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HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 3 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON


January - June
1972



The EC-47 History Site



HISTORY
OF
DETACHMENT 3, 699th SECURITY SQUADRON
1 JAN 72 - 30 JUN 72
~~**1 July 1972 - 31 December 1972**~~
RCS: USS-D3



14 August 1972



699th SECURITY SQUADRON, PACIFIC SECURITY REGION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE

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HISTORY
OF
DETACHMENT 3, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON
1 January 1972 - 30 June 1972

[REDACTED]

RCS: USS-D3

Prepared by

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Commander

[REDACTED]

6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON
PACIFIC SECURITY REGION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE

[REDACTED]

FRONTISPIECE

. . . there is always a certain moment when the battle degenerates into a combat, particularises itself, scatters into innumerable details, which, to borrow the expression of Napoleon himself, "belong rather to the biography of the regiments than to the history of the army." The historian, in this case, evidently has the right of abridgement. He can only seize upon the principal outlines of the struggle, and it is given to no narrator, however conscientious he may be, to fix absolutely the form of this horrible cloud which is called a battle.

Victor Hugo
Les Misérables

It is hard to tell at any given moment what is relevant. The thing so advertised is likely to be as unrelated to reality as the skirt length is to the construction of the female anatomy — to be relevant merely to a symptom and not to a disease.

Robert Penn Warren
Accepting the National
Medal for Literature

F O R E W O R D

This document was prepared to provide a history of Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron during the period indicated.

It is a combination of the routine and the extraordinary; the dull and, hopefully, the interesting events that have transpired at or been felt by the detachment during the first half of 1972. Sources include correspondence, observation, interviews and historical input reports. It was compiled and edited by an additional duty historian, who, regrettably, also typed it and can, therefore, evade no blame for its content or lack thereof.

The historian gratefully acknowledges the assistance received from various sections, particularly in the area of support functions. Since this history was assembled from only those sources available at detachment level, any corrections or additions are sincerely solicited.

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
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Organization of Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron



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CHRONOLOGY

1972

- 6 January The H-1 communications van was moved to the new Detachment 3 Operations building. Detachment 3 analysts began producing Target Data Listings locally for Steel Tiger missions.
- 9-15 January Detachment 3 relocated the NVA 2nd Division.
- 26 January Detachment 3 analysts began local production of Target Data Listings for Barrel Roll missions. Binh Tram 42 instructed its AAA facilities to concentrate on C-47 flights.
- 28 January Headquarters USAFSS closed the controversy over Detachment 3 voice processing and Exploitable Message Reporting.
- 6 February Installation of an Air/Ground/Air secure voice communications system in the new Detachment 3 Operations building was begun.
- 15 February The 6908th Security Squadron assumed processing and reporting responsibility for all Detachment 3 voice intercept in southern Laos.
- 16-19 February Detachment 3 flew successful ARDF missions against NVA tanks in southern Laos. One of these sorties was fired upon while returning to base.
- 1 March The National Security Agency instituted Rye/Autoline computer service for all Detachment 3 Exploitable Message Reports.
- 3 March ARVN Dancers at the 6908th Security Squadron assumed responsibility for the hard-copy transcription of all Detachment 3 voice intercept.
- 14 March Detachment 3 activated OpsComm circuits to the 6908th Security Squadron and the ARDF Coordination Center

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- 18 March A special ARDF Search and Rescue assistance effort was mounted.
- 11 April Detachment 3 was informed of a ramp space shortage at DaNang AB. As a result, three to five A1R-34 aircraft were to operate from NKP RTAFB for the duration of that shortage.
- 23 April An OpsComm circuit between Detachment 3 and the 7th Radio Research Field Station was activated.
- 26 April Transfer of the Air/Ground/Air secure voice system from the Task Force Alpha building to the Detachment 3 Operations building was completed.
- 11 May Thirteenth Air Force alluded to the possibility of a large scale transfer of EC-47 aircraft from DaNang AB, RVN to NKP RTAFB, Thailand.
- 16 May Detachment 3 assessed its ability to absorb an aircraft and personnel augmentation from DaNang AB.
- 23 May Detachment 3 was informed that MACV and 7th Air Force had definitely decided to augment the NKP EC-47 fleet from DaNang AB.
- 1-4 June The final aircraft mix for NKP and DaNang AB was decided at Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN.
- 25-30 June The transfer of aircraft and personnel from DaNang AB to Detachment 3 was completed.

[REDACTED]

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I MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

*

Mission

[REDACTED] Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron (Scty Sq) was tasked with the operation of Airborne Radio Direction-Finding (ARDF) and Airborne Communications Intelligence (ACI) resources to locate and identify designated foreign communications emitters. Tasking requirements were levied by [REDACTED] [REDACTED], Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and Military Assistance Command Thailand (MACT) through the ARDF Coordination Center (ACC) in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Planning and coordination were conducted with Detachment 1, 362nd Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (TEWS), which was responsible for maintaining and operating the EC-47 platforms in which the ARDF and ACI resources were mounted. Five such aircraft were provided on a rotational basis from the 362nd TEWS, DaNang AB, RVN until late June, when 17 aircraft were assigned to Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force

* - For greater detail see MUSSO Opins 3564, 6 July 1971, as amended (SCC)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Base (RTAFB) for Detachment 3 usage. Processing, analysis and reporting facilities were maintained to support the ARDF and ACI missions. The area of operations was Laos.

Organization

(U) Detachment 3, 6994th Scty Sq was located at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB (NKP), Thailand. It was commanded by Major William D. Graham. The Operations Officer was Captain Charles T. Purkiss. These were the only two officers assigned.

(U) Administrative, personnel and operations functions were housed in building 218 on the NKP flight line. Maintenance and Supply were next door in building 200.

Operational control was exercised by tasking agencies via ACC. Collection Management Authority (CMA) for Detachment 3 was delegated by the National Security Agency (NSA) to the 7th Radio Research Field Station (RRFS), Ramasun Station, Thailand and the 8th RRFS, Phu Bai, RVN. Additionally, a processing and reporting relationship was maintained with the 6908th Scty Sq at NKP.

(U) The detachment was directly subordinate to the 6994th Scty Sq, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN; thence to Pacific Security Region (PacSctyRgn) and Headquarters, United

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS).

(U) Enlisted personnel were quartered in barracks 1605 and 2949. Building 2949 was airconditioned and billeted aircrewmember personnel only.

Personnel

<u>Date</u>	<u>Officers</u>		<u>Enlisted</u>	
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>
1 Jan 72	2	2	84	84
30 Jun 72	2	2	89	131

Augmentation from Detachment 2

(U) The long range growth of Detachment 3 had been expected for some time by unit personnel. The size of the new Operations building, occupied at the end of 1971, was, alone, testament to the anticipated expansion of activities. Accelerated troop reductions in the Republic of Vietnam, coincident with the April invasion by North Vietnamese regular forces, prompted considerable speculation throughout the 6994th Scty Sq complex about the respective futures of Detachments 2 and 3.

Get Out of my Parking Space

() Following the North Vietnamese invasion across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the consequent buildup of fighter aircraft at DaNang AB, RVN, ramp space at that



station was at a premium, and pressure was brought to bear against Detachment 2 to relinquish some of its EC-47 parking area. Detachment 3 became aware of the ramifications of this circumstance through an 11 April telephone call from Captain G. F. Logan Jr., the 6994th Scty Sq Operations Officer. He informed Detachment 3 that up to five ALR-34 equipped EC-47 aircraft would be rotated with TDY crews to NKP for the duration of the ramp area shortage. This TDY situation continued, with from three to five Detachment 2 ALR-34 systems operating from NKP, until it eventually melded with the permanent transferral of a larger number of aircraft and personnel to Detachment 3 in June.

Permanent Relocation Explored

■ An 11 May 13th Air Force (13AF) message (13AF XP 111047Z May 72) inquired of the 56th Special Operations Wing at NKP its capability to absorb resources which might be transferred from the RVN to NKP RTAFB. Specifically affecting Detachment 3 was a proposed transfer of seventeen EC-47 aircraft from DaNang AB. Although Detachment 3 was not made privy to a 12 May Wing counsel of war, it replied on 16 May to a Wing request for an impact statement.

■ The detachment indicated that it could provide

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

only very general information until more details were
⁶ available. The primary hinderance was uncertainty as to
the precise nature of the platforms, i.e., ALR-34, ALR-35
ALR-38 or some mixture thereof.⁷ For example, were all the
airframes to contain ALR-35/38 systems, maintenance support
special levels, already established for five ALR-35/38
aircraft, 122 line items valued at \$1.1 million, would
⁸ triple. If, however, the systems were all ALR-34 or a
mix including some ALR-34 systems, entirely new levels would
⁹ have to be computed.

■ The only firm additional requirements, stated by
Detachment 3, were for one pickup truck, one step-van, one
carry-all or pickup truck and about 1,000 square feet of
¹⁰ added floor space for the maintenance section. Finally,
the detachment called attention to the effect such an
increase would have on the Thailand cryptologic personnel
¹¹ ceiling.

Death and Resurrection

■ Since the knowledge that such a move was being
considered had not reached Detachment 3 through command
channels, the detachment notified its parent unit on 17 May
of the contents of the 13th Air Force message and requested
¹² further details for planning purposes. The squadron



[REDACTED]

replied on 18 May that, although there was a 7th Air Force proposal to move 17 aircraft to NKP, it had been "flatly rejected" by MACV.¹³

[REDACTED] Thus matters remained until 22 May, when the 6994th Scty Sq advised that the 7th Air Force plan was still alive.¹⁴ The outcome, it seemed, depended upon the resolution of a disagreement between 7th Air Force and MACV as to the degree of mission degradation that would evolve from such a move.¹⁵ While 7th Air Force stated a mere three percent, MACV contended a depressing 27 percent.¹⁶ The matter appeared at that time so contentious that the 6994th Scty Sq felt obliged to request that its detachments provide "any further info/rumor available."¹⁷

[REDACTED] Nevertheless, only a day later the 6994th Scty Sq informed PacSctyRgn, USAFSS and both detachments that it had "just learned informally that Gens Abrams and Vogt . . . [had] agreed that 17 EC-47s . . . [would] be permanently moved from DNG to NKP, probably on 25 Jun."¹⁸

Discussion Begins

[REDACTED] On 25 May the 6994th Scty Sq offered two options of aircraft mix for the consideration of the detachments.¹⁹ Although both options provided for an even split of 15 aircraft at each station, the first had all A1R-34 and

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ALR-38 systems at NKP and all ALR-35 systems at DaNang, while the second differed in that it left NKP holding three ALR-35s in place of three ALR-38s, left at DaNang. ²⁰ Either option was to include full aircraft maintenance capability at each station, i.e., aircraft would no longer have to return from NKP to DaNang for phase inspection. ²¹

At the end of May MACV, 7th Air Force and the 6994th Scty Sq seemed to be in agreement that the mix would be in accordance with option two, i.e., at NKP five ALR-38s, three ALR-35s and seven ALR-34s, with DaNang retaining twelve ALR-35s and three ALR-38s. ²² MACV thinking in approving this mix included the provision of 7-hour platforms at NKP to cover SEA Area Seven, as well as VHF ARDF capability in both Laos and Military Region-1 of the RVN. ²³ The actual redeployment of aircraft was planned to take place no earlier than 25 June. ²⁴

Meeting at Tan Son Nhut

The final aircraft mix for NKP was decided at an Operations Officers Conference, ^{*} held at the 6994th Scty Sq,

* - Attending were: Capt G.F. Logan Jr, 6994 Scty Sq Ops Officer; CMSgt L.M. David, 6994 Scty Sq NGOIC Ops; 1st Lt H.X. Mioduski, 6994 Scty Sq Chief Local Ops; MSgt J.R. Herridge, 6994 Scty Sq NGOIC Local Ops; MSgt W.E. Marshall, 6994 Scty Sq NGOIC Local Ops (Incoming); Capt C.T. Purkiss, Det 3 Ops Officer; SMSgt W.E. McCollough, Det 2 NGOIC Ops

Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN between 1 and 4 June. Because of the availability of Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE), it was decided that the majority of the aircraft moved to NKP should be ALR-34s, and that no ALR-34s should remain at DaNang, the surplus being absorbed by the 6994th Scty Sq, itself.²⁵

Additionally, all aircraft assigned to NKP were to be capable of 7-hour missions.²⁶ The mix agreed upon and later implemented for NKP was six ALR-38, three ALR-35 (2,000 HP engines)²⁷ and eight ALR-34 systems.

Another matter considered at the meeting was that of scheduling aircraft to fly SEA Area Seven missions from NKP. It was at first suggested that the mission stop for refueling, both going to and coming from the area.²⁸ After discussion with MACV and 6994th Scty Sq Maintenance, however, it was determined that the aircraft should proceed directly to the area, refueling at Ubon RTAFB just prior to recovery at NKP.²⁹ Although some such missions were scheduled in June, weather and aircraft availability factors prevented any being flown before the end of the reporting period.³⁰

Logistics Reviewed

Following the meeting at Tan Son Nhut AB, Captain Arthur J. Willis, 6994th Scty Sq Supply Officer proceeded to

[REDACTED]

NKP to evaluate the logistics situation and to coordinate
with the 56th Supply Squadron on the impending move.³¹ On
5 June he met with the Chief of Supply, the Assistant Chief
of Supply, the Supply Management Officer, the Item
Accounting Officer and the Management and Procedures
Officer.³² After briefing them on the "impending move of
supplies and equipment and the various supply levels to be
incorporated in the base supply system," Captain Willis
could see no remaining problem in that area.³³ Still, he
cautioned Detachment 3 and the 6994th Scty Sq that daily
coordination and the maintenance of "exact supply usage
data" would be "necessary to effect a smooth transfer of all
assets."³⁴

Working Space

(U) Captain Willis found the maintenance area in
building 200 adequate, provided the supply function move
out of it into the Operations building.³⁵ This was a move
reluctantly taken by Detachment 3 and was considered an
interim measure until such time as proper facilities could
be constructed or otherwise obtained for Supply.³⁶

(U) Space for downloaded airborne systems was
obtained on the flight line by agreement with the 6908th
Scty Sq.³⁷ The building to be used was already equipped

[REDACTED]

with 400-cycle, 3-phase power and airconditioning.

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Living Space

(U) Billeting was another area where the initial problem could be dealt with, but a lasting solution would be more difficult. While it was determined by the 56th Special Operations Wing Director of Logistics that adequate billeting was available for the expected increase in personnel, this could for the present be accomplished only by spreading the new personnel through various areas on the base. Also, it was not possible to initially ensure air-conditioned quarters for all aircrewmembers.

Transportation

(U) On 9 June requests were forwarded to the Equipment Management Office for four more vehicles, i.e., one ton-and-a-half truck for Supply, one 3-passenger vehicle and one 6-passenger vehicle for Maintenance and one step-van for Operations. Done with full knowledge that these assets were not readily available on NKP, the action, it was hoped, might bear fruit at a future date.

The Move Made

The time table, mentioned earlier by MACV, ran to schedule. Beginning on 25 June, transferred Detachment 2 personnel started arriving by a combination of ferry

aircraft, Military Airlift Command (MAC) transport and mission recovery at NKP. By the end of June the move was an accomplished fact and the ranks of Detachment 3 were swollen by an additional 34 personnel in AFSC A292X1, five in AFSC A202X0 and three in AFSC A203X1.

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II SUPPORT

Communications

(U) Installation of Scheme 0793AK0, to relocate an Air/Ground/Air secure voice communications system from the Task Force Alpha building to the new Detachment 3 Operations building, was begun on 6 February by the 483rd Electronics Installation Squadron Engineering and Installations team. Although the installation was complete on 3 March, certification was delayed until 26 April, when the Base Civil Engineer had installed ground conduit, grounding rods and ground boxes, and a power filter.¹

*

Van Relocation

(U) The H-1 communications van was moved to a position adjacent to the new Operations building on 6 January. After one close call during positioning, when the van, one wheel having slipped from a concrete retaining wall, hung precariously at the edge of a 4-foot embankment, Base Civil Engineers secured it on level ground, supported by metal

* - Hist (SCW), Det 3, 6994SS(USS-D3), Jul-Dec 1971, pp 60.

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matting. The van was connected with the Operations building by an enclosed, wooden walkway.

Circuit Activation

The van became operational on 14 March with the activation of OpsComm circuits 1J53 to the 6908th Scty Sq and 1J92 to ACC.² An additional circuit, 1H56, to the 7th RRFS at Ramasun Station, Thailand was activated on 23 April.³ This was the culmination of a request, initiated by Detachment 3 on 14 January, for a full-period OpsComm circuit with that CMA.⁴

Budget

(U) With regard to Equipment Element of Expense/ Investment Code (EEIC) 628, Detachment 3 was programmed for a fund target of \$11,300 during the third and fourth quarters of Fiscal Year (FY) 1972. Net issues of \$11,296.94⁵ left a balance of \$3.06.

(U) With a projected, cumulative expense of \$47,276 for the fourth quarter of FY 1972, the Supplies EEIC 60X had a cumulative fund target of \$44,300. Net expenditures of \$44,146.28⁶ left a balance of \$153.72.

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Supply

(U) MSK (ALR-35), used by Detachment 3, was authorized 67 line items, 66 of which were on hand, valued at \$127,578.23.⁷

(U) MSK (ALR-38). Transfer was made of primary support for the ALR-38 system from the FB5263 Account at DaNang AB, RVN to Account FB5228 at NKP. Ninety-six of 99 authorized line items, valued at \$237,940.49, were on hand.⁸

(U) Special levels were established with Base Supply for 147 line items.⁹

NORS

(U) The Detachment experienced a total of 22 NORS (Not Operationally Ready, Supply) conditions, as indicated.¹⁰

<u>System</u>	<u>NORS</u>
ALR-34	1
ALR-35	5
ALR-38	16

Top Secret Control

(U) Five hundred and twenty-five pieces of courier material, weighing 4,211 pounds, were processed, while registered material amounted to 112 pieces, weighing 327 pounds.¹¹

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Maintenance

(U) Austere manning was the source of most Maintenance problems. With only six personnel assigned against an authorization of nine, launches, recoveries and normal maintenance of system components regularly consumed time in excess of normal duty hours. The advent of a daily Aircraft Status Report, requiring a one-hour, daily meeting with Detachment 1, 362nd TEWS personnel, did nothing to ease this load. The Maintenance Section was able to meet tasked requirements only with the continued TDY assistance of one technician from Detachment 2, 6994th Scty Sq.¹²

Security and Law Enforcement

(U) The relatively new Detachment 3 Security and Law Enforcement (SLE) function was tasked to the limit after the move to building 218. Aside from providing a round-the-clock sentry, there was the need for overseeing the installation of all required security safeguards, as well as developing and formalizing procedures for emergency destruction, activation and deployment of Security Augmentation Teams, etc.

(U) With an authorization, which remained unchanged,

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for only four Security Policemen, all SLE functions were accomplished with some difficulty. Initially, Detachment 3 received assistance from the 6908th Scty Sq in meeting sentry requirements. When this was withdrawn in June, it became temporarily necessary to augment the Security Police by detailing Operations personnel to perform as guards during some shifts. This procedure was no longer in effect at the end of the period.

(U) The SLE function processed three security violations, four Behavioural Data Reports and four Article 13
15 actions.

Standardization / Evaluation

(U) The Standardization / Evaluation (Stan/Eval) Section was manned by four, full-time Flight Examiners. Evaluations were performed, as follows. 14

Initial	23
Semi-Annual	24
Special	17
No-Notice	23

(U) Aircrew categorization at the beginning of the period was: 15

<u>AFSC</u>	<u>Cat II</u>	<u>Cat III</u>	<u>Cat IV</u>	<u>IRO/IA</u>	<u>AMS</u>
292X1	5	11	13	9	10
202X0	2	9	3	2	--
203X1	1	8	6	6	--
328X3	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>--</u>
Total	9	21	23	18	10

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(U) Aircrew categorization, excepting those personnel newly assigned from Detachment 2, 6994th Scty Sq, at the end of the period was:

<u>AFSC</u>	<u>Cat II</u>	<u>Cat III</u>	<u>Cat IV</u>	<u>TRO/TA</u>	<u>AMS</u>
292X1	2	12	14	8	14
202X0	1	5	3	2	--
203X1	--	9	6	4	--
328X3	--	4	1	1	--
Total	<u>3</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>14</u>

Awards and Decorations

(U) The awards program was an additional duty function manned by Operations.

<u>Award</u>	<u>Submitted</u>	<u>Approved</u>	<u>Disapproved</u>	<u>Pending</u>
DFC	17	7	0	10
BS	9	0	0	9
AM	68	35	0	33
AFCM	3	1	0	2

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III SIGINT TASKING

Tank Reconnaissance

On 1 February SSO MACV informed Detachment 3 and others of recent Combat Apple intercepts indicating the presence in Laos of a large number of North Vietnamese tanks, presumed to be en route to South Vietnam.¹ Although this message was openly skeptical of the probability of obtaining ARDF fixes on short, tactical transmissions, it requested that "any information (fixes, intercepted comms) which could assist in locating these tanks be passed immediately to either 7AF, SSG Det or 6994th Scty Sq at Tan Son Nhut for immediate relay to 7AF Warning Center."²

At the request of NSA Pacific Vietnam (C), the 6990th Security Group supplied Detachment 3 with the technical data, related to the Combat Apple intercepts.³ In response to expressed NSA interest in this activity, Detachment 3 recommended to the 6994th Scty Sq on 10 February that two special AN/ALR-38 missions be scheduled into the SEA 10 Alpha area^{*} to attempt the location of the

* - See Appendix 6

⁴
tanks. The tanks were believed to be in the vicinity of
the Bolovens Plateau, moving along Route 966.⁵

() This suggestion was approved by MACV, and the
first mission was flown in the late night and early morning
hours of 15 and 16 February.⁶ The results of that night's
work were two tanks fixed and one line-of-position (LOP).⁷
Unfortunately, communications could not be established with
the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC)
platform in the area, and the fix locations could not be
passed until the mission had returned to base.⁸ While 7th
Air Force conducted a daylight, visual reconnaissance in the
area, the triple canopy jungle precluded sightings.⁹ It was
by then a reasonably well established fact that the tanks
moved only during hours of darkness.

() Subsequent special ARDF missions were flown
against these tanks by both Detachment 3 and Detachment 2,
6994th Scty Sq with varying degrees of success. All were
flown in the early morning hours, and all positive results
obtained by Detachment 3 were between the hours of 0300 and
0500 (Local).¹⁰ A fix was obtained on seven tanks on 17
February.¹¹ There were four fixes on 19 February and
another six on 22 February.¹² Three later missions on 24
and 28 February and 1 March produced negative results; one

weather aborted, one arrived too late on station and the
third aborted due to the loss of an inverter.¹³ The
remaining special missions in March were non-productive.

While the progress of these tanks had become,
by 19 February, "a high command interest item" at 7th Air
Force, no communications for a Fix/FAC cooperative effort
had been arranged.¹⁴ Although a 19 February, 7th Air Force
message referred to passing fix information to a Forward Air
Controller (FAC) in the area, Detachment 3 did not have
adequate procedural data, such as frequencies, keys and
callsigns.¹⁵ Therefore, Detachment 3 complained to the
6994th Scty Sq that, in spite of good ARDF results against
the tanks, distance had frustrated all efforts to transmit
fix data from the air, either to home station, or to
ABCCC.¹⁶ Authorization for a Fix/FAC effort and necessary
procedures thereto were requested.¹⁷ Regrettably, by the
time such a program was made effective, Detachment 3 had
ceased to intercept the tanks.¹⁸

Detachment 3 was not advised of any action
taken against the tanks or of the effects of the intel-
ligence provided. Despite laudatory correspondence from NSA
and USAFSS, it seemed from the viewpoint of Detachment 3 that
a golden opportunity had been missed, because no striking
force had been placed in readiness to capitalize on the

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initial ARDF successes. At any rate, any doubts about the destination and purpose of the tanks in question vanished in early April, when the North Vietnamese launched a massive attack, heavily supported by armor, into the central highlands of South Vietnam.

Special SAR Assistance Effort

During the morning of 18 March, an OV-10 aircraft with a crew of two was shot down in the Laotian Panhandle, southeast of SEA Area 11. * Both crewmembers were rapidly located by USAF Search and Rescue (SAR) forces, but extraction proved difficult because of the density of enemy ground forces in the vicinity. Efforts to sanitize the area with ordnance were incomplete by evening. As this life-and-death drama continued into the hours of darkness, a knowledge of the position and movement of enemy troops became critical. The completion of the rescue effort in the morning was not in question, provided the downed airmen could survive the night at liberty. This was the end toward which ARDF assistance was requested.

* - See Appendix 6

[REDACTED] At about 2100 (Local) on 18 March Captain Charles T. Purkiss, Detachment 3 Operations Officer, received a telephoned request from Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Powers, Detachment 1, 362nd TEWS Commander, to come to the 56th Special Operations Wing (SOW) Command Post.²⁰ Arriving at the Command Post, Captain Purkiss was briefed by the 56th SOW Commander, Colonel Jack A. Robinson, on the predicament of the OV-10 crew. It was Colonel Robinson's desire to mount a special ARDF mission against the threatening forces, so that ResCAP aircraft, utilizing fix derived target locations, could frustrate their attempts to reach the two men. Certain that this could be done, Captain Purkiss initiated coordination with ACC, which approved moving up the early Barrel Roll mission for the next day and rescheduled it into SEA Area 11.²¹

[REDACTED] A highly qualified crew was quickly put together, and the mission launched at 0010 (Local) on 19 March,²² scarcely three hours after the initial notification. Of five low VHF targets worked during the mission, one was fixed within 7,000 meters of the downed personnel.²³ This fix was passed to the ABCCC platform at 0246 (Local), and a strike was called in on the target.²⁴

[REDACTED] Although the extraction was finally successful,

[REDACTED]

the relative value of ARDF in this case was hardly impressive. Nevertheless, a definite quick reaction capability and a potential for ARDF support of such operations were clearly demonstrated.

(■) Another SAR assist was attempted on 22 April, but the effort had been completed before the ARDF aircraft arrived on the scene.

ARDF Highlights

(■) In January Detachment 3 was credited with locating North Vietnamese Radar Company 12, formerly located inside North Vietnam, at a deployed site 20 miles northwest of Tcepone, Laos, where it posed a serious and hitherto undetected threat to U.S. aircraft operations in southern Laos.²⁵

(■) Detachment 3 Steel Tiger missions on 9, 10, 13 and 15 January relocated the Headquarters of the NVA 2nd Division, which had been missing since 17 November 1971.²⁶

(■) January ARDF activities against the closing stages of the NVA Dry Season Offensive in the Plaine des Jarres (FDJ) were treated in the previous USS-D3 report.

(■) Throughout the period Detachment 3 kept tabs on elements of the 312th and 316th Divisions in Northern Laos.²⁷

[REDACTED] A target fixed in southern Laos on 11 February was exploited via the Brown Beaver Fix/FAC program. The target was struck by three A-7s and five flights of T-28s, which induced six secondary explosions and destroyed five bunkers and 150 cubic feet of supplies.²⁸

[REDACTED] If a unit may be distinguished by its enemies, then the North Vietnamese General Directorate of Rear Services paid tribute to Detachment 3 on 26 January, as reflected in an NSA GDRS Summary.²⁹

On 26 January probably Binh Tram (BT) 42 instructed probably its 36th AAA Battalion to concentrate on C47 flights in its area, since, the BT stated, these aircraft were probably confirming and determining flight skeds for B-52 strikes.

During the early morning hours of 18 February, a Detachment 3 mission in SEA Area 10 was the intended recipient of an estimated 40 rounds of 37mm AAA fire. There were no hits.³⁰

Decline in Productivity

[REDACTED] During April, May and June, ARDF and ACI productivity dropped in inverse proportion to a sharp rise in unaccomplished or reduced missions. By far the most contributing factor was weather arising from the annual monsoon. This accounted for 26 unaccomplished and 86 reduced missions in the last three months of the period.³¹

[REDACTED]

Many of the missions counted as reduced actually spent no
more than 15 minutes in the target area.³²

Simultaneously, productivity suffered because of the movement of target entities out of Laos. In late April and early May the NVA 312th Division departed northern Laos for eventual redeployment to the DMZ offensive.³³ This unit, which accounted for some 73 target transmitters, had been the primary source of both VHF targets and exploitable message copy in Barrel Roll.³⁴ At the same time the remaining major headquarters elements around the PDJ moved north and northeast into the high AAA threat pocket between Xieng Khoungville and Ban Ban, where they were secure from the prying eye of ARDF.³⁵ This left only the 148th Regiment and the 316th Division units, engaged in blocking and holding operations south of the PDJ.³⁶


In Steel Tiger a similar, but less drastic decrease was noted, as several units relocated to the DMZ front.³⁷ As the period closed, the weather and massive troop relocations conspired toward a continually declining situation.

REF CHARLIE RA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 1960, ON 07 DEC 71, SUBJ FREQ PROPOSAL
HAS SUBMITTED TO THE 1975RD COMM SQ DORN RTAFB.

4. IT WAS LATELY LEARNED, VIA INFORMAL OPSCOMM, THAT DET 5 IS AWARE THAT TFA IS NOW IN RECEIPT OF THE CRYSTAL FOR 566.2MHZ. DET 5 KY-8 MONTHLY EVALUATION REPORT DTG 050150Z INDICATEDS THE PROB WITH 270.4 MHZ HAD BEEN TRACED TO TWO CROSSED WIRES IN THE REC LINE, HOWEVER DID NOT ELABORATE WHETHER OR NOT IT HAD BEEN CORRECTED. IT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT DUE TO THE COMM SYSTEM CONFIGURATION AT NKP, THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MONITOR MORE THAN THREE FRECS AT A TIME. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF CURRENT SIGNIFICANT AND VERY HIGH INTEREST ACTIVITY LATELY REPORTED ON THE COMFY BRIDLE NET (MIGS IN REACTION TO US ACFT), THIS UNIT FEELS THAT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT ITS ALTERNATE FREQ 566.2 MHZ BE AVAILABLE ON AN IMMEDIATE BASIS TO ALL PARTICIPATING GROUND STATIONS. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, DET 5, 19, 78, YES TO UTILIZE 566.2 MHZ (THE COMFY BRIDLE NET ALTERNATE FREQ) AS ITS PRIMARY FREQ. SINCE THE CRYSTAL FOR 566.2 MHZ IS AVAILABLE AND THE PROBLEM WITH 270.4 MHZ HAS BEEN LOCATED, CAN SEE NO REASON FOR DET 5 TO CONTINUE USE OF 566.2 MHZ ON A "NORMAL BASIS". THE FUTURE USE OF 566.2 MHZ, PENDING COMPLETION OF THE DET 5 MOVE FROM THE TFA COMPOUND, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ONLY IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY.

5. FOR PSR: ABOVE PARA ANSWERS PARA THREE OF REF CHARLIE.

788
0164



IV PROCESSING AND REPORTING

Exploitable Message Controversy Concluded

█ The dispute over voice processing and the reporting of exploitable messages at Detachment 3, which had begun in September 1971, continued to its conclusion in January with the National Security Agency (NSA) replacing Pacific Security Region (PacSctyRgn) as primary inquisitor.*

NSA Questions Timeliness

█ On 7 January the 6994th Scty Sq retransmitted to Detachment 3 part of an NSA message which noted "a delay in the receipt of EMR's [sic] based on USA-564 voice incept" ¹ According to NSA estimates, approximately 50 percent of the Exploitable Message Reports (EMR) derived from Detachment 3 intercept were not being sent out by Detachment 3, but were being initiated by the 7th RRF5 (USM-7) after its receipt and transcription of the recordings. ² This was allegedly causing a delay of up to ten days between time of intercept and receipt of the EMRs at NSA. ³ The agency also noted a

* - Hist █

█

[REDACTED]

disparity between the text of EMRs produced by Detachment 3⁴ and transcription of the same traffic made by USM-7.

[REDACTED] The conclusion drawn by NSA was that total reliance by Detachment 3 on handlogs was at the root of this discrepancy.⁵ Their suggested solution was that all voice tapes be scanned for explitable messages prior to shipment to CMAs for transcription.⁶ [REDACTED] The 6994th Scty Sq requested that Detachment 3 comment and provide "an estimate of the daily workload involved and whether or not Det 3 . . . could comply unassisted."⁷ It also reminded Detachment 3 of the stand previously taken by PacSctyRgn on the subject of total scan.*

Detachment 3 Disagrees

[REDACTED] Detachment 3 replied the same day in a message to PacSctyRgn and the 6994th Scty Sq. The Detachment began by denying the NSA conclusion that USA-564 EMRs were produced solely from handlogs, stating that all reels were indeed scanned, either during the return portion of the mission, or after recovery.⁸ It went on to "challenge the statement that 50% of USA-564 messages were not EMR'd."⁹ Acknowledging the possibility of a few, isolated cases in the past, Detachment 3 contended that whatever discrepancies might have existed had been corrected within the past few

* - Hist [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

10
weeks. Furthermore, the EMR/transcript discrepancies had
been addressed in December 1971, as soon as they had been
11
noted by USM-7. No effort was made to minimize the
Detachment 3 linguist experience-level problems so recently
scored by PacSctyRgn. * Nevertheless, it was felt that NSA
was flogging an already dead horse of vastly exaggerated
12
proportions. Neither did Detachment 3 miss the oppor-
tunity to observe that, while it was manned to provide one
linguist aboard four 5-hour missions per day, it was at that
time flying four 7-hour missions per day, two of which were
13
tasked to carry an extra linguist. In other words
sufficient difficulty was being experienced in manning the
airborne voice mission, without instituting new ground
duties.

NSA Inquires

[REDACTED] Following a USAFSS recommendation that eight
linguist personnel of undetermined origin be supplied on
a TDY assistance basis, NSA began to act. Before responding
to USAFSS that the ante seemed a bit high, with the sug-
gestion that three 6908th Scty Sq voice processors might
suffice, Mr. [REDACTED]

* - Hist [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

then TDY to the 6908th Scty Sq (USA-523).¹⁴ After a brief recap of the situation, Mr. [REDACTED] requested that Mr. [REDACTED] provide several days of assistance to Detachment 3, and forward his comments on the problem.¹⁵

Mr. [REDACTED] Turns the Tide

[REDACTED] It was serendipitous that Mr. [REDACTED] should have paid his first visit to Detachment 3 on 15 January and that his moment of entry should have coincided with an exchange taking place between TSgt Willis G. Neal, Assistant NCOIC of the voice section, and two representatives of the PacSctyRgn Stan/Eval Team, Captain Michael T. Christy and TSgt William N. Daniels.¹⁶ Up to that time TSgt Neal had been getting the worst of a discussion regarding the previously reported PacSctyRgn desire for total scan/TACREP reporting at Detachment 3.^{*} Consequently, the interruption by an unidentified civilian, who modestly stated that he did not believe the PacSctyRgn personnel understood the problem, attracted immediate attention. Having introduced himself and established his credentials, Mr. [REDACTED] proceeded to deflate the PacSctyRgn position.¹⁷ Aside from the fact that Detachment 3 had neither the personnel, nor the equipment to

* - Hist [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

perform a formal transcription, decryption and translation effort, the delay that would be created by such an effort was entirely unacceptable. In effect he affirmed the previous Detachment 3 contention that "the established method of forwarding exploitable messages via EMR to USM-7, thence into the Rye Autoline system, was in fact faster than the proposed system." ¹⁸ Captain Christy and TSgt Daniels were convinced, and, at least on the Detachment 3 level, the decrypt, translation and TACREP aspect of the problem dissolved. Remaining, however, was NSA dissatisfaction with EMR timeliness, completeness and accuracy.

Debunking the EMR Problem

After visiting Detachment 3 on 15, 16 and 17 January Mr. ¹⁹ reported his findings to Mr. Repeating much of what he had told Captain Christy and TSgt Daniels, he emphasized that formal transcription at Detachment 3 was neither possible, nor desirable. ²⁰ While Detachment 3 voice operators and EMR quality would benefit from a transcription training program, he advised that instructors for such a program be provided from outside the unit on a ²¹ TDY basis. In particular, he recommended that USM-7 ²² become involved in such an effort.

The result of this was a visit to Detachment 3

on 23 January by Lieutenant [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and two 7th RRFS linguist/analyst personnel. ²³

A certain amount of surprise was generated when these gentlemen announced their amazement at the furor brought on by NSA's critical message of 7 January. ²⁴ The actual problem, which had been discussed with the Detachment 3 Operations Officer in December 1971, had begun to disappear ²⁵ immediately thereafter, and had vanished by Christmas.

[REDACTED] Armed with the knowledge that NSA had been complaining of a non-existent problem, the 6994th Scty Sq ²⁶ moved that the matter be dropped. Pacific Security Region concurred, and on 28 January USAFSS closed the affair by rescinding the "requirement for augmentation of USA-564 ²⁷ processing."

Radiotelephone Transcription

[REDACTED] Formal transcription was not conducted by Detachment 3. Ground rescan of traffic was performed, when necessary to meet reporting requirements, but hardcopy transcripts were not prepared. Recordings from Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger were forwarded, respectively, to USM-7 and USM-808 until 3 March.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 24 February NSA announced its decision to move ten ARVN transcribers (Dancers) to the 6908th Scty Sq at NKP.²⁸ The stated purpose of this action was "to ensure complete off-line transcription of all GDRS and ground tactical force multichannel intercepts at NKP," including those of USA-564.²⁹ The National Security Agency established the first priority task of the NKP Dancers as the "transcription of all GDRS and ground tactical forces multi-channel intercept."³⁰ Second priority was to be "the remainder of USA-564 intercept."³¹ With the arrival of the Dancers at NKP, Detachment 3 began passing tapes solely to USA-523, effective 3 March.³²

[REDACTED] Since the Dancers were originally scheduled to be on station for only 120 days, eventual resumption of tape forwarding was anticipated.³³ Before the end of the reporting period, however, Detachment 3 was informally advised that the Dancers would be staying at NKP indefinitely.

Processing and Reporting (PAR) Responsibility

[REDACTED] During late February, NSA altered the existing Processing and Reporting (PAR) situation, which had been split between USM-7 for northern Laos (Barrel Roll) intercept and USM-808 for Laotian Panhandle (Steel Tiger) take.

[REDACTED]

This resulted from the transfer of several different, but related, functions to the 6908th Scty Sq (USA-523).

On 8 February an NSA message advised that, effective 15 February, USA-523 would assume PAR responsibility for "all R1XX and multichannel intercept from . . . USA-564 (other than R1XX in northern Laos)."³⁴ The same message instructed USA-564 to "pass all multichannel tapes to USA-523 for PAR." On 18 February USA-523 PAR responsibility was extended to include USA-564 HF intercept, except for Barrel Roll, which remained the exclusive province of USM-7.³⁵ Further clarification on 24 February established the fact that USM-808 retained responsibility for Steel Tiger GDRS/GDRS related cryptosystems, while USA-523 inherited PAR responsibility for those systems only when found in its own intercept or that of USA-564.³⁶ In accordance with this, later Exploitable Message Reports by USA-564 were addressed as follows.

Steel Tiger Intercept	-	DIRNSA
Barrel Roll Intercept	-	DIRNSA USM-7
Possibly Exploitable (any area)	-	DIRNSA USM-7 USM-808

In spite of the fact that USA-523 forwarded

USA-564 Exploitable Message Reports via pre-punched 5-level tape, that unit was not an addressee. This difficulty was easily circumvented by USA-564 through passing a page-print copy to USA-523 with the EMR tape. This procedure became no longer necessary on 14 March, when an OpsComm circuit between the two units was completed. As of 1 March, NSA instituted Rye/Autoline service for all USA-564 Exploitable Message Reports, so as to provide timely, computerized decrypts to all concerned.

Target Data Listings

██████████ Prior to January, all Target Data Listings (TDL), used to identify ARDF targets, were produced by the unit Collection Management Authorities, i.e., by USM-7 for Barrel Roll and by USM-808 for Steel Tiger. On the theory that more current TDLs could be produced locally, Detachment 3 proceeded on 6 January to develop these aids on a trial basis. Following a brief period of training and familiarization for the analysts preparing the TDLs, the USM-7, Barrel Roll listings were replaced with local ones. Promptly, the target identification rate in Barrel Roll jumped from 52 to 65 percent. These TDLs were also used for the development of mission profiles for optimum aircraft



positioning. The success of the local TDL effort ensured its continuation and prompted its expansion to include Steel Tiger on 26 January.

38

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Footnotes completely redacted. Six pages following removed to reduce file size.

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAA	Anti-aircraft artillery
AB	Air Base
ABCCC	Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
ACC	ARDF Coordination Center
ACI	Airborne Communications Intelligence
AF	Air Force
AFCM	Air Force Commendation Medal
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
ALR-34	ARDF system; 2-seat; 2 - 16 megahertz
ALR-35	ARDF system; 4-seat; 2 - 16 megahertz
ALR-38	ARDF system; 4-seat; 2 - 190 megahertz
AM	Air Medal
AMS	Airborne Mission Supervisor
ARDF	Airborne Radio Direction Finding
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
Barrel Roll	U.S. air operations in Laos north of 1830N
Brown Beaver	A project for coordination between ARDF platforms and forward air controllers
BS	Bronze Star
CAS	Controlled American Source
Cat	Category
CMA	Collection Management Authority
Combat Apple	RC-135 Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Program platforms operating in Southeast Asia
Dancer	A project for the transcription of U.S. communications intercept by vietnamese nationals. Also, a vietnamese national so employed.
Det	Detachment
DFC	Distinguished Flying Cross
DIRNSA	Director, National Security Agency



EEIC	Element of Expense/Investment Code
EMR	Exploitable Message Report
FAC	Forward Air Controller
Fix/FAC	A program for passing ARDF fixes to on-scene Forward Air Controllers. See Brown Beaver.
GDRS	General Directorate of Rear Services
HF	High Frequency
HP	Horsepower
IA	Instructor Analyst
IRO	Instructor Radio Operator
LOP	Line of Position
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACT	Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
mhz	Megahertz
mm	Millimeter
MSK	Maintenance Supply Kit
MSM	Meritorious Service Medal
NGOIC	Noncommissioned Officer in Charge
NKP	Nakhon Phanom
NORS	Not Operationally Ready, Supply
NRV	National Security Agency Pacific Representative, Vietnam (C)
NSA	National Security Agency
NSAPac	National Security Agency, Pacific
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
OpsComm	Operational Communications



PacSctyRgn Pacific Security Region
PAR Processing and Reporting
FDJ Plaine des Jarres

ResCAP Rescue Combat Air Patrol
R1XX Refers to a series of Soviet-built radio transmitters, generally operating in the HF and low VHF spectrums

R105 Soviet-built radio transmitter (36 - 46.1mhz)
RRFS Radio Research Field Station
RTAFB Royal Thai Air Force Base
RVN Republic of Vietnam

SAR Search and Rescue
Scty Sq Security Squadron
SEA Southeast Asia
SOW Special Operations Wing
SSO Special Security Office/Officer
Stan/Eval Standardization/Evaluation
Steel Tiger U.S. air operations in Laos below 1830N

TACREP Tactical Report
TDL Target Data Listing
TDY Temporary Duty
TEWS Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron

USA-564 Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron
USAFSS United States Air Force Security Service
USM-7 7th Radio Research Field Station
USM-808 8th Radio Research Field Station

VHF Very High Frequency





APPENDIX 1

Biography of Major William D. Graham

Major William D. Graham was the Commander of Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron, Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base. He was directly responsible to the Commander, 6994th Security Squadron for the control and utilization of the personnel and materiel under his command.


Major Graham was born in Buffalo, New York on 20 October 1933 to Douglas S. and Mercedes F. Graham. In 1935 he moved with his family to East Aurora, New York, a Buffalo suburb, where he graduated in 1952 from East Aurora High School. Beginning his higher education as a music major (piano) at the University of Rochester, he graduated in 1956 with a Bachelor of Arts in English. His other interests in college included varsity baseball, dramatics, and Air Force ROTC, from which he earned a reserve commission on 10 June 1956.

From Navigator training at Harlingen AFB, Texas Major Graham proceeded in August 1957 to Dover AFB, Delaware, where for the next five years he served as a navigator aboard C-124 transports of the Military Air Transport Service (MATS). Returning to that assignment from attendance at Squadron Officer School in 1962, he renewed an acquaintance with the former Mary Pierce, also of East Aurora, New York. They were married in January 1963, immediately prior to his assignment to the Signal Intelligence Officer course at Goodfellow AFB, San Angelo, Texas, where he received his Regular Air Force commission in May. A delay in the receipt of his SSIR clearance and the birth of his first child conspired to keep him in San Angelo until the following January, when he was sent to the 6937th Communications Group, Peshawar, Pakistan. There he held the positions of Flight Commander, Senior Flight Coordinator and, finally, Special Assistant to the Operations Officer, prior to his transfer in February 1966 to Ft George G. Meade, Maryland, where he performed staff duties with the National Security Agency. Major Graham received his first command in February 1969, when

he became Commander of Detachment 1, 6916th Security Squadron in Athens, Greece. Upon completion of that assignment, he assumed command of Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron on 30 August 1971. In addition to his command functions, as a Senior Navigator with over 4,500 hours, he also flew regularly in that capacity with Detachment 1, 362nd Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron.

Major Graham holds the Meritorious Service Medal, the Joint Service Commendation Medal and the Air Medal with two oak leaf clusters. He and Mrs. Graham have three children; Kathy, Bobby and Andy, aged 8, 7 and 4, respectively.

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Det 3, 6991JSSHR

Operations Structure

APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 3

Key Personnel

Major William D. Graham	Commander
Captain Charles T. Purkiss	Operations Officer
TSgt James W. Bainbridge	First Sergeant
CMSgt Kenneth J. Seals	NGOIC Operations
MSgt Monte D. Hargrave	NGOIC Airborne Operations
MSgt James F. Hart	NGOIC Analysis & Reporting
MSgt John W. Hama Jr	NGOIC Radiotelephone
TSgt Curtis W. Davis	NGOIC Mission Management
TSgt Vernon P. Hurdle	NGOIC Maintenance
TSgt Henry Webb	NGOIC Materiel
TSgt Ronald L. Schofield	NGOIC Standardization/Evaluation
SSgt Keith M. Wilson	NGOIC Personnel
SSgt David E. Taylor	NGOIC Administration
SSgt George D. Woodward Jr	NGOIC Communications
SSgt Norman A. Welch	NGOIC Training
SSgt James M. Willis	NGOIC Security

APPENDIX 4

Detachment 3 Productivity

	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>
Missions Fraggd	114	101	107	149	161	168
Missions Launched	103	85	100	143	139	159
Percent Missions Launched	90.4	84.2	93.5	96.0	86.3	94.6
Hours Fraggd	798	707	749	1043	1127	1176
Hours Flown	641.7	482.7	554.2	847.0	781.6	843.4
Percent Fraggd Hrs Flown	80.4	68.3	74.0	83.4	69.4	71.7
Targets Worked	1217	819	746	1061	868	695
Targets Fixed	830	587	510	724	559	482
Percent Targets Fixed	68.2	71.9	68.4	68.2	64.4	69.4
Fixes Identified	326	220	187	325	258	239
Percent Fixes Identified	39.3	37.5	36.6	44.9	46.1	49.6
Priority Fixes	219	136	146	273	201	207
Fixes Passed	591	434	426	598	420	345
Manual Morse AMOC (mins)	35239	28289	28115	38828	34883	43434
Manual Morse HF Copy (mins)	8924	5545	6331	9463	9333	8537
Percent Manual Morse HF Copy	25.3	19.6	22.5	24.4	26.6	19.7
Manual Morse VHF Copy (mins)	546	157	831	163	1	0
Percent Manual Morse VHF Copy	1.5	.6	2.9	.4	.0	.0
Radiotelephone AMOC (mins)	38132	26657	31892	31030	22257	14518
Radiotelephone HF Copy (mins)	1095	395	552	367	367	150
Percent RT HF Copy	8.7	1.8	1.7	1.2	1.6	1.0
RT VHF Copy (mins)	2959	3850	3576	2894	1338	918
Percent RT VHF Copy	7.5	14.4	11.2	9.3	6.0	6.3
Messages Copied	1206	763	1051	814	569	479

Reports Issued


<u>Report Title</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>
ARDF Recovery Report (ARR)	87	85	105	148	169	162
Aviation Unit Daily Status Report (AUDSR)	31	29	31	30	31	30
Southeast Asia Technical Summary (SEATS)	58	52	21	57	52	59
Tactical Reports (TACREP)	44	22	41	31	24	35
Exploitable Message Report (EMR)	134	118	166	172	120	108

APPENDIX 5

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APPENDIX 6

South East Asia ARDF Areas



Presumed to be listing of Supporting Documents. One additional page removed to reduce file size.

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 1

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFIC. [REDACTED]

PAGE	DRAFTER OR RELEASER TIME	PRECEDENCE		LMF	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY		
		ACT	INFO				DATE - TIME	MONTH	YR
1 OF 1		PP	PP		[REDACTED]		11/0315Z	APR	72

BOOK 1 MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 3, 6994SCTYSQ NKP RTAFB, THAILAND

TO: 6994SCTYSQ/DO/TSN AFLD, RVN

INFO: DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ/DO/DANANG AFLD, RVN

[REDACTED] / CC

SUBJ: TDY SUPPORT FROM DET 2

REF: 11 APR TELECON - CAPT LOGAN/CAPT PURKISS

1. ASSUMING, AS PER REF, THAT FIVE A1R-34 EQUIPPED CC ACFT ARE DEPLOYED TO NKP FROM DANANG, WE WILL REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL TDY SUPPORT FROM DET 2:

10-12 - 292

3 - R202/A202

3 - 326

2. REQUEST DET TWO ARRANGE TO HAVE TDY ORDERS, CURRENT AF FORM 1042 AND CUMULATIVE MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY FLYING HOURS FORWARDED ASAP TO DET 3. THE FULL FM 846 AND MEDICAL RECORDS SHOULD BE SENT AS SOON AS PRACTICAL. ADDITIONALLY ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE TO HAVE MAIL FORWARDED REGULARLY.

6
5
4
3
2
1
0

DISTR: [REDACTED]

DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE

Same as Releaser

TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE

CHARLES J. PURKISS, Capt, DO, 2020

Charles J. Purkiss

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

SECURITY [REDACTED]

DD FORM 173 1 JUL 68

REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 NOV 63 AND DD FORM 173-1, 1 NOV 63, WHICH WILL BE USED IN THE USAF.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 2

1 1 17/0940L RR

170250Z MAY 72

DET 3 6994SCTYSQ NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAILAND
6994 SCTY SQ/CC TAN SON NHUT AB RVN

CC

1. A 13TH AF TS MESSAGE 111047Z MAY, SUBJ: RVN RELOCATIONS, WAS ADDRESSED TO THE 56TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING, NKP, INFO 7TH AF, 7/13TH AF, AND COMUSMACV AND CONCERNED THE POSSIBLE RELOCATION OF UP TO 29 OV-10'S AND 17 EC-47'S TO NKP BY 15 JUNE 72. INVOLVING AN INCREASE OF ALL THE AIRCRAFT AND QUOTE APPROXIMATELY 800 PERSONNEL UNQUOTE, EACH INVOLVED UNIT WAS ASKED BY THE WING FOR SHORT FUSE IMPACT STATEMENT. THIS UNIT PROVIDED A STATEMENT WHICH WAS VERY GENERAL IN NATURE BECAUSE OF THE UNKNOWN MIX OF THE EC-47 SYSTEMS AND LACK OF DETAILS IN PLANNING FOR SUPPLY LEVELS, PERSONNEL, ETC.
2. REQUEST HIGHER HEADQUARTERS BE ADVISED OF THE CONTENTS OF THE 13TH AF MESSAGE, OF WHICH WE WERE UNABLE TO GET A COPY, AND TO PROVIDE MORE DETAILS TO THIS UNIT WHICH CAN BE USED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

Same

WILLIAM D. GRAHAM, Major, USAF

William D. Graham

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 3

©CC477.com

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 4



CC

16 May 1972


RVN Relocations (U)

56th Spec Ops Wg/LG

1. (U) Reference your letter, dated 12 May 1972, same subject.
2. (U) This organization was neither invited nor represented at the meeting at TUOC (ref b, your letter) and therefore this response will be limited to the impact of ref a of your letter, the 13AF message of 11 May.
3. (U) Until more details are provided, any impact statement from this organization will be general in nature. 13AF has apparently addressed only airframes thus far in their planning and not backend aircraft systems which are the only reasons the airplanes are flying.
4. ■ The EC-47's have three (3) separate and distinct backend systems, the AIR-34, the AIR-35, and the AIR-38. Without knowing how many of which type systems are involved, it is difficult to give any accurate estimate concerning supply levels, total personnel or increased space requirements. For instance, the AIR-34 system EC-47 requires two (2) backend crew members, the AIR-35/38 four (4) or five (5). It is not known whether this has been taken into consideration in the approximate personnel figures given in referenced message. Maintenance support special levels have already been established here at NKP for 122 line items valued at over \$1.1 million for the AIR-35 and AIR-38 system based on five aircraft here at NKP. If all the proposed aircraft were going to be of this system, it would mean three times that amount of levels would be required. However, if the AIR-34 system of EC-47 was based here, new levels of unknown amounts would have to be established from scratch.
5. (U) The only firm requirements that can be stated at this time are transportation in which our increased requirements would be;

- 1 - pickup
- 1 - step van
- 1 - carry all or pickup

and facilities in which our present operations building (#218) is adequate, however the "Bravo" Maintenance (#200) floor space would need an additional 1000 square feet for additional test equipment and increased maintenance manning.



[REDACTED]

6. (U) Until more tangible plans are revealed by 13AF concerning the proposed mix of EC-47 aircraft systems here at NKP, this unit cannot provide any more realistic figures at this time.

7. [REDACTED] Another important problem which has to be addressed by 13AF is the approval to raise the Thailand cryptologic ceiling. This ceiling, which is closely monitored each month [REDACTED] is the reason this unit is presently limited to an authorization of 89 personnel. The proposed tripling of EC-47's here at NKP would result in an increase of from 60 to 80 SSIR-cleared Det 3 personnel.

8. (U) Since any proposed plans concerning the EC-47 deeply involve this unit and USAF Security Service, request we be allowed to take part in any further meetings or discussions that are held.


WILLIAM D. GRAHAM, Major, USAF
Commander

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 5

ZCZCQKC1ZCZCQKC

18 MAY 1972

new
DO
19
cc

OLZCZCQKC562
RR YMRVIZ

DE YMRQK 0005 1390256
ZNY MMNSH
R 130220Z MAY 72
FM 6994SCTYSQ
TO DET 3 6994SCTYSQ/CC/DO
INFO DET 2 6994SCTYSQ/CC/DO
ZEM

CC/DO

SUBJ: RVN RELOCATIONS.

YOUR CC 170250Z MAY 72 (NOTAL.

1. THERE ARE PRESENTLY TWO PLANS WHICH CALL FOR THE MOVE OF ACFT FROM DANANG. THE FIRST CALLS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF ACFT TO NKP AND UDORN IF EMERGENCY EVACUATION OF DNG IS REQUIRED.
2. THE SECOND PLAN IS ASSOCIATED WITH DRAWDOWN ACTIONS. 7AF PROPOSED MOVING SEVENTEEN ACFT TO NKP AND RETAINING FIFTEEN ACFT AT DNG. OUR GUESS IS 13AF WAS QUERIED TO SEE IF NKP COULD SUPPORT THAT MOVE. MACV/J2 AND J3 HAVE FLATLY REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL AND LATEST INFO/RUMOR IS THAT ALL EC-47 ACFT WILL BE RZLOINED AT DNG.

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 6

b

COORD:	
CC	
DD	
13 25	
UCOTC	
	1489

TJTXW WIMVRKCAM

22 MAY 1972

MMKOT

JKPZZRV

ZCZC0040533

RR YIPVIZ

DE YVR70K 0070 1436253

ZNY VVNSH

R 000700Z MAY 72

FM 6994SOTYSO

TO DET 2 6994SOTYSO/CC/DO

DET 3 6994SOTYSO/CC/DO

ZNY

[REDACTED] DO

SUBJ: 362TEWS RELOCATION.

1. DESPITE WHAT APPEARED TO BE A REJECTION OF THE PROPOSAL, THE POSS RELOCATION OF AIRFRAMES FR DNG TO NKP IS STILL ALIVE. FYI 7AF IS STATING THAT THERE WILL BE A THREE PERCENT DEGRADATION WHILE MACV IS CALING IT A TWENTY SEVEN PERCENT DEGRADATION. ALTHO COMUSMACV HAS NOT PROVIDED A FINAL ANSWER WHICH IS EXPECTED TO BE A REJECTION OF 7AF PROPOSAL, 7AF PLANNING IS CONTINUING.
2. ON THE BASIS THAT THERE IS A POSS THAT RELOCATION COULD OCCUR WOULD APPREC UR PROVIDING PROBLEM AREAS OR ASSISTANCE YOU ANTICIPATE/REQUIRE. AS NO CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO MIX AND SYSTEMS, TRYING TO PROVIDE AN IMPACT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE. WOULD APPREC KNOWING ANY FURTHER INFO/RUMOR AVAILABLE AT RESPECTIVE UNITS.

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
NNNN



SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 7

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


23 MAY 1972 18 17

ZCZCOK0591
PP YXRVIZ
DE YXBOOK 0004 1440315
ZNY WWSH
ZEL
DE YXBOOK 0004 1440258
ZNY WWSH
R 030000Z MAY 72
FM 6994SCTYSQ
TO USAFSS/DOR/XR
INFO PSR/DOR
DET 6 6994SCTYSQ/DO
DET 6 6994SCTYSQ/DO
ZEM



CC
SUBJ: RELOCATION OF EC-47S TO NKP.
REF: A. MY 180650Z MAY 72 (NOTAL).
B. PSR DOX 200215Z MAY 72 (NOTAL).
C. PSR DOR 152215Z MAY 72 (NOTAL).
SUBJ: COMMAND STAN/EVAL TEAM ITINERARY (U).
WE HAVE JUST LEARNED INFORMALLY THAT GENS ABRAMS AND VOGT HAVE
AGREED THAT 17 EC-47S WILL BE PERMANENTLY MOVED FROM DNG TO NKP,
PROBABLY ON 25 JUN. IN VIEW OF THE PLANNING ACTIONS/COORDINATION
THAT MUST TAKE PLACE DURING NEXT TWO WEEKS, REQUEST STAN/EVAL
VISIT TO 6994SS UNITS BE CANCELLED/RESCHEDULED.
141
0004



SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 8

Q
FM 6994 SCTY SQ
TO DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ/MA
DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ/MA
BOC

MA

SUBJECT - RELOCATION OF EC-47 AIRCRAFT

G

M IN ADDRESSING THE QUESTION OF EC-47 RELOCATION
WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO CONSIDER TWO OPTIONS:

OPTION I

AT NKP

3 (9 WITH 304) 38 SYSTEMS

7 34CC SYSTEMS

AT DNG

15 35 SYSTEMS

OPTION II

AT NKP

7 34CC SYSTEMS

3 35CC

5 (6 WITH 304) 38 SYSTEMS

AT DNG

12 35 SYSTEMS

3 38 SYSTEMS

2. IN CONSIDERING THESE OPTIONS LOOK AT OVERALL DIS-
TRIBUTIONS OF WORKLOAD, ASSIGNING FIXED UE TO EACH
LOCATION AND ELIMINATING TDY OF SYSTEMS BETWEEN
LOCATIONS, AND THE CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT ANY
OPERATIONAL FRAG FROM EITHER LOCATIONS. IT IS ALREADY
ESTABLISHED THAT NKP AND DNG WILL BOTH HAVE SAME
AIRCARXV CAPABILITY, THAT IS NO LONGER WILL AIRCRAFT
HAVE TO RETURN TO DNG FOR PHASE IRAN AND CC

3. WITH EITHER OPTIONS THE BELOW ITEMSS MK T BE CON-
SIDERED AND SATISFIED.

A. MANNING AND WORKLOAD

B. AGE AND TEST EQUIPMENT SUPPORT

C. BU YDIFS SPACE AT NKP FOR SUPERVISION, SUPPLY,
ADMINISTRATION AND MAINTENANCE AREA.

D. IRAN, CC DOWNLOADED SYSTEM STORAGE AND CHECK OUT

E. PMT CAPABILITY (VHF TRANSMITTERS)

F. POWER AND AIR CONDITIONING REQUIREMENTS

G. VEHICLES

[REDACTED]

H. SUPPLY - MANNING, RPC, BENCH STOCK, SYSTEM
SPAJWSBZI MSK, STORAGE
I. ANY OTHER ITEMS YOU DEEM NECESSARY
4. REQUEST YOU REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE AS TO WHICH
OPTION YOU WOULD PERFER. PART 3 IS FOR YOUR CON-
SIDERATION AND FUTURE REPLY. NEED ANSWER BY 1500
26 MAY TO CAPT SMITH MA.
BT

NNNN

A TRUE COPY

Edward S. Marek

EDWARD S. MAREK, CAPT, USAF

[REDACTED]

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 9

[REDACTED]

P 260700Z MAY 72
FM 6994SCTYSQ
TO PSR/DOR/DOX
INFO USAFSS/DOR/XR
DET 2 6994SCTYSQ/DO
DET 3 6994SCTYSQ/DO
ZFM

[REDACTED] DO

DELIVER FIRST DUTY HOUR.
SUBJ: RVN/362 TEWS RELOCATIONS.
YOUR DOX 200215Z MAY 72.

1. INFO AVAILABEL HERE INDICATES THAT TEN ADDITIONAL EC-47 ACFT FOR A TOTAL OF FIFTEEN WILL BE DEPLOYED FROM DNG TO NKP. MOVEMENT OF ACFT IS KEYED ON PHRASE THAT FIFTEEN EC-47 ACFT WILL REMAIN AT DNG, THE REMAINDER TO BE DEPLOYED TO NKP.
 2. 7AF IS PRESENTLY WRITING TWO PADS, ONE FOR THE DRAWDOWN OF DANANG AB, THE SECOND DEALING WITH THE MOVEMENT OF ACFT FROM DNG TO VARIOUS BASES IN THAILAND. BECAUSE PLANNING HAS BEEN OF A HOLD CLOSE NATURE IT IS ONLY RECENTLY THAT THIS UNIT HAS SEEN CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THESE ACTIONS. UNTIL IT WAS REQUESTED THAT WE INPUT INFO PADS BEING WRITTEN ONLY AIRFRAMES WERE CONSIDERED WITHOUT REGARD TO MIX OR CONFIGURATION.
 3. IN CONJUNCTION WITH MACV/7AF THE FOLLOWING ACFT ARE TO BE PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED TO NKP: SEVEN ALR-34 (CC), THREE ALR-35 (CC), FIVE ALR-38 (CCZ). ACFT REMAINING AT DNG WILL BE TWELVE ALR-35 AND THREE ALR-38. DEPLOYING ACFT IN THIS MANNER WILL ALLOW FOR PLACING OF ALR-34 AGE AT TWO LOCATIONS (NKP/TSN), ALLOW FOR MAX TIME OVER TARGET WITH ACFT FLOWN FROM NKP AND PRE-POSITION EQUIP AND SUPPLIES AT NKP IF/WHEN FUTURE MOVES OCCUR.
 4. COORDINATION WITH 7AF/LGM REVEALS THAT THEY ARE PLANNING TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT ACFT AT BOTH LOCATIONS WITH IRAN TO BE DONE AT CLARK.
 5. IN TERMS OF PERSONNEL APPROX 55-60 PEOPLE WILL HAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM DNG TO NKP. PRELIMINARY FIGURES INDICATE THAT 40 OPERATIONS PERSONNEL AND 15-20 SUPPORT PERSONNEL. A DEFINITIVE BREAKOUT BY AFSC WILL BE PROVIDED ASAP.
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6. PLAN TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE PROBLEM AREAS/RAMIFI-
CATIONS AT OPS OFFICER CONFERENCE TO BE HELD HERE
2-3 JUN. MAINT PERSONNEL FROM DETS ARE ALSO GOING
TO ATTEND.

301
0009

A TRUE COPY

Edward S. Marek

EDWARD S. MAREK, CAPT, USAF

Q47.com

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 1.0

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 11

CLASSIFICATION



MASTER PROGRAM CHANGE R



SECTION I - IDENTIFICATION DATA

FOR USE BY HQ USAFSS ONLY

TO Pac Scty Rgn	MPCR NO	PWG NO	XRP NO
		PROJECT OFFICER CMS Setser	CIP NO
FROM USAFSS	DATE OF REQUEST	DATE OF CHANGE 13 June 72	MPC NO P-024-053
		OPINS REQ	OPINS APPROVED
UNIT(S) AFFECTED 6994SS, Dets 2 and 3, 6994SS		TYPED NAME, GRADE, AND OFFICE SYMBOL	
SIGNATURE			

SECTION II - NARRATIVE (Action required, justification, related POEREP, comments)

1. This change realigns ARDF assets in SEA in accordance with CINCPAC direction.
2. This change results in aircraft basing as follows:
 - a. 6994 SS: 25 ALR-34 CC
 - b. Det 2, 6994 SS: 12 ALR-35 and 3 ALR-38
 - c. Det 3, 6994 SS: 6 ALR-38, 3 ALR-35 and 8 ALR-34

file
228
cu

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: PSR; 6994SS; Det 2, 6994; Det 3, 6994

NOTE: Attach additional sheet(s) if required; reference Part/Item number.



SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 12

[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
6994 SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



9 June 1972

REPLY TO DO
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT: Operations Officer Conference (U)

TO: CG

1. (U) The Operations Officer Conference for the second quarter of 1972 was held at the 6994th Soty Sq, Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam from 1-4 Jun 1972. Those attending the conference included:

Capt G F Logan Jr	6994th Soty Sq, Operations Officer
CMSgt L M David	6994th Soty Sq, NGOIC Operations
1Lt H K Miodnaki	6994th Soty Sq, Chief, Local Operations
MSgt J R Herridge	6994th Soty Sq, NGOIC Local Operations
MSgt W E Marshall	6994th Soty Sq, NGOIC Local Operations
Capt C T Purkiss	Det 3, 6994th Soty Sq, Operations Officer
SMSgt W E McCollough	Det 2, 6994th Soty Sq, NGOIC Operations

2. (U) The conference was opened by Capt Logan who welcomed the visiting personnel. It was pointed out that there was no firm agenda for the conference although there were several areas which required the attention of the members attending.

3. [REDACTED] (U) The following items were discussed:

a. [REDACTED] Transfer of Aircraft from Danang to NKP. This was the primary reason the conference was convened, to discuss possible problem areas and actions that could and would surface as the result of this planned move. Majority of the discussion revolved around actions that were Manpower Change Request (MCR)/Master Program Change Request (MPCR) oriented. Of primary importance were the spaces and grade structure required for the transfer of aircraft. A structure (by grade and AFSC) was set up for each detachment based on aircraft to be located at that unit. Because of the mix of aircraft both detachments will be about equal in strength. The additional spaces needed at NKP will be about equal to the spaces that Danang will lose. The extra support/overhead spaces that NKP requires (i.e. clerk, Maintenance Officer, etc.) will have to be programmed for. In terms of physical transfer of personnel, a determination will be made to distribute personnel, with all variables considered, so that neither detachment is adversely affected. The squadron will submit a proposed MCR to Headquarters USAFSS for their approval/consideration.

(1) Coordination was effected with MACV (DI 11-2) with regards to the move. Of primary interest during this discussion was the probability of aircraft having to refuel at Ubon, Thailand to achieve maximum time over target when fraggged in area seven. Discussion with MACV and our own maintenance personnel determined that aircraft should be fraggged directly to [REDACTED]

Det 3, 6994th Soty Sq/DO

[REDACTED]

the area and refuel at Ubon upon their return to NKP. Coordination with TEMS will have to be accomplished to ensure mission requirements are met. Recent discussion with MMOV indicates that on a trial basis a mission will be down-fragged in the PDJ to fly the seven area.

(2) Among other items that were discussed with regards to the move were airlift support, transfer of crypto equipment, life support equipment requirements, and transfer of technical data. Det 3 will TDY an analyst to Det 2 to familiarise him with tech data available for area seven.

b. [REDACTED] Command and Control Relationships. An informal discussion in this area revealed that the age-old problem of grading criteria for front end and back end crew was still a bone of contention and this has resulted in some mission degradation. The conflict between requirements to fulfill airframe time and those of our operational mission accomplishment are not compatible and will not be in the foreseeable future. This is understood by most people concerned with the program. There have been instances recently where personnel controlling the aircraft (i.e. TERPES, HUBBARD, etc.) are not providing or are unaware of present status of a given aircraft and AGC is being accused of making poor decisions. Action to be taken in this area will be to correlate reduced/aborted missions in the DUBMIS with information available to AGC. Discrepancies will be documented and action taken when deemed necessary.

c. [REDACTED] Joint Operating Agreements. Revised JOAs have not yet been published. The JOAs which were handcarried to Danang during the last Operations Officer Conference (20-22 Mar 72) were returned signed by the 366TFW approximately mid-April. Since that time the 377th Air Base Wing has held the JOAs and a meeting was held on 29 May 72 to finally discuss further changes. The JOAs have been reaccomplished and will be again forwarded to Danang to be signed by the 366TFW and subsequently the 377ABWG. Possible changes to the JOAs were suggested as follows:

(1) A post mission test will be performed whenever erratic bearings are experienced. This policy is presently in effect at Tan Son Nhut with the purpose of identifying the cause of erratic bearing (i.e. antenna polarization, long wire antenna, weather, equipment, etc.).

(2) That a bad self test on the ALR-38, at the discretion of the AMS, should be considered criteria for an abort. AMS would base decision on the signal environment of the fragged area. For example, if self test is for a band normally used by targets for the fragged mission area he will abort; if the band is not needed for targets in that area the mission will continue.

d. [REDACTED] It appears that on many occasions TEMS personnel request 6994th Soty Sq units to remove one crewmember (i.e. analyst) from "E" configured aircraft because of weight limitations. Lengthy discussion ensued as to whether analysts should be removed or whether TEMS should be asked to off-load fuel. It was the opinion of those present that aircraft are fueled

[REDACTED]

in a standard manner determined primarily by engine size. As the TEMS has access (at least a day in advance) to the USAFSS crew schedule some planning could be done on those aircraft that will have full complement of USAFSS personnel aboard. Intent, therefore will be to emphasize importance of the Airborne Analyst and ensure that he flies aboard "Z" configured aircraft as a recognized crewmember.

e. **A/G/A Communications.** Status of installation of secure communications at Det 2 was discussed. Under the recent emergency CEIP, two GEC-27s should be operational by 30 Jun 72. Det 3 requested that assistance be provided to improve their GEC-27 transmitter capability. A squadron radio technician will be sent to NKP to try and resolve their problem.


SIGNED

GEORGE F LOGAN JR, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer

Cy to: Pac Soty Sq/DOR
Det 2, 6994th Soty Sq/DO
Det 3, 6994th Soty Sq/DO

ec41.com

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 13



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: Capt Willis/MAL

SUBJECT: Move Coordination/WKP

TO: MA

1. In consonance with the pre-planning meeting held at TSN AflD, on June 2nd and 3rd 1972, the following is submitted as an interim trip report to appraise the overall coordination accomplished at this location.

a) Supply:


All supply coordination was coordinated through the 56th Supply Squadron. A meeting was held on 5 June in the Chief of Supply office with the Asst Chief of Supply, SMO, BMO, Item Accounting officer and M&P officer. They were notified of the impending move of supplies and equipment and the various supply levels to be incorporated in the base supply system. It appears that no problem will exist in this area. However, daily coordination and exact supply usage data is necessary to effect a smooth transfer of all assets. As soon as a definite date is mentioned all supplies and equipment accountability will be transferred as expeditiously as possible.

b) Space:

1. The overall maintenance building area is adequate for all equipment and maintenance to be performed. No problem is foreseen. DMC shipped the ALB-38 Mockup on 6 June 72 and are shipping 3 pieces of ALB-34 test equipment for in-shop use. With this equipment, test equipment for all systems will be on hand. Also, adequate Bench Stock space is available in the maintenance building.

2. 780 Equipment space has been provided for down loaded systems by the 6908th SS. The location of this area is approximately 1/4 mile from the maintenance complex located on the flight line within easy access to all aircraft. The building to be used has adequate space and is equipped with 400 cycle 3 phase power. It is air conditioned and manned 24 hours a day to insure optimum security.

3. Supply will be located in the squadron Ops building on an interim basis. No adequate space is available at WKP for this function. The Commander, Det 3, 6994th and the PSR(IGSS) coordinated on the utilization of this space for use as an interim supply area. The space is approximately 400 sq ft and is sufficient for the supplies and equipment to be stored. A partition must be erected to provide adequate protection of all supplies stored. Although the inaccessibility of the area poses a problem, I feel that as an interim location the hardship imposed will not adversely affect the overall supply/maintenance operation.



c) Vehicles:

On 9 June 72, 601b's were forwarded to EMO for 4 vehicles. Requested were: 1 1/2 ton truck for supply, 1 3-Pax for maintenance, 1 6-Pax for maintenance and 1 step van for operations. At present there is no ready assets available on RHP. However a special vehicle utilization board will be held in the near future to re-allocate vehicles on base. This, plus possible assets arriving via PACAF channels should solve our immediate vehicle shortage. However, constant coordination and contact with agencies on base is a necessity, if we are to get the vehicles requested.


d) Billiting:

In conversation with the 56th Wing Director of Logistics adequate billiting is available on base. However, billets are spradd throughout the barracks areas. I will attempt to gather as much billiting space as possible in one location. Again constant coordination is needed to insure that all our people are adequately housed with a minimum of inconvenience.

Other than insuring that our billiting and vehicle requirements are met the only key problem remaining is the supply space needed. There is a definite need for a relocatable building located in close proximity to all maintenance to permit a free flow of supplies and equipment. As the space to be used in the operations area, is an interim solution, all efforts should be made to acquire another building. This problem will be addressed by PSE(IGSS) in his debriefing to PSE Commander.


ARTHUR J. WILLIAMS, Capt, USAF
6994th Scty Sq

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 14



ROUTINE

14/0530Z JAN 72

DET 3 6994SCTYSQ/DO/NKP RTAFB THAILAND

USAFSS/DOR/SAN ANTONIO TEXAS



/ DO

RADNOTE: MAJOR WOLINSKI FROM CAPT PURKISS

1. AT THE PRESENT TIME 1J96 IS THE ONLY OPSCOMM CIRCUIT BETWEEN NKP AND UDORN. THIS CIRCUIT IS TERMINATED ON ONE END IN THE 6908TH SPACES (NKP) AND ON THE OTHER, AT THE 6924TH (UDORN). DURING PERIOD OF PEAK ACTIVITY (APPROX 0001Z TO 1200Z) THESE TWO UNITS REQUIRE NEARLY CONSTANT ACCESS TO THE CIRCUIT BECAUSE OF THE HIGH PRECEDENCE OF THEIR MESSAGE TRAFFIC.


2. DET 3, 6994TH HAS A REQUIREMENT FOR A OPSCOMM WITH 7RRFS (RAMASAN STATION, UDORN). THIS IS NECESSARY NOT ONLY FOR THE ~~XXXXXX~~ FORMAL MESSAGE TRAFFIC (ARR'S, SEATS, EMR'S, TDL'S ETC) BUT FOR THE INFORMAL ANALYST TO ANALYST EXCHANGES THAT HAVE PROVEN TO BE SO VALUABLE IN ALL OUR SIGINT OPERATIONS. THE VAST MAJORITY OF BOTH OUR FORMAL TRAFFIC AND INFORMAL EXCHANGES ALSO IS PASSED BETWEEN APPROX 001Z AND 1200Z.

14
 JAN 72
 1 2

3158

CHARLES T. PURKISS

CHARLES T. PURKISS, CAPT., USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER



ROUTINE

PURKISS

PURKISS

3158

3. IN THE PAST, THE 6908TH HAS MADE EVERY EFFORT TO ACCOMMODATE US, HOWEVER THE CIRCUIT HAS BEEN PRE-EMPTED FROM US MORE OFTEN THAN NOT.
4. WITH OUR RELOCATION TO THE FLIGHT LINE OPS BUILDING AND THE IMPENDING INSTALLATION OF 1J53 CIRCUIT ~~XRBNXX~~ ~~EXXX~~ (PONY CKT FROM DET 3 TO 6908TH), IT WAS FELT THAT OUR TRAFFIC COULD BE PASSED BY THE 08TH OR WE COULD BE PATCHED ~~XXXXXX~~ THROUGH TO 7RRFS. THE 6908TH ~~XXXX~~ HAS FLATLY STATED THAT THEY CANNOT PATCH US THROUGH DURING THE DAYLIGHT PERIOD OF ACTIVITY AND THEREFORE WE WILL BE EFFECTIVELY CUT OFF FROM OUR CMA.
5. WE REQUIRE A FULL-TIME OPSCOMM CIRCUIT BETWEEN OURSELVES AND 7RRFS. THIS WOULD NOT ONLY FACILITATE THE PASSING OF OUR MESSAGE TRAFFIC, BUT WOULD ALSO ALLOW US TO PASS TRAFFIC/PATCH BETWEEN USM-704 (ARDF COORDINATING CENTER) AND USM-7 VIA THE 1J92 CIRCUIT, SOON TO BE REITERMINATED IN OUR COMM VAN.
6. IN THE EVENT OF EQUIPEMENT OUTAGE, THE 1J53(PONY) WOULD HAVE THE LOWEST RESTORATION PRIORITY.
7. IN VIEW OF THE HIGH INTEREST THE US HAS IN THE LAOTIAN GROUND WAR AND OUR INTELLIGENCE CONTRIBUTION TO IT, A FULL TIME OPSCOMM CIRCUIT IS FULLY JUSTIFIED.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 15

POST MISSION DEBRIEF		DATE 19 MAR 72	ARDF MISSION NO 611A	ALTERNATE MISSION AREA -
T E-72/RT01	FRAG POINT WD2060	FRAGGED TIME ON TARGET 1800Z		SRO/AMS Schaffner
RO 1 DICKERSON	RO 2 LADSONS	RO 3 HAMERIK	RO 4 -	

MISSION DATA			
AIRCRAFT TAIL NO 8097	TIME TAKE-OFF/LOCATION 1710Z/NKP 18 MAR 72	TIME LAND/LOCATION 0010Z/NKP/19 MAR 72	
ENTERED EFFECTIVE AREA 1725Z	ENTERED ABSOLUTE AREA 1755Z	DEPART ABSOLUTE AREA 2315Z	DEPART EFFECTIVE AREA 0001Z
ARRIVE ALTERNATE AREA -	DEPART ALTERNATE AREA -	TIME OF ABORT -	TOTAL TOT 5+20
			TOTAL FLT TIME 7+0

COLLECTION DATA									
POSITION NO	MINUTES MM COPY		MM IDENT		MINUTES VOICE COPY		VOICE IDENT		
	HF	VHF	ABN	POST MSN	HF	VHF	ABN	POST MSN	
Y EDFY EM052	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Z1 EDFZ BT025	-	32	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Z2 EDFZ ET085	-	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TOTAL MESSAGES COPIED								TOTAL MINUTES COPY			
PARTIALLY		COMPLETE		EXPLOITABLE		PASSED TO DSU		MM		VOICE	
HF	VHF	HF	VHF	HF	VHF	HF	VHF	HF	VHF	HF	VHF
-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	10	-	-	54
-	3	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-

ARDF DATA												
POSITION NO		TGTS WORKED		TGTS FIXED		TGTS CUT		FIXES PASSED		CUTS PASSED		
		HF	VHF	HF	VHF	HF	VHF	HF	VHF	HF	VHF	
X EDFX EM052		-	6	-	1	-	4	-	1	-	4	
FIX/CUTS IDENT			TIP-OFFS FROM DSU				FIX RADIUS		NO FIXES IN AREA	NO CUTS IN AREA	NO PRIS FIXED	
C/S	DSU	POST MSN	RED	HEARD	FIXED	CUT	0-1000	1001-2000			P61	P62
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	-	-

IV) AREA CONDITIONS	
DID WX INTERFERE WITH MISSION?	<input type="checkbox"/> YES (Explain) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
ABORT WX?	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
DID ARTILLERY INTERFERE WITH MISSION?	<input type="checkbox"/> YES (Explain) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO

V) EQUIPMENT	
EXPERIENCE EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS?	<input type="checkbox"/> YES (Explain) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO

VI COMMUNICATIONS DATA					
PRIMARY DSU / FREQ NATURAL 270.4	CONTACT YES	ALTERNATE DSU / FREQ WILLARD MOBILE 256.5	CONTACT NO	PASSED TFC TO DSU FOR NATURAL	
T. IN NET 1715Z	TIME OUT NET 2315Z	NO HESTIA PAD PAGES USED N/A			

TFC PASSED BY SECURE VOICE YES NO (Explain)

RELAYED TFC FOR STATIONS (From, To, Time)
N/A

IF NO CONTACT WITH DSU - GIVE TIME, FREQ, DSU, AND EXPLAIN IF ANY OTHER STATION CONTACTED.
N/A

VII MARKET TIME / ON-SCENE GARDEN DATA									
FIX COORDS	RADIUS	TIME	SIGHTED VISUALLY	COORDINATES	TIME	AIRCRAFT		N OF	
						FROM	TO	NO	NO
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TYPE VESSEL SIGHTED		HEADING	SPEED	AMPLIFYING DATA ON VESSEL (Name, Registry, etc)					
---		---	---	---					
TIME CONTACTED		CALLSIGN	FREQ	COMMENTS					
---		---	---	---					

REMARKS (Fully explain all late take-offs, ground or air aborts, and include such items as landing codes, etc.)

TRIPLES CALLED AT 1715Z AND INFORMED US OUR TFC
CALL WAS LOGMAN 413 VICE BAREN 413


CHECKED IN WITH MOON BUAM (AR000) AT 1738Z
HAD THEM 5X5 ON FM 44.2. PASSED TFC 1 TO
MOON BUAM AT 1946Z - THAT WAS 7000 METERS FROM ONE
OF THE DOWNED PILOTS.

MINUTE OF COPY OUT OF AR000 - MM - 1740Z
LANDING CODE - II ALAN/MC - 1740Z

LAUNCHED EARLY IN SUPPORT OF SAR EFFORTS

CERTIFICATION

I certify the above information is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

SIGNATURE OF SRO / AMS


SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 16

FF TMLD CR
DE WAWWIZ 0015 2-11-68
ZNY WWSH
P 010950Z AUG 72
FM DET 3 6994SOTYSO
TO 6994SOTYSO/00

REF: A. USAFSS DOW 350100Z JUL 72, SUBJ: DET 3 ANOPACI
B. 6994SS DORM 310000Z JUL 72, NO SUBJ

1. WE HAVE CONDUCTED A THOROUGH ANALYSIS OVER A FOUR MONTH PERIOD OF THE DECREASE POINTED OUT IN REF A AND HAVE ISOLATED SOME INTERESTING FACTS AND POSSIBLE CONCLUSIONS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE DERIVED ALL THE FIGURES USED IN THIS MSG FROM OUR OWN DATA, WE HAVE EXAMINED IN THE FOLLOWING FORMAT SOME PROBLEM AREAS WHICH ARE VISIBLY. READ ACROSS MONTH AND CATEGORY:

LAND AND AIR ABORTS RESULTING IN UNRECOVERED MSNS:

	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL
A. WX	5/28	5/28	15/42	23/61
B. COMM	1/1	2/8	2/3	1/2
C. GAFFER COMPASS	1/1	4/2	3/15	2/2
D. ELECTRICAL	1/4	4/4	1/4	2/2
E. ENGINE	1/18	7/7	4/7	18/8
F. LANDING GEAR	1/8	2/8	2/1	1/8
G. FUEL	8/3	8/26	2/11	2/6
H. BRAVO	3/5	5/11	2/9	6/5
I. OTHER	2/4	1/4	2/1	2/8
J. NO ACFT AVAILABLE	2/3	4/8	1/1	9/11

2. THE INCREASING NUMBER OF ABORTS FOR WX IS DUE TO THE WEATHER PRESENTLY AT ITS PEAK; WE CAN ANTICIPATE A GRADUAL DECREASE IN PROBLEM THRU THE END OF SEPT. THE LARGE NUMBER OF THE ABORTS EXPERIENCED DUE TO LOW FUEL DURING MAY IS POSSIBLY CAUSED BY AN ERRONEOUS READING OF THE CLIMB RATE/LOAD CHART AND FUEL GAUGE. THE INCREASE OF BOTH BR/AV ABORTS IN JULY CREDITED TO THE UNAVAILABILITY OF ACFT HAS BEEN DUE TO SCHEDULING AND OPERATIONAL READY ACFT AGAINST A PARTICULAR MISSION, WAITING FOR A TURN AROUND ACFT THAT REQUIRED REPAIRS, ETC.

3. WE CANNOT DETERMINE THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF FLYING HOURS DUE TO PARTICULAR MALFUNCTIONS/WEATHER WITHOUT EXHAUSTIVE DATA WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A PROHIBITIVE NUMBER OF MANHOURS. THEREFORE, THE MISSIONS COUNTED AS REDUCED THAT SPENT NO MORE THAN 15 MINUTES IN THE TGT AREA.

4. THIS IS PRIMARILY THE CASE WITH WX ABORTS WHICH WE BELIEVE IS CAUSED TO A GREAT EXTENT BY THE PRESSURE BEING APPLIED TO THE OPERATING COMMAND TO DECREASE THE NUMBER OF ABORTS. IN MISSIONS, THE ACFT WILL BE REQUIRED TO FLY AT A HIGH ALTITUDE FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, KNOWING ALL THE TIME THAT THE ACFT WILL BE REQUIRED TO FLY FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

[REDACTED]

4. THE SIGNIFICANT DECREASE IN COPY TIME AND NUMBER OF FIXES OBTAINED IS ALSO DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE RELOCATION OF THE HQ NVA 312TH DIV. THE HQ AND SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS DEPARTED THE SEA AREA 15 DURING THE LATE APR/EARLY MAY TIME FRAME. THIS ENTITY ACCOUNTED FOR 73 TGT TRANSMITTERS (ACCORDING TO NSA SIGINT ORDER OF BATTLE) AND WAS THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF BOTH VHF TGT AND EXPLOITABLE MSG COPY IN THAT AREA. DURING THIS SAME PERIOD THE REMAINING MAJOR HQ BEGAN MOVING TO THE NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN PORTION OF THE PDJ BETWEEN XIENG KHOUANGVILLE AND BAN BAN. THESE AREAS ARE CURRENTLY, AS IN THE PAST, INSIDE THE AAA HIGH THREAT AREA AND INACCESSIBLE TO ARDF DUE IN LARGE PART TO THE LOW WATT OUTPUT OF THE TACTICAL XMTRS. TO DATE THE ONLY LOW LEVEL EXPLOITABLE MSG COPY BEING OBTAINED IS FROM BATTALION AND COMPANY SIZE ELEMENTS OF THE NVA 148 REGIMENT, 316TH DIV. THESE ELEMENTS ARE CONDUCTING BLOCKING/HOLDING OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE PDJ IN THE VICINITY OF PHOU PHAXAI RIDGE AREA. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE DECREASE IN THE COPY (COLLECTION) TIME IS THE RELOCATION AND REORGANIZATION OF BINH TRAM ACTIVITIES IN THE STEEL TIGER WEST (SEA AREA 11) AREA. AT LEAST TWO AND POSSIBLY MORE OF THESE UNITS HAVE RELOCATED TO THE DMZ AREA.

5. IN SUMMARY, BELIEVE THE DECREASE IN PRODUCTION IN RELATION TO THE INCREASE IN RESOURCES IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE THREE FACTORS POINTED OUT ABOVE: WEATHER IN THE TGT AREAS, MASSIVE RELOCATION OF ENEMY FORCES AND THE EVER PRESENT COMBINATION OF MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY PROBLEMS TO BE CONFRONTED IN KEEPING THE ACFT AND EQUIPMENT IN GOOD OPERATING CONDITION.

6. IF WE CAN BE OF ANY FURTHER ASSISTANCE PLEASE ADVISE.

850

0016

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NNNN

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 17

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 18

07 Jan 72

JOINT [REDACTED]
SECURITY CLASSIF [REDACTED]

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		XX	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION IMMEDIATE			
INFO IMMEDIATE			

DTG 07 JAN 72

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: PACSCTY RGN/DORT

~~INFO:~~ 6994SCTYSQ/DO

INFO: USAFSS/DORT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DO

SUBJECT: USA-564 VOICE INTERCEPT PROCESSING

REF: PSR MSG DTG UNK, SUBJ AS ABV.

1. CONCLUSION REACHED BY DIRNSA THAT OUR EMR'S ARE PRODUCED FROM HANDLOGS IS INCORRECT. ALL TAPES ARE SCANNED EITHER WHILE THE ACFT IS RETURNING OR ITS DONE ON THE GROUND. I CHALLENGE THE STATEMENT THAT 50% OF OUR MESSAGES WERE NOT EMR'D. ALTHOUGH A VERY FEW OF THE MESSAGES IN THE PAST MAY NOT HAVE BEEN EMR'D, BLV MEASURES INSTITUTED TWO-THREE WEEKS AGO HAVE RESOLVED THIS PROBLEM.

2. THE VOME-158 SYSTEM BEGAN TO APPEAR IN HEAVY USAGE IN OUR BARREL ROLL (312TH/316TH DIV AO) INTERCEPT APPROX 15 OCTOBER. PRIOR TO THAT, THE BULK OF OUR TRAFFIC FROM THE 15 AREA WAS IN SYSTEM VOMA-1062.

DATE	TIME
07	
MONTH	YEAR
JAN	1972
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	

DRAFT

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE 3158

C.T. PURKISS, CAPT USAF

SIGNATURE

RELEASED

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

CHARLES T. PURKISS, CAPT, USAF

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]

REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION




PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY
INFO IMMEDIATE	C.T. PURKISS	
INFO IMMEDIATE		3158

A SIMPLE DYNOMIS DIGITAL SYSTEM WITH NO PLAINTEXT. ^X 7

THE NUMBER OF VOICE MESSAGES COPIED IN AREA 15 ~~XXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXX~~ PRIOR TO OCTOBER HOWEVER WAS ONLY A FRACTION OF
WHAT WE NOW SEE IN THAT AREA. THE MOST LUCRATIVE AREA
FOR VOICE MESSAGES WAS IN THE STEEL TIGER AREAS, HERE
WE SEE ~~WCMA-300~~ SERIES SYSTEMS, ALSO PURE DYNOMIC
DIGITAL SYSTEMS.

3. DET 3 IS AUTHORIZED A203'S TO MAN ONE LINGUIST
ABOARD FOUR FIVE-HOUR MISSION PER DAY PLUS GROUND
PROCESSING. ALTHOUGH WE ARE TWO OVERSTRENGTH ON
NUMBER OF ASSIGNED, OUR PFD TOTAL IS ONE UNDER AUTHORIZED.
WE PRESENTLY ARE FLYING FOUR SEVEN-HOUR MISSIONS PER
DAY AND MUST HAVE TWO LINGUISTS ABOARD ON TWO OF THEM.
BEGINNING THIS WEEK, WE WILL REQUIRE TWO ABOARD ON
THREE MISSIONS FOR FOUR DAYS OF THE TASKING WEEK. WE
HAVE REQUESTED TDY ASSISTANCE AND EXPECT TWO LINGUISTS
TO ARRIVE SHORTLY. HOWEVER, AS OF THIS DATE, WE HAVE THREE
OF OUR LINGUISTS MAXED OUT FOR MONTHLY FLYING HOURS AND FOUR
MORE THAT WILL MAX^X OUT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE HAVE THREE LINGUISTS
ON 30-DAY SPECIAL LEAVE AND THREE MORE SCHEDULED FOR IT
WITHIN THE NEXT MONTH. J



CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 2	NO. OF PAGES 9	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS		

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SEC [REDACTED]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
NON IMMEDIATE	G.T. PURKISS		
INFO IMMEDIATE			

5. APART FROM THE QUANTITATIVE PROBLEMS WITH THE 203⁷ ARE THE QUALITATIVE PROBLEMS. AS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN EARLIER EXCHANGES CONCERNING USA-564 PROCESSING, OUR LINGUISTS ARE CAPABLE ~~OR~~ INTERCEPT OPERATORS, BUT THEIR PROCESSING ABILITY IS EXTREMELY LIMITED BY ~~IN~~EXPERIENCE. THE TRAINING PROGRAM DISCUSSED HAS BEEN HELD IN ABEYANCE BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY FLYING SCHEDULE.

6. THE PROBLEM OF MISSED PLAIN-TEXT IN OUR VCME-158 EMR'S WAS POINTED OUT TO US DURING MY DEC TDY TO USM-7. SINCE THEN, WE HAVE HAD ONLY OUR MOST EXPERIENCED PROCESSORS WORK ON VCME-158 MSGS. WHILE I BLV THE QUALITY OF OUR TRANSCRIPTION HAS IMPROVED SINCE THEN, I ADMIT IT IS STILL INADEQUATE,

7. WITH THE PRESENT NUMBER AND TYPE OF LINGUISTS, I SEE NO WAY THAT WE CAN SATISFY DIRNSA. WE DO SCAN AND EXTRACT ALL EXPLOITABLE MSGS. HOWEVER, SOME WILL CONTINUE TO BE OF LITTLE VALUE UNTIL THEY ARE RETRANSCRIBED AT USM-7.

8. AS EVIDENCED BY OUR DO ~~AND OTHER RECENT~~ 260750Z DEC 71, ~~AND~~ OTHER RECENT MSGS WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE CRITICAL POTENTIAL OF OUR EFFORTS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENHANCE THE TIMELINESS OF OUR PRODUCT.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		3	4		
SECURITY CLASS [REDACTED]				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	

DD

FORM 1 NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY
ACTION IMMEDIATE	C.T. PURKISS	
INFO IMMEDIATE		

9. FOR 6994: REQ WAIVER OF MAXIMUM MONTHLY FLYING 7 HOURS FOR ~~SGT~~ SGT JAMES B. LIDSTONE, FR [REDACTED], SGT CRAGIN P. PARKER JR., FR [REDACTED], SGT JOHN W. CLANCY, FR [REDACTED]. LIDSTONE AND PARKER WILL DEPART ON SPEC LV 15 JAN 72 AND 05 FEB RESPECTIVELY. THIS WAIVER WILL HELP RELIEVE THE CURRENT PROB AND NOT CAUSE A PROB FOR QUARTERLY HOURS REQUIREMENTS.



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CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		16	16		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			GRADING INSTRUCTIONS		

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 19

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 20



XXX

IMMEDIATE
IMMEDIATE

24/0730Z JAN 72

USA-564

USA-
~~564~~561

INFO: PACSCTYRGN/DOR

USAFSS/DOP

USM-7/DO



ZEN/USA-523



DO JAN 72

SUBJ: USA-564 VOICE PROCESSING

REF: A. UR 070145Z JAN 72 REXMTL OF DIRNSA MSG, SAME
SUBJ.

B. PSR/DOR 180248Z JAN 72

1. ^{WO} AND ² ~~TWO~~ 7RRFS LING-
 UISTS/ANALYSTS VISITED THIS UNIT ON ² 03 JAN 72. ALL WERE
 AMAZED BY OUR RECENT GYRATIONS BROUGHT ABOUT BY REF ALFA.
 THEY STATED THAT THE PROBLEM THAT HAD EXISTED PRIOR TO
 CAPT PURKISS' VISIT TO UDORN IN EARLY DEC. HAD BEGUN TO
 GO AWAY IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE VISIT. SINCE APPROX ^D
 CHRISTMAS, USM-7 HAS BEEN ISSUING SPOTS, TACREPS, AND

24
JAN 1972
01 02

3158

CAPT PURKISS

John P French
for CHARLES T PURKISS, CAPT, USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER



IMMEDIATE
IMMEDIATE

CAPT PURKISS

CAPT PURKISS

3158

TRANSLATIONS DIRECTLY FROM OUR EMR'S.

2. FYI: USM-7 [REDACTED] NOW BELIEVE AN OPSTOP AT UDORN IS DESIRABLE. THEIR LINGUIST/ANALYST WOULD RATHER WORK WITH A FULL TRANSCRIPT THAN AN EMR. WE EXPLAINED SOME POSSIBLE PROBLEMS, E.G., REDUCED TOT DUE TO FUEL REQUIREMENTS OR ALLOCATED AIRFRAME FLYING HOURS, CREW-REST, ETC. THEY INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD PURSUE THE SUBJ THROUGH NSAPAC CHANNELS.

3. USA-523 INTENDS TOPROCESS OUR TAPES (STARTING TODAY) ON THE MID SHIFT. THIS WILL RESULT IN A TWELVE TO EIGHTEEN HOUR DELAY IN EMR FORWARDING OVER THE PRESENT METHOD. IN VIEW OF PARA ONE, QUERY ADVISABILITY OF CONTINUING WITH PROCEDURES TASKED IN REF BRAVO.

02 02

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 21.

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 22

[REDACTED]

P R 012106Z MAR 72
FM DIRNSA
TO USA-523
USA-564
INFO USAFSS
CG USA
PSK
USASAPAC
NSAPAC
NSAPAC REP VIETNAM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

USM-7
USM-808
USA-561
ZEM
[REDACTED]

B65-0568-72
RYE/AUTOLINE SUPPORT
REF: B65-0503-72 242226Z FEB

1. IN CONNECTION WITH RECENT ASSUMPTION BY USA-523 OF PROCESSING AND REPORTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR VC ENCRYPTED MSGS AS SUMMARIZED IN REF AM NOW PREPARED TO PROVIDE DIRECT RYE/AUTOLINE SUPPORT IN FORM OF DECRYPTS OF MSGS AS WELL AS IDENTIFICATION OF MSGS TO CRYPTOSYSTEM (THE LATTER IS ALREADY BEING PROVIDED)
 2. SHORTLY AFTER RECEIPT OF THIS MSG USA-523 WILL RECEIVE FIRST DECRYPTS VIA OPSCOMM CIRCUIT 1J45. DECRYPTS WILL BE PROVIDED FOR MSGS IN GDRS/GDRS RELATED CRYPTOSYSTEMS (EXCLUDING NORTHERN LAOS) RECEIVED AT NSA IN EMRS WHICH CARRY THE USA-523 OR USA-564 PDDGS IN THE XXMM LINE. DECRYPTS WILL BE RETURNED FOR MSGS RECEIVED WITH IDENT IN THE TTT LINE AS WELL AS FOR MSGS WHICH ARE RECEIVED AS POSS EX AND SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTED TO CRYPTOSYSTEM DURING RYE PROCESSING.
 3. TO GAIN MAXIMUM BENEFIT FROM THE RYE SYSTEM EMRS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED AS SOON AFTER INTERCEPT AS POSSIBLE. IF RAPID PUNCHING AND OPSCOMM INPUT IS NOT ACHIEVED, MANUAL DECRYPTION METHODS WILL PRODUCE DECRYPTS MORE RAPIDLY. THE TURN AROUND TIME FOR DECRYPTS IS EXPECTED TO BE SIMILAR TO THAT USA-523 HAS ALREADY EXPERIENCED FOR IDENT SUMMARIES. THE PRIMARY FACTORS EFFECTING TURN AROUND ARE THE AVAILABILITY OF THE OPSCOMM CIRCUIT AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE RYE COMPUTER SYSTEM. DURING PERIODS OF COMPUTER OR CIRCUIT OUTAGE DECRYPTS SHOULD BE PREPARED BY HAND.
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. EMRS ORIGINATED BY USA-564 ARE AT TIMES BEING RECEIVED VIA THE USA-523/B65 OPSCOMM CIRCUIT. REQUEST USE OF THIS CIRCUIT AS THE PRIMARY METHOD OF FWDING USA-564 EMRS IF POSS AS IT WILL RESULT IN MORE RAPID PROVISION OF DECRYPTS TO USA-523, USM-7 OR USM-808 AS APPROPRIATE.

5. REQUEST USA-523 COMMENTS ON COMPUTER SUPPORT AFTER RECEIPT OF DECRYPTS FOR TWO WEEK PERIOD.

395
1239

NNNN

A TRUE COPY


Edward S. Marek

EDWARD S. MAREK, CAPT, USAF

[REDACTED]

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