

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 460TH TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE WING (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



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REPLY TO
ATTN OF: CCR

8 Dec 1966

SUBJECT: Phyllis Ann Accomplishment (U)

TO: 360 RS (C)

1. (U) Please extend my personal congratulations to all personnel involved in carrying out the important mission cited in attached correspondence.
2. (S) The fix obtained through ARDF efforts by this crew was the only pre-warning of a carefully planned Viet Cong ambush against an 11th Cavalry, U.S. Army, convoy. This again points out the highly important role being carried out by your squadron in the Southeast Asia conflict.
3. (U) Actions such as this serve as a great source of pride to me and reflect highly favorable on this Wing and the United States Air Force.
4. (U) This letter is classified SECRET because it discusses ARDF operations.

EDWARD H. TAYLOR, Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
Ltr, 7AF
dtd 28 Nov 66

"THIS IS A TRUE ~~EXTRACT~~ COPY"

360RS-66-0319

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Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DIO

28 Nov 66

SUBJECT: Phyllis Ann Accomplishment (U)

TO: Commander, 460th TRW

1. (S) Quoted below are pertinent excerpts from a message sent to the 509th Radio Research Group by the 175th Radio Research Company and forwarded by the 6994th Security Squadron. The fix referred to was the only one involved and was obtained by the 360th Reconnaissance Squadron.

Quote: Subject: TAC REP

Reference: IAPV372 3D SPT PLT 632501 (ARDF SPOT REPORT)

1. Reference msg received 210124Z and fix was passed immediately to Regt S-2.
2. Forward Air Control aircraft was sent into the air approximately 210205Z to recon area.
3. Air strike was requested in the area by FAC.
4. Convoy was notified of possible ambush.
5. Four each UH1D Gun Ships were sent to the area due to approach of the 11th Cav convoy along route one. As convoy reached approximated fix location (YT 289 098), recon by fire was begun by helicopters. Fire was returned by VC and subsequent fire fight began. As of 210330Z fire fight continues. No casualty reports received as yet, however, two vehicles were disabled and both VC and friendly KIA's have been reported by S-2. Two each recoilless rifles have been captured.
6. Important point-this ARDF prevented a serious ambush for which the supported command is indebted Unquote.

2. (C) Although clear cut examples such as the above are not a frequent occurrence, they conclusively demonstrate the value of the ARDF efforts. Recommend that this information be brought to the attention of all personnel associated with the Phyllis Ann Program.

3. (U) This letter is classified SECRET because it discusses ARDF operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER

JAMMIE M PHILPOTT, Brig Gen, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff/Intelligence

GROUP-1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

7DIO-66-2473
36ORS-66-0319

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OPERATIONAL REPORT LESSONS LEARNED



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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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11th ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
"THE BLACKHORSE REGIMENT"

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FOR OTRD
670233

Incl 26²

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NARRATIVE OF THE AMBUSH OF
21 NOVEMBER 1966

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INTRODUCTION (C)

On 21 November 1966 a large convoy escorted by nine Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles (ACAV's - Modified M113 Armored Personnel Carriers mounting a 50 caliber machine gun with hatch armor and two side mounted M60 machineguns, each with an armored gun shield) was ambushed on National Highway One between BIEN HOA and XUAN LOC (YT 27509980 YT 299097) by elements of two battalions of the Viet Cong 274th Regiment. The escort successfully defended the convoy despite the fact that the VC were well entrenched and employed 57 and 75mm recoilless rifles, mortars, automatic weapons, and small arms and grenades.

BACKGROUND (C)

Operation ATLANTA, which began on 20 October 1966, was the operation in which the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment cleared, secured, and occupied a base camp in the vicinity of LONG GIAO, YT 4496, 12km south of XUAN LOC, RVN. The convoy of 21 November was one of many convoys moving supplies, equipment and men from the staging area to the base camp as Operation ATLANTA progressed.

Units represented in the convoy included Headquarters and Headquarters Troop 11th Armored Cavalry, 28th Military History Detachment, 33rd Chemical Detachment, 11th Armored Cavalry Tactical Air Control Party, 541st Military Intelligence Detachment, 48th Transportation Group, as well as elements of the S1, S2, S3, and S4 staff sections of Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry.

The terrain and vegetation in the area provided good fields of fire and concealment for the ambush force. On the south side of Highway One, where the heaviest concentration of enemy troops was located, the brush, jungle and secondary growth begins at YT 275099 and continues to YT 282100, where an area of grass and banana trees begins (see sketch map). This area continues to YT 292098 where brush and high grass dominate the area. The north side of the road is generally level or with only gentle slopes and consists of high grass vegetation interspersed with low scrub brush, throughout the ambush area.

Less than ten minutes prior to the ambush, an intelligence report was received by S2, 11th Armored Cavalry, indicating that VC forces were in position at what soon proved to be the ambush site. This information was passed immediately to the 1st Squadron, parent unit of the convoy escort platoon.

THE AMBUSH OF 21 NOVEMBER 1966 (C)

The escort commander received warning of the impending ambush when his own vehicle was less than 1,000 yards from the ambush site. All vehicles except the lead ACAV were notified of the impending ambush before the VC commenced firing. As the convoy and escorts passed by the ambush site they employed reconnaissance by fire which was returned by a heavy volume of small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, recoilless rifle, and hand grenade fire.

Approximately one-half of the convoy passed through the killing zone safely before a truck was hit by recoilless rifle fire which stopped and burned in such a position that no other vehicles could pass. Within two minutes the three trucks behind the first one to be hit were destroyed on the road. The two ACAV's closest to the firing moved immediately to protect the trucks under fire engaging the enemy with all their available weapons. This action, combined with the small arms fire returned by the personnel who had dismounted from the trucks when the rear portion of the convoy was forced to halt, kept the enemy elements from overrunning the convoy. After a brief but furious exchange of fire, both of the ACAV's that had come up to protect the trucks took disabling recoilless rifle rounds, and had to be evacuated by their crews, most of whom had become casualties.

As the fire fight was raging in the killing zone, the escort platoon leader organized a hasty escort from three ACAV's in the lead and moved that section of the convoy on towards XUAN LOC. He then immediately turned around, and with one other ACAV, moved at top speed back toward the sound of the guns. Halfway to the burning trucks, the platoon leader was forced to leave the ACAV accompanying his vehicle to act as security for the DUST-OFF helicopter coming in to evacuate

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wounded. As he continued alone his vehicle was struck by a recoilless rifle round which disabled only the radio, on the vehicle, but wounded two crewmen. Before reaching the scene of the action the platoon leader's vehicle engaged the ambush force on both sides of the road until the enemy fire stopped. During this time he adjusted the ordnance delivered by an air-strike, and supervised the evacuation of wounded by DUST-OFF. 82

FIRE SUPPORT (U)

There was no artillery fire in support of the ambush fight, however, later in the day artillery was emplaced to support search and clear operations in the area. There was a total of four firing runs made by armed helicopters and two airstrikes flown in support of the convoy. Later in the day an additional air strike was flown in support of search and clear operations.

The Light Fire Team from the Aviation Platoon, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment placed the following ammunition on the ambush:

1st Firing Run	12 Rockets (2x75 FFAR)
2 UHLB	12,500 rounds 7.62 MG (+)
2nd Firing Run	18 Rockets
3 UHLB	12,500 rounds 7.62 MG
3rd Firing Run	10 Rockets
3 UHLB	12,500 rounds 7.62 MG
4th Firing Run	2 Rockets
3 UHLB	12,500 rounds 7.62 MG
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>42 Rockets</u>
	50,000 rounds 7.62 (+)

The Air Force delivered the following ordnance on the site of the ambush:

1st Air Strike	6-500 pound bombs
Flight of 3 F100's	6-750 pound napalm bombs
	7200 rounds 20mm
2nd Air Strike	2-500 pound bombs
Flight of 2 F51's	2-750 pound bombs
	2-Type 2A CBU clusters

RESULTS

(U) Enemy losses included:

Personnel:

KIA (BC)	30
KIA (POSS)	75 - 100

Equipment:

57mm Recoilless Rifle	1
AKA M7 Assault Rifle and Tripod	1
RPG-2 AT Rockets	2
RPG AT hand grenade	1
Stick grenades	35
Tail fin assemblies from expended RPG-2	2
AT rockets	3
75mm RR Casings	3

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a	Unfired 57mm RR HEAT Rounds	9
	Expended 57mm RR casings	6
	Expended booster charge casings for RPG	2
	Sets of web equipment and camouflage	10
	Aidman's medical kit with splints	1

Documents identifying 1st Bn, 274, and 2nd Bn,
274th VC Regiment were taken from bodies

(C) Friendly losses included:

Personnel:

KIA 7

WIA 8

Equipment:

ACAV's destroyed 2

2½ ton trucks destroyed 4

CONCLUSIONS (C)

Information obtained from documents found on the VC bodies indicated elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 274th VC Regiment comprised the ambush force.

Though the VC destroyed 2 combat and 4 administrative vehicles the convoy was not overrun, despite the fact that the major portion of the enemy force only had to contend with the small arms of the escorted personnel and two ACAV's. This was determined by three factors:

First was the counter fire from the ambushed column, which began as soon as the trucks stopped.

Second was the fact that the escort unit was warned of the ambush and entered the killing zone firing their automatic weapons. This undoubtedly inflicted casualties on the enemy and may well have caused the VC to initiate the ambush prematurely.

Third it must be accepted that the tremendous volume of fire out out by the ACAV's was instrumental in causing the VC to break contact and flee.

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