitable for optimum coverage. This often necessitated signals being DF'd from a greater stand-off range than desired for the best ARDF results.

[redacted] Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) High Threat Areas probably presented the biggest problem. The Tanks utilized the existing route structure in Laos for transit from North Vietnam into Cambodia, Southern Laos and South Vietnam. This entire route network through Laos was extremely well protected with AAA weapons. Mission aircraft had to avoid the AAA high threat areas and still maintain a flight profile to insure ARDF coverage. As in the case of the weather build-ups, this often required signals being DF'd from a greater stand-off range than desired.

[redacted]

Footnotes completely redacted. One page following removed to reduce file size.

[redacted]

USS-D3

GLOSSARY

ABBREVIATIONS

A

AAA	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AB	Air Base
ABCCC	Airborne Command Control Center
ACC	ARDF Coordination Center
ACI	Airborne Communications Intelligence
Afld	AIRFIELD
A/G	Air to Ground
AIR-34	ARDF System, Frequency Range 02-16 MHZ
AIR-35	Computerized ARDF System, Frequency Range 02-16 MHZ
AIR-38	Computerized ARDF System, Frequency Range 02-190 MHZ
AMS	Airborne Mission Supervisor
ARDF	Airborne Radio Direction Finding
ARR	ARDF Recovery Report

B

C

CBPO	Consolidated Base Personnel Office
CC	Combat Cross
CMA	Collection Management Authority
COCDC	Consolidated Operational Career Development Courses
CONMSG	Control Message
CUT	In DF, The Point at which two LOB's Intersect
C&D	Continuity and Development

[redacted]

D

DF Direction Finding

DI Director of Intelligence

DSU Direct Support Unit

DURMIS Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary

E

EMR Exploitable Message Report

EUMR Emergency Unsatisfactory Materiel Report

F

FAC Forward Air Controller

FIX In DF, a Point Determined by the Intersection of Three or more LOB's

FM Frequency Modulated

G

GDRS General Directorate Rear Services

GSU Geographically Separated Unit

H

I

ICR Identification Change Report

IRAN Inspection and Repair as Necessary

IRO Instructor Radio Operator

J

JOA Joint Operations Agreement

K

L

LOB	Line of Bearing

M

MACV	Military Assistance Command VietNam
MHZ	Megahertz
MM	Manual Morse

N

NKP	Nakhon Phanom, Thailand
NORS	Not Operationally Ready-Supply
NSA	National Security Agency
NVA	North Vietnamese Army

O

OPINS	Operating Instructions

P

PACAF	Pacific Air Force
PRC	Page Row Column
PSR	Pacific Security Region

Q

R

RD	Reference Designator
RO	Radio Operator
RRFS	Radio Research Field Station
RT	Radio Telephone
RVN	Republic of VietNam

[redacted]

[redacted]

S

SEA	Southeast Asia
SEATS	Southeast Asia Technical Summary
SEFE	Standardization Evaluation Flight Examiner
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence

T

TDL	Technical Data List
TDY	Temporary Duty
TEWS	Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron
TECHINS	Technical Instructions
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TOT	Time on Target

U

USAFSS	United States Air Force Security Service

V

VC	Viet Cong
VHF	Very High Frequency

W

WAPS	Weighted Airman Promotion System

X

Y

Z

[redacted]

APPENDIX I

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

APPENDIX I

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Captain William J. Shea was born in Springfield Massachusetts. He graduated from St Francis College in 1962 with a Bachelor degree in English with a Minor in History. He entered the United States Air Force in November 1962 through the Officer Training and Commissioning Program and was commissioned a Second Leiutenant on 5 February 1963. After a one year tour at Goodfellow Air Force Base Texas, where he attended the Intelligence Officer Course, CBK 8031, he was assigned to the National Security Agency at Fort Meade Maryland. In August 1966, Captain Shea reported to the 6980 Security Squadron, St Lawrence Island, Northeast Cape, Alaska where he was utilized as Exploitation Officer. Also, while at St Lawrence Island he was promoted to the grade of Captain on 13 February 1967 and departed Northeast Cape upon closure in April 1967. His second overseas tour was to Okinawa where he was assigned to the Joint Sobe Processing Center as a Team Chief and later as Branch Chief of the Air Division's 24 hour Current Operations Branch, JSPC-36. After 30 months in Okinawa he returned to the National Security Agency in January 1970 as a USAFSS Representative to the National Security Agency and other DOD Agencies in the Washington D.C. Area. His

duties included, representing the USAFSS on the Vietnamization Program and the ACRP Program. He was also the USAFSS/Ft Meade Representative to the National Cryptologic School. In May 1972, Captain Shea graduated from Johns Hopkins University with a Masters Degree in the History of Ideas.

Effective 16 June 1972, Captain Shea assumed command of Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron Danang Airfield, RVN.

APPENDIX II

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

APPENDIX II

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

(U) The Awards And Decoration Section was responsible for maintaining a current file of all personnel assigned to the unit to verify award qualifications. The section also typed and coordinated all requests for awards and decorations to ensure timely submission to higher headquarters. In addition, the section processed the approved awards to ensure prompt entry into personnel records. The Awards And Decoration Section was unable to promptly present Basic Air Medals to personnel due to the non-availability of the Medal at this station. Correspondence is currently being exchanged with higher headquarters in an attempt to alleviate this situation. The chart shows the number of awards processed and status as of 30 June 1972.

Award	Submitted	Approved	Disapproved	Pending
Distinguished Flying Cross	43	25	0	18
Bronze Star Medal	5	3	0	2
Air Force Commendation Medal	6	4	0	2
Air Medal	188	122	0	66

APPENDIX III

AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

[redacted]

USS-D3

APPENDIX III

AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

Aircraft Number	Type	Equipment
42-100665	EC-47N	AIR-35/Z1/Z2
45-000937	EC-47P	AIR-35/Z1/Z2
42-093814	EC-47N	AIR-35/Z1/Z2
42-023882	EC-47N	AIR-35/Z1/Z2
42-024313	EC-47N	AIR-35/Z1/Z2
44-077254	EC-47P	AIR-35/Z1/Z2
43-048153	EC-47N	AIR-35/Z1/Z2
43-048702	EC-47P	AIR-35/Z1/Z2
43-049491	EC-47P	AIR-35/Z1/Z2
43-048087	EC-47Q	AIR-38/Z1/Z2
43-048636	EC-47Q	AIR-38/Z1/Z2
43-049208	EC-47Q	AIR-38/Z1/Z2
42-024300	EC-47N	AIR-35
43-048072	EC-47N	AIR-35
43-049260	EC-47P	AIR-35

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPENDIX IV

MANNING

[redacted]

USS-D3

APPENDIX IV

MANNING

AFSC	1 January 1972 Authorized	1 January 1972 Assigned	30 June 1972 Authorized	30 June 1972 Assigned
E4044	1	1	1	1
E8035	3	3	2	2
202X0	32	23	19	18
203X1	40	29	23	21
207X1	140	107	67	61
291X0	12	9	12	13
304X4	4	1	0	1
328X3	34	23	34	15
645X0	5	3	6	5
702X0	10	9	8	7
732X0	2	2	2	3
811X0	11	9	10	8
Total	294	221	184	155

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPENDIX V

SEA ARDF AREAS

[redacted]



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APPENDIX VI

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS

DETACHMENT 2 OPERATIONS



CHAIN OF COMMAND

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE

HEADQUARTERS, PACIFIC SECURITY REGION

6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

DETACHMENT 2, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

[redacted]

USS-03

OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND



[redacted]

APPENDIX VII

ARDF TARGET PRODUCTIVITY

[redacted]

USS-UB

AERF TARGET PRODUCTIVITY ALL SEA AREAS

TOTAL JOBS	1805	2561	2171	2103	2166	2348	
TOTAL FLY	1361	1995	1804	1495	1434	1541	
TOTAL OUT	371	456	381	409	451	445	
FIT	75.4	77.9	75.5	71.1	66.3	65.6	

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]



[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-D3

ARDF TARGET PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA EIGHT

TOTAL WORKED				960	862	893	
TOTAL FIX				711	609	634	
TOTAL CUT				175	176	135	
% FIX				74.1	70.6	71.0	

[redacted]

VII-3

[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-03

ARDF TARGET PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA



TOTAL WORKED				142	101	503	
TOTAL FIX				64	37	257	
TOTAL CUT				48	30	114	
% FIX				43.0	36.6	51.5	

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-D3

ARDF TARGET PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA TEN



TOTAL WORKED				217	29	23
TOTAL FIX				142	18	17
TOTAL CUT				56	8	3
% FIX				65.4	62.1	73.9

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPENDIX VIII

RT ACI PRODUCTIVITY

[redacted]

DES-03

[redacted]



ANOD	31783	3265	34780	39586	4527	5078	
TEN COPY	4096	4214	3457	9731	8903	13186	
S	12.9	13.0	09.9	24.3	21.7	23.1	

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-D3

RADIOTELEPHONE ACF PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA SEVEN



AMOC				1985	7895	7770	
MIN-COTY				638	2045	1509	
%				32.1	25.9	22.4	

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-03

RADIOTELEPHONE AOS PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA EIGHT



AMOC				19490	14 90	13195	
MEN. COPY				4567	2043	2097	
%				23.4	13.9	16.0	

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-D3

RADIOTELEPHONE ACT PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA NINE



ANCC				16485	16732	31975	
MIN. Copy				4202	4632	8332	
%				25.4	27.6	26.1	

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-DB

RADIOTELEPHONE ACT PRODUCTIVITY SRA AREA TEP



AHOC				1926	580	140	
MIN. COPY				324	82	47	
%				16.8	14.3	31.7	

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPENDIX IX

MM ACI PRODUCTIVITY

[redacted]

[illegible]

[illegible]



AMOU	99054	98505	102153	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
MIN. CUT	16560	17686	16985	7784	6107	[illegible]	
%	16.7	17.9	16.3	17.4	14.2	15.3	

[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-03

MANUAL HOUSE ACT PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA SEVEN



ACTUAL				2343	16070	22504	
MIN. COPY				394	2208	3785	
%				16.3	21.9	16.8	

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-03

MANUAL MORSE ACT PRODUCTIVITY SDA AREA EIGHT



AMOC				26741	15125	15220	
MIN. COPY				4864	2523	2002	
%				18.2	16.7	13.2	

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-D3

MANUAL MORSE ACT PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA NINE



AMOC				11500	8490	16885	
MIN. COPY				1666	1297	2558	
%				14.5	15.3	15.2	

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-03

MANUAL MORSE ACT PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA TYK



ARRC				3847	1160	446	
MIN. COPY				823	309	82	
%				21.4	26.6	18.4	

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APPENDIX X

PHOTOGRAPH OF COMMANDER

[redacted]

Doc #1

MSgt Mack/DCFP 5 May 1972

Report of Visit to USA-ACS (Phu Bai) 17-18 Apr 72

DC
CO
IN TURN

1. Purpose of Visit: Mission Coordination.

2. Names of Visitors:

MSgt Daniel C. Mack
TSgt Troy M. Roberts
SSgt Robert G. Baker

3. Personnel Contacted:

Maj Mason - Assistant Operations Officer
1Lt Capucci - OIC Exploitation
CWO Hutton - OIC ASMS/Exploitation
MSgt Canong - NCOIC Operations
SFC Bonvillian - NCOIC Airborne Systems Management
SFC Inman - NCOIC Exploitation
Sgt Gibbs - NCOIC MRDF Shop
SP4 Nadland - 9 Area Analyst
SP4 McCarty - 10 Area Analyst

4. Findings: The trip was arranged and coordinated through SFC Bonvillian, NCOIC of Airborne Systems Management (ASMS). We arrived at Phu Bai at approximately 1100 hrs. Sgt Bonvillian met us at the airfield and escorted us to the operations site and assisted us in getting temporary badges. He then introduced us to the personnel in ASMS and briefly explained the primary mission of the Airborne Systems Management Shop and also gave us an overall briefing of the analytical effort at Phu Bai. He further explained that a reduction in personnel, in addition to the assumption of CHA responsibility from Nha Trang had seriously hampered much of their efforts to provide full technical support to the aviation units. Sgt Bonvillian introduced us to MSgt Canong, the NCOIC of Operations. Sgt Canong welcomed us to the site and offered us any assistance we needed while TDY. We discussed TDL reliability with SP4 Nadland who is responsible for TDL's for SEA area 09. We were particularly interested as to why no VHF targets were included in TDL's for SEA area 09 since a large portion of targets in that area were on VHF. He explained that they attempted to task aviation units with targets according to MACV requirements irrespective of frequency range. They prepare technical data on transmitters they feel

[redacted]

[redacted]

would be most likely to produce an ARDF fix on the desired reference designator (RDB). He said that since we had brought it to his attention that a large portion of targets in SEA area 09 was in the VHF range, he would explore the possibility of having VHF targets included in TDL's. We also discussed the accuracy of TDL's with SP4 Hadland and he agreed to look into efforts to improve them. TDL accuracy was discussed more fully with SFC Inman and will be covered in another portion of this report. SP4 McCarty, who is responsible for TDL's in SEA area 10 was interested in securing ALR-35 and ALR-38 systems in the 10 area to put more emphasis on collection in these areas. We felt that they ALR-35/38 systems could be more effectively used in other CMA areas. We discussed TDL format and particularly one that would aid our analysts in sanitizing TDL's to be carried aboard aircraft. At present, we is including all fragged areas in SEA area 10 on the same TDL. He agreed, however, to begin separating them by frag areas as soon as his co-worker returns from leave. We discussed identification change reports (ICR) with SFC Bonvillian and SP4 Hadland. We explained that the ICR was a particularly sore subject because we had hoped to use it as an authoritative basis for updating our data base. We advised them that we could not use the ICR for data base updating because it frequently conflicted with traffic identification we based on the latest NSA and CMA identification aids. Our primary objective in discussing the problem was to have the CMA to include in the ICR their basis for changing the identification on our ARDF Recovery Report (ARR). We advised them that more than half of all the identification changes made by them were apparently completely arbitrary or were in direct conflict with our traffic identification data base. They conceded that a genuine problem existed but they were unable, due to reduced manning, to include justification for their changes on the ICR. The only encouraging note of the discussion was that they would emphasize careful evaluation of ARR identification to the analysts preparing the ICR. TSgt Roberts and Maj Mason discussed the assignment of a Det 2 analyst on TDY (semi-permanent) status to Phu Bai. This concept is approved by the CMA's, 6994 Scty Sq, and by PACAF. Maj Mason was previously an Operations Officer at a CMA at Union an Air Force analyst was assigned. He enthusiastically endorsed the idea of our providing a full time analyst to coordinate problems and arrangements between our unit and the CMA at Phu Bai. He said he would make a desk and working space available for our analyst and offered any other assistance in setting up the liaison position. We also discussed with Major Mason and CWO Hutton our desire to receive TACREPS they issue based on our intercept. They assured us that they would not include the source of the information in the body of the report but would look into the possibility of having us added to electrical distribution. He felt that an informal arrangement for a drop copy by courier would be too prone to "falling through the cracks" to ensure regular receipt. We discussed with LTC Capucci and SFC Inman the possibility of receiving CMA sents, primarily for the purpose of preparing supplementary TDL's. They were sympathetic, but would not add us to distribution without prior coordination with DIRNSA. They then showed us a DIRNSA message wich prohibits lateral distribution of sents to other units unless specifically approved by DIRNSA. (According to the DIRNSA message, our distribution of sents to Det 3 is illegal.) They further declined to send us a drop copy of their sents via courier on the basis

[redacted]

[redacted]

that it is unrealistic for one intercept unit to generate technical data based on another unit's intercept. They suggested that if we still wanted to receive their seats that we should address our request to DIRNSA. Upon DIRNSA's approval, they would gladly send us their seats. I discussed with SFC Inman the pathetic showing we were experiencing in fixing TDL targets. I advised him that the primary reason we wanted the CMA seats was so we could supplement the CMA TDL's, thereby improving the percentage of TDL targets fixed. He assured me that the current CMA TDL's were already as reliable as could be reasonably developed. He cited statistics for the 909A area where their ground intercept covers the same targets as our airborne tasking. The ground intercept verified that the TDL's were 75-80 percent reliable. That is, their ground intercept positions were given the same TDL's as were sent to the aviation units. Those positions intercepted 75-80 percent of the targets using the callsigns, on the frequencies, and at the times listed on the TDL. He had no explanation why our TDL target fix rate is approximately 1 percent. Sgt Gibbs in the medium range direction finding (MRDF) briefed us on the role that function plays in relation to the ARDF program. They are primarily interested in determining the general location of targets of interest so that more specific location data can be obtained through ARDF. SSgt Baker talked with various analysts in the exploitation section to obtain up-to-date technical information on SEA area 909A. These analysts were helpful in every respect and Sgt Baker was able to return to Det 2 with a much more complete working aid for that area. Sgt Baker remained at Phu Bai until 20 April 1972 in order to get all available technical information. Overall, I feel that, while not many problems were completely resolved, the trip provided a good basis for establishing a profitable working relationship with our CMA at Phu Bai. We were able to personnally contact most of the individuals there who has a job related to the ones we perform at Det 2. Everyone was helpful and offered any assistance they could render to help both the CMA and the aviation units do a better job.

Daniel C. Mack

DANIEL C. MACK, Maj, USAF
Asst NCOIC Airborne Analysis and Reporting

Cy to: OC/6994 Sety Sq

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

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Doc 3

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS PACIFIC SECURITY REGION (USAFSS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96515

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DOKT

SUBJECT: Standardization/Evaluation Report - Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq

TO: Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq (CC/DO)
6994 Scty Sq (CC/DO)

1. Names of FSR Examiners

Capt Michael T. Christy
SMSgt David H. Winter
TSgt William R. Daniels Jr
NOTE: SMSgt Nanness (Hqs USAFSS/DOR) accompanied the FSR Stan/Eval Team

2. Dates: 21 - 25 January 1972

3. Missions Flown:

Capt Christy
908C, 22 Jan, AMS - SSgt Ousaman
908B, 23 Jan, AMS - TSgt Wright

SMSgt Winter
907A, 22 Jan, AMS - SSgt Baldwin
910C, 23 Jan, AMS - SSgt Dongilli

TSgt Daniels
910D, 22 Jan, AMS - SSgt Sellers

SMSgt Nanness
908A, 23 Jan, AMS - SSgt Fitzsrusa
907A, 24 Jan, AMS - SSgt Allen

4. Unit Evaluation:

a. Mission Statement:

(1) Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq provides ARDF and airborne collection support to COMUSMACV, DIA and 7AF. Flying in the northern portion of the Republic of Vietnam, the Tri-Border area (RVN, Cambodia and Laos) and the Steel Tiger area of the Laotian Panhandle the unit conducts ARDF/airborne collection operations against NVA and Viet Cong tactical units and General Directorate Mean Services (GDMS) elements. The unit also collects a significant volume of both morse and voice exploitable messages, derived from both enemy tactical and GDMS communications. ARDF and exploitable message data is reported electrically after each mission to the appropriate CMA, ACC and NSA for further dissemination to tactical users. Additionally,

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the unit has participated in the Brown Beaver and Black Bear programs which provide for secure air-to-air relay of fix information for utilization by FAC aircraft. When the US controlled site at Pakse, Southern Laos has been activated, Det Two has provided ARDF fix data directly to the Pakse site via secure air-ground communications. These latter programs have greatly enhanced the capability of US Forces to exploit perishable ARDF data in a timely manner and have contributed significantly to tactical ground operations and USAF interdiction efforts in Laos.

b. Standardization/Evaluation

(1) General:

(a) The unit's Stan/Eval section continues to operate under effective and highly qualified management. Stan/Eval procedures are closely adhered to and general administration of the Stan/Eval program is satisfactory. A review of USAFSS form 74's indicated that the unit's Stan/Eval Flight Examiners are conducting check rides in a satisfactory manner. However, a major objective of this visit was to evaluate each unit Stan/Eval section's procedures or system for ensuring that the Operations Officer and Commander are systematically provided with an assessment of the effectiveness of overall airborne mission procedures, the general level of proficiency of the unit's aircrews, and degree of adherence to emergency procedures and aircrew discipline requirements. A conscious and consistent monitoring of overall airborne mission performance with regular reporting to the Commander/Operations Officer should be the primary responsibility of the unit Stan/Eval section. Although the Stan/Eval section regularly initiates action to correct individual aircrew proficiency discrepancies and advises the Operations Officer of corrective actions at weekly staff meeting, Det 2 does not have an established system which ensures that the Stan/Eval section is performing their primary monitoring/assessment task. To assist the unit in developing a more effective Stan/Eval program, it is recommended that a directive be published requiring a formal written report to be submitted monthly from the Stan/Eval section to the Operations Officer. This report would provide the Stan/Eval section's assessment of the effectiveness of mission/aircrew procedures, general aircrew proficiency and degree of adherence to established procedures. Special emphasis should be placed upon trends noted, weak areas and potential problem areas. In preparing for submission of this report each month, the Stan/Eval section should collectively review all USAFSS form 74's, student evaluations, written examinations results and informal notes prepared by the unit SEPE's during check rides in an attempt to isolate trends and problem areas. After preparing a draft of their findings, the Stan/Eval section should call a meeting(s) of all unit AEC's and IMC's to discuss problem areas in depth and solicit additional comments from the Cat IV Operator force. The final monthly report, complete with recommended solutions, would then be forwarded to the Operations Officer and Commander for appropriate corrective action. These reports would then form the base for discussion by the unit Stan/Eval Review Board as prescribed by USAFSSM 55-7.

(b) The Chief [redacted] routinely certify other SEPE's regardless of AFSC. This is not a sound practice as the senior A29231 SEPE is appointed chief and is not qualified to certify proficiency in all aspects of the 202/203 career fields. [redacted] is tasked to discuss this with the 6954 S and recommend that [redacted] only [redacted] (A29231) do not certify the various Analyst and Linguist

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SEFE's at the detachments.

(2) AF6 Maintenance:

Maintenance of subject aircrew records was generally good. Pertinent data was included in the appropriate sections. Approximately 60% of the total AF6's on file were reviewed for accuracy and completeness. This amounted to 95 of 162 records on file. All AFSC's were reviewed. Special note is made of the fact that a large number of the AF6's were inherited from Det 1, 479th and the 479th Ferry Sqdn due to transfer of personnel.

(3) No-Notice Evaluations:

Detachment SEFE's only performed 6 No-Notice Check Rides during the month of November 1971. This was primarily due to the large influx of newly assigned personnel from the 479th Ferry Sqdn and Det 1, 479th Ferry Sqdn which ceased operation on 7 November 1971. It should be noted that the SEFE Section conducted 74 systems upgrade check rides during this month. With the assignment of AIR-X configured aircraft to the organization and arrival of personnel not familiar with the ALR-35/38 aircraft it was necessary to undergo an extensive upgrade training program. The SEFE section did conduct approximately 10% of their check rides as No-notice rides in December. Special attention should be given to USAFSM 60-1 concerning two semi-annual checks per year with one being a no-notice.

(4) SEFE's/IAO's:

Only one instance was noted where a SEFE also performed additionally as an IAO. The unit was appraised of USAFSM 55-7 requirements and immediate action was taken to correct this deficiency.

(5) Periodic Training Requirements:

The Standardization and Evaluation section has established a suspense system that identifies and records recurring flight training and flight physical requirements. Follow-up action in the form of a letter to the Operations Officer is taken on individuals who fail to meet specific requirements. There were no instances of submitted AF Forms 1042, Medical Recommendation for Flying Duty.

(6) USAFSM Form 7A:

The unit is using outdated forms. The May 71 edition has been requested and will be placed in for use upon arrival. Form 7A's on individuals for applicable systems (AIR-X/38, or 39) upgrade are only annotated in the remarks section. The appropriate action item in parts II, III, IV and V are not specifically addressed. USAFSM 55-7, Vol II makes no provision for omitting entries (S, U, or N/A) in the applicable blocks.

(7) Specific Discrepancies in Aircrew Evaluation and/or Categorization Procedures:

It is recommended that flight examiners identify those individuals whose current airborne categorization will require frequent and close monitoring. Having identified a weak or potentially weak aspect of an aircrew member's performance, the flight examiner shall evaluate the appropriate follow-up actions, to

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include no-notice, special orientations, and/or removal from flying status actions are taken. The follow-up check ride and USAFE Form 74 should specifically address such failure areas annotated in the previous check ride.

e. Training:

(1) General.

The unit has documented an excellent overall training program, particularly exceptional in the initial ground orientation (Category I) training for newly assigned personnel. The local training regulation is well-written and is quite detailed in stating the training section's responsibilities. All newly assigned personnel are assigned to and responsible to the training section until general ground orientation is completed. All aircrew attend joint classes in emergency procedures and general unit mission orientation. At this point, maintenance and analysis personnel are released to their respective sections for specialized training and ATC/AD personnel continue formal training in sensor intercept equipment and target environment.

(2) AFSC Specialized Ground Training:

Following the joint environment/target environment phase, the training section continues specialized MDT training for AFSCs. This phase deals in considerable detail with airborne mission procedures, traffic format, ARIP equipment/antennae, air-to-ground communications procedures and in-flight trouble shooting. Category II training for AFSCs is considered adequate and well documented.

(3) AFSC Specialized Ground Training:

The newly arrived AFSC [redacted] begins his unit indoctrination and training by attending the Category II general training course. Completion of the majority of this general instruction then releases the trainee to the Voice Procedure Section where his specialized training begins. It is recommended that the AFSC receive the entire general training course to better prepare him for his airborne duties and enhance his understanding of the entire mission. The trainee must receive this specialized linguistic and target entities instruction before he can be upgraded to Category II. It is the Voice Processing Section's responsibility to provide this instruction through the use of well documented lesson plans, training tapes, and qualified instructions. Satisfactory completion of this specialized training that qualifies the trainee for Category II testing to be administered by the unit training section.

Lesson plans and training outlines have already been prepared for the majority of material that will be presented. Training tapes have been received and with the exception of multi-channel intercepts, contain all required voice communications that the AFSC linguist may encounter. Qualified instructors are available and have been identified. Ground processing equipment, AVCRs and TTY recorders are installed and will provide the necessary aural training and hardcopy practice required during the specialized training phase.

To ensure that the specialized AFSC training program is well-documented, current, and viable, the following actions must be completed and formalized:

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(a) Written lesson plans must be finalized and must adequately cover all areas listed in the specialized training outline.

(b) Available training tapes need to be reviewed, selected cuts isolated and identified, and transcripts prepared for those cuts of traffic selected. Multi-channel training tapes with annotated transcripts are mandatory if the trainee is to receive the required specialized training. Training tapes should include, but not be limited to, all possible voice entities that the Det 2 linguist may encounter. Terminology and communications procedures not normally intercepted from Det 2's current target areas may also be included to provide the entire A202/A1-WD force familiarization with potential intercept.

(c) In coordination with the unit training section, a test must be developed that will cover both general and specialized instruction. This test will be used to determine the trainee's proficiency and readiness to up-grade to Category II.

(d) A monitoring system should be initiated to ensure that lesson materials presented in the specialized training phase are monitored for accuracy, applicability, and currency. Along these lines, the entire voice effort, both intercept and processing, must continually be monitored and any alterations to current procedures and/or responsibilities should be readily identified for inclusion in the specialized training program. If the alterations or changes are significant enough, the entire A202 centre must be up-dated on the new procedures. It is recommended that the above monitoring system be formally documented into an applicable local operating instruction.

(4) A202 Specialized Ground Training.

Incoming A202 personnel are entered into joint classroom ground training conducted for initial orientation, aircraft familiarization and emergency procedures. However, they remain only for the initial day of ground training. Recommend A202 personnel be required to attend the complete joint ground training course for familiarization with all aircraft equipment, proper logging procedures and duties of other crewmembers. Following joint ground training, the A202's are placed on swings and mix for ground support familiarization. At this point in the A202 training cycle, the specialized training program has been left to the individual instructor analyst. There is no centralized system for directing and monitoring the specialized A202 training that is necessary before the student analyst is prepared to begin training flights with an instructor analyst. Det 2 has recently developed a very general training outline for specialized A202 ground training. To expand upon this outline and to ensure that airborne analysts are specifically and fully prepared for airborne duties prior to initiation of Det 2 II upgrade training with an instructor analyst, the following actions must be completed and formalized:

(a) Appointment of a highly qualified individual to develop and conduct A202 specialized training.

(b) Development of detailed lesson plans which stipulate systematic and planned instruction in all areas covered in the general training outline.

(c) Development of procedures designed to closely monitor the students progress through the ground training phase. These procedures should include

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assignment of practice problems, hypothetical analysis situations and short written and/or verbal quizzes. These procedures should also include a requirement for periodic review and update of the A202 specialized training materials.

(d) In coordination with the unit training section, an A202 Category II Upgrade Examination must be developed for administering to student analysts upon completion of specialized ground training and prior to assignment to an instructor analyst for Category III Upgrade Training.

(5) A292 Category III Upgrade Training:

After successful completion of Category II training, student radio operators are assigned to instructors who are responsible for imparting Category III training. The unit has utilized 6994th Sety Sqdn Form 1 (Student Evaluation) to document student progress. The form is completed after each mission and is forwarded to the Stan/Eval and training section for review and is filed by the training section in the AF Form 623. The student evaluation is forwarded through the scheduling section so that the IRO/Student are scheduled for the appropriate system as recommended by the instructor. For reasons unknown, the 6994th Sety Sqdn has discontinued the Form 1. The Stan/Eval team will investigate this situation upon arriving at Tan Son Nhut. Pending resolution, the unit should continue student evaluation procedures on an interim basis.

(a) Det 2 has implemented a procedure for 292s whereby an instructor from the training section monitors the final training flight prior to a student's upgrade. This is considered an excellent procedure for monitoring the IRO program and consideration should be given to instituting a similar procedure for monitoring the 203 and 202 instructor programs.

(b) Four A292 IROs were observed in training performance during missions flown by the team. All four (TSgt Wright, SSgt Allen, SSgt Baldwin and SSgt Gussman) exhibited outstanding instructor techniques and were extremely professional and effective in their performance of instructor duties.

(6) A203 Category III Upgrade Training:

An excellent A202 IRO checklist has been developed to guide and standardize A202 IRO procedures. A203 IRO's utilize the 6994th Form 1 to evaluate each student's progress. However, the Form 1 is delivered to the training section for filing upon completion of each flight. This affords no opportunity for review of student progress or monitoring of IRO effectiveness. Recommend procedures be established requiring that each student evaluation be routed through the NCOIC, Voice Processing Section and stipulation of the requirement for the NCOIC to additionally review student progress and to closely monitor A203 IRO effectiveness.

(a) Sgt Mejia was observed by a USAF flight examiner in the performance of IRO duties. Sgt Mejia exhibited outstanding instructor techniques and was extremely effective in handling his student.

(7) A202 Category III Upgrade Training:

The unit A202 Category III training program is ineffectively managed with no evidence of adequate monitoring or control. No checklists or training outline is available to the Instructor Analyst. (1) Student evaluation forms are not

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utilized. Consequently, there are no procedures for monitoring IA effectiveness, standardizing IA training procedures, or assessing student progress. The unit MEOI, analysis and reporting should be required to develop and monitor an effective AMD2 Cat III upgrade training program. This program must include, at a minimum:

(a) Development of an IA checklist or training plan which specifies the planned areas of instruction to be covered by the IA.

(b) Development of a student evaluation form, to be completed by the IA after each flight. This form should be reviewed by the MEOI, analysis and reporting prior to forwarding to the training section for filing in the individual's AF Form 623.

(c) Establishment of a program requiring regular monitoring and systematic update of IA procedures to ensure currency, standardization, and overall effectiveness.

(3) Category IV Upgrade Training: Several outstanding training innovations are included in the Det 2 program. Of particular note are the planned seminars for upgrading AMU/IRO nominees. This idea provides for a final preparation of these key personnel for their increased responsibilities. Decision making in hypothetical situations is to be stressed.

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(9) Overall Training Recommendations: Recommend the following additions to Det 2 Regulation 50-1:

(a) A provision for quarterly review and update of course AZK 29271-2. Suggest the Training Section be the OPR for this requirement. Inputs should be required from an operations branch.

(b) Provisions should be included implementing the various training guides/lessons plans thereby making the entire training program official.

(c) Expand in greater detail the requirements and procedures for 202/203 Category II and III training.

(d) A provision for using the student evaluations as a tool for evaluating instructor performance and standardization of efforts.

d. Mission Performance:

(1) General: The overall airborne mission performance at Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq was generally excellent. The evaluation of this portion of the unit's mission covered all areas from pre-mission preparation and briefing to post-mission debriefing and critique. Emergency procedures were observed and crew responses tested by use of bail-out drills and written emergency procedures questions. Aircrew responses and in-flight discipline were generally good with few discrepancies/inconsistencies noted. One potential problem area observed was the time required to don survival and personal gear during the bail-out drills. While this was the exception rather than the rule, it should be continually stressed to all crewmembers that the survival and personal gear must be prefitted and readily accessible if the crewmember is to don these items in minimum time. One other item that warrants mention is reminding each man that after the survival and personal gear has been donned, the nomex gloves should be the next item donned. Aircrew coordination between USAFSS and TEWS personnel was excellent. Interphone procedures were outstanding and chatter was limited to only that which was mission essential. 362 TEWS front-enders were exceptionally receptive to AFUPP mission profile requirements and cooperated fully with the AMS' requests for special orbits and flight routes that might improve fulfilling mission requirements. The below listed sub-paragraphs are keyed to the USAFSS Form 186 and expand on the unit's airborne evaluation.

(2) Pre-Mission: Pre-Mission preparation and briefings were generally excellent. The Det 2 briefing by both the AMS and Analyst was informative and well presented. The new briefing room has immeasurably aided in improving the overall quality and atmosphere of pre-mission briefings. The analyst briefing covered target data for both the primary and ingress/egress areas. Briefings were recorded and generally conform to the requirements of USAFSSM 55-7, Chapter 8, with the following exception. Emergency destruction tasks were not being briefed by the AMS or Analyst. This is a stipulated requirement of USAFSSM 55-7, Chapter 8, para 8-3, a, (2). We recommend that this item be immediately integrated into the pre-mission briefing.

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(a) On 23 January 1972, mission 907A, the 362 TEWS briefing was delayed for 15 minutes due to the late arrival of a USAFSS crewmember. The AMS elected to wait for this man and by doing so, delayed both the Det 2 and 362 TEWS briefings.

(b) On 24 January 1972, mission 907A, the Z1 operator was late to both the Det 2 and TEWS briefings. The AMS asked the TEWS briefer to delay his briefing by approximately 4 minutes until the delinquent crewmember arrived.

(c) In view of the 2 above mentioned incidents and the apparent lack of a pre-determined and definite Det 2 brief time, it is recommended that the Detachment establish a written directive establishing set USAFSS pre-mission briefing times for each mission. These times should be prominently displayed together with the crew bus time, TEWS briefing time, and mission takeoff.

(3) Pre-Flight: The position checklists available for pre-flight procedures were generally excellent. However, during several of the flights flown by PSR Flight Examiners, operators were not observed using checklists. When this was brought to the unit's attention, we noted an immediate improvement in the operator's use of their checklists and closer adherence to specific items listed therein. Checklists for the I, Z1, and Z2 positions specifically require that the G-176 recorders be checked for operation, tape loaded, and heads cleaned. Operators were observed not complying with this item on the checklist, especially as pertains to each of these 3 operators loading their recorders. This particular item will be mentioned in further detail within the next section, "Post Takeoff/Pre-Mission" procedures. Pre-Flight checks of survival and personal equipment were generally satisfactory. It was noted that USAFSS crewmembers normally carry "AWOL" bags on board the aircraft with personal items and foodstuffs. While this is an individual's prerogative and should normally not interfere with either aircrew performance or jeopardize flight safety, it is strongly suggested that the AMS periodically check the contents of these bags to ensure that mandatory survival equipment (K and E Kits, Water bottles, Flashlight, Etc) are not being stored in these bags but rather are in fact on the aircrewmember's person. Additionally, personal articles such as photographs, envelopes, letters, etcetera, are prohibited items aboard mission aircraft.

(a) In-Flight observations noted that the Z1 operator sometimes pre-flights and loads the G-184 recorder amplifier and G-176 recorder on the I position. Furthermore, the recorder on the Z2 position is not loaded nor is the G-184 activated as part of normal mission procedures. The practice of having one operator pre-flight and load his own equipment and additional selected equipment from another position is neither advisable nor a sound pre-flight procedure. Each operator is singularly responsible for the complete awareness and proper operation of all equipment located on his position. Furthermore, each piece of USAFSS equipment should be both pre-flighted and set-up or loaded for its intended purpose. 6994SS Reg 57-7, dtd 1 May 1971, "Reporting Distress Signals", requires that distress signals encountered other than on UHF Guard (243.0 Mhz) be recorded. It is therefore mandatory that each recorder on board 6994SS missions be properly pre-flighted, cleaned, and loaded in order to comply with this regulation. All associated recorder amplifier equipment should also be pre-flighted and activated to ensure that the requirements of

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6994SS Reg 55-7 are met. Finally, each individual 6994th crewmember must be personally responsible for activating, pre-flighting, and properly operating all associated equipment for his position.

(4) Post Takeoff/Pre-Mission: Equipment was turned on as soon as back-end power was applied. With the exception of the recording equipment on the Z2 position, all operators and equipment were generally prepared to search, perform ARDF, and copy within minimum time after takeoff. The G-175J tuner configuration on the Z2 position is not standardized. Aircraft 771 and 702 are equiped with an A/B band tuner configuration on Z2. Although this position is normally manned with an A292 at Det 2, the optimum tuner configuration for ARDF missions is A and E band covering the frequency range 10-90 MHz. The team will further discuss this item with the 6994 Sety Sq.

(a) On 24 January, 1972, Mission 907A, the Z1 operator did not have his RF logs or forms ready for use as soon as the back-end power was applied and the equipment set up. Consequently, when later during the mission the X operator tipped off Z1 that the target being worked was switching to voice, the Z1 operator had to leave his position and get his required logs and forms from the mission pouch. The AMS on each mission must ensure that all operators are properly briefed on the requirements for complete position and equipment set-up and furthermore that all operators and/or the analyst are prepared to begin work as soon as back-end power is applied.

(5) Mission Performance: The ARDF and collection aspects of each mission observed were generally good. Exceptions to this overall evaluation are listed separately below and deal with both recommended improvement areas and specific areas warranting commendation. As noted in the "General" comments above (para 4D (1)) coordination and interworking, especially between USAFSS crewmembers, was very good. For the most part, operator procedures for searching, ARDF, and collection were well-coordinated and professional. Air to ground comm procedures were timely, followed proper comm format, and did not interfere with mission requirements. Operators and analysts normally followed established priority tasking procedures outlined by 6994SS Reg 55-14 and USAFSSM 55-7. There were several instances of non-compliance with directed search procedures. These instances will be mentioned in detail below. The X operator worked closely with the Navigator and Y operator throughout each mission observed.

(a) On 23 January 1972, Mission 908A, the FSK Flight Examiner observed the Z1 operator not conducting search for collection targets, either assigned or otherwise. This period of inattentiveness lasted for approximately 10 minutes after which the Z1 operator resumed search for the remainder of the mission. Both the AMS and Operations Officer were briefed on this incident and corrective action had already been initiated by the Operations Officer. On 24 January, 1972, Mission 907A, the FSK Flight Examiner again observed the Z1 operator not fulfilling his search and collection responsibilities. In this instance, the operator appeared almost indifferent to the fact that his assigned responsibility was to search for assigned/non-assigned targets, and thereby tipoff the X operator of possible voice activity.

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his search procedures and techniques were perfunctory and did not follow any pattern, i.e., HF, FIXX, and Multi-Channel. The above two instances serve to emphasize the continuing requirement for a thorough and continuing training and step/eval program. It further points out the responsibility of the Airborne Mission Supervisor to keep abreast of his crew's actions and adherence to assigned duties. It is recommended that all concerned staff offices, section heads, and supervisory personnel make this a continuing item to be monitored and stressed.

(b) We further noted tendencies for the I operator to neglect his search and collection responsibilities whenever he was not assisting the I operator or was not using the radios. Once again we reiterate the continuing requirement for all operators to conduct systematic and effective search whenever they are not directly assisting the I operator or manning the radios. The ARDF platform configuration and equipment/personnel limitations makes it imperative that all available resources be utilized to their maximum effectiveness. As noted in sub-paragraph D (4) (a) above, a concerted and continuing effort involving all echelons of Unit Managers and Supervisors must be channeled towards emphasizing this point, i.e., when not working a specific target or otherwise gainfully involved in the ARDF mission, the operators should always be searching.

(c) The receiver/recorder alignment on the Z1 position allows the voice operator to record from either of three sources, HF FIXX, or Multi-Channel. Since the current crew configuration at Det 2 does not allow for 2 203X1 operators per mission, the voice operator should be as flexible as possible concerning his search and copy procedures. If the voice operator detects a multi-channel signal on his G-175J receiver, normal procedure dictates that he transfer the signal via a patching system to the I console where the signal will be recorded at 15 ips. While this procedure allows the multi-channel signal to be recorded at 15 ips, it also effectively negates any further search that the Z1 operator can accomplish since his VHF receiver is now tied to the I recorder. We recommend that after initially detecting a multi-channel or FIXX signal, the Z1 operator first determine if the signal should warrant his undivided attention, or if periodic monitoring of the signal would suffice. If the latter is the case, then we recommend that the Z1 operator immediately inform the Z2 operator to set up his G-175J on a specific frequency and the Z1 operator assist in center-tuning and setting up the frequency in question. The I operator will then record the signal if it is multi-channel or the Z2 operator can record the signal if it is FIXX or HF. This will then allow the Z1 operator to both monitor the signal being recorded and further continue his search of the A and B bands by switching back and forth between the G-175J tuners.

(5) Despite the generally excellent airborne mission procedures observed during this visit, Det 2 aircrews are suffering from inadequate technical support and lack of specific technical guidance for both the ARDF and Collection mission. CMA -produced TAR's are of negligible assistance in guiding the mission. The local analysis section has not implemented procedures for ensuring that aircrews are provided with the most current and accurate technical data available. Additionally, the Airborne Analysts observed were generally unable to provide any mission guidance to the radio operators. The single most important factor relevant to this lack of effective airborne analysis in the current controversy concerning the amount and types of technical data which may be carried aboard combat crew mission aircraft. The majority of Det 2's missions encounter enemy nets utilizing daily

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changing callsigns. Also frequently encountered are MO's which utilize several sets of callsigns. These factors make it absolutely necessary for the Det 2 Airborne Analyst to carry sufficient technical aids to enable him to provide mission guidance to the operator. The Stan/Eval team will further discuss this problem with the 6994th SS. If approval is granted to carry the necessary tech data, the unit analysis section must be prepared to re-implement procedures to ensure that the airborne analyst actively and continuously provides timely identification support to the ARDF mission as well as timely "drop a copy" guidance to the collection mission.

(a) Regardless of the final decision regarding tech data to be carried aboard the aircraft, the unit analysis section must effect the necessary internal organization and procedures necessary to provide increased tech support/mission guidance. Assignment of analysts to work specific entities or areas, requests to be placed on distribution for CNA SPOTS and increased managerial emphasis upon locally-generated tech support are possible actions that must be considered. The team will discuss assignment 4 additional 202 personnel to Det 2 with the 6994SS.

(b) The unit voice processing section has developed procedures for ensuring that locally-generated tech data is provided to those missions flying in productive voice areas. Particularly noteworthy was the tech data on enemy multi-channel communications provided for missions flying in the southern Steel Tiger area. Again, the voice analysis effort suffers from a lack of tech support from the CNA. With the assistance of the 6994th SS, the unit is attempting to obtain the tech data necessary to expand the voice analysis/tech support program. This will be discussed further at the 6994SS.

(7) Post Mission/Pre-landing: The PCR Stan/Eval team observed no discrepancies during the post mission/pre-landing portions of the mission. All required duties to include equipment shut-down and area clean-up were performed well. All crewmembers were strapped in with nomex gloves on prior to landing. As was the case with take-off instructions, wearing of LPU's is optional and at the discretion of the individual. The AMS should personally check to ensure that all classified material has been returned to the mission bag and that all crewmembers are ready for landing with equipment properly shut-down and sanitized.

(8) Post Flight/Debriefing: Counterpart debriefings are performed after the crew has returned to the Det 2 area. 6994 SS Form 2's were properly filled out and informative. We noted and commend the excellent post-flight inventory of all mission materials. The individual on duty from Mission Management physically checks off each item entered on the 6994SS Form 5. The AMS observes this inventory and he together with the DOM duty sgt guarantees that all mission classified material signed out is in fact returned to operations.

(9) Flimsy/Pouch Check: Materials and checklists contained in the mission bag were for the most part properly classified current, well maintained and applicable. Although each checklist contained a 30 day review line, we noted that there was some discussion as to the applicability of all items contained within the checklists. We recommend that the OPS section continually monitor these checklists to ensure that out-dated data is removed and new data inserted. Furthermore, it is

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recommended that the first item on each checklist require all MO's to make an initial security check of their position and immediate area as soon as they board the aircraft.

(a) We noted the lack of an analyst aircrew checklist and recommend that one be drawn up as soon as possible to identify the airborne analyst's specific aircrew duties and responsibilities aboard Det 2, 6994S missions.

e. Miscellaneous

(1) CIF's: The CIF read file was checked on 22 January 1972. There were only three CIF's on record, one of which (77-71) is as dated in December 1971. None pertained to mission accomplishment. Section Operating Instruction 11-2 dated April 1971 tasks the NCOIC Operations with monitor and maintenance of the CIF file. This has been re-written (dated 24 January 1972) to task the NCOIC, DOAV (SEFR) with this responsibility. Flying personnel are tasked with annotating their individual CIF cardex file certifying awareness of each CIF. The AMS on each flight is responsible for ensuring crewmembers on his flight have complied with SOI.

(2) Flight safety information file: The flight safety information file was current, well maintained, and applicable.

(3) Antenna Cleanliness: We recommend that Detachment 2 initiate a program whereby the dirt and oil accumulated on the AN/ALR-38 underwing antennae are regularly wiped off prior to each mission. Any heavy accumulation of dirt, grime, or oil will almost definitely have an adverse effect on system ASEF performance.

(4) Flight Management: Detachment 2 operates with a four flight (4292's) concept. A202's and A203's are scheduled for specific missions (when required) by the analysis or voice processing sections. The scheduling section schedules flying personnel for pertinent missions and details (duty drivers, Ops detail, and etc.). The unit does maintain a visible (mounted on a wall) mission schedule board which depicts personnel requirements for certain missions. A weekly schedule is made in advance but is necessarily subject to change according to mission requirements. The unit does not display a visible flying hours chart. Conversely, this data is posted to a seperate sheet (one for each operator) on a daily basis. Information is extracted by the scheduling section from the individuals 6994 Form 9. The accountability sheet shows a monthly accumulation of flying hours on a daily basis. Quarterly hours are not automatically up dated. This data can be obtained by simply adding the three pertinent months together. DNIF, MAI, and leave are shown to support imbalances in personnel flying hours. The unit should ensure that a system is established for regular monitoring of quarterly flying hours.

5. Follow-up Requirements:

a. Follow-up reporting to PacSetyRgn is required for the following items. Request a complete summary of actions taken to resolve the problems noted and to eliminate listed discrepancies:

(1) Paragraph 4b (1) (a). Suspense: 29 Feb 72

(2) Paragraph 4b (5). Suspense: 3 Feb 72

(3) Paragraph 4b (7). Suspense: 3 Feb 72

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(4) Paragraph 4c (3) (a), 4c (3)(b), 4c (3) (c), 4c (3) (d). Suspense: 29 Feb 72

(5) Paragraphs 4c (4) (a), 4c (4) (b), 4c (4) (c), 4c (4) (d). Suspense: 29 Feb 72

(6) Paragraph 4c (6). Suspense: 3 Feb 72

(7) Paragraph 4c (7) (a), 4c (7) (b), and 4c (7) (c). Suspense: 29 Feb 72

(8) Paragraph 4c (9) Suspense: 29 Feb 72

(9) Paragraph 4d (2) (c) Suspense: 9 Feb 72

(10) Paragraph 4d (3) (a) Suspense: 9 Feb 72

(11) Paragraphs 4d (4) (a) and 4d (5) (b). Suspense: 9 Feb 72

(12) Paragraph 4d (6) Suspense: ASAP after receipt of approval to any tech aids on aircraft.

(13) Paragraph 4d (6) (a) Suspense: 29 Feb 72

(14) Paragraph 4d (9) Suspense: 9 Feb 72

(15) Paragraph 4d (9) (a) Suspense: 29 Feb 72

(16) Paragraph 4e (3) Suspense: 3 Feb 72

(17) Paragraph 4e (4) Suspense: 9 Feb 72

b. FacSctyRgn will initiate action as outlined in paragraphs 4a(1)(b), 4c(5), 4d(4), 4d(6), 4d(6)(a), and 4d(6)(b).

FOR THE COMMANDER

Michael T. Christi

MICHAEL T CHRISTI, Capt, USAF
Chief, FACSCTYCOM Standardization/Evaluation Team

[redacted]

Doc # 4

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
6994 SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DO (Tsgt Preslar/4391)

23 June 1972

SUBJECT: Report of Visit to Det 2, 6994th Scty Sq (26-30 May 72) (U)

TO: CC
DO
IN TURN

1. (U) Purpose of the visit was to conduct the quarterly standardization/evaluation inspection/assistance visit and to administer standboard evaluation to Detachment 2's chief flight examiners.

2. (U) Names of visitors: TSgt Michael D Preslar, Squadron A292FI Flight Examiner.
SSgt Jack L Lukens, Squadron A202XD Flight Examiner.

3. (U) Personnel contacted: Maj Thompson, Commander
SMSgt McCollough, NCOIC Operations
MSgt Douglas, NCOIC Stan/Eval
MSgt Payne, NCOIC Analysis/Reporting
MSgt Main, NCOIC Training
TSgt Merrill, NCOIC Linguists
TSgt Acre, Chief A203 Flight Examiner
SSgt Maginness, Chief A202 Flight Examiner
SSgt Hendricks, 202 Ground Trainer

4. (U) A comprehensive three section standardization/evaluation management checklist was used as a guide for the visit. Evaluation findings were briefed to the commander and the NCOIC of Stan/Eval prior to departure. The operations officer was on leave.

5. (U) A total of four missions were flown with Detachment 2 aircrews during the visit.

6. [redacted] (U) Findings:

a. [redacted] (U) Stan/Eval Section:

(1) [redacted] MSgt Douglas, the NCOIC of Stan/Eval, was administered a standboard check flight by the squadron A292 flight examiner. He is highly qualified in all areas of ARDF operations. Strongly recommend MSgt Douglas be retained in his present position of NCOIC of the Stan/Eval Section and chief A292 flight examiner. SSgt Maginness, the chief A202 flight examiner, was administered a re-certification standboard check flight by the squadron A202 flight examiner. He too was found to be highly qualified as a flight examiner.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(2) (U) The Stan/Eval Section is efficiently managed by MSgt Douglas. Stan/eval procedures are closely adhered to and general administration of the stan/eval program is satisfactory. All previously reported items contained in the PSR stan/eval report dated 25 Jan 1972 have been corrected. Close coordination exists with the Training Section to improve overall aircrew proficiency.

(3) (U) Maintenance of the AF Form 846 is being maintained according to AFM 60-1 and USAFSSM 55-7, Vol II. Aircrew member badge orders were not filed in the 846 on approximately 50 percent of the aircrew members assigned. Timely submission of requests for badge orders after an individual completes his 10th mission is desirable. Letters of delinquency were filed in the 846 on a few individuals that weren't actually delinquent. A misunderstanding of the definition of "semi-annual check" and "no notice check", and when they could be administered and how long after the different types of checks does an individual become delinquent caused this discrepancy. The Stan/Eval Section is now aware of the criteria and the incorrect letters of delinquency have been removed.

(4) (U) A review of USAFSS Form 74, "Airborne Operator Flight Check," indicates the flight examiners are conducting through flight checks. In most cases the remarks and recommendations sections of the form is being used in an excellent manner.

b. (U) Training. Det 2's ground training program continues to function in an outstanding manner. The program is well organized and effectively managed. Lesson plans and training outlines are current and thorough. PSR's recommendations for improving the ground training program for A202s and A203s have been accomplished. Each AFSC has extensive training material including guides and outlines, quizzes, practice problems, etc. A ground trainer is appointed for each AFSC. When the specialized ground training is completed, the student is administered a category II upgrade exam which he must pass before he is released to airborne operations for airborne training with an instructor.

c. [redacted] Mission Procedures/Performance:

(1) Pre-mission briefings are satisfactory. The briefing by the analyst included all the required information concerning the analytical/technical aspects of the mission. His briefing was informative and well presented. The briefing by the AMS was generally satisfactory but could be improved. Recommend the AMS stand up front facing his crew while he briefs. When his is finished, the analyst goes forward and presents his briefing. Additionally, the analyst briefed some items that should be briefed by the AMS, that is, latest OIF and FSB, etcetera. The briefing at the TEWS was about the same. When it came time for the 6994th to brief, the analyst went forward, announced he was briefing for the 6994th, delivered his briefing, then sat down. The analyst did announce who the AMS was and he announced the names of the other USAFSS crew members. The AMS was sitting in back of the TEWS crew members and they didn't look around

[redacted]

[redacted]

to see who the AMS was when his name was announced. To enhance the overall image of the AMS, strongly recommend he take an active part in the briefing. There should be two separate briefings by USAFSS personnel, one by the AMS and one by the analyst. Five TEMS pre-mission briefings were observed. In each instance the aircraft commander and navigator briefed in a highly professional manner.

(2) Preflight procedures were satisfactory. A few people neglected to check their survival radios. Tape recorder heads weren't cleaned a couple of times. Except for these two items the entire preflight was excellent. Each operator checked his position equipment for serviceability and checked his parachute. Excellent safety procedures were followed. Everyone had their seatbelts fastened during taxi, takeoffs, and landings. Nomex gloves were worn for takeoffs and landings.

(3) Overall in-flight mission procedures were excellent. Operators turned on their equipment and started searching as soon as backend power was applied. Crew coordination and intercomm discipline was excellent. The airborne analysts were highly proficient and were effective in directing and coordinating mission tasks. The supplemental TDLs carried by the analysts proved to be accurate and were superior to the CMA TDL. It was noted on one mission that upon returning to base, the Z2 operator turned off his equipment 30 minutes prior to entering the landing pattern. The Z1 operator turned his off 10 minutes later.

(4) Post-mission procedures were satisfactory. The AMS conducted a thorough security check of each position and was the last person to leave the aircraft. The debrief was conducted in a satisfactory manner. The debriefer inventoried the mission briefcase in the presence of the AMS and signed the 6994th Scty Sq Form 5, "Mission Briefcase Checklist," certifying all material was accounted for.

d. (U) Airborne Operations:

(1) The unit CIF is well maintained. When a new item for the CIF is published, a termination date is included with the item. The termination date on several CIFs had passed without the CIF being deleted or continued with a new termination date. If a termination date is assigned then the CIF should be reviewed for currency on or before the termination date. All crew members of five crews checked and signed off the latest CIF.

(2) The flight safety bulletin contained excellent and interesting safety information. Since only one entry (the last one) was dated, it was difficult to ascertain whether the FSB was being regularly updated. All crew members had signed off the latest FSB. Each new bulletin should be dated.

(3) The Scheduling section posts flying hours daily to ensure personnel don't exceed the maximum allowable.

[redacted]

[redacted]

e. (U) Miscellaneous. A special emphasis item that was checked during this visit concerned aircrew conduct. Because of certain incidents that occurred during the PSR stan/eval visit in January, and contained in their report dated 25 January, we were looking for possible recurrences. We didn't find any. For all missions, all crew members were on time and in good condition for the pre-missionbriefing. We didn't observe anyone sleeping or displaying a general inattentiveness toward airborne duties. This applied to the TDY crew members also.

7. GDS date - declassify 31 December 1978.

Michael D Presla

MICHAEL D PRESLAR, TSgt, USAF
Chief, Squadron Standardization/Evaluation

Cy tot Det 2/DO

READ AND INITIAL

TSgt Acre [signature] (DORV)

TSgt Schallover _____ (DORV)

TSgt Brown, N. [signature] (DOT)

SSgt Luther [signature] (DORV)

SSgt Roerig [signature] (DORV)

SSgt Robinson _____ (DOT)

[redacted]

(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

[redacted]

Doc #5

Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron

1. General Comments. Det 2, 6994th Sety Sq was visited 21 May - 5 June 1972. Seven operational missions were flown and comments on these missions are contained in the body of this report. Comments on other areas of interest are also provided.

2. Analysis and Reporting: (A&R). There has been a marked improvement in the A&R since the last PacSetysqn Stan Eval visit in [redacted] 72. However, there are some areas that still require improvement. These areas, plus other specific items are discussed in detail below.

a. Tech Data List (TDL) Preparation. Presently each mission has the CMA produced TDL, the NSA produced high speed traffic identification aid and the airborne analyst's locally produced TDL. These aids are a definite asset to the analyst and allow him to direct intercept and identify priority targets. The local TDL is produced by each analyst for the mission and area that he flies. This procedure is excellent for each individual mission and for the individual analyst but if for any reason the aircraft was diverted or an analyst change was necessary the effectiveness of the "Personal" TDL would be reduced. Recommend that a unit supplemental TDL (by area) be produced by the Airborne Analysis section and carried on each mission. Then all locally produced tech data would be available to all personnel.

b. Area Continuity. Even though the analyst fly in the same area as much as possible, there is a possibility that continuity could be improved by producing an airborne TECSUM on each mission flown and leaving it in the mission bag for at least ten days. By doing so the analyst each day could tell exactly what had been copied on previous days and who/what to look for the following days. The TECSUM should be completed in duplicate and the second copy should be provided to the I.D. Analyst for cross reference. The content/format of a proposed TECSUM log was discussed with the NCOIC of Airborne Analysis [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. Collection: Instructions pertaining to what type five figure (5F) traffic (primarily manual morse) to collect and what type to drop are very vague. NSA has been asked for low/medium grade crypt system identification characteristics, and specific tasking instructions will be issued when NSA responds.

d. It is suggested that an alphabetical card file be started on [redacted] callsigns (by transmitter and receiver call). In addition to the callsigns and other tech data specific emphasis should be placed on maj or analysis.

e. Duties for Airborne Analysts should be Standardized. Specific duties and work areas should be documented. There are a number of routine duties that the analyst could perform to free the "X" or "Y" operator for position operating. These duties include, but are not limited to, log preparation, portions of the debrief, and portions of the A/C Comms. One example of the above requirement for specific duties occured on the 907TH mission on 26 May. On that mission the same exploitable message was copied in full on both the "Y" and "Z2" position simultaneously. Additionally, two [redacted]'s were issued on the same exploitable message.

f. Det Two is also experiencing the same difficulty as Det Three getting product/technical reports based on their own intercept/ARDF. The problem will be discussed with DIRNSA.

g. Radio Telephone Processing/Reporting: The only processing done on voice intercept is exploitable message reporting. The traffic that does not contain exploitable messages is forwarded to [redacted] for processing.

3. Mission Management. The primary interest item in mission management was DUKMID reporting. Specific items were on entries in sections three and six.

a. Section Three. Missions reported as reduced for two or more reasons in section 631 are reported with times for each cause. This requires the reader to

[redacted]

[redacted]

scan each line entry and perform a simple mathematical function to determine total reduced time for a mission. To standardize reporting in the 6994th complex, it is recommended that the following format be used to report missions which are reduced for two or more reasons: 831 RM 907RE 059. IMS 025. MSN AA DUE TO RADIO PROBLEM, RTB PROBLEM CORRECTED. MSN RELAUNCH THEN AA MK 854. AOFT 3551. (Note. This format is currently used by Det 3 6994th). The entry immediately following the mission number is "TOTAL" reduced time for that mission. Remaining entries are unchanged.

b. Section Three and Six. Reference USAFSS Msg 2223302 Apr 72, [redacted]. Subject: DURRIS reporting. Several instances have been noted where data reported in sections three and six was not reported in accordance with the reference. Differences noted were in times and reasons reported for reduced missions. To resolve this problem, and insure accurate reporting it is recommended that those personnel preparing and reviewing the DURRIS make sure the data contained in these two sections is compatable.

4. Stan/Eval. Only two specific items of interest were discussed with the 6994th Stan/Eval, both of which concerned USAFSSM 55-7 Vol II.

a. Each year the units in SEA encounter problems in putting extra people on mission aircraft due to weight/fuel limitations. This causes a problem in compliance with USAFSSM 55-7 Vol II paragraph 6-6. At present the manual requires flight examiners to fly as an extra crewmember when conducting examinations. As stated above this causes problems which are beyond the unit's control. This matter will be discussed further at the 6994th. The possibility of a waiver of paragraph 6-6 has been discussed at Det 2, however, a rewrite of the paragraph deleting the requirement for flight examiners to fly as extra may be the best solution.

b. Det 2 has on file a waiver of semi-annual Stan/Eval requirements for TSgt ADAE, David L, [redacted] and [redacted] Gordon M. [redacted] This

[redacted]

[redacted]

waiver appears to have been granted by the squadron (ref 6994 msg 270240Z Apr 72 DO). This will be a subject for discussion with the DO 6994th.

5. Mission Observations. All of the missions were flown with a great deal of professionalism. Even those missions that had students or crewmembers with limited experience were conducted in an outstanding manner. The Detachment is fortunate to have a number of personnel with vast experience in the ARDF program who have obviously passed on their knowledge to the newer personnel.

6. Awards and Decorations. Det 2 6994th is having considerable problems in obtaining Air Medals for presentation of the basic award to unit crewmembers. It also seems impossible to obtain award element folders in RVR. On 22 May 72 a message was forwarded to Hq USAFSS/DP requesting their assistance in this matter. As of 3 June 72 a reply had not been received from Hq USAFSS. These medals are well earned and they should be presented on a timely basis. It appears that timely presentation is not possible without headquarters assistance and the problem will be discussed with the Headquarters Awards and Decorations personnel.

7. Discussion Items at Det 2, 6994th. Two items contained in the unit crew information file (CIF) were considered worthy of discussion and inclusion in this report. These items are:

a. CIF 50-72, 30 May 72, Target Position Reporting Criteria. No authority given. Target position reporting criteria as applies to Det 2 6994th is as follows:

(1) Log LOP if spread is less than six degrees.

(2) A COP will have a 6-19.9 degree spread.

(3) A FIX at least 20 degrees spread, minimum 3 LOP's and at least six degrees between LOP's. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(4) Any bearing spread less than three degrees will be considered as parallel and will not be used.

(5) A fix with less than thirty degrees spread will have a minimum radius of 800 meters.

b. CIF 49-72, 30 May 72, Number One needle on ID 250. No authority given. The CIF states that the number one needle on the ID 250 will be disconnected on all positions when dual OPS is implemented. Bravo Maint will accomplish this task. These items were considered for discussion only to determine the authority/reasons for the actions/procedures outlined. Both will be discussed at the 694th.

B. Maintenance:

a. The Maintenance Forms 273 are printed front-to-back rather than top-to-bottom as they should be. The problem will be pointed out to DAPS at Hq to try and have the problem alleviated before any new forms are printed the same way.

b. Maintenance requires a non-COMINT portion of USAFSSM 55-7 so that it may be maintained in a non-SI area. We will discuss the problem with the appropriate personnel at Hq to see if the portion of the manual pertaining to AMT's can't be extracted and classified either straight SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL.

(M/R: prepared by Command Staff Eval Team of SMS McCollough and TSgt Jameson)

[redacted]

[redacted]





[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

3. EXPECT NO FURTHER SOVIET REFLECTIONS OF THIS ACTIVITY UNTIL POSSIBLY 5 TO 7 DAYS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES. AT THAT TIME THE TANKS AND REQUIRED SUPPORT VEHICLES WILL PROBABLY MOVE TO ASSUME OFFENSIVE POSITIONS AGAINST RONTUM, IF THAT IS THE TARGET.

4. BASED ON OUR INTERCEPT, TRANSCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS THE CONCLUSIONS ABOVE ARE LIMITED IN SCOPE. REQUEST AMPLIFICATION, CONFIRMATION, AND/OR REJUTAL OF CONCLUSIONS DRAWN. TKS.

SIG

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