


HISTORY OF THE 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

January – June 1972










HISTORY OF 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON 01 JANUARY 1972 THROUGH 30 JUNE 1972 RCS: USS-D3



6994th Security Squadron, APO San Francisco 96307

USAFSS FORM 86



HISTORY OF THE 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON 01 January 1972 through 30 June 1972 RCS: USS-D3

Approved:

DAVID H EDDY, Lt Col, USAF Commander



i (This page is unclassified)

FRONTISPIECE

We, who are here, know what we have done; to tell others of its significance is the problem at hand. To examine all aspects, then pick and choose which need be related to give others an awareness of the past, is to be instructed in the course of the future. This morning has already become part of yesterday, and tonight remains still a part of tomorrow. If we as a people cannot use the past to understand today and plan for tomorrow, then we will remain wandering in the dark ages forever.

(Sgt William T Schroeder, Unit Historian, 6994th Security Squadron.)

FOREWORD


This report covers the period of 01 January 1972 through 30 June 1972 concerning the operations of the 6994th Security Squadron, staging from Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Republic of Vietnam.

It is concerned with operational concepts involved with day-to-day interaction with Tactical Field Commanders. This is in compliance with existing requirements to compile a continuing documentation of the Airborne Radio Direction Finding program in support of an armed conflict.

The documents of the two subordinate detachments have been submitted separately.

This history is subject to revision. Additional information or suggested corrections are welcome.

This report was written by Sergeant William T Schroeder as an additional duty Unit Historian, with valuable research assistance and aid coming from all levels.



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Listing of Key Personnel

Commander - Lt Col David H. Eddy

First Sergeant - MSgt Jacob D. Bonnette

Operations Officer - Maj Holbrook M. Watts

Chief Airborne Operations - Capt Henry X. Mioduski

NCOIC Airborne Operations - MSgt William E. Marshall

NCOIC Operations - CMSgt Luther M. David, Jr

NCOIC Standardization Evaluation - TSgt Michael D. Preslar

OIC ACC - Capt William K. Skaer, Jr

NCOIC ACC - SMSgt James C. Boyd

NCOIC Mission Management - SMSgt Ronald J. Faile

NCOIC Plans and Programs - MSgt John H. Ragsdale

OIC Operational VIM Training - Capt Thomas L. Collins/Capt Henry X. Mioduski

OIC VIM Maintenance Training - Capt Patrick Loos

NCOIC Local Analysis and Reporting - MSgt James P. Cobble

OIC Communications Security - Capt Jay G. Cowan

NCOIC Communications Security - SMSgt J.P. Regan

Chief of Maintenance - Capt William H. Smith

NCOIC of Maintenance - SMSgt John E. Decker

OIC Material/Supply - Capt Arthur J. Willis

NCOIC Material/Supply - TSgt Edward M. Hopkins

NCOIC Communications - MSgt J.J. Disabatino

NCOIC Administration - MSgt Andrew J. Brooks

NCOIC Security Police - TSgt Leon A. Beverly

NCOIC Personnel - SMSgt Donald R. Speer



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Vietnamization Improvement and

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Sector Sector

CHRONOLOGY

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1 January	VIM electronic maintenance training begins.
3 January	Three EC-47s damaged by "near miss."
4 January	PSR initiates moritorium on all manpower changes.
8 January	377th ABW assumes Command and Control of 360th TEWS.
8-10 January	Certain Frag areas realigned due to changing high threat status.
ll January	ACC implements MIG/SAM reporting to all CMAs and aviation units due to increased threat.
12 January	Documents captured, sampans destroyed in U Minh as result of excellence of ARDF reporting.
17 January	USM-704 queries possibility of eliminating Hestia Pads due to non-use. 6994th concurs.
18 January	Det 3 receives assistance from 6908th in voice processing due to volume of traffic and low level of manning.
18 January	Pakse dismantles its secure voice equipment due to high threat.
18 January	Four-cycle test begins to evaluate aviation units' suggested tasking changes/revisions.
22 January	Six EC-47s awaiting deployment to CONUS to be put back on operational status at TSN, RVN.
26 January	ARDF supports ARC LIGHT activities throughout Tri- Border area.
26 January	6994th advises that VIM program is slipping due to poor quality of student input.
31 January	401 manning level for 6994th queried; could result in elimination of Det 2.
31 January	Tanks believed to be operational in Laos.
31 January	VIM manning ten aircraft per day and DIRNSA releases much of the necessary technical data to them.



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6 February	Project Cumbersome expanded to include USM-7 and USM-626.
9 February	6994th to supply 10 men out-of-hide to maintain ACC function.
10 February	Two ALR-38s to hunt tanks believed to be of battalion strength in the Boleveu Plateau, Laos.
12 February	PSR reports tanks moving south on Rt 966, Laos.
14 February	6994th coordinates with 7AF to try to solve Brown Beaver (Fix/FAC) program deficiencies.
15 February	Det 3 fixes tanks.
15 February	Special ARDF/ACI mission tasked specifically for tanks.
19 February	Tanks enter South Vietnam as USM-808 receives TACREP responsibility; ACC works with 7AF Blue Chip for fast reaction.
19 February	Air/Ground/Air tip-off station at Savannakhet, Laos to be established.
21 February	VC 5th and NVA 271st Divisions pose a threat to Tay Ninh, RVN.
25 February	Project Cumbersome II test begins.
26 February	Manpower study forwarded to USAFSS.
26 February	VIM assume ARR and EMR responsibility for Morse intercept.
l March	6994th visits 362d TEWS to train navigators in the Dual Ops program.
4 March	Twenty-six tank columns known to be operating.
11 March	Suggested curtailment of A292s to meet manning reductions.
13 March	6994th banned from night operations in certain areas due to high threat and possible mistaken shootdown by friendly gunships.
14 March	PSR waives Corrosion Control in some instances and authorizes cannibalization of aircraft for more availability.

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22 March	Test flight for COMUSMACV.
27 March	Laudatory comments ask for continued support of ARDF in ARC LIGHT targeting.
30 March	6994th plans to turn over all ALR-34 aircraft to the VIMs.
l April	LZ Sarge and Fire Support Base A-4 overrun. 6994th counters to prevent loss of ACI.
2 April	Loss of Explorer sites means a greater need for ACI.
4 April	Army and Air Force work together as Quang Tri is threatened.
7 April	5th, 7th, and 9th VC/NVA Divisions on the move; 6994th adjusts for better coverage.
7 April	AAA threat in Loc Ninh/An Loc area reduces 6994th ability to cover all lucrative targets.
8 April	6994th re-states need for ACC function.
13 April	Two EC-47s destroyed by rocket attack.
14 April	7AF requests special mission to locate 325th NVA Division, believed near Dong Hoi, North Vietnam.
16 April	6994th coordinates with 6990th for MIG/SAM warning in SEA area 17.
22 April	6994th locates suspected tanks near Snoul, Loc Ninh, and An Loc.
29 April	Possible tanks in the Parrots Beak as 12 APCs sighted by ARDF crew 50 kms from Saigon.
2 May	SA-7s introduced into Quang Tri area.
3 May	SA-7s introduced into Kontum/Pleiku areas.
5 May	Det 2 prepares for possible emergency evacuation by destroying all non-essential classified data.
5 May	6994th tracking the 325th, but having "Bar Cap" problems.
6 May	6994th ceases flying with Vietnamese operators. VIMs now flying 70-75 missions per week.

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11 M	lay	Phase II of Project Cumbersome II begins.
13 M	-	USN-414N acts as tip-off agency in support of missions over Gulf of Tonkin.
13 M	lay	Maj Gen J.J. Jumper DCS/Intel lauds 6994th for filling gap left by other agencies.
19 M	•	MACV states that as imminent battle approaches in MR-II, ARDF will provide most valuable information.
22 M	lay	Increasing activity in Kontum area causes ARDF community to join forces.
23 M	ay	Det 2 makes plans for possible shift to Det 3.
🔴 24 M	lay	ACC status still undecided.
- 26 M	ay	Cumbersome II, Phase II complete success.
28 M	lay	NCPR(C) outlines reductions for ACC.
30 M	ay	Emergency landing of EC-47 leaves crew safe.
2 J	une	Cumbersome II, Phase III begins.
5 J	une	ACC status is at a standstill.
12 J		COMSEC closedown; marks end of seven years of surveillance.
15 J		DIRNSA relates that success of the Vietnamization of the EC-47 program entirely due to 6994th effort.
1 5 J		Maj Gen McNaff offers thanks for a job well done as COMSEC closes.
17 J [.]		Army reinitiates U-8s into ARDF fight against elusive VC/NVA.
17 J	une	VIM increases to 12 lines per day.
23 J	une	ACC to move to the 7AF compound.

Chapter I

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

This chapter is an introduction to succeeding chapters and covers the mission of the 6994th Security Squadron. It explains how the 6994th provided intelligence support to tactical units in the Republic of Vietnam.

<u>Mission</u>

The 6994th Security Squadron (Scty Sq) was located at Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Republic of Vietnam (RVN). The operational mission of the 6994th Scty Sq was to conduct Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) and specified Airborne Communications Intelligence (ACI) collection against enemy targets in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) and Cambodia in direct support of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Another mission of the 6994th was providing direct Communications Security (COMSEC*) support to I Tactical Commanders and Seventh Air Force (7AF).

In addition to the mission performed in III and IV CTZs, the 6994th Scty Sq provided command, operational, and administrative control for the two subordinate units located at Da Nang Air Base, 2 RVN, and Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand.

The Command, Administration, Personnel, Communications, and Operations functions were located in the Air Force Special Security Office (AFSSO) 7AF compound within the Hq 7AF compound at Tan Son Nhut

*The phasedown and subsequent close-out of this portion of the squadron mission will be explained in Chapter V_{\bullet}



Afld, RVN. The squadron logistics function was located on the flight line adjacent to the 360th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (TEWS). The 360th TEWS directly supported the 6994th Scty Sq by providing the necessary aircraft and front-end crews. The 360th TEWS was subordinate 3 to the 483d Tactical Airlift Wing at Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN, until l February 1972 when command and control was assumed by the 377th Air Base Wing (ABW), at Tan Son Nhut Afld, RVN.

The 6994th Scty Sq performed the ARDF mission in South Vietnam and Cambodia aboard EC-47 platforms throughout the entire reporting period and were tasked with any of three types of missions: ARDF, ARDF/ACI, and if the ARDF capability was lost, ACI only. In accomplishing these missions two separate position equipment configurations, COMBAT CROSS (CC) and COMBAT CROSS ZULU (CCZ) were utilized. In subsequent portions of this document, the specific tasking for each of these positions and configurations is outlined in detail.

Organizational Structure

The 6994th Scty Sq was directly subordinate to the Pacific Security Region at Wheeler AFB, Hawaii, the only intermediate between the squadron and Hq, USAF Security Service. With two operational detachments subordinate to the squadron and a direct support role of supplying ARDF to tactical units (both Army and Air Force) within the Republic of Vietnam, the 6994th was placed in the distinctive position of being the only USAFSS unit of its kind.

In view of the daily inter-service involvement throughout the entire ARDF program in Southeast Asia (SEA) (i.e. Army, Air Force,



Australian, and Vietnamese), the general operational control of the entire ARDF effort was exercised by the Commander, United States 7 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV).

Internal Organizational Structure

(U) The 6994th Scty Sq integral support functions consisted of Administration, Personnel, Airborne Equipment Maintenance*, Operations 8 Supply*, Communications, and Security.

(U) The operations functions consisted of Local Operations, Squadron Mission Management, COMSEC, and the Airborne Coordination 9 Center (ACC).

Local Operations was responsible for the management of airborne mission resources located at Tan Son Nhut Afld. This function directed, coordinated, and controlled personnel and mission equipment toward achieving maximum mission effectiveness. They provided for all operational missions and were responsible for scheduling and training newly assigned airborne personnel. They coordinated with ACC and the 360th TEWS on all changes to mission tasking and published daily flying schedules for all fragged mission areas. Additionally, coordination with the TEWS command and control element and 7AF was conducted on special occasions. They performed analysis and reporting on all ARDF and COMINT intercept collected, prepared daily/weekly evaluations and reports on the squadron's ARDF/Collection accomplishments.

*Specific functions and appropriate historical data is outlined in Chapter VI.

Scheduling Section

The Scheduling Section continued to be the focal point of all duties performed by airborne personnel assigned to the 6994th Scty Sq. The section consisted of two NCOs whose primary function was to schedule air crew members for each ARDF/ACI mission tasked. The schedules were normally posted two days in advance and contained brief times, crew members, drivers, and stand-by personnel. In addition, the Scheduling Section also was required to maintain a personnel statistics chart on a daily basis which contained strength by AFSC, number assigned, number present for duty, and appropriate remarks. This chart also provided information deemed necessary for coordinated scheduling of Students with IROs, local and base details, appointments, leaves/TDYs/ R&Rs, and projected losses due to reassignment. An individual mission time chart was kept current on each crew member to insure that none of the personnel exceeded the maximum 125 flying hours per month.

During the first six months of 1972, the amount of time required to accomplish all of the scheduling functions decreased in proportion to the increase in mission assumption by the Vietnamese. Early in the year, Local Scheduling was responsible for scheduling radio operators, linguists, and analysts for eight American lines per day. In addition, it was tasked with the responsibility of coordinating briefing times at the 360th TEWS for the Vietnamese crews. On 15 January, ten lines were tasked against the Vietnamese, reducing the lines flown by all American crews to three. Americans were still flying to maintain communications due to the language deficiency of the



Vietnamese operators.* Beginning 15 March, the 6994th was tasked with two additional lines per day as the six aircraft which had been awaiting redeployment to CONUS were brought back into use. The American sorties then fluctuated between five and seven each day. At the end of June, the Squadron level again dropped to three missions per day. <u>Mission Management</u>

(U) The Mission Management function of the 6994th Scty Sq was accomplished by two separate offices (Local and Squadron Operations) until March of 1972. The two offices combined to reduce the expenditure of manpower and economize on the amount of office and file space being utilized.

The single office then prepared and distributed the Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS), prepared and forwarded all changes to the USA-561 distribution lists, and prepared a weekly evaluation of local mission accomplishments. It was also responsible for the staff supervision of all ARDF and COMINT collection missions at the subordinate detachments. They evaluated management summaries and position status reports submitted by the subordinate units as well as maintained weekly and monthly statistics, used to identify trends/problems in all areas of productivity. The statistical management data base maintained by the section was used not only at the 6994th Scty Sq, but also at staff level by both 7AF and MACV. Additionally, the Mission Management Section participated in the development of plans,

*See Chapter IV for the resume of VIM activities.



programs, Joint Operating Agreements (JOAs), and other directives governing all aspects of squadron operational functions. Mission Management was responsible for monitoring/updating the Master Program, the submission of Change Requests generated thereby, and assisted in the preparation of Manpower Change Requests which were necessitated as a result of Master Program action. Periodic Master Program Review Boards were convened under the guidance of Mission Management to insure current/future alignment of documented resources with constantly changing mission requirements. Preparation of various weekly and monthly Programmed Actions Directives (PADs) progress reports was also a 11 function of Mission Management.

Training

The training function of the 6994th Scty Sq was concerned with two distinct phases: ARDF Proficiency Training, and normal upgrade training. It was also responsible to oversee the subordinate units to insure that they too, fulfilled all requirements.

(U) During the first six months of 1972, the number of persons in upgrade training (UGT) decreased at the local level but increased at the detachment level. The majority of the people in training were attempting to upgrade to the seven skill level. The local training section, like the detachments, maintained the training records (AF Form 623) of all personnel. The records were inturn used as a guide to assist individuals in their respective problem areas in a never ending task to continually improve individual worth to the Air Force.





(U) Training of newly arrived aircrew members varied at all three locations both in type/duration (due to the differences in aircraft systems at each unit) and in numbers. Individual Knowledge Examination and Testing (IKET) was also done at all levels to insure that the knowledge implanted was being retained. The overall passing average was 90%. The Squadron Training NCO also visited the detachments to further insure this important function was given adequate attention.

Standardization Evaluation Flight Examination (SEFE)

The Standardization Evaluation Flight Examination function Was composed of a Chief Examiner (member of the Squadron Operations staff) and the Local Operations SEFE section. The Chief SEFE was responsible for monitoring the flight examination/evaluation procedures employed by SEFE sections of both local and subordinate detachments. He also acted as an advisor to the Operations Officer on matters relating to his area of specialization. This also insured that current material was utilized by the 6940th Technical Training Group/TTG, Goodfellow AFE, Texas. The Local Operations SEFE section, composed of A202, A203, and A207 personnel, worked in close coordination with the ARDF Proficiency Training Section to insure timely action to upgrade newly assigned personnel. Coordination with the Scheduling Section insured that upgrade actions provided the quality of operators necessary to the ARDF effort.

(U) Local SEFE section revised/updated their entire testing and data base during the first six months of 1972. The Squadron was visited by the Pac Scty Rgn Stan/Eval team in January and visits to the detachments by the Squadron SEFE section in April insured that they complied



with all recommendations and maintained the high standards that the 6994th Scty Sq has come to expect.

Communications Security (COMSEC)*

The COMSEC function of the 6994th Scty Sq continued to operate in direct support of 7AF, a unique position for any United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) COMSEC unit. This support consisted of providing timely information concerning probable or possible intelligence losses and COMSEC weaknesses on which the tactical commander could base operational decisions. This was accomplished by continual monitoring of telephone/radio communications, conducting analysis, and reporting the 12 results thereof directly to 7AF. This function continued until the phase-out in June of 1972.

ARDF Coordination Center (ACC)**

The ARDF Coordination Center (ACC) function was manned and operated jointly by members of the 509th Radio Research Group (RRG) and the 6994th Scty Sq in accordance with MACV Directive 381-23. Located in the Hq, 509th RRG at Whitebirch Station within the Vietnamese Joint General Staff Compound, the ACC was the organization through which MACV coordinated ARDF/ACI operations throughout SEA. The mission of this unique center was to provide for the coordination, control, and evaluation of all functions connected with the ARDF/ACI program. This included the coordinated scheduling and evaluation of ARDF and ACI

*See Chapter V for a resume of the activities and closure of this function.

**See Chapter IV, portion pertaining to SEA reductions for the questionable future operation of this function.



program. This included the coordinated scheduling and evaluation of 13 ARDF and ACI missions as directed by MACV.

Administrative Support

The 6994th Scty Sq also provided administrative support to the Security Service Liaison Officer (SSLO), Electronic Warfare Liaison Officer (EWLO) to 7AF, and the USAFSS personnel assigned to Operating Location Foxtrot-Delta (OL-FD), 6970th Support Group. Tasked with separate missions, these activities functioned independently of the 14

Chapter II

SIGINT TASKING AND COLLECTION

The Commander, MACV exercised operational control of the ARDF/ACI activities performed by the 6994th Scty Sq. Technical control of assigned ARDF/ACI activities was exercised by the Director, National l Security Agency (DIRNSA).

The 6994th Scty Sq was tasked with ARDF collection, processing, and reporting of Southeast Asian High Communist Frequency (HF) tactical Morse voice communications. In addition, ACI tasking was levied against both HF and Very High Frequency (VHF) SEA Communist Morse and single-channel voice communications. Applicable authorities held the prerogative for tasking against all other entities deemed 2 necessary.

aircraft, manned by Manual Morse and Voice Systems Specialists.

Basic Missions

For the period 1 January through 30 June 1972, the 6994th Sety Sq, staging from Tan Son Nhut Afld, RVN, was tasked with flying missions in SEA areas 01, 02, 03, 04 (RVN), and 20 (Cambodia).* The primary objective of these missions was to obtain accurate locations through ARDF of Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces operating in South Vietnam and Cambodia. The secondary mission was to collect target communications data in order to derive exploitable intelligence. The 6994th Scty Sq utilized two basic methods

*For outline of SEA ARDF areas see Appendix II.



of operation in accomplishing its assigned mission. <u>COMBAT CROSS (CC)</u>

The primary objective of CC missions was to fix enemy target transmitters deemed priority targets by MACV. CC aircraft were configured with two individual Signal Intelligence positions; ARDF and target acquisition. The ARDF and target acquisition positions were designated "X" and "Y" consoles, respectively. The "X" position was capable of fixing targets within a frequency range of 2 to 16 megahertz (MHZ). During fix operations, the "Y" console provided supporting intercept copy of ARDF targets and when time permitted, performed a Communications Intelligence (COMINT) collection mission, which was directed toward maximum continuity and development of all hostile target transmitters. The "Y" console operated within a frequency 4 range of .2 to 30 MHZ.

<u>COMBAT CROSS ZULU (CCZ)</u>

(This platform possessed two positions in addition to those found on the CC aircraft. The additional positions provided voice and manual Morse intelligence collection capabilities and were designated "Z1" and "Z2" respectively. The "Z1" and "Z2" consoles were wired for flexible system capability and could be configured for HF/HF, VHF/VHF, or HF/VHF reception. Selection of HF/VHF receivers and VHF tuners was more in consonance with the target environment to be exploited and in consideration of other system component characteristics, (i.e., Antenna/ Pre-amplification capability of .2 to 300 MHZ). To accomplish 6994th Scty Sq mission requirements, the two collection positions were



configured in accordance with tasking/collection requirement in the SEA ARDF area being targeted. The major portion of missions fragged were configured HF/VHF for "Z1" and HF/HF for "Z2." Selection of E-Band (10-30 MHZ) and A-Band (30-90 MHZ) tuners for the VHF receiver and the resulting radio frequency overlap of 10-30 MHZ between the G-133 and G-175J was to provide simultaneous intercept capability for back-link (two-way) communications in the more densely populated area of the radio spectrum. This provided either or both the "Z1" and "Z2" with HF/VHF (.5-90 MHZ) intercept capability. Appendix 3 is provided for further amplification of aircraft configurations utilized by the 6994th Scty Sq during this period.

Tasking Cycle


The tasking cycle for the ARDF/ACI missions flown by the 6994th Scty Sq was unique for a USAFSS unit, in that the tasks were designed to provide constant tactical support in a highly fluid armed 6 conflict.

(ARDF/ACI tasking originated with Army and Navy field commanders, the Cryptologic Community, and 7AF submission of requirements for each week. These requests were submitted to MACV (J2-114). On Wednesday of each week, MACV (J2-114) submitted the proposed tasking to the ARDF Coordinating Committee. This committee consisted of representatives (usually operations officers) of the 509th RRG, 6994th Scty Sq, ACC, MACV (J2), 7AF, Department of Defense Special Representative (DODSPECREP), Controlled American Source (CAS) Saigon, and the Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV). The Coordinating Committee then



passed these recommendations to MACV (J2) for final approval and back to ACC for issuance. While these procedures were taking place, the 483d TAW/377th ABW* provided ACC with an aircraft availability forecast for the tasking week in question. ACC then assigned individual missions to fulfill the tasking requirement originally generated by the Field Force Commanders to each Collection Management Authority (CMA) and the 6994th Scty Sq on Thursday of each week. At the same time, ACC provided a "sanitized" version of the tasking to 7AF for issuance of the required Fragmentary Order (FRAG ORDER) for each mission to be flown. On Friday morning of each week, the 6994th Scty Sq received position tasking from the appropriate CMA having the SIGINT collection, processing, and reporting responsibility for the specific target area of operations concerned. Prior to each days' series of missions, the applicable CMA provided the majority of technical data. Once airborne, CC/CCZ crews, through Air/Ground/Air contact with Direct Support Units (DSUs) and the 6994th Scty Sq Local Operations, had access to additional technical data for individual FRAG areas. In addition, DSUs accepted all fixes from the airborne platform, passed tip-offs to the aircraft, and accepted messages which were deemed exploitable by the airborne crew. The 6994th Scty Sq also accepted fixes and exploitable messages for relay to CMAs when aircrew contact with the DSU could not be made.

*483d TAW from 1 Sep 1971 - 1 Feb 1972, 377th ABW from 1 Feb 1972 - 30 Jun 1972.



Tasking Revision/Improvement Actions

Tasking Reduced by High Threat Areas

As January opened, the aviation units operating in SEA areas began to encounter increased threats from three major sources; Surfaceto-Air Missles (SAMs), enemy aircraft (principally the MIG-21), and Anti-aircraft Artillery (AAA). Later as the Spring Offensive developed, the STRELLA (SA-7, hand-held heat-seeking rocket) was introduced throughout SEA.

By mid-January, the enemy had moved MIG-21s south of the 20th 8 Parallel, representing a possible threat to the ARDF/ACI missions. The introduction of 85 millimeter (mm) AAA into the Laotian Panhandle (Barrel Roll) also compounded the threat. As a result of the above 10 threats and the possibility of a shootdown at night by AC-119/AC-130 gunships, ARDF/ACI platforms were greatly restricted in their coverage 11 of the Barrel Roll.

These threats predominantly affected the tasking of Detachment 2, and 3 of the 6994th Scty Sq*, while Local Operations were affected by the increased use of 23mm AAA and 37mm AAA, and later by the SA**. As a result, mission aircraft were forced to fly at higher altitudes than the systems were originally calibrated for - thus, opening the way for possible mission degradation.

*Actual affects felt by the Detachments will be reflected in their own respective histories.

**See Chapter III section on Aircraft Incident Reports (AIRs) for further information on this subject.

The main result felt by tasking was the use of stand-off distances from the high threat areas, placing the platforms farther away from the desired targets. The enemy build up during the dry season made way for the coming offensive. At this time more than ever, there was an increased need for ARDF/ACI products, yet greater 12 restrictions were felt by the program. This impacted even more when in March, two SIGINT sites (Explorer IIIA and IIIB) were lost to ground/ 13 artillery attacks.

Tasking Reduced by Ground/Artillery Attacks

As just mentioned, the emphasis on airborne efforts increased as ground sites were lost. Tasking was also affected by the loss of aircraft due to ground/artillery attacks.

During the early hours of 3 January 1972, three of Det 2's aircraft were damaged by a near miss in their parking area. One aircraft required extended repair, which caused a decrease in sortic capability by 14 one mission per day for approximately four weeks.

On 13 April 1972, a rocket attack on Da Nang AB decreased their aircraft availabilities by one COMBAT CROSS ZULU (ALR-35) and one COMBAT CROSS MAXI (ALR-38). These aircraft were both determined to be a total loss. Four other aircraft were also damaged in the attack, but were repaired and back in operation shortly. Army units at Phu Bai, RVN, and Det 3 at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand were forced to expand their efforts 15 where coverage was lost or decreased from the loss of the Det 2 aircraft. Special Tasking

(U) The first six months of 1972 were crucial ones in the Vietnam

Conflict. The ability of the 6994th Scty Sq and its subordinate units to 16 adapt to the changing requirements was noteworthy.

Hq, 203d Vietnamese Communist/Khmer Communist (VNC/KC) Regiment had not been located by ARDF forces since the Saigon/Nakhon Phanom shuttle had been discontinued in September of 1971. On 3 January 1972, MSN 820J, having been specifically tasked to "chase" the target, fixed him in his normal area of operation. Although only a Priority III target, 17 the fix refuted the indication of a move towards Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

<u>NVN</u> On 14 April 1972, 7AF requested a mission to be fragged off the cost of North Vietnam, in the area between Dong Hoi and Vinh for coverage of the NVA 325th Division. Fix information was to be used to direct air strikes against the 325th and its subordinate units because they were expected to move South to join the conflict in MR I. The problems and subsequent success of these missions will be detailed in the Det 2 history.

(<u>Tanks</u> On 31 January 1972, analysis of COMBAT APPLE intercept 18 reflected the existance of tank activity in Southern Laos. Further developments did, in fact, confirm the presence of these and other armored columns. The tanks participated in numerous strategic battles. The influx of this new element in the war was readily bandled by the dissemination of all necessary technical data to the 6994th Scty Sq and its subordinate Detachments. Detachment fixes on this activity contributed to many confirmed tank "kills."



(Local Operations received the technical data; however, there was no intercept during the first half of 1972. This perplexed Local Operations since tanks were reportedly involved in major battles in SEA area 03. A discussion of the Detachments' involvement in tank activity and their successes will be detailed in their respective histories.

<u>Summary</u> The enemy offensive caused considerable realignment of resources and adjustments in missions to contend with contingency situations as they developed. The 6994th Scty Sq played a vital role in the provision of enemy positions, intentions and capabilities. The flexibility and initiative shown by the squadron did 19 fill the gap left by the loss of other intelligence sources.

Continuation of the BLUE BEETLE FIX/FAC Program

(Throughout the first half of 1972, the 6994th Scty Sq was tasked with the continuation of a coordinated effort with the Forward Air Controllers (FACs). The BLUE BEETLE program, as the 6994th Scty Sq (South Vietnam/Cambodia) effort was called, was tested in early 1971 and adopted as standard procedure on 2 October 1971. The objective of the program was to allow ARDF platforms to pass pertinent fix data to the FAC via secure voice communications. The FAC was subsequently able to provide immediate visual reconnaissance (VR) of the target and, if deemed lucrative, call in immediate strike 20 activity. With an elusive enemy, skilled in the art of hiding from the eyes of visual reconnaissance, it was necessary to employ every potentiality to detect his operations.



against the 6994th Scty Sq. During these missions, 532 fixes were passed to the FAC, 102 of which were VR'd, resulting in two air strikes.*

(The availability of a dedicated FAC (without other responsibility) to work directly with specific EC-47 combat sorties was seldom a reality. While ARDF results added to the enemy data base and could be used for ground and air operations, the mobility of the enemy frequently 21 negated the effect of such delayed action.

(The enemy build up and following offensive, was of sufficient scale, that FACs were usually too busy directing air strikes in support of ground units to be available to work with the ARDF crews. Program degradation was readily seen by even the casual observer.* While the effectiveness of the FIX/FAC program did decline an increasing number of 22 ARDF fixes were being used for ARC LIGHT (B-52) targeting.

ARDF Improvement Actions

Tip-Off of High Interest Targets to ARDF Aircraft

(Since the beginning of the ARDF program, one of the limitations has been the lack of search capability to insure that each target worked was of high interest to the tactical war effort. Due to the nature of the communications facilities comprising enemy network(s), there was no possible way a single ARDF platform could sort out the desirable from the undesirable, and still come up with a significant volume of ARDF collection. Consequently, the most logical means of

*See Appendix IV for the breakdown of BLUE BEETLE statistics.



increasing capability was to employ ground facilities targeted against these high interest intercept targets. By enabling ground stations to tip-off high priority targets as they became active, the capability of the ARDF mission to satisfy its requirements was greatly enhanced. This system was utilized throughout Vietnam, with a high degree of success. In the early months of 1971, an effort was launched to expand this tipoff capability to include Thailand intercept sites targeted against the Steel Tiger (Southern Laotian Panhandle) area. Given the codename of Project Cumbersome, this program involved the installation of communications facilities at USM-7J to facilitate tip-off actions. Preliminary planning was complicated by the fact that existing facilities established for Air/Ground/Air communications between EC-47 platforms and the Forward Site at Pakse, Laos, utilized the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) range. Although the EC-47 possessed both UHF and FM VHF capabilities, monitor of both frequencies simultaneously was not possible, since only one KY-8 was available aboard the aircraft. As an alternative, a suggestion was offered by National Security Agency Pacific (NSAPAC) that VHF equipment be installed at both locations, thereby providing a common frequency for both sites. Such action had a built in advantage of potentially extending the range of communications from the Pakse site, since VHF was known to provide better long range capabilities than UHF. However, the significance of insuring USM-7J/Pakse was nullified in mid-June (and again in mid-January 1972) when the critical military situation dictated the withdrawal of the Pakse site.



Due to the success of Project Cumbersome in increasing the communications and resultant Air/Ground/Air capabilities, it was decided in mid-January of 1972 to start Project Cumbersome II. This was the installation, and subsequent three-phase testing of discone antennas at USM-626/808 (Bien Hoa and Phu Bai, RVN, respectively) to increase their 24 tip-off capabilities. The 6994th Scty Sq took part in the second phase by maintaining a record of aircraft position and readability when in 25 contact with either of these two units. The test concluded that Cumbersome II was also a worthwhile project and would further enhance tip-off capability to ARDF platforms.*

subsequently, Project Cumbersome III was planned for early/mid-April. This test called for the installation and evaluation of a discone antenna at USM-7 (Ramasun Station, Thailand). The primary purpose was to increase the tip-off capability to ARDF aircraft operating in the Barrel Roll area of Laos. Terrain, weather, and distance had hampered communications throughout the past. To date, the effect of the installation remained unevaluated due to the enemy buildup and launching of the spring offensive.

Dual-Ops Program

The Dual-Ops program introduced in 1968, was implemented for use with the ALR-35, ALR-38, and Sentinel String (now defunct) systems. These systems were chosen due to their intrinsic similarities in the use of a computer to resolve fix data into a usable product. To explain

*Also increased in air reporting. See Chapter III, EMR section.



it in the simplest possible terms, it was merely a rewrite of the computer program to acquire increased capability in fixing multiple, closely spaced targets and/or targets using short duration transmissions. The program's success depended only on the operators' ability to identify each target.

on the ALR-38 system. In January of 1971, aircraft 76304 was dispatched to Europe to evaluate its capabilities there.

Subsequently, when the tank problem arose in SEA, Dual-Gps was called on to handle this new type of transmission. The tanks were using extremely short transmissions and were either clustered in groups or strung out in close proximity along a roadway. The successful use of the Dual-Ops program should have increased the quality and quantity $\frac{26}{26}$ of fixes on those vehicles.

worked in the Hq USAFSS Test and Evaluation Shop for two years,* attempted to coordinate with the TEWS navigators in implementing the program. It got off to a slow start due to a reluctance on the part of 27 the navigators to adopt the new program. Although some significant successes were realized with the use of Dual-Ops against tank activity, the program was still under evaluation at the close of June (further information should be revealed in the histories of the two Detachments).

*See Appendix V concerning the Commander's (then Operations Officer) qualifications regarding the Dual-Ops program.





Hestia Pads

Throughout the history of the ARDF/ACI program, much emphasis has been placed on the importance of timely product reporting. Thus, the need for a secure means of relaying the fix information to the consumer was of paramount importance. Early in the program, the Hestia Pad was the only secure means available. In mid-1967, ARDF/ACI platforms received the KY-8 Secure Voice system for Air/Ground/Air communications. This method of communications was much faster since the operator no longer had to encrypt his product prior to relaying the information to the ground.

The subsequent installation of KY-8 equipment in the 6994th Scty Sq Operations area provided a means for aircrew members to check their secure voice systems prior to take-off. With the secure voice, the need/use of the Hestia Pads declined to almost zero. In fact, their presence on board the aircraft became an unnecessary bulk of classified information.

(MACV continued to maintain the need for the Hestia Pads as a back-up means of relay in event of a loss of secure voice communications. In January of 1972, the futility of maintaining the pads on board the aircraft was finally realized. A study aimed at eliminating the Hestia Pads 28 was initiated.

(The Collection Management Authorities/Direct Support Units working A/G/A with the ARDF/ACI platforms did not even have people trained in the use of the Hestia Pads, and there was no provision to contact these people in-the-clear since the callsigns were classified.



Ict, somehow the ARDF/ACI platforms were still plagued by this unnecessary bulk of this classified material. At the end of June, this problem remained unresolved; however, the prospects for eliminating the Hestia 29 Pads were gaining momentum.

Collection Management

Collection management was conducted on both a local and Squadron Complex basis. The Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS), as prepared locally and at each detachment, remained the most important vehicle for maintaining knowledge of ARDF/ACI mission progress. In addition, a Weekly Unit Resource Management Report (WURMR) was prepared by the same operational echelons, which served to identify trends in productivity and equipment status as well as to provide feedback within the unit to the operator level. An aspect of the ARDF/ACI mission were evaluated and action to resolve potential problem areas was taken immediately. The Mission Management office of the Squadron Operations Staff extracted pertinent information from the DURMIS, WURMR and ARDF Recovery Reports (ARRs) prepared at all three operating locations. This information, presented in an abbreviated format, was presented to the Squadron Operations Officer on a daily basis. Weekly averages for each separate unit were compiled for comparison against an average of the previous four weeks. Results of weekly squadron complex activities were provided both to 7AF and the TEWS command and control element. Primary interest in this report lay in the status of aircraft and equipment. This report was accepted as the most comprehensive weekly summary available to assist agencies in the management of ARDF assets.



In addition, the Squadron Mission Management function reviewed voluminous daily reports from various out-of-command sources to extract feedback information on ARDF fixes. This information was provided to all interested parties in the form of a weekly ARDF Feedback Report. Although a highly involved and often frustrating duty, the production of this report was considered one of the most beneficial of all management functions, since the report reflected actual tactical actions taken on the ARDF 31 product.

Prior to March 1972, the management function had been divided between Local Operations and Squadron/DORM. Two people worked in DOR and two in DORM. While DOR compiled local statistics, DORM added them to the detachment inputs for an overall picture of the squadron complex. Additionally, DORM monitored all inputs for accuracy and continuity. It was decided to combine these two areas to prevent duplication of effort. The consolidation resulted in a reduction in manning by one body, and less office/filing space. The management section, thus, became more 32 streamlined, yet equally functional.

Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS)

(U) A new Volume XII to USAFSSM 200-4 was published in mid-1971 which placed management statistics in a highly versatile, machine processing format. At the same time, this vehicle was arranged in such a manner as to provide for easy review and manual posting of statistics. During the first six months of 1972, the format remained stable and all three locations successfully adjusted to the revised report. The 6994th Soty Sq, in performing quality control of all



incoming DURMIS submission, was in constant contact with the two detachments to insure accurate reporting. Two operational assistance visits were made to the outlying detachments, specifically aimed at insuring that the reports submitted by all units were as nearly analogous as the differences in mission environment allow. Brevity of presentation without sacrifice of clarity remained the rallying point.

During this period, the 6994th Scty Sq continued to coordinate with the 6940th Technical Training Group to insure that their instructors were aware of current changes in the AMUF program. Local personnel provided quarterly ARDF update information for inclusion in section mine of the DURMIS. This system proved successful, and continued to insure the timely receipt by the USAFSS School of all pertinent changes in the ARDF program.

ARDF Productivity*

During the first six months of 1972, ARDF improvement/ fluctuation/degradation rates were under constant study by the Squadron Operations Staff. Local Operations performed 824 out of 879 scheduled missions for a completion rate of 93.7% (this figure represents only the U.S. missions tasked and flown). Monthly deviations ranged from a low of 111 out of 138 (80.4%) in June to a high of 83 out of 84 (98.8%) in February. The overall complex average was notably lower, with a total of 4467 missions flown out of 4969 scheduled, for a completion rate of 89.9%. Complex deviations ranged from a high of 93.1% (788 flown - 846 scheduled) in March to a low of 87.0% (879 flown - 1010

*See Appendix IV for appropriate charts and graphs.



scheduled) in February. Locally, the reason for these fluctuations lies in two areas; equipment** and weather (49 out of 55 unaccomplianed missions (89%). In June, the low month, 23 missions were unaccomplished because of weather (June and July are traditionally the worst of the rainy season months). In January, two equipment malfunctions and two weather cancellations accounted for 100% of the unaccomplished missions, while all six unaccomplished missions in April were due to weather aborts. The same is true of the complex statistics, with 409 of the 502 missions listed as unaccomplished being attributed to these two factors. With 169 equipment problems and 240 weather cancellations, these two items comprised 81.5% of the Complex unaccomplished missions. When the Complex rate dropped to 87.0% in February, 55 weather cancellations and 40 equipment problems comprised 72.5% of the 131 unaccomplished missions. The ratio of hours flown versus hours fragged naturally shown the same fluctuation. Local Operations flew 4794 hours of the 5433 fragged for a rate of 88.2%. As in mission accomplishment, the highest rate was reached in February. Of 487 hours fragged, 470 hours were flown (96.5%). This compared to the 67.5% rate realized in June, which was the low for the period, due to 57 reduced and 25 unaccomplished missions, representing the highest figures for both problem areas.

Since the success of the ARDF program depends largely on the effective management of mission areas to achieve the greatest ratio of time-over-target (TOT) to actual time flown, this item was given a great deal of critical review by the Mission Management and local analysis

**Statistics include both airframe and USAFSS -equipment problems.

sections. Both local and complex statistics showed fluctuations in this area. Local missions registered 3250 hours over target, which constituted 67.8% of the 4794 hours flown. The most effective month in this respect was February, when 73.6% of the hours flown were over target. During the month of April, 603 hours flown on target versus the 958 hours flown, resulted in a low figure of 62.9%. Complex figures were noticeably lower; 16,900 hours over the target area vice 26,422 hours flown resulted in a percentage of 63.9%. All of these percentages were within limits due to increased distances to the target areas and the numerous weather diversions.

The ratio of targets fixed versus hours over target increased considerably. This increase was due to the lucrative time frame of the spring VC/NVA offensive. Locally, for the months of January through March, the figures were 1.19, 1.38, and 1.21 respectively. After the offensive began, the figure rose to a height of 1.77 in June (this gave an overall 1.42 fixes per hour over target). Complex figures reacted the same say; January through March were 1.31, 1.14, and 1.31 respectively. These too, rose with the offensive to a height of 1.52 fixes per hour over target, or 1.36 overall.

In the area of analysis, target identification rates fluctuated greatly. Again dependent upon operator/analyst expertise as well as enemy target activity, this aspect of the mission was under constant surveillance by the Squadron Operations staff. During the first six months of 1972, the Local Operations' identification rate stood at 44.4% of targets worked. 34.0% of those were identified as

priority targets. These figures are somewhat low due to the major change in VC/NVA communications procedures (see Chapter III). The Complex identification rate remained somewhat stable with 55.9% of the target fixed/cut being identified and 27.4% of those identified as priority.*

Finally, exploitable message copy for the Complex stood at 11,377, 7,277 of the exploitables were obtained through voice intercept, while the remainder was from manual Morse copy. This represents an average of 2.55 messages per mission flown. Since the major portion of the messages were VHF voice (line of sigh propagation that couldn't be as easily intercepted by available ground units), and since the intelligence community was losing an increased number of operating locations to the drawdown in SEA, the importance of the ACI capability aboard the EC-47 platform increased dramatically.

*See Appendix IV, which compares, identification rates of all available sources.

Chapter III

SIGINT PROCESSING AND REPORTING

Processing, reporting, and analysis functions remained relatively stable during the first half of 1972; however, the volume of reports issued was drastically reduced concurrent with the Vietnamese assumption of reporting on their own missions. The volume of voice processing remained at a low level, but conversely, the volume of intercept increased considerably. This was a direct result of the VC/ NVA spring offensive which commenced in April and was primarily associated with artillery command communications in the Snoul/Loc Ninh/ An Loc areas. No significant changes were made in the processing procedures. Reporting functions also remained static, with basic reports continuing to be prepared in accordance with existing directives. The Airborne Recovery Report (ARR), Southeast Asia Technical Summary (SEATS), Exploitable Message Report (EMR), Airborne Incident Report (AIR), MARKET TIME/GAME WARDEN Report, and ofcourse the CRITIC Report were the primary reporting vehicles for which the unit was responsible. In view of its direct relation to collection, the Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS) is covered in Chapter II vice Chapter III of this history.

Processing

Voice Processing

In spite of a 100% increase in voice intercept and a 50% cut in voice processors, voice processing efforts at the 6994th Scty Sq remained fairly stable during the first half of 1972. Voice processors

copied 5,588 minutes of intercept, compared with 2,659 minutes copied in the latter half of 1971. Of course the minutes copied is not always relative to the minutes of processing, as a large portion of the traffic represented station call-ups and chatter. Those tapes not containing exploitable messages, were immediately forwarded to the Collection Management Authority (CMA) at Bien Hoa AB, RVN for processing. All message activity not relayed air/ground was transcribed upon mission recovery. Intercept during the first three months of 1972 centered around the Parrots Beak area of Cambodia; however, concurrent with the VC/NVA spring offensive, intercept in the Snoul/Loc Ninh/An Loc areas increased considerably. Perhaps the most significant item during this time frame was the initial intercept of VHF voice related to the offensive and mainly involving NVA Artillery Units. This intercept provided much insight into artillery command tactical procedures. Collateral information indicated that the VHF voice originated from Allied PRC-25 VHF Transceivers captured by the energy during the Cambodia incursion in 1971.

Reporting

CRITIC Reporting

During the first half of 1972, the CRITIC reporting criteria remained unchanged with no reports being issued by the 6994th Scty Sq. The provision for immediate return to base (RTB) of any platform obtaining critical intelligence remained in effect, but was never utilized.



Airborne Recovery Report (ARR)

Technical Instructions (TECHINS) 2038, the governing directive for the preparation and issuance of the ARR remained in effect through the first half of 1972. Several procedural changes were made which had no major impact on the reporting functions. A suggested change, involving the ARR and the Southeast Asia Technical Summary (SEATS), will be amplified in the section concerning the SEATS.

Sq continued to prepare ARRs for both U.S. missions and those manned by ARVN operators. Effective 12 February, the ARR responsibility for the VIM missions was assumed by Unit 17 of the Vietnamese Special Security Technical Branch (SSTB)*.

In the first half of 1972, a total of 1285 ARRs were issued by the 6994th Scty Sq.** 847 of these were issued for missions staged from Ton Son Nhut Afld by U.S. crews. Vietnamese missions staging from Tan Son Nhut accounted for the remaining 438. It is interesting to note that in the week prior to Unit 17's assumption of ARR responsibility, the 6994th Scty Sq issued a total of 84 ARRs; during the following week, only 24 ARRs were issued. Although the number of ARRs for subsequent weeks fluctuated, the above figures (84 versus 24) adequately depicted that this was the beginning of the drawdown of the Analysis and Reporting Section of the 6994th Scty Sq and the advancement of the Vietnamization Improvement and Modernization (VIM) reporting program.

*See Chapter IV for complete resume of VIM actions. **See Appendix IV for reporting statistics.



Southeast Asia Technical Summary (SEATS)

(U) TECHINS 2037 governs the preparation of SEATS. Several changes were received to this document, none of which adversely affected the production and dissemination of the report.

In addition to the location/identification of enemy forces in SEA, ARDF is utilized to maintain continuity on targets. As an analytical tool, ARDF is unsurpassed. Major decisions concerning the validity of unit identifications were frequently based solely on ARDF input. When a review of TECHINS 2037 (SEATS) and 2038 (ARR) revealed no means for the inclusion of ARDF data into the SEATS program, a message was sent to DIRNSA questioning whether ARDF data should actually be included in the SEATS or if the data was being extracted from the ARR format and merged into the SEATS format after receipt at DIRNSA. It was further suggested that if such data was in fact being integrated into the SEATS, then the duplication of frequencies and callsigns in SEATS was redundant and could be discontinued. DIRNSA's reply concurred that the TECHINS was vague on the point of SEATS manipulation of ARDF data and also concurred that effective with the month of May (upon a major rewrite of the SEATS computer program), that duplicate technical data would no longer be required. This was further discussed in March when representatives of B64 and C5 (computer management division) visited the 6994th Scty Sq. Consultation with these personnel revealed a misunderstanding of the initial message and concurrence was then verbally given to discontinue SEATS reporting of ARDF targets containing no amplifying data. The verbal concurrence was followed up by a formal NSA change to TECHINS 2037.



(During the first six months of 1972, a total of 378 SEATS sections, comprising 106,458 communications groups, were issued by the 6994th Scty Sq. This was a considerable decrease from the 563 SEATS sections and 394,909 communications groups issued during the last six months of 1971, and can be attributed to the above changes as well as the decrease in U.S. missions.

Exploitable Message Report (EMR)

A total of 61 EMRs were issued during this period, representing a considerable drop from the previous 194 reported for July through December of 1971. Several factors were responsible for this decrease: The installation of the discone antenna at Bien Hoa AB, RVN (USM-626) in February increased the working range of Air/Ground/Air communications, thus more exploitable traffic was relayed air to ground.* This gave the airborne operator a means to expedite the handling of his perishable intelligence and it motivated the voice operators to increase their proficiency in live-transcription. This resulted in less loss of timely intelligence due to the time lapse in ground processing. Additionally, Unit 17 assumed reporting responsibility for all their exploitable message activity intercepted on HF Morse (26 February 1972). Local Operations continued to process/report all voice activity until 16 April 1972 due to a lack of voice transcription facilities at Unit 17.

(Intercept of VHF tactical voice, initially noted in April 1972 in conjunction with the VC/NVA spring offensive, accounted for a significant number of messages. All of this activity was Artillery

*See Chapter II, Project Cumbersome.

Command associated and, for the most part, represented unique message copy.

Airborne Incident Report (AIR)

(U) During this period, two AIRs were issued by the 6994th Scty Sq (Det 3 and Det 2 issued 01 and 02 respectively). AIR 01-72 resulted from crew observation on 4 April 1972 of assumed 37 mm artillery fire bursting approximately 1000 feet below the aircraft and one-fourth to one-half mile off the left wing. AIR 02-72 involved the 807D mission on 30 May 1972. Heavy weather, fuel expenditure, and distance from Tan Son Nhut, resulted in a divert to Cam Ranh Bay; however, fuel minimums necessitated landing the aircraft at Bac Lao airfield (1133N 10749E). Immediately prior to touchdown, two Vietnamese on Hondas crossed the runway in front of the aircraft. Evasive action taken by the Aircraft Commander resulted in damage to two engines and the airframe. The aircraft was repaired sufficiently enough to return it to Tan Son Nhut where additional repairs returned it to duty. No personnel were injured in either of the two incidents.

Market Time/Game Warden Reports

A change to ACC OPINS 1-71, involving Market Time/Game Warden reporting requirements, resulted in the elimination of post mission reporting for targets meeting established Market Time/Game Warden criteria provided such targets were passed air to ground to the designated DSU. This change in itself had no appreciable affect on our reporting as only one confirmed instance of enemy sampan infiltration was observed (12 January 1972). Movement of five sampans, confirm through ARDF, was reported to the DSU and in turn relayed to the local Naval authority. Subsequent action by the Navy resulted in 16 watercraft destroyed, 9 VC KIA, and 6 structures destroyed. Additionally, the attacking force captured an unspecified amount of enemy documents. The success of the operation was directly attributable to the speed with which the initial contact was reported to the operational forces. This was just another example of the "dedication" of the 6994th Scty Sq resulting in a "job 4 well done."

Tactical Report (TACREP)

The issuance of a TACREP is based on the criteria outlined in TECHINS 4046. This is a sanitized report to inform tactical commanders of impending attacks/threats/or a greatly changing situation. When the tank problem arose in SEA, it was found that the normal TACREP authorities (usually the DSU) experienced too great a time delay between reception and transmission. Subsequently, the two detachments of the 6994th Scty Sq received authority to issue TACREPs on all tank activity. This resulted in an average savings of 48 hours from time of intercept until time of issuance. Local Operations did not participate in TACREP 5 reporting since it was not intercepting tank-to-tank communications.

<u>Analysis</u>

(**Total Identification** The local identification rate for USA-561 traffic* continued to decline from the 60% average enjoyed in the last six months of 1971 to an average of 46% for the first six months of 1972. This decline was anticipated based upon the closure of USM-607 (Can Tho) and the reorganization of "B" Group at the *Collection and targets.




National Security Agency (NSA). Additionally, all associated COMINT units suffered personnel losses due to the SEA drawdown of forces and thus, technical support to the aviation units gradually declined. Unfortunately, this action came at a time when VC/NVA Hq South Vietnam controlled communications were undergoing major communications changes. All regimental and above sized units, and the majority of echelons below regiment size changed their communications SOIs. A total of 74 case notations utilizing daily changing callsign systems were notated after 1 January 1972. All these cases had previously employed fixedtype SOIs. Implementation of a unique projection system further hindered development of the daily changing system and notation of these cases did not commence until March. As of this date, some entities still remain unnotated.

To adequately assess the analytical effectiveness of the local airborne operations, consolidation of USM-626/DIRNSA feedback of identifications was attempted, utilizing their SEATS IDENT AID and the Identification Change Report (ICR). Several problem areas were isolated 6 in the ICR and one minor one in the SEATS IDENT AID. Suggestions by this unit to change both reports were not successful, although DIRNSA did concur with the problem area in their SEATS IDENT AID and stated that changes would be forthcoming. Since the ICR was effective only if accurate, the 6994th Scty Sq could not employ this aid in determinating its analytical effectiveness. Therefore, it concentrated on the SEATS IDENT AID. The theory behind the SEATS IDENT AID was that all inputs to DIRNSA via SEATS were machine manipulated in such a manner as to

ascertain the validity of the field station identification. If an entity was unidentified/incorrectly identified, the machine automatically produced an output for electrical transmission to the intercept unit. This output of additional identifications then represented the sum total of all possible identifications. Thus, we had the means to determine not only the percentage of local identifications of total intercept, but also the percentage of total possible identifications by DIRNSA. Computation procedures were implemented in April and the results were reported weekly. In compiling the figures, note was made that it was possible for an intercept unit to identify 65-75% of their intercept and still have only identified 60-70% of the total identifications possible; yet on the other hand, a unit could identify only 30% of their total intercept which could feasibly represent 100% of the total possible identifications. Utilizing the above procedures, the local operations analysis section maintained an average identification rate of 98.24% from OL April through 30 June 1972. Locally, 4247 idents were made with NSA only being able to identify an additional 74. This figure is expected to decline as access to technical data becomes more difficult.

Target Identification

Target identification while airborne is of primary concern to the tactical commander and target planners as quick reaction to ARDF frequently results in considerable destruction of the unit(s) thus located. As a result, not only the number of targets identified, but how quickly the tactical commander is advised of its location is important. Statistical computations provided by DIRNSA for the period



In-Depth Analysis

Analytical efforts were expended in several major areas with fruitful results. Coordination with DIRNSA/USM-626 resulted in improved support from them. Local analysts were involved in extensive analysis of the Hq VO 9th Division traffic passing net (VCMB 08001), Hq SVNLA Artillery Command (VCMB 08201), and Hq SVNLA daily changing communications nets (approximately 74 cases). Additionally, 13 VC cases were resolved* and numerous others further isolated as a direct result of analyst coordination with the CMA (USM-626).

(completed during March. Recovery extended to frequencies, schedules, and date repeat patterns (DRPs).

*See Appendix IV for the resolution of these 13 cases.

Correlation of unique Artillery Command communications from October 1971 through January 1972 resulted in identification of the Hq SVNLA Artillery Command and the subsequent further identification of the temporary case to VCMB 08201. As a result of this, two subordinate subscribers were also identified as artillery associates.

Prior to January, only one daily changing case existed in local area of responsibility (AOR). As all of the technical data on this case was supplied by DIRNSA, local analytical personnel were not familiar with procedures necessary to derive positive identification/projection of entities observed utilizing this type of SOL. Since January, a total of 74 cases have been isolated, with the majority utilizing unique projection systems. This necessitated development of a new analytical approach. Coordination with USM-626 over the period February through May resulted in several techniques which were implemented at all echelons and increased the identification rate of the local analytical section.

Isolation and resolution of new continuities is one of the primary functions of a first echelon station; however, ARDF units rarely obtain sufficient continuity on any given terminal to apply this function and therefore no TEMPO authority exists. In the first six months of 1972, at least one military intelligence unit was isolated, and a total of 13 VC nets were reported to the CMA for appropriate TEXTA action as a result of local traffic analysis.

(**MAN**) Identification of the NVA/VC 5th, 7th and 9th Division Hq daily changing terminal and several of their regiments was also accomplished through ARDF locations and subsequently re-identified through analysis/

analyst coordination with USM-626. These identifications/subordinations came during the period with the 5th Division was relocating from An Loc to base camp area 470 and provided an additional means of determining current locations on these headquarters elements.

Analysis of intercepted communications from 1 through 26 April 1972 resulted in an analytical report to DIRNSA/USM-626 on NVA Watch Communications in the 6994th Scty Sq AOR. During this period, the VC spring offensive commenced and many of the existing Watch facilities underwent changes reflecting increased tactical posture. The 5th Division, Hq SVNLA forward element one, and the Hq SVNLA tactical Watch authority were noted in new Watch SOIs. Unidentified terminals were suspected to be: Hq Military Region 10 (M0074), Hq 271st Independent Regiment (MO198), 101st Independent Regiment (M6175), 101st Regiment (MO057), and the Hq NVA 950 Regiment (MO056). Associations were based primarily on ARDF fixes and the first/last heard of the respective elements. The purpose of the study and subsequent report was to obtain TEXTA/RAD action on the respective entities as the volume of tactical activity during this period necessitated isolation/identification of all stations as expeditiously as possible. Follow-up by USM-626 resulted in the requested action in most cases.

During January, identification of the possible VC Military Region 3 Maritime trawler controller was accomplished through correlation of ARDF MARKET TIME/GAME WARDEN reports issued during 1971/1972. The basis for identification was the re-appearance of an unidentified link (M6641/M6600) during a period when trawlers/sampans were known to be

infiltrating into the Mekong Delta area from Cambodia sanctuaries/resupply points. Assumption on the identity of the terminals were presented informally to USM-626/MACV through ACC, stating the belief that M6641 represented the lead sampan and M6600 the controller, directing the vessels to their scheduled rendezvous locations. These theories were accepted and the terminal reclassified from Routine to Priority II ARDF targets. All crews were briefed on the significance of these terminals and the action to be taken when observed in communications. Shortly after, the area of activity was turned over exclusively to VIM missions and the 6994th Scty Sq was unable to pursue the isolation of this entity. Supplemental Technical Data Lists (TDLs)

Froduction of local Supplemental TDLs for all missions was initiated during June of 1972. This requirement was levied by a change to the unit OPINS and was very timely, since USM-626 experienced a major circuit outage and was unable to provide CMA produced TDLs. Although local operations had produced TDLs for individual missions in the past, a concentrated effort on the part of all assigned analysts produced a product which proved to be more reliable than the basic data provided by the CMA. This was evidenced by the number of Pre-emptive and Priority I targets fixed during the week of 10-16 June, and provided the most qualitative mission week in local history. The seige of An Loc, RVN, was broken and the VC 5th Division was in the process of relocating. Collateral information provided to MACV placed increased emphasis on the location of the Division and subordinate units, with the use of Supplemental Technical Data, virtually all units were fixed while relocating.



Additionally, the Hq 7th and 9th Divisions were confirmed as still being in the An Loc area. Experience gained in the production of these Supplemental TDLs assisted in developing a broad analytical base for use by the Airborne Analyst.



Chapter IV

VIETNAMIZATION IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PLAN/SOUTHEAST ASIA REDUCTIONS

In early 1971, plans were generated to form a Tactical Reconnaissance facility within the framework of the Vietnamese Military Complex. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), and the Special Security Technical Branch (SSTE) all cooperated to provide the personnel necessary for formation of two units; the 718th Reconnaissance Squadron of the VNAF and Unit 17 of the SSTE. 6994th Soty Sq involvement included the training of ARVN personnel to assume operational duties for all EC-47 positions. The 6994th Maintenance function was responsible for training VNAF personnel for the assumption of back-end maintenance duties. NCPR VN (C) as the DIRNSA representative for Vietnam, was responsible for the training of personnel to prepare and forward applicable reports. Other units (noncryptologic) were tasked with the training of VNAF personnel to assume front-end flight duties (pilots, co-pilots, and navigators) and aircraft maintenance.

The first class of operators, started in April 1971, consisted of ARVN personnel already proficient in code copy and operation of communications equipment. As a result, the rapidity with which they grasped instructions and applied it to operational situations was highly gratifying. Personnel associated with the program were enthused over the speed with which the first class progressed and expressed optimism for the ultimate success of the program.



Naturally, there were many facets (other than operational) involved. Classroom and office supplies and equipment were made available upon request, due to the high priority applied to the overall Vietnamization program. Consequently, by 1 July 1971, the VIM program 1 was well established and progressing on schedule.

(The VIM action was directly related to the drawdown of American forces in SEA. As more Vietnamese crews became available, the number of U.S. personnel required to cover the ARDF mission declined. A major aim of the program was to have Vietnamese personnel perform the ARDF mission without U.S. assistance as soon as possible. However, language problems, which prohibited operation of airborne Air/Ground communications nets by the Vietnamese, made it necessary to retain at least one U.S. operator to pass pertinent ARDF data to the DSU. Since the U.S. Forces drawdown had made no provisions for the simultaneous training of Vietnamese to assume ground duties concomitant with Vietnamese flight operations, an imbalance between the air/ground Vietnamization programs prevailed throughout 1971.

Vietnamization was not the only problem facing the 6994th Scty Sq as a result of the drawdown of the U.S. Forces in SEA. The close-out of Phu Cat resulted in a juggling of resources to prevent loss of coverage. Then, the withdrawal of many of the Army and Navy ground/air collection/ARDF resources compounded the problem.

Support for the ARDF program also faced many and varied problems. Throughout the last six months of 1971, the command and control responsibility for the Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (TEWS) was in a



constant state of fluctuation. In mid-1971, the TEWS were subordinate to the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Tan Son Nhut. From the 6994th Scty Sq point of view, this was an ideal situation, which provided the means for rapid coordination between the 6994th, 7AF, MACV, ACC, and the TEWS Command and Control function. Many potential problems were expeditiously solved/alleviated through the close proximity of responsible elements. Then came the time to deactivate the 460th TRW. The 6994th stressed the fact that command and control should be retained at Tan Son Nhut. In spite of this contention and exhaustive actions to make the USAFSS position/desires known, the responsibility was transferred to the 483d Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW), Can Ranh Bay, RVN. This decision was predicated on the probability than the closure of Phu Cat AB would force the transfer of Detachment 1, 6994th Scty Sq and the 361st TEWS to Cam Ranh Bay, even though USAFSS had traditionally been against such a move. At the end of 1971, the drawdown of Cam Ranh Bay and the planned deactivation of the 483d TAW again posed major concern in relation to TEWS Command and Control.

Finally, as SEA reduction became more and more prevalent, there were high level opinions that ARDF would be reduced propertionally with other forces. MACV, 7AF, and all in-country users of the ARDF product were strong in their opposition to such actions. Statistics proved that ARDF/ACI provided the bulk of the intelligence upon which combat operations were based. Nevertheless, even cryptologic spaces were giving way to reduction pressures and the 6994th Scty Sq was soon forced to assume the attitude of doing the best possible job with the



manpower/equipment, authorized. It is significant to note that in spite of the deactivation of Detachment 1, the constant reduction of manpower resources, the forced reduction of airborne analyst slots, and certain delays in the Vietnamization program, the 6994th Scty Sq was still able to maintain a respectable mission posture and make continued outstanding contributions to the war effort.

Vietnamization Improvement and Modernization Plan (VIMP)

In July of 1971, a VNAF plan (71-62) was published which took action and outlined steps for the activation of the VNAF 718th Reconnaissance Squadron (EC-47) on 1 December 1972. Stated purposes of the plan were to program tasks and assign responsibilities to activate. man, train, and equipt the 718th Reconnaissance Squadron. Basically, this plan was involved with the operation (front-end), maintenance (both airframe and mission equipment), and the establishment of material channels to support the maintenance function. Primary 6994th/USAFSS involvement lay in the training of maintenance personnel to perform necessary maintenance and upkeep of the installed mission equipment. ъ a lesser degree, 6994th was involved in the establishment of bench stock of pertinent parts, providing the necessary Avionics Ground Equipment (AGE). and coordinating the procurement of support for the maintenance function. Foints of contention which were raised were primarily in the areas of the source of maintenance trainees and the establishment of supply channels. On the subject of source of trainees, the 6994th insisted that those personnel destined to receive initial training as maintenance technicians and to subsequently assume the role of instructors for later classes.



should be graduates of the USAF Air Training Command School at Keesler AFB, Mississippi. Later inputs could be provided from the VNAF Air Training Center school at Nha Trang AB, RVN. Pac Scty Rgn points of contention were primarily in the support/logistics area.

After review by all pertinent offices, a revised plan dated 1 October 1971 was published which incorporated the majority of the suggested amendments. In accordance with this plan, 6994th responsibilities were listed as follows:

1. Provide formal training on the AN/ALR-34 equipment, with three VNAF personnel scheduled to commence training on 1 August 1971 and the followup training of 26 additional individuals to begin on 31 December 1971. Seventeen trainees were to be derived from Keesler AFB inputs, while the remaining nine were to be inputs from the in-country school.

2. Transfer peculiar mission support equipment for maintenance of the ALR-34 system.

3. Provide bench-stock listings on ALR-34 "Y" and "Z" positions.

4. Provide Air Force Advisory Group (AFAG) a listing of end items, AGE, special tools, and test equipment to be transferred concomitant with the transfer of aircraft. Also, a listing of shortages in each category was to be provided.

5. Assist VNAF/AFGP in USAFSS areas of responsibility to ensure an orderly transfer of facilities and support activation of the 718th.

6. Train 80 ARDF operator personnel in accordance with Joint Program Actions Directive (PAD) 71-7-12. This PAD was supplemented by USAFSS 4 PAD 71-3.



The operator training was well under way by mid-1971 according to the joint VNAF/SSTB/AFGP/7AF/USAFSS PAD dated 1 March 1971 and supplemented by USAFSS PAD 71-3. The USAFSS PAD, dated 26 February 1971, combined both the operator and maintenance training phases.

(In summarizing the status of the program as of 31 December 1971, reference to the PAD Progress Report for that date is made. The following actions had been completed:

1. A UDL for the 6994th Scty Sq reflecting an increase of 1 officer and 23 airmen for FY 3/71 and 1 officer/35 airmen for FY 72 to act as instructors had been published.

2. The command and control operations had been determined and defined.

3. Training facilities had been scheduled, identified, and equipped.

4. The in-country training program schedule had been finalized and approved.

5. Personnel, equipment, and supplies for training had been identified.

6. Training packages had been finalized and forwarded to DIRNSA for approval.

7. USAFSS operator instructors and training materials were in-country.

8. Logistical support procedures had been established IAW Chief of Staff, Air Force and USAFSS directives.

9. Technical order and supply data for AN/ALR-34 "G" equipment and AGE had been identified to AFAG.

10. "G" position equipment management procedures had been submitted to Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC).

11. The host base (377th CSG) had concurred and cooperated in the



modification of buildings to accommodate training outside the USAFSS operations controlled area.

12. Procedures were established for review/sanitation of materials and equipment.

13. The first three classes of Vietnamese operators had been through 5 the classroom work and were manning five daily sorties. The majority of the PAD items were on schedule as of 31 December 1971.

In January of 1972, the checklist for filling out the forms and logs was translated and turned over to Unit 17. NCFR VN (C) advised that ARVN/Air/Ground communications within MR-III and MR-IV should be activated by 1 July 1972. Class IV was lagging with three operators still in ground training. In airborne training, there were three students from Class III, eleven from Class IV and 16 from Class V. Class VI was tentatively scheduled to begin in early March; however, their code proficiency was greatly lacking.

(MINING) During January, the ARVN began flying ten lines per day, five lines for training Category II operators with one 6994th instructor and one ARVN instructor, and five lines with qualified ARVN operators and one 6994th advisor to maintain communications. By the end of the month, there were 29 students in airborne training, 20 qualified Category III operators, four Category IV AMS operators, and seven qualified Category IV AMS/IRO operators.

During February, Unit 17 began to schedule all of their operators except the students. Vietnamese language checklists for IRO/SEFE, Airborne Emergency Destruction, Mission Diverts, and Bravo Maintenance



Codes had been translated and published. An effort to translate and produce the series of regulations governing all airborne operations was also begun. Planning had been revised to include ARVN ground radio sites by 1 May 1972. Unit 17 also began to issue their own EMRs (Exploitable Message Reports) during this month.

(U) By the end of February, there was only one remaining Category I student. One Category I student had been removed from training for disciplinary reasons and one had been hospitalized for over a month and subsequently dropped from the program. The one that was remaining had progressed only slightly and was put back for re-schooling with the sixth class.

(U) Class VI began ground training on 6 March 1972. The class was supposed to have 15 students (14 plus one wash-back). Before the class started, the student who was set back was dropped from the program for lack of ability to copy code. Of the 14 remaining students, one did not attend class for a week and was dropped from the program by SSTB and a second student was dropped for disciplinary actions. Twelve students graduated for Class VI ground training.

During March it became evident that SSTB was making no progress in the composition of their own airborne regulation. This was to be investigated and some sort of solution found. Common User Nestor Key lists were to be forwarded from NSA along with 6994th Scty Sq KY-8 equipment in mid-April. This material and equipment was to be turned over to the SSTB in time for Vietnamese secure ARDF communications.in May. The status of ARVN personnel by the end of March was 12 Category I students,



23 Category II students, 26 Category III qualified operators, 4 Category IV qualified AMS, and 8 Category IV AMS/IRO operators.

(U) During April 2 Category IV operators, 1 Warrant Officer and 1 Master Sergeant, were checked out as SEFEs. This will be the entire SEFE section complement. Also, an additional MSgt was groomed to create/maintain their training section. He was shown how to maintain files and records as well as given advice on how to set up and run his training section.

(U) At the end of April, there were 9 Categroy I operators in remedial code training, 20 Category II students in airborne training, 42 qualified Category III operators, 4 qualified Category IV AMS operators, 6 qualified Category IV AMS/IRO operators, and 2 Category IV SEFE personnel.

() On 5 May 1972, the 6994th Scty Sq flew its last mission with the ARVN. All training of the ARVN ARDF operators ceased at this time. One A207X1 and one A202X0 were supplied out of hide for continued liaison. These two personnel were under the "indirect" supervision of DODSPECREP and were to be PCA'd to DODSPECREP as soon as the details could be worked out. At the end of June, their status was still uncertain.

In summary, the Vietnamization program was recognized at the outset as a very important facet of the overall SEA drawdown. Consequently it was with mixed emotions that the cryptologic community in SEA embarked upon the endeavor. First and foremost in the minds of all concerned was the possibility that the quality of the ARDF program would suffer as a result of the Vietnamization process. MACV was strong in their insistance



that such a result could not be condoned. As the reduction of American forces was accelerated, positive intelligence concerning the locations of enemy forces was a must, and only ARDF could be relied upon to provide this data. In addition, a great deal of ACI (especially in Cambodia) was gathered by the EC-47 fleet which provided extremely important intelligence to MACV for military reaction purposes.

Consequently, as the plans for the training of Vietnamese crews expanded, extreme care was taken to insure that the ARDF program would not be allowed to deteriorate. The most qualified operators available were chosen to conduct the training and strict adherence to upgrade provisions was stressed. When it appeared that SSTB was placing too little emphasis on selection criteria for trainees, immediate action was taken to secure NCPR VN (C) intervention and stress to SSTB the importance of the program. Although NCPR VN (C) was strong in pointing out the necessity for screening all potential trainees to insure well qualified and motivated inputs, the situation grew progressively worse. At the outset it was difficult to ascertain the reason for this apparent apathy on the part of the Vietnamese. It seemed to those responsible that the SSTB was actually torpedoing the program. When a complete review of the implications was made, it was apparent that the Vietnamese Armed Forces were no different from any other. When two services were involved (in this instance, the SSTB is composed of ARVN personnel, while the ARDF program was for all practical purposes, to be controlled by the VNAF), there was a general feeling of antagonism and jealousy. Since the ARVN was responsible for providing the operators to perform SSTB ground intercept duties, they



were apprehensive about providing their more qualified operators as ARDF trainees. As a consequence, the Vietnamization of ARDF suffered unforeseen setbacks.

In the area of direct SSTB support to ARDF, this situation did not manifest itself so drastically. They seemed more willing to provide trainees to assume scheduling and reporting functions. These facets advanced well within the purview of the Vietnamization plan and all programmed action directive items were met on schedule.

With almost a year and a half having transpired since the inception of the Vietnamization plan, it was generally accepted that the Vietnamese were capable of performing the ARDF mission. They are, in fact, doing it today. They did have their problems, some of which still remain unsolved. In the early stages, it was decided that those with poor ability to copy code could readily be used to copy voice traffic. It was deemed that being Vietnamese, they could copy Vietnamese. Americans do not even ask Americans to be stenographers without some training. As a result of this, the ARVN voice operators did rather poorly in comparison to their American counterparts. The difference in dialects and knowledge of VC/NVA procedures prevented the Vietnamese from having much of a chance for comparison. This still remains unresolved as of this writing.

(U) Their maintenance trainees worked closely with the 6994th Scty Sq personnel daily. The success of this was reflected by the high degree mission readiness of the mission essential equipment throughout the first half of 1972 (see Chapter VI for amplification). This is the only portion of the Vietnamization the 6994th Scty Sq remains active in. The separation of VIM and U.S. maintenance would duplicate efforts and was not deemed



profitable. So at the close of June 1972, the Americans and Vietnamese were still working side by side in this final problem.

Southeast Asia Reductions

As the first six months of 1972 began the reduction of forces in Southeast Asia continued to be a major concern to the 6994th Scty Sq. A number of different aspects were pertinent, all of which had a definite impact upon the ARDF program. The programmed closure of the Army's ARDF program in SEA was of great interest to all. This represented a loss of ARDF capabilities during a time when their product was especially needed to insure the safe withdrawal of American forces. The closure of supporting ground sites increased the need for a greater ACI effort on the part of the 6994th Soty Sq. Finally, the reduction of cryptologic spaces without any decrease in tasking promised to place still increased demands upon those personnel remaining. While the future of AGC continued to be tenuous, the complete elimination of manpower for the Communications Security function was realized.

A meeting held in Saigon in early October 1971 supposedly stabilized the questions concerning the deployment of ARDF resources within RVN. As we entered into 1972, we became aware that the Army Security Agency (ASA) planned to withdraw nearly all of their ARDF platforms by 1 May 1972. The Air Force had 457 slots manning the 6994th Scty Sq, Det 2, 6994th Scty Sq, Monkey Mountain, and DODSPECREP. The 6994th Scty Sq supplied administrative aid to the latter two and their respective portion of the total slots remainded constant. Meanwhile, the total number of slots declined to 394 in May and the projected figure was 340



for 1 August. This was to support the ARDF platforms (UE 58 aircraft, two of which were destroyed). It would seem that degradation of the mission was inevitable; however, steps were taken to prevent this. The Army maintained a large portion of their resources on an emergency basis due to the increase in enemy activity and the Air Force personnel at 6994th Scty Sq worked at a pace which met the need in a truly commendable manner.

In the opening days of February, 7AF caught some people napping when they announced the proposal to close Da Nang AB, RVN, and move all resources there to other stations. They later studied proposals considering anywhere from zero up to 27 ARDF platforms to be stationed there. None of the proposals were realized when the spring offensive precluded any movement of the very necessary resources.

(U) The demise of the Communications Security function was forecasted in May 1971. After coordination between USAFSS and 7AF, as the COMSEC function was in direct support of 7AF, the phase-down and subsequent closure became a reality in June 1972. This represents a great loss to the effort of security, but it was felt necessary with the Executive Troop Withdrawals. It was felt the mission could be maintained by mobile teams from out-of-country resources should the need arise.

Probably the greatest threat to the ARDF effort due to withdrawals was the possible loss of the ACC function. The ACC function massaged the inputs/requests from the field commanders and the known VC/NVA targets with the ARDF availabilities to successfully issue an outline to MACV J2-114 for formal tasking of all available resources.



They also provided artillery strike input against these VC/NVA targets and supplied the ARC LIGHT people with target information. This function, as was pointed out earlier, was manned jointly by the 6994th Scty Sq and the 509th RRG. During early 1972, the status of this effective and very necessary function became questionable.

Everyone agreed that the loss of the function was not agreeable to any of the interested parties. However, the Army was no longer allocating cryptologic slots to this function and the eventual loss of the housing facility for the function, at Whitebirch Station, made the need for re-examination of needs versus resources evident. Three relocation proposals were submitted for discussion: MAGV J2-114's area, the DODSPECREP area or within the 7AF area compound. Meanwhile, reduction of a work force from 43 to 26 was felt. This caused the elimination of the Daily Status Report and the concurrent elimination of the mid-shift working hours. It is truly commendable to say that the ACC function continued in the high degree of excellence that all ARDF units had come to know. As of the close-out of this period, the status of the ACC has not yet been resolved.

In summary, the first six months of 1972 was one of the most important periods ever experienced by the 6994th Scty Sq. With the increased fluidity of the war effort compounded by troop withdrawals, ARDF was becoming more in demand by war planners. It was a time for frustration to those who understood the ARDF program in its entirety. It was continually stressed by MACV that ARDF remained the single most important ingredient in the intelligence community. On the other hand,



continued drawdown pressure was ever present from all sides. As a result, the 6994th Scty Sq was forced to continue to satisfy mission requirements with an ever decreasing number of manpower spaces. This required constant scrutiny and demanded efficient utilization of manpower authorizations to enable the unit to continue its support of the war effort. At the close of June 1972, an end to U.S. ARDF operations stagging from Tan Son Nhut Afld, RVN was already planned and expected. It will continue to be a challenging situation until completion.

Chapter V

COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY OPERATIONS

The Communications Security (COMSEC) Section of the 6994th Scty Sq continued to perform its unique function of providing direct COMSEC support to tactical units in SEA during the first half of 1972. This support was provided through the monitoring analysis, and reporting of voice conversations passed over communications vulnerable USAF intercept systems. The reporting of probable/possible intelligence losses, security compromises, and COMSEC weaknesses was accomplished through the use of Communications Security Message Reports (CSMRs), Interim CSMRs, Informal Daily Summaries (DASUMs), and Communications Security Monthly Summaries (CSMSs). All these reports were designed to be forwarded directly to 7AF for their information/action. The high level of interest in COMSEC at 7AF was evidenced by the fact that all CSMRs destined for 7AF consumers were reviewed by the 7AF Chief of Staff before being released to the consumers. Further COMSEC support was provided to 7AF by COMSEC personnel who were members of the 7AF Operations Security (OPSEC) Working Group and Communications Cover and Deception Board. COMSEC was also called upon by 7AF to provide recommendations to eliminate specific problem areas. These actions were normally accomplished through the OPSEC Working Group or by personal contact with the sections concerned. Periodic COMSEC briefings were presented to newly assigned controllers from the 7AF Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at Tan Son Nhut. These briefings outlined common COMSEC danger areas, presented a review of services the COMSEC section had available to TACC personnel, and included a question and answer session on all aspects of COMSEC in SEA.



Equipment

operations, specific types of equipment were used:

<u>YT0009Y-Telephone Monitor</u>

Two YTO009Y telephone monitor positions were used to monitor USAF telephone circuits originating/terminating at Tan Son Nhut Afld, RVN. Each position contained two GS-80 magnetic tape recorders and two switching groups. This configuration provided a capability for selectively recording conversations from any two of 22 circuits per position (for two positions, this gives four of 44). Periodic circuit changes ensured a representative sample of USAF telephone communications was obtained. Longhaul circuits were the primary target of the telephone monitor; however, local telephones were monitored during special missions. Each position required one operator/analyst per shift who, using split headsets, was able to monitor all conversations. Effective 1 April 1972, the normal daily hours of coverage (DHOC) for these positions was reduced from 16 to ten hours per day (0730 - 1730H) because of phasedown manning reductions. Accountability for both the YTO009Y positions was transferred to the 6990th Scty Gp on 1 April with the positions remaining at the 6994th as deployed equipment until they were removed on 12 June 1972.

YTOOLY-High Frequency Radio Monitor

Three HF radio monitor positions were available for use during the first half of 1972. One position was dedicated to monitor of the II Comps Direct Air Request Net, another to the III Corps Direct Air Request Net, and the third position was untasked. The two tasked positions were



manned 12 hours per day (0700 - 1900H), utilizing one operator/analyst per shift who monitored conversations by using split headsets. Effective 1 April these positions were closed and removed from the COMSEC (DOS) area for shipment to other COMSEC units. Four antennas, three double-doublets and one omni-directional whip, were used with this equipment and remain in place for use by future 6990th Scty Gp mobile teams.

YTOO24-VHF/UHF Radio Monitor

The VHF/UHF radio monitor position consisted of one VHF and one UHF receiver with associated GS-80 magnetic tape recorders. Four antennas, cut to various wave-lengths, were available for use with this equipment and remain in place for future mobile monitor missions by the 6990th Scty Gp. <u>YTS001-Supervisor Position</u>

This position consisted of an HF radio receiver and a switching group which provided the capability to monitor any of the other positions. This position was untasked and was removed from the DOS area on 1 April. <u>YTPOOLX-Transcribe Position</u>

The two GS-80 equipped magnetic tape transcribe positions were used to transcribe the monitored conversations from the other positons. One of these positions was deleted effective 1 April and turned in to supply. The other was transferred to control of the 6990th Scty Gp, but remained at the 6994th Scty Sq in a deployed status until 12 June when it was removed.

Manning

DOS manning as of 1 January 1972 was 31 authorized and 21 assigned. Manning was reduced periodically during the first half of 1972 to meet phasedown requirements. DOS manning as of the following dates was:



Rank	AFSC	<u>l Jan</u>	<u>1 Feb</u>	<u>l May</u>	<u>l Jun</u>	<u>l Jul</u>
Capt lst Lt SMSgt TSgt SSgt SSgt Sgt	E3024 E3024 R20290 R20270 R20270 R20250 R20250	0 1 5 4 7	0 1 5 5 3 7	0 1 2 3 1 3	1 0 1 2 3 1 2	1 0 2 0 0 0
Total		21	22	11	10	3

Mission Accomplishment

(U) During the first half of 1972, the success of the COMSEC mission was best illustrated by the listing and discussion of those significant reports submitted as a result of the monitor mission.

Communications Security Message Reports

CSMRs continued to be forwarded electrically to tactical commanders, and pertained to perishable intelligence losses requiring immediate attention. During early 1972, the COMSEC section issued 44 CSMRs, 35 to 7AF and 9 to USAFSS/Pac Soty Rgn. The most significant of these were: <u>New Air Rescue Tactics</u>. CSMR 042330Z Jan 72 reported the use of laser equipped OV-10 and AC-130 aircraft to "help locate and direct the recovery force" and that the test had "turned out fantastic results." This report elicited considerable attention from the 7AF Vice Commander and Chief of Staff and resulted in a letter on COMSEC violations being forwarded to all 7AF units.

Secret Base in Thailand. CSMR 060215Z May 72 reported that a total of five telephone conversations by high ranking personnel contributed to the information reported in this CSMR. The conversations revealed the following facts concerning a soon-to-be-opened base in Thailand; it was a highly



classified project, it was located south of Udorn RTAFB, it had the callsign BRIDEGROOM, the telephone extension was 3881, and the nickname for the project was COMMANDO CRATE. The parties also revealed numerous additional items of support equipment which were planned for the new base. This information was reported to Pac Scty Rgn with a request for guidance and a DOS assumption that the information disclosed was highly significant. Subsequently, USAFSS agreed with the DOS assessment of the situation and instructed DOS to pass the information directly to the 7AF Chief of Staff, Brig Gen Moore. He confirmed that all the DOS information was valid except the assumption that F-4 aircraft would be assigned to the new base. Subsequently, it was determined that two new bases (Takhli and Nam Phong) were being activated. Also, General Moore stated that no further action was necessary and that he would personally take cars of the matter. SEA VIP/DV Activities. Ten CSMRs were issued reporting disclosures of classified/sensitive information concerning VIP/DV activities in SRA. Items such as codenames and itinerary compromises have a direct bearing on the safety of the traveler and are considered by 7AF to be very sensitive. The reporting of this information alerted consumers to the fact that the information had been subjected to possible compromise and enabled them to take actions to negate the value of the information disclosed. These efforts resulted in several strongly worded letters issued by 7AF/CS to subordinate units.

DASUM

(U) The informal Daily Summary was prepared and distributed to the 7AF Tactical Air Controller Center, Directorate of Command and Control, Fighter



Frag Shop, Operations Security Office, and Directorate of Communications. These reports contained items of information considered by DOS analysts as being of value to bostile intelligence gathering agencies, but which did not meet specific CSNR guidelines. These summaries kept 7AF staff offices appraised of their COMSEC posture on a day-to-day basis and their effectiveness could be measured by the continuing downward trend of reportable items. <u>Communications Security Monthly Summary</u>

(U) The CSMS, the most widely read report, was prepared in accordance with Fac Scty Rgn Regulation 200-2. At the beginning of 1972, 1150 copies of the CSMS were distributed to consumers each month. However, with the reduction of forces in SEA, our distribution was gradually reduced to 694 copies each month. The report continued to be an extremely valuable COMSEC education/information tool. It enabled 7AF units throughout SEA to better understand the sensitivity of in-the-clear communications in SEA and to recognize the dangers of COMSEC malpractices. A lack of knowledge in either of these areas could jeopardize USAF operations and/or resources. The CSMS for May 1972 was the final report in this series.

Special Missions

Between 1 January and 10 June 1972, DOS provided monitor and analysis support for five Pac Sety Rgn numbered COMSEC/OPSEC missions. These missions were directed by USAFSS/SR and Pac Sety Rgn/DOS, and were performed in support of CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCSAC, and 6990th Sety Gp survey activities. A brief resume follows:

PSR 2-72 PACAF. This mission was performed by the 6990th Scty Gp in response to PACAF/DCOOC letter, 22 October 1971, to determine consumer



requirement and vulnerability of the AKAG-275 CIRCE Code. DOS assisted the 6990th Scty Gp mobile teams with coordination and analysis support and provided them with copies of all monitored traffic containing CIRCE code transmissions. Special monitor was not required as routine telephone monitor produced sufficient AKAG-275 traffic to satisfy the requirements.

PSR 3-72 CINCPAC/PACAF (ARC LIGHT). DOS was tasked by Pac Scty Rgn/DOS message 101025Z Dec 71 to provide all possible support for a CINCPAC Operations Security (OPSEC) survey of SAC ARC LIGHT (B-52) activity in SEA. To satisfy this tasking, DOS representatives attended a mission planning conference at Hq MACV which resulted in specific monitor and analysis taskings vy the CINCPAC survey team chief. During the period 3 through 23 January, DOS prepared daily resumes of monitor traffic and sanitized traffic extracts for the OPSEC team to use in preparation of their final report. During this mission, DOS was authorized by Pac Scty Rgn to coordinate directly with the OPSEC team.

PSR 6-72 PACAF (High Threat Reconnaissance). 6990th Scty Gp/SR message 080255Z Apr 72 requested DOS support for a COMSEC survey of high threat reconnaissance operations in SEA. Monitor for this survey was performed from 10 through 19 April. DOS provided daily analysis summaries and copies of all monitor traffic to the 6990th Scty Gp mobile team.

PSR 13-72 CINCSAC/USAFSS (ARC LIGHT). The North Vietnamese offensive and subsequent deployment of additional SAC B-52s and KC-135 aircraft to SEA resulted in a request from CINCSAC to USAFSS for expanded COMSEC monitor of ARC LIGHT activities in SEA. USAFSS/SR message 1421552



Apr 72, Subj: CINCSAC Monitor Request, directed the 6994th Scty Sq/DOS to provide the maximum COMSEC monitor possible to support this request. Since the SAC request was subsequent to the start of the DOS phasedown, the DHOC on one telephone monitor position was increased from 10 to 24 hours and remainded for a period of one week. It was then changed to 16 hours and remainded so through termination of the mission at 1606002 May 72. During the extended coverage, over 48 hours of transcribed traffic was accumulated. DOS personnel informally briefed both the CINCFAC and CINCSAC survey teams on our monitor capabilities and the results of previous DOS studies of ARC LIGHT activities. DOS also provided daily analysis summaries and sanitized traffic to both teams. The CINCFAC and CINCSAC OPSEC team chiefs expressed great appreciation for the DOS effort.

Special Study. In response to an informal request from 7AF/DOOS, DOS analysts compiled a comprehensive study of the VC/NVA threat to inthe-clear UHF/VHF ABCCC communications. Originally this study was intended to be only a source document for use by DOOS in preparing a report for 7AF/DO. However, because of the professional style and completeness of the information contained in this fourteen page study, DOOS forwarded it directly to 7AF/DO without change. Copies of this study were also forwarded to Pac Scty Rgn and the 6990th Scty Gp.

Phase-Down

(U) The 6994th Scty Sq COMSEC Operations Section (DOS) manning and mission was gradually reduced until the function was deleted on 1 July 1972. Actions contributing to the phasedown/close-out were as follows:



Initial actions were to entail deleting all monitor resources at the 6994th Scty Sq effective 4Q72. It was planned that the COMSEC support to SEA would be assumed by the 6990th Scty Gp at Kadena AB. The 6990th Scty Gp concurred with this proposal and would accept all the resources except the two YTOOIX transcribe positions. They also foresaw no problems in the transfer of the COMSEC personnel slots to that location.

In concurrence with the President's Vietnam force reduction order, the COMSEC resources were reduced to 11 slots. These were to be reduced prior to 30 April 72 and the remaining personnel would only be tasked with the responsibility for telephone monitor.

At 312400Z Mar 72, 6994th Scty Sq COMSEC radio monitor ceased and all COMSEC equipment with the exception of the two YT0009 telephone monitor and one YTPOOLX transcribe position became excess to the mission. During this time all excess equipment was removed and turned over to the Mission Maintenance Branch (MA). Also, COMSEC personnel began departing PCS to bring down the manning levels as desired.

Because of manning shortages and to facilitate disposition of the equipment, COMSEC telephone monitor at the 6994th Scty Sq was terminated at 100930Z Jun 72. All remaining equipment was removed on 12 June 1972 and turned over to MA for disposition and shipment to the 6990th Scty Gp. During the final weeks in June, the remaining personnel completed the necessary actions to effect closure and transfer of the SEA COMSEC function to the 6905th Scty Sq/SR (effective 15 June 1972, COMSEC at the 6990th Scty Gp became the 6905th Scty Sq).



Chapter VI

MAINTENANCE/SUPPLY ACTIVITIES

(U) Logistical activities within the maintenance and supply areas showed vast changes with active maintenance planning and supply coordination highlighting the period. Supply activities increased with the rapid advance of the Vietnamization Modernization and Improvement (VIM) training program and the assistance provided to Det 2, 6994th Scty Sq and Det 3, 6994th Scty Sq. Maintenance actions became of paramount importance with the complete revamping of the maintenance complex, squadron wide. Maintenance involvement in the VIM training program, coordinated with 7AF and AF Advisory Group, hit an all time high with commendable results. Management of the entire maintenance effort affected higher overall mission accomplishment.

Maintenance

COMSEC Maintenance

(U) The COMSEC operation terminated at the 6994th Soty Sq during 4th Quarter 1972. During the first three months of 1972, no outages or lost position time was experienced for COMSEC equipment. Again, timely operator maintenance assisted in maintaining high reliability in the system.

ARDF Maintenance

Local ARDF maintenance was highlighted by increased effectiveness and high system reliability. Despite critical manning, overall mission effectiveness was maintained. Total sorties flown for the period was 5,707 (including VIM missions) and an overall reliability rate of 97%



was gained as a result of the outstanding maintenance performed on mission equipment. This is indeed indicative of a fine effort with only a nine percent abort rate being attributed to Bravo Maintenance (includes air and ground aborts).

Maintenance Management

(U) Technical and Logistic Support and Detachments. The Maintenance Branch performed outstandingly in support of the squadron's efforts. Guidance, management techniques and technical/logistical support were given to the two operating detachments as well as to Tan Son Nhut. Constant coordination with the various host bases proved a positive asset to the overall maintenance effort. Maintenance Data Collection, Analysis, Workload Control, VIM training and material support were highlighted during this period. While aircraft disposition remained the same, the most experienced personnel were assigned duties throughout the Squadron and Detachment maintenance complexes. No problems of any magnitude were suffered in the logistics area. The critical manning problem was solved since personnel arrived in a timely manner to effect mission accomplishment.

Vietnamization Improvement and Modernization Training Program (VIMP)*

The VIM training program accelerated during the first six months of 1972, with 27 students going from formal classroom training in ALR-34 systems to on the job training with USAFSS trained instructors. The VNAF were placed on shift schedules to give them all the training required. Results of this effort were extremely gratifying; however,

*See Chapter IV for related information concerning the VIM program.



continued training will be necessary to effect a smooth transfer. It was anticipated that the overall program would prove to be a success and will accelerate rapidly when the aircraft are turned over (current figures estimate this date to be on/about 1 December 1972).


(U) Zonal Maintenance continued to perform in an outstanding manner. The efforts put forth by this unit improved the overall squadron appearance. Repairs they effected at all detachments aided the health, morale, and welfare of all concerned. Zonal Maintenance rehabilitated all maintenance buildings at Tan Son Nhut and aided Det 2 and Det 3 on numerous occasions in electrical, carpentry, and refrigeration projects. Also, this force was tasked with numerous manning assistance TDYs to aid other Security Service units within SEA. The Zonal Maintenance force has truly been an example of dedication to the overall mission and a commendable asset to the 6994th Scty Sq.


Footnotes completely redacted. Following 4 pages removed to reduce file size.


AFPENDIX 1


ORGANIZATIONAL AND


COMMAND CONTROL CHARTS












APPENDIX 2


GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS

AND MISSION AREAS

i inter

6994th Sety Sq and Detachments





APPENDIX 3

EC-47 AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION



BASIC COMPLET CROSS CONFIGURATION

"I" Position

"X" Position

G-133 HP Ressiver Frequency Range .5-30 HHz G-176 Tape Recorder Spectrum Display Unit ALE-34 or ALE-35 Frequency Hunge 3-16 C-12 Compass Panoranis Scope

Function: "X" Position - ARDF, "Y" Position - Inrget Aquisition/

Flight times 7 hours.

Gruise speed: 120 Knote.

Crew Composition: Pilot, Copilet, Navigator, Flight Mechanic, and two Operators.


Communications Radios: 1 UNF radio, 1VNF radio, 1 HF radio, and 1 FM radio.

Navigation Equipments (TACAN, Weather Reday, and Doppler.

Navigator's position includes: Plotting table and Franklin Printer that provides fix data readout from the "X" position.

The ALR-35 system differs from the ALR-34 in that it is coupled with a data processor. The processor converts the target magnetic bearings to true bearings, calculates target location relative to the selected dopplar set point, and determines the circular error of the fix. In the ALR-34 systems, these functions are performed manually by the navigator.

3-1





COMBAT CROSS (ZULI) CONFIGURATION

#Z1# Position

G-133 HF Receiver Frequency Range .5-30 MHs G-175J VHF Receiver Frequency Range 10-260 MHs G-276 Demodulator G-176 Tape Recorder

"I" Positica

G-133 HF Receiver)2) Frequency Range .5-30 MHz G-176 Tape Recorder Spectrum Display Unit

#22# Posttion

G-133 HF Receiver (2) Frequency Range .5-30HHs G-176 Tape Recorder Spectrum Display Unit

"I" Position

ALR-34 or ALR-35 Frequency Range 2-16 MHs C12 Compass Panoramic Display

Function: "I" Position - ARDF, "I" Position - Target aquisition/ collection/Air-Ground communications, "Z1" Position - Intercept collection, and "Z2" Position - Collection.

Flight time: 5 hours.

Gruise speed: 120 Knots.

Crew: Pilot, Copilot, Navigator, Flight Mechanic, 4 operators, and one Airborne Analyst.


Communications Radios: 1 UHF radio, 1 VHF radia, 1 HF radio, and 1 FN radio.

Navigation Equipments TACAN, Weather Badar, and Doppler.

Navigator's position includes: Plotting table and Franklin Printer.

The ALR-35 system differs from the ALR-34 in that it is coupled with a data processor. The processor converts the target magnetic bearings to true bearings, calculates target location relative to the selected doppler set point and determines the circular error of the fix. In the ALR-34 system, these functions are performed manually by the navigator.





APPENDEL A

ARM PEGENCTIVITY STATISTICS

ARDF PRODUCTIVITY



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	JAN		7	FEB		MAR		AFR		AY -	TUN		TOTAL	
EVALUATED AREAS	proc	COMP	LOG	COMP	TOC	COMP	LOC	COMP	TOC	COMP	TOC	COMP	LOC	COMP
Missions Tasked	144	871	84	1010	109	8.46	164	888	240	801	138	553	879	4969
Missions Flown	140	795	83	879	106	788	158	802	226	718	111	485	824	4467
Hours Tasked	879	5503	487	6474	693	5427	1029	5651	1517	5134	828	3492	5433	3168
Hours Flown	829	4760	470	5263	662	4773	958	4811	1316	4161	559	2654	4794	2642
Hours over Igt	583	3077	346	3433	392	2980	603	2989	928	2699	398	1701	3250	1690
Tgts Worked	1021	5582	689	6271	664	5518	1564	6732	2309	6455	1120	3991	7367	3454
Tgts Fixed	699	4044	479	3905	476	3897	944	4473	1331	4049	689	2592	4618	2296
Tets Out	196	968	123	953	100	1831	285	1250	437	1280	202	752	1343	703
Exploit. Msgs (MM)	44	792	45	719	14	738	28	717	29	718	9	416	169	410
Exploit. Mags (RT)	11	988	8	992	10	803	45	1525	31	1381	15	1588	120	727
Fixes/Cuts Ident	477	2228	321	1840	258	2117	496	1816	653	1786	441	1405	2646	1119
Fixes/Outs Ident Priority	358	1560	244	1251	206	1545	420	1 398	451	1357	353	1110	2032	822





Unsecomplished Missions


•		LOCAL			e Barat			
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUI	TOTAL	
SCHEDULED MISSIONS	144	84	109	164	240	138	87 9	
ACCOMPLISHED MISSIONS	140	83	106	158	226	111	824	
UNACCOMPLISHED MISSIONS	4	1	3	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		27	55	
UNACCOMPLISHED DUE TO:	Q							
Equipment Weather Misc.	2 2 0	1 0 0	3 0 0	0	4 8 2	0 23 4	10 39 6	

		COPI	<u>rr</u>					
	JAN	ASB B	MAR	AFR	MAT		TOPAL	
SCHEDULED	·							
MISSIONS	871	1010	846	888	801	553	4969	
ACCOMPLISHED				· · · ·			· .	
MISSIONS	795	879	788	802	718	485	4467	
UNACCOMPLISHED		`						
MISSIONS	76	131	58	86	83	68	502	
UNACCOMPLISHED DUE TO:			· ·	· · ·				
_								
Equipment	20	40	28	21	50	10	169	
Weather	37	55	13	59	24	52	240	
No acft avail	17	33	13	5	3	- 1 0	71	
M.sc.	2	3	4	1	3	6	22	



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
ARDF Productivity


Reduced Missions


LOCAL

	TOTAL MSNS REDUCED	REDUCED M	ISSIONS CAUS	ED BY: FUEL	WEATHER	OTHER
January	19	5	3	3	8	0
February	12	3	1	0	8	0
March	-15	7	0	3	5	0
April	30	3	0	9	14	4
May	69	7	3	5	47	7
June	57	6	Ŏ	1	46	4
TOTAL	195	31	7	21	121	15

· .		COMPLEX				
	TOTAL HENS REDUCED	REDUCED MIS	SICHS CAUSED	BY: FUEL	WEATHER	OTHER
January	175	46	23	31	58	. 17
February	218	36	23	44	94	21
March	1%	44	20	48	68	16
April	254	19	20	80	115	14
Hay	323	41	20	132	106	24
June	281	38	9	110	107	23
TOTAL	1447	224	115	445	548	115
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					· · ·







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USAF DAILY AVERAGE ARDE IDENTIFICATION STATISTICS (TGTS/#ID)

USA-561 13/37 55	U3A-563 #4/2# 24	USA-564 194/29 33	(VERACE		
N/A	N/A	N/A	ØE/27 N/A	33	
26/12 38	14/11 25	14/16 3#	16/12	28	
16/15 31	Ø9/Ø8 17	15/26 41	13/14	27	
	16/10 26	16/25 41	14/14	3¢	
24/72 - 62 - 2	18/49 27	25/21 46		33	
1. 8	12/12 24	15/13 38	14/16		

LEGEND: STOTA ID WHILE AINBOUR, TOTS ID AFTER RECOVERY STOTAL IDENTIFIED (ALL IN S)





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DAILY AVERAGE ARDE IDENTIFICATION STATISTICS (TOTS / SID)

	USAF	USA	SSTB	AVERAGE
ANUARY	ø6/27 33	\$5/19 24	Ø9/38 47	¢6/27 33
FEBRUARY	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
MARCH	16/12 28	14/29 23	14/10 24	ø5/1ø 25
APRIL	13/14 27	01/13 14	Ø3/17 2Ø	¥7/14 21
MAY	16/14 30	Ø1/12 13	<u>ø4/11 15</u>	<u>,*/13 21</u>
JUNE	21/12 33	w2/15 17	Ø4/1Ø 14	12/15 24
AVERAGE	14/16 30	ø5/14 18	Ø7/17 24	ø8, 15 25

LEGEND: STOTE ID WILLE A RE RNE TOTS ID AFTER RECOVERY STOTAL IDENTIFIED

	VOICE	INTERCEPT	STATIST	103 (16/
	<u>U.S.</u>	VIM		•
HF	2,86ø	549		د
VKF	2,179		÷	
TOTAL:	5,039	549	F	

*VHF VOICE INITIALLY NOTED IN APRIL AFTER VIN ASSUMED COMPLETE RESPONSIBILITY FOR VUICE PROCESSING.

				RECURRING	FE I	PORTS	S STATISTIC	s		
		· · · · ·		t tra 🌔						
1	cul.	<u> </u>	4	. 5 -	<u>.</u>	I	<u>et</u> i i	· '£	<u>10</u>	LEGEND
1/1-7	788	757	371/-	59/1ø/8	53	: 49	21;ø45/37	49.0	. 4	1 - MONTH/WEEK
1/8-14	681	646	3#7/-	88/21/14	1.9	49	17,703/30	47.5	-	2 - TOTAL INTERCEPTS
1/15-01	477	467	219/-	28/5/4	21	7Ø	11,725/22	46.8		3 - WITH CALLSIGNS
1/22-28	5 66	352	327/-	25/6/1	21	7ø	16,435/26	59.2		4 - LOCAL/NSA IDENTS
1/29-2/4	501	49ø	275/-	47/17/3	21	7Ø	12,820/20	56.1	-	5 - MESSAGES
2/5-11	173	164	73/-	26/12/8	14	74	4,750/12	44.5	+	HIGH GRADE/EXP/PASSED A/G
2/12-18	526	506	269/-	58/8/6	24	-	13,540/24	53.2		6 - U.S. ARR'S
2/19-25	334	324	161/-	28/9/9	16	-	8,095/15	49.7		7 - VIM ARA13
2/26-3/3	147	-143	72/-	11/0/0	9		3.785/9	59.3	· · · ·	8 - SEATS
3/4-19	263	254	108/-	21/9/9	14		6,220/10	42.5		TOTAL GROUPS/SECTIONS
3/11-17	374	356	173/-	32/2/2	25	•		46.3		9 - \$ OF TOTAL IDENIS
3/18-24	497	482	226/-	56/3/#	35	-		46.8	· . ••	19- \$ OF POSSIBLE IDENTE
3/25-31	448	44.7	226/-	37/4/4	35	-	4,495/9	51.2		
4/1-7	51'3	505	242/19	26/2/2	35	1 2 🋶		N.	93.0	
4/8-14	798	779 .	494/2	45/3/8	45	8		51.9		
4/15-21	756	736	333/4		44			45.2		
4/22-28	910	877	345/15	ing a subscription of the	42				95.3	
4/29-5/5	982	913	346/7	1#2/6/2				37.9	98.3	
•	•		- 7			• 11 - • •	tan normanian na ta			

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	5/6-12	555	834	312/4	51/5/1	47	. 	3,695/8	37.4	98.8	
	o/13-19	915	891	382/2	60/7/4	47	-	6,410/9	43.8	98.9	
	5/20-26	87ø	843	348/4	83/9/4	59	-	6,440/10	40.0	97.6	
•	5/27-6/2	748	728	326/4	41/1/1	48	<u>`</u>	6,27\$/9	44.5	98.8	
	6/3=9	547	492	183/2	31/3/3	48	-	3,400/7	37.2	98.9	
	6/16-16	686	658	325/.4	62/8/0	44		3,560/8	49.4	95.5	
	6/47-23	675	664	3+7/4	59/1ø/7	25		5,720/11	46.2	98.7	
	6/24-3ø	729	716	394/3	40/4/1	21	-	8,400/13	55.ø	99.2	
	-				• •			•	1		

TOTAL: 15,717 15,220 7,054/74* 1,240/167/94 847 438 106,458/378 46.3 98.3 *TOTAL IDENT FROM Ø1 APRIL: 4,247/74

NOTE: A TOTAL OF 61 EXPLOITABLE MESSAGE REPORTS WERE ISSUED ON EXPLOITABLE MESSAGES NOT PASSED AIR/GROUND.




BLUE BERTLE FIX/FAC Statistics

DATE	TOTS PASSED	TGTS VRID	TOTS	
01-07 Jan	49	8	0	79
06-14	61	ŝ	ő	56
15-21	40	7	ō	56
22-28	52	ģ	14	56
29-04 Feb	49	8	Ó	63
05-11	29	1	100	48
12-18	30	11	Ö	54
19-25	37	22	ŏ	55
26-03 Mar	7	1	· Ö	56
04-10	28	Â.	ō	57
11-17	23	ŏ	Ğ	68
18-24	41	5	õ	. 79
25-31	20	1	Ō	75
01-07 Apr	17	4	Ō	63
08-14	3	Ó	Ō	Š
15-22	29	9	Ō	13
23-28	14	- ŏ	ŏ	31
29-05 May	6	0	ō	21
06-12	Ó	Ó	Ō	14
13-19	10	3	ō	12
20-26	5	1	Ō	12
27-02 Jun	2	0	Ō	13
0309	0	Ö	õ	14
10-16	-8	Ō	Ŏ	10
17-23	_ 0	Ö	Ö	7
24-30	A	<u>o</u>	Ö.	7
TOFALS	390	102	2	1906

- * 23 January, two A-378 struck the target with three secondary explosions.
- ** Of February, two A-37s struck the target with one secondary explosion and one bunker destroyed.
- # After 05 May, the scheduled messions dropped drastically due to the unit no longer flying with the VIN flights and not being considered part of the product of the 6994th Soty Sq.

APPENDIX 5 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF COMMANDER



BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

LT COL DAVID H. EDDY

On 22 May 1972, Lt Col David H. Eddy assumed command of the 6994th Security Squadron, Republic of Vietnam. His previous duty assignment was at the same unit in the capacity of the Squadron Operations Officer.

Born 8 October 1931 at Freeport, New York, Lt Col Eddy attended Davis-Elkins College, Elkins, West Virginia. He received his B.S. degree in Personnel Management in January of 1954.

Entering the Air Force on 19 March 1954, he was an aviation cadet at Harlingen AFB, Texas. As a navigator, he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant on 23 May 1955. He was subsequently assigned to the 2578th Air Force Reserve Center, Ellington AFB, Texas as an Instructor Navigator (he also served as the Base Supply Officer) until May of 1959.

After attending Combat Crew Upgrade Training (as a B-47 Radar Bombadier) at Mather AFB, California and Little Rock AFB, Arkansas, he was assigned to the 380th Bomber Wing at Plattsburgh AFB, New York, where he served from December of 1959 until May of 1963 when he became the Targeting Officer.

From September of 1965 until September of 1966, Lt Col Eddy served as a navigator aboard EC-47 aircraft operating within the Republic of Vietnam. He then returned to the United States to work at USAFSS Headquarters, Kelly AFB, Texas, in the Test and Evaluation Division for two years. He remained at Kelly AFB to become the Chief of Tactical Airborne Operations for three more years. It was then that Lt Col Eddy returned to Vietnam to become the Squadron Operations Officer in May of 1971. He assumed command in May of 1972, the position he is currently holding.

Lt Col Eddy's decorations include the Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal, and the Air Force Commendation Medal.

He is the father of four children residing in New York. They are: Mark, age 16; Bethann, age 15; Mary, age 13; and David, age 10.

CAREER CHRONOLOGY

- 19 March 54 Enlisted in the USAF.
- 23 May 55 Aviation Cadet commissioned Navigator, Harlingen AFB, Texas.
- May 55 Oct 58 Instructor Navigator, 2578th Air Force Reserve Center, Ellington AFB, Texas.
- Oct 58 May 59 Base Supply Officer, 2578th Air Base Group, Ellington AFB, Texas.
- May 59 Sep 59 3535th Student Squadron, Radar Bombardment School, Mather AFB, California.
- Sep 59 Dec 59 Combat Crew Training, B-47s, Little Rock AFB, Arkansas.
- Dec 59 May 63 Combat Crew Member, B-47s, 380th Bomber Wing, Flattsburgh AFB, New York.
- May 63 Sep 65 Target Study Officer, Bomb/Nav, 380th Bomber Wing, Plattsburgh AFB, New York.
- Sep 65 Sep 66 EC-47 Navigator, 360th TEWS, Tan Son Nhut Afld, RVN.
- Sep 66 Jul 68 Test and Evaluation Division, Hq USAFSS, Kelly AFB, Texas.
- May 71 May 72 Squadron Operations Officer, 6994th Scty Sq, Tan Son Nhut Afld, RVN.
- 22 May 72 Squadron Commander, 6994th Scty Sq, EC-47 Combat Crew member, Navigator, Tan Son Nhut Afld, RVN.

DATES OF RANK

RANK	TEMPORARY	PERMA NENT
A/B, Aviation Cadet	•••	19 March 1954
2d Lt	23 May 1955	23 November 1955
lst Lt (Reserve)	23 November 1956	22 May 1958
lst Lt (Regular)	22 May 1958	4 September 1961
Captain	4 September 1961	23 May 1962
Major	15 October 1966	23 May 1967
Lt Col	13 September 1971	-

Awards and Decorations

Distinguished Flying Cross

Bronze Star

Meritorious Service Medal

Air Medal w/eight Oak Leaf Clusters

Air Force Commendation Medal w/one Oak Leaf Cluster

Presidential Unit Citation

Air Force Outstanding Unit Award w/"V" for Valor, and one Oak Leaf Cluster

Combat Readiness Medal

Army Good Conduct Medal

National Defense Service Medal w/one Bronze Star

Air Force Expeditionary Medal


Vietnamese Service Medal w/seven Bronze Stars

Expert Marksmanship Ribbon

Longevity Ribbon w/three Oak Leaf Clusters

Vietnamese Campaign Medal

NOTE: Several pages following completely redacted. All removed to reduce file size.



302397 NO. 585 208**885** // INNED // 85x**88**44 FM DET 2 699433 To 699455/CC/DB 0.005 82 89Z JAN RET 2 699455 TO PACECT YREN/CC USA F35/CC/DOMP 2E#/699458/00/00 ZEN SUBJE STELLTION BATTLE DAMAGE REPORT 1. DET 2,6994 SCTY SQL DANANG AFLD, RVN 2. 8152-8245 HOTEL ,85 JAN 72 5. SIX 122MM ROCKETS IMPACTED ON WEST SIDE OF DANANG AFLD. TWO OF THE SE IMPACTED IN RUNNAY AREA, BALANCE IN PROXIMITY TO WEST SIDE OF PLICHT LINE. SUSP DIRECTION OF LAUNCHE FROM SOUTHNEST. 4. N/A. 5. THREE OF THIS UNIT'S A IRCRAFT WERE DAMAGED BY NEAR MISS

IN PARKING AREA. ACFT 072 SUFFERED FABRIC DAMAGE IN CONTROL STACES AND SHEET METAL DAMAGE TO FUSELAGE AND RIGHT WING ROOT. EST TIME TO REPAIR-TWO TO FOUR WEEKS. ACFT 702 AND 240 WERE & IGHTLY DAMAGED WITH FABRIC TEARS ONLY AND WILL PROB BE ABLE TO LAUNCH TODAY. S. DAMAGE WAS CAUSED BY IMPACT OF ROCKET IN TARMAC IN FRONT OF REVETMENT SEPERATING TWO ACFT PARKING AREAS. WHILE NO SHRAPNEL STRUCK ACFT, DONSIDERABLE DEBRIS, PRINCIPALLY PIECES OF PAVEMENT STRUCK THREE ACFT, WITH MAJORITY OF DAMAGE SUBTAINED BY ACFT 072. PSR REPORTING ON THIS ACFT BEING SENT CHARATELY. LOSS OF THIS ACFT DECREASES SORTIE CAPABILITY BY SHE MISSION PER DAY FOR DURATIN OF LOSS. T. ESTIMATE ABLE TO RESUME NORMAL OPS NLTI FEB, PROB SOONER, DEPENDING ON TIME TO REPAIR ACFT 072.

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16 April 1972

SUBJECT: Weekly Activity Report(08 - 14 Apr 72)

YO: CC DC Unit Historian (IN TURN)

I. GENERAL

1. The influx of fighter/fighter bomber aircraft at Da Nang on 10 April has forced the deployment of seven EC-47 aircraft from Da Nang to MEP and Saigon. Five of the aircraft have deployed to MEP and the remaining two aircraft to Tan Son Nhut. MACV and 7AF coordinated the dates of these moves.

2. 12 Apr 72: Coordination was conducted with the Combat APPLE mission to insure tip-offs will be issued to ACC on any tank communications intercepted by the platform.

3. 13 Apr 72: Recket attack on Da Mang decreased their aircraft availabilities by one COMBAT CHOSS Zulu and one COMBAT CHOSS Maxi. There were four other aircraft damaged in the attack, but they are repairable and expected to be back into operation shortly. Every effort is being unde to sugment the mission capabilities of Da Mang by 7th Air Force. Fin Bai and MKP are expanding their areas of operation to ovver the SEA areas where coverage was lost or decreased.

II. PROCESSING

Nothing to report.

III. COLLECTION:

1. Due to increased energy activity in the Can The area, MACV directed the establishment of the 801 Brave mission on 08 April. The Air Force aircraft will increase the daily sortic allocation in this area to two, one from Air Force and one from Army.

2. On OS April, the sortic allocation in the 03 Eshe area was increased by four CONSAT CHOSS. The increase of sorties is to provice additional coverage on the NVA offensive in the An Lec area.

3. On 14 April, 7th Air Force requested a sortie be fragged off the seast of North Vietnam, in the area between Deng Hei and Vink for coverage of the NVA 325th Division. Fix data obtained from this mission will be used for inmediate air strikes against the 325th and its elements.

674299 02 24 Z CZ CROCED MON SE 1400 (7 XX. AK 6685 1398049 MINEN **?**R Bal sci Yso/ce HAT YES /CC MUT NO/00 14 1207 YS2/00/20 0 LIS HOMP. MENT MAY CORRELATO NOT NOT (U) A MESSE' & REMARKS RETRANSMITTED SELON ANE FURTHER EDEDIENT OF YOUR UNITS' CONTINUED OUTSTANDING POREANCE THROUGHOUT THE SEA NAN 201E. ONE AGAIN TO DENTATULATE EACH AND EVERY WAN INVOLVED AND URGE THU TO OD NT IMAE SYOWN EPPORTS AT THEIR CURRENT HIGH LEVELS. · \$17 WY # A USA 128 PACECT VRC N/00/ FHAVE BEEN GLOSELY MONITORING THE CURRENT ORITICAL SITUATION

IN MALITARY REGION 1 OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND MARTICUL ARLY THE EFFORTS OF THE SIGINT COMMUNITY TO RESPOND TO THE CHANGING STMOSTNERE. YOUR AWARENESS OF REQUIREMENTSAND THE TIMELY AND PROFESSIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS PARTICUL ARLY BY THE SOUTH POTT OF, GOUSTH SOTY SQ, 6924TH SOTY SQ AND 6994TH SOTY SOUTH POTT OF, GOUSTH SOTY SQ, 6924TH SOTY SQ AND 6994TH SOTY MENSE AND PROFESSIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS PARTICUL ARLY BY THE SOUTH POTT OF, GOUSTH SOTY SQ, 6924TH SOTY SQ AND 6994TH SOTY AND MANED FOR THE CURRENT SURGE EFFORT AND, THEREFORE, MAT MANNED FOR THE CURRENT SURGE EFFORT AND, THEREFORE, AND WINNEL AND MAN ACCOMPLIANMENT SURGE EFFORT AND, THEREFORE, AND WINNEL AND ACCOMPLIANMENT MORE NOTENORTHY, PLEASE MANNER IN MANED AND THEY HAVE CONDUCTED THEMSELVES DURING THE SE STOTAL DAYS.

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2. 3 Jan 72:

a. During a discussion following the last MACV Wednesday Tasking Meeting, Capt McIlnay mentioned that the analysts had some infe that suggested the HQ, VC/ICC, 203d Regt may have relocated from its mermal AQ. As this entity had not been fixed since the Saigon to MCP emittle flights were discontinued, MSgt Phillips suggested fragging a mortis to Uniform Victor area to check out the target. ACC them moordinated with USM-626 to insure tech data was available and determine data for sortis. On 3 Jan 72, MSN 820 Juliett fixed the target in its normal AO. Although only a Priority Three target, the fix on E 0116 refuted the indication of a move southward toward Phase Penh.

And received AFSSO, 7th AF, IN, DIG 27/01452 DEC 71, Subj: "Inotian ARIF Support". The message, sent "action" to NACV/ J211-4, concurred with the action taken in the BARREL BOLL/PDJ area (PSR 24/01002, DIRESA 24/16172 and our IAPVOP-AC 26/09452 DEC 71) and requested sixilar measures to be taken in the STERL TIGER area to increase/emphasize ARDF and collection of GDRS communications. Migt Philling aperdimeted with both Dets of the 6994th Scty Sq and the two CMA' By WERENESS and USH-7 must concerned with STERL TIGER Missions to stank, BEL 698 was made TTA anthority for MAII "NOD sortles was den 7 for CONBAT CHOSS sortles. In order to pro-Will the mapheeis on GDRS activity requested by AFFSSO, 7th AF and will ministain a balance of Tactical coverage desired by 100 recommended fragging Saiges based COMBAT CROSS to the B 3 Front area normally covered from Da Mang, releasing the Da Mang CROSSES IN STREE THER ALesions. Tasking messages for period 5 - 12 Wax 72 we look steps taken to acet both and AF330, 7th Ar Provident States the second

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3. 5 am 72: We received HEV (C), F 4611-0012-72, DTG 04/0716Z JAN 72, subit "Left Twist". This message to DIENSA indicated no further left Twist sorties would be fragged as the life expectancy of the CSD was such that the effort would not be productive. The message requested information on future left Twist operations.

4. 6 Jan 72: We received USA-564, DO, DTG 04/0620Z JAN 72 which suggested re-alignment of 11 Alfs frag area. This message was sent CRITICOM to **Example** info ACC and USM-7 recommended the frag box be entended eastward to cover Pre-Emptive Tasking (P/T) targets and GDRS communications. After two days of querying USM-7, via OPSODMy on this recommendation, ACC issued IAPVOP-AC, DTG OS/0405Z JAN 72, re-aligning 11 Alfs frag box. However, based on surrent AAA High Threat locations and a suspected SAM area within 19 MM of Zray Delta 1292, the upper right-hand portion was modified by AGC in the interest of crew safety. After issuance of ACC tasking where message on 11 Alfs, concurrence by **Example** was finally invested via **ANNON** (GAS Moorn, DTG 06/0715Z JAN 71.) DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH AIR FORCE (PACAF) APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



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
subject. Letter of Appreciation

to: Commander 6994th Security Squadron

> 1. The current enemy offensive has caused considerable realignment of Intelligence resources and adjustments in missions to contend with contingency situations as they have developed. The 6994th Security Squadron has played a vital role in the provision of timely intelligence relative to enemy intentions and capabilities. Your flexibility and initiative have been very evident and instrumental in filling the gap left by the loss of other intelligence collection facilities.

2. Please convey my sincere appreciation to the personnel of the 6994th Security Squadron for a job well done. Your continued professionalism and performance are greatly appreciated.

ER Maj Gen, USAF DOS/Intelligence



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SE TECHINS \$2037, PAGE 3, SECTION 11, 1A(7)(B). SUBCEST USE OF TERM "FXD" VICE "FIX" FOR SOI USAGE FOR PURPOSE OF STANDARDIZATION.
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THREE AND FOUR ABOVE WOULD ELIMINATE APPROXIMATELY FIFTY PERCENT OF SEATS OUTPUT BY THIS UNIT WITH A CORRESPONDING DEGREASE IN REQUIRED MANHOURS.

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UNEVERAL PROBLEM AREAS COMMON TO ALL GMATS. ICR'S ARE NOT PREPARED ON THE OURRENT DAYS MISSIONS, DO NOT REFLECT CORRECTED VERSION OF INTERCEPTED GALLSTORS AND CONTAIN DUPLICATED INFORMATION. ATION

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3. LAW SUBJ TECHINS, ICR'S SHOULD BE ISSUED NET 2200 HOURS LOCAL ON THE CURRENT DAYS INTERCEPT. ALTHOUGH THE NOR IS NORMALLY ISSUED WITHIN THE REQUIRED TIME FRAME, IT FREQUENTLY CONTAINS DATA FOR SEVERAL DAYS MISSIONS. ADDITIONALLY, THE CHA'S SELDOM PROVIDE THE CORRECTED VERSION OF CALLSIGNS AS DETERMINED THROUGH RESEARCH OF THEIR DATA BASE. IN LIEU OF THE CORRECT/DEGARGLED CALLSIGN, THE INTERCEPTED VERSION IS SUGMITTED IN THIS REPORT. THIS RESULTS IN ADDITIONAL RESEARCH BY THE ANT AVEATION UNITS ATTEMPTIONS TO DETERMINE BASIS FOR (RE) IDENTIFICATION. SHOULD THE CALLSIGNS ACTUALLY BE CORRUPT, SUBSEQUENT INTERCEPT WINLL LEAD TO CONTINUED MISIDENT AND ICR ACTION. FURTHERMORE, HAVE NOTED THAT ICR'S OFTEN CONTAIN IDENTICAL INFORMATION AS THAT REPURTED IN THE ARR. AS THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE ARR THIS INFORMATION IS REDUNDANT AND SHOULD BE DELETED. 4. TO ENHANCE THE ICR POTENTIAL AS AN IDENT AID, WE

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SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. CMA*S SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO ISSUE ICR'S NLT THREE (3) HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE LAST ARR FROM INDIVIDUAL AVIATION UNITS AND THE ICR SHOULD CONTAIN ALL ACTIVITY FOR THAT PARTICULAR MISSION DAY, FOR THAT UNIT. THE PRACTICE OF ISSUING CONCLOMERATE ICR'S MOULD BE SERIOUSLY REVIEWED AND INDIVIDUAL UNIT ICR'S ISSUED. THIS SHOULD FACILITATE PROCESSING AT ALL ECHELONS.

B. CORRECTED CALLSIGNS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE

C. CREATION OF A THIRD SECTION OF THE IGR (SECTION THREE). THIS SECTION WOULD CONTAIN RATIONALE FOR RE-IDENTS, I.E., MØØ90 FTB EØ156, VCXBV4661 FTB PO VCXBV4556, ETC. THIS SHOULD BE A FREE FORM SECTION WITH THE STIPULATION THAT ONLY PERTINENT DATA BE INCLUDED. DEGARBLED CALLS FOR INSTANCE WOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED FOR OBVIOUS REASONS. CREATION OF A THIRD SECTION WOULD CONTRIBUTE IN A LARGE MEASURE IN ASSISTING AVIATION UNITS WITH MAINTENANCE OF THEIR TECHNICAL DATA BASE. 5. REQUEST COMMENTS.

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A. VOMBN5143, FH THIS STATION 16 APRIL, 18 POSSIBLE TO, TO, TO, VOMBJ3156. KNOWN SUBSORIBERS TO THIS NET INCLUDE THE 9TH DIV, M2629; HQ YC 5TH REGT, B4974; HQ NVA 95C REGT, M0056; HQ VNC MR 0-20, M9772; AND TWO UI'S, 85346 AND E4726. IN ADDITION, THE HQ NVA 271ST IND REGT, M0196 (CALL 58A) WAS NOTED IN CONTACT WITH NXG ON 19 APRIL AT 01292. IBENT TO THE FWD ELE HOVN WATCH IS BASED ON PREVIOUS KNOWN CAONTACTS BY THE ADOVE SUBSORIBERS AND MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE SUBSORIBERD TO THE UN WATCH REPORTED IN PARA 48, BELOW.

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8. UNCASED CONTINUITY: RX CALL "YQJ", FH 15 APRIL, HAS BEEN DBBERVED WITH THE FOLLOWING SUBSCRIBERS: 9TH DIV, NE620; HQ NVA SENDREGT, M0944; HQ NVA 24TH REGT, M0194; HQ NVA 272ND REGT, M0042; TWO UI'S, E4724/E4720 PLUS THE POSS HQ NVA 32ND REGT, M0127 WQX - E4726). IN ADDITION, UI CALLS VIO AND ALF HAVE BEEN NOTED. IN EA OF THE ABOVE INSTANCES, THE ONLY COMMON WATCH FACILIET. TO ALL OF THE KNOWN SUBSCRIBERS IS VOMB0094, THUS THE IDENT TO M0676. E. RE THE IDENT OF THE SUBSCRIBERS:

A. MODTH: HE MR 10 WAS LOD BY USH-6240, HISSION 343L ON 20

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APRIL AT XU997055, 1500 METERS ON THE BROADDAST VOMBRECON. CALLENGN UXF WAS ALSO LOCATED ON THE 20TH BY USA-561 AT YU93007E, N900 METERS. NOTE ALSO THAT THE FWD BLE MR 10, BANDS (CALL QAZ) HAS RECENTLY BEEN ACTIVIATED ON THE HQ SVN NATCH WITH NEGYS, PROBABLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OURRENT OFFENSIVE INTHE LOC NINH/ AN LOC AREAS.

B. MOTOS: CALLSION 68A, PREVIOUELY UTILIZED BY THIS REGT WAS LAST HOTED IN COMMO ON 19 APRIL, LOGATED AT XTOMESSO DONY AND XT019264, DEOD METERS. CHLL "POJ" WAS FH 15 APRIL AT D445Z AND FIXED AT WT716700, 1500 METERS AND AGAIN LOCATED ON 28 APRIL AT XT051933, CEOC METERS. UNABLE TO EXPLAIN DISPARITY OF FIXES GETWEEN 15 APRIL AND 22 APRIL AS MOTOS WAS LOCATED IN HIS CURRENT AO ON 26 APRIL, HOWEVER, NOTE THAT THE 24TH REGT AND THE 271ST IND REGTS ARE THE ONLY REGT SIZED UNITS LOCATED IN THAT IMMEDIATE AREA. THIS PLUS THE PAUGITY OF INTERCEPT ON MOTOS AND THE FACT THAT MOTOS THE PAUGITY FOLLOW EACH OTHER IN COMM CHECKS ON THE WATCH FACILITIES, IS CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO IDENT POR AS 20195.

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C. UKFLY WAS FH 19 APRIL AND HAS BEEN LOCATED W/057: SEVERAL TIMES IN THE AD OF 10057. THIS CALL WAS FIXED ON ED APRIL at v8335838. 1000 meters and again on 23 April at v8313827. 1000 METERS. MODST WAS LOCATED ON 20 APRIL AT V8318635, 5885 METERS. FEEL THIS IDENT IS CONCLUSIVE. 16

FROM

"PFL" WAS FH T APRIL ON HUJ3156 AND LOGATED AT Э. ¥6175: XT574525. \$598 METERS AND AGAIN ON BE APRIL AT XT388565, \$988 ARDE LOCATED CALLS BAJ DE ZVU, VOMBJ3966, MET 75 ON 22 METERS. APRIL AT XT739524, 2000 METERS. ON BASIS OF THE LOCATIONS, FEEL THAT GALL "PFL" IS A PRIME GANDITATE FOR THE 101ST IDN REGT.

MERSS: ISULATION OF THIS CALL APPRESENTS MALTIPLE PROBLEM. Ε. AS IT HAS BEEN DARBLED IN THE FOLLOWING MANNERS: OFQ/OFQ/OFQ/FQ/FQ. CALL "OFQ" WAS UTILIZED SEVERAL TIMES AND LOGATED ON IT APRIL AT YTE49898, READ METERS. CURRENT ROTA ON VOUBSER94 LISTS "QCX" AS VALID CALL FOR MØØ56 AND FEEL THAT OFQ MAY JUST REPRESENT ANOTHER CANELE FOR "GOX", HOWEVER, WHEN REPORTED TO DIRNSA AS MUSIC, THE ABOVE FIX WAS NEGATED.

METER: AS NOTED EARLIER, CALL "WOX" IS SUSPECTED CONTINUITY F.

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OF MØ127, HOWEVER, THIS IS PRESENTED AT THIS TIME JUST FOR POSSIBLE CONSIDERATION IN THE FUTURE. FEEL THAT REIDNT OF E4726 TO MØ127 WOULD BE FREMATURE, HOWEVER, ADDITIONAL ARDF MAY REFET TO CONFIRM THE IDENT.

5. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, NUMEROUS GALLS HOTED ONTHE MAJOR HQ SVN WATCHES HAVE NOT BEEN ASSIGNED AN RD. GALL JDP WAS LOCATED AT XT705763, 1000 METERS ON 17 APRIL, JRX WAS NOTED ON 09/19 APRIL AND A LOP OF VT803372 BROR OBTAINED, AND IS POSSIBLY PHOUS LONG FNT ASSOG. GALL LINN HAS BEEN NOTED SEVERAL TIMES, MOST RECENTLY ON 19/23 APRIL. REQUEST RD'S FOR THE ABOVE.

6. THIS INFORMATION IS INTENDED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION AND ACTION. ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE TOO EARKY TO ACTUALLY ASSIGN THE SUGGESTED CASE NOTATIONS TO THE ABOVE CONTINUITIES, FEEL THAT TEMPO ACTION IS NECESSARY AND SHOULD BE INITIATED ASAP.

7. QUERY UR VIEWS/COMMENTS.

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DISCRIMUTIONS

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Detachment 3, 6994th Security Security	613					

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