UNCLASSIFIED

HISTORY OF THE 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

July - December 1971



h

HISTORY OF

6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

1 JULY THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1971

RCS: USS-D3



6994th Security Squadron, APO San Francisco 96307

HISTORY OF THE 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON O1 July 1971 through 31 December 1971 RGS: USS-D3

Approved:

GROVER S MCMAKIN, Lt Col, USAF

Commander

i (This page is unclassified)

FRONTISPIECE

As time evolves - hour by hour - day by day - week by week and month by month, history is in the making. To the unindoctrinated/uninterested individual, passage of time and the resultant historical developments are of little consequence. To those who see and record the passage of time as history, time becomes one of man's most valued possessions. Without the passage of time, there would be no history. So, as the year of 1971 comes to an end, we who are purported to be historians, again attempt to record for antiquity that which has passed before us. Our efforts will successfully capture a great share of those bygone events for posterity. Others will evade us as we struggle to recognize and isolate the significant and eliminate the commonplace. To reduce those instances where important events are lost in the web of time will be our goal. Since no historian has a crystal ball with which to view the future, it is impossible to know all that will be significant in years to come. Consequently, that which is herein written takes cognizance of historical events the writer recognizes as having rippled the surface of the sea of time. If through recording the past we will have shed light upon some of the problems of the future, we can feel satisfaction and pride in the accomplishment.

(Magt Kyle L. Emerson, Unit Historian, 6994th Security Squadron.)

FOREWORD

This historical report covers the period 1 July 1971 through
31 December 1971 for those operations performed by the 6994th Security
Squadron and staged from Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Republic of Vietnam.

The report concerns itself with the overall operational concepts of the 6994th Security Squadron in day-to-day performance of a direct support mission for Tactical Field Commanders. This record has been compiled in an effort to provide a continuous documentation of the Airborne Radio Direction Finding program in support of an armed conflict.

Historical accounts of three subordinate detachments of the squadron have been documented individually by these units.

This history is subject to revision. Additional information or suggested corrections will be welcome.

This report was written by Master Sergeant Kyle L. Emerson as additional duty Unit Historian, with valuable research assistance from Master Sergeant John T. Koraska and typing assistance from Master Sergeant John H. Ragsdale.

Listing of Key Personnel

Commander - Lt Col Grover S. McMakin

First Sergeant - MSgt John R. Herridge

Operations Officer - Major David H. Eddy

Assistant Operations Officer - Captain George F. Logan, Jr.

NCOIC Operations - CMSgt Luther M. David, Jr.

NCOIC Operations Requirements - SMSgt Ronald J. Faile

NCOIC Standardization Evaluation - TSgt Michael D. Preslar

OIC ACC - Captain William K. Skeer, Jr.

NCOIC ACC - SMSgt James A. Jones

OIC Mission Management - 1st Lt Henry X. Mioduski

NCOIC Mission Management - MSgt Thomas N McChesney

NCOIC Plans & Programs - MSgt John T. Koraska

OIC Operational VIM Training - Captain Thomas L. Collins

OIC VIM Maintenance Training - 1st Lt Owen T. Costello

OIC Local Operations - Major John V. Thompson

NCOIC Local Operations - MSgt William D. Baucom

NCOIC Local Analysis and Reporting - SMSgt David A. Mangum

OIC Communications Security - 1st Lt Jay G. Cowan

NCOIC Communications Security - SMSgt J. P. Regan

OIC Material/Maintenance - Captain Matthew R. Morrone

NCOIC Material/Maintenance - CMSgt Donald F. Connell

NCOIC Supply - MSgt J. L. Morris

NCOIC Communications - MSgt J. J. Disabatino

NCOIC Administration - MSgt Andrew J. Brooks, Jr.

NCOIC Security Police - TSgt Leon A. Beverly

NCOIC Personnel - MSgt Ronald A. Graynm

CONTENTS


TITLE PAGE	Page	i
FRONTISPIECE	Page	ii
FOREWORD	Page	iii
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL	Page	iv
CONTENTS	Page	▼ .
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART	Page	ix
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	Page	X
CHRONOLOGY	Page	ᇏ
CHAPTER I - Mission and Organization	Page	1
Mission	Page	1
Organizational Structure	Page	3
Internal Organization	Page	3
Scheduling Section Reorganized	Page	4
Mission Management	Page	8
Training	Page	9
Standardization Evaluation Flight Examination	Page	10
Communications Security	Page	10
ARDF Coordination Center	Page	11
Administrative Support	Page	11
CHAPTER II - Sigint Tasking and Collection	Page	12
Basic Missions	Page	12
Combat Cross	Page	13
Combat Cross Zulu	Page	13
Tasking Cycle	Page	14
Tasking Revisions/Improvement Actions	Page	15

Phanom	Page	15
EC-47/Forward Air Controller (FAC) Targeting	Page	23
Expension of FIX/FAC Program to include Entire 6994th Complex	Page	24
FIX/FAC Operations Summarized	Page	28
ARDF Improvement Actions	Page	31
Variable Mission Tasking	Page	32
ARDF Coverage of Military Region I	Page	33
Adjustment of ITOTs	Page	34
ARDF Support	Page	35
Multichannel Communications	Page	41
Multichannel Communications in Gambodia	Page	42
Tip-off of High Interest Targets to ARDF Aircraft	Page	43
Target Identification	Page	47
Accuracy of TDLs	Page	47
Collection Management	Page	51
Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary	Page	5 2
ARDF Productivity	Page	53
CHAPTER III - SIGINT PROCESSING AND REPORTING	Page	58
Processing	Page	5 8
Voice Processing	Page	58
Reporting	Page	59
CRITIC Reporting	Page	59

Airborne Recovery Report (ARR)	Page 59
Southeast Asia Technical Summary	Page 60
Exploitable Message Reports	Page 60
Airborne Incident Report (AIR)	Page 61
Target Identification Rates	Page 61
CHAPTER IV - VIETNAMIZATION IMPROVEMENT AND MODERN- IZATION PLAN/SOUTHEAST ASIA REDUCTION .	Page 63
Vietnamization Improvement and Modernization Plan	Page 66
Southeast Asia Reductions	Page 79
CHAPTER V - COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY OPERATIONS	Page 85
Equipment	Page 86
Manning **********************	Page 87
Mission Accomplishment	Page 88
Future of 6994th Scty Sq COMSEC	Page 96
CHAPTER VI - MAINTENANCE/SUPPLY ACTIVITIES	Page 99
Maintenance	Page 99
COMSEC Maintenance	Page 99
ARDF Maintenance	Page 99
Maintenance Management	Page 100
Vietnamization Training	Page 101
FOOTNOTES	Page 103
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS	Page 113
GLOSSARY OF CODENAMES	Page 119
APPENDIX 1 - ORGANIZATIONAL AND COMMAND CONTROL CHARTS	Page 1-1
APPENDIX 2 - GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS AND MISSION AREAS	Page 2-1
APPENDIX 3 - EC-47 AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION	Page 3-1

APPENDIX 4 - ARDF PRODUCTIVITY STATUS	Page 4-1		
APPENDIX 5 - BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF COMMANDER	Page 5-1		
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS			
DISTRIBUTION PAGE			





LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1. CHARTS

	Organizational Chart	Page ix
	ARDF Command Relationship	Page 1-1
	ARDF Operational Control	Page 1-2
	ARDF Technical Control	Page 1-3
	ARDF Command Control	Page 1-4
	ARDF Productivity	Page 4-1
	ARDF Unaccomplished Missions	Page 4-2
	AFDF Reduced Missions	Page 4-3
	Recurring Reports Statistics	Page 4-7
	Blue Beetle FTX/FAC Statistics	Page 4-8
5•	MAPS	•
	6994th Security Squadron Unit Locations	Page 2-1
	SEA ARDF Areas	Page 2-2
3.	PHOTOGRAPHS	
	Portrait of Unit Commander	Page 5-6
) +=	GRAPHS	
	% of Tasked Mission Flown	Page 4-4
	% of Tasked Hours Flown	Page 4-4
	% of Flying Time Expended Over Target	Page 4-5
	Fixes Per Flying Hour On Target	Page 4-5
	% of Fixes/Cuts Identified	Page 4-6
	% of Fixes/Cuts Identified Priority	Page 4-6

5. ILLUSTRATIONS

Basic Combat Cross Configuration

Page 3-2

Combat Cross Zulu Configuration

Page 3-4



CHRONOLOGY


2 July	COMUSMACV informed 7AF/6994SS of plans to trans- fer ALR-38s to NKP.
6-8 July	Test flights flown by Det 2 in ALR-38s to determine volume of VHF in northern Leos.
10 July	Flight training for VIM Class II begun.
13 July	6994SS proposed changes in mission duration to provide more time over target. (Variable Tasking).
16-20 July	Coordination on replacement of 460TRW as command and control of TEWS begun.
24 July	AFSSO PACAF advised all concerned of a need for 6 daily ALR-38 sorties from Danang (DNG).
27 July	MACV concurred in variable tasking and announced intentions for implementation of a test period from 7-13 August.
28 July	Blue Beetle program updated by 7AF.
30 July	7AF suggested transfer of two ALR-38s and three ALR-35s with R-2000 engines to NKP to replace the R-1830 powered ALR-35s being fragged from that base.
30 July	MACV concurred with transfer of R-2000 powered (7 hour sortie capability) aircraft to Nakhon Phanom (NKP).
30 July	PACAF recommended that action be taken to eventually establish a squadron of EC-47s at NKP.
02 August	7AF execution order for FIX/FAC operation in Danang area originated.
02 August	6994SS concurred in 15 October target date for transfer of ALR-38s to NKP.
03 August	7AF announced plans to transfer command and control of TEWS to 483 TAW at Cam Ranh Bay on 31 August.
03 August	DIRNSA evaluation of ALR-38 test at NKP received, verifying the need for VHF fix capability (ALR-38) at that location.

05 August	MACV concurred with tasking of CCZ for multi- channel collection, not to interfere with primary ARDF requirements.
06 August	6994SS reported a meeting to discuss transfer of Det 1, 6994th Sety Sq and 361 TEWS to Cam Ranh Bay.
11 August	Meeting held at 7AF to discuss development of PAD covering movement of Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq and 361 TEWS to Cam Ranh Bay.
13 August	Possibility of deactivation of Det 1, 361 TEWS and transfer of assets to Danang/Continental U.S. (CONUS) raised.
16 August	7AF recommended that deactivation vice relocation of Det 1, 361 TEWS, with transfer of certain resources to Danang and possibly deploying certain assets to CONUS.
17-18 August	Quarterly 6994th Security Squadron Operations Officer conference held.
18 August	Conference held at 7AF to discuss Black Bear communications problems.
26 August	6994th informed PSR of a number of options originated by 7AF for transfer of Det 1, 361 TEWS.
26 August	6994SS advised Fac Scty Rgn that sufficient menpower for manning 7 hour sorties from NKP were available within squadron resources.
31 August	460 TRW deactivated and commend and control of TEWS transferred to 483 TAW, Cam Ranh Bay.
07 September	6994th Sety Sq advised Pac Sety Rgn of in-country actions to discuss phase-down of USAF ARDF assets.
07 September	USAFSS concurred with 6994SS working with MACV/7AF as USAFSS representative in ARDF drawdown discussions.
10 September	6994th SS advised PSR that MACV had assumed the 'no reduction of assets' posture.
11 September	Det 2, 6994SS announced system of relaying Black Bear fixes via AUTOSEVOCOM to 20th TASS.
15 September	7AF requested CINCPACAF approval for transfer of 15 EC-47s from Phu Cat UE to Danang vice movement of Det 1 to Cam Ranh Bay.

16 September	6994SS provided local operations and detachments with up-to-date status of SEA reductions.
16 September	6994SS advised of CAS Vientiane concern over lack of ARDF support.
17 September	6994SS advised Pac Scty Rgn of failure of CAS Vientiane to state requirements in tasking requests.
18 September	ACC announced necessity to re-frag certain missions to cover enemy build-up in Cambodian/Vietnamese border area.
24 September	NSA implemented study to determine quality of ARDF technical support.
30 September	6994SS advised of plan to resume Project Cumbersome tasking in near future.
01 October	MACV expressed appreciation for outstanding support given in cover of Gambodian/Vietnamese border targets.
02 October	Pac Scty Rgn expressed concern over the effect of Direct Support Unit closures on FIX pass timeliness.
02 October	7AF directed implementation of Brown Beaver FIX/FAC program for northern Lacs.
06 October	COMSEC submitted request for reduction of DHOC to Pac Scty Rgn.
09 October	DIRNSA message concerning possible multichannel operations in Cambodia received.
10 October	MACV directed special ALR-38 mission for cover of possible VHF multichannel.
11 October	ALR-38/R2000 ALR-35s began regular sorties from NKP.
11 October	Ground school for Class IV of VIM training begun,
12 October	COMSEC received special Igloo White tasking.
13 October	903G mission established for ALR-38 sorties in Cambodia.
14 October	6994SS provided MACV with summary of favorable impact of variable tasking on ARDF results.
20 October	MACV opposition of tentative plan for transfer of EC-47 assets to CONUS announced.

2	1-23 October	Typhoon Hester forced evacuation of Phu Cat/ Danang aircraft to Tan Son Nhut/Nakhon Phanom respectively, and hampered construction of Danang facilities to accomodate influx of Phu Cat resources.
22	2 October	COMSEC tasked with participation in tri-service COMSEC survey of MACSOG operations.
23	3 October	Advised by USM-7 that Project Cumbersome test would resume on 25 October.
24	October	Phu Cat aircraft departed Saigon safe haven fellowing typhoon evacuation.
25	October	30 day test of Project Cumbersome resumed.
25	October	Danang/Phu Cat aircraft departed Nakhon Phanom safe haven fellowing typhoon evacuation.
25	October	7AF directed that plans for transfer of Phu Cat aircraft be held in abeyance until further notice.
27	October	Plans for SSTB personnel to begin scheduling for VIM back-end crews amounced by ACC.
31	October	7AF advised that transfer of Phu Cat aircraft would begin on 6 November.
01	November	366TFW (Danang) advised of minimum required items to support influx of Phu Cat aircraft and crews,
03	November	Det 1 issued plan for personnel movement in conjunction with deactivation.
06	November	Det 1 began standing down: Two aircraft transferred to Danang (DNG), six to Tan Son Nhut (TSN).
06	November	Complaint received from concerning number of ALR-38 missions being fragged into Plainne des Jarres (PDJ) area of Northern Laos.
07	November	Six TSN ALR-35s transferred to DNG and five ALR-34s arrived TSN from PHC.
80	November	Movement of complex aircraft completed, with three aircraft being moved from DNG to TSN.
80	November	All Det 1 supply assets at Phu Cat turned in to the host base.

11 November	Material functions terminated at Phu Cat.
11 November	CSAF message providing for turn-over of 23 EC-47s to VNAF on 31 December 1971 received.
12 November	Detachment 1, 6994SS officially deactivated.
19 November	Need for additional CCZ assets at TSN aired by 509 RRG.
22 November	All AGE equipment for turn over to VIM on hand at TSN.
22 November	Plan for closure of Cam Ranh Bay and deactivation of 483TAW announced.
22 November	Plan for resubordination of TEWS to 377ABW at TSN and 366TFW at DNG announced.
25 November	Project Cumbersome test terminated.
26 November	Target date of 15 December set for trade-off of three TSN ALR-34CC for three DNG ALR-34CCZ.
08 December	Meeting held at MACV to discuss ARDF/ACI support to Lactian intelligence requirements.
10 December	Rehabilitation of building to house VIM mainte- nance completed.
12 December	7AF intent for resolution of TEWS command and control problem announced.
15 December	Meeting held at 7AF to discuss TEWS subordination.
15 December	Det 2 suggested cancellation of Black Bear FIX/FAC tip-off program,
21 December	Guidelines established for aviation units to request tasking changes.
27 December	7AF stated need for more voice collection emphasis in Steel Tiger.
31 December	VIM maintenance training began.



MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

The organization of the 6994th Security Squadron was comparable to that of the majority of USAF Security Service units.

Directly subordinate to the Pacific Security Region at Wheeler Air Force Base, Hawaii, this was the only intermediate between the squadron and Headquarters, USAF Security Service. The one difference in organization was the subordination of three (two after 12 November 1971) operational detachments to the squadron. The mission of the 6994th and subordinate detachments was unique. Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) in support of tactical units (both Army and Air Force) within the Republic of Vietnam placed the 6994th in the distinctive position of being the only USAF unit of its kind.

<u>Mission</u>

- Son Nhut Airfield (Afld), Republic of Vietnam (RVN). The operational mission of the 6994th Scty Sq was to conduct Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) and specified Airborne Communications Intelligence (ACI) collection against enemy targets in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ), and Cambodia in direct support of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Another mission of the 6994th Scty Sq was providing direct Communications Security (COMSEC) support to Tactical Commanders (2) and 7th Air Force (7AF).
- (U) In addition to the mission performed in III and IV CTZs, the 6994th Scty Sq provided command, operational, and administrative control for the three subordinate units located at Phu Cat Air Base (AB), RVN,

Danang AB, RVN, and Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB), (3)
Thailand.

Vietnam and Cambodia aboard EC-47 platforms throughout the entire reporting period and were tasked with the completion of any of three types of missions: ARDF, ARDF/ACI, and when ARDF capability was lost, ACI only.

In accomplishing these missions, two separate position equipment configurations, COMBAT CROSS (CC) and COMBAT CROSS ZULU (CCZ) were utilized.

In subsequent portions of this historical document, the specific tasking (5) for each of these positions and configurations is outlined in detail.

*See Chapter IV for additional information.

Organizational Structure

(U) The 6994th Scty Sq was subordinate to Pacific Security Region (Pac Scty Rgn), located at Wheeler Air Force Base (AFB), Hawaii.

In view of the daily inter-service involvement throughout the entire ARDF program in Southeast Asia (SEA) (i.e., Army, Navy, Air Force, Australian, and Vietnamese), the general operational control of the entire ARDF effort was exercised by the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV).

Internal Organizational Structure

- (U) The 6994th Scty Sq integral support functions consisted of Administration, Personnel, Airborne Equipment Maintenance*, Operations (7) Supply*, Communications, and Security.
- (U) The operations functions consisted of Local Operations, Squadron Mission Management, COMSEC, and Airborne Coordination Center (ACC).
- airborne mission resources located at Tan Son Nhut Afld. This function directed, coordinated, and controlled personnel and mission equipment toward achieving maximum mission effectiveness. They provided for all operational missions and were responsible for scheduling and training newly assigned airborne personnel. They coordinated with ACC and 360th TEWS on all changes to mission tasking and published daily flying schedules all fragged mission areas. Additionally, coordination with the TEWS command and control element and 7AF was conducted on special occasions. They performed analysis and reporting on all ARDF and COMINT *Specific functions and appropriate historical data is outlined in detail in Chapter VI of this history.

intercept collected, prepared daily/weekly evaluations and reports on (9)
the squadron's ARDF/Collection accomplishments.

Scheduling Section Re-Organized:

- (U) Local scheduling was the focal point of all duties performed by airborne personnel assigned to 6994th Scty Sq. From 1 July until mid-August, the scheduling section was made up of 3 Noncommissioned Officers (NCO) (one E-6 and two E-5s), working on a semi-rotational schedule. A review of the workload and the Job Continuity folders for the section revealed several extraneous tasks, and a lack of continuity. In mid-August, the section was reorganized, with the assignment of one E-6 and one E-4. The former semi-rotational schedule was replaced with a 7 day per week operation, with both assigned individuals working days only.
- (U) To accomplish the reorganization, considerable changes were necessary. Tasks unrelated to scheduling were either eliminated or transferred to more appropriate sections. This allowed the scheduling section to concentrate solely on airborne problems, or areas directly associated with the airborne mission. Prior to this time, an overage of 202s within the Local Operations Branch had allowed assignment of one individual per shift to the additional duty of driver for the crew van. When 202XO slots were reduced, it became necessary to schedule drivers for this particular duty. Initially, random selection of persons to fill this position was employed. The problem was later resolved by the establishment of a fixed driving crew, selected from the unit's most qualified drivers. Through this action, the scheduling section's duties were simplified and more efficient vehicle control was realized.

- On 15 Nevember 1971, 360th TEWS implemented a program to have a ground check performed on all aircraft prior to launch time, thereby greatly reducing late Initial Time Over Target (ITOT) incidents. On 19 November, following close coordination with 360th TEWS, 6994th Sety Sq established a pre-flight detail, whereby one A292X1 was assigned to pre-flight back-end equipment on a daily basis. Expanding upon this duty, the Scheduling Section in cooperation with the Ground Training Section, made this duty a part of the ground training indoctrination program. This allowed a student and the Instructor Radio Operator (IRO) to whom the student was assigned to be scheduled for this pre-flight duty, making it possible for the student to become familiar with the back-end equipment and pre-flight procedures prior to his initial flight. This program was enthusiastically endorsed by the IROs, as it greatly enhanced the student's familiarity with both the aircraft and equipment prior to his assuming responsibility for a position under actual combat sortie conditions.
- (U) The Scheduling Section also became responsible for assigning students to individual IROs. This facet ranged from critical to negligible in its degree of impact upon the squadron's mission. At the peak of the permanent change of station (PCS) turnover during September and October, up to 16 individuals were in training status at a given time, resulting in IROs being assigned two trainees simultaneously. This situation led to IROs exceeding their authorized flight time in given months and necessitated immediate action to upgrade the more proficient Class III operators to IRO status. By the end of 1971, the

IRO/student imbalance had been resolved, with adequate certified IROs available to handle any student influx.

An imbelance between authorized and required A203s presented a constant scheduling problem during the early part of this historical period. A203s had been programmed into the unit, based upon a specific number of CCZ aircraft assigned. MACV requirements being fluid, required a change in CCZ assignment/utilization, placing five CCZ configured EC-47s on temporary duty status (TDY) to Detachment 3, 6994th Scty Sq, and retaining CC platforms at the 6994th. Additionally, the impetus of the Vietnamization program added to these complications. in that more and more CCZ sorties were manned by Vietnamese linguists, leaving the U.S. A203s virtually without a job. Lacking slots/requirements to place these individuals on regular flying duties, they were placed in various duties throughout the organization, ranging from Duty NCO to analytical assistants. While this satisfied the requirement for day to day utilization of manpower resources, it became the responsibility of the scheduling section to insure equitable distribution of the few flying requirements that were available to prevent aggrivation of an already potentially explosive morale problem. Turnovers and PCS movements ultimately brought the number of assigned personnel down to a more realistic level, and through coordination with the Vietnamese Improvement and Modernization (VIM) Section, arrangements were made to allow A203s to fly as linguists aboard VIM CCZ missions. This served to insure adequate airborne duties to alleviate the situation and insure proper use of assigned airborne linguists.

(During the past historical period, certain contingencies

were experienced which further taxed the Scheduling Section to meet daily requirements. For nearly 60 days (October-December) one member of the Scheduling Section was TDY for manning assistance, leaving only one individual to perform all scheduling duties. It was during this period that two separate aircraft movements transpired: Typhoon Hester forced the evacuation of Detachment 2 aircraft resources and Detachment 1 closure brought an influx of aircraft into Tan Son Nhut. In both instances, local scheduling was tasked with the assignment of crews to both the local missions and those of visiting aircraft as well. Close coordination between 6994th Sety Sq, Airborne Radio Direction Finding Coordination Genter (ACC), and 360th TEWS greatly facilitated this task and all missions were launched as scheduled.

program had a significant impact upon the scheduling section. During the 3 October Vietnamese national elections, it was necessary to provide 15 additional U.S. stand-by crew members to insure that allfragged missions were fully manned in the event election poll times conflicted with the ARVN operator's mission schedule. As the VIM program progressed, constant rearrangement of crew structures was necessary to meet mission requirements. All VIM missions were flown with one USAFSS operator aboard, due to the lack of language expertise which prevented Vietnamese operators from working with English speaking ground operators. Scheduling of these VIM mission augmentees became an integral part of the Scheduling Section's responsibility and required constant coordination between the two sections. In addition, a stand-by crew was scheduled daily to replace any VIM operator who failed to show for a fragged mission.

- (U) Increased participation in personnel management was a major factor in the success of the scheduling function. All correspondence involving aircrew members (including leaves, Rest and Relaxation (R&R) absences, TDYs, etc.) were cleared through the Scheduling Section prior to final approval. Copies of the unit manning report were delivered to the section on a daily basis, as were all matters emanating from the local personnel office, such as port calls, tour untailments, tour extensions, etc. A line of communications was established between the Scheduling Section and the base Flight Surgeon's office for the purpose of monitoring the status of personnel who were unable to fly due to medical reasons.
- (U) As a result of this reorganization, crew schedules were prepared daily, two days in advance of the effective date. This arrangement was well received by all aircrew members. Changes to any day's schedule were held to a minimum, limited to conditions of an emergency nature.

 Mission Management:

The Mission Management function for the 6994th Scty Sq was accomplished by two separate offices, one coming under Local Operations and one a Squadron function, subordinate to the Squadron Operations Officer. The local operations function prepared and forwarded the Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS), prepared and forwarded all changes to the USA-561 distribution lists, and prepared a weekly evaluation of the local operations mission accomplishments.

The Squadron Mission Management function was responsible for the steff supervision of all ARDF and COMINT collection missions at the 6994th (Local Operations subordinated) and subordinate detachments.

The section evaluated management summaries and position status reports submitted by subordinate elements and maintained weekly and monthly statistics which were used to identify trends/problems in all areas of productivity. The statistical management data base maintained by the section was used not only at the 6994th Scty Sq but also at staff level by both 7AF and MACV. Additionally, the Mission Management Section participated in the development of plans, programs, Joint Operating Agreements (JOAs), and other directives governing all aspects of squadron operational functions. Mission Management was responsible for monitoring/ updating the Master Program, the submission of Change Requests generated thereby, and assisted in the preparation of Manpower Change Requests which were generated as a result of Master Program action. Periodic Master Program Review Boards were convened under the guidance of Mission Management to insure current/future alignment of documented resources with constantly changing mission requirements. Preparation of various weekly and monthly Programmed Actions Directives (PADs) progress reports was also a function of Mission Management.

Training:

The training function of the 6994th Sety Sq was concerned with two distinct phases; ARDF Proficiency Training, and normal upgrade training. The ARDF Proficiency Training involved the conducting of a familiarization "ground training" course prior to a newly arrived individual being placed on airborne orders, monitoring upgrade actions as the newly assigned individual progressed, and maintaining Air Force Forms 623 in accordance with existing directives. AFSC upgrade training was limited to seven level upgrade, since five level is a prerequisite for

operators being assigned to the ARDF program. There was an average of 10 persons on seven level training throughout this historical period, with no end of course tests being given.

Standardization Evaluation Flight Examination (SEFE):

The Standardization Evaluation Flight Examination (SEFE) function was composed of a Chief Examiner (SEFE), (a member of the squadron operations staff), and the Local Operations SEFE section. The Chief SEFE was responsible for monitoring the flight examination/evaluation procedures employed by the SEFE sections of Local Operations and subordinate detachments. He also acted as an advisor to the Operations Officer on matters involving standardization evaluation examinations. Additionally, as a means of insuring that current material was utilized by 6940 Technical Training Group (TTG), Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas for the schooling of operators destined for assignment to the 6994th complex, the Chief SEFE provided quarterly update information on all changes in techniques generated at a squadron level. The Local Operations SEFE section, composed of A202, A203, and A292 personnel, worked in close coordination with the ARDF Proficiency Training Section to insure timely action to upgrade newly assigned personnel. Cognizance of the Scheduling Section's activities was also an important requirement of the SEFE Section, thereby insuring that IRO upgrade actions were taken in a sufficiently timely manner to provide adequate IROs to guarantee ease of scheduling and constant upgrade capability.

Communications Security (COMSEC):*

*See Chapter V for complete resume of COMSEC activities.

operate in direct support of 7AF, a unique position for any United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) COMSEC unit. This support consisted of providing timely information concering probable or possible intelligence losses and COMSEC weaknesses on which the tactical commander could base operational decisions. This was accomplished by continual monitoring of telephone/radio communications, conducting analysis, and reporting the results thereof directly to 7AF.

ARDF Coordination Center (ACC):

and operated jointly by members of the 509th Radio Research Group (RRG) and the 6994th Scty Sq in accordance with MACV Directive 381-23. Located in the Headquarters, 509th RRG at Whitebirch Station within the Vietnamese Joint General Staff Compound, the ACC was the organization through which MACV coordinated ARDF/ACI operations throughout SEA. The mission of this unique center was to provide for the coordination, control, and evaluation of all functions connected with the ARDF/ACI program. This included the coordinated scheduling and evaluation of ARDF (12) and ACI missions as directed by MACV.

Administrative Support:

The 6994th Security Squadron also provided administrative support to the Security Service Liaison Officer (SSLO), Electronic Warfare Liaison Officer (EWLO) to 7AF, and USAFSS personnel assigned to Operating Location Delta-Delta (OL-DD), 6970th Support Group. Tasked with separate missions, these activities functioned independently of the (13) 6994th Scty Sq.

Chapter II

SIGINT TASKING AND COLLECTION

The Commander, MACV exercised operational control of the ARDF/ACI activities performed by the 6994th Scty Sq. Technical control of assigned ARDF/ACI activities was exercised by the Director, National (1) Security Agency (DIRNSA).

The 6994th Scty Sq was tasked with ARDF collection, processing, and reporting of Southeast Asia Communist High Frequency (HF) tactical morse and voice communications. In addition, ACI tasking was levied against both HF and Very High Frequency (VHF) SEA Communist morse and single-channel voice communications. Applicable authorities held the prerogative for tasking against all other entities deemed (2) necessary.

aircraft, manned by Manual Morse and Voice Systems Specialists.

Basic Missions

ing from Tan Son Nhut Afld, RVN, was tasked with flying missions in SEA Areas O1,02,03, O4 (RVN), and 20 (Cambodia).* The primary objective of these missions was to obtain accurate locations through ARDF of Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces operating in South Vietnam and Cambodia. In addition, the secondary mission was to collect target communications data in order to derive exploitable intelligence. The 6994th Scty Sq utilized two basic methods

*For outline of SEA ARDF areas see Appendix II.

of operation in accomplishing this assigned mission.

COMBAT CROSS (CC)

target transmitters deemed priority targets by MACV. CC aircraft were configured with two individual Signal Intelligence positions; ARDF and ARDF acquisition. The ARDF and ARDF acquisition positions were designated "X" and "Y" consoles, respectively. The "X" position was capable of fixing targets within a frequency range of 2 to 16 megahertz (MHZ). During fix operation, the "Y" console provided supporting intercept copy of ARDF targets and when time permitted, performed a Communications Intelligence (COMINT) collection mission, directed toward maximum continuity and development of all hostile target transmitters. The "Y" console operated within a frequency range (4)

COMBAT CROSS ZULU (GCZ)

those found on the CC aircraft. The additional positions provided voice and manual morse intelligence collection capabilities and were designated "Z1" and "Z2" respectively. The "Z1" and "Z2" consoles were wired for flexible systems capability and could be configured for HF/HF, VHF/VHF, or HF/VHF reception. Selection of HF/VHF receivers and VHF tuners was more in consonance with the target environment to be exploited and in consideration of other systems component characteristics, (i.e., Antenna/Pre-amplification capability of .2 to 300 MHZ). To accomplish 6994th Scty Sq mission requirements, the two collection positions were configured in accordance with tasking/collection requirement of the

SEA ARDF area being targeted. The major portion of missions fragged were configured HF/VHF for "Z1" and HF/HF for "Z2". Selection of E-Band (10 - 30 MHZ) and A-Band (30 - 90 MHZ) tuners for the VHF receiver and the resulting radio frequency overlap of 10 to 30 MHZ between the G-133 and G175J was to provide simultaneous intercept capability for back-link (two-way), communications in the more densely populated area of the radio spectrum. This provided either or both (5) the "Z1" and "Z2" with HF/VHF (.5 - 90 MHZ) intercept capability. Appendix 3 is provided for further amplification of aircraft configurations utilized by the 6994th Scty Sq during this period.

Tasking Cycle

The tasking cycle for the ARDF/ACI missions flown by the 6994th Scty Sq was unique for a USAFSS unit, in that the tasks were designed to provide constant tactical support in a highly fluid armed (6) conflict.

manders, the Cryptologic Community, and 7AF submission of requirements for each week. These requests were submitted to MACV (J2-114). On Wednesday of each week, MACV (J2-114) submitted the proposed tasking to the ARDF Coordinating Committee. This committee consisted of representatives (usually operations officers) of the 509 RRG, 6994th Scty Sq, ACC, MACV (J2), 7AF, Department of Defense Special Representative (DODSPECREP), Controlled American Source (CAS) Saigon, and the Commander Naval Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV). The Coordinating Committee then passed these recommendations to MACV (J2) for final approval and return to ACC for issuance. While these procedures were taking place, the 460

TRW/483 TAW* provided ACC with an aircraft availability forecast for the tasking week in question. ACC then assigned individual missions to fulfill the tasking requirement originally generated by the Field Force Commanders to each Collection Management Authority (CMA) and the 6994th Scty Sq on Thursday of each week. At the same time, ACC provided a "sanitized" version of the tasking to 7AF for issuance of the required Fragmentary Order (FRAG ORDER) for each mission to be flown. On Friday morning of each week, the 6994th Scty Sq received position tasking from the appropriate CMA having the SIGINT collection, processing, and reporting responsibility for the specific target area of operations concerned. Prior to each day's series of missions, the applicable CMA provided the majority of technical data. Once airborne, CC/CCZ crews, through Air/ Ground/Air contact with Direct Support Units (DSUs) and the 6994th Scty Sq local operations, had access to additional technical data for individual FRAG areas. In addition, DSUs accepted all fixes from the airborne platform, passed tip-offs to the aircraft, and accepted messages which were deemed exploitable by the airborne crew. The 6994th Scty Sq also accepted fixes and exploitable messages for relay to CMAs when aircrew contact with the SDU could not be made.

Tasking Revisions/Improvement Actions

Basing of ALR-38 Aircraft at Nakhon Phanon

Early in 1971, DIRNSA expressed a desire for VHF coverage in Northern Laos. Between April and June, numerous massages of coordination involving MACV, USAFSS, 7AF, DIRNSA, and the 6994th Scty Sq were exchanged concerning basing of VHF equipped AIR-38s at Nakhon Phanom to cover *460TRW from 1 July-31 August, 483 TAW from 1 Sep-31 December.

this growing demand. An estimated target date of late September/early (8)
October was generally agreed upon.

uniqueness of the ALR-38 ARDF system as opposed to the ALR-34 and ALR-35 made maintenance and operation a somewhat different problem. Maintenance technicians with ALR-38 experience were not available to allow for division of the ALR-38 fleet between two bases within the 6994th Scty Sq complex. Avionics Ground Equipment (AGE) to support ALR-38 was not available to allow for dispersing of facilities. The fact that all ALR-38 equipped EC-47s were powered by the more sophisticated R-2000 vice the standard R-1830 engine had to be considered from the aircraft maintenance standpoint. Finally, action to divert VHF equipment to Nakhon Phanom for Laotian targeting could not be taken until such a time as activity in the mission area of Detachment 2, 6994th Scty Sq at Danang would allow (9)

Barrell Roll area (Northern Laos), three missions were flown by Danang personnel (staging from Nakhon Phanom) on 6, 7, and 8 July. To accomplish this test, Detachment 2 maintenance personnel, with a supply of ALR-38 unique parts, were sent to Nakhon Phanom to accomplish the launch, (10) recovery, and maintenance responsibility for the ALR-38 systems. Since Detachment 1, 6990th Scty Sq, Cam Ranh Bay, RVN (among operational USAFSS units) possessed the only pertinent data base on North Laotian VHF targets, Pac Scty Rgn requested that all technical data available be provided to Detachment 3. Of specific importance was the multi-channel VHF (11) known to be emanating from the Plaine Des Jarres area.

In response to this request, Detachment 1, 6990th Scty Sq

advised that Bench Lance* intercept in the Plaine des Jarre Area (SEA ARDF Area 15) had been rather sparse during the latter part of June 1971. Available technical data was passed on, with a recommendation that assistance be requested from analyst at USM-7 and USA-29 (Udorn, (12) Thailand ground intercept sites.

COMUSMACV informed 7AF and 6994th Sety Sq of plans to transfer 3 ALR-38s and 2 ALR-35Qs** to Nakhon Phanom (NKP) to replace the ALR-35 N/P (R-1830 powered) that were being fragged from NKP at the time.

In a 22 July message, Pac Scty Rgn apprised AFSSO Pacific Air Forces with a resume of ALR-38 activities, stressing what appeared to be mis-tasking by MACV, in that ALR-38s were being fragged into predominately HF environmental areas, thereby depleting the effectiveness of the VHF capability. This message stressed that VHF activity in the Southern Laotian panhandle (Steel Tiger) could be covered better by selective targeting of Danang based ALR-38s. Pac Scty Rgn suggested that 7AF insistance upon Steel Tiger targeting by VHF capable platforms (14) was essential.

This situation was iterated by AFSSO PACAF on 24 July along with other pertinent information primarily concerning SEA ARDF utilization and particularly the VHF resources. They expounded upon the fact that VHF 1.5 watt single-channel (R1XX) and 2.5 watt multi-channel (R4O1) General Directorate of Rear Services (GDRS) had long been recognized

^{*}Bench Lance - Det 1, 6990th/PACAF C-130 ACRP staging from Cam Ranh Bay.

** Aircraft equipped with R-2000 vice R-1830 engines.

as a lucrative source of valuable intelligence concerning the movement of troops and supplies, both in the Steel Tiger and Barrell Roll areas of Laos. To adequately cover the Steel Tiger area, PACAF stressed the need for 6 daily sorties by ALR-38 aircraft staging from Danang, with no foreseen possibility for that requirement to diminish. Past practices had been for MACV to task the majority of the ALR-38s with missions in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between RVN and North Vietnam and in the triborder (Laos/North Vietnam/RVN) areas. Linked with the requirement to support 7AF Steel Tiger commitments was the necessity to effect Barrell Roll coverage in support of As a result, PACAF/USAFSS planners had recognized the fact that coverage of both Steel Tiger and Barrell Roll requirements could be effected from NKP. While this would have been the ideal arrangement, the cryptologic headroom ceiling for Thailand prohibited the increase of EC-47 staging from NKP. As an alternative, PACAF tentatively suggested the immediate transfer of five ALR-38s to NKP to replace the ALR-35s then in use. As an added point, PACAF suggested that immediate action be taken to obtain the necessary ceiling increase to allow for retention of an EC-47 squadron consisting of 9 ALR-38s and 3 ALR-35s at NKP after all U.S. forces had been removed from RVN.

In response to this PACAF action, 7AF coordinated with MACV and obtained tentative agreement for the transfer of two ALR-38s and three ALR-35s (all R-2000 engines with 7 hour mission capability) from Danang to NKP and in turn relocate the 5 R-1830 powered ALR-35s at NKP to Danang. At that time (30 July 1971), MACV still considered

the Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) and CDRS transmitters in the DMZ and

A Shau Valley areas as first priority VHF ARDF targets. MACV stressed

(16)
a need for retaining at least 7 of the 9 ALR-38 systems at Danang.

July. In a message of that date, they announced the need for both
Barrell Roll and Steel Tiger VHF coverage by VHF equipped ARDF platforms.
The proposal outlined by MACV included the tasking of 10 weekly ALR-38
and 16 additional 7 hour (either ALR-35 or ALR-38) for a total of 26
seven hour sorties from NKP. At the same time, 36 ALR-38 (7 hour sorties)
and 26 five hour ALR-35 CCZ sorties would be staged from Danang. Target
date for transfer of aircraft to allow for formal tasking was set for

(17)
15 October 1971.

This information was provided Pac Sety Rgn on 2 August

1971. At that time, 6994th Sety Sq envisioned the transfer of 2 ALR-38s

and three ALR-35Q (R-2000) aircraft to NKP. 6994th Sety Sq was concerned

as to the availability of a satisfactory maintenance cadre to allow for

splitting of ALR-38 resources. However, the 15 October target date was

(18)

accepted as feasible.

ceived from DIRNSA on 4 August. During the test, four missions were flown with 8 fixes and 7 VHF cuts being obtained. Seven of the 8 targets fixed had been previously carried as unlocated and unidentified. In view of the test results, DIRNSA stated their belief that the test had proven the value of the ALR-38 system in Northern Laos, and supported (19) the proposed MACV alignment.

As the friendly offensive commenced in the Plaine des Jarres, became concerned about the lack of enemy communications activity. In an 18 August message this concern was announced, and the possibility of the transfer of at least one ALR-38 trained maintenance personnel prohibited the permanent transfer of an aircraft. As an alternative, 6994th Scty Sq suggested the TDY of one ALR-38 per week, flying 3 to 5 missions from NKP and subsequently return to Danang for maintenance checks. It was pointed out that it was doubtful if the aircraft/system could be maintained in an operationally ready status for longer (20) periods at NKP.

Consideration of ALR-38 EC-47 assets for Northern Laos was affected by the plan to replace Nakhom Phanom based Army RU-8s*with RU-21s.** Such action had been proposed, along with an alternative to transfer one U-21 from Army SEA resources to Udorn. DIRNSA indicated that as of 21 August, National Security Agency Liaison Office (NSALO)/ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were staffing a message that would request Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) concurrence, Department of the Army (DA) reaffirmation of aircraft availability, and National Security Agency (NSA) rejustification for this alternative action. Since any aircraft trade-off action was entirely dependent upon Thailand cryptologic ceiling dictates, the ultimate decision had to be kept within manover limitations.

(In recognition of the fact that replacement of EC-47s

^{*} HU-8 - Army ARDF platform with only HF capability.

^{**} RU-21 - Army ARDF platform with VHF capability.

with 5 hour capabilities with 7 hour platforms would greatly increase flying time requirements, Pac Scty Rgn requested 6994th Scty Sq to review and provide a resume of the impact this would place on squadron personnel resources. This impact was greatest in the A292X1 area, with 24 being authorized at Detachment 3 and 29 required. All other pertinent fields were adequately provided for by the Unit Detail List (UDL). 6994th Scty Sq stated the belief that augmentees to satisfy the 292X1 deficiency (22) would be available from within squadron complex resources.

ment of programmed date for transfer would not be possible. This was due to maintenance training requirements in regards to ALR-38 systems, lack of R-2000 maintenance spare parts, and the lack of maintenance support at NKP. In a joint 7AF/6994th Scty Sq message, the recommendation that "short duration" temporary duty (TDY) of aircraft from Danang would be the only possible solution to effect emergency coverage of Northern Laos (23) by ALR-38 platforms.

the transfer planning was allowed to progress as scheduled. Final direction from 7AF covered all contingencies and outlined actions to be taken as follows: (1) Transfer five ALR-35 N/P* aircraft assigned to 360 TEWS at Tan Son Nhut and staging from NKP to the 362d TEWS at Danang; (2) Arrange for three ALR-35 EC-47Q** and two ALR-38Qs to be placed on TDY status from the 362d TEWS to KNP; and (3) Implement a programming Document * EC-47 N/P - R-1830 powered, capable of 5 hour missions as CCZ platforms.

** ALR-35 EC-47Q - Powered with R-26000 engine and capable of 7 hour missions in CCZ configuration.

change to reflect the Unit Equipment (UE) increase of five ALR-35 EC-47 N/P at the 362d TEWS and a simultaneous removal of the same aircraft from the 360th TEWS UE at Tan Son Nhut. Advantages listed for this action included the consolidation of support at one location, elimination of long exchange flights between Tan Son Nhut and Nakhon Phanom for phase maintenance, and allowed the 360th TEWS to isolate its activities and concentrate on programmed Vietnamization responsibilities.*

formulated for the closure of Detachment 1, 6994th Scty Sq and the 361st TEWS at Phu Cat Air Base, RVN. This action had a sweeping effect upon aircraft disposition. Relocation of the fleet of 20 ALR-34 EC-47 Combat Cross Configured aircraft from these units, coupled with this ALR-38 basing action dictated a massive re-shuffling of all 6994th Scty Sq platform assets. It was generally agreed that only ALR-34 aircraft would be retained at Tan Son Nhut, and that all ALR-35 N/Ps at Tan Son Nhut would be transferred to Danang, along with several of the Phu Cat based ALR-34s. Since this massive move was to take place in early November, 483d TAW at Cam Ranh Bay (at the time Command and Control authority for the TEWS) stated a desire to make all movements at the same time, thereby eliminating possible confusion. It was generally agreed that this would afford an acceptable solution for all concerned.

(U) This planning went awry in mid October as a result of weather.

On 22-23 October, Typhoon Hester struck Danang, forcing the typhoon evacuation of all operational aircraft, many of which were evacuated to Nakhon *See Chapter VII, Special Interest Items, for complete resume of the Vietnamization Program.

Phanom.

When the weather allowed for a return to Danang, the five ALR-35s TDI from Tan Son Nhut (360TEWS) that were staging from NKP were returned to Danang, and four ALR-38s and one ALR35Q were retained at NKP, finally giving Detachment 3 the long sought capability for VHF coverage of North Laos. Although the planned arrangement of 3 ALR-35Q and two ALR-38s was not realized due to the non-operational status of two of the three ALR-35Qs assigned to the complex, the primary objective had been realized. It is significant to note that as of 31 December 1971, this planned mix of 35/38 platforms had not been reached, although the Master Program for Detachment 3 was changed to reflect the planned structure. It appeared doubtful if the initial plan would ever be realized, because of the lack of ALR-35Qs to serve as back-up. As of 31 December, five 7 hour platforms were being staged from NKP, with the mix (25) of one ALR-35/four ALR-38s or two ALR-35/three ALR-38s dominating.

with subordinate detachments, was tasked with direct working between mission aircraft and Forward Air Controllers (FAC). The Blue Beetle program, as the 6994th Sety Sq (South Vietnam/Cambodia) effort was called, was tested in early 1971 and adopted as standard procedure. The objective of the program was to allow ARDF platforms to pass pertinent fix data to the FAC via secure voice communications. The FAC was subsequently able to provide immediate visual reconnciter (VR) of the target and if

deemed lucrative, call in immediate strike activity.

During the six month period (1 July through 31 December), a total of 982 Blue Beetle missions were flown by 6994th Scty Sq. During these missions, 1019 fixes were passed to the FAC, 244 of which were VR'd, resulting in 26 air strikes.

Operating procedures for the Blue Beetle program were consolidated and updated by 7AF on 28 July 1971. Procedures were set up as follows: (1) EC-47 crews would pass (via secure voice communications) the UTM coordinates, the fix radius, visual description of area if possible, and the priority of the target to the appropriate FAC; (2) All communications would be accomplished by U.S. crewmembers (this stipulation was necessary since some crews were composed of both Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and USAF personnel); (3) 6994th Scty Sq was tasked with providing a weekly summary of targets passed, along with Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for use by 7AF and 360 TEWS; (4) Although assignment of a dedicated FAC was not always possible, a plan to designate one EC-47 as "primary" ARDF platform to work with a dedicated FAC was outlined, while other EC-47s would be selected to pass targets, but would be considered as "secondary" missions; and (5) Specific communities (27) cations procedures were established governing tip-off of target data.

Expansion of FIX/FAC Program to Include Entire 6994th Complex:

As the execution of the Blue Beetle program continued, daily feedback reports indicated recurring problems. These included (but were not limited to) communications problems, weather limitations, aborts of either the ARDF or FAC aircraft, and terrain/vegetation

restrictions placed upon VR activities. Nevertheless, 7AF was convinced that the program was highly successful and remained optomistic. In view of the position taken by 7AF, expansion of the program to include Detachment 2, and Detachment 3, 6994th Scty Sq, with cursory involvement by Detachment 1 was initiated. The targeting trial for Detachment 2 was implemented in mid-August with 7AF Execution Order being forwarded to all (28) concerned on 2 August. Tabbed Black Bear, this program was primarily associated with the South Vietnamese area immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone, in ARDF Area 9.

as interest developed in the Cambodian/South Vietnam areas, cryptologic authorities in Thailand

began to show concern about the rapid exploitation of ARDF results in Northern Laos. This concern was first addressed in a 3 August 1971 message from to DIRNSA, in which the "real time" use of ARDF results in the Barrell Roll area was addressed. Basically, the proposal called for ARDF platforms to relay fixes (initially suggested were those falling below 500 meter radius) to the 7/13AF controlled Airborne Command Control Center (ABCCC). ABCCC would in turn relay the fix to the FAC who would (when operationally able), VR the target/fix area and direct strike sorties to confirmed lucrative targets.

This message drew immediate USAFSS reac-

tion, in that the message implied that DIRNSA was the approving authority. USAFSS pointed out that the prerogatives for establishing programs of this nature were totally within the jurisdiction of USAFSS and pertinent operating commands. USAFSS requested that Pac Scty Rgn

review the development process to ascertain the extent of involvement and determine the reason for DIRNSA concurrance having been solicited. Although some objection to the initial message was stated. (30)

USAFSS concurred with the proposal. Even though DIRNSA was not directly involved (as was pointed out by USAFSS), that agency agreed with the proposals and suggested use of 1000 meter radius fix criteria rather (31)

than the 500 meter radius initially suggested by

Sq began close coordination with National Security Agency Office Pacific (NSAPAC) and 7AF respectively. Although it appeared that coordination between and possibly Laotian FAC operations had indeed been conducted, none of the action agencies had been actively involved in formulation of the plans. Once all concerned became aware of the procedures and objectives, rapid exchanges to finalize plans were made. These exchanges are summarized as follows:

- 1. Pac Scty Rgn notified NSAPAC of concurrence with the proposal and queried as to what restrictions or constraints would prohibit passing of (32) fixes directly to the FACs via the KAC-275 (wheel) system.
- 2. updated their initial proposal by outlining Special Operating Areas in which fixes would be passed to the FAC (in addition to the "Raven Boxes", as the operating area of Laotian "Raven" FACs were called). The further indicated that 7/13AF had initiated a message to 7AF, requesting permission to implement procedures as outlined in the original proposal, and that an affirmative response was expected.
- 3. In a resume of coordination actions between 6994th Scty Sq and 7AF, 6994th apprised Pac Scty Rgn of the fact that it appeared that at

the outset, the participating units had been omitted from planning. However, by 6 August, 7AF had a message in the coordination stage that incorporated the FIX/FAC principle in Laos. 6994th Scty Sq further stressed that there had been a communications problem prevalent in the ABCCC/EC-47 relationship during Operation Lam Son 719 (18 February through 31 (34)

March 1971), due to the location of the UHF antenna on the underside of the EC-47. In view of this past experience, 6994th offered the suggestion that relay of fix information to the ground, thence to the ABCCC (35) might provide the greatest reliability.

- 4. NSAPAC reply to the initial Pac Scty Rgn query agreed that passing information directly from the ARDF platform to FACs would result in faster response than would be realized by relaying through the ABCCC. However, feeling was that 7/13AF might be opposed to the loss of control that would be involved by omitting ABCCC involvement.* NSAPAC further stressed that since all aircraft involved (EC-47s, ABCCC, and FACs) were equipped with Nestor (KY-8 or KY-28) secure transmission devices, use of this system would be far more reliable and secure than the AKAC-275 (36) (wheel) system.
- 5. Pac Scty Rgn provided follow-up information to USAFSS, in which they attempted to dispell USAFSS adamancy concerning ______/DIRNSA in-volvement in the Laotian FIX/FAC program. Pac Scty Rgn stress that ______ had historically been more involved in U.S. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) activities in Laos than NRV(C) exercised in Vietnam, due to the vast amount of authority/control vested in MACV for the RVN area. It was further stated that the ______ actions appeared to be "within their Charter" *Raven FACs operating in Laos were not directly subordinate to 7/13AF.

and suggested that opposition to DIRNSA involvement be dropped.

In reply to specific USAFSS queries, Pac Scty Rgn advised that they envisioned no change in the level of support being provided pointing out that implementation of the FIX/FAC program should have an enhancing effect on that support. Region further stated their assumption that all communications between ARDF platforms and ABCCC would be in the secure mode; however, it was request that 6994th Scty Sq confirm this supposition and further insure that the proposal. These assumptions were subsequently confirmed by 6994th Scty Sq, and 7AF agreed that any proposals originated would include as an addressee.

Was not until 10 September 1971 that the 7/13AF message outlining basic procedures was received at 7AF. Immediately thereafter, 7AF/6994th Scty Sq began coordination and development of the final plan, which was forwarded to all concerned in the form of a 7AF execution order on 2 October. This Execution Order outlined the FIX/FAC background and set forth procedures to be followed. The guidelines for this test (code named Brown Beaver) were generally the same as those implemented for Blue Beetle and Black Bear, with the exception of the involvement of ABCCC as a relay (39) point for Brown Beaver activities.

FIX/FAC Operations Summarized: The objective of each of the three FIX/FAC programs implemented in SEA was to allow the ARDF platform to provide the Forward Air Controller with potential targets to exploit, strike, and destroy. With an elusive enemy, skilled in the art

of hiding from the eyes of visual reconnaissance, it was necessary to employ every potentiality to detect his operations. Since it is well known that every military unit must maintain communications links in order to successfully execute war objectives, ARDF provided the answer to the location of those necessary communications facilities. While hiding from the eyes of visual reconnaissance, soundwaves could not be hidden from the ears of the ARDF crew. Once soundwaves divulged the location of an enemy transmitter within a given area, the FAC could be told WHERE to look - a much easier task than attempting to survey the entire countryside. On the other had, ARDF alone served only to locate a radio transmitter, easily remoted from the main cadre of the enemy. To call in an air strike on the basis of ARDF alone might result in destruction of a transmitter, but would have very little effect upon the ability of the enemy to conduct warfare. It was with these facts in mind that the ears of ARDF and eyes of the FAC were combined as a means of locating the enemy. Basically, the principle was sound. Technically, the program was well planned and gave every indication of being highly advantageous. However, as with virtually every newly developed tactic, there were drawbacks and limitations that only actual execution could divulge.

Availability of a dedicated FAC (without other responsibility) to work directly with specific EC-47 combat sorties was seldom a reality. This meant that a fix of pinpoint accuracy often failed to have the benefit of visual reconnoittering. While the ARDF results added to the data base concerned with enemy locations and could be used for ground operations, the mobility of the enemy often negated the effect of such delayed action.

operations. Lack of dependable secure communications often made the passing of valuable fix information impossible. The human element also prevailed, in that there was feeling on occasions, that the FAC was failing to monitor appropriate frequencies, thereby prohibiting tip-off. This led to a feeling of frustration among EC-47 crews who felt that their product was being ignored as a valuable addition to tactical warfare assets.

Although repeated emphasis was placed upon education of the Forward Air Controllers as to the value and reliability of the ARDF product, there remained an undercurrent of feeling among the EC-47 crews that many were not cognizant of the accuracy of the ARDF fix, resulting in the ignoring of many valid fixes. Whenever this feeling was allowed to become prevalent, the ARDF platform operators began to slacken in their attempts to contact the FAC, leading to a general deterioration of the program.

Weather conditions often forced the cancellation/diversion of one of the aircraft. Since weather requirements were not identical, dedicated FACs were often in area without the EC-47, or the EC-47 would be working without the benefit of the FAC. Equipment problems, causing the cancellation/abort of the EC-47 mission had the same effect.

FACs were more and more involved in directing strikes in support of ground operations. This left very little VR support for the ARDF platforms and the Blue Beetle program seemed to be losing its imitial impetus. Again, the human element prevailed, in that the ARDF crews were unable to realize

any real or direct results from their efforts. It was a real boost to morale to know that a target fixed by ARDF could be destroyed almost immediately - then the ARDF operator had proof of the worth of his product. Once the ARDF fix had been combined with collateral information, it lost its identity and became just another statistic.

riment to the program, in that many of the fixes obtained were centered in triple canopied jungle areas, impossible for the FAC to successfully VR. This led to fewer and fewer of the targets passed being VR'd, since the FAC (from previous experience) knew that visual observance of enemy activity in the area of the fix would be impossible. On the other hand, the terrain and vegetation in the Barrel Roll area did not offer the same protection, and the Brown Beaver program showed much higher VR and strike rates.

In spite of the problems encountered, 7AF (as the directing/controlling authority) continued to deem the product of the FIX/FAC program as being of high value to the war effort.* Considerable time and effort was expended in the coordination and execution of the programs, and (40) general feeling was that the concept was worthwhile and should be continued.

ARDF Improvement Actions:

A recurring program at the 6994th Scty Sq was the constant review of tasking and fragging actions to improve the ARDF/ACT mission of the unit. During this historical period, this had become an even more pertinent requirement, due to theater drawdown actions which made it necessary to reassess requirements and capabilities to insure effective *See Appendix IV for Blue Beetle statistics.

utilization of available resources. As a result of this constant effort, a number of programs were implemented which had beneficial effects upon the unit's mission.

Variable Mission Tasking: As the drawdown of American forces continued through mid and late 1971, 6994th Scty Sq tended to become more and more aware of actions necessary to insure continued effectiveness of the ARDF program. To this end, 6994th outlined a number of facts with associated proposals to enhance the potential of the squadron in maintaining a high level of mission success. To effectively illustrate the point in contention, 6994th Scty Sq restated the fact that Combat Cross Zulu (CCZ) EC-47s were ordinarily fragged for 5 hours, while Combat Cross aircraft were scheduled for 7 hour missions. This was due to fuel limitations on missions carrying "X," "Y," "Z-1," and "Z-2" positions and associated operators. 6994th further stressed that this concept had been maintained with very little attention being given to the availability/desirability of ACI obtained on the CCZ missions. In order to maximize ARDF and insure effective use of the ACI acquisition positions, certain option for CCZ manning were pointed out as follows: (1) Standard manning with one voice/one Morse ACI position manned, resulting in a five hour mission capability: (2) Manning both "Z" positions on standard 5 hour sortie with two Morse operators in areas where Morse activity was prevalent: (3) Where voice activity formed the bulk of ACI, man 5 hour missions with two voice operators for ACI: (4) Omit either the voice or Morse operator from missions where additional Time over Target for ARDF purposes outweighed the ACI requirement, resulting in $5\frac{1}{2}$ vice 5 hour flight capability: (5) Man for ARDF only in areas

where ACI was of little consequence, which would make 6 hour missions (加) possible.

This variable tasking was approved by MACV and implemented for a 28 day test period on 7 August, and subsequently extended. By mid-October, positive results could be noted. Squadron Complex TOT increased from 67 to 70 percent, while local USA-561 TOT rose four percent, an achievement which equaled 30 hours, or five 5 hour missions per tasking week. Since the ratio of one fix per hour had remained constant, there was a concemitant rise in the number of fixes obtained. From the collection standpoint, ACT had not shown a significant volume decrease; on (12) the other hand, exploitable message volumes had risen.

ARDF Coverage of Military Region I: At a 3 November ARDF conference, the stability of the military situation in Military Region (MR) I was an important point of discussion. The implication was that some of the ARDF missions in SEA ARDF Area 9 could be cancelled/diverted.

7AF/6994th Scty Sq, acting on this implication, suggested the downfragging of Da Nang based aircraft from 75% to 50% of available aircraft on a daily basis. A number of advantages in such an arrangement were listed as follows: (1) Aircrews would be allowed more time for transition into the different systems (ALR-3h/ALR-35 and ALR-38s) which resulted from the closure (43) of Detachment 1 in November 1971: (2) Allow for more comprehensive phase maintenance: (3) Give Da Nang organizations time to adjust to the influx of assets to the available facilities: and (h) Provide Da Nang organizations time to recover from the destruction caused by Typhoon Hester.

The MACV reaction to this suggestion was more or less in the negative vein, since they felt that the implications of the 3 November meeting were misunderstood: However, they did concur with a sortie

rate of 50% of assigned aircraft, vice 75% of possessed. 6994th Scty Sq (46) concurred in this arrangement and so advised Pac Scty Rgn. Although the MR-1 activity rate continued to remain static, no positive action was taken other than the 75 to 50% downfragging action.

quest of 28 August, 6994th Scty Sq approached SSO MACV and 509 RRG/ACC concerning a noted drop in Detachment 1 effectiveness during early morning and late evening hours. The crux of the problem was the low level of productivity (due to a combination of low target activity and propagation) prior to 2300 and after 1100 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) daily. Statistics were presented which revealed a total of 4 targets being worked during 84 hours on target prior to 2300 and after 1100 GMT. Potential solutions for this problem were offered and comments (48) requested. As a result of this action, MACV agreed to adjustment of ITOTs to allow missions to be on target during more optimum periods.

Scty Sq involvement in the adjustment of ITOTs to provide maximum capability, as all units in the Complex began close scrutiny of ARDF results in given areas during specific hours, and made repeated recommendations for changes. The entire problem was given formal recognition in December when ACC requested that all aviation units and CMAs follow certain guidelines for establishing and requesting ITOT changes. These guidelines included: (1) CMA coordination of ITOT with aviation units prior to submission of weekly requests: (2) That all aviation unit/CMA coordination be conducted over formal OPSCOM facilities with ACC as information addressee: and (3) Insure that GMT time be used on all requests.

the Complex followed specific guidelines, by forwarding a suggested format for requesting ITOT changes. 6994th further pointed out that all tasking adjustment requests be forwarded to the CMA each Sunday, thereby allowing the information to be included in the statement of requirements (49) for the coming week's tasking. At the close of December, plans were being formulated to implement a 30 day test and if successful, to incorporate procedures into formal directives.

Early ARDF Support to in this historical period, 6994th Scty Sq was faced with a problem that has a shocking effect upon any SIGINT unit. With the only objective of ARDF in SEA being to satisfy the daily requirements of the war effort, the entire complex maintained thorough statistical data on all activities and kept abreast of the latest intelligence developments to assist in the representative performance of the ARDF mission. Thus, when a informed the USAFSS commander that was dissatisfied with the ARDF support being given, the entire complex/command structure was somewhat taken aback. The information presented by was statistical in nature, and was primarily concerned with the lack of priority targets being fixed by Detachments 1, 2, and 3 in Military Regions III and IV. Of particular emphasis was the activity in SEA ARDF areas 10 and 11. The content of the paper presented to the USAFSS Staff was passed to Detachments 1 and 2 on 11 August, requesting their immediate review and comments.

In reply to this initial query, Detachment 1 pointed out that a number of different conditions were prevalent which limited

their coverage of SEA Area 10 targets. These were listed as follows:

- 1. A noted lack of activity on Priority targets.
- 2. Lack of a data base to identify those targets actually being intercepted.
 - 3. Inadequacy of Target Data Lists (TDLs) provided by the CMA.
 - 4. Weather cancellations/conditions limiting Area 10 missions.
- 5. Proximity of many priority targets to Anti-aircraft Artillery (AAA) high threat areas.

These same reasons held true in relation to Detachment 2 coverage of SEA Area 11.

At the request of 699hth Scty Sq, ACC performed a study of SEA Area 10 and 11 ARDF results. Pointing out that a like study had been made in May of 1971 concerning the same areas, ACC went on to discuss problem areas known to hamper ARDF in these areas. Primary detriment was CMA responsibility. Basically, USM-7 (7th Radio Research Field Station (RRFS), Udorn, Thailand) was the Technical Tasking Authority (TTA) for SEA Areas 10 and 11: However, USM-60h (330th RRFS, Pleiku, RVN) and USM-808 (8th RRFS, Phu Bai, RVN) retained TTA responsibility on entities that moved from South Vietnam into those Laotian areas. Although TDLs for Areas 10 and 11 were compiled by USM-7, they had to depend on information provided by USM-60h and 808 on a h8-hour basis. An ACC suggestion that the responsibility for certain of these targets be transferred to USM-7 was rejected by NRV(C) as being impractical. Consequently, when the concern over lack of support was aired, the less than effective TDL situation still existed. ACC went further to point out certain

statistical data pertinent to the problem, and stressed the fact that with one exception (in April 1971) had not addressed the problem to ACC via their formal weekly request for ARDF support. The fact that seldom identified specific entities (excepting those upon which they desired special tasking) in their weekly tasking requests was also pointed out. In presenting this summary, ACC brought all concerned up to date on actions that had transpired in relation to support.

On 1 September, Pac Scty Rgn officially instructed 699hth Scty Sq to provide a full resume of the outcome of discussions with MACV and NRV(C) as related to the subject. 699hth replied by stating that NRV(C) had been made aware of the situation and was performing a detailed study of the matter. It was further pointed out that the ACC study had revealed that TDLs provided for these areas contained very little useful information, and that the ACC or the CMA.

warded to all concerned. Some important statistical results of this study which were instrumental in arriving at the major findings were as follows:

- 1. SEA Area 10: 26.6% of all Radio Designators (RDs) identified as priority one were either inactive or not assigned.
- 2. In SEA Area 11, 15.3% of the targets designated as Priority 1 were inactive during the entire seven week period.
 - 3. Four priority one RDs in SEA Area 10 were active only 28 minutes

collectively during the 49 day period.

- 4. SEA Area 10 total communciations time on RDs in question was 21093 minutes, while ARDF aircraft were scheduled into the are during only 7179 minutes of the activity. As a result, aircraft were present for only 31% of the lucrative time.
- 5. Communications activity stood at 17581 for SEA Area 11, with ARDF aircraft having been in area only 29.4% of this time.

 As a result of this study, NRV(C) arrived at major findings as follows:
- 1. Observation that ARDF was not satisfying the requirement was valid.
- 2. Aircraft scheduling did not appear to be consistent with optimum periods of activity.
- 3. Priority 1 targets were determined to have been inactive during extended lengths of time during the period studied, indicating abuse of the Priority system.
- 4. The fix rate for both areas was below acceptable standards.

 With such findings to substantiate the complaint, NRV(C) recommended that MACV (J2-114) convene a conference among representatives of ACC, 509RRG, 699LSS, Department of Defense Special Representative (DODSPECREP)

 MACV, and other interested parties to review and improve the ARDF process.
- On 30 September, a follow-up study performed by ACC basically supported NRV(C) findings. It became readily apparent that there were fallacies which had indeed resulted in a lack of ARDF support. TDLs were recognized as being inadequate. Over half of the RDs requested by were omitted from TDLs. This was due in part to the fact that
- requirements were received too late to be incorporated into weekly

tasking. USM-7 had failed to translate requirements into specific areas for a given airframe, while weekly requests had not even been furnished by the CMA on several occasions. The Priority listing was completely unwieldy and unrealistic, making it impossible for ARDF resources to (53) satisfy tasking requirements.

Recognizing these deficiencies, ACC representatives visited

, USM-7 and

in late August. After coordination with these agencies, requests were more specific, sorties were requested by frag area and type of platform desired, and TDLs were made more responsive to requirements.

It was significant to 6994th personnel that in no instance was the expertise/dedication to duty of the Complex singled out as a potential reason for the alleged lack of support. It was evident that awareness of ARDF capabilities on the part of users and the quality of technical support were of paramount importance in achieving program objectives. At the close of this historical period, all problems seemed to have been resolved and close coordination was being maintained with to preclude recurrences of this nature.

relation to ARDF/ACI support to Lactian requirements at a 8 December meeting held at MACV. Primary concern expressed at this meeting was the lack of VHF fixes being collected by missions flown in the Plaine Des Jarres area of Northern Laos. Once the problem was aired, it became evident that was still not familiar with ramifications of ARDF and the type of technical support needed if the platform was to satisfy re-

quirements. Although was aware of the fact that at least five enemy regiments in the area were utilizing VHF, the data base was inadequate to allow prediction of callsigns, frequencies, and schedules on these entitles. As a result, it was impossible to include the VHF targets on TDLs. After a thorough discussion of all the ramifications/ limitations involved, certain problems that demanded resolution or at least awareness of by were made a matter of record. Primary of these facts were: (1) must state priorities before ARDF could be expected to satisfy requirements: (2) With only four daily missions scheduled from Nakhon Phanom, certain limitations must be expected: (3) Headroom ceilings of Thailand precluded addition of more daily sorties (4) ALR-38 resources had to be distributed in such a manner as to cover all lucrative VHF areas (Southern Laos, Demilitarized Zone, and the Tri-border area) as well as Northern Laos: (5) Technical data must be provided on targets requiring priority cover, since random search could not be expected to produce the necessary results: (6) would have to take a long look at priorities to preclude conflict between HF Morse and VHF voice targets: and (7) must understand that VHF targets were decidedly more difficult to fix in many instances than the higher powered HF targets.

At the end of this historical period, it was apparent that the subject of support to in Thailand would be a recurring matter of discussion, since it was impossible to educate personnel to become cognizant of every aspect of ARDF. To compound this situation, was out of the normal flow of information concerning the ARDF mission:

Although they were users, they were not among the policy makers when decisions on major applications/changes to the program were being made.

To prevent this from ever becoming an insurmountable problem, Detachment 3, 6994th Scty Sq established a channel of coordination between the CMA (USM-7), ______, and themselves to insure that requirements were made known and that users were kept informed of the 6994th capability to fulfill those stated requirements.

Multi-Channel Communications:

Perhaps one of the most important developments of this historical period was the increase in use of low-powered VHF multi-channel communications by the enemy. This sophistication of the enemy's communications facilities necessitated a number of changes in the posture of the Squadron Complex, complicated manning, and brought about a need for altering the capability of ARDF/ACI platforms. Closure of Detachment 1, 6990th Security Group and cessation of that unit's EC-130 Bench Lance collection missions increased the value of the ACI portion of the 6994th Scty Sq mission. This single problem affected the entire complex to some extent, although the greatest impact was felt by Detachment 3. Virtually all aspects of that unit were affected: Tasking, collection, analysis, reporting, processing, master programming, manning, and maintenance all The 6994th Scty Sq, in its role of Squadron management being involved. became actively involved in every aspect of the planning of the multichannel intercept/processing/reporting capabilities within the complex. The magnitude of this problem was sufficient to involve not only the 6994th, but several other USAFSS and Army Security Agency (ASA) units became actively involved.

In the coordination of the necessary actions to accomplish necessary multi-channel coverage, 6994th Scty Sq performed certain functions

including the following: (1) Coordination with all levels of command to achieve assignment of ALR-38 aircraft at Nakhon Phanom: (2) Monitoring and initiating master program changes to provide adequate processing capabilities for Detachment 2 and 3: (3) Insuring that personnel adjustments were made within the complex to provide necessary manning capabilities: (4) Coordinate mission manning to insure maximum utilization of the Z-1 and Z-2 positions to accomplish the ACI mission: (5) Insure that USAFSS and Pac Scty Rgn were kept apprised of all ramifications and progress made in the processing and reporting of multichannel communications: (6) Continually monitor manning requirements for the reporting/processing phase and relentlesly persue the solicitation of assistance: (7) Insure that adequate avenues of coordination/interworking relationships were maintained between the Complex, 6908th Security Squadron, and USM-7 at Udorn, Thailand: (8) Take necessary steps to set to set up avenues of coordination between in-field users of intelligence and the collection agencies to insure understanding of objectives and limitations: and (9) Establish in-house procedures at all units to provide for rapid recognition of deficiencies in tasking and subsequently recommend adjustments thereto.

At the close of December, Detachment 3 was firmly entrenched as an important contributor to the multi-channel problem, through copy of activity emenating from the Plaine Des Jarres area of Northern Laos. Close coordination between Detachment 3, 6908th Scty Sq (Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand), and USM-7 at Udorn provided up to date technical data and insured meaningful ACI tasking of all Detachment 3 missions.

Multi-Channel Communications in Cambodia: Early in October,

Technical Reports received from MIRNSA indicated the possibility of multi-channel communications being used by the enemy in the Krek area of Cambodia. When 6994th Scty Sq was apprised of this fact, immediate coordination was begun to attempt intercept/fixing of the targets. Since such coverage required an ALR-38 configured aircraft, immediate action was taken to transfer one Da Nang based ALR-38 to Tan Son Nhut to conduct research and development flights in the Krek area. On 13 October, ACC established a new mission area and scheduled the first of five ALR-38 sorties, tasked with the express mission of discerning the validity of the reported possibility. The last of these missions was flown on 18 October, with negative results. Due to lack of ALR-38 maintenance facilities at Tan Son Nhut, retention of the platform at Saigon for a longer period of time was not feasible. As of the end of this historical period, no further indications of multi-channel operation in Cambodia have been received.

Tip-off of High Interest Targets to ARDF Aircraft:

Since the inception of ARDF, one of the built-in limitations has been the lack of search capability to insure that each target worked was of high interest to the tactical war effort. Due to the nature of the communications facilities comprising the enemy network(s), there was no possible way that a single ARDF platform could sort out the desirable from the undesirable, and still accomplish any volume of ARDF collection. Consequently, the most logical means of applying a wider capability was to utilize ground facilities targeted against these high interest targets for intercept. By enabling ground stations to tip-off

high priority targets as they became active, the capability of the ARDF mission to satisfy requirements was greatly expanded. This system was utilized throughout Vietnam, with a high degree of success. In the early months of 1971, an effort was launched to expand this tip-off capability to include Thailand intercept sites targeted against the Steel Tiger (Southern Lactian panhandle) area. Given the codename of Project Cumbersome, this program involved the installation of communications facilities at USM-7J (Detachment J, 7 RRFS, Ubon, Thailand) to facilitate tip-off actions. Preliminary planning called for the use of Frequency Modulated (FM) KY-8 secure voice communications between Ubon and the aircraft: However, this planning was complicated by the fact that existing facilities established for Air/Ground/Air communications between the EC-47 platforms and Forward Site at Pakse, Laos, utilized the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) range. Although the EC-47 possessed both UHF and FM VHF capabilities, monitor of both frequencies simultaneously was not possible, since only one KY-8 was available aboard the aircraft. As an alternative, the suggestion was proffered by National Security Office Pacific (NSAPAC) that Very High Frequency (VHF) equipment be installed at both locations, thereby providing a common frequency for both sites. Such action had a built-in advantage of potentially extending the range of communications from the Pakse site, since VHF was known to provide better long range capabilities than UHF: However, the significance of insuring USM-7J/Pakse frequency compatability was mullified in mid-June when a critical military situation dictated the withdrawal of the Pakse site.

(56)

On 5 July, a 30 day test was implemented, utilizing the FM VHF range as had been previously planned. When the KY-8 cypher switch malfunctioned on 31 July, the test was suspended. Unfortunately, contacts had been very sparse during the test. In response to an NSA suggestion, USM-7 concurred with the installation Office of a discone antenna at Ubon and suggested that a follow-up test be conducted once this antenna was in place and the KY-8 facilities had been returned to operational status. In extending this suggestion, USM-7 pointed out that the July test had not been conclusive for a number of reasons, primary of which were weather (causing cancellation of many of the ARDF sorties), equipment malfunctions, and the lack of experience of personnel manning the ground site. The USM-7 proposal was agreed upon by all concerned, and immediate action was taken by to supply the necessary antenna. KY-8 spare parts arrived at Ubon on 24 August. In the ensuing days, further expansion of the program received the attention of all concerned. On 23 September, DIRNSA made a point of reminding all units/agencies involved that Detachment 1 and 2, 6994th Scty Sq were to be considered full participants in the program while flying in SEA Areas 10 and 11. Prior to this time, Detachment 3 had been the single USAFSS unit considered as a participant by certain of the non-USAFSS agencies.

Antenna installation was completed and the VRC-1.7/KY-8 equipment successfully tested on 18 October, with the new test being (58) scheduled to commence on 25 October.

Initially, this test was also plagued with problems.

The primary frequency became blocked by an unidentified signal (later determined to be Forward Air Controller communications) forcing a change (57) to the alternate frequency. To enhance the test, USM-7 suggested additional procedures, involving "in-the-blind" transmissions by the ground station every 10 minutes. At the same time, they requested ARDF platforms to attempt to contact the ground as often as possible. Additionally, they requested Detachment 1, 2, and 3 to provide certain (59) feedback concerning contacts on a daily basis.

was pointed out that such a procedure would interfere with the primary mission of the aircraft, since such involved logging would keep one operator busy and while transmitting, the FM would interfere with the "X" console, thereby causing a detriment to the ARDF collection capability. As an alternative, it was suggested that a special Detachment 3 mission be scheduled to overfly Ubon and establish contact, then proceed on to Areas 10B, 10C, and 10D, covering as much of these areas as possible. This flight would be entirely dedicated to the communications test and would record specific information concerning each contact, such as aircraft position, altitude, direction of flight, distance from Ubon, weather conditions, hearability, and any other remarks pertinent to the test. Depending upon the success of this special mission, 699hth/7AF were prepared to initiate further flights to augment the test data if necessary.

provided all concerned with a resume of the results. Generally, it was felt that the project was worthwhile, and certain refinements were sug-

gested. The content of the report as supplied by USM-7 was dedicated to only the communications portion of the test, and did not address the success of the USAFSS platforms in fixing those targets tipped off. Although the tip-off/fix ratio was not overly impressive, all concerned were convinced that the program should be extended.

To augment the test data, the 7AF/6991th proposed special mission was flown by Detachment 3 on 2 December. During this five hour mission, 28 contacts were made at distances ranging from 10 to 135 miles and at altitudes from 5,500 to 10,000 feet. All contacts were of excellent signal strength and readability. As a result of the proven capability of the communications system, USM-7 strongly suggested that the Ubon site be made a permanent ARDF tip-off station. At the end of the year, action was being taken to make this a reality.

Target Identification:

Target identification has been a recurring problem throughout this historical period, with fluctuations causing repeated queries from higher headquarters. Each query prompted studies to be generated, with the same two problems being unearthed; quality of Target Data Lists (TDLs) as supplied by CMAs and the completeness of the DIRNSA High Speed call sign list.

Accuracy of TDLs: Following a USAFSS Staff visit in August during which time the subject of inaccuracy of TDLs was discussed,

Pac Scty Rgn that a project officer had been assigned by MACV to visit all

CMAs to coordinate the improvement of this identification aid. Additionally, 6994th Scty Sq tasked all subordinate operational echelons with providing inputs to assist in determining specific areas in which improve-

- ments were needed. The requested input was voluminous and pointed to the fact that a multitude of factors were involved, primary of which were as follows:
- 1. This often had targets with simultaneous activity schedules that were separated by up to 50 miles, hindering accurage profile preparation for missions.
- 2. Very little information was included on TDLs regarding targets of opportunity which could be covered while the mission was enroute to and returning from fragged target areas.
- 3. Some TDLs were prepared two days in advance of scheduled missions and the ARDF unit was not notified of call sign/frequency changes that occurred in the interim period.
- 4. TDLs did not always agree with tasking as levied by tasking messages.
- 5. When missions were re-fragged (changed from one area to another), on short notice, it was almost impossible to obtain TDLs for the new area prior to launch of the mission.
- 6. TDLs were stereotyped, with little revision action taken to insure coverage of high priority targets.
 - 7. There was a noted lack of data concerning HF voice targets.
 - 8. Low level targets were generally omitted from the TDL.
- 9. VHF voice targets (this applied generally to Detachment 2 only) were not covered by TDLs.
 - 10. Many TDLs were received too late to be of any mission value.
 - With these discrepancies having been listed and documented,

6994th Scty Sq (through ACC) approached USM-704 to attempt to resolve the chronic problem. Through stressing the importance of speed in supplying required information and encouraging the use of OPSCOM circuits vice the regular communications channels, USM-704 was able to effect an improvement in the content, accuracy, and timeliness of these valuable aids.

- The 699hth Scty Sq continued to monitor the identification rate of targets throughout the period. Although the TDLs were vastly improved, a gradual decline in identification rates began in July and continued well into November, reaching an all time low of 42% of the fixes/cuts being identified in November. Many factors contributed to the decline, as was addressed to Pac Scty Rgn on 2 December. These factors were listed as follows:
- 1. Greater communications security awareness on the part of the enemy. Transmitters covered by Tan Son Mut missions resorted to short transmissions, with a number of targets apparently utilizing the horizontally polarized antennas. Since the ARDF antennas on EC-47 were specifically designed to intercept vertically polarized transmitting antennas, this action reduced the effectiveness of the ARDF platform to fix/identify the target.
- 2. The drawdown of forces had an adverse effect on the ground station's ability to maintain continuity on many targets, thereby reducing the quality of technical data upon which to base identification. This led to a reduction of the effectiveness of TDLs.
- 3. A large turnover of operator personnel had mullified the "operator familiarity" advantage to be gained through knowledge of a target

area.

h. The NSA High-Speed call-sign machine run which had proven to be an extremely valuable aid to identification was often received piecemeal with some sections never being received. As of 31 December, this item remained a major problem.

As a result of 6994th Scty Sq awareness, and to further isolate the cause of the identification rate decline, 6994th requested NRV(C) to provide a DIRNSA prepared machine run to assist in isolating the problem and facilitate any corrective actions.

Although it was recognized that the NSA High Speed run was inadequate in several respects, a system of search was implemented that deviated from the TDL list, and depended a great deal upon analytical expertise, especially on missions with analysts aboard. Through use of locally prepared data base, identification techniques were generally able to cope with this "vacuum cleaner" approach to search efforts. A number of significant results were realized through this system: (1) The number of targets worked increased substantially: (2) A large number of garbled and incomplete call signs were worked/copied: (3) The "fix per hour" rate remained stable: (h) Percentage of targets worked resulting in fixes/cuts dropped slightly: (5) An increase in priority target fixes resulted: and (6) Overall identification rate on targets fixed/cut rose substantially, standing at 56% at the end of the period.

At the close of December, continued emphasis/study was being made to improve this very important aspect of the mission. Analysts felt that with the resolution of the High Speed run problem, coupled with the extra search efforts of the operators and determined analytical expertise, the identification rate could be further improved and stabilized

further mission degredation occurring.

Collection Management

The management of collection was conducted on both a local and Squadron Complex basis. The Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS) as prepared locally and at each Detachment, remained the most important vehicle for management of the ARDF/ACI mission. In addition, a Weekly Unit Resource Management Report (WURMR) was prepared by the same operational echelons, and served to identify trends in productivity and equipment status. Every possible aspect of the ARDF/ACI mission was taken into consideration, evaluated, and action to resolve any potential problem areas was taken immediately. The Mission Management office of the Squadron Operations Staff extracted pertinent information from the DURMIS, WURME, and ARDF Recovery Reports as prepared by Local and all Detachment operational sections. This information, presented in an abbreviated format, was presented to the Squadron Operations Officer on a daily basis. Weekly averages for each separate unit were compiled for comparison against an average of the previous four weeks. Complex statistics (arrived at through combination of all imput data) were also compiled on both a daily and weekly basis. Results of the weekly complex activities were provided both 7AF and the TEWS command and control element. Primary interest in this report lay in the status of aircraft and equipment. This report was accepted as the most comprehensive weekly summary available to assist agencies in management of ARDF facilities. In addition, the Squadron Mission Management function reviewed voluminous daily reports from varied and sundry sources to extract feedback information on ARDF fixes. This information was provided all interested parties in the form of a

weekly ARDF Feedback Report. Although a highly involved and often frustrating duty, this report was considered one of the most useful of all management functions, since it allowed the recording of actual tactical (64) actions taken on the ARDF product.

Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS):

A new Volume XII to USAFSSM 200-4 was published in mid-1971, which placed management statistics in a highly versatile yet complete machine processing format. At the same time, this vehicle was arranged in such a manner as to provide easy review and posting of statistics manually. During the last six months of 1971, only minor adjustments additions were made to the format. 6994th Scty Sq, in performing quality checks of all incoming DURMIS submissions, was in constant contact with subordinate units to effect accurate DURMIS reporting. Two separate Operational Assistance visits were made to outlying Detachments, specifically aimed at insuring that the reports submitted by all units were as nearly analogous as the difference in missions would allow. Brevity of presentation without sacrificing clarity became a daily point of discussion. By relying on the built-in double checks provided by the ARDF DURMIS format and stressing the necessity of quality control at the production level, DURMIS reporting had become nearly a routine function by the close of the period.

During this period a system of advising 6940th Technical Training Group of changes in ARDF procedures applicable to the curriculum of the training school was developed. This involved local preparation of all pertinent information covering a three month period into electrical format and inclusion of this course update material in section nine of

the ARDF DURMIS. This system proved highly successful, and served to insure timely receipt and served to provide adequate update capabilities.

ARDF Productivity:*

During the last six months of 1971, ARDF mission results showed a number of fluctuations that were major points of discussion within the Squadron Operations Staff offices. Local operations performed 2070 of 2148 scheduled missions for a completion rate of 96.4%. (This figure represents both U.S. and ARVN manned missions). Monthly deviations ranged from a low of 336 of 360 (93.3%) in July to a high of 337 of 342 or 98.5% in December. Complex statistics were noticeably lower, with the total for the six month period standing at 5509 of 6067 scheduled missions being flown, with a completion rate of 90.8%. Complex deviations ranged from a high of 97.9% (1248 flown - 1275 scheduled) in August to a low of 82.7% in November when only 863 of the 1043 scheduled missions were flown. The reason for these fluctuations can be attributed to two major factors, equipment** and weather. Local statistics for these pertinent areas show 63 of 78 unscheduled missions (80.8%) being attributed to these two causes. During August, 15 of 24 unaccomplished missions were due to equipment problems. In October, 8 equipment malfunctions and 9 weather cancellations accounted for 100% of the unaccomplished missions, while all 15 of the missions not accomplished in November were due to weather aborts. The same is true for the Complex statistics, with 483 of the 565 missions listed as unaccomplished being attributed to these two factors. With 111 equipment problems and 372 weather cancellations, these two items comprised *See Appendix IV for appropriate charts and graphs.

**Statistics include both Airframe and USAFSS equipment problems.

85.5% of the Complex unaccomplished missions. When the Complex rate dropped to 82.7% in November, 129 of the 180 unaccomplished missions were due to adverse weather. The ratio of hours flown versus hours fragged naturally shows the same fluctuation. Local operations flew 12262 hours of the 13524 fragged for a percentage of 90.7%. As in the mission accomplishment rate, the highest percentage was realized in December. Of 2270 fragged hours, 2178 or 95.9% were actually flown. This compared to the 86.8% rate realized in July, which was low for the period, due to 105 reduced and 24 unaccomplished missions, representing the highest statistics for the period in both areas.

During this period, the ratio of Airframe/USAFSS equipment (FRAVO) problems became a point of contention. When possible, it appeared that efforts were being made to show Bravo problems as being a major contributing factor. In response to several 7AF queries, this became an objective of the Weekly Combat Cross Operations report. All malfunctions attributed to equipment were broken down into specifics: E.G., engine, doppler, generators, etc., rather than generalizing and listing as airframe. Likewise, ERAVO discrepancies were listed as printer, scope, erratic bearings, etc., rather than simply "Mission Equipment." In this manner, the report showed developing trends in specific areas and allowed for corrective action to be taken in the maintenance category showing the greatest weakness.

Since the success of the ARDF program depends largely upon the effective management of mission areas to achieve the greatest ratio between time-over-target (TOT) to actual time flown, this item was given a great deal of critical review by the Mission Management section and the local analyst section. Both local and complex statistics showed fluctuations in this area. Local missions registered 8475 hours over target during the period, which constituted 69.1 percent of the 12262 hours flown. The most effective month in this respect was September, when 73.9% of the hours flown were expended over target. During November, the least effective month locally, 1521 hours or 62.6% of the 2428 hours flown were expended over the assigned target area. Complex performance shows a somewhat lower percentage in this area. During the six month period, 22212 hours were spent over target by the complex, comprising 66.8 percent of the total flying time. The most productive month was September when 3844 hours, or 69.6% of the 5520 hours flown were logged over the mission area. Lowest ratio for the complex occurred in July with 3366 hours being spent over target, which was 61.5% of the 5473 hours flown.

The ratio of targets fixed versus hours over target remained relatively stable throughout the period. Local operations accomplished 8484 fixes for 8475 hours over target, an average of slightly better than one fix per hour over target. Complex performance showed 22212 hours over target, resulting in 24640 fixes for an average of 1.1 per hour.

ing study in ARDF operations. This facet is important from several standpoints, and provides a great deal of insight into target activity trends,
as well as the unit's ability to realize mission objectives. As an example,
November shows only 77.7% of tasked hours being flown by the complex, with
only 5566 targets being worked, 85.2% of which resulted in fixes/cuts.
Both these statistics reflect the lowest percentages for these areas. Generally speaking, this should hold true in all instances: However, such is
not necessarily the case. The local statistics show September as having

Provided the lowest ratio of fixes/cuts in comparison to targets worked:
However, September reflects over 90% of the tasked hours being flown.
Generally speaking, it would appear that the month of September should have been one of the more productive months for local operations. Since this was not the case, all possible aspects were considered in attempting to explain the situation. In depth examination of each specific area revealed that for the most part, targets were employing stringent communications security procedures. Length of time active was extremely low, as reflected for both ARDF and ACI. Consequently, the "X" operator would barely get a target tuned, when activity would stop, resulting in a single line of position (LOP) rather than the multiple bearings needed for fix/cut data, or on the other hand, providing nothing more than an ACI item, void of any ARDF and not being counted as a target worked for fixing. After all aspects were considered, this seemed to be the only valid reason for this generally perplexing statistic.

The quality of fixes obtained was generally determined by the fix radius. Basis for VR was a fix of 1000 meters or less. Both Local and Complex statistics show better than two-thirds of total fixes falling within this category, a fact that offered proof of the accuracy of the ARDF system as well as the expertise of the operator/navigator teams.

In the area of analysis, target identification rates fluctuated greatly. Again dependent upon operator/analyst expertise as well as enemy target activity, this aspect of the mission was under constant surveillance by the Squadron Operations staff.* During the last six months *This subject covered in another portion of this chapter.

of 1971, local operations identification rate stood at 57.7% of fixes/cuts. Fourty-two point three percent of thoses fixes/cuts were identified as priority targets. Complex performance in this area was somewhat lower, due primarily to the difference in call-sign usage employed by a number of Detachment 2 and 3 targets. Complex identification rate for the period stood at 16.0%, while only 32.1% were identified as priority. Due to the rapidly changing structure of the targets lying in and around the demilitarized zone and Northern Laos, identification of targets was a complex problem for both Detachments 2 and 3. In spite of this condition, nearly one third of the targets fixed/cut during this period by the complex were identified as priority.*

Finally, exploitable message copy for the complex stood at 13615, 6535 of which were obtained through Manual Morse copy, while the remainder were collected by voice positions. This represents an average of 2.5 messages per mission flown. Since the major portion of the voice messages were derived from VHF, this statistic is a realistic representation of a large volume of important intelligence that would not have been intercepted without the EC-47's ACI capability.

*6994th Scty Sq Identification Rates as compared to other ARDF agencies is discussed at length in Chapter III of this history.

Chapter III

SIGINT PROCESSING AND REPORTING

Processing and reporting functions have remained relatively static during the past six month period. Veice processing was directly affected by the paucity of voice activity in the 6994th Scty Sq target areas, and required very little effort on the part of transcription personnel. No changes in local processing procedures were made during this time. Reporting also remained static, with basic reports continuing to be prepared in accordance with existing directives. Southeast Asia Technical Summary (SEATS) continued to be the most time consuming of all reports prepared by the unit. The Airbrone Recovery Report (ARR), Exploitable
Message Reports (EMR), Airborne Incident Report (AIR), and of course
Critical Intelligence (CRITIC) reporting remained the major reporting vehicles for which the unit was responsible. In view of its direct relation to collection, the Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary
(DURMIS) is covered in Chapter II vice Chapter III of this history.

Processing

Voice Processing:

The voice processing effort at the 6994th Scty Sq centinued to be hampered throughout the reporting period by a lack of intercept. The only productive area was centered around portions of Cambodia where (2) active warfare was being conducted. Although there was suspected multi-channel activity in Cambodia, a special search and development mission failed to obtain any intercept of this mode.*

* See Chapter II for resume of this special test.

during the period. Operators continued to record VC/NVA voice communications while airborne. When short messages were intercepted, transcription was performed in the air (when possible), and subsequently passed via secure voice air/ground circuitry to the appropriate Direct Support Unit. After mission recovery, the recorded magnetic tapes were transcribed and those exploitable messages not already forwarded were given immediate handling to insure receipt by users at the earliest possible moment.

Reporting

CRITIC Reporting:

During the latter portion of 1971, the CRITIC reporting criteria remained static, with no reports being issued by the 6994th Scty Sq. The provision for immediate return to base (RTB) of any platform obtaining critical intelligence remained in effect, but was never utilized.

<u>Airborne Recovery Report:</u>

tive for preparation of the Airborne Recovery Report (ARR) remained in effect throughout the last six months of 1971. One minor change was made in July that eliminated certain statistical data from the remarks section (Minutes of copy for Radiotelephone, Manual Morse, HF, VHF, etc.) and subsequently incorporated this information into the ARDF Daily Status Report as prepared by ACC. Further proposed changes were proffered by DIRNSA on 13 November. If implemented, these changes will provide much more ease of preparation of the report.

During this period, 6994th Scty Sq continued to prepare

ARRs for both U.S. missions and those manned by Vietnamese operators.

However, at the close of the period, plans were underway to turn the ARR

responsibility for VIM missions over to the Vietnamese Special Security

Technical Branch (SSTB), under auspices of the Vietnamization Improvement
and Modernization (VIM) probram.*

During the six month period covered by this report a total of 2228 ARRs were issued by 6994th Scty Sq. One thousand, two hundred, and twenty-seven of these were issued on missions staged from Tan Son Nhut and flown by U.S. crews. VIM missions staged from Tan Son Nhut accounted for 975, while 12 were issued on Detachment 2 missions that terminated at Tan Son Mhut. An additional 11 resulted from tasked missions from Detachment 1 that terminated at Tan Son Nhut during the deactivation and transfer of Detachment 1 resources.**

Southeast Asia Technical Sumary (SEATS):

No significant changes were made to TECHINS 2037, the governing directive for SEATS preparation during the period. The most significant change affecting local reporting work loads occurred on 14 Angust when DIRWSA began accepting VC Technical Summaries (TECSUM) as produced by the ARVN SSTB. This action deleted nearly 20 percent of the SEATS production responsibility for the 6994th. As Vietnamese crews continued to assume mission responsibilities, SEATS volume underwent a gradual decline. During the six menth period, a total of 563 SEATS sections, comprising 394,909 communications groups were issued by the 6994th.**

Exploitable Message Reports (EMR):

*See Chapter VI, this history, for complete resume of VIM actions.

**See Appendix 4 for reporting statistics.

3008, remained unchanged during the last six months of 1971. However, NRV(C) made some minor provisional changes to accommodate reporting of exploitable message activity collected on VIM missions. These changes eliminated certain Communications Intelligence (COMINT) information from the report that was not releasable to the ARVN, allowing 6994th Scty Sq EMRs to be provided to the SSTB. Although unique, these changes did not substantially increase local workloads. A total of 194 EMRs were issued during the six month period.*

Airborne Incident Report (AIR):

Sq. On 5 August, a mission operating in an area just west of Saigon was fired upon by automatic weapons fire while attempting to make a doppler setting on a prominent bridge. Evasive action was taken and no aircraft damage or crew injury sustained. On 14 December, a mission operating over the Delta region south of Saigon detected 6-8 bursts of antiaircraft fire exploding off the left wing. The nearest bursts were estimated to be at least one-half mile distant. The crew stated that fire appeared to have been directed at an 0-2 observation aircraft operating in the vicinity at a much lower altitude. There were no injuries to crew members and no aircraft damage occurred.


Target Identification

A great deal of time was expended by 6994th Scty Sq analysts in the area of identification during this period. Constant efforts to build a data base to augment those aids provided by the CMA and DIRNSA were maintained. As a result, 6994th Scty Sq consistently led * See Appendix 4 for reporting statistics.

the ARDF community in identification rates. Statistics extracted from a DIRNSA prepared report depicting monthly ARDF management data shows 6994th Scty Sq maintaining from 8 to 15 percent greater identification rates than those shown for the overall SEA ARDF effort.*

August, and September (a high of 74% was realized in July), a drastic drop to 59% occurred in October. This decline was attributed to a VC/NVA communications change affecting major entities within the 6994th area of responsibility. A further decline to 57% (remaining constant in December) occurred in November, concemitant with the deactivation of Detachment 1, 6994th Sety Sq, and the reduction of USM-607 at Can Tho, RVN. The drawdown of USM-607 denied 6994th missions of valuable timely support data in the form of TDLs and call sign rotas. The deactivation of Detachment 1 further detracted from the effectiveness of local identification, since certain new and unfamiliar areas were added to mission tasking to fill the resulting void.

^{*} See Appendix 4 for statistical comparisons.



VIETNAMIZATION IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PLAN/SOUTHEAST ASIA REDUCTIONS

During the early portion of 1971, plans were generated to form a Tactical Recommaissance facility within the framework of the Vietnamese Military Complex, The Army of the Republic of Vietnam, (ARVN), Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), Special Security Technical Branch (SSTB) all cooperated to provide the personnel necessary for formation of two units, the 718th Reconnaissance Squadron of the VNAF and Unit 17 of SSTB. 6994th Scty Sq involvement included the training of AHVN personnel to assume operational duties for all EC-47 positions. The 6994th Maintenance function was responsible for training VNAF personnel for the assumption of back-end maintenance duties. NRV (C), as the DIRNSA representative for Vietnam, was responsible for the training of personnel to prepare and forward applicable reports. Other units (non-cryptologic) were tasked with the training of VNAF personnel to assume front-end flight duties (Pilots, Co-Pilots, and Navigators) and aircraft maintenance. The initial actions in the plan involved the in-country training of operator personnel, and the stateside training of these individuals to take over operation and maintenance of the aircraft.

sisted of ARVN personnel already proficient in code copy and operation of communications equipment. As a result, the rapidity with which they grasped instruction and applied it to operational situations was highly gratifying. Personnel associated with the program were enthused over the speed with which this first class progressed and expressed optimism for the ultimate success of the program.

Naturally, there were many facets (other than operational)

involved. Supply and support for maintenance of classrooms and a necessary level of office supplies and equipment were made available upon request, due to the high priority applied to the overall Vietnamization program. Consequently, by 1 July 1971, the VIM program was well established and progressing on schedule.

Such actions as those described above were directly related to the drawdown of American forces in SEA. As Vietnamese crews became available, the number of U.S. personnel required to cover the ARDF mission declined. However, problems beyond the capability of the 6994th to rectify tended to persist, which prevented the complete turn over of back-end operation to the ARWN operators. Language problems, which prohibited operation of airborne Air/Ground communications nets by the Vietnamese, made it necessary to retain one U.S. operator to pass pertinent information to the ground base DSU. Since the U.S. Forces drawdown had made no provisions for the simultaneous training of Vietnamese to assume ground duties concomitant with commencement of Vietnamese flight operations, an imbalance between the air/ground Vietnamization programs prevailed throughout 1971.

The Vietnamization of ARDF was only one of the many problems facing the 6994th Scty Sq as a result of the drawdown of U.S. Forces in SEA. As outlined in Chapter III of this history, reduction of cryptologic spaces forced the closing of many ground intercept positions, thereby reducing the available data-base upon which to derive target identification information. This drawdown action likewise brought about the closure of several ground based Direct Support Units (DSUs), making the real-time objective for passing of fix data to the ground a virtual impossibility.

Support for the ARDF program also faced many and varied problems. Throughout the last six months of 1971, the command and control responsibility for the Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons (TEWS) was in a constant state of fluctuation. As the period begun, the TEWS were subordinated to the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Tan Son Nhut. From the 6994th Scty Sq point of view, this was the ideal situation, providing the means for rapid coordination between the 6994th, 7AF, MACV, ACC, and the TEWS Command and Control function. Many potential problems were expeditiously solved/alleviated through this proximity of responsible elements. As the period progressed and the deactivation of 460TRW became a reality, 6994th stressed the fact that command and control should be retained at Tan Son Nhut. In spite of this contention and exhaustive actions to make the USAFSS position/desires known, the responsibility was transferred to the 483d Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW), Cam Ramb Bay, RVN. This decision was predicated on the possibility/probability that the closure of Phu Cat Air Base, RVN would force the transfer of Detachment 1, 6994th Scty Sq and the 361st TEWS to Cam Ranh Bay, even though USAFSS had continually been against such an arrangement. At the close of 1971. the drawdown of Cam Ramh Bay and the planned deactivation of 483d TAW had again posed a major problem in relation to TEWS Command and Control.

more prevalent, there were high level opinions that ARDF would be reduced on a graduated basis commensurate with the drawdown of other forces.

MACV, 7AF, and all in-country users of the ARDF product were strong in their opposition to such actions. Statistical evidence was presented that pointed out the fact that ARDF/ACI had provided the bulk of the intelli-

gence upon which the war activities had been based. With general support of this opinion prevailing, it became more and more difficult to support the war effort, since a drawdown of cryptologic spaces was likewise planned. As a result, 6994th Scty Sq was forced to assume the attitude of doing the best possible job with the manpower/equipment authorized. It is significant to note that in spite of the deactivation of Detachment 1, the constant reduction of manpower resources, the forced reduction of airborne analyst slots, and certain delays in the Vietnamization program, the 6994th was able to maintain a respectable mission posture and make continued contributions to the war effort.

evolving from the Vietnamization Improvement and Modernization Plan (VIMP) and the SEA reduction actions that directly impacted upon the 6994th Scty Sq. Both subjects are covered in monograph style, thereby providing a smooth flow of pertinent information as each subject unfolded and demanded more and more attention on the part of the 6994th staff.

Vietnamization Improvement and Modernization Plan (VIMP):

In July 1971, a VNAF plan (71-62) was published which took action and outlined steps for the activation of the VNAF 718th Reconnaissance Squadron (EC-47) on 1 December 1972. Stated purpose of the plan was to program tasks and assign responsibilities to activate, man, train, and equip the 718th Reconnaissance Squadron. Basically, this plan was involved with the operation (front-end), maintenance (both airframe and mission equipment), and the establishment of material channels to support the maintenance function. Primary 6994th/USAFSS involvement lay in the training of maintenance personnel to perform necessary maintenance and

upkeep of the installed mission equipment. To a lesser degree, 6994th was involved in the establishment of bench stock of pertinent parts, providing the necessary Avionics Ground Equipment (AGE), and coordinating the procurement of support for the maintenance function. Points of contention which were raised were primarily in the areas of the source of maintenance trainees, and the establishment of supply channels. On the subject of source of trainees, 6994th insisted that those personnel destined to receive initial training as maintenance technicians and to subsequently assume the role of instructors for later classes, should be graduates of the USAF Air Training Command school at Keesler AFB, Mississippi, with later inputs to be derived from the VNAF Air Training Center school at Nha Trang AB, RVN. Pac Scty Rgn points of contention were primarily in the support/logistic area.

After review by all pertinent offices, a revised plan, dated 1 October 1971 was published, which incorporated the majority of the suggested amendments. In accordance with this plan, 6994th responsibilities were listed as follows:

- 1. Provide formal training on the AN/ALR-34 equipment, with three VNAF personnel scheduled to commence training on 1 August 1971 and the follow-up training of 26 additional individuals to begin on 31 December 1971. Seventeen trainees were to be derived from Keesler AFB inputs, while the remaining 9 were to be inputs from the in-country school.
- 2. Transfer peculiar mission support equipment for maintenance of ALR-34 system.
 - 3. Provide bench-stock listings on ALR-34 "Y" and "Z" positions.
 - 4. Provide Air Force Advisory Group (AFAG) a listing of end items,

AGE, special tools, and test equipment to be transferred concomitant with the transfer of aircraft. Also, a listing of shortages in each category were to be provided.

- 5. Assist VNAF/AFGP in USAFSS areas of responsibility to ensure an orderly transfer of facilities and support activation of the 718th.
- 6. Train 80 ARDF operator personnel in accordance with Joint Program Actions Directive (PAD) 71-7-12. (This PAD was supplemented by USAFSS (6-7)
 PAD 71-3.
- The operator training was well under way by the first of July 1971, governed by the joint VNAF/SSTB/AFGP/7AF/USAFSS PAD dated 1 March 1971 and supplemented by USAFSS PAD 71-3. The USAFSS PAD, dated 26 February 1971, combined both the operator and maintenance training phase.
- 1971, reference to the PAD Progress Report for that date is made. The following actions had been completed.
- 1. A UDL for 6994th Sety Sq reflecting an increase of 1 officer and 23 airmen for FY 3/71 and 1 officer/35 airmen for FY 72 to act as instructors had been published.
 - 2. The command and control operations had been determined and defined.
 - 3. Training facilities had been scheduled, identified, and equipped.
- 4. The in-country training program schedule had been finalized and approved.
 - 5. Personnel, equipment, and supplies for training had been identified.
- 6. Training packages had been finalized and forwarded to DIRNSA for approval.

- 7. USAFSS operator instructors and training materials were incountry.
- 8. Logistical support procedures had been established TAW Chief of Staff, Air Force and USAFSS directives.
- 9. Technical order and supply data for AN/ALR-34 "G" equipment and AGE had been identified to AFAG.
- 10. "G" position equipment management procedures had been submitted to Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC).
- 11. The host base (377th GSG) had concurred and cooperated in the modification of buildings to accommodate training, outside the USAFSS operations controlled area.
- 12. Procedures were established for review/sanitization of materials and equipment.
- 13. The initial cadre of Vietnamese operators had been through the classroom work and were manning three daily ARDF sorties.

 The majority of the PAD items were on schedule as of 1 July 1971.
- During the month of July 1971, progress continued without any pertinent drawbacks. In the area of assumption of the responsibility for the interface of the A/G mission operations with the ARDF data base, the SSTB was training for the preparation of the ARR. Tech data development and use was improving. Actual operator training was progressing well, with 10 students qualified as Class III operators and 12 in student status. Class II was in flight training.
- With the graduation of Class II from ground training, the necessity for increasing the number of sorties flown by the ARVN operators from 3 to 4 per day was made known to all concerned. The point was stressed

that the success of the first class had been remarkable, and a recommendation was proffered for the gradual phasing in of the VIM missions in order to reach the programmed level of seven sorties per day in October.

USAFSS, Pac Scty Rgn and AFSSO PACAF all concurred, and on 24 July, VIM flights were increased to four per day.

On 1 July, NRV(C) advised DIRNSA that actions had been initiated to train the Vietnamese in production of ARRs for those EC-47 missions manned by ARVN operators. Interim procedures as established involved coordination between SSTB/509th RRG and 6994th Scty Sq. A system was initiated wherein ARRs, along with a copy of the appropriate operator log, were delivered to teh ACC, thereby allowing ACC to provide a quality check prior to transmission. Any questions requiring clarification were to be resolved through ACC/6994 Scty Sq coordination. In view of the extra steps involved, NRV(C) requested that the three hour timeliness requirement imposed by TECHINS 2038 be waived, a recommendation with which DIRNSA readily concurred.

stood in mid July) had been highly successful, a wrap-up of the productivity of flights manned by ARVN personnel for one week (26 June-2 July) was provided all concerned by NRV(C). Of 21 scheduled missions, 19 had been flown, with three of the 19 having been reduced. A total of 1794 minutes of HF Manual Morse intercept had been logged, an average of 94.4 minutes per mission. One hundred seventy-one targets had been worked, of which 101 had been fixed and 33 cut, Fifty-four of these targets had been identified. This showed an average of nearly 5 fixes per mission, and an identification rate of 40%. These statistics compared favorably with those of U.S. missions, and let creditability to the abilities of the ARVN oper-

ators, as well as to the quality of instructions being provided by the (10)
6994th Sety Sq.

ity of degradation of ARDF as a result of the VIM program, very close scrutiny of the product was maintained. The 509 RRG, as the senior cryptologic collection agency in Vietnam and one of the major users of the output of the ARDF program, conducted a study of the quality/quantity of the ARVN product. During a one month period (17 June through 17 July), and covering 34 VIM missions (9 of which were reduced) 157 fixes/cuts were obtained, 92,9% of which had accompanying call-sign data. One hundred thirty-two of 146 fixes were passed to the ground for a pass rate of 84%. The quality of ARDF was high, in that the majority of fixes were below 1200 meter radius. Through analysis of call signs, 61% of the fixes were identified. In summary, the 509th said "quality of ARDF results obtained by VIM EC-47 operators indicates a high degree of professionalism and exceptional training as evidenced by the high percentage of fixes obtained with call signs and the average 1200 meter radius of fixes obtained.

As the month of August began, all PAD actions were on schedule, with the third class scheduled to begin on 9 August. Throughout the month, the training progressed in a very satisfying manner, with ARVN personnel flying four sorties per day.

270

Some question as to the ultimate turn over of equipment arose in August when Lt Col Lang of SSTB met with members of NRV(C) staff to discuss pertinent problems. Lt Col Lang indicated that SSTB might be required to operate EC-47 aircraft in Military Region 1 (Danang area) and along the Laotian panhandle. Should such tasking be levied, the fact that

only one set of AGE was available would preclude the permanent break-up of the 718th Reconnaissance Squadron into two separate operating locations. The potential for intercepting multi-channel intercept by the "Z" configured aircraft could not be overlooked. Since the SSTB had no demulti-plex capability, Lt Col Lang was concerned as to whether SSTB was to be provided demultiplex equipment or if they would be expected to collect and provide recordings to DIRNSA for processing. These points were presented to DIRNSA on 4 August, along with a solicitation for comments/guidance. 6994th concern was minimal, since the capability for multi-channel intercept was an already established fact in the CGZ aircraft that had been tentatively identified for turn-over.

As of 14 August, 6994th reported the operator training status as follows: (1) Class I - twelve students enrolled, one eliminated medically, ten upgraded to Category III, and one in airborne training; (2) Class II - twelve students enrolled, one eliminated medically, and eleven in airborne training; and (3) Class III - fourteen students enrolled in classroom training.

On 11 August, Pac Scty Rgn queried the 6994th concerning the type of feedback program that had been established for the ARVN operators, if any. In response, 6994 Scty Sq advised that a daily feedback was provided on the Technical Summaries (TECSUM) prepared on SSTB EC-47 collection. This feedback was subsequently incorporated into TDLs when appropriate, and occasionally fed back to the ARVN operators. At that time, this was the only formal program in existence. A meeting was held between NRV(C) and 6994th representatives on 25 August to discuss types of feedback that was felt necessary to insure operator motivation and mission coverage. Such

interrelated items as TDLs, pre-mission briefings, in-flight target identification, aircrew motivation, and feedback were discussed. From insight
gained at this meeting, it appeared that the major stumbling block was
the reluctance of the SSTB analytical division to disseminate any more
than the barest essential information. NRV(C) technical advisors to SSTB
were addressing the problem in an effort to ensure full support and
feedback on the AEDF program.

Although not directly responsible for the compilation of aids to ease the language barrier, 6994th Scty Sq was constantly hampered by the lack of a common language base for cryptologic matter. Although an understanding of English was a prerequisite for the Vietnamese trainess, this was limited to general rather than technical terminology. Consequently, when DIRNSA announced the preparation of a working aid listing SSTB terminology for cryptologic subject matter with Vietnamese to English, English to Vietnamese, and an abbreviations listing (Vietnamese to English), the 6994th was highly enthused. This single aid served greater purpose in resolving the technical language problem than any other document, and greatly enhanced the overall training program.

ground training on 1 September, on 28 August the 6994th Scty Sq suggested the incorporation of the fifth daily ARVN mission concomitant with the (12) start of the 4-10 September tasking week.

In the PAD Progress Report (USAFSS PAD 71-3) reporting progress as of 31 August, 6994 Scty Sq reported that the training of SSTB personnel had progressed sufficiently to allow discontinuance of of the duplication of ARRs on VIM missions. All but five of the graduates of Class II had been upgraded to Category II operators, with an additional four scheduled for upgrading in the first week of September. Class III, with 14 operators, was scheduled to complete ground training on 1 September.

as scheduled, appearing to have steadied itself into a routine. The third class completed training on 1 September and trainees were entered into flight training on 2 September. At that time, the sortic rate was increased to five per day (beginning with the 4-10 September tasking week). As of 30 September, a total of 21 students from Classes I and II were performing as Category III operators, and mission degradation was non-existent. Fourteen operators from Class III were undergoing airborne training, with 15 students having been identified for Class IV, scheduled to begin on 11 October.

In the maintenance training area, three Vietnamese began informal training during the latter portion of August. By the end of September, positive assessment of these individual's abilities could be made.

Professional abilities of the three ranged from excellent to fair, while comprehension of English was good to poor. However, it appreaed that language would not be a barrier in the training of this initial group.

In view of the excellent showing made by the initial classes, 6994th requested that the sortic rate be increased from 5 to 7 per day beginning with the tasking week of 2 October, NEV(C) concurred and USM-704 initiated coordination on 28 September to insure that tasking was commensurate with this proposal.

As October began, so did drawbacks. Although the SSTB was

progressing and well on their way toward issuing technical reports (Unit 17, SSTB was expected to commence technical reporting in November), the operator training suddenly realized a pitfall. One student from Class II had been removed from the program due to lack of progression. The majority of the Class III operators were very slow in grasping a comprehension of airborne operations and potential for upgrading was virtually nonexistent. The major problem was the lack of ability to communicate (the language barrier again) and poor, though improving, code ability. To further complicate the situation, only 14 vice the scheduled 15 operators were available to begin Class IV. Those provided were completely unfamiliar with any aspect of flying. Eleven of the 14 failed the first week's code check, while three failures (the first since training began) of the second week's written test were realized. At the close of October, it was obvious that SSTB had relaxed considerably in their selection criteria for ARDF trainees, a condition that threatened to delay progress of the Vietnamization program.

As the month of November began, the lack of proficiency on the part of Classes III and IV precluded the scheduling of any additional VIN missions, consequently the sortic rate remained at the October 7 per day level. In upgrading actions, five of the 14 Class III graduates had been upgraded by the end of November. Lack of ability for target recognition and poor code proficiency remained the major reason for lack of pregression. Class IV presented seemingly insurmountable problems. Upon completion of classroom training, only 6 of the 14 students possessed sufficient code proficiency to be entered into flight training. The remaining 8 were entered into concentrated code training, practicing for 6 hours daily on valid tapes. In addition, one student from Class III was grounded due

to lack of code proficiency and was given remedial code training. On the brighter side, four operators from Class I had been upgraded to Category IV Airborne Mission Supervisor (AMS)/Instructor Radio Operator (IRO) status, and one from Glass II had been upgraded to Category III AMS.

December, with the quality of inputs to the program having a profound effect upon the overall success. In spite of the pitfalls encountered in this area, most other facets were progressing satisfactorily. As of 31 December, ARVN Unit 17 was performing the scheduling function for four lines per day. Tasking messages, as provided by ACC, were being processed and applied to scheduling in an efficient manner. Position checklists, prepared by the 6994th Scty Sq VIM section were in use, while modified forms and logs were being prepared. In addition, Vietnamese Language checklists for filling out these forms were being compiled, while AMS and emergency destruction checklists were being translated.

what slowed by the failure of SSTB to provide previously qualified individuals for training into the airborne program. The class scheduled to commence on 1 December was slipped to 15 December, while it appeared that Class VI, scheduled to begin on 1 February was not expected to start before early March 1972.

At the close of 1971, the entire cadre of Vietnamese operators consisted of five AMS/IRO Category IV, four Category III

AMS, 20 qualified Category III, 14 Category II in airborne training, and
21 Category I in ground training.

In summary, the Vietnamization program was recognized at the outset as a very important facet of the overall SEA drawdown. Consequently it was with mixed emotions that the cryptologic community in SEA embarked upon the endeavor. First and foremost in the minds of all cencerned was the possibility that the quality of the ARDF program would suffer as a result of the Vietnamization process. MACV was strong in their insistence that such a result could not be condened. As the drawdown of American forces was accelerated, positive intelligence concerning the location of enemy forces was a must, and only ARDF could be relied upon to provide this data. In addition, a great deal of ACI, especially in Cambodia, was gathered by the EC-47 fleet, and provided extremely important intelligence to MACV for military reaction purposes.

Consequently, as the plans for training of Vietnamese crows expanded, extreme care was taken to insure, at all costs, that the ARDF program would not be allowed to deteriorate. The most qualified operators available were chosen to conduct the training, expecially the airborne portion, and strict adherence to upgrade provisions were stressed. When it appeared that SSTB was placing too little emphasis on selection criteria for trainees, immediate action was taken to secure NEV(C) intervention and stress to SSTB the importance of the program. Although MRV(C) was strong in pointing out the necessity for screening of all potential trainees to insure well qualified and motivated inputs, the situation grew progressively worse. At the outset it was difficult to ascertain the reason for this apparent apathy on the part of the Vietnamese - it seemed to those responsible that SSTB was actually torpedoing the program. When a complete review of the implications was made, it was apparent that the Vietnamese armed forces were no different from any other. When two services were involved (in this instance, the SSTB is composed of ARVN personnel, while

the ARDF program was for all practical purposes, to be controlled by the VNAF), there was a general feeling of antagonism and jealously. Since the ARVN was responsible for providing the operators to perform SSTB ground intercept duties, they were apprehensive over providing their more qualified operators as ARDF trainees. As a consequence, the Vietnamization of ARDF suffered unforseen setbacks.

In the areas of direct SSTB support to ARDF, this situation did not manifest itself so drastically. They seemed more willing to provide trainees to assume scheduling and reporting functions, and these facets advanced well within the purview of the Vietnamization plan, and all programmed actions directives items were met on schedule.

With almost one year having transpired since the beginning of Vietnamization actions, it has been generally agreed that the Vietnamese are capable of performing the ARDF mission, and a great deal of individual initiative and interest was exhibited by the trainees. The language barrier presented problems, while the awe with which lower ranking Vietnamese look upon officers and senior noncommissioned officers resulted in a great deal of hesitation on the part of airborne trainees to project themselves into a situation, and to recognize themselves as being as important to the mission as the officers aboard the platform. This condition was most obvious in the requiement for "I" console operators to coordinate with navigators. However, as navigators came to recognize this situation, they became highly cooperative and understanding, thereby relieving the feelings of awe and hesitancy that had prevailed. With the inclusion of Vietnamese navigators in the program, the language problem that had prevailed among the back-end crews was somewhat eliminated. At the close of

the year, the lack of Vietnemese speaking operators at DSUs remained the major drawback to complete Vietnamization, and an American operator was still required on all missions to accomplish the necessary communications functions.

Southeast Asia Reductions:

As the last six months of 1971 began, reduction of forces in Southeast Asia was of major concern to 6994th Scty Sq. A number of different aspects were pertinent, and all had a definite impact upon the ARDF program. As closure of USAF units progressed, the subject of commend and control of the Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons was of major importance. At the same time, the programmed closure of certain air bases (Phu Cat Air Base and disposition of Detachment 1, 6994th Soty demanded close scrutiny to prevent the Sq was of primary importance) loss of ARDF coverage. Drawdown of Army forces which resulted in the closure of DSUs had an adverse effect upon the speed with which ARDF results could be passed to ground commanders, while the void created in intercept parameters placed greater demands upon the ACI portion of the 6994th Sety Sq mission. Drawdown of Army direction finding platforms required USAF operation in areas to which they had not been previously fragged. Finally, the reduction of cryptologic spaces without any decrease in tasking promised to place increased demands upon those personnel remaining, while the future of AGC became tenuous, and the complete elimination of manpower spaces for the Communications Security function forecast the complete demise of that effort in 1972.

At the close of June 1971, 6994th Scty Sq was involved in discussions as to the appropriate unit to assume command, and control responsibility of the Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons, con-

comitant with the deactivation of the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing Several different proposals had been at Ten Son Nhut on 31 August 1971. made, the majority of which were unsatisfactory to the 6994th. The imlication that command and control was to be fragmented and assigned to various organizations at different locations was strongly opposed by the 6994th, stressing that retention of the function at Tan Son Mbut was of essence. This contention was aired repeatedly, due to the fact that coordination between the command and control function, 7AF, MACV, and 6994th Scty Sq was considered critical to the success of the ARDF program, Scty Rgn supported the 6994th in this matter, and initiated coordination with PACAF to resolve differences in opinions. Although the 6994th Commender discussed the situation at length with 7AF, they stood firm in their decision to transfer command and control away from Tan Son Mhut, with the fact that a drawdown in American involvement at Tan Son Nhut was being advocated by higher headquarters one of the prime factors affecting this stand.

sidered the 483d Tactical Airlift Wing at Cam Ranh Bay, RVN the most logical existing wing structure to assume the TEWS command and control responsibility. This decision was made with the assumption that the 361st

TEWS and Detachment 1, 6994th Scty Sq would be transferred to Cam Ranh

Bay when Phu Cat Air Base was closed, sacaction envisioned to occur in

(19)

late October/early November 1971. After exhaustive meetings and discussions, it became obvious that 7AF was to stand firm on their recommendations to let any final decisions rest with PACAF.

7AF stood firm on their decision to transfer the command and control to

the 483d TAW, still based upon the very tentative assumption that 361st TEWS and Det 1, 6994th would be relocated to that base. Since no firm decision was made on this relocation prior to the deactivation of the 460TRW, command and control was transferred to the 483TAW on 31 August, a situation that complicated matters even more when it was revealed that Detachment 1 and 361st TEWS were to be deactivated and resources were to (20) be transferred to Danang and Tan Son Nhut. In spite of 6994th Scty Sq apprehension, the transfer caused very little degradation of the ARDF program. It was difficult to discern the reason for this, since for all practical purposes, the 483TAW was completely alien to the ARDF program. Much credit for the success must be given to 483d, since they refused to assume such responsibility without first hand knowledge of ARDF requirements. Although numerous TDYs and lengthy coordination visits were necessary, through vigorous actions the 483d proved fully capable of controlling the TEW squadrons from a "remote" location.

Although the 483TAW was successful in their endeavors, they were to retain the position for a very short time. On 22 November, 7AF announced plans to close Cam Ranh Bay in early 1972. As a result of this action, the TEWS command and control again became a point of contention. Since existing wing structures within South Vietnam were at a premium, the early discussion revolved around the fragmentation of the responsibility. Since the 377th Combat Support Group at Tan Son Nhut was scheduled for upgrading to an Air Base Wing structure, early consideration was given to the return of the command and control to Tan Son Nhut. However, 7AF persisted in the fragmentation issue, and pressed with plans for the 366TFW at Danang to assume control of the 362d TEWS and Det 1, 360th

TEWS (to be redesignated Detachment 1, 362d TEWS), while the 377th ABW at Tan Son Nhut would assume control of the 360th TEWS. This situation reverted to a pre 31 August stand for the 6994th, since fragmentation had always been considered less than desirable. In spite of USAFSS arguments against such an arrangement, by the close of 1971, plans were well formulated to accomplish the transfer, concomitant with the close of 483d TAW in early 1972.

During the last six months of 1971, 6994th Soty Sq spent many hours coordinating the closure of Phu Gat Air Base, and the ultimate decision to deactivate Detachment 1, 6994th and the 361st TEMS. Before final decision was made, transfer to Phan Rang, Cam Ranh Bay, Ubon, Thailand, as well as the final decision to transfer assets to Danang and rearrange the entire complex EC-47 arrangement. Repeated mention was made of the transfer of any given number (6 to 11 were considered) to the Continental United States (CONUS). In spite of all considerations that were aired, the ultimate decision was to increase the Danang UE to 32, while 26 were to be assigned to the 360th TEWS at Tan Son Mhut. Twenty of the Tan Son Nhut aircraft were to be maintained in operational status, while 6 were held in reserve, tentatively slated for return to the COMUS.

ARDF resources, the status of the entire cryptologic community of SEA had to be taken into consideration. Any decision arrived at had to take the allocations for each Service Cryptologic Agency into consideration. Each ensuing day of early September brought new figures to bear, alternating from zero for USAFSS as of 1 July 1972 to any number of imaginable on any given date. Ultimate decision was made as a result of a meeting held in Saigon in early October. However, until this time, there were repeated

implications that the Air Ferres would be assuming all ARDF functions in South Vietnam, with the Army withdrawing their resources. This resulted in Air Force planners being forced to make provisions for any contingency, from retention of all EC-47 assets to the drawdown of the fleet and the return of any given number to the Continental U.S. As a result of the Saigon conference, the Air Force cryptologis space allocation was set at 1126, which provided for sufficient manpower to continue the ARDF program with a UE of 58 aircraft throughout the remainder of 1971. Additional allocations for the Army resulted in the retention of a number of Army Security Agency platforms and negated an anticipated void that would have been created by the removal of UMAPSS ARDF from the Central Vietnam area. As a result of these actions, compled with the DIRMSA stand that Cam Ranh Bay was unacceptable as a USAFSS ARDF staging base, the future of the USAF ARDF mission in SEA was relatively stabilized by the end of October.

One outcome of the cryptologic conference that caused alarm within SEA was the tenuous status of ACC. Since all concerned SEA units recognized the ACC as a vital part of the ARDF management process, the fact that NSA planners had caitted ACC manning in the allocation of cryptologic spaces was deemed extremely important. Throughout the remainder of the year, the subject was repeatedly discussed, with no positive action having been taken concering the future status of ACC as of 31 December.

In summary, the 6 menth period between 1 July and 31 December 1971 was one of the most important from a historical viewpoint that has ever been realized by the 6994th. Gencepts were changed rapidly, all brought about by the pressure at all levels to achieve an orderly executed

drawdown posture. Conflicting interests, with 74F/HACV pressures from both sides and national level decisions often negating the efforts of local planners made for a period of frustration and defeatism on the part of those who fully understood and appreciated the value of ARDF to the war effort. It was continually stressed by MACV that ARBY remained the single most important ingredient in the cryptologic community. At every opportunity, 7AF Intelligence and MACV stressed the need for ARDF to continue to cover the drawdown of American forces. On the other hand, pressures from PACAF, CINCPAC, and national levels dictated that 7AF planners continue to persue the objective of drawdown. Consequently, what ensued was far from orderly. Although the need for continued ARDF coverage was generally recognized, pressure for continued drawdown began to take its toll of cryptologic spaces. As a result, the 6994th was forced to continue to satisfy mission requirements with an ever decreasing number of manpower spaces, requiring constant scrutiny and demanding efficient utilization of manpower authorizations to enable the unit to continue its support of the war effort. At the close of 1971, it appeared that the constant state of flux and uncertainty that had prevailed throughout the latter portion of the year would continue to challenge the unit as 1972 unfolded.

Chapter V

COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY OPERATIONS

The Communications Security (COMSEC) Section of 6994th Scty Sq continued to perform its unique function of providing direct COMSEC support to tactical units in SEA during this historical period. This support was provided through the menitor, analysis, and reporting of voice conversations passed over intercept vulnerable USAF communications systems. The reporting of probable/possible intelligence losses, security compromises, and COMSEC weaknesses was accomplished through use of Communications Security Message Reports (CSMRs). Interim CSMRs, Informal Daily Summaries (DASUMa), and Communications Security Monthly Summaries CSMSs). All these reports were designed to be ferwarded directly to 7AF for their information/ection. The high level of interest in CONSEC at 7AF was evidenced by the fact that all CSMRs destined for 7AF consumers were reviewed by the 7AF Chief of Staff before being released to the consumers. Further COMSEC support was provided to 7AF by COMSEC personnel who were members of the 7AF Operations Security (OPSEC) Working Group and Communications Cover and Deception Board. COMSEC was also called upon by 7AF to provide recommendations to improve their COMSEC status and for specific recommendations to eliminate specific problem areas. These actions were normally accomplished through the CPSEC Working Group or by personal contact with the sections concerned. Periodic COMSEC briefings were presented to newly assigned controllers from the 7AF Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at Tan Son Nhnt. These briefings outlined common COMSEC danger areas, presented a review of services the COMSEC section had available to TACC personnel, and included a question and ensuer

session on all aspects of COMSEC in SEA.

Lquipment

To accomplish the mission of COMSEC support to 7AF tactical operations, specific types of equipment were used as follows:

YTOOO9Y - Telephone Monitor:

tor USAF telephone circuits originating/terminating at Tan Son Nhut Airfield. Each position contained two GS-80 magnetic tape recorders and two switching groups, giving a capability to selectively record conversations from any four of 22 circuits on each position. Periodic changing of circuits connected to the positions ensured a representative sampling of USAF telephone communications. Long-haul circuits were the primary target of the telephone monitor, except during special mission periods when local on-base telephones were connected. On 13 October, due to lack of activity and reduced manning, the Daily Hours of Coverage (DHOC) for the telephone positions was reduced from 24 to 16 hours (0700-2300H). Each ITOCOSY position required one operator/analyst (using split headsets) per shift.

YT001Y - High Prequency Radio Monitor:

Three HF radio monitor positions were available during this historical period. One position was dedicated to monitor of the II Corps Direct Air Request Net. On 13 Nevember, a second HF position was activated to monitor the III Corps Direct Air Request Net. These positions were manned for 11 DHOC, (0700-1900H), and required one operator/analyst for the two positions (utilizing split headsets) per shift. The third position was tasked only during a short TDY mission to Nha Trang AB, RVN.

Four antennas, three doublets and one cami-directional whip, were available for use with the HF positions.

YT0024 - VHF/UHF Radio Meniter Position:

separate VHF and UHF receivers with their associated GS-80 magnetic tape recorders. One person, using split headsets, operated both positions. This position was normally tasked until 13 Nevember, when it was converted to mobile configuation and used on a TDY mission to Wha Trang AB. Due to lack of VHF/UHF radio activity, the position was not tasked after the TDY. Four antennas, cut to various wave lengths, were available for use with the YTOO24.

YTS-001 - Supersiser Positions

This position consisted of an HF radio receiver and a switching group, providing a capability to meniter any of the other positions, and was not formally tasked during the entire historical period.

TTPOOTX - Transcribe Position:

The two GS-80 magnetic tape transcribe positions were used extensively to transcribe local monitor tapes and those tapes recorded during TDY missions. Additionally, 6990th Sety Gp COMSEC monitor teams periodically used the positions for transcription during their frequent TDYs to SEA.

Manning

COMSEC manning was 22 of 31 anthorized on 1 July and 21 of 31 on 31 December, for an average of 66 percent manning during the entire period. Although manning was always below authorized levels, it had little adverse effect upon the section's ability to perform its duties.

Mission Accomplishment

(U) During this historical period, the success of the COMSEC mission was best illustrated by the listing and discussion of those significant reports submitted as a result of the monitor mission.

Communications Security Message Reports:

CSMRs continued to be forwarded electrically to tactical commanders, and pertained to perishable intelligence losses requiring immediate attention. During this historical period, the COMSEC section issued a total of 53 CSMRs; 42 to 7AF, 10 to Pac Scty Rgn, and one to the 405th TFW (PACAF). The success of these reports is recapitulated as follows:

Strategic Air Command Special Interest: CSMR 230600Z Jul 71, issued via Immediate precedence to Pac Scty Rgn, reported that several B-52s at U-Tapao RTAFB, Thailand, were grounded due to wing structural failures and there were indications that the entire B-52 fleet could be grounded. Pac Scty Rgn immediately informed this unit to release this information to local SAC representatives at the Strategic Air Command Advanced Echelon at Tan Son Nhut. Subsequent communications with Pac Scty Rgn revealed that General Holloway (Commander, SAC) had conversed with M/Gen Stapleton (Comdr USAFSS) concerning this CSMR. It was the determined that the problem was local at U-Tapao and appropriate actions had been taken to prevent further disclosures of this type of information.

SEA VIP/DV Activities: Thirteen CSMRs reported compromises, disclosures of sensitive information, etc., concerning VIP/DV activities within, into, and through SEA to 7AF and Pac Sety Rgn. The most Notable of these were: (1) The compromise of General Ryan's (CS USAF) codename while

touring SEA and (2) a planned visit by General Lavelle (Comdr 7AF) to Danang and Phan Rang Air Bases, EVE, five days prior to departure. Coincidently or otherwise, at 1305H on the day General Lavelle planned to tour Phan Rang AB, the base received two rounds of 122MM rocket fire with one round impacting in the Officer's club compound. These CSMRs resulted in the publication of a 7AF (CS) letter, dated 8 November 1971, which outlined COMSEC protection required for VIP/DV travel information and a similar 7AF (CS) message to all SEA units, dated 8 December 1971. Subsequently, the COMSEC posture of VIP/DV activities improved almost 100 percent.

PACAF CIRCE Code Study: Fifteen CSMRs were issued on CIRCE code compromises, resulting in a PACAF directed mission to study the CIRCE code operations in SEA. As of 31 December, it appeared that a new code device is being designed to replace the present CIRCE code, offering better communications security and easier, faster manual operation.

Interim CSMRs:

In addition to normal CSMR reporting, the COMSEC section issued seven Interim CSMRs (handcarried reports which were delivered to 7AF within 15 minutes after monitor) to the 7AF TACC in accordance with 7AF Regulation 100-7. These Interim CSMRs reported information concerning: (1) A SAC EC-135 refueling altitude and location; (2) A General Officer combat sortie; (3) A Prisoner of War extract; and (4) several prior indications of USAF Tac Air strikes in the combat zone. The TACC, in turn, took immediate corrective actions, such as cancelling or diverting those activities, to protect USAF personnel and aircraft.

Informal Daily Summeries:

Section was the Informal Daily Summary to 7AF. This report was prepared and distributed on a daily basis to the 7AF TACC, Directorate of Command and Control, Fighter Frag Shop, Operations Security Office, and Directorate of Communications. The contents of these summaries were reported as intelligence items considered by COMSEC analysts to be of value to enemy intelligence gathering/analysis agencies. The success of this reporting vehicle was realized through the gradual decline of reportable items from several per day to one every few days.

COMSEC Monthly Summary:

The COMSEC Monthly Summary, the most widely read report submitted by the COMSEC Section (1150 copy distribution to USAF units in SEA), was prepared in accordance with Pac Scty Rgn Regulation 200-2. These reports were designed to inform USAF tactical commanders in SEA of the COMSEC status of their units. 7AF considered these reports as COMSEC information/education tools, prepared as an aid to recognizing communications practices which could jeopardize the security of a project, mission, or exercise. Consumer response to one of the six CSMSs issued during this historical period gave indication of the success of these reports. HQ Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, queried the section about a specific item that had been reported in the October 1971 GSMS concerning a possible security compromise. Upon receipt of the 6994th reply, a special directive was issued to all Rescue and Recovery units in SEA, reminding them of the dangers of poor COMSEC procedures. Secondly, at the request of 7AF Directorate of Communications, two special features were written concerning the danger of not properly protecting DV/VIP travel information and another describing the dangers

and deficiencies of an illegal code called "Magic Numbers".

Special Missions:

Between 1 July and 31 December 1971, the COMSEC Section participated in six Pac Scty Rgn numbered COMSEC projects and performed three special communications studies. The studies were in support of 7AF, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), and 6990th Security Group COMSEC operations. A brief resume of each of these missions/studies follows:

Pac Scty Rgn Project 15-71-USAFSS (COMFY DRAGON: This mission was directed by Pac Scty Rgn on 09 July. The purpose of the mission was to perform an Operations Security (OPSEC) survey of all facets of the 6908th Soty Sq and any units/functions in any way connected with that unit's operations. The 6994th was tasked to perform normal monitor, and to report by traffic extracts, any communications reflections of COMPASS FLAG/SENTOR BOOK**activity. Monitoring period for this mission was 1 through 30 September.

Pac Sety Rgn Project 16-71-PACOM/PACAF (BUFFALO HUNTER/COMBAT DAWS):

On 1 July, a Pac Sety Rgn message tasked 6994th with providing all possible support to the CINCPAC OPSEC Survey Team and the 6990th Sety Gp mobile monitor teams in SEA. Between 4 and 16 August, the COMSEC Section provided radio, radiotelephone, and telephone monitor of Reconnaises ance Drone operations in SEA. Traffic extracts and summaries of this **COMFY; DRAGON - Code name for USAFSS OPSEC program.

** COMPASS FLAC/SENIOR BOOK - AF operational test program of USAF execution of an NSA request to equip a small number of QU-22B aircraft with a remotely controlled COMINT payload.

*** BUFFALO HUNTER/COMBAT DAWN - Joint USAFSS/SAC drone recommaissance system for COMINT collection using a Ryan 147 drone.

activity were forwarded to the 6990th Scty Gp for processing and release to the CINCPAC OPSEC team. 6994th Scty Sq also provided the 6990th Scty Gp with COMSEC/SIGINT correlation of the reconnaissance drone activity.

PacSctyRgn Project 18-71-PACAF/PACOM (ARDF OPSEC Survey):

This mission was generated by CINCPAC message on 31 July 1971 and a

CINCPACAF message of 06 August 1971. As with the previous OPSEC surveys,
the COMSEC Section was tasked to provide monitor of radio, radiotelephone,
and telephone communications for reflections of ARDF activity. As a
special monitor effort, the EC-47 on-board recorder normally used for

COMINT recording purposes was modified to copy transmissions to/from the
mission aircraft. Daily traffic summaries and sanitized traffic extracts
were provided to the CINCPAC OPSEC team and the 6990th Scty Gp. The 6994th
Sety Sq COMSEC Section also acted as a central coordination/relay/contact
point for the 6990th Sety Gp mobile monitor team in SEA. In addition,
6994th provided the mobile monitor teams with callsigns, frequencies,
identification, etc., of ARDF activities.

PacSctyRgn Project 20-71-PACOM/PACAF (IGLOO WHITE Operations): On 12 October, 6994th COMSEC was tasked by Pac Scty Rgn to provide monitor/analysis support for the CINCPAC OPSEC Survey of IGLOO WHITE operations. The tasking included monitor of radio, radiotelephone, and telephone communications during 0800 to 1600H daily from 14 through 20 October for reflections of IGLOO WHITE activity. 6994th provided traffic summaries and extracts to the 6990th Scty Gp for processing and release to the CINCPAC OPSEC team for inclusion in their final report.

^{*} IGLOO WHITE - (MANAGEMEN) Air support anti-infiltration system in SEA employing EC-121 aircraft.

Pac Sety Rgn Project 21-71-7AF (Udern ABGCC Monitor): () On 28 August, 6994th Sety Sq was tasked by 7AF DGO and DOOS (COMSEC and OPSEC) to perform a COMSEC study of Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABGCC) communications. Three COMSEC personnel were sent TDY to Udern RTAFB, Thailand to transpose seven track ABGCC tapes to ‡ inch dual track tapes for transcription and analysis at the 6994th Sety Sq. An analysis report was generated by the COMSEC Section which pointed out four representative samples of COMSEC malpractices that made sensitive information of possible intelligence value susceptible to hostile intercept and exploitation. This report was forwarded to FAGAF, MACV, 7AF, USAFSS, PSR, and the 6990th Sety Gp on 20 October. During the planning and monitor/analysis phases of this effort, HQ USAFSS evidenced considerable interest, possibly because this was the first PSR COMSEC mission assigned exclusively to the 6994th Sety Sq.

PacSctyRgm Project 22-71-MACV (Tri-Service MACSOG Survey):

This project was the OPSEC survey of a highly classified, compartmented,
COMUSMACV function. 6994th was tasked to participate in this survey by

7AF at the request of MACV (J-222). Tasking was contained in a 7AF DCOO

letter of 14 August 1971. Three 6994th COMSEC operator/analysts were sent
to Nha Trang AB, RVN to monitro VHF/UHF radio communications from 15 to

28 November. Upon termination of the mobile monitor, the team returned
to Tan Son Nhut, transcribed the tapes, and prepared the AF portion of the
final report. As this was a MACV project, the Army Security Agency was
designated as controlling authority and all copies of the Air Force report
were forwarded to them for inclusion in the final tri-service report. Due
to the extreme sensitivity of the information contained in the report, no
USAFSS distribution was made and no file copies of the report were re-

tained by 6994th.

message of 01 September requested the 6994th Scty Sq to perform a special monitor and analysis study of B-52 (ARC LIGHT) operations in SEA. The purpose of this study was to determine if possible, how enemy forces were being forewarned of impending B-52 strikes. During the period 1 through 15 September, a determined effort was made to monitor VHF and HF radio and telephone communications for ARC LIGHT related conversations. In addition, an ABCCC VHF/UHF radio tape was reviewed for ARC LIGHT reflections. On 28 September, a Special Communications Study letter report was forwarded to COMUSMACV (J-3), 7AF (DC, DOOS, and TACC), SAC ADVON, and the 6990th Scty Gp. This report pointed out that direct compromises of impending ARC LIGHT strikes were extremely rare and that the enemy is probably predicting B-52 strike times and targets by analysis of past strike patterns and stereotype mission procedures employed by the B-52s.

Special Study (DART): (Appendix Appendix Appendi

Special Emphasis Monitor (CIRCE Code): Between 22 and 26 November, a special emphasis monitor was performed on CIRCE Code usage in SEA. This monitor was at the request of the 6990th Scty Gp to assist in preliminary analysis for an upcoming study of the code system. In addition to forwarding traffic reflecting CIRCE Code transmissions, 6994th forwarded transcripts of all code related CSMRs issued during 1971 to the 6990th.

Special Project Monitor (F-105 Shootdown): (On 14 December, 6994th was included as an information addressee on a HQ USAFSS message to AFSSO Tactical Air Command, requesting diarized COMSEC traffic on an F-105 shootdown. This message acknowledged receipt of an AFSSO TAC message and stated that USAFSS units had been queried for COMSEC reflections of the shootdown. 6994th Scty Sq had already begun researching traffic for reflections of this activity, consequently were prepared when USAFSS and PacSctyRgn formally requested input. 6994th message on 15 December 1971 answered this request and contained a detailed report of COMSEC reflections, COMSEC/COMINT correlation of communications pertinent to the incident, and a resume of stereotype F-105 communications procedures that could have contributed to the shootdown. HQ USAFSS message of 17 December to AFSSO TAC repeated the 6994th Scty Sq message almost verbatim.

COMSEC Management

USAFSS Manual 200-4, Volume XIV, Test:

The previsions contained in USAFSS Manual 200-4, Volume XIV (Test), dated 1 June 1971, were implemented by 6994th on 1 August.

The testing period was scheduled to continue through May 1972, and during that time the manual is to be revised periodically to reflect any improvements in reporting methods. Essentially, the only change imposed

by the new manual was to incorporate information formerly contained in the COMSEC Management Summary into a machine formatted vehicle and subsequent forwarding of the information via message in the Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS). The basic purpose of the procedures implemented by the new manual was to formalize recording and reporting of daily performance data and provide local managers with data upon which they could base actions to achieve the greatest degree of self-guidance for attaining optimum performance from their resources. To this end, the 6994th feels that the new manual has been an unqualified success.

Future of 6994th Sety Sq COMSEC

Background:

On 13 May, USAFSS initiated a proposal for the cessation of COMSEC operations in SEA. Contained in this proposal was a request for 6994th to determine the levels of COMSEC support necessary to 7AF for fiscal years 72 through 74, and to determine personnel strength levels (1) at specific time frames throughout the three year period. Since the COMSEC monitor function of the 6994th is a 7AF directed function, on 13 May 1971, 6994th requested that 7AF provide the information concerning the level of support needed. In reply, 7AF indicated that 72-74 fiscal year requirements would be the same as those for fiscal years 70 and 71. In reporting this response to Pac Scty Rgn, 6994th pointed out that from the squadron viewpoint, HF/VHF/UHF radio monitor resources could be considered for drawdown, as the VHF/UHF equipment was not tasked at that time, and little information was being obtained from the HF monitor. It was further suggested that adequate support could be provided 7AF by quarterly mobile monitoring missions from the 6990th Scty Gp.

Situation as of 31 December 1971:

During the latter part of September a Pac Scty Rgn message again addressed the reduction of SEA COMSEC resources. This message indicated that a review of planning information concerning SEA residual cryptologic forces had no provision for retaining COMSEC support for FAF and requested that 6994th Scty Sq Security Service Liaison Office so ad—

(4)
vise 7AF. After official notification, 7AF DCS Communications/Electronics agreed to act as office of primary responsibility in staffing the matter at 7AF. Preliminary indications (unofficially) were that there would be

(5)
no need for in-country COMSEC support after 30 June 1972.

At the same time, USAFSS was also showing interest in the future of SEA COMSEC resources. A USAFSS message of 24 September 1971 indicated that in the immediate future USAFSS representatives were to attend a meeting at MACV headquarters to determine the total cryptologic posture in the RVN for the next fiscal year. As the USAFSS COMSEC position was dependent upon the component commander's need for direct support, it was requested that 6994th Scty Sq contact 7AF to confirm the COMSEC requirement and to determine any change in total effort caused by reduction. USAFSS further requested 6994th assessment as to the number of personnel that would be required to continue the direct support mission, and the number and type of COMSEC positions which should be retained in RVN (6)

On 28 September, 7AF reported that developments subsequent to May 71 indicated that tactical COMSEC support could be eliminated during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1972. As a result of these actions, the paucity of projected manning resulted in Pac Scty Rgn authorization of a reduction in DHOC from 24 to 16 hours daily for the two telephone

monitor positions. This reduction in DHOC was implemented on 13 October 1971.

As of 31 December, lateral coordination between USAFSS, Pac Scty Rgn, 6994th Scty Sq, and 7AF continued. However, it appeared that complete closure of the COMSEC function would be formalized and accomplished sometime during the 4th quarter of fiscal year 1972.

Chapter VI

MAINTENANCE/SUPPLY ACTIVITIES

Maintenance

COMSEC Maintenance:

- Selja s

Although no technicians were dedicated solely to the maintenance of GONSEC equipment, no cutages or lost position time were experienced during this historical period. Due to a critical manning situation throughout the complex throughout the period, CONSEC maintenance was
performed through the dispatch of technicians from other work centers,
with all scheduled inspections and maintenance tasks being performed in
the allotted time. Proper and timely operator maintenance assisted greatly to bring about this high system reliability.

ARDF Maintenance:

The local ARDF maintenance effort was well above USAFSS standards. Critical manning and combat conditions were overcome with exceptional results. As an example, a total of 38,680.4 flying hours were scheduled during this period, with only 448.6 (0.1%) of the scheduled time being lost as a result of special mission equipment malfunctions. A total "See Chapter IV, this history for related information.

of 5,864 combat missions were flown, with an equipment reliability of 97.8 percent. The "pride of the fleet" as she is affectionately known, is the ancient lady, Aircraft 43-049126. This aircraft flew a total of 110 consecutive no discrepancy flights for the special mission equipment during this time frame. This aricraft has been assigned to five different operating locations within Southeast Asia and continues to perform in an admirable manner.

Maintenance Management:

Technical and Logistical Support to Detachments: tenance Branch of 6994th Scty Sq not only performs maintenance on Tan Son Nhut facilities, but provides technical and logistical support to the widely distributed squadron detachments. During this period, Detachment 1, 6994th Scty Sq at Phu Cat Air Base was deactivated, with the aircraft, personnel, and material resources successfully being relocated throughout the squadron complex. The logistical planning for the maintenance portion of this move was engineered by the material staff at Tan Son Nhut. This involved relocating 13 ALR-34 aircraft from Phu Cat to Tan Son Nhut and 7 ALR-34s from Phu Cat to Danang. In addition, 13 ALR-35 EC-47s were transferred from Tan Son Nhut to Danang. The entire cadre of the Phu Cat maintenance staff was transferred to Tan Son Nhut, Thirteen technicians were transferred from Tan Son Nhut, eleven to Danang and two to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand. This transfer of personnel was engineered to place the most experienced personnel with the applicable equipment. In addition, logistical support was required to adapt Danang for the influx of ALR-34 systems, not previously assigned to that location. An extremely important by-product of this closure was the transfer of ALR-34 AGE/Test Equipment to Tan Son Nhut for use in the Vietnamization training program

During this period, a maintenance phenomenon developed which caused much consternation on the part of the maintenance personnel. Documented evidence has been amassed to indicate a minimum of 15 instances where "erratic bearings" or "swinging needles" were experienced by the operators while in flight. This unusual incident occurred primarily in two adjacent mission areas. Thorough ground checks of the equipment failed to reveal any discrepancies with the mission equipment, and subsequent flights into different mission areas verified proper operation of the ARDF equipment. There is no true indication of what is the determining factor for this phenomenom. However, a theory has been presented to higher headquarters. The most pertinent and logical theory is that the site being fixed was utilizing a number of transmitting antennas, causing the "swinging needle" effect. The second theory is that seme mineral deposit activity, caused by variations in the weather, is responsible for the problem. At the close of the period, no satisfactory solution for the problem had been arrived ato

Vietnamization Training:

Three VEAF personnel with prior experience in the electronic career field began familiarisation training on AEDF equipment in August of 1971. This training was scheduled to cover a four month period, and was taught by instructor personnel assigned to the maintenance complex. These three individuals will form the nucleus of the Vietnamese maintenance effort and serve as instructors in later classes. It is anticipated that these individuals will prove invaluable in surmounting language problems that are sure to manifest themselves as the training program begins formal *See Chapter IV for related information concerning this program.

expansion on 31 December.

One of the major obstacles to overcome in establishment of the training facility was the rehabilitation of a building to house the classroom and shop training area. Since cost of Base Civil Engineering refurbishing this building was prohibitive, the 6994th Zonal Maintenance Force and other maintenance personnel as available undertook the project of re-arranging, installation of proper lighting, electrical circuits and air conditioning. This self-help project was completed on 3 December, with formal classroom training scheduled to begin on 31 December. Even though the program of training of Vietnamese to assume the maintenance responsibility presents a challenge, all concerned express optimism that the program will prove an unqualified success.

NOTE: 10 pages of footnotes have been completely redacted as shown here. To reduce file size, these pages have been removed.



GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

A

AAA Antiaircraft Artillery

AB Air Base

ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center

ACC ARDF Coordination Center

ACT Airborne Communications Intelligence

AFB Air Force Base

AFIC Air Force Logistics Command

Afld Airfield

AFSSO Air Force Special Security Office

AGE Avionics Ground Equipment

AIR Airborne Incident Report

AMS Airborne Mission Supervisor

ARDF Airborne Radio Direction Finding

ARR Airborne Recovery Report

ARRS Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

ASA Army Security Agency

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam

B

BDA Battle Damage Assessment

<u>C</u>

CC Combat Cross

CCZ Combat Cross Zulu

CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific

CMA

Collection Management Authority

COMINT

Communications Intelligence

COMNAV FORV

Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam

COMSEC

Communications Security

COMUSMACV

Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

CRITIC

Critical Intelligence

CSMR.

Communications Security Message Report

CSMS

Communications Security Monthly Summary

CTZ

Corps Tactical Zone

n

DA

Department of the Army

DASUM

Daily Summary

DHOC

Daily Hours of Coverage

DIRNSA

Director, National Security Agency

DMZ

Demilitarized Zone

DODSPECREP

Department of Defense Special Representative

DSU

Direct Support Unit

DURMIS

Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary

E

EMR

Exploitable Message Report

EWLO

Electronic Warfare Liaison Office

F

FAC

Forward Air Controller

FM

Frequency Modulation

FRAG ORDER

Fragmentation Order

 $\underline{\mathbf{G}}$

GDRS General Directorate of Rear Services

GMT Greenwich Mean Time

<u>H</u>

HF High Frequency

Ī

IRO Instructor Radio Operator

ITOT Initial Time On Target

Ţ

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JOA Joint Operating Agreement

K

Ē

LOP Line of Position

M

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MHZ Megahertz

N

NCO Noncommissioned Officer

NKP Nakhon Phanom

NEV (C) NSA Representative, Vietnam (Confidential)

NSA National Security Agency

NSALO National Security Agency Liaison Office

NSAPAC National Security Agency, Pacific

AVA

North Vietnamese Army

<u>0</u>

OL-DD

Operating Location Delta Delta

OPSEC

Operations Security

<u>P</u>

PACAF

Pacific Air Forces

PCS.

Permanent change of station

Pac Scty Rgn

Pacific Security Region

PAD

Programmed Actions Directive

PDJ

Plaine des Jarres

PHC

Phu Cat

Q

R

RD

Radio Designator

R&R

Rest and Relaxation

RRG

Radio Research Group

RRFS

Radio Research Field Station

RTAFB

Royal Thai Air Force Base

RTB

Return to base

RVN

Republic of Vietnam

<u>s</u>

SAC

Strategic Air Command

Scty Sq

Security Squadron

SEA

Southeast Asia

SEATS

Southeast Asia Technical Summary

SEFE

Standardization Evaluation Flight Examiner

SIGINT

Signal Intelligence

SSLO

Security Service Liaison Office

SSTB

Special Security Technical Branch

I

TAC

Tactical Air Command

TACC

Tactical Air Control Center

TAW

Tactical Airlift Wing

TDL

Target Data List

TDY

Temporary duty

TECHINS

Technical Instructions

TEWS

Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron

TOT

Time over target

TRW

Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

TSN

Tan Son Mhut

ATT

Technical Tasking Authority

TTG

Technical Training Group

Ū

UDL

Unit Detail List

UE

Unit Equipment

THE

Ultrahigh Frequency

USAFSS

United States Air Force Security Service

V

VC

Viet Cong

VHF

Very High Frequency

VIM

Vietnamization Improvement Modernization

VIMP

Vietnamization Improvement Modernization Plan

VNAF

Vietnamese Air Force

 $\mathbf{v}\mathbf{r}$

Visual Reconnoiter

Ä

WURMER

Weekly Unit Resource Management Report

<u>*</u>

<u>Y</u>

<u>z</u>

7AF

Seventh Air Force

GLOSSARY OF CODENAMES

- 1. ARC LIGHT
- (U) B-52 Operations in SEA.
- 2. BARRELL ROLL
- (U) North Lactian Area.
- 3. BENCH LANCE
- (SHVCCO) PACAF ACRP (C-130) operating in SEA.
- 4. BRAVO
- (U) USAFSS mission equipment aboard EC-47s.
- 5. BUFFALO HUNTER
- Strategic Air Command (SAC) drone program in SEA.
- 6. COMBAT CROSS
- USAF EC-47 aircraft performing ARDF/COMINT collection in SEA.
- 7. COMBAT DAWN
- Byan 147 drone, jointly operated by USAFSS and SAG.
- 8. COMFY DRAGON
- (U) USAFSS OPSEC program.
- 9. COMPASS FLAG
- USAF executing an NSA request to equip PAVE EAGLE II, QU-22B aircraft with a remotely controlled COMINT payload consisting of 16 positions.
- 10. IGLOO WHITE
- SEA employing EC-121 aircraft.
- 11. SENIOR BOOK
- (U) Air Force operational test program.
- 12. STEEL TIGER
- (U) Lactian panhandle area.

APPENDIX 1
ORGANIZATIONAL AND

COMMAND CONTROL CHARTS

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
6994 SCTY SQ
COMMAND RELATIONSHIP




Chart #1



ARDF
OPERATIONAL CONTROL






CHART #2

ARDF
TECHNICAL CONTROL








ARDF

COMMAND CONTROL





APPENDIX 2

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS

AND MISSION AREAS

6994th Scty Sq and Detachments





APPENDIX 3

EC-47 AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION

6994SS HR 1-71

BASIC COMBAT CROSS CONFIGURATION

"Y" Position

"X" Position

G-133 HF Receiver Frequency Range - .5-30 MHz G-176 Tape Recorder Spectrum Display Unit ALR-34 or ALR-35 Frequency Range - 2-16 MHz C-12 Compass Panoramic Scope

Function: X Position - ARDF, Y Position - Target Acquisition/
Air/Ground comms.

Flight Time: 7 hours

Cruise Speed: 120 Knots

Crew Composition: Pilot, Copilot, Navigator, Flight Mechanic and

2 Operators.

Communications Radios: 1UHF radio, 1 VHF radio, 1 HF radio, and

1 FM radio.

Navigation Equipment: TACAN, Weather Radar, and Doppler

Navigator's Position Includes: Plotting table and Franklin Printer that provides fix data readout from "X" position.

The ALR-35 system differs from the ALR-34 in that it is coupled with a data processor. The processor converts the target magnetic bearings to true bearings, calculates target location relative to the selected doppler set point, and determines the circular error of the fix. In the ALR-34 system, these functions are performed manually by the navigator.



COMBAT CROSS (ZULU) CONFIGURATION

"Zi" Position

"Z2" Position

G-133 HF Receiver Frequency Range - .5-30 MHZ G-175J VHF Receiver Frequency Range - 10-260 MHZ G176 Tape Recorder G-133 HF Receiver (2) Frequency Range - .5-30 MHZ G-176 Tape Recorder

"Y" Position
G-133 HF Receiver
Frequency Range - .5-30 MHZ
G-176 Tape Recorder
Spectrum Display Unit

"X" Position
ALR-34 or ALR-35
Frequency Range 2-16 MHZ
C-12 Compass
Panoramic Scope

Function: X Position - ARDF, Y Position, Target acquisition/collection/Air-Ground communications, Z1 Position - Intercept collection, and Z2 Position - Collection.

Flight time: 5 hours.

Cruise speed: 120 Knots.


Crew: Pilot, copilot, navigator, flight mechanic, 4 operators, and 1 airborne analyst.

Communications Radios: 1 UHF radio, 1 VHF radio, 1 HF radio, and 1 FM radio.

Navigation Equipment: TACAN, Weather Radar, and Doppler.

Navigator's position includes: Plotting table and Franklin Printer.

The ALR-35 system differs from the ALR-34 in that it is coupled with a data processor. The processor converts the target magnetic bearings to true bearings, calculates target location relative to the selected doppler set point and determines the circular error of the fix. In the ALR-34 system, these functions are performed manually by the navigator.



APPENDIX 4

ARDF PRODUCTIVITY STATISTICS



ARDF PRODUCTIVITY

EVALUATED AREAS	JUL		AUG		SEP		OCT		VOH		DEC		TOTAL	
	LOC	COMP	LOC	COMP	LOC	COMP	LOC	COMP	LOC	COMP	LOC	COMP	LOCAL	comp
Missions Tasked	360	987	436	1275	319	954	325	910	366	1.043	342	898	2148	6067
Missions Flown	336	877	427	1248	311	916	308	832	351	863	337	773	20 70	5509
Hours Tasked	2129	6272	2624	8217	1941	6133	1877	582 8	2683	6592	2270	5645	135 24	386 87
Hours Flown	1849	5473	2425	76 <mark>7</mark> 5	1749	5520	1633	4853	2428	5125	2178	4600	12262	33246
Hours Over Tgt	1217	3366	1772	5286	1292	3844	1168	3336	1521	3402	1505	2978	8475	22212
Tgts Worked	1946	5021	2490	7811	1859	5632	1414	4522	.2658	5566	2063	5037	12430	33589
Tgts Fixed	1303	3694	1632	5768	1144	4272	1004	3337	1889	3964	1512	3605	8484	24640
0-500 M 501-1000 M 1001 Plus M	154 695 454	710 1522 1363	916	1235 2911 1622	75 626 443	978 2070 1224	79 604 321	596 1581 1160	175 1082 632	537 2253 1174	765 898 449	426 1885 1294	803 4821 2860	4482 12322 7837
Targets Cut	356	735	451	12.52	331	840	246	700	450	1047	366	872	2200	5436
Exploit. Maga (Morae)	74	888	116	1595	119	1176	139	961	1.69	992	138	923	755	6535
Exploit. Msgs (Voice)	4	1099	වි	2002	4	1450	30	785	29	925	29	809	104	7080
Fixes/Cuts Ident	1060	22.23	1269	3327	854	2364	669	1784	1226	2150	1084	2000	6162	13848
Fixes/Cuts Ident Priority	769	1582	917	2322	6.46	1660	509	1283	877	1,493	798	1394	4516	9734

ARDF Productivity

Unaccomplished Missions

			LOCAL				
	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
SCHPD-DID MISSIONS	360	436	319	325	366	342	2148
ACCONVITSHED MISSIONS	336	427	311	308	351	337	2070
WACCOPPLISHED MISSIOMS	24	9	පි	17	15	5	78
UNACCOPULISHED DUE TO:							
Equipment Weather No Aircraft Misc:	15 3 6 0	5 1 3 0	3 2 1 2	8 9 0 0	0 15 0 0	0 2 2 1	31 32 12 3
			COMPLEX				
	JIJ	AUG	STA	oct	NOT	DEC	TOTAL
SCHEDULID MISSICKS	987	1275	954	910	1043	898	6067
ACCOMPLISHED MISSIONS	877	1248	916	832	863	773	5509
UHACCOMPLISHED MISSIONS	110	27	38	78	180	125	558
UNACCOMPLISHED DUE TO:							
Equipment Weather No Aircraft Misc:	24 89 7 0	8 10 8 1	15 20 1 2	16 48 13 1	25 129 19 4	23 76 26 0	111 372 74 8

ARDF Productivity

Reduced Missions

LOCAL

	TOTAL MSRS REDUCED	REDUCED A IRFRANE	ISSIONS CAUS NSN EQUIP	ED BY: FUEL	WEATHER	OTHER
July	105	58	18	6	19	4
August	134	60	19	22	2,3	10
Soptember	73	32	13	6	17	5
October	76	27	12	7	25	5
Movember	77	22	11	8	24	12
December	58	19	<i>I</i> ₂	5	27)	3
TOTAL	523	218	77	54	135	39

COMPLEX


	TOTAL MSNS Redijord	REDUCED 10 AIRFRANE	ISCIONS CAUS MSN ETUIP	D NY: FUEL	WEATHER	OTHER
July	257	85	30	52	70	20
August	281	88	43	51	73	56
September	234	75	28	22	91	18
Tedet50	248	54	25	16	135	18
November	227	61	27	26	86	27
December	168	45	14	31	68	10
TOTAL	1415	408	167	198	523	119





PERCYPTAGE OF TASKED MISSIONS FLOWN




PERCENTAGE OF TASKED HOURS FLOWN











PERCHETAGE OF FIXES/COTS IDENTIFIED

Local ---- Complex



PERCENTAGE OF FIXES/CUTS IDENTIFIED PRIORITY



Recurring Reports Statistics

Statistics presented below show monthly production of individual recurring reports issued by the Analysis and Reporting Section.

MONTH	<u>ay</u>	ARR VIM	TOTAL	SEA Techni US	cal Summaries VIM	(Gps/Segments) TOTAL
July August September October November December	264 266 200 147 156 194	91 124 146 203 197 214	355 390 346 350 353 408	80650/102 80869/105 47330/68 41306/60 46244/70 62230/111	16400/20 19880/27 No VIM Seats issued after August.	97050/122 100749/132 47330/ 68 41306/ 60 46244/ 70 62230/111
Total	1227	9 7 5	2202	358629/516	36280/47	394909/563

ARDF Identification Rate (SEA)

MONTH	<u>699435</u>	USAF AVG	ARMY AVG	OVERA LL
July August September October November December	74% 70% 66% 59% 57% 57%	64% 63% 63% 57% 50%	50% 45% 42% 45% 38%	59% 57% 5 7 % 54% 49%

BLUE BEETIE FIX/FAC Statistics

MONTH	MS NS SKED	TGTS PASSED	TGTS VR ID	AIR STRIKES	PREV PASSED*	PREV VR •D*	PREV STRUCK*	
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	132 187 178 177 113 257	197 239 192 124 65 189	83 64 41 16 10 29	11 3 2 0 1 2	60 47 47 1 0	32 36 36 0 0	2 2 1 0 0	
TOTAIS	1044	1006	243	19	155	97	5	

* Previous targets were those known locations that were prepared by local analysts and passed to FACs during missions. In early October this procedure was discontinued since results did not warrant the time spent in preparing the data.

BLUE BEETIE Air Strike Data

		NR/TYPE	
D.	ATE	STRIKE ACFT	RESULTS
2	July	4 F4s	Trails cut and 2 bunkers uncovered.
	Ju ly	4 F 4 s	Six fortified fighting positing positions (FFP)
			destroyed, 3 others damaged.
		2 A-37s	One FFP destroyed.
10	July	2 A-37s	Results not known due to heavy foliage.
13	July	4 A-37s	Nine bunkers (BKS) destroyed, 7 damaged, and two secondary fires.
14	Jul y	1 AC-130	Ten small secondary explosions detected.
		2 A →37 s	Results not known due to triple canopy jungle.
		2 A-37s	One FFP destroyed, one damaged, 1 sustained fire.
19	July	2 A-37s	Two FFP destroyed, 1 damaged, 1 grass fire.
20	July	2 A-37s	One storage building destroyed, 1 damaged, 1 HKS uncovered.
24	July	2 A-37s	Results not known due to heavy foliage.
30	July	2 A-37s	One FFP destroyed.
	Aug		Strike made but no feedback available.
10	Aug	2 A-37s	One truck destroyed, 1 bridge partially destroyed.
			2 sustained fires, secondary explosions and unknown number of bodies detected.
15	Aug	2 A -3 7s	Three FFP destroyed, 1 secondary explosion, 3
			trenches uncovered.
	\mathtt{Sept}	2 A-37s	Radio site destroyed.
	\mathtt{Sept}	2 A -37 s	One secondary explosion; fireball & smoke detected.
	Sept	2 A-37s	Results not known due to darkness and foliage.
	Nov	2 A-37s	Three FFF destroyed, 3 others possibly destroyed
25	Dec	2 A-37s	Truck convoy struck but no results known due to darkness.
30	Dec	2 A-37s	Three EKS destroyed.

APPENDIX 5 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF COMMANDER

BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GROVER S MCMAKIN

On 18 July 1971, Lt Col Grover S McMakin assumed command of the 6994th Security Squadron, Republic of Vietnam. His previous duty assignment was at Headquarters, USAFSS, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, where he served as Staff Pilot from July 1965 through November 1968 and as Chief, Command Flight Division from November 1968 to November 1970.

Born on 1 July 1930 at Roswell, New Mexico, Lt Col McMakin attended New Mexico Military Institute, Roswell, New Mexico, graduating in 1948. He graduated from Oklahoma State University with a B.S. Degree in Agriculture in 1952.

Entering the Air Force as an Aviation Cadet on 1 July 1952, he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant on 9 May 1953. After attending RB-26 Combat Crew Training school at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, he was assigned to the 366th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Sembach Air Base, Germany as an Aircraft Observer from October 1953 through October 1956.

Returning from overseas duty in 1956, he was assigned to pilot training at Bainbridge Air Base, Georgia from 1 December 1956 through 1 July 1957. Upon graduation, he attended basic B-25 training at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas from 17 July 1957 through 27 December 1957. From January through March 1958, he attended C-97 transition training at West Palm Beach Air Base, Florida, and was subsequently assigned to the Military Air Transport Service at Travis Air Force Base, California as a C-97 Transport pilot.

On 20 February 1959, he began his association with USAFSS, as Staff Transport Pilot at Kelly AFB, Texas. After serving from 15 May 1962 through 20 July 1965 in this capacity, he was assigned as Staff Pilot and later Chief, Region Flight Section at Headquarters, Pacific Security Region, Wheeler Air Force Base, Hawaii. Returning to duty at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, he became Staff Pilot and subsequently Chief, Command Flight Division at Headquarters USAFSS, a position he held from 1 November 1968 through 1 November 1970.

In November 1970, he entered the Signal Intelligence Officer School at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. Upon graduation, he attened EC-47 Combat Crew Training at England Air Force Base, Louisiana and was subsequently assigned as Commander, 6994th Security Squadron, Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Republic of Vietnam, his current assignment.

Lt Col McMakin's decorations include the Air Force Commendation Medal, the Air Medal, and Meritorious Service Medal.

His wife, the former Betty Burnside of Geraldine, Oklahoma and son Kelly, age 11, reside at 9910 Tioga Drive, San Antonio, Texas.

CAREER CHRONOLOGY

01 July 1952	Enlisted USAF as Aviation Cadet.
July 52 - Jan 53	Ellington AFB, Texas (Primary Aviation Cadet) (Bombadier/Aircraft Observer training.)
Jan - Jun 1953	Mather AFB, California (Basic Aircraft Observer Student)
09 May 1953	Commissioned Second Lieutenant.
Jun 53 - Sep 53	Shaw AFB, South Carolina (RB-26 Combat Crew Training - Night Photo Reconnaissance)
Sep 53 - Oct 56	366 TAC Reconnaissance Wing, Sembach AB, Germany (Aircraft Observer/Combat Crew Member)
Oct 56 - Jul 57	Bainbridge Air Base, Georgia (Student Officer Pilot Training)
Jul 57 - Dec 57	Goodfellow AFB, San Angelo, Texas (B-25 Basic Pilot Training)
Dec 57 - Mar 58	West Palm Beach Air Base, Florida (C-97 Transition Training)
Mar 58 - Feb 59	Travis AFB, California (C-97 transport pilot - MATS)
Feb 59 - May 62	Kelly AFB, Texas (Staff Transport Pilot, HQ USAFSS)
May 62 - Jul 65	HQ Pacific Security Region, Wheeler AFB, Hawaii (Staff Pilot/Chief, Region Flight Section)
Jul 65 - Nov 68	Kelly AFB, Texas (Staff Pilot, HQ USAFSS)
Nov 68 - Nov 70	Kelly AFB, Texas (Chief, Command Flight Division, HQ USAFSS)
Nov 70 - Apr 71	Goodfellow AFB, Texas (Student, Signal Intelligence Officer School)
Apr 71 - Jun 71	England AFB, Louisiana (EC-47 Combat Crew Training)
Jun 71 - Present	Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Vietnam (Commander, 6994th Scty Sq/EC-47 Combat Crewmember - Pilot)

DATES OF RANK

RANK	TEMPORARY	PERMANENT
Aviation Cadet		1 July 1952
2d Lt	09 May 1953	09 May 1953
1st Lt (Reserve)	10 May 1954	10 Nov 1954
1st Lt (Regular)	09 May 1956	22 July 1 957
Captain	19 Feb 1959	09 May 1959
Major	01 Dec 1965	09 May 1967
Lt Col	10 Aug 1969	

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Air Medal

Mertiorious Service Medal

Air Force Commendation Medal

Air Force Longevity Service Medal w/three Oak Leaf Clusters

National Defense Service Medal w/one bronze star

Air Force Occupation Medal

Air Force Expeditionary Medal

Vietnamese Service Medal

Expert Marksmanship Ribbon

Vietnamese Campaign Medal



DISTRIBUTION:

USAFSS/HO	(2)
6940th Security Wing/TAL	(1)
Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron	(1)
Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron	(1)



NACOS 6 ZOBNOS 1 ZOBNOS 1 SSN SCAN R 135 8/Z PO DET 0 699455/00/00 LOUICE 699455/00/00 ZES RK OVA

60/00 JUL 71

SUBJ : ALR -38 DEPLOYMENT TO NKP 1. AS YOU KNOW HE WILL BE FLYING THREE MISSIONS IN THE 15 STAVE AREA FROM MKP ON THE 6, 7, 8TH OF JUL. 2. WE WILL BE SENDING UP SEGT SAMUEL MORTON (MINGE) AND SSOT WITH THE CREW. SET WHICH HAVE A LIMITED SUPPLY OF ALR-38 UNIQUE PARTS, AND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR LAUNCH, RECORERY AND MA THE NAME OF MISSION EQUIPMENT . REQUEST ANY ASSISTANCE HE MAY REQUIRE AND WHICH IS WITHIN UR CAPABILINT TO PRO-VIOE, SE GIVEN. SET WILSON WILL FUNCTION AS DET & PROJECT REPRESE WAT IVE AND SHOULD BE THE FOCAL POINT FOR SOURDIN-ATTOM ON TECHNICAL AND SUPPORT MATTERS. HE WILL SUPERVISE OUR CREWS, LAUNCH AND RECOVER MISSIONS AND CODED ANTE WITH UR ARAL YSIS PEOPLE, HE IS ALSO A BACKUP AMB. OF THEE 232X 1'S AND A 203X1. HE WOULD PREFER TO USE ONE OF YOUR ANDLYSTS. AS THEY ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA. WORKING PROGEDURES WILL BE COORDINATED BY SOT WILSON, WHO WILL ALSO FUNCTION AS ONE EXTRA (BACKUP) ROZAMS. IN THE EVENT OF THE 203 BECOMING DNIF, WE WOULD LIKE TO FILE IN FR CM YOUR UNIT.

SENT IN THE SAME MANNER AS IS PRESENTLY DONE FOR THE 911A.

S. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE REQUIRED KY- EXEMACTS TO OUR CREW.


ORINK. BLACKWELL.

368

33 13

MIN

Doc#1



-2 JULIAN 17

13 1792202CRDCA864612
FF YMRDQR
CE YADVIL B010 1831233
TAY MANSH
P 02 12332
FM DET 1 6996 SCTY SQ 00
TO DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ/00
INFO 6994 SCTY SQ/00
PACSCTYRGN/DOR
6901 SCTY SQ/DOR

SIEJ: "HE ARDE IN POJ SENCE LANCE INTERCEPT IN THE POLITIAS BEEN EXTREMELY SPARSE DIRING THE PAST 20 DAYS. AS FAR AS 18 KNOWN THIS STA. THE 163TH NVA RECT IS IN THE SOUTHEAST PART OF THE FOU. THE ONLY KNOWN INTERCEPT FROM 165TH UNITS HAS BEEN ON FREDS 42.00 AND 43.20MHZ. THESE STATIONS USUALLY COME TO EVERY HOUR ON THE HOUR AND PASS 5 FIG PLAIN TEST TAFO. 2. BELIEVE THE 168TH NVA REGT IS STILL IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE POUR HONVER HAVE SEEN UNABLE TO ISOLATE ANY RECENT COMMS. FOLLHOING FREQS MAY POSS BE USED BY THE 168TH: S45. 16 (8482Z AND 8586Z), 42.14 (8188Z AND 8288Z). 100 45.95 (NO SKED). ALSO FREQS 28.48 AND 2906WHZ HERE HEARD RECENTLY, (NO SKED). 3. BELIEVE ANALYSTS AT USM-7 AND USA-29 MAY BE IN A SETTER POSITION TO PROVIDE CURRENT TECH DATA. 10%2011年

Doc #3

	seoue:	SACEFORM						
<i>*</i>	TYPE MSG	OOK MULTI	SINGLE					2
		X			٠.	v .		A CO
	ACTION ACTION	DENCE				•		
	INFO	FDOM: /	DTG	050825 2 jul	71			
		Luose: P	994 SINT SQ	TSN RVN			SPECIAL	L INSTRUC
200		70: }	Sa/Dor /whee	LER AFB HAWAII				
				u antonio tra		·		" - s.
D		96						•
	SUBJ: PASTEC (OF ALR-38,	/35 ARDF ATE	CRAFT (C)			: :	ذ
	1. DE FOLLOW			• •): CHOPP.			.*
4	7 020329 5 .705 1							
7 7	en: combemor							· · · · · ·
- A. P. C.	TO: 7AP							- 4
	6994 SCIY SQ							
	INFO: 460 PRI							
Í	362 TELES							
	DET 1, 360 TEWS	.				÷		
	DET 2, 6994 SCT					. •		
	DET 3, 6994 SCT							
	509 RR GP	च						
	7 RK FS		•	:				
		שאנו <i>ו</i> גל	ነው በላቀቀ።	Dineral			DATE 5	1300
1				OTHE FOR DOJ,	SOOTH DR GP	POB ACC	MONTH	YEAR
1	BASING CL	- ALR-38/;	35 ARDF AIRC	RAFT (C)			PAGE NO.	NO. OF
	TYPED NAME AND TIT	TLE	PHONE	R SIGNATU	RE		<u> </u>	
1	A HSgt Larson	/drs	4891	L R				n uit ain
	T E R	·		E DAYID	r steeped NAME AT H KIDY, Major ions Officer	O TITLE		
	SECURITY CLASS	·			NSTRUCTIONS		7 =	
=	DD . FORM 173			NOF I MAY 88 WHI			NOCT	4

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM: and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE RELEASED BY CRAFTED BY

ACTION ROUTTINE Major Eddy MSgt Larece 4991

- 1. AT THE PRESENT TIME, MACY IS CONSIDERING MOVING ALR-35

 (Q) AND ALR-38 AIRCRAFT CUPLENTLY BASED AT DA NAME TO MAKHOR

 PHANOM (NKF), THATLAND. THE FINAL DECISION WILL NOT BE MADE UNTIL

 AFTER SEVERAL TLEY FLIGHTS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED BY ALR-38 AIRCRAFT

 INTO THE BANGEL ROLL AIRCA OF LAGS (REF COMUSMACV 291350Z JUN 71).

 IF THE DECISION IS MADE TO MAKE THE AIRCRAFT, ANTICIPATE MOVING

 TWO (2) ALR-38 AND THREE (3) ALR-35 (Q) AIRCRAFT FROM DA HANG TO

 INKP AND REPLACING THEM WITH THE FIVE (5) ALR-35 AIRCRAFT CURRENTIA

 BASED AT NEY.
- 2. REQUEST ACTION ADDRESSES BEGIN ADVANCED PLANNING TO SUPPORS THIS ACTION IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THE TRADE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SHOULD & THE DECISION TO MOVE BE APPROVED. UNQUOTE.
- 2. PLANNING HAS BECOM TO SUPPORT THIS ACTION. WILL ADVISE. CP-1

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	O. OF	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION		INITIAL
SECURITY C		<u></u>		REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	DOC*	4-1

DD . FORM 173-1

2638426 2638421 26384382CLURDB493N2A352 RR YMRDNR GE YMLARZ 2624 2638247 281 26044 R 2245262 rM 14060 TYRSN 10 A6520 FACAF/IN

INIU USAFSS/DO

6994 50/00

LE 15

RIF W.

SUBJ: UILLIATION OF ALR-SE RESOURCES IN SEA

1. INDESTINATION OF ALR-SE RESOURCES IN SEA

2. INDESTINATION OF YEAR AGO, ITS RATE OF SHEELES ANALOSS

2. INDESTINATION OF YEAR AGO, ITS RATE OF SHEELES ANALOSS

2. INDESTINATION OF CONCERN. THE ALR-SE'S PERFORMANCE

AGRICULT HE TARGETS IS CONSIDERED SUCCESSFUL AND INSIGNATED TO COPE WITH CHEMY

TIVE OF THE CAPABILITY OF OUR ARCF SYSTEMS TO COPE WITH CHEMY

COMMUNICATION OF SUCCESS RATE AGAINST WHY TARGETS, PARTICULARLY

IN VILVOR THE RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ENEMY'S UTILIZATION

UN THE VERMODE. IN THIS RECARD, WE KAVE INCENTIFIED IN

VARIOUR INJEDING OPERATIONS.

A OTHER FACTOR WHICH IMPACTS SIGNIFICATION OF A PRECION ALREAD TO ALREAD TO ALREAD TO ALREAD TO ALREAD MISSION TASKING ASSIGNED TO ALREAD MISSION THE 36'S ARE TARRED ACCORDING TO THE ARD MISSION FRICKITY SYSTEM WHICH IS A REPLECTION OF THE ARD MISSIS (AEQUIREMENTS) SUBMITTED WELKLY BY MACV'S SHOWN ALL ATED INTO USABLE TASKING BY THE COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AUTHORITIES WHICH PROVIDE THE SIGINT TECH DATE OF THE MACV PRIORITY ARD TARREST OF

Doe #5

LIGHT REPRESENTATION OF THE TO SEAVENAS A A THE PRIVATE AND ACCOMPANY WE A DR ALK-US VISSIONS TASKS THESE PLATFORMS PALLET TYAN VAF TERMINALS. 1 - RICRITY MARKET LISTINGS REFLECT TACTICAL HAND H' - REGULASKENIS, BUR AIRCREUS MUST RECESSABILY - ILLIAN SERATIONAL ENTHASIS (REG SEARCH, ACTI FIGURE 10 - 100) ON TARBETT ARGETS. AS A RESULT. THE A LAND LUTTING THE SECRETARY WITH HE REALTZERS LE, IN JUNE, 1971, WE FLEW 139 ALRESS MISSIONS in 24. I SE MISSIONS OBTAINED A TOTAL OF SAT PIXES TA. IC. SE 0135 TONS OBTAINED A TOTAL OF SAT FIXES AME THE WHICH ONLY 115 PERE CHTAINED AGAINST WHE TARGETS S. H. BRALLI, W. AUST RESPOND COMPLETELY TO MACU'S FIGHT I REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE CV' THE CONREST TASKING OF THE SERAGAINST A PREDOMINANTLY NO THE TOTAL NET REPRESENTS A LESS THAN EFFECTIVE UTILI-ZALLUE DE THIS ALMOST TOTALLY UNIQUE RESOURCE. CORRESPOND-Inoly, a Valid Ulas Regularment for expanded utilization of I .. . 8 . ALSES IN THE LUCANTIVE VAF ENVIRONMENT IN STEEL Theen. I will THE MAJORITA OF THE VAR TARGETS IN STEEL TIGER AND SONDERELATED, THEY ARE OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO 71 . . IN INS RULE AS AR ARDS CONSUMER, TIN AF IS IN THE BELL PUBLICATION TO PRESS FOR EXPANDED UTILIZATION OF INL ALRESS IN THE LACTIAN PAR ANDLE. A STRONGER WOICE FREE 71 A: IN THE COMPETITION FOR ALLOCATION OF SCARCE ARE RELIGIOR CES WOULD VERY LIKELY CONVINCE MACY THAT THE 38' L CAR BE MORE EFFECT WELY DITLIZED BY EXPANDING THE IN UICHATIONS IN EASS WHILE STILL PROVIDING ADEQUATE COMERAGE J. THE HELATIVELY FEW VAF TERRIBALS IN RVA AND THE DATE ARLA. 4. COULT APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION REGARDING THE ABOVE. WILL BE AVAILABLE AT TOUR CONVENIENCE FOR DETAILED DISCUSSIONS THIS SUBJECT

AND THE RELATED SUBJECT OF MAP SASEMET THE 38'S.

う5日 ごごろ34











						MONTH	YEA
	*						
1	•		i.	627. N=		DATE	TIME
					3.38	Name of the Control o	
4. WI	J. KREEF YOU ARWI	Sed. Gra					
1	UE AT BEST.	O COL LONE	G. Der 2 AS	CATA WE T	· is, vill	. B\$	
~ i	ABILITY TO PROM					. 2	
3. 1 B	LEVE 15 OCTOBER			- 1 to 1	1	1	
1	ON 2 ALB-38 AND						
. 1	AIRCHAFT TO BE				TALLY		
2	ARE COORDINATIO						
	CERTEN F IS QUA TI						
1. 12	E FOLLOWING COM	ishacy ngg i	s quoted pos	YOUR INTO	e quare		
	DO DO	ng center	DO/M/MELL	LAPS TEXAS	% 		**************************************
	INFO:	•	DOMESTA				
	TO:	•			*		
INFO	FROM	6001 SCT V	o no/ O	726	141671	i pr	AL INSTR
ACTION	PRECEDENCE		-	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
TYPE	MSG						





ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM: and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED	BY
CTION TOULTES	Had Eddy	٠.,
NFO		
National Control of the Control of t	4 ,	

Sens as releases

ABy

SUBJ: COLLECTION MACV DARKA 15

H. FUR PAST TWEELVE DAYS HAVE HUTED A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN CO. LLECTION PRODUCT ME-11; WHILE PORTION OF COLLECTION DECREASE MAY BE IDENCIFIED SITH WESTIER THIS FACTOR DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE AFFECTED MEDIC RESULTS COMING OUT OF SAME MSH AREAS. ADDITIONALLY, THERE HAS BERN NO SIGNIFICAM DECREASE IN ENEMY FORCES OR FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BY ASSOCIATED WITH THE DECREASE IN ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS. CM LIVEL VOICE COLLECTED BY CAS GROUND TRANS REMAINS HIGH, INDECA-TING THAT THIS MODE OF COMMUNICATION HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY WHAT EVER IS AFFECTING OTHER EFFORTS. REQUEST ADDRESSEE COMMENTS. 2. ANNAMED TO ABOVE, WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST HACV REVIEW POSSIBILITY OF TREETSFERING ONE ALR. 38 TO NKP FOR COVERAGE ARMA 15. DATE SET FORTH IN 1880 07415 STATED TRANSFER OF TWO ALR. 38'S AND THREE ALR. 38 S WOULD BE COMPLETED 15 OCTOBER 71 DUE TO PDJ OPERATIONS NOW UNDERWAY, PEEL THAT EVEN ONE AT THIS TIME WOULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNI. FIGARLY TO EMEMI INTELLIGENCE AND ASSIST FIRID COMMANDERS WITH POJ OF. PERASE ADVISE IF THIS CAN BE DONE AND EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE ARRIVAL HKP.

UNQUOTE

2. MACV J211-4 MAS QUERTED TAF ON FEASIBILITY OF COMPLETING PRO-

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	lei i	TIA	L
SECUR		2	4				-
SECURI				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DOC#	11-	·l	

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE RELEASED BY
ACTION ROUTINE Maj Kddy

drafted by S**uid** es releasor

1991

BELIEVE MESSAGE MUST INDICATE THAT THE ONLY IMMEDIATE SOLUTION IS
THROUGH TOW OF THE ALR-38 PER WEEK. AIRCRAFT WOULD DEPLOY FROM DWG
TO MKP, FLY ROUND ROBIN FROM MKP FOR 3-5 MISSIONS, AND REDEPLOY
TO DMG. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE AIRCRAFT SYSTEM CAN BE MAINTAINED
IN AN OR STATUS AT MKP FOR A MUCH LONGER PERIOD.

- 3. PROBLEMS INVOLVED WITH TRANSFER OF THE ASSETS AT THE PRESENT THE SECONDARY ARE BRIEFLY SUMMARIZED BELOW.
- WITH ONLY E ACTE/JASSED IS ALREADY TAXED WITH THE LAUNCHING OF A ALR-35 MISSIONS PER DAY. THIS SYSTEM IS RELATIVELY NEW AT DET 3 AND ALL 301'S ASSIGNED ARE STILL NOT UP TO THE DESIRED PROFICIENCY. DET 2 HAS THE COLY QUALIFIED ALR-38 PERSONNEL (19 AUTH/9 ASSED/2 TOY FROM TSN.) THEY TOO ARE TAXED WITH THE LAUNCHING OF DAILY MISSIONS AND WOULD BE HARD FRESSED TO PROVIDE TOY SUPPORT AT THIS THEE. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS WILL HAVE TO BE DONE IN OUTCOMER. IT IS NOT ENVISIONED THAT WE WILL BE IN ANY BEITTER SHAPE AT THAT WE TIME.
- B. TRAINING. THE CONTRACTOR TECH REP FROM DET 2 IS CURRENTLY
 TO TO NKP AND IS PROVIDING TRAINING ON THE ALR-38. ME ANTICIPATE
 TRAINING WILL HE REQUIRED BEYOND THE OCT DEPLOTMENT DATE. UNLESS

ľ	CONTROL NO.	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	•	INITIALS
L		7	4/	`		
				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	Doc	#11-2

DD FORM 173-1

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFON and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE ACTION ROUTIAN INFO RELEASED BY

DRAFTED BY

A REW CONTRACT IS LET FOR THIS REPRESENTATIVE HE WILL TERMINATE
TRAINING IN APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK TO PREPARE FOR ROTATION TO THE
GORES (31 AUG). IF THIS OCCURS WE ANTICIPATE ADDITIONAL SLIPPAGE
BEYOND OCTOBER UNTIL ADEQUATE MANPOWER CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR
GONTINUED TRAINING MAINTENANCE.

- C. SPARES. WE EXPECT A CONTINUED HIGH NORS RATE IN CRITICAL ITEMS (FREAMP, ANTENNA, NAV CONVERTER, COMPUTERS, ETC.) AND WHILE THESE MAY BE MINIMAL RELIEF IN THE OCT/NOW TIME FRAME, OPERATION FROM TWO LOCATIONS ONLY COMPORADS AN ALREADY UNACCEPTABLE CONDITION.


 *** D, FRONT END RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE ENGINE MAINTENANCE
- D, FRONT END RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE ENGINE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT, NAVIGATOR MANNING/TRAINING AND SUPPLY(PROPS, GENERATORS ETC).
- 4. WILL PROVIDE COPY OF 7AF RESPONSE WHEN AVAILABLE.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	MITIAL
G				•	
- Andrews				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DOC#	11-3

1







JOINT MERSANDPORM			
ECOMITY			深势
TYPE M3G X MULTI SINGLE			
PRECEDENCE			- (g
CTION ROUTINE	~ ~		
	09/02 100 71		
PROM: 6994 SCTI SQ		SPECIAL I	MSTRUCT
TO: PSR/DOR			
THEO DESCRIPTION	an Imn		- 15
IMPO DET 3 6994 SCTI	SQ/DO		
DO:			•
NEW : ALE-38 ACPT TO MEP	•		د
EFS: A. YOUR DOR 3003081 JUL 71	. 9		:
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
B. YOUTE DOR 232232Z AUG 71 (NOT)	44)		
. THOUGH THE MARKING OF A SEPTEM-BOOK M			, k m
· VINACET TEM NAMES OF THE CONTRACTOR	Mait er net) 出い「い 逆放送灯	alel.	
equire more spaces for most plythic afsi	THAN ARTH IN UDL. WE		• •
KLIEVE MARKING CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH	VOL RESOURCES WITHIN THE	\$.	
QUADROS COMPLEX. THE IMPACT ON EACH PLA	FTMA ANGO TO INTERMEDIA		
- THE THE PART OF THE TAXABLE PART OF THE	LANG AFTH 10 HISTORY		
EPARATELI BELOW:			
TOTAL THE SECTION OF SECTION AND ASSESSED TO A SECTION OF THE SECT			
. A292XL. UEIT IS AUTH 24, BUT WILL RI	MAINE SA' NOLH MAINERS		
nclude a overhead management spaces for	SIPY, SEPE, MSE MOY PORC	277 CH S	
			i e ji
WE REQUIRED FIGURE IS BASED ON 110 PLIN	NG HES PER MONTH PLUS 12	PIR	
BUT FOR DELF, MAR AND LY. (BELIEVE 110	INC DES MINES TO HE STATE	_	
			+ ₋
igure to use for a sustained period of t	THE.) ACCORDINGLY, DET	3 DATE	TIME
	.*		161
ARRIEG WOULD REQUIRE CONTINUAL AUGUSTAS	TION BY 1-5 A292818, WITH	монтн	YEAR
CTUAL NUMBER DEPENDENT UPON NOW MICH ON	RHEAD/MIT 120211 SPACES	CAN PAGE NO.	No. 0F
		PAGE NO.	PAGES
TYPED NAME AND TITLE PHONE	A MONATURE		<u>, </u>
1800			
9450 - A Doug 3 / 2	A TYPED (or etamped) NAME AND		2 12
SMSgt David/dra	DAVED H MAN, Major,		
	R Operations Officer	_	
ECURITY	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS		

ABBREVIATED JOBFE MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE ACTION POITFFEE RELEASED BY

Rajor Eddy

PHONE

BE USED TO FLY.

INFO

B. A202EO. UNIT IS AUTH 9 AND WILL REQUIRE 9. BOTH NUMBERS INCLEDE

1 OVERHEAD SEFE SPACE. THE LATTER FIGURE (REQ*D) WAS COMPUTED AT 110

FLYING HOURS PER MONTH, INCLUDING 12 PERCENT FOR DRIF, BAR AND LV.

NEED FOR MANNING AUGMENTATION WILL HINGE ON HOW WELL UNIT IS NAMED

(ASSIGNED STREEGTH) IN AFSCS A202EO AND R202EO. BASED ON PAST AND

PRESENT MANNING RISTORY, ONE OR BOTH AFSC. WILL ALMAYS BE BELOW AUTH

THROUGHOUT MOST OF 6994 SS COMPLEX. SHORTAGE OF R202EO WOULD

INCREASE A202 USE FOR ANAL/RPTG AND TECH SUPPORT FUNCTIONS AND

DECREASE A202 AVAIL TO FLY. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO KEEP

A202EO ASSICHED STRENGTH AT AUTH LEVEL AND R202EO AUTH AT MINIMUM

OF 90 PERCENT NAMED. ANTICIPATE AT MIST SHORT DURATION TOTS, NOT

TO EXCEED 2 A202EO.

- C. A203X1. UNIT IS AUTHORIZED 13 AND WILL REQUIRE 13. THE REQUIRED FIGURE IS BASED ON 100 FLIING HRS PER MONTH AND INCLUDES 12 PERCENT FOR DNIF, RAR AND LV. THE AUTH/REQ⁴D FIGURES EACH INCLUDE OVERHEAD SPACES FOR SUPV AND SEFE FUNCTIONS. CURRENT/PROJECTED MANNING IS GENERALLY PAVORABLE AND WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE HERD FOR TOY ASSISTANCE FOR A203X1 AFSC FOR FORESERABLE FUTURE.
- D. A301X3. UNIT IS AUTH 8 AND WILL REQUIRE 8. EVERY 6994SS UNIT IS CURRENTLY UNDERMANNED AND IT APPEARS THIS CONDITION WILL

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
			3		
SECURITY C				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	13-1

DD

	or CONTINUATION SHEET		
PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY		
FO ROUTING	Na for Eddy	See Perid	48/81
	• •	· •	
CONTINUE FOR SOMET	IME. ONE A30113 IS CURRE	HILL TOY TO DET 3 AND	
E ANTICIPATE CONT	INUING TOY AUGMENTATION,	BUT LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE	1
	113 AVAIL THROUGHOUT THE		. •
			•
. IN SUMMARY, WE	FEEL THAT THROUGH CAREFU	L RESOURCE BARAGEMENT	
IE CAN PROVIDE SUF	FIGURAT MANNING FOR DET 3	THROUGH TOY AUGMENTATION.	
TERTHER, DO NOT AN	TICIPATE DIFFICULTY IN RE	MAINING WITHIN CURRENT	ذ
RADROOM CEILING.			•
			,
		•	
,			

CONTROL NO. TOR/TOD PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION INITIALS REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DOC # SECURITY CLA

DD







ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE OF A CONTINUATION SHEET

		4 %	100	4.0	à
PRECEDENCE	RELEASED	BY	7	<i>a</i>	
ACTION HUTTING				4.1	•
NFO	· ·		**	2.5	

DRAFTED B

SUBJECT: EC-47 AIRCRAFT TRANSFER (U).

REFERENCES: A. COMUSHACY MSG DTG 310922Z JUL 71 (NOTAL)

B. 7AF DO/EM MEG ETG 130003Z SEP 71 (NOTAL)

- 1. REFERENCE A DIRECTS 7AF TO REALIGN EC-47 AIRMANT IN SUPPORT OF CHANGING REQUIREMENTS. TO MERT THESE REQUIREMENTS, TWO ALR-36 AND THREE ALR-35 EC-47Q AIRCRAFT FROM DA HAND WILL REPLACE THE FIVE ALR-35, EC-47 N/P AIRCRAFT PRESENTLY OPERATED FROM MAKECE PHANCE. THE MEP EC-47 N/P AIRCRAFT MUST BE RELOCATED TO CHIRAGE OUT OF BA HANG. THE PROJECTED COMPLETION DATE FOR THIS TRANSPER IS 15 OCT 71.
- 2. REFERENCE B ADVISED CONCERNED UNITS TO INITIATE APPROPRIATE PER-SONNEL, SUPPLY, AND HAINTENANCE ACTIONS HECKESARY TO ALLOW A SMOOTH TRANSITION OF AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL TO COMPLETE THE ABOVE ACTION.
- 3. THE FIVE ALR-35, EC-47 N/P AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM NET 1 OF THE 36OTEWS AT MEP ARE UE OF THE 36OTE AT TEM. THESE AIRCRAFT RECULARLY ROTATE TO AND FROM TEM FOR PHASE IMPRETIONS AND MAJOR MAINTHANNEE.

 RATHER THAN RETAIN THIS HOTATION SCHEMLE AFTER THE AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED, THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 85-47Q'S AT MEP AS WELL AS THE EC-47 N/P*S AT DA NAME SHOULD BY ASSESSED BY THE 36275MR.
- 4. REQUEST PACAP APPROVAL OF A PROGRAMMING COMMUNICATION OF PLACE AN INCREASE OF PIVE IN 362111115 THE 360TENS UE. THIS CHANGE WELL PROMIT THE COMMULIDATION OF

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	MAITINE
		2	3	DOC#15-	4
REGRADING INSTRUCT	ONS			SECURITY CLASS	, s

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM.


	PRECEDENCE	
ACTION	MUSINES .	*
INFO	The second secon	•

RELEASED BY

DRAFTED BY

PHON!

SET FORT AT ONE LOCATION, WILL MIDITARY THE LONG PLICHTS TO AND PROS ESH YOR PRANK DISPECTIONS, AND ALLOW THE MOTION TO INCLATE ITS ACCIVITIES AND CONCENTRATE ON CURRENT AND PROGRAMMO VINTUMINATION BESPONSIBILITIES. Q2-3.



DD , FORM , 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF I MAY 59 WHICH MAY BE USED

TO PERLOCATION OF NO. ATT SUPERING APP MANAGE TO HEP TO PERLOCATE OF NO. ATTOM HOLDING STATE OF NO. ATT AND THE NO. ATTOM HOLDING STATE OF NO. AT A LOT PROM DAMAGE TO HEP THAT I HAVE THE MANAGE TO HEP ATTOM OF NO. ATT OF NO. ATTOM OF NO. ATTOM OF NO. ATT AND THE NO. ATTOM OF NO				
TYPER MAD PROOF MALTI SHORE AND ASSESSED AS BOOK AS AND THREE ALK-356 ARE REPAIRED FOR ALK-35 ARE STREETED AS BOOK AS AND THREE ALK-356 ARE REPAIRED WILL BE ADODRYLISHED AS BOOK AS AND THREE ALK-356 ARE REPAIRED, OP-1		JOINT BURAGEPORE	Market Control of the South	
PRESENCE OF THE PROOF SO A STEEL OF THE TOTAL WAS A STEEL OF THE TOTAL OF THAT THE PROOF THE TOTAL OF THE TOT		ascom		
PRESENCE OF THE PROOF SO A STEEL OF THE TOTAL WAS A STEEL OF THE TOTAL OF THAT THE PROOF THE TOTAL OF THE TOT				
PROB 5994 SUTY SQ TSH ENTS TO PER/ORA/WHELER APS HAMAII THEO THANKS/BOR/MAN ANTONIO THANS SUBS: REACCATION OF NO-47 AIRCRAFT 1. RECEST TYPHON ENARMATION OF NO-47 AIRCRAFT 21. RECEST TYPHON ENARMATION OF NO-47 AIRCRAFT LILIAGED FOR MASELY SHITCH OF NO-478/F/Q AGET. THE FIVE NO-478/F THAT WERS THY FROM THE TO HEF (THIL MAS O-24300, O-43260, O-9381A, O-24313, AND O-48072) HERE RELOCATED AT BREAK CH IO OUT 71 WHILE DAMAIN RASED NO-47/3 RENYMBER MASELY FOR ALB-JOS AND ONE ALB-JOS NO-4705 AT MEP. EZALIZE PLANNING CALLED FOR MARIED THO ALB-JOS AND TROPE ALB-JOS AT MEP, HOMEVER, ONE ORE ALB-JOS WAS OFFRATIONAL WHILE ACT MIXTERED TO DAMANG. FURTHER SHITCHING WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AS BOOK AS AIDITIONAL ALE-35G ARE REPAIRED. OP-1 TYPED NAME AND TYPLE AND TYPED NAME AND TYPLE AND TYPED NAME AND TYPLE AND TYPED (NAME AND TYPLE				A 2
TO PERIOD 6994 SETT SQ THE RESET OF THE PROPERTY OF STATE		PRECEDENCE		
TO PERIOR STATE OF HAMAIX THE CHAPTER/DER/MINISTER AFF HAMAIX THE UNAMES THE MACHATICS OF HE-47 ADET FROM DAMAIN TO HET ALLOWED FUR MALL SAIRCH OF HE-47 ADET FROM DAMAIN TO HET ALLOWED FUR MALL SAIRCH OF HE-47 ADET FROM DAMAIN TO HET ALLOWED FOR MALL SAIRCH OF HE-47 ADET FROM DAMAIN TO HET WHEN THE FROM THE TO HEP (TAIL MAS 0-24309, 0-43260, 0-9361A, 0-24313, ARD 0-45713 REPUSSEED HOME. 2. THINK ARE PRESENTLY FORM ALR-363 AND ONE ALR-35 NC-4708 AT HEP. EZALIZE PLANNING CALLED FOR MARIND THO ALR-368 AND THREE ALR-358 AT HEP, HOMENER, ORLY ONE ALR-35 WAS OPERATIONAL WHIN ADET MATTERED TO DAMAING. FURTHER SAINCHIMS WILL HE ACCOMPLISHED AS ROOM AS ADETTIONAL ALK-356 ARE REPAIRED. QP-1 TYPED NAME AND TITLE AND THE MALL MALL THE PROBE AND THE MALL MALL THE PROBE THE PROBE AND THE MALL MALL THE PROBE			DT# 31 0730 g new 21	
SUBJ: RELACATION OF RG-47 AIRCRAFT 1. REGIST TYPEON ENACHATION OF RC-47 AOFT FROM DAMANG TO REP ALLOGED FUR EARLY SMITCH OF RC-478/P/Q AGFT. THE FIRE EC-478/P THAT WERE TOT FROM THE TO REP (TAIL, MRS C-2430G, C-9361A, C-24313 ARD C-45072) WERE RELOCATED AT DAMANG ON 10 OST 71 WHILE DAMANG RASED RC-473 RETURNED HORE. 2. THERE ARE PRESENTLY FORE ALR-963 AND ORE ALR-35 EC-4708 AT REP. REALIZE PLANNING CALLED FOR BARRIED TWO ALR-368 AND THREE ALR-953 AT REP. HOMENTER, ORLY ONE ALR-35 WAS OPPRATICALL WERE ACCT. METERING TO DAMANG. FURTHER SATERIES WILL HE ACCORPLISHED AS BOOM AS AIRDITIONAL. ALK-356 ARE REPAIRED. GP-1 TYPED NAME AND TITLE AROU. PROMET AROUTE TYPED (** ANDREAD MARK AND TITLE AROUTE TYPED (** ANDREAD MA		PROID 6994, 8	CTT SQ TSE RIFE	SPECIAL INSTRUCTION
SUBJ: RELACATION OF RG-47 AIRCRAFT 1. RECEPT PERSON ENACHATION OF RG-47 AOFT FROM DAMANG TO MEP ALLOGED FUR EARLY SMITCH OF RG-47R/P/Q AGFT. THE FURE RG-47R/P THAT WERE TOT FROM TON TO MEP (TAIL, MAS O-2430G, O-9381A, O-24313) ARD O-48372) WERE RELOCATED AT DAMANG ON 10 OST 71 WHILE DAMANG RASED RG-473 RENAMED HOME. 2. THERE AND PREMENTLY FORE ALR-963 AND OME ALR-35 NG-4708 AT MEP. REALIZE PLANNING CALLED FUR BANKING TWO ALR-368 AND THREE ALR-958 AT MEP, HOMENTER, OMEL ONE ALR-35 WAS OPPRATIONAL WERE AGFT RETURNED TO DAMANG. FURTHER SATERIES WILL ME ACCOMPLISHED AS BOOK AS AIRCTIONAL. ALK-35G ARE REPAIRED. GP-1 TYPED NAME AND TITLE ARGOL. TYPED NAME AND TITLE ARGOL. TYPED OF ANDRONG MASS AND THREE ARGOL. TYPED OF ANDRONG MASS AND THREE TYPED OF ANDRONG MASS AND THREE TYPED OF ANDRONG MASS AND THREE ARGOL. TYPED OF ANDRONG MASS AND THREE TYPED OF ANDRONG MASS A	***	TO: pen ∕oc	MANUFACE AND HAVATT	# 4 ₀
SURI: RELECATION OF NO.47 AIRCRAFT 1. RECEST TIMEON REACHATION OF NO.47 ACRT FROM DAMAIN TO MEP LILOWED FOR MARLY SHIPCH OF NO.478/P/Q SCFT. THE FIVE NO.478/P THAT WEEK THY FROM THE TO MEP (TAIL MES O.24300, O.49260, O.99814, O.24313 ARD O.48072) WHEE RELOCATED AT DAMAIN O. 10 OCT 71 WHEE DAMAIN RASED EC.47*3 RETURNED HOME. 2. THERE ARE PRESENTLY FORM ALR.363 AND OME ALR.35 MC.4708 AT MEP. EZALIZZ PLANEIRO CALLED FOR RABING TWO ALR.363 AND TRIME ALR.353 AT MEP, HOMEVER, OMLY OME ALR.35 WAS OFFRATIONAL WHEE ACT; METURED TO DAMAING. FURTHER SATECRISM WILL ME ACCOMPLISHED AS BOOK AS AIRPITICAL ALR.356 ARE REPAIRED. GP-1 TYPED (OF ANDRO AND TYPLE AND TYPED (OF ANDROPH AND TYPLE				
1. RECEST TYPECON EMACRATICS OF EL-47 ACST FROM DAMANG TO MEP LILLOWED SUR MARLY SMITCH OF 3D-478/P/Q ACST. THE SUR EC-478/P THAT WERE TOY FROM THE TO MAP (TAIL MAS 0-24309, 0-43260, 0-93814, 0-24313 ARE 0-48372) WERE RELOCATED AT DAMANG OR 10 ORY 71 WHILE DAMANG RASED RC-47'S RESTRICTED HOME. 2. THERE ARE PRESENTLY PORE ALE-38S AND ONE ALE-35 MC-470S AT MAP. REALIZE PLANSING CALLED FOR RASING TWO ALE-38S AND THREE ALE-353 AY MEP, HOMENTA, ORLY ONE ALE-35 WAS GENERATIONAL MEM ACCT METURED TO DAMANG. FURTHER SUITCHISM WILL ME ACCORPLISHED AS BOOM AS AIRDITIONAL ALE-354 ARE MEPALEMS. GP-1 TYPED NAME AND TITLE WASTE LOURSON/CRE PARK TYPED OF SURVEY MASTER AND TITLE A TYPED OF SURVEY MASTER AND TITLE SMIST LOURSON/CRE TYPED OF SURVEY MASTOR, MASTOR, MASTOR, MASTOR, USAF OPERATIONS COTTOOL TYPED TO MAKE AND TITLE TYPED OF SURVEY MASTOR, MASTOR, MASTOR, USAF OPERATIONS COTTOOL TYPED TO MAKE AND TITLE TYPED OF SURVEY MASTOR, MASTOR, MASTOR, USAF OPERATIONS COTTOOL TYPED TO MAKE AND TITLE TYPED OF SURVEY MASTOR, MASTOR, MASTOR, USAF OPERATIONS COTTOOL TYPED OF SURVEY MASTOR OF THE SURVEY MASTOR OF TITLE OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATIONS COTTOOL TYPED OF SURVEY MASTOR OF THE SURVEY MASTOR OF TITLE OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATION OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATION OP	S. Maria	CERT GOLLEGE	A DOMESTIC TOTAL	
1. RECEST TYPECON EMACRATICS OF EL-47 ACST FROM DAMANG TO MEP LILLOWED SUR MARLY SMITCH OF 3D-478/P/Q ACST. THE SUR EC-478/P THAT WERE TOY FROM THE TO MAP (TAIL MAS 0-24309, 0-43260, 0-93814, 0-24313 ARE 0-48372) WERE RELOCATED AT DAMANG OR 10 ORY 71 WHILE DAMANG RASED RC-47'S RESTRICTED HOME. 2. THERE ARE PRESENTLY PORE ALE-38S AND ONE ALE-35 MC-470S AT MAP. REALIZE PLANSING CALLED FOR RASING TWO ALE-38S AND THREE ALE-353 AY MEP, HOMENTA, ORLY ONE ALE-35 WAS GENERATIONAL MEM ACCT METURED TO DAMANG. FURTHER SUITCHISM WILL ME ACCORPLISHED AS BOOM AS AIRDITIONAL ALE-354 ARE MEPALEMS. GP-1 TYPED NAME AND TITLE WASTE LOURSON/CRE PARK TYPED OF SURVEY MASTER AND TITLE A TYPED OF SURVEY MASTER AND TITLE SMIST LOURSON/CRE TYPED OF SURVEY MASTOR, MASTOR, MASTOR, MASTOR, USAF OPERATIONS COTTOOL TYPED TO MAKE AND TITLE TYPED OF SURVEY MASTOR, MASTOR, MASTOR, USAF OPERATIONS COTTOOL TYPED TO MAKE AND TITLE TYPED OF SURVEY MASTOR, MASTOR, MASTOR, USAF OPERATIONS COTTOOL TYPED TO MAKE AND TITLE TYPED OF SURVEY MASTOR, MASTOR, MASTOR, USAF OPERATIONS COTTOOL TYPED OF SURVEY MASTOR OF THE SURVEY MASTOR OF TITLE OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATIONS COTTOOL TYPED OF SURVEY MASTOR OF THE SURVEY MASTOR OF TITLE OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATION OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATIONS COTTOOL OPERATION OP				
ALL-35S ARE REPAIRED. GP-1 ALK-35S ARE REPAIRED. GP-1		SUBS: RELECTION OF NO.47 AI	BCRAFT	١
HERE TOT FROM THE TO MAP (TAIL MS 0-24309, 0-49260, 0-93614, 0-24313) ARD 0-48072) WHEE RELOCATED AT DAMAGE OF 10 OFF 71 WHEE DAMAGE RASED RC-47'S RESUMENTLY FOR ALE-36S AND ONE ALE-35 MC-470S AT MCP. REALIZE PLANNING CALLED FOR RANGED THO ALE-36S AND TRUE ALE-35S AT MCP, HOMEVER, OMLY ONE ALE-35 WAS OFFRATIONAL WHEE ACCORPLISHED AS BOOM AS ARBITROMAL ALE-35S ARE REPAIRED. GP-1 DATE THE TAIL	3	1. RECENT TYPEON BUCKATION	OF NG-47 ACPT FROM DAMANG TO MEP	
HERE TOT FROM THE TO MAP (TAIL MS 0-24309, 0-49260, 0-93614, 0-24313) ARD 0-48072) WHEE RELOCATED AT DAMAGE OF 10 OFF 71 WHEE DAMAGE RASED RC-47'S RESUMENTLY FOR ALE-36S AND ONE ALE-35 MC-470S AT MCP. REALIZE PLANNING CALLED FOR RANGED THO ALE-36S AND TRUE ALE-35S AT MCP, HOMEVER, OMLY ONE ALE-35 WAS OFFRATIONAL WHEE ACCORPLISHED AS BOOM AS ARBITROMAL ALE-35S ARE REPAIRED. GP-1 DATE THE TAIL		LILOYED WE MALL SAINCE OF R	G-478/P/Q AGPT. THE PINE BG-478/P THAT	
AND O-48072) WHEE RELOCATED AT DAMAGE OF 10 OFF 71 WHEE DAMAGE RASED RC-47'S RETURNED HOME. 2. THERE AND PRESENTLY FORE ALE-36S AND ONE ALE-35 NC-470S AT MET. RZALIZE PLANSING CALLED FOR RANGED THE ALE-35S AND THREE ALE-35S AT MEP, HOMEVER, ONLY ONE ALE-35 WAS OFFRATIONAL WHEE ACFT METERIED TO DAMEANG. FURTHER SUPERIES WILL ME ACCOMPLISHED AS BOOM AS AMBITICHAL ALE-35G ARE REPAIRED. OP-1 TYPED HAME AND TITLE PHONE ABOUT TYPED HAME AND TITLE ABOUT TYPED (or simpled) HAME AND TITLE ABOUT TYPED (or simpled) HAME AND TITLE ABOUT TYPED (or simpled) HAME AND TITLE THE DAY IN EMBET, Major, USAF Operations Officer				
EC-47'S RENESSAND HORE 2. TESSE AND PRESENTLY PORE ALE-36S AND ONE ALE-35 NC-470S AT MP. BEALLIER PLANNING CALLED FOR BARING THE ALE-36S AND THORE ALE-35S AT MP. REP, ROMENTER, ONLY ONE ALE-35 WAS GENERATIONAL WEST ACT METERS TO DATE TIME ALE-35S AND REPAIRES. GP-1 TYPED NAME AND TITLE PROME TYPED NAME AND TITLE SWEGT LGTBOR/GES AND TYPED (or simpled NAME AND TITLE TYPED (or simpled NAME AND				
EZALIZE PLOMETER CALLED FOR BASTED TWO ALR-368 AND TROBE ALR-353 AY EXP., HOMENTER, CHEY CHE ALR-35 WAS GPERATIONAL WERE ACT MERCHAND TO DAHANG. PURTIEND WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AS BOOM AS ADDITIONAL. ALR-35G ARE REPAIRED. OP-1 DATE TIME 11 1/00 MONTH VEAR OCT PAGE NO. PAGE NO				
EZALIZE PLOMETER CALLED FOR BASHED TWO ALR-368 AND TROBE ALR-358 AY EXP., HOMENTER, CHEY CHE ALR-35 WAS GPERATIONAL WERE ACT MERCHAND TO DAHANG. PURTHER SUINCHING WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AS BOOM AS ADDITIONAL. ALR-35G ARE REPAIRED. OP-1 DATE TIME 11 1400 MONTH YEAR OCT 77 PAGE NO. MO. OF PAGE NO.		2. THE AME PROPERTY FOR	ALE-WE AND ONE ATRICE WE FORE AN INC.	
DATE TIME LE-356 ARE REPAIRED. QP-1 TYPED HAME AND TITLE PHONE ARCONFLISHED AS BOOM AS ADDITIONAL. TYPED HAME AND TITLE ARCONFLISHED AS BOOM AS ADDITIONAL. PAGE NO. PA				
DARANG. PURTER SITECHING WILL ME ACCOMPLISHED AS SOOR AS AIR TYPED AND AS SOOR AS AIR TYPED AND AND AND TYPED NAME AND TYPE ARC OF PAGE AS AIR TYPED (or singled) NAME AND TYPE ARC OF PAGE AS AIR TYPED (or singled) NAME AND TYPE ARC OF TYPED (OR S				
ALE-358 ARE REPAIRED. QP-1 DATE TIME 11 1/00 MONTH YEAR OCT 7 PAGE NO. PAGES PAGE NO. PAGES TYPED HAME AND TITLE REPAIR AND TITLE ASSI TYPED (or steeped) HAME AND TITLE DATID B MONTURE TYPED (or steeped) HAME AND TITLE DATID B MONTURE TYPED (or steeped) HAME AND TITLE DATID B MONTURE OCTION	41			
DATE TIME 11 1/05 MONTH YEAR 007 77 PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES 1 TYPED NAME AND TITLE PHONE TYPED (or shaped name and title A TYPED (or shaped name and title A TYPED (or shaped name and title A TYPED (or shaped name and title Operations Officer; USAF Operations Officer			LL ME ACCOMPLISHED AS BOOM AS AIDITIONAL	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE PHONE ABOUT TYPED (or simple) NAME AND TITLE DAY ID E MBUT, Hajor, USAF Sporations Officer		ALE-350 ARE REPAIRED. OP-1		
TYPED NAME AND TITLE PHONE ABOUT TYPED (or simple) NAME AND TITLE DAY ID E MBUT, Hajor, USAF Sporations Officer				
TYPED HAME AND TITLE PHONE R ABOUT TYPED (or enumed hame and title DAYID E MOY, Major, USAF Operations Officer	# 12			DATE TIME
TYPED NAME AND TITLE ASSOL TYPED (or stemped) NAME AND TITLE DAYID E MOY, Major, DEAF Operations Officer	1			MONTH YEAR
TYPED NAME AND TITLE ASSOL TYPED (or stemped) NAME AND TITLE DAYID E MOY, Major, DEAF Operations Officer	E.			PAGE NO. NO. OF
Operations Officer	5 1 1 2 2 5 5 5 CB	TYSET WARE AND VIVIE	ENGLATION CONTRACTOR	PAGES
Operations Officer		P R	121	
Operations Officer		· ·		
SECURITY CLASS PAGE 16		R	* Operations Officer) •
	* 1	SECURITY CLASS	RESTAINING INSTRUCTIONS	Doc#16

DD . 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ SPO 1988-257-86


,: Sign



























CURPTY CLA	÷	ens de la company						
TYPE MSG	ROOK MULT	NASCE	•					
PAS	CEDENCE							
CTION PR	IORITY							
ŧro		D [*]	το <u>0605</u> 00	Z AUG 71		1 20		5. g 3.
	FROM	6994 SCTY	(SQ .				MACIAL	SA VANCTINA
	1,				4		A Section of	
. *		PSR/DO	3			. X.	, a _d	
	TiDa	******	•					# 15 m
v	INFO:	: USAFSS/DO) -	•				
		200 3 46	്രം ഭരത്തെ വ	o /ce			2.7	\$ 140 M.S.
		נס פנ זמנו	994 SCTT S	ψ/cc	÷	ar NA	e Jan	
	·			a. 24.			ζ φ.	4 ²
	•				•		11 14	
SUBJ: RAPID	EXPLOITAN	TON OF ARE	of results	IN NO LACS	(0)			é
	**	دس.	والواليداد الأوادان					Į.
ref	[47-1345-71	F47/D-573	371 0309 4	3Z AUG 74				
1. REF MESS	TAPE TENTO	LANDIC A THETE	AND THEODO	OF THE TREE O	DICTOR S	TO ATECUT		
T. KEN MESS	agge indici	(122 W Call	AMP THIEVE	DI IN SUIDA	STOITON 1	nn-vous		
ARDF, DISCUS	SEE RATIO	IAL FOR AN	FR.	OPOSAL AND	REQUESTS	D IRNSA	40.7	
Mail 1 2 20 20	3010							1.7 2.8 2.8
CONCURRENCE	WITH TIP (FF PROGRA	H.		: '' 99 at 9			
	wa ji		11,					
2. IT APPEA	RS TEAT,	ES IN PROJE	ect cumber	Sums, the H	KAL PLATI	MR HVAR		
						. *		e.
NOT REPORT THE	สาราชาชา - ค ร	TREE TS. TI	N COORDINA	TON HOW. 4	TAN DO I	RSS1.CH		
NOT BEEN IN	volved. Ti	erre is, ii	N COORDINA	tion how, a	YAP DO I	ESSAGE		
NOT BEEN INV					. *			
WHICH EXPARE	os the fix	PAC PRINC	ipie to in	CLUDE LAOS	AGAIN. PI	loced (r ie		
	os the fix	PAC PRINC	ipie to in	CLUDE LAOS	AGAIN. PI	loced (r ie		
WHICH EXPANS	os the fix eveloped w	PAC PRINCI	ipie to in (aboce) an	CLUDE LAGS D OUS-ATMA	AGAIN. PI	LOCEDÓRES LC OPS)		
WHICH EXPARE	os the fix eveloped w	PAC PRINCI	ipie to in (aboce) an	CLUDE LAGS D OUS-ATMA	AGAIN. PI	LOCEDÓRES LC OPS)		
WHICH EXPANS HAVE BEEN DI AND WILL BE	os the fix eveloped w incleded	Pac Princi ITH 7AACS (IN THIS TAK	ipie to in (abocc) an sking mess	CLUDE LAGS D OUS-ATMA	AGAIN. PI (RAVEN FI STEEL TI	LOCEDÓRES LC OPS)		
WHICH EXPANS	os the fix eveloped w incleded	Pac Princi ITH 7AACS (IN THIS TAK	ipie to in (abocc) an sking mess	CLUDE LAGS D OUS-ATMA	AGAIN. PI (RAVEN FI STEEL TI	LOCEDÓRES LC OPS)		
WHICH EXPANS HAVE BEEN DI AND WILL BE	OS THE PIX EVELOPED WI INCLACED	PAC FRINCI ITH 7AACS IN THIS TAI INVOLVED.	ipie to in (abocc) an exteg mess 7ap has	CLUDE LAGS D OUS-ATMA	AGAIN. PI (RAVEN FI STEEL TI	LOCEDÓRES LC OPS)		
WHICH EXPANS HAVE BEEN DI AND WILL BE BARREL ROLL COORDINATION	OS THE FIX EVELOPED WI INCLACED AREAS ARE	Pac Princi ITH 7AACS IN THIS TAN INVOLVED. ATED IN RE	IPLE TO IN (ABOCC) AN BRING MESS 7AF HAS	CLUDE LAGS D OUS-ALMA AGE, BOWN NO ENOWLEDS	AGAIN. PI (RAVEN FI STEEL TIC SE OF ART	LOCEDÓRES LC OPS)	₩	
WHICH EXPANS HAVE BEEN DI AND WILL BE BARREL ROLL COORDINATION	OS THE FIX EVELOPED WI INCLACED AREAS ARE	Pac Princi ITH 7AACS IN THIS TAN INVOLVED. ATED IN RE	IPLE TO IN (ABOCC) AN BRING MESS 7AF HAS	CLUDE LAGS D OUS-ATMA	AGAIN. PI (RAVEN FI STEEL TIC SE OF ART	LOCEDÓRES LC OPS)	DATE 6	1040
WHICH EXPANS HAVE BEEN DI AND WILL BE BARREL ROLL COORDINATION 3. THE FOLL	OS THE PIX EVELOPED WI INCLEMENT AREAS ARE N AS INDIC	PAC PRINCI ITH 7AACS IN THIS TAN INVOLVED. ATED IN RES	IPIE TO IN (ABOCC) AN SKING MESS 7AF HAS F.	CLUDE LAGS D OUS-ARMA AGE, BOTTO NO KNOWLEDN ARE OFFERE	AGAIN. PI (RAVEN FI STEEL TIC E OF AMT	ic ops)	DATE 6 HONTH	1670
WHICH EXPANS HAVE BEEN DI AND WILL BE BARREL ROLL COORDINATION 3. THE FOLL	OS THE PIX EVELOPED WI INCLEMENT AREAS ARE N AS INDIC	PAC PRINCI ITH 7AACS IN THIS TAN INVOLVED. ATED IN RES	IPIE TO IN (ABOCC) AN SKING MESS 7AF HAS F.	CLUDE LAGS D OUS-ALMA AGE, BOWN NO ENOWLEDS	AGAIN. PI (RAVEN FI STEEL TIC E OF AMT	ic ops)	DATE 6 HONTH ABB	1048 1971
WHICH EXPANS HAVE BEEN DI AND WILL BE BARREL ROLL COORDINATION 3. THE FOLL	OS THE PIX EVELOPED WI INCLEMENT AREAS ARE N AS INDIC	PAC PRINCI ITH 7AACS IN THIS TAN INVOLVED. ATED IN RES	IPIE TO IN (ABOCC) AN SKING MESS 7AF HAS F.	CLUDE LAGS D OUS-ARMA AGE, BOTTO NO KNOWLEDN ARE OFFERE	AGAIN. PI (RAVEN FI STEEL TIC E OF AMT	ic ops)	DATE 6 HONTH	1048 1971
WHICH EXPANS HAVE BEEN DI AND WILL BE BARREL ROLL COORDINATION 3. THE FOLL A. PARA 4B	OS THE PIX EVELOPED WITH AS INDICATED COMPANY	PAC FRINCI ITH 7AACS IN THIS TAI INVOLVED. ATED IN REI MEETS, KEY ION CM 2 A	IPIE TO IN (ABOCC) AN SKING MESS 7AF HAS F.	CLUDE LAGS D OUS-ARMA AGE, BOTTO NO KNOWLEDN ARE OFFERE	AGAIN. PI (RAVEN FI STEEL TIC E OF AMT	ic ops)	DATE 6 HONTH ABB	1048 1971
WHICH EXPANS HAVE BEEN DI AND WILL BE BARREL ROLL COORDINATION 3. THE FOLL	OS THE PIX EVELOPED WITH AS INDICATED COMPANY	PAC PRINCI ITH 7AACS IN THIS TAN INVOLVED. ATED IN REI MATS, KEY ION CM 2 A	ipie to in (abscc) an sking mess 7af has f. ed to ref	CLUDE LACS D OUS-ALMA AGE, BOTH NO KNOWLEDS ARE OFFERM	AGAIN. PI (RAVEN FI STEEL TIC E OF AMT	ic ops)	DATE 6 HONTH ABB	1048 1971
WHICH EXPANS HAVE BEEN DI AND WILL BE BARREL ROLL GOORDINATION 3. THE FOLI A. PARA 4B	OS THE PIX EVELOPED WI INCLEMENT AREAS ARE N'AS INDIC LOWING COM CONVERSAT	PAC PRINCI ITH 7AACS IN THIS TAN INVOLVED. ATED IN REI MATS, KEY ION CM 2 A	IPIE TO IN (ABOCC) AN SKING MESS 7AF HAS F. ED TO REF	CLUDE LACS D OUS-ALMA AGE, BOTH NO KNOWLEDS ARE OFFERM	AGAIN. PA	COPS)	DATE 6 HONTH ABD AGENO	1048 1971
WHICH EXPANS HAVE BEEN DI AND WILL BE BARREL ROLL COORDINATION 3. THE FOLL A. PARA 4B	OS THE PIX EVELOPED WI INCLEMENT AREAS ARE N'AS INDIC LOWING COM CONVERSAT	PAC PRINCI ITH 7AACS IN THIS TAN INVOLVED. ATED IN REI MATS, KEY ION CM 2 A	IPIE TO IN (ABOCC) AN SKING MESS 7AF HAS F. ED TO REF	CLUDE LACS D OUS-ALMA AGE, BOTH NO KNOWLEDS ARE OFFERM	AGAIN. PA	COPS)	DATE 6 HONTH ABD AGENO	1049 1971
WHICH EXPANS HAVE BEEN DI AND WILL BE BARREL ROLL GOORDINATION 3. THE FOLI A. PARA 4B	OS THE PIX EVELOPED WI INCLEMENT AREAS ARE N'AS INDIC LOWING COM CONVERSAT	PAC PRINCI ITH 7AACS IN THIS TAN INVOLVED. ATED IN REI MATS, KEY ION CM 2 A	IPIE TO IN (ABOCC) AN SKING MESS 7AF HAS F. ED TO REF	CLUDE LACS D OUE-ARMA AGE, BOYE NO KNOWLEDA ARE OFFEREI ABCCC TEP	AGAIN. PA	LOCEDURALE LC OPS)	DATE 6 HONTH ABD AGENO	1049 1971
WHICH EXPANS HAVE BEEN DI AND WILL HE BARREL ROLL COORDINATION 3. THE FOLK A. PARA 4B TYPED NAME A Major Eddy	OS THE PIX EVELOPED WI INCLADED AREAS ARE H AS INDICA LOWING COM CONVERSAT	PAC PRINCI ITH 7AACS IN THIS TAN INVOLVED. ATED IN REI MATS, KEY ION CM 2 A	IPIE TO IN (ABOCC) AN SKING MESS 7AF HAS F. ED TO REF	CLUDE LAGS D OUS-ARMA AGE, BOYE NO ENOWIEDA ARE OFFEREI ABCCC TEP	AGAIN. PI (RAVEN F) STEEL TIC E OF ANT INDICATE:	LOCEDURALE LC OPS)	DATE 6 HONTH ABD AGENO	1049 1971
WHICH EXPANS HAVE BEEN DI AND WILL BE BARREL ROLL GOORDINATION 3. THE FOLI A. PARA 4B	OS THE PIX EVELOPED WI INCLADED AREAS ARE H AS INDICA LOWING COM CONVERSAT	PAC PRINCI ITH 7AACS IN THIS TAN INVOLVED. ATED IN REI MATS, KEY ION CM 2 A	IPIE TO IN (ABOCC) AN SKING MESS 7AF HAS F. ED TO REF	CLUDE LACS D OUE-ARMA AGE, BOYE NO KNOWLEDA ARE OFFEREI ABCCC TEP	AGAIN. PI (RAVEN F) STEEL TIC E OF ANT INDICATE:	LOCEDURALE LC OPS)	DATE 6 HONTH ABD AGENO	1048 1971

ABBREVATED A DAT BUS ARESTONA

PRECEDENCE

Najer Bidy

de la locat

PASSES COORDINATES IN THE CIEAR TO THE AIRCRAFT OR SECURE TO GROUND CONTROLLER.

- B. PARA 5. CONTACT WITH ABCCC DURING IS 719 WAS MARGINAL AT HEST.

 PRIMARY PROBLEM WAS ANTENNA LOCATION ON EC. 47 IE BOTTOM OF THE

 AIRCRAFT WHICH CAUSED BLANKING DURING ATTEMPTS ON UNF. UTILIZING

 WHY REQUIRES ADDITIONAL TIME FOR ONE CONTROLLER TO CHANCE POSITIONS

 IN THE ABCCC AND SET UP TRANSCRIVER EFFORE AND AFTER EACH CONTACT.

 THIS POSITION IS NOT MANNED ON A FULL TIME BASIS. THE SAME PROBLEMS

 ARE ANTICIPATED THIS TIME, AND HELIEVE HETTER RESULTS COULD BE OBTAINED

 FROM PASSING DIRECTLY TO A GROUND SITE. QUERY ANY INFO YOU MAY HAVE

 ON PROGRESS OF ESTABLISHMENT OF ADDITIONAL TERMINALS.
- C. PARA 6. MACY DECERTOR WAS NOT REPEAT NOT ALLOCATION OF 10 ALR-3S
 SORTIES TO BARREL ROLL EXCLUSIVELY BUT TO ALL LACTION FRAG AREAS.

 ALTHOUGH DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THIS IS DECREANT. PLESS DERIVED FROM
 THE ALSO HAVE THERD LATE TACTICAL VALUE. PURTHER DO NOT UNDERSTAND
 INVOLVEMENT OF ARD NEW FOR DIRNSA CONCURRENCE.
- 4. HAVE IMPRESSIDE THAT WE MAY BE UKAWARE OF SOME DIALOGUE WHICH
 HAS COME BEFORE OF THIS SUBJECT. REQUEST YOUR VIEWS.

PAGE NO. OF MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION NO. PAGES 2 2

TIONS

DOC 124-3



A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

COMCENTER NBR: Ø 7 1 3

TIME OF RECEIPT: 12/0045Z AUG 71

DTG: R 110104Z AUG 71

FM FAC SCTY RGN TO USAFSS/DOR INFO 6994/DO

ZEM

SUBJ: RAPID EXPLOITATION OF ARDF RESULTS IN NORTHERN LAOS (C) REF: USAFSS DOR 061900Z AUG 71.

- HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN MORE INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN US SIGINT EFFORTS AGAINST COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN LAOS THAN NRV(C) IN RVN. THIS IS PARTIALLY DUE TO THE UNIQUE INTEREST VESTED IN COMUS MACV WITH REGARD TO SIGINT IN RVN. FEEL THAT PROPOSALS AS STATED BY ARE FULLY WITHIN THEIR CHARTER. ACREE THAT ASKING FOR DIRNSA APPROVAL SEEMS TO BE UNNECESSARY, HOWEVER WE ARE NOT FRIVY TO ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN PASSED VIA NSA CHANNELS.


 2. BASED UPON GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY USAFSS CC DURING RECENT VISIT (MGEN STAPLETON STATED "WE MUST COOPERATE FULLY WITH DIRNSA OR HAVE A VERY GOOD REASON FOR NOT DOING SO".), RECOMMEND THIS SUBJECT NOT BE PURSUED FURTHER.
- 3. IN ANSWER TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS POSED IN PARA 2 OF REF, THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED.
- A. WE ENVISION NO CHANGE IN SUPPORT PROVIDED TO MOREOVER, PROPOSAL SHOULD ENHANCE THIS SUPPORT.
- B. WE ALSO ASSUME COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN EC-47 AND ABCCC WILL BE VIA SECURE VOICE.
- 4. FOR 6994TH. REQUEST YOU CONFIRM PARA 3 ABOVE. WE FEEL ALSO THAT SHOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW AND COMMENT ON THE PROPOSAL.

290

This is a certified true extract copy.

GEORGE F. LOGAN Jr., Capt., USAF

Operations Officer









A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

RR YMRDQR

DE YHLAKZ ØØ24 337Ø242

ZNY MMNSH

R Ø3Ø159Z DEC 71

FM PSR

TO 6994SS/DO

ZEM

SUBJ: FIX/FAC PROGRAMS

REF OUR DO 022349Z DEC 71.

THE FOLLOWING PACAF MESSAGE IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE.

R Ø121ØØZ DEC 71

FM AFSSO PACAF

TO USAFSS/DOR

INFO PACSCTYRGN/DOR

SECRET COMINT CHANNELS INX

SUBJ: FIX FAC PROGRAMS

REF: A. USAFSS 181815Z NOV 71.

B. 7AF/INX 23ØØ3ØZ NOV 71 (NOTAL)

1. REF A REQUESTED DATA UPDATE OF FIX FAC PROGRAMS. REF B PROVIDED CURRENT STATISTICS ON PROGRRAM, A RESUME OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRGMS AND OUTLINED FACTORS LIMITING THEIR EFFECTIVENESS.
2. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL PRGMS HAS VARIED WITH THE GEO-

- 2. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL PROMS HAS VARIED WITH THE GEO-GRAPHICAL LOCATION, OTHER FAC COMMITMENTS, RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR SUPPORT, AND THE LENGTH OF TIME FOR WHICH THE PROMS HAVE BEEN IN BEING. THIS IS BEST ILLUSTRATED BY A COMPARISON OF THE BLUD BEETLE AND BROWN BEAVER PROGRAMS:
- A. WHEN THE BLUE BEETLE PROGRAM WAS FIRST ESTABLISHED, 7AF WAS ABLE TO PROVIDE DEDICATED TACTICAL AIR AND FAC SUPPORT. INITIALLY THERE WERE SOME ENCOURAGING RESULTS: HOWEVER, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME THE VR AND SUBSEQUENT BDA DECREASED. THIS IS IN PART DUE TO AN INCREASE IN THE TEMPO AND CONCENTRATION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN CAMBODIA AND SUBSE_ QUENT COMMITMENT OF FAC RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF FANK OPERATIONS. FAC ACTIVITY WAS CENTERED AROUND PHNOM PENH, TAY NINH, AND THE RUMLONG/ CHENIA II AREAS. A LARGE ARVN CROSS-BORDER OPERATION IS TAKING PLACE IN THE TOAN THANG A.O. ALONG THE RVN BORDER. AS A RESULT, THERE MAY BE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS LEVIED ON THE FACS WHICH WOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE BLUE BEETLE PROGRAM. A NUMBER OF THE FIXES RECENTLY PASSED TO THE FACS IN CAMBODIA FALL OUTSIDE OF THESE AREAS AND THE FAC IS NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE VR. LATEST STATISTICS FOR THE BLUE BEETLE PROGRAM RE-FLECT THE FOLLOWING: FROM 1-10 OCT, 52 TARGETS WERE PASSED AND 10 VR'D. FROM 11-20 OCT, 31 TARGETS WERE PASSED AND 7 WERE VR'D. DURING THIS TIME NO TACTICAL AIR STRIKES WERE CALLED IN AS A RESULT OF THE

BLUE BEETIE PROGRAM. ONE FACTOR WHICH CANNOT BE QUANTITATIVELY ASSESSED IS THE NUMBER OF FIXES WHICH FALL IN AREAS WHICH THE FAC KNOWS FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE TO BE TRIPLE CANOPY JUNGIE. THE ENEMY HAS TRADITIONALLY OPERATED FROM HEAVY FOLIAGE AREAS IN CAMBODIA. THESE FACTORS COUPLED WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE FAC FLY AT AN ALTITUDE OF 4500 FT WHEN THERE IS A THREAT (PRESENCE OF 12.7 MM AAA), REDUCES THE EFFECT-IVENESS OF THE PROGRAM IN CAMBODIA.

- B. BROWN BEAVER CURPENTLY REFLECTS A MUCH GREATER PERCENTAGE OF VR AS WELL AS SIGNIFICANT BDA FROM AIR STRIKES CALLED IN AS A RESULT OF VR. BROWN BEAVER STATISTICS FROM 31 OCT TO 10 NOV SHOW 56 TARGETS PASSED, 28 VR'D, AND 4 STRUCK. FROM 11-20 NOV, 103 TARGETS WERE PASSED, 53 VR'D WITH 6 SUBSEQUENT AIR STRIKES. ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN POSSIBLE TO REPORT BDA, THE FOLLOWING RESULTS ARE AVAILABLE AND CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE BROWN BEAVER PROGRAM:
- 31 OCT 1 TRUCK DESTROYED
- 07 NOV TROOP CONCENTRATION STRUCK, NO BDA AVAILABLE
- 99 NOV 1 SECONDARY EXPLOSION, 2 STRUCTURES DESTROYED
- 11 NOV 1 SECONDARY EXPLOSION, 4 SUSTAINED FIRES, 5 KBA, (RNO FOR TWO STRIKES)
- 17 NOV 1 BUNKER DESTROYED
- 18 NOV RNO
- 19 NOV 1 SECONDARY EXPLOSION, 1 STRUCTURE DESTROYED, 4 SECONDARY FIRES
- 20 NOV 3 AIR STRIKES WITH 8 BUNKERS AND 1 STRUCTURE DESTROYED, 100 CU FT SUPPLIES DESTROYED AND 1 SECONDARY EXPLOSION.
- REASONS FOR MORE SUCCESS IN LAOS ARE THAT FACS CAN DEVOTE MORE TIME TO VR OF ARDF FIXES AND HAVE MORE DEDICATED TACTICAL AIR AVAILABLE FOR STRIKES (A1s, F-4s, A-37s, AND LAOTIAN T-28s).
- 3. CONCUR WITH REF A THAT THE FIX FAC PROGRAMS HAVE BIEN AND CONTINUE TO BE OF VALUE. 7AF ADVISES THAT INTEREST IN THE PROGRAMS REMAINS HIGH AND THAT THEY ARE THE OBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE MANAGEMENT EFFORT AT THAT HQ AND SUBORDINATE UNITS. UNITS FLYING IN SUPPORT OF BLUE BEETLE AND BLACK BEAR, ALTHOUGH NOT ABLE TO DEVOTE OPTIMUM TIME TO VR, MAINTAIN RECORDS OF FIXES PASSED AND USE THESE RE ORDS TO NOMINATE AREAS FOR FUTURE VR IF TIME BECOMES AVAILABLE. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE TO QUANTITATIVELY ASSESS THEIR ACTUAL VALUE, BELIEVE THAT THE PROGRAMS ARE WORTHWHILE AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE PROGRAMS FROM YOUR HQS ARE WELCOMED.

OMGOOTE

900

This is a certified true extract copy.

GEORGE F. LOGAN Jr, Capt., USAF

Operations Officer

JOINT MESSAGEFORM		347. 34.
ECURITY CLASSIFICATION		
AASS MES ROOK MOFL! SINGER		
PRECEDENCE		7-18 E
CTION DE LESTEN		:
NFO DTG 16 040 2 007 71 .		<u> </u>
FROM: (994 SCII 61)	SPECIAL II	HOTRUCTION
TO: 850 1867/32:1-4	·	:
INFO TAT/THE / WANTER COM		- 04 - 04 - 17
PSR/DOR		•
an analysis of the second seco		<i>)</i>
	.	د د
WEJ: EUF INFROMMENT ACTIONS	·. [
	\	•
IBF A. SSO MATH JELL-4 1310492 007 71 (BOTAL)		• •
B. APEN TAY DE ATLANS OUT '11 (BOTAL)		
. IN AN ANTEST TO DEPOSIT MOT MERCHINARS, THE 6994 SCTI SQ		. 1
CIRTAL CUI TRAT UP TO COR ROLL OF LELF TIME ON TABLET IS LOCAT MADE.	i .	•
CTH TULE POSITIONS ARE MARKED OF 5 STORE COZ MUSICIONS IN AREAS WHEN		,
IN BELL ACT REQUIREMENT KAISTE. IT HAS BELLEVED BEFLEELY PRASIBLE.		
MAT DEPENDENT OF TAKETED OF EC-47 ASSETS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED		
MACRICE A PERALD OF CONFIGURATIONS AND MAINTING STRUCTURE. NOR		
HAMPLE, AN EC-47 HOLE CAS PROVIDE THE POLLOWING VARIETY OF SUPPORT		ं हा - भू - भू
. 5 HOUR HISTOR WITH THO MERK COLLECTION POSITIONS.	7	*** **********************************
S HOUSE MESSION MINE THE THE COLLECTION POSITIONS.	DATE	Twist
	j	TIME
	MONTH	- 6930
. 5 AND CHE HALF HOUR MISSION, ONE MORSE OR CHE VOICE COLLECTION	PAGE NO.	NO. OF
		PAGES 4
TYPED NAME AND TITLE PHONE R SHIRTURE		
SHEET LAYSON / dry DAVID H BRIT, Hajor, I		
	*	100 W 300
Spare times Officer ECUMITY CLASSIFICATION REGRADING METRUCTIONS		^* 4 ×

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CC SINUATION SHEET

CURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE ACTION PETORITY INFO

RELEASED BY Major Eddy

SMigt Larson

PHON 1302

POSITION MANNED.

- E. 6 SCUR MISSION REITHER COLLECTION POSITIONS WARNED.
- F. THIS VARIABLE TASKING WAS APPROVED AND IMPLRIGHTED FOR A 28 DAY TEST PURIOD ON 7 AUG. IT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RECOMMENDED TO CONTINUE THE TEST UNTIL A COMPLETE EVALUATION COULD BE COMPLETED. AS A RESULT OF THUS MAN TASKING THREE AREAS HAVE SHOWN AR IMPACT.
- (1) PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON TARGET, SINCE THE FIRST WEEK IN ARCHIST THE SCHALECK PERCENTICE OF THIAL PLYING TIME WHICH IS SPENT OF TARGET HAS RISER FROM 67 PERCENT TO 70 PERCENT. LOCALLY, IT HAS INCREASED FOUR PARCENT. BAPRESSED IN TERMS OF FLAING HOURS THIS EQUATES TO APPROLIMATELY 30 HOURS OR SIX MISSIONS PER TASKING WEEK.
- (2) OUR FIX BATE PER HOUR ON TARGET REMAINS AT JUST ONER ONE PER HOUR. THEREFORE ANY INCREASE IN TOT HAS RESULTED IN AN ATTENDARY INCREASE IN FIXES CETATION.
- (a) REDUCED MARRIEG OF SELECTED POSITIONS HAS NOT RESULTED IN A PARALLEL REDUCTION IN COLLECTION. EXPLOITABLES, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE INCREASED.
- 2. DIBING 23-26 AUG. ACC REPRESENTATIVE VISITED USH-7 TO DISCUSS, AMENU CARRY TRINGS, ARDY SUPPORT PROVIDED TO IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE WESELT PRE PLANORD REQUEST FOR ANDY COVERAGE BEING RECEIVED FROM THE IS TOO GERERAL IN NATION

S !		Ĩ	1	
SEC		TANK STREET, AND THE	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DOC # 30	3-1

ABBREVIATE JOINT MESSABEFORM

RELEASED BY

PRECEDENCE

INFO

Bajor Maly

Stigt Lerson

4891

AND THAT IT WAS USUALLY RECRIVED TOO LATE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

THE SYSTEM USED IN MYN WAS EXPLAINED, WHERE THE FIELD PORCE

COMMANDERS MEET WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE CHA AND PRESENT THEIR REQUESTS.

THE CHA, SINCE IT IS IN THE BEST POSITION TO KNOW TARGET COMMUNICATIONS

ACTIVITY, RESCONMENDS THE SUMMER OF SORTIES BY TYPE AND FRAG AREA TO

SATISFY THE FIRLD PORCE COMMUNICAN REQUESTS. IT WAS EMPHASIZED THAT

CLOSE COORDINATION RETWEEN AND THE MAD USM-7 AND THE CONTINUED USE

OF OFS COMM TO THE MCC WOULD ENTIRE SATISFY THEIR MEEDS. COVERAGE

IS NOW BRING REQUESTED AND THE MEETING PRECLUDE BRING RECRIVED TO

LATE AT THE AGG.

3. A REJENT EVALUATION OF THE THEM DATA LISTS PROVIDED BY THE CMA'S SHOWED A DEPURITE HEED FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THIS PRODUCT. DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE LOCAL CMA (USM-626), MACV 1211-4, AND THE 509 MBG, SOME OF THE MORE CHARLEG INADEQUACIES WERE POINTED OUT. CHE OF THE RIGGEST PROBLEMS COMPROSTING THE ADEQUACY OF THE ELL IS THE SCHEDULES. MOST SCHEDULES CONTAIN TIMES OF THE HOUR AND HALF MOUR MIRE IN ACTUALITY THEY SHOULD BE MORE PRECISE.

(EG FIVE MINETESS OR 35 MINUTES AFTER THE HOUR). REVIEW OF CURRENT TOL'S REVEAL THE CMA IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO PROVIDE MORE ACCURATE SKED TIMES ON THESE TOL'S.

4					
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE	NO, OF	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		NO.	PAGES		١.
		1 .	4		
SI SI			<u> </u>	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	-
				Doc#3	0-2

DD 1 HOY 63 173-

ABBREVIATE JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CO. INUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE RELEASED BY
ACTION PRICEITY

DRAFTED BY

HOME

INFO

(₽

Major Eddy

SEgt Larson

4891

- 4. THE FILFFAC PROGRAM WAS ESTENDED TO COVER NORTHERN SCUTH VIETELAM (BLACK SEAR) AND LAGS (BROWN BEAVER) ON 31 JULY AND 2 OCT RESPECTIVELY. THE PROGRAM DIFFERS SLIGHTLY FROM THE CAMBODIAN (BLUE BESTLE) REPORT IN THAT THE FIXES ARE PASSED TO A GROUND CONTROLLER (BLACK BEAR) AND TO THE AIRBORNE COMPAT CONTROL CHATER (BROWN BEAVER). THE FIXES ARE THEN PASSED TO THE PAC FOR VISUAL BECORNAISSANCE.
- 5. VIN OPERATORS CONACTOR TRAINING PROGRESS. THE POURTH CLASS OF ARVE CHERATORS CONACTORED SCROOL ON 11 OCT. THEY ARE NOW FLYING SEVEN MUSSICES A DAY (EFFECTIVE 2 OCT). A US CREW MUSSICE IS STILL FLYING ON RACE MISSICE TO HANDLE ANY PROBLEMS THAT MAY ARISE INCLUDING THE A/G/A COMMUNICATIONS. IN ADDITION, A LINCEIST IS NOW FLYING THE SOLD COMPTCHARD MISSICES TO INSTRUCT THE VIETNAMESE OFFERATORS OF THE PROPER ESCORDING/TUNING PROCRIMES OF VOICE SIGNALS.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE	NO. OF	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
` .		NO:	PAGES		
		# 4	11		
SECURITY CLASSIC	ICATION		-	PECOADNIC INSTRUCTIONS	
				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	_
				DOC#3	0-3

JOINT MESSAGEFORM			* *
ION			
			4. Te
TYPE MSG BOOK MULT! SINGLE		ā Ti	
IX I	New N		
PRECEDENCE ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO DTG 5/ 27	75 2/ NOV 71		
FROM: 6994 SCTI SQ TAN S	ON NHUT, APLD, NYE	SPECIAL IN	EMOLTOURTS
to: 280 MACV/SAIGON, K	VN (MESSENGER)		
THEFO: 509TH RR GP (ACC):	SAIGON, HVN (MESSENGER)	CORE !	7.02.
483 TAW/ DEF PER/DOR/WHISELER AF	· .	DOWNE S	Palacher.
FOR FOR TRANSP. AF.	· IIOMALI,	JONEZ Z	- Park
GON MARTE BOD Y OLD			٠ - د
SSC MACV FOR J-211-4		100	
VBJ: ARDF IN RVE MR-1		16	
THIS IS A JOINT 7AF/ 699488 HESEARE			
1. DURING THE 3 NOV ARDS SCHEDULING COMP	ERENCE, DEPUTI/JZREMARKED		
THAT THE SITUATION IN MR-1 WAS STABLE AND	THAT ARDY IS PRESENTLY PRO-		1 4
VIDING SATISFACTORY COVERAGE. HE ADDITION	VALLY SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS		
SOME SEA AREA NINE RESOURCES COULD BE DIVI	ERTED OR CAMOBILLED. FURTHER,		
MACV ANALYSTS BRIEFED THAT ALL OTHER AREAS	S WITHIN THE RANGE OF DAMANG		÷
BASED BC-47'S ARE ALSO BEING PROVIDED SAT	ISPACTORT ARBY COVERAGE.		
2. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, ME SUGGESTITHE	362 TEME/DET 2, 6994 SCTI 8Q		
A DOWNFRAGORD TO SON OF POSSESSED ACFT V	ICE THE PRESENT BATE OF 75%,		
A PIGURE WHICH IS SELDON ATTAINED. TASKII	NG AT THIS LEVEL WOULD BE		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
MAINTAINED UNTIL SUGH TIME AS ENDEY ACTIV	ITY LEVEL IN MR-1 DEMANDS AN	71 A	715.50
INCREASE. ADOPTION OF THIS RECONOMINATION		DATE 05	TIME 9850
	TO A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE	MONTH	YEAR
THE		PAGE NO.	NO. OF
		1	PAGES 2
TYPED NAME AND TITLE PHONE D 4891	R SIGNATURE		•
Ä	L E		·
Capt Purkiss/mlg	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE DAVID H EDDY, Maj, USA	F	
8	Constions Officer	_	
M .	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	Doc#	3/
TO FORM 1772		4 0%	SSE SET. GET

ABBREVIATE JOINT MESSAGEFORM

PRECEDENCE RELEASED BY
ACTION RUTTERS Major Ridy
INFO

DRAFTED BY Captain Parkies 4891

ARDY REFORT IN THAT AREA IN THAT IT WOULD

- A. ALLOW AIRCREMS MORE TRAINING TIME FOR TRANSITION MITO DIRFER-ENT MODEL EX-47'S AND DIFFERENT AND SYSTEMS REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF THE PHU CAT CLOSURE.
- B. ALLOW MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL TIME TO PERFORM MORE COMPRE-HERSIVE PHASE MAINTENANCE. HE EXPECT THIS MOULD REDUCE THE ABORT RATE COMBIDERABLY AND IN GENERAL MAKE FOR A MORE EFFICIENT ARDY SYSTEM.
- C. GIVE THE DEG ORGANIZATIONS ERRATHING ROOM TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR HELY ACCULRED ASSETS WITHIN THEIR NOT-YET EMANDED FACILITIES.
- D. PROVIDE DNG ORGANIZATIONS EXTRA TIME AND MANPOWER TO RECOVER FROM THE RECENT TYPHOON.
- 3. BASED ON COL CRECO'S STATEMENTS, WE BELIEVE THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT ANY IMMEDIATE DEGRADATION TO THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THE ACFT AND PERSONNEL WOULD, OF COURSE, BE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES. THES PLAN WILL PROVIDE FOR A MORE HIGHLY TRAINED AND ARDY FORCE CAPABLE OF MEETING INCREASED DEMANDS DURING THE HERT SERIES OF OPERATIONS IN ME.-1.

GP-4

w

-

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 2	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INIŢIALS
	TION			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DC#3	1-1

DED 1 HOY 53 1/3-1

PREFER THAT WE CANCEL REF ALPHA AS THEY BELIEVE COL CREGO WAS INCORRECTLY QUOTED. THEIR CONCERN I STEMS FROM THE FACT THAT HE WILL BE PASSING THROUGH HAWAII SOON AND YOUR BEING AN ADDRESSEE MAY HAVE RESULTED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH CINCPAC/NSAPAC/PACAF. AS COL CREGO HAS NOT SEEN THE MSG THEY OBVIOUSLY WOULD PREFER THAT IT IS NOT DISCUSSED AT THAT LEVEL. WE CONCUR.
SEEN THE MSG THEY OBVIOUSLY WOULD PREFER THAT IT IS NOT DISCUSSED AT THAT LEVEL. WE CONCUR.
RECOGNIZING THE PROBLEMS/ADVANGAGES DISCUSSED MACV HAS CHOSEN
LEASED TOMORROW TASKING THE AF TO SUPPORT A SORTIE RATE OF .5 PER ASSIGNED ACFT VICE .75 PER POSSESSED. THIS SORTIE RATE WILL MONTH VE

age to the transfer of	ABBREVIA and/or I	CONTINUAT	州に2つから来すり代析	9 3 9 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5		
PRE	CEDENCE	RELEASE			3	PHONE
ACTION A AL	TOMETH					
INFO		1				

7AF IS ABLE TO OFFER MORE. A CONDITION WILL BE INCLUDED THAT

IF ADDITIONAL ACFT ARE OPS CAPABLE THEY SHOULD BE OFFERED FOR POSSIBLE TASKING.

TWE CERTAINLY IF SUCH TASKING CHANGE IS TO BE PERMANENT THERE ARE REDUCTION IMPLICATIONS WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED. WE WILL PASS THE MSG WHEN AVAILABLE AND AT THE SAME TIME REQUEST UR COMMENTS.

CONTROL NO. TOR/TOD PAGE NO. OF MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION INITIALS PAGES REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DOC #32-1

DD , FORM 173-1

1

- c. Yet another possibility might be to schedule those missions with TOT of after 1300L for a less than seven hour mission, the length of which would ensure leaving the target area by 1900L.
- 5. It would appear that the best solution to this problem would be a combination of those suggested above. We would appreciate your assistance in coordinating with ACC so as not to schedule TCT before 2300Z and to ascertain the possibility of that 4C above. As for those missions which are scheduled to remain on orbit after 1100Z, request authority to call for an RFI abort and properly notate the reduced mission as such in the DURMIS. However, if this is done, what would be the ramifications of the increase in the number of reduced missions? Your earliest guidance on this problem would be appreciated.

ZICHED

Ki RMIT J. WEGNER, Captain, USAF Operations Officer

1 Atch: Time on target Statistics (S)

			728:50			•		` •				ŧ		•			
		66:15	Š.				12			·				-	-		
30	40	50	15	35	05	2,0	20	30 20	10	50	45 35 50	4.5	70	у.о Ул	Ĝ.	Ç.	N I
	ы	16	46	R	127	151	157	130		228 250 255 227 194 152	227	255	250	228	123	18	TOT HRS
			N	3	80	114	129	%	175	199	399 336 278	336	399	1 % 8 322	1,068	ν,	TARGETS WORKED
22 D0	<u>ک</u>	20	49	1 €	17	16	15 16	14		12 13	<u> </u>	7	99	88	\$7	8.	LOCAL

6 July 1971 - 17 Aug 1971

ZULU

22

Ø

26

B

700

ğ

86

18

98

OC #33-2

JOINT MESSAGEFORM			
ECURITY CLASSIFI			
TYPE MSG		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
AA.		•	
PRECEDENCE .	1		1
CTION SOUTINE OTO 13/0	0015Z SEP 71		100
FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ		SPECIAL IN	STRUCTIONS
TO: SSC MACV/J211-4-		· .	
509RRG#ACC			
INFO: PSR/DO		-	
TMFO: TSM/DO			
			٠ ١
A RECENT STUDY CONDUCTED BY DET 1, 6	994 SCTY SQ RELATIVE TO ARDF		
ission effectiveness illustrates a wast.			, .
ESOURCES DURING EARLY MOR <mark>NING AND EVENI</mark>	NG HOURS. THE STUDY CONTAINS		
TATISTICS COMPARING THE AMOUNT OF TIME	SPENT ON TARGET DURING FACH		
OUR OF THE DAY FOR THE SIX WEEK PERIOD,	6 JUL THRU 17 AUG 71. AND		
THE CORRESPONDING RESULTS OBTAINED FOR E			
. DURING THIS SIX WEEK PERIOD, ARDF EC	-47 ATRCRAFT WERE ON TARGET		
. TOTAL OF OVER 18 HOURS BEFORE 2300% FO	or on <mark>ly two targets worked.</mark> Of	VI.	
T THESE TARGETS HAS NO PRIORITY ASSIGNE			
		•	
INIDENTIFIED. THEY WERE ON TARGET A TOT	CAL OF OVER 66 HOURS AFTER		
100% FOR ONLY 2 TARGETS WORKED. THESE	TWO TARGETS WERE IDENTIFIED		
S THE SAME UNIT (MO134-PRI ONE) AND IS.			
			1445
THER DAY. AFTER 1000Z, THEY WERE ON TA	HIGHT A TOTAL OF 129 HOURS	MONTH	YEAR
WITH 15 WORKED. IN COMPARISON, THE UNIT	IS AIRCRAFT WERE ON TARGET	SEP PAGE NO.	71 NO. OF PAGES
		1	PAGES 2
TYPED NAME AND TITLE PHONE.	R SIGNATURE		
1	E E	·	
ion	TYPED (or elempost) HAME AND TITLE	15	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
4891	E E	5	

and/or CONTINUATION SHEET RELEASED BY

DRAFTED BY

ACTION INFO

PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE


Major Eddy

SMSgt Lerson

DURING THE G100Z HOUR DURING THIS PERIOD FOR A TOTAL OF 250 HOURS AND 10 MINUTES WITH 399 TARGETS WORKED.

- 3. THE REASON FOR THIS LACK OF SUCCESS DURING THE FVENING AND EARLY MORNING HOURS IS: (1) THE LACK OF TARGET ACTIVITY AND (2) THE INCREASED RFI, SKYWAVES, ETC. WHICH IS PREVALENT AT THESE TIMES OF DAY. THE LATTER MAKES DETECTION AND PHASE MEASUREMENT OF LOCAL TRANSMISSIONS, VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE.
- 4. THERE APPEAR TO BE SEVERAL SOLUTIONS TO THIS PROBLEM:
- A. SCHEDULE MISSIONS TO BE ON TARGET DURING OPTIMUM TIME PERIODS.
- B. REDUCE THOSE MISSIONS WHICH ARE SCHEDULED TO REMAIN ON TARGET AFTER 1100Z BY CALLING AN RFT ABORT WHEN THE SITUATION WARRANTS IT. NORMALLY THE UNIT IS FININSHING THE MISSION SORTIES AS SCHEDULED EVEN THOUGH TOT AFTER 1100Z IS UNPRODUCTIVE.
- C. SCHEDULE THOSE MISSIONS WITH THOSE OF AFTER OF OCZ FOR A IESS THAN SEVEN HOUR MISSION. THE LENGTH OF WHICH WOULD ENSURE LEAVING THE TARGET AREA BY 1100Z.
- 5. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS PN THE ABOVE.

NO. OF MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION CONTROL NO. TOR/TOD PAGE NO. DING INSTRUCTION



ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

RELEASED BY

CHEFTEON

ACTION ROBATED

PRECEDENCE

Major Eddy

439

IT IS UP TO OUR UNITS TO ENSURE THAT INFORMATION IS PASSED. TO THIS END, WE WOULD LIKE TO ARRIVE AT A FORMAL MEANS OF RELAYING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF 6994TH ANALYSTS TO THE CMAS FOR THEIR USE IN STATING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COMING WEEK. THIS INFO COULD BE FWD VIA OPSCOM, TO ARRIVE AT THE CMA EACH SUNDAY, AND COULD INCLUDE ANY INFO DEEMED ESSENTIAL. FORMAT MIGHT BE AS FOLLOWS:

FM: USA-56X

10: USM-626

INFO: ACC

USA-561/DO

subj: ardf tasking recommendations 4-10 Jan 72

- D. FRAG AREA ADJUSTMENTS:
- A. 820C. CHANGE FRAG PT TO WI6080. RECENT FIXES ON MOO75 INDICATE MOVEMENT TO SE. CHANGE PROVIDES OVERLAP WITH 803G.
- 2. ITOT ADJUSTMENTS.
- A. 801G. CHANGE ITOT TO 0200Z VICE 010CZ. COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY
 HAS BEEN INCREASING AS ACET IS DEPARTING AREA. FIRST HOUR -- HOUR AND
 A HALF HAVE BEEN TOTALLE NON-PRODUCTIVE DURING LAST 30 DAYS.
- 3. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS SUCH AS MISSION DURATION BECAUSE OF NIGHT/
 AAA EFFECTS, ADDITIONAL/DELETION OF ENTITIES FROM TASKING, TYPE OF
 CCZ TASKING, ETC.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO, OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	3	28/0845Z Dec 71	
SECURITY CLASSIFICAT	10		٠.	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	35-1

DD , "0" 173-1

PRECEDENCE ACTION ROUTING

INFO

RELEASED BY Maj Eddy

4891

4. YOUR COMMENTS ARE REQUESTED ON THE ABOVE. ONCE THE PROCEDURE IS PIRM, WE WILL PROPOSE A 30 DAY TEST TO MACV/ACC/CMA AND IF SUCCESSFUL, WILL FORMALIZE IN APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES.

NO. OF PAGES CONTROL NO. TOR/TOD PAGE NO.

CLASSIFICATION

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DOC#35-2

THIS IS A TRUE COPY:

//PRICRITY//

SSN 0263

P 110620Z AUG 71

FM 6994TH SCTYSQ

TO DET - 1 6994TH SCTY SQ

DET -2 6994TH SCTYSQ

ZEM

FOR CAPT CHAPELLE (DET-2) AND CAPT WEGNER (DET-1), MAJ EDDY SENDS
THE FOLIOWING PAPER WAS PRESENTED TO GENERAL'S PARTY DURING THAI
VISIT BY I KNOW ITS TOUGH BUT CAN YOU PROVIDE YOUR
THOUGHTS BY TOMORROW AM. I WILL WORK IT DOWN HERE AND JOINTLY MAYBE
WE CAN GIVE AN ANSWER.
QUOTE:

- 1. ARDF CONTINUES TO BE HIGHLY USEFUL TOOL FOR KEEPING TRACK OF THE ENEMY. WE ARE CONTENT WITH LEVEL OFARDF SUPPORT BEING AFFORDED US IN MR II; IT DOES NOT MEET OUR STATISTICAL REQUIREMENT I.E., FIXING 31 FIRST PRIORITY TARGETS IN MR II EACH DAY, BUT IT'S CONTRIBUTION TO OTHER KNOWLEDGE GAINED BY INTERCEPT AND COLLATERAL IS SUFFICIENT ENOUGH SO THAT WE HAVE A GOOD GRASP OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.
- 2. THE STORY IN MR III AND MR IV IS LESS COMFORTING. COMINT COLLECTION OF FNEMY UNITS KNOWN TO BE IN THOSE AREAS IS FAR BELOW THE LEVEL
 OF MR II. THUS MORE RELIANCE IS PERFORCE PLACED ON ARDF. UNFORTUNATELY
 ARDF RESULTS IN MR III AND MR IV ARE NOT GOOD, AS CAN BE SEEN BY STATISTICS COMPILED WEEKLY FOR PERIOD 29 MAY THROUGH 30 JULY (9 WEEKS). READ
 IN COLUMNS FOR WEEK, SORTIES SCHEDULED, PRIORITY I REQUESTED/FIXED,
 PRIORITY II REQUESTED/FIXED, PRIORITY III REQUESTED/FIXED, AND TOTAL
 FIXES MADE OF IDENTIFIED (NOT NECESSARILY REQUESTED) ENEMY STATIONS:
 SEA AREA 10:

SORTIES	PRI I R/F	PRI II R/F	PRI III R/ F	TOT
35	25/5	9/3	17/0	19
28	25/3	9/ 0	17/0	9
3 4	27/5	9/0	16/0	16
33	31/2	8/1	14/0	7
27	25/4	4/1	11/3	12
28	26/2	5/1	13/3	14
45	24/3	4/0	11/1	8
3 5	28/3	5/0	1 1/1	6
35	27/5	5/1	10/0	18
	35 28 34 33 27 28 45	35 25/5 28 25/3 34 27/5 33 31/2 27 25/4 28 26/2 45 24/3	35 25/5 9/3 28 25/3 9/0 34 27/5 9/0 33 31/2 8/1 27 25/4 4/1 28 26/2 5/1 45 24/3 4/0	35 25/5 9/3 17/0 28 25/3 9/0 17/0 34 27/5 9/0 16/0 33 31/2 8/1 14/0 27 25/4 4/1 11/3 28 26/2 5/1 13/3 45 24/3 4/0 11/1

SEA	AREA 11				
1	11	11/5	5/1	9/0	15
2	11	14/3	4/0	5/0	7
3	11	13/3	3/0	5/0	6
4	11	12/2	3/0	9/0	6
5	11	13/3	2/0	8/0	7
6	11	13/3	2/0	8/0	6
7	11	14/3	2/7	7/0	11
8	11	15/5	2/0	9/0	15
9	11	11/8	7/0	6/0	19
_					

3. PRIORITY I TARGETS ARE SUPPOSED TO BE FIXED DAILY, PRIORITY II, EVERY OTHER DAY, AND PRIORITY III EVERY THIRD DAY. THUS THE 25 PRIORITY I TARGETS REQUESTED FOR WEEK 1 IN SEA AREA 10 WOULD MEAN 175 FIXES A WEEK IF THE REQUIREMENT WERE TOTALLY MET. THE 5 FIXES REPORTED FOR THE WEEK THUS FALLS WOEFULLY SHORT OF OUR STATISTICAL REQUIREMENT. BEING REALISTIC, HOWEVER, WE WOULD BE MUCH HAPPIER IF THE NUMBER OF FIXES ON PRIORITY TARGETS MERELY DOUBLED IT'S PRESENT RATE, AND WOULD PROBABLY EVEN STOP COMPLAINING ALTHOUGH IT WOULD STILL LOOK BAD STATISTICALLY. UNQUOTE:

720

This is a certified true extract copy:

GEORGE F. LOCAN Jr., Capt. USAF

THIS IS A TRUE COPY:

FM USA 562 TO USA 561

FOR MAJ EDDY (6994) AND CAPT CHAPELLE (DET2) FM CAPT WEGNER. REF 6994SS DO 110620Z AUG 71

- 1. SINCE WE DON'T FLY IN SEA AREA 11, WILL COMMENT ABOUT THE ABOVE REF AS IT APPLIES TO SEA AREA 10.
- A. THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THE LACK OF PRIORITIES 1, 2, AND 3 TARGETS FIXED IN THE 10 AREA APPEARS TO BE THE LACK OF TOT SIGNALS INTERCEPTED/AVAILABLE. THE VC JUST DON'T SEEM TO BE TRANSMITTING AS MUCH IN THAT AREA, AT LEAST IN THE 2-16 MEG RANGE.
- B. TO BE LISTED AA PRIORITY, A TGT MUST BE IDENTIFIED AND THIS IS ANOTHER BIG PROBLEM, BREAKING THE TARGETS WITH CALLSIGNS BACK TO THE RADIO DESIGNATOR TO DETERMINE ITS PRIORITY. THIS PROBLEM BEGINS WITH THE TOL, WHICH ISN'T A TRUE TOL AT ALL FOR THIS AREA BUT ONLY A LIST OF CALLSIGNS THAT (HOPEFULLY) MAY COME UP ON THAT PARTICULAR DAY. ONCE INTERCEPTED, DUE TO THE WORKING OF THESE NETS AND THE UNIQUE CALLSIGN SYSTEMS THEY EMPLOY, THE CALLSIGN WILL NOT BREAK TO THE RADIO DESIGNATOR. WE DO NOT HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE ENOUGH DATA BASE, AND EVEN AFTER MANY ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN ONE FROM THE PRIMARY CMA, WE ARE STILL NOT ABLE TO BREAK THE CALLS BACK TO ANYTHING MORE THAN VOMB WITH NO RDS IN THE MAJORITY OF CASES. WHEN TARGETS BECOME ACTIVE THEY ARE INTERCEPTED AND DFD, ALL ATTEMPTS ARE MADE TO ID THEM AFTER RECOVERY AT PHU CAT. AND ARE SUBSEQUENTLY USUALLY REPORTED IN THE ARR AS VCXB -/VCMB -. C. THERE ARE OTHER FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE OUR RESULTS IN THE TEN AREA, SUCH AS THE MANY WX CANCELLATIONS THE FAST MONTH. MANY TARGETS IN THAT AREA LIE AROUND THE HIGH THREAT (AAA) AREAS, HOWEVER PARAS 2A, B ABOVE ARE THE MOST INFLUENTIAL.
- 3. IF THERE ARE ANY STATISTICS YOU NEED ON THIS THAT WE COULD PROVIDE, PLEASE LET ME KNOW EITHER TONIGHT OR TOMORROW MORNING.

/////////////////////////////////////END INFORMAL //////<mark>//</mark>/////<mark>/</mark>//////////////

This is a certified true extract copy.

GEORGE F. LOGAN Jr., Capt., USAR

Operations Officer

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 4994 SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSE) APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



REPLY TO ATTN OF: DORA

30 Sep 1971

subject: Problems Associated with ARDF Effort in SEA Areas 10 and 11

та: ВО

- l. Subsequent to Maj Gen Stapleton's briefing at about ARDF results in SEA Areas 10 and 11, MACV J21 directed a study to identify and explore possible problems associated with ARDF productivity in these areas. NRV (C) was specifically charged with performing a detailed analysis of the transmitter reference designators (RDs) on assignment and their communications activity relative to the ARDF missions in the area and their resultant fixes. In support of this analysis, the ACC provided to NRV (C) details on actual missions flown.
- 2. To supplement the NRV (C) study, the ACC took a critical look at the existing procedures for establishing and satisfying consumer requirements in Laos. To this end, we found the following problems:
- with USM-7. While USM-7 was responsible to consolidating technical data on all SEA Area 10 and 11 missions, ever half of the 42 mDs purportedly requested by were not reflected on daily Technical Data Lists (TDLs) produced by USM-7 for missions between 15 and 31 Jul. (TDLs for 29 May thru 14 Jul were not available).
- b. requirements were eften received by ACC and MACV after tasking for SEA Areas 10 and 11 had been made. Also, these requests were very general in nature.
- requirements into specific frag areas for specific airframes, they were not. In fact, USM-7 seldom submitted a weekly request at all forcing us to furnish identical coverage week after week.
- d. The number of priority targets in SEA Areas 10 and 11 requiring daily and almost daily fixes is too large and unwieldy. The sparce communications activity on many of them does not justify the assigned priority. ARDF resources available can not begin to satisfy the fix requirement as defined by the MACV criteria for priority targets.

- e. While said they requested 29 and 13 Priority 1 RDs for SEA Areas 10 and 11 respectively, only a portion of these were reflected in their weekly requests.
- 2. At NRV's (C) request submitted the following list as those RDs of interest during the period 29 May thru 14 Jul.

⊃tu	A Area 10	· ·	SEA Area 1
B6242	M0731		воо46
B6401	M1738	i	BOO47
B7661	M1761		80048
MO048	И1806	u	E0671
E0089	M2537		E1544
E0096	M2538		M0934
£1862	M2539		M3135
E21,63	M4855		MILLOL
E2164	M5298		M6800
E2165	M5372		M7680
E2166	M5408		E0071
B 0007	M8704		E0984
MO107	M5515		M5782
MO108	M7504		
	M5729		
	•		

(Ref: msg 150730Z Aug 71.)

- 3. A review of USM-7's TDLs during the period 15 Jul to 3 Aug showed how many times the schedules for these RDs appeared during the entire period. (See Atch 1)
- 4. ACC took the following actions to improve existing procedures:
- a. ACC representatives visited, USM-7, and 19-27 August to propose and discuss changes to these procedures, pointed out that the weekly requirements message from too general in nature and that it was usually received too late for planning purposes. We explained that the message did in fact justify the coverage, but did not give specifics on the number and type of sorties needed to satisfy their requirements. Because it was general and usually did not ask for changes in target disposition or target frag areas, we had no choice but to allocate the same sorties week after week. We outlined the system used in the RVN whereby the Field Force Commander met with his respective CMA and presented his weekly request. The CMA then used his data on target communications activity to determine and recommend the number of sorties by type and frag area to satisfy the Field Force Commander's request. While the weekly requests from contained basically the same type information as presented in the Field Force Commander's request, little coordination was effected with USM-7, who, in turn, never submitted a detailed

request for sorties by type or frag area. Since our visit, USA-7 has initiated these weekly requests in the format we proposed and is coordinating these requests with the sound of Additionally is submitting their request two days earlier so that it can be used for weekly planning of ARDF tasking. So long as this increased coordination between USA-7 and continues, the TDLs produced by USA-7 should become increasingly more responsive to requirements.

b. As for the MACV priority list of ARDF targets, ACC has emphasized to J211-4 that the fix requirement for priority targets is unrealistic, the criteria for priority assignment needs to be redefined, and the priority list itself is much too long for practical use. This unrealistic priority system has contributed to the seemingly low ARDF productivity of SEA Areas 10 and 11, and has a similar effect when applied to any area of coverage. Recognizing that ever 1100 targets are on the priority list and that 52% have not been active in communications for ever three months, J211-4 is taking action to revamp the priority system, redefine the priority criteria, and insure that only reasonably fixable targets are included. His initial objective is to amend MACV Directive 381-23. Having achieved this goal he will implement new operating and procedural instructions to support the new priority systems

- 5. MACV J-21 currently has on his desk a message to USAFSS Commander, informations has awareness of the complaint, these actions he has taken and those to be taken. We have asked that PSR be included as an information addresses.
- 6. Col Novy was furnished a cepy of the NEV (C) study (dated 25 Sep 71) I believe that we should point out several glaring errors in their statistical evaluation of our effort in SEA Areas 10 and 11.
- a. In Table 1, entry 1, (Priority One RDs Identified as Assigned), this list of 30 was reduced by 7 from 21 Jun 71 on. These deleted are noted in Atch 1. (Ref: Message 2108,22 Jun 71).
- b. In Table 1, the second "Minus" entry (RDs inactive in comm) is an inaccurate figure for all periods. Since the end result desired is "Max Fixes Feasible", these RDs inactive on each day must be subtracted from total assigned. Or conversely, only the RDs active on each day should be considered. Table 3, column 2 shows the number of days each RD was active during the 49 day period. The aggregate of 320 days that all RDs were active in communications is equivalent to the total number of times all RDs were heard at least once during the 49 day period. Column 4 however tells us that 48 times the RDs were not fixable because their communications were five minutes or less. Deducting this from 320,

we find that the maximum fixes feasible for the 49 day period are 272. It follows then that 272 divided by 7 (quotient of 39) yields the "Max Fixes Feasible" for a seven-day period. This should properly be the line 7 entry in Table 1. Looking at the first period (column 1) in Table 1 and netting out 16 fixes for incorrecting fragging, weather, etc, we find that "Net Fixes Feasible" equal 23. The "Net Fix Percentage" for the first period then becomes 35%. This method similarly applied to all periods yields a dramatic increase across the board in the net fix percentage.

7. After discussing with NRV (C) the aforementioned fallacies in their evaluation, they assured us that the record would be corrected and all recipients could expect an amended version in the near future.

WILIJAM K. SKAER JR, Capt, SAF OIC, DORA

のでは、100mmのでは、100mmのでは、100mmで

l Atch Review, USM-7 TDLs Msg 210842Z Jun 71

SEA Area 10

<u>RD</u>	Avg No. SKEDS On Daily TDL	Last Fix (Location and Date)	Remarks
B6242	one	XC 3918 21 Jun 71	Removed Fm Priority By Ref
B6401	zero	No Bata Avail	tt 11 in in 12
B7661 .	zero	XC 4215 08 Sep 71	n n n
E0048	one	AC 4024 24 Sep 71	H H W M m.
E0089	zero	No Data Avail	H H H M H
E0096	zero	XB 8280 13 Dec 70	te it is it
E1862	zaro	Unloc in 10	As of 28 Sep 71
E2163	zero	Unloc in 10	Removed Fm Priority By Ref
E2164	zero	XB 2384 29 Jul 71	Sec.
E2165	zero	XB 1988 23 Aug 71	
E2166	zero	Unloc in 10	As of 28 Sep 71
M0007	zero	YD 0727/23 May 71	
M0107	three	ZC 1822/17 Sep 71	Was In High Threat Area
M0108	two .	XB 3082/31 May 71	
M. J1	Two	XB 3192/4 Aug 71	
М1738	ene	MD 6446/29 Sep 71	
M1761	five	xc 3922/26 Jul 71	
M1806	zere	XB 5442/18 Jun 71	\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
M2537	zere	XB 3995/9 Jun 71	
M2538	zero	XB 3448/20 Jun 71	
M2539	zere	XB 1982/1 Aug 71	
М4855	five	XC 4118/5 Aug 71	·

M5298	2870	XC 9501 5 Jan 71	Removed Fr Priority By Ref
M5372	zaro	No Data available	
M2708	zero	Ne Data Available	
M5515	gêre	XB 2586 4 Jan 71	
M7509	one	XB 9833 5 Feb 71	
M8704	zero	YB 6822 2 Jul 71	
M5729			No Info Available
Ж ұ4О4	zero	XC 2613 15 Aug 71	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
SEA Are	ea 11	·	
B0046	zero	WD 5942 1 Aug 71	
B0047	three	WD 5944 28 Jul 71	Hi Threat Area
B0048	zere	WD 5645 2 Jun 71	Hi Threat Area
E0671	sporatic (one)	WD 5841 3 May 71	Hi Threat Area
E1544	two	YA 5671 15 JUL 71	Priority 1 SEA Area 7
м0934	speratic (ene)	WD 6431 31 May 71	
из135	three	WD 9551 29 Jul 71	
M [†] †O [†]	zero	XC 2613 15 Aug 71	
h00	two	10 7637 2 Aug 71	
M7680	four	WD 5644 6 Aug 71	
E0041	28.F		Prob Lec In Hi Threat Area
E0984	2010	Unlec To Any Area	No Priority
M5782	zere	Unloc To Any Area	No Priority













A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

DTG: 12Ø9Ø5Z NOV 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ TAN SON NHUT AFID, RVN

TO: DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ/DO/ NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB TAHI DET 1, 362 TEWS/DO/NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI 7 RRFS/UDORN THAILAND

SSO MACV (J-2114) (MESSENGER) INFO:

509 RRG (ACC)/MESSENGER

DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ/DO/DANANG AB RVN

362 TEWS/DO/DANANG AB RVN 483TAW/DOJ/CAM RANH BAY RVN PSR/DOR/WHEELER AFB HAWAII

NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C) MESSENGER

HQ USAFSS/DOR/KELLY AFB TEXAS

THIS IS A JOINT 7AF/6994SS MESSAGE SUBJ: PROJECT CUMBERSOME (U)

- 1. PROJECT CUMBERSOME IS DESIGNED TO TEST FEASABILITY OF SECURE A/G VHF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN EC-47'S, OPERATING OVER THE STFEL TIGER, AND DET J, 7TH RRFS AT UBON RTAFB. FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, SUCCESS TO DATE HAS BEEN MINIMAL. A FEW CONTACTS HAVE BEEN MADE, HOWEVER. AND READABILITY HAS BEEN EXCELIENT.
- IN ORDER TO FULLY TEST THE SYSTEM, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CHART EXACTLY THOSE AREAS WHERE A/G CONTACT CAN BE MADE. 7RRFS HAS PRO-POSED A PROCEDURE WHEREBY MISSIONS OPERATING IN AREAS 10 AND 11 WILL LOG ACFT LOCATION, ALT, HEARABILITY ETC WHEN THEY RECEIVE IN THE BLIND MMSNS FROM UBON AND WOULD ATTEMPT CONTACT AS FREQUENTLY AS FOSSIBLE. WE BIN THAT THIS PROCEDURE COULD INTERFERE WITH THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE ACFT (I.E. KEEPS ONE OPERATOR BUSY LOGGING, AND INTERFERS WITH DF/COPY WHILE TRANSMITTING).
- 3. DET 1, 362 TEWS AND DET 3, 6994SS WILL BE TASKED TO FLY ONE SORTIE IN A BRAVO NORS ACFT, INITIALLY OVERFLY UBON AND THEN PROCEED TO SEA 10. THE DET 3 RO WILL ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH UBON WHILE OVER HEAD AND ALL CONTACTS WHILE IN AREA 10. LOGS WILL INCLUDE: ACFT POSITION, ALTITUDE, DIRECTION OF FLT, WEATHER, HEARABILITY, AND ANY OTHER REMARKS DEEMED NECESSARY. THE CREW WILL ATTEMPT TO COVER AS MUCH OF AREAS 10 DELTA, CHARLIE, AND BRAVO AS POSSIBLE, FURTHER MISSIONS OF THIS NATURE WILL DEPEND ON THE SUCCESS OF THIS ONE. DET 3 WILL COORDINATE TIME AND DATE WITH 7RRS AND DET 1, 362TEWS.
- 4. REQUEST DET 1/DET 3 SUBMIT A CONSOLIDATED PLAN FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THIS TEST.
- 5. THIS MESSAGE DOES NOT PRECLUDE DET J FROM ATTEMPTING TIPSOFFS UNTIL THIS TEST CAN BE CONDUCTED.
- 6. FOR PSR: YOUR DOR, 100224Z REFERS. GP-1

This is a certified true extract copy.

GEORGE F. LOGAN Jr., Capt., USAF

Operations Officer

DOC#43

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

COMM CENTER NBR: 1 9 0 7

TIME OF RECEIPT: 31/1055Z AUG 71 DATE TIME GROUP: 310054Z AUG 71

PREC: ROUTINE

FM PACSCTYRGN TO 6994TH SCTYSQ (DO)

ZEM

SUBJ: ACCURACY OF TOL

USAFSS/STAFF TRIP DEBRIEF AT THIS HOS HAS INDICATED THAT TDL'S PROVIDED BY THE CMA WERE LESS THAN ACCURATE. AS THIS PROBLEM WAS NOT SURFECED DURING THE MAY STAN/EVAL VISIT, WE ASSUME DEGRADATION OF TDL ACCURACY TO BE OF RECENT OCCURRANCE. QUERY WHAT ACTIONS YOU HAVE INITIATED WITH USM_704 TO INCREASE TDL ACCURACY.

A certified true extract copy:

GEORGE F. LOGAN Jr., Capt., USAF

Operations Officer

TYPE MEG	OOK SHULTI SING	· 1				
. IFE MID	I			,	stij •	
TION ROUT	EDENCE .					1 1
FO ROUL		1970 010750	2 #RPT 71	*		
	FROM 699	4 SCTY SQ			SPECIAL I	STRUET ION
					•.	
	To Pa	/DOB	- -			
	,	r Both Barrier <u>III a sa</u>	1. 6 G - 1 G - 1			
		- 185 W				
TEJ: ACCURAC	er er tol			N-		
EF YOUR 3110	555 AW 71	e de la companya de l				10 P
. ARED FOR	IMPROVING TOLS	HAS HEEN A CH	ROME HATTER.	AT ONE		
WATERCH MART	Cind at 1 MAG 78	- 1 PAGE 1877 A 280	OFFICER TO	O WORK ON		
•			4			
DOROVING THE	V SAR THE CHA	ISITED THE CHA	S TO DISCUSS TO	L EFFECT		
TENESS.			:	: ') (
_ · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	<u>, a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a</u>					2
Z. WE HAVE T	LINEO LUMBE OF	S AND BACK NAT	TO EVALUATE TO	IS AND MELL		
s identify s	PECIFE AREAS	MINERA IMPROVED	ENTS ARE REDED	. THEIR		-
	IN INDIE IN SET	TE USE THE	M PRESENT OUR F	INDINGS AND	·	
rplies are d						J.
		TO POSSIBLE APA	TIONS TO IMPROVE	mis.	•	
POSSIBL	e Greeks påco		TIONS TO IMPROVE		•	
THERE POSSIBL	e offeris paper E die energen	INDEPENDENT 81	TIME CAN PROVIDE	A MRANTING.	•	
PERE POSSIBL	e offeris paper E die energen	INDEPENDENT 81		A MRANTING.	•	***
PERE POSSIBL	e offeris paper E die energen	Independent 81	TIME CAN PROVIDE	A MRANTING.		
WE RELIE	e offeris paper E die energen	INDEPENDENT 81	TIME CAN PROVIDE	A MRANTING.	DATE	
PERE POSSIBL	e offeris paper E die energen	Independent 81	TIME CAN PROVIDE	A MRANTING.	DATE 01 MONTH	1450 YEAR
PERE POSSIBL	e offeris paper E die energen	Independent 81	TIME CAN PROVIDE	A MRANTING.	01 Month SEP	1450 YEAR 71
PERE POSSIBL	e offeris paper E die energen	Independent 81	TIME CAN PROVIDE	A MRANTING.	01 Month SEP Page no.	1450 YEAR
MERE POSSIBL	L OFFICE SPACE	Independent 81	TIME CAN PROVIDE	A MRANTING.	01 Month SEP	1450 YEAR 71
TYPED NAME AND	E COPPERIS PARCE AND STORES TO STORE STOR	Independent 81	THE CAN SHATTE	A MEANING.	01 Month SEP Page no.	1450 YEAR 71
TYPED NAME AND	E COPPERIS PARCE AND STORES TO STORE STOR	Independent 81	DL IMPROVEDENT	A MEANING.	O1 MONTH SEP PAGE NO.	1450 YEAR 71
TYPED NAME AND CHEST DAVIS	E COPPERIS PARCE AND STORES TO STORE STOR	Independent 81	DA IMPROVEDENT	NED TITLE	O1 MONTH SEP PAGE NO.	1450 YEAR 71
TYPED NAME AND CHEST DAVIA	E COPPERIS PARCE AND STORES TO STORE STOR	Independent 81	DL IMPROVEDENT	NED TILL	O1 MONTH SEP PAGE NO. 1	1450 YEAR 71 MO. OF PAGES
TYPED NAME AND	E COPPERIS PARCE AND STORES TO STORE STOR	Independent 81	DAVID H. EDO	NED TILL	O1 MONTH SEP PAGE NO.	1450 YEAR 71 MO. OF PAGES

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 4894 SECURITY SQUADRON (UBAFSS) APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



MEALY TO ATTN OF: DORM/MSgt McChesney/4641

13 December 1971

suesect: COMBAT CROSS Operations for Period 4-10 December 71.

roi CC

THRU: DO

INFO: 7AF/DOINE (Maj Wallace)
483TAW/DOJ (Lt Col Casts)

PART ONE

				•
1.	Air	craft assigned:	58	26 at TSN, 32 at DNG.
	a .	AIR-34 AIR-35 AIR-38	16	26 at TSN, 7 at DNG. 16 at DNG. 9 at DNG.
	ъ.	Aircraft available:	37	(daily average)
	Ĉ,	Local maintenance:	. 6	(daily average)
	đ.	IRAN	4	TSN = 49103, 15512 DNG = 48087, 00925
	8.	Corresion Control:	2	TSN - 73735: DNG - 15980
	f.	Other:	9	TSN = 00513, 16055, 16123, 09894, 76524 = NOS (awaiting disposition) DNG = 00937/RAM at TSN 48009/RAM at NKP 08980/Pipeline to TSN-Programmed aircraft exchange.

2. Mission accomplishment:

a. Missions scheduled: 211

b.	Missions	unaccomplished:	21	2 Doppler	10.6 hours
				4 engine	27.2 hours
				3 No acft available	21.0 hours
		A		2 invertor	14.0 hours
				1 generator	6.7 hours
		•		1 other (Airframe)	5.0 hours
		· ·		8 weather	48.0 hours

c.	Reduced missions:	1 2 3 1 13	engine doppler mission equipment invertor other (airframe) fuel weather	7.1 hours 1.3 hours 4.0 hours 7.2 hours 1.7 hours 13.4 hours 13.6 hours
đ.	Missions LIA:	2 1 1 1	weather invertor engine other (airframe) no avail acft other (other)	24.2 hours 1.6 hours 1.3 hours 3.0 hours .4 hours .5 hours
6.	Aborts w/no lost time:		engine, 1 computer generator, 2 doppl	

f. Lost time:

(1)	Actual	lost	flying				
	time:			180.8	Airframe	80.8	hours
					Bravo	4.0	hours
					Weather	61.6	hours
					Other	2/ /	hanne

g. Fragged flying time: 1310.0

h. Actual flying time: 1139.4

i. Total time on target: -750.8

j. Summary of lost time:

- (1) % of loss attributed to AIRFRAME: 44.7
- (2) % of loss attributed to BRAVO: 2.2
- (3) % of less attributed to WEATHER: 34.1
- (4) % of loss attributed to OTHER: 18.1

GEORGE F. LOGAN Jr., Capt., USAF Operations Officer

DOC #46-1

•		PART TW	<u> </u>		. 44 y 36.	A.T.Y
3. Miss	sion Results					
a.	Missions Scheduled	21				
Ъ.	Missions Accomplish	ed 19	0			
c.	Sorties Flown	20			• .	
d.	Targets Worked	127	4			
е,	Fixes Achieved	94				
f.	Outs Achieved	21	A ha			•
5 •	Priority Targets		77.		:	
h.	Fixes/Cuts Passed A	/0 103	8 (89.7%	pass rate)	
1.	Fixes/Cuts not Page	ed 1	No con Not Pl Insuff KY-8 i DSU bu	icient Tim nopv	.	8 38 12 28 18 15
j	Fixes/Cuts Identifi	.ed 5/	2 : 1		T _N T	
k.	Morse Messages		The second secon			
	(1) Copied (2) Exploitable (3) Passed A/G (4) Not Passed	Parties of the second state of the second stat	4 18 19 28 Insuff KY-8	icient Cop	"y	1 3
			Insuff No cor DSU be DSU co	icient Time stact DSU sy pried		79 27 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1	Voice Messages			sive statio		15
	(1) Copied (2) Exploitable (3) Passed A/G (4) Not Passed	2	- Agreement of the Control of the Co	anscribed		215
· !			Dsu co	/40 - 35	ie .	1

4. AIR-38 Results

a. Missions Flown

30

b. Targets Worked

287 (245 HF - 42 VHF)

c. Targets Fixed

197 (168 HF - 29 **VHF**)

d. Targets Cut

54 (45 HF - 9 VHF)

5. Fix CEPs

a. ALR-34 Fixes

- 474
- (1) 250-500M CEP
- 79
- (2) 501-1000M CEP
- 253 (70.0% of fixes were below 1000M CEP)

b. ALR-35 Fixes

- 270
- (1) 250-500M CEP
- 35
- (2) 501-1000M CEP
- 158 (71.5% of fixes were below 1000M CEP)

c. ALR-38 Fixes.

- 197
- (1) 250-500M CEP
- 8
- (2) 501-1000M CEP
- 65 (37.1% of fixes were below 1000M CEP)

HENRY X HIODUSKI, tit, USAF DIC, Mission Haragement

1 Atch: AMOC/Copy Data and Flt/Area Coverage

AMOC/COPY DATA

					•
	LOCAL	MIA	DET 2	DET 3	TOTAL
MM AMOC	10505	17010	29026	84 <mark>96</mark>	65037
HF MM COPY	1081	4234	51.86	2161	12662
VHF MM COPY		•	99	103	202
RT AMOC	2240	43 7 0	11607	8860	27116
HF RT COPY		215	425	262	902
VHF RT COPY			1117	1153	227 0
		F	FLT/area C	overage	
MACV AREA	LOCAL	ΛIM	DET 2	DET 3	TOTAL
C1		13			13
03	L _i	18			22
07	ŕ		36	·	36
08			25		25
09			6		6
10			19	7	26
; 11		•	3	L,	7
15			•	11	-11
20	27 31	· <u>17</u> 48	89	22	<u>144</u> 190
	•				

JOINT MESSAGEFO BOOK | MULTI | SIMEL TYPE MEG IXI PRECEDENCE ACTION ROUTIE 20/0840Z OCT 71 INFO 699 SCTY SQ, TAN SON NHUT AFID, RVN HLL/122/ANI SIVAS imo: Det 1, 6994SS, Deu Cat Ab, RVN DET 2, 69943S, DA NANG AB, RVN DET 3. 69948S, NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB, THAILAM TEN/AFSSO 7AF (IEDS) APSSO USAF PASS TO INISE: AFSSO AFSC PASS TO SDRS: AFSSO PACAF PASS TO INKS: SSO CINCPAC FOR ATTN, 232: DIRNSA PASS TO B645: USAFSS PASS TO DORT/IN. FOR PASS TO DOR: 6940TTG PASS TO TPY. SUBJ: WEEKLY COMPAT ORCES FEEDBACK REPORT FOR 9-15 OCT 71. 1. BLUE BESTIE (69468): A TOTAL OF 42 MISSIONS WERE SCHEDULED TO WORK WITH PORMAN AIR CONTROLLERS. THIRTY THEER TARGET REPORTS Were passed to the pag the visualist reconnoitered five of them. SIGNIFICANT ACCIONN VAN DESCRIPTION SO AIR STIRKES WERE INITIATED B BASED ON BLIE METIE REPORTS. 2. BLACE PROPERTY OF PLANT PASSED VIA AUTOSEVOCOM OVER DATE TIME THE PAST THE MONTHS MAY EXPOSED READILY APPARENT FIX CLIETERS IN MONTH YEAR OCT. THE S APRA: ON 18 OCT HELT'S PAGE AND AIR CAV ATTACHED TO THE 2380 PAGE NO DIV CONDUCTED OPERATIONS AGAINST THE THERE CLUSTERS. GROUND FIRE

DD .25-173

THOMAS N. MCCHESERY, MOOT, USAY

MON ACES MONTON OF I MAY SE THESE MAY AS HERO.

TYPED (or Manufor) HAME AND TIPLE

OPERATIONS OFFICER

DAVID H. EDDY, MAJOR, USAP

☆ 070 1050-357-000

ASEREVIATED (DON'T MESSAGE PORT)

PRECEDENCE ACTION ROTTE IN

RELEASED BY

DRAFTED B

All and

WAS EXPERIENCED AND I HELICOPTER WAS LOST. EXTENSIVE BURXER AND TO CAVE COMPLETES WERE UNCOVERED AND AIR CAV OPERATIONS CONTINUE. ON 19 OCT, AN FA STRIKE WAS CONDUCTED, AT 10097913 BASED PRIMARILY ON FIX DATA AND SI CORRELATION. THIS STRIKE RESULTED IN THE DESTRUCTION OF SPIDER ANTENNA AND BUILDING ASSOCIATED THEREWITH, 3 YAGI ANTENNAS WHICH APPEARED SIMILAR TO TO LEADING. AND 1 AM FOOT POLE ANTENNA.

3 EMENT MEA AND & POSSIBLE REA. CHULLS SEEDING IS REQUESTED FOR 200 OCT.

3. (REPORTED BY 1812. TAPORMATION SOURCE: 196TH BRIGADE S-2,
20 TASS DI.) AS A RESULT OF AN ACCUMULATION OF FIXES, PRINCIPALLY
ON 575TH NVA ARTY IN, 196TH LIGHT INFANTRY HAS EBEN CONDUCTING OP.
ERATIONS ON CHARLE RIDGE SINCE 3 OCTOBER. 3 TO 4 COMPANIES OF IN.
FANTRY AND 3 PANGER TRANS HAVE BEEN COMMITTED TO THE OPERATIONS.
A LARGE CAVE, DESCRIPTION CAVE AND BURNER COMPLEX HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED.
CAPTHERD DOCUMENTS INDICATE IT HAS CONTAINED ELEMENTS OF COMPANY
10 AND COMPANY IN THE TYPE ARTY, Q-84 BTH, 9TH INDEPENDENT
BUTN, AND PASS REP. & MOMBER OF MEAPONS AND QUANTITIES OF AMED HAVE
BEEN CAPTURED TO THE RADICS, B-408, AK-478. OF PARTICULAR IN.
THREST IS THE CAPTURE FOR ROCKET MOVERS, ASSEMBLY TOOLS FOR ROCKET
BODIES. CUMULATIVE CASUALITIES TO DATE: EN; 6 KIA, I WIA/POW,

A				_6 4 .			**************************************
Completed	L NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO, OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION		INITIALS
			2	TAGES			
A STATE OF THE PARTY OF	VW 2 No.				700 - 11 - 11 - 11 - 11 - 11 - 11 - 11 -		
وتدكري					RUCTION	Doc#	47_5
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1							# / T/36

CONTION OF E MAY SE SHIER MAY 65 ME CO.

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE RELEASED BY DRAFTED BY ACTION ROUTING INFO

FRD: 2 KIA (US), UNK WIA, BUT NONE WHO WERE NOT ABLE TO RETURN TO DUTY. OPERATION CONTINUES. COMMANDO VAULT (15,000 IB BOMB) IS FRAGGED FOR 16 OCT.

- THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION REACTED TO THREE OF DET 2'S FIXES BY EXPENDING 84 RDS OF 105 MM ORDINANCE. THEY ALSO INSERTED RE/PF TROOPS FOR A GROUND RECON OF ONE FIX AREA. RESULTS ARE UNKNOWN.
- THE 23RD INF DIV EXPENDED 27 RDS OF 175MM ORDINANCE ON THREE OTHER DET 2 FIRES.
- 6. XXIV CORPS INTEL REPORTS THAT AGENTS REPORTS AND ARDF (DET 2) FIXES INDICATE 2 ENEMY UNITS, INCLUDING A 575TH ROCKET TEAM, WERE DEPLOTED NEAR AT934669 AND AT936660 WITH THE INTENTION OF HARRASSING LOCAL VILIAGES AND LAUNCHING ROCKETS ON DA NANG AB. XXIV INTEL GOES ON TO REVEAL QUOTE: COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTS HAVE REVEATED NO INCREASE IN 575TH TACTICAL ACTIVITY, HOWEVER, WE DO KNOW THAT ITS TEAMS REMAIN IN AREA 2 AND DO HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO FIRE ON TA NAME. UNQUOTE.
- 7. ADDITIONAL XXIV INFO REPORTS THAT DET 2 FIXED THE 404TH SAPPER BN ON 13 OCT INDICATING A 30 KM MOVE SN OF LAST FIX. UNIT MAY HE RETURNING TO KHAM DUC BUT CONFIRMING PIXES NEEDED TO ESTABLISH LO. CATION.
- 8. (XXIV) ATTREMET FROM B CO, 123 AVIATION, RECEIVED FIRE WHILE

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
	N				
DD FORM 173				ictions	DOC#47-2

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSABERORY and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

RELEASED BY

PRECEDENCE
ACTION ROUTINE
INFO ROUTINE

DRAFTED BY

PRONE

FLYING OVER BS105822 AND BS100818. ARDF HAD INCICATED CONTINUED

ENEMY PRESENCE IN THIS REGION BY FIXING SEVERAL U/I TERMINALS IN THE

AREA DURING THE PAST WEEK.

- 9. (EXIV) DET 1 ARDF HAS LOCATED PROBABLE 406TH SAPPER BN ELEMENTS SW OF FORMER BASE AREA 124 BY SEVERAL U/I FIXES ON 12 AND 13 OCT.

 ARDF HAS NOT LOCATED THE BN HDQTRS SINCE ITS 9 OCT FIX AT BS715172.

 16. (DET 3) AFSSO UDORN REPORTS THAT, OF 369 FIXES RECEIVED, 86

 ERE USED FOR TARGET ANALYSIS BY HQ 7/13AF.
- 11. NO BAPREL ROLL OR BRAON BEAVER FEEDBACK AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

CON	TROL NO.		TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION		INITIALS
g				<u>,</u>	4		•	•
DD	FORM 1	173-1				CTIONS	Doc#4	47-3

REPLACES ET

TOOK MULTI SINGLE		
TYPE M30		
PRECEDENCE		
HEO DIE 10/ 0940 2 JULY 71	e *	
FROM: 6994 SCTT SQ	SPECIAL V	HET WHICH THOMS
TO: FACSCTYRGE/IE/DO		
Info: in usars/m	•	
Bubj: Vin Bo-47 TNG		٤
PLICHT THE FOR THE SECOND CLASS OF ARTH RADIO OF BATCHS COMMENT	.	**
10 JUL. POSSURE STUDENTS ARE LEVIENED IN THIS THE. THESE TO 47		$\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{C}}$
MINION FOR DAY WILL BE IMPIGATED TO THIS RYPORT.		
2. PURING THE FERIOD SINCE THEIR GRADUATION TO PRESENT, THE PIRET		
		2.
glass of studicits has demonstrated a remarkable gapability to propu		
THE ARDF MISSISM.	.	
3. IN CRIDER TO PROVIDE A MEANS OF PERSON THE SECOND CLASS.		
AND CONTINUED PACFICIENCY POR THE OPERATORS CURRENTLY QUALIFIED IN		
"TOGGREED ASYNCRIZATION OF A FOURTH VIM MISSION BOAT WITHIN THE		. (3)
CURRENT TASKING. THIS MISSICS WOULD BE PLONE IN ASSAS WHERE THE R.		. Ž
PROFESIONCY DAS SEEN DEMONSTRATED AND WILL INCLUDE A US OFSRATOR ON		
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
BOARD. HO DESENTATION OF STRING/MISSION PERFORMANCE WILL BE EXTEN-	DATE	7146
TENSIKO.	МОНТ	YEAR
4. SHOULD IN IS APPROACH PROVE SUCCESSIVE, WE MAY EXPECT TO PRASE I	PASE NO.	NO. OF
	1.	PAGES
TYPED NAME AND TITLE PHONE E		3.7
CAPT Colline DAVID E RIDE MANE AND THE		
R Consentions Officer		فن جنياً خِيْسِ ـــ
CAT	DOC#	49

ABBREVIATED TOINT MESSAGEFORM ond/or CON RUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE RELEASED BY
ACTION PRIORITY
Maj Eddy

RAFTED BY Capt Collins PHONE 4891

A FIFTH MISSICM WHEN THE THIRD CLASS BEGINS FLIGHT TRAINING (SEPTEM.). THIS WILL HAVE THE ADDITIONAL BENEFIT OF PHASING THE VIM FRO.

GRAM INTO THE SEVEN SORTIES/DAY SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER.

THE TO EMPHASIZE THAT REDUCTION OF 6994TH PROJECTED PERSONNEL INPUTS REYOND THOSE SCHEDULED AS A RESULT OF INCREASED VIM SCRITES WOULD BE UNDESTREABLE. AS THIS PROPSAL WILL HAVE TO BE COORDINATED WITH MACV, NRV(C), AND SSTE, REQUEST YOUR EARLIEST CONCURRENCE TO INSURE NO LOSS OF OPERATOR MOTIVATION AND CONTINUITY.

CONTROL NO. TOR/TOD PAGE NO. OF MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION INITIALS

PAGES PAGES

STRUCTIONS

DOC #UR-/

DD 173-1







TYPED HAME AND TYPED					
PRECEDENCE TION PRICEIPS TO MEN (G) PROM 6994 SOTE SQ TON ME TO MEN (G) SSO NEG/JZ11-4 JEFO REA/ZE/DO WSAFSS/ZE APSO PACAF/INE BJ: VIN EC-47 TRAINING BJ: VIN EC-47 TRAINING BJ: VIN EC-47 TRAINING CAF CO. D AFSO PACAF/INE C. 6994 SOTE SQ CO/DO 1000402 JUL 71 (MOTAL MEN (C), MACY, MED AFSO CAF). C. 6994 SOTE SQ DO 1406002 JUL 71 (MOTAL MEN (C), MACY, AND AFSO CAF). C. 6994 SOTE SQ DO 1406002 JUL 71 (MOTAL MEN, PER, WSAFSS). A PRINCE PACAF DE TO TO THE MEN (G), MACY, AND WSAFSS). A PRINCE PACAF DE TO TO THE MEN (G) WAS UNAFSS, AFSO LAF). PATERNAL D COMMENTARION OF THE MEN (G) OF THE MESSIONE METHERS TO FORE MEN BAIL. THAT AFTER WAS INFLIMENTED OR 24 JULY FRENCH TO FORE MEN BAIL. THAT AFTER WAS INFLIMENTED OR 24 JULY FRENCH TO FORE MEN BAIL. THAT AFTER WAS INFLIMENTED OR 24 JULY FRENCH TO FORE MEN BAIL. THAT AFTER WAS INFLIMENTED OR 24 JULY FRENCH TO FORE MEN BAIL. THAT AFTER WAS INFLIMENTED OR 24 JULY FRENCH TO FORE MEN BAIL. THAT AFTER WAS INFLIMENTED OR 24 JULY RESERVATIONS RESERVATIONS RESERVATIONS RESERVATIONS RESERVATIONS RESERVATIONS	Togt hay tolds/dr		E DAVID H RODY.	Major, BEAF	
PROCESSIONER TION PRICEITY TON MENT (C) SSO NAC/1211-4, IMPO RSA/IM/DO WEAFSS/ME APREO PAGAN/IMM 25: A. 6994 SCHI SQ CZ/DO 100/MOZ JUL 71 (MOTAL MEN (C), MACV, D AFSSO PAGAN/IMM CAP). C. 6994 SCHI SQ DO 140600X JUL 71 (MOTAL MEN (C), MACV, AND AFSSO CAP). C. 6994 SCHI SQ DO 140600X JUL 71 (MOTAL MENV, PMR, WEAFSS, ARRESO PAGAN). D. PRIC NO 147800X JUL ST (MOTAL MENV, PMR, WEAFSS, ARRESO PAGAN). D. PRIC NO 147800X JUL ST (MOTAL MENV, AND MEAFSS). A DOMENNAME TO FORE MEN RAI. THE MET MASS IMPLEMENTED ON 24 JULY PAGE THERE TO FORE MEN RAI. THE METRIC MASS IMPLEMENTED ON 24 JULY PAGE THERE TO FORE MEN RAI. THE METRIC MASS IMPLEMENTED ON 24 JULY PAGE THERE TO FORE MEN RAI. THE METRIC MASS IMPLEMENTED ON 24 JULY PAGE TO THE METRIC MASS IMPLEMENTED ON 24 JULY PAGE TO THE METRIC MASS IMPLEMENTED ON 24 JULY PAGE TO THERE TO FORE MEN RAI. THE METRIC MASS IMPLEMENTED ON 24 JULY PAGE TO THERE TO FORE MEN RAI. THE METRIC MASS IMPLEMENTED ON 24 JULY PAGE TO THE METRIC MASS IMPLEMENTE	TYPED NAME AND THILE	The state of the s	R SIGNATURE E L		
TYPE MAG. THOM PRICEIPT TON 6994 SOTT SQ TON MYS TON MEN (C) SSO NAME/J211-4 IMPO PSE/ME/DO WEAFSS/MR APSO PAGAP/TEME BJ: VIM MC-47 TRAINING WS AFSO PAGAP/TEME D. AFSO PAGAP/TEME 2. USAFSS MM 132110% JUL 71 (MOTAL MAGY, MAGY, MAGY, MAGY). CAFSO PAGAP). D. POR MC 14210% JUL 71 (MOTAL MAGY, PMM, WSAFSS). A PRESO PAGAP). D. POR MC 14210% JUL 71 (MOTAL MAGY, PMM, WSAFSS). A DOMESTICATE DED 15 JUL 71 (MOTAL MAGY, MAGY, AND USAFSS). A DOMESTICATE DED 15 JUL 71 (MOTAL PCM, USAFSS, AFSO) LAF).	· .			24 JULY AND NO.	NO. 67
PRECEDENCE TION PRICEITY OTO 280502 (ANY) FROM 6994 SOTT SQ TEN ETH TO HEN (C) SSO MAE/JZ11-4, DEFO REA/ZE/DG USANSS/ZE ANSSO PAGAF/LEE BJ: VIM E2-47 TRAININE ES: A. 6994 SOTT SQ CE/DO 100-MOS JUL 71 (MOTAL MEN (C), MACV, D AFSSO PAGAF). B. HEAPES ME 13/21/OS JUL 71 (MOTAL MEN (C), MACV, AND AFSSO CAP). C. 6994 SOTT SQ DO 140600% JUL 71 (MOTAL MACV, PER, USAFSS). ARSSO PAGAF). D. PER NO 14/2008 JUL 71 (MOTAL MEN (G), MACV, AND USAFSS). Z. DOMESTICATE MEN 15 JUL 71 (MOTAL PER, USAFSS, AFSSO MAP).		The state of the second		Ī	V2182.5
PRICEDENCE THOM PETCHTY TO MEY (C) SSO MAE/J211-4 DEFO PSE/J2/DG WSAJSS/TE APESO PACAF/TEXE BJ: VIM MC-47 TRAINING PS: A. 6994 SCTT SQ CQ/DO 1009402 JUL 71 (MOTAL MW (C), MACV, D AFSSO PACAF). 2. DEAPES BOR 1321102 JUL 71 (MOTAL MW (C), MACV, AND AFSSO CAF). C. 6994 SCTT SQ DO 1406002 JUL 71 (MOTAL MW V, PSR, WSAPSS). B ARSSO PACAF). D. PSE MO 1438003 JUL 71 (MOTAL MW V, PSR, WSAPSS). A DOSSMENNE LTE DED IS JUL 71 (MOTAL PSA, USAFSS, AFSSO				· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
PRECEDENCE TION PETCHTY TO SON 6994 SUTY SQ TOW HY TO SET (C) SSO NAG/JZ11-4 IMPO PSE/ZE/DO WSAFSS/ZE APSO PACAF/ING BJ: VIM NC-47 TRAINING PS: A. 6994 SUTY SQ CC/DO 100 MOZ JUL 71 (MOTAL NEW (C), MACV, D AFSSO PACAF). 2. USAFSS NOW 132110S JUL 71 (MOTAL NEW (C), MACV, AND AFSSO CAP). C. 6994 SCTY SQ DO 140600E JUL 71 (MOTAL NEW, PSE, WSAFSS, D ARSSO PACAF). D. PSE NO 143860E JUL 72 (MOTAL NEW (C), MACV, AND USAFSS).	\$ - 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	III DE 15 JE 71	(BOTAL PSE, USAFSS	, AFSSO	
PRECEDENCE TION PRICETY TO DIE 280502 (1047) FROM 6994 SOTE SQ TSE REE TO MEN (C) SSO MAC/JZ11-4 DEFO PSE/JE/DO WSAFSS/HR AJESO PACAF/TENE PS: A. 6994 SCTE SQ CC/DO 100 MCZ JUL 71 (MOTAL MEN (C), MACV, D AFSSO PACAF). 2. USAFES NOR 1321108 JUL 71 (MOTAL MEN (C), MACV, MED AFSSO CAF). C. 6994 SCTE SQ DO 1406008 JUL 71 (MOTAL MACV, PSR, WSAFES, B ARSSO PACAF).					
PRECEDENCE TION PRIORITY OTHER 6994 SORY SQ TSW MYN TO MEY(G) SSO NAM/J211-4 IMPO PSE/IM/DO WEAFSS/M ANSSO PACAF/INE BJ: VIM MC-47 TRAINING WS. A. 6994 SORY SQ CC/DO 1000402 JUL 71 (MOTAL MW/C), MACY, D AFSSO PACAF/ B. DSAFES NOR 1321102 JUL 71 (MOTAL MW/C), MACY, AND AFSSO CAP). C. 6994 SCTY SQ DO 1406002 JUL 71 (MOTAL MW/V, PER, WSAFES,					
PRECEDENCE TION PRICEDENCE TO DET 280500 CACCE FROM 6994 SOTE SQ TSE BYE TO BEY (C) 580 NMC/JZ11-4 DEFO PSCAP/INC SS: A. 6994 SOTE SQ CC/DO LOOMOG JUL 71 (MOTAL MEN (C), MACV, D AFREO PACIAL. 2. USAFES NOR 13Z1106 JUL 71 (SOTAL MEN (C), MACV, AND AFREO CAF).		THE MOSCOTT OR DR	71 (BOYAL MACY, PER	, VSLPES,	
PRECEDENCE TION PRICETTY DTE 2805002 (LUG-V FROM 6994 SOTT SQ TON BYE TO: MEY(C) \$50 NAS/1211-4 IMPO RSE/12/100 WSANSS/MA APSSO PACAN/INC BJ: VIN EC-47 TRAINING WS. A. 6994 SOTT SQ CC/DO 1000MOS JUL 71 (MOTAL MW(C), NACY, D APSSO PACAY).	•				
PRECEDENCE TION PRICETY DYO 2805002 (LOGT) TOI NEW (C) 580 NME/1211-4 IMPO 882/12/100 WARRSS/MA APREC PACAF/IERC BJ: VIN EC-47 TRAINING WS: A. 6994 SCHI SQ CC/DO 1009406 JUL 71 (NOTAL MW (C), NACV,	2. DEAPER NO	132108 JUL 71 (1	SOTAL NEW (C), MACY,	ASD A7880	
PRECEDENCE TION PRICETY DTE 2805002 (LUST) FROM: 6994 SUTT SQ TSS RES TO: NEW (C) \$80 MAC/J211-4 IMPO PSE/IM/DO USAFSS/IR APRIO PACAF/IEST	•				
PRECEDENCE TION IPRICATELY O DITE 2805002 (LOG V PROM: 6994 SOFT SQ TON BYB TOL BEY (C) \$50 Mac/1211-4 DEFO PSE/12/100 USAFSS/IN APSSO PACAF/INET:			701. 71. (2074). www.fc.) MACIV	
PRECEDENCE TION PRICEIPS DTE 2805002 (LUG-V FROM: 6994 SOTT SQ TEN RVB TO: MRV (C) 580 MME/J211-4 WEATES/JR	W: VIN ME-AT TRAI			1	
PRECEDENCE TION PRICEIPS DTE 2805002 (LUG-V FROM: 6994 SOTT SQ TEN RVB TO: MRV (C) 580 MME/J211-4 WEATES/JR		Mass Pacar/Tere			
PRECEDENCE TON PRICETTY O DTG 2805002 (LUST) FROM: 6994 SUTT SQ TSS RTS TON NEW (C) 580 Neg/J211-4				Triple and the second	4
PRECEDENCE TION PRICETY O DTO 2805002 (Lug V PROM: 6994 SOTT SQ TSS REE TOI NEW (C)	DIFO				
PRECEDENCE TION PRICEITY DYE 2805002 (LUS V PROM. 6904 SOTT SQ TSW REE SPECIAL METROCYCLE	•	580 NAE/1211- 4			
PRECEDENCE PRECEDENCE TION PRICETES O DTG 280502 (4487)	Tů	MRA (C)			
PRECEDENCE PRECEDENCE TION PRICETEY TO DIE 280502 (4487)	FRO	* 6994 8033 SQ TS	S MA	SPECIAL	P
TYPE MBG PRECEDENCE	33148411	DYG	280500Z	age V	
TYPE MSG	PRECEDENCE				
	TYPE MEG				

ABBREVIATED SHIP HE INAGE HOW ON ON COMMUNICATION SKEET

PRECEDENCE

HELEASED BY

ACTION PRICETTY

Major Eddy

WITH RECKLERT RESULTS. REFERENCE WAS ALSO MADE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF PRASING IN A FIFTH MISSION IN SEPTEMBER WHEN THE THIRD CLASS BEGINS FLIGHT TRAINING. SINCE THIS APPROACH HAS PROVEN SUCCESSIVEL, WE WOULD LIKE TO PHASE IN A FIFTH MISSION PER DAY STARTING WITH THE A SEPTEMBER TASKING WELL. OUR THIRD CLASS OF 14 STROWN'S WILL COMPLETE THE CROSED PHASE OF TRAINING ON 1 SEPTEMBER. IF YOU CONGRED PLASE COORDINATE WITH APPROPRIATE AGENCIES TO PROVIDE TASKING FOR AVE VIN MSHS DAILLY REGISHING MENE OF 4-10 SEPTEMBER. APPROPRIATE THIS OF DEGRADATION OF SUSTEM/MISSION PERFORMENCE AS A RESULT OF THIS ACTION.

CONTROL NO. TOR/TOD PAGE NO. OF MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION INITIALS

SECURITY CL

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DOC \$52-1

PAGE TO STATE AND THE		110.8					direction.
FROM: 59M, SOLT SO THE MEAN OF THE PROPERTY OF	100						
PROMISED TO SOLVE TO SOLVE THE TO SOLVE				<u>-</u>			*
PROME SPON SOLID THE TO PERSON AND THE PROPERTY OF STATE	#560	EDENCE					
TO PER IN THE WAR AND THE WAR AND THE PART OF THE PART		. 27	DTG 45	0920			
SHEAT: SEA RESIDER OF) THE WHAPAS IN PRINCIPLE OF TO DEPOSE THE SHEAT PARTY HAS BEEN ASSESSED. ASSESSED AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO RESIDENCE THE SHEAT PARTY HAS ASSESSED. ASSESSED AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE SHEAT PARTY HAS ASSESSED. THE WILL BE THE EXCEPTION OF CRA DEPOSE. DISAMSSED., THE WILL BE THE PRINCIPLE OF CRA DEPOSE. DISAMSSED., THE WILL BE THE PRINCIPLE OF CRA DEPOSE. 2. CHE APPROACH, MINKS HAS BEEN ANALYSIS MANAGED HAVE BEEN TO THE MANAGED TO THE SHEAT PARTY HAS BEEN ANALYSIS MANAGED TO THE SHEAT PARTY HAS BEEN ANALYSIS MANAGED TO THE SHEAT PARTY HAS BEEN ANALYS AS THE MANAGED THE MANAGED THE MANAGED THE MANAGED THE MANAGED TO THE SHEAT PARTY HAS BEEN ANALYS AS THE MANAGED	And the second of the second o	FROM:	MA ROUT SQ THE	1975		SP ECHAL H	NETRUCTIONS
SHEAT: HEA RESIDENCE OF) THE UNLAWAS IN THE LIGHT WAS AND MILE, HE MILE ON TO AND WEST MINE MANY THE PLANS, ASSESSED AND SPECIAL PROPERTY IN TO RESIDENCE THE MINE POTENCE IN LIGHT OF MANY MANY MANY MANY THE EMPTION OF CRA DEPENDANCE. DISOPRESSED THE COMMANDS TIME. 2. ORE APPROACH, MINES HAS BEEN ANALYSIS MANY MANY MANY IN THE 440 THE KINNESS OF THE PROPERTY AND MINESTER WAS ANALYSIS IN THE MINESTER WAS ANALYSIS OF THE MINESTER WAS AND THE MINESTER WAS ANALYSED AND MINESTER WAS AND THE MINESTER WAS ANALYSED AND MINESTER WAS AND THE MINESTER WAS ANALYSED AND MINESTER WAS AND THE MINESTER WAS AN		70 %	en Asan				
SERI: MAPAS ER PRACES JEN 71 1. AZ ONE MARINE, A MARINE MALLE MAD ON 30 JUN 1025 MARINE MANA TAR HAMS, AGURE AN OPPER. HANDE IN TO RECOME THE TIME PURSE IN LIGHT OF MANY MARINE MARINE MARINE OF CR. MARINE DIRECTORS THE OPPERATE, MICH MA THE PROPERTY MANY IN THE AND THE PURSE THE OPPERATE, MICH MA THE MARINE MARINE MANY IN THE AND THE PURSE THE OPPERATE, MICH MA THE MARINE MARINE MAY IN THE AND THE PURSE THE ALIMINO STORE AND THE MARINE MARINE MAY IN THE AND THE MARINE MARINE MARINE MARINE MARINE MARINE MAY IN THE MARINE MARINE MARINE				· .	· · · · ·		
THE MARKS HE PRICES NO. 71 1. AZ GER MARKEN, A MARKEN MICH. MINES IN TO MARKEN SINE MARK PUTWER IN LIGHT OF MARK MINES MARKEN FOR MARKEN SINE MARK PUTWER IN LIGHT OF MARK MINES MARKEN FOR MARKEN SINE AND MARK DIBONESIAMA, MARK MINE HAS THE SINE CHARGE THE 460MM MAR HIS STORY Z. GER APPROXIMA, MARK MAR HAS MARK MARKEN MARKEN MARK IN THE 460 THE MAINTENS WINES AT MARK MARK MARKEN MARK MARK MARK MARK MARK MARK MARK MARK	d. The same of the	LEDO VI			: .		i i
THE MARKS HE PRICES NO. 71 1. AZ GER MARKEN, A MARKEN MICH. MINES IN TO MARKEN SINE MARK PUTWER IN LIGHT OF MARK MINES MARKEN FOR MARKEN SINE MARK PUTWER IN LIGHT OF MARK MINES MARKEN FOR MARKEN SINE AND MARK DIBONESIAMA, MARK MINE HAS THE SINE CHARGE THE 460MM MAR HIS STORY Z. GER APPROXIMA, MARK MAR HAS MARK MARKEN MARKEN MARK IN THE 460 THE MAINTENS WINES AT MARK MARK MARKEN MARK MARK MARK MARK MARK MARK MARK MARK	STRI: MA RE	PRETIÉNE (P)					š . ::
TAP PLANS, AGOTH AN OFFICE PROPERTY TO MARKE THE SERVICE OF A MINES WE AS THE THREE PARTY OF THE MARKET THE AGOTH AS THE SERVICE OF A MINES WE AS THE CHARGE THE AGOTH AS THE							
POTONE IN LIGHT OF NAME AND RESIDENCE IN TO RECORD THE COMMENT OF CHARACTERS OF A MINISTER WILL BE THE FIRST CHARGE THE GOOM HAS AND THE COMMENT OF CHARACTERS OF CHARACTE				<u> </u>			
DISCUSSIONS, THE WILL R THE FIRST CHARGE THE MODEL OF GRAINING. DISCUSSIONS, THIS WILL R THE FIRST CHARGE THE MODEL OF GRAINING. 2. CRE APPRAINE, SHIPE HAS BEEN ALLESS MANUAL DISCUSSION IN THE MANUAL PROPERTY OF THE MANUAL PROP				* 1997.			
DISCUSSIONS, THE WILL IN THE PROPERTY OF THE MODEL OF THE				ib to diacess t			
DISCRECION REPORT TO SECURITY AND RESIDENCE OF SECURITY REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DISCRECIONS OF SECURITY AND RESIDENCE OF SECURITY REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DATE THE CHARGE OF THE COURSE OF SECURITY REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DATE THE CHARGE OF THE COURSE OF SECURITY REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENTS OF SECURITY REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENTS OF SECURITY REGRADING IN	POTENT IN LIES	R OF HARP	Militar Marian	No. 18 Marie 1	TAXABLE AND A		
2. GE AFFRENS, NOW RAS HE AND THE WAY IN THE WAY THE EXTENSES THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF THE	WIND THE AREA		LE , MIN THE	instruct or or			
2. CEE APPROON, MICH HO MAN AND MAN AND THE MAN AND THE SECURITY AND AND AND AND THE SECURITY AND AND AND AND AND THE SECURITY AND	DIAMETICAL,	nd vil e	THE PART CHA	CE THE 460988 1		,	
THE EXTENSION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE LIMITS AND THE THE SECOND PARTY OF THE SECOND PART	REFERENCE OF CO	TELESCO TO		†			
THE EXISTING STATE OF THE LIABOR, THE STATE OF THE STATE		cs, beck i					
THE EXISTING STATE OF THE LIABOR, THE STATE OF THE STATE	2. ORE 1790			and the same of th		1	. Vi 45
THE LIMIT THE CONTROL OF THE PARTY OF THE PA							
DATE TIME CONSCIPATION AND THE MEMORY OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE MA	w, 15 th						
DATE TIME COMMITTALE AND THE PAGE NO. NO. OF	THE EXPRISE			27000 IJ. 1200	L. Plant Bug.		
COMMENDATION AND THE ACTION PLANES APPROACH AS TERMINATED AND NO. OF PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGE NO.	THE ELIBRIDO I			27000 IJ. 1200	L. Plant Bug.		
TYPED NAME AND TITLE PHONE TYPED NAME AND TITLE PHONE TYPED for stomped) NAME AND TITLE TYPED for stomped) NAME AND TITLE REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DOCC # 5.3	THE ELLERISM IN			12:300 12, 12:00 7:200 day (Tough	i, Signi Reg. Llatecs, Seco		
TYPED NAME AND TITLE PHONE SIGNATURE TYPED TO	THE ELLIPSING IN THE SELECTION OF THE SE			127000 13. 12101 7224 247 (SSSE) 1725 20 747. 16	LIANS SEE	DATE	2500
SIGNATURE SIGNATURE TYPED for signified NAME AND TITLE TYPED for signified NAME AND TITLE AND BELLEY BASES REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DOC # 5.3	THE EXIMINATION OF THE EXIMINATI			12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 1	i, pioni dell Llaigus, 'Prin I dellaigh dell Is to paine po	DATE :	2500
Home as Balancer/Gre Typed for stamped NAME AND TITLE MATER &	THE EXISTENCE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE EXIST OF T			PERSONAL IN LEGISLATION OF THE PERSONAL INC. PERSONAL PART (TERRITOR INC.) PERSONAL PART (TERRITOR INC.) PERSONAL PART (TERRITOR INC.) PERSONAL PART (TERRITOR INC.)	LLALIGE, TRANS LLALIGE, TRANS LUCLION SELECTION LE TO PRODUCT PA	DATE TO THE TOTAL THE	2700 YEAR NO. 07
BEQUALTY REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DOC # 53	TIPED NAME AND		THOUSE THE ACTUAL SECTION AND	PART DAY (SEEM) PART DAY (SEEM) PART DAY (SEEM) PART DAY (SEEM) REPART ARE INTO	LLALIGE, TRANS LLALIGE, TRANS LUCLION SELECTION LE TO PRODUCT PA	DATE TO THE TOTAL THE	2700 YEAR NO. 07
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS DOC#53	TOWN IN COMMENTS OF THE EXTENSION OF THE		THE RESERVE	TED SO TAY. IS SEEN THE CONTUR RESIDENT AND THE SECOND SO THE SECOND S	LIALICE, TRANS LIALICE, TRANS LIBRARIO SEE LIALICE LIA	DATE TO THE TOTAL THE	2700 YEAR NO. 07
JUC 03	TOPED HAME AND		THE RESERVE	TYPED for stamps	LIALIST THAT LIALIST SEE TO PROPER IN GOR MILES AND	DATE MONTH. PAGE NO.	2700 YEAR NO. 07
FORM	THE BLIMING IN THE BL		AS WATERS AND THE PARTY OF THE	TYPED for stamps	LIALEGE, THAN LI	DATE MONTH. PAGE NO.	2700 YEAR NO. 07

ABBREVIATED ADIT MIESSAGE and/or CONTINUATION SHE RELEASED BY PRECEDENCE ACTION PRIORITY Maj Bddy MPO MAYER DIFFICULT TO CONVEY. 3. REQUEST YOUR VIEWS SOCKEST. CONTROL NO. TOR/TOD SECURI

-2 JUL 1971

TI; 306 42 VZ CZ CR DA5 220L A88 26 KZ 44 46 BR YMRDGR DE YHLAKZ - 8825 **1**853435 ZNY MMNSH R 020221Z PAUS OT YRIGH TO E994SCT YSQ INFO USAFSS/DO/XR ZEM


SUBJ. SSE REDUCTIONS (U)


REFS: A.5 7 -1 /4 291410Z JUN 71.
T B. 699455 DO 360930Z JUN 71.
1. APPRECIATE INFO CONTAINED IN REF BRAVO. REF ALPHA PROVIDES MOST GURRENT USAFSS VIEWS PERTAINING TO SEA REDUCTIONS.

2. THIS HEADQUARTERS DOES NOT FAVOR APPROACHED DUTLINED IN REF BRAVO PARA 2. BEGAUSE OF MANAGEMENT FRAGMENTATION AND THE NEED FOR A CENTRAL LIAISON FUNCTION WITH 7AF AND MACV. 5. FOR USAFSS: THIS HEADQUARTERS IN COORDINATION WITH PACAF WILL REEX AMINE THE ALTERNATIVES ADVISE ALCON OF OUR FINDINGS.

130 0828

DOC#54





ABBREVIATED JOH THESSAGEFORM Cod/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	HELEASED BY
ACTION SHITTEN	
INFO	in or Kody

FERS SEE CHARLE TO VIEW CRITICALLY OF TENS PARENT LOCATION IN SAME T

- O. THE ADDIE TO PRESENTED HIS PROPOSAL FOR ASSIGNIBO THIS TO REISTING WINGS, MORSON IN HIS DIFFERENCETICS THE 460TH OC STATED THAT HE PROPERTED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SENGE THE SINGLE WING PHILOSOPHY WAS ACCEPTED BY ALL.
- 4. THE DESCRIPTION CONTINUED IN AN EXPONE TO AGREE ON WHICH WING TAY
 MOVED PROPOSE. THE 315 TAN WAS MENTIONED AGAIN AS WELL AS A MENCOMER POR
 CONSIDERATION, THE 483 TAN AT CRR. THIS WING IS CURRENTLY MADE UP OF
 SEVEN 6-7 SQUADRONS AND WAS INTRODUCED RECAUSE OF OUR REQUIREMENT FOR
 PROUND PACKALITIES. AT THIS POINT CRB WAS AGIN MENTIONED AS THE MOST
 TAKEN FOR RELOCATION OF PRO EC-47 ASSETS. THE 6994 DO AND 450 DOJ.
 CONTINUED TO RESES AT CESTRAL MANAGEMENT AT THE AND RESULTANT
 DISCUSSION AND TO REPORTITION THAT AT LEAST A WING LIAISON FUNCTION
 WAS RECRIFIED AT TAY. 2-4 SAMES WERE ENVISIONED, A NUMBER THAT HE
- J. WE MEET THIS TIME MADE WHAT PAP RESPONSE WILL DESIGNED.

 IN ALL PROCABILITY WO RESPONSE WILL BE MADE UNTIL AFTER GEN STAFF'S

 VISIT PURIES NEW OF LITE. WE IS REPECTED TO COMMENT ON THE TENURE

 OF CHE AS WILL AS CYCHE AF BASENG DECISIONS. IT DOES NOT APPEAR

 HOWEVER THAT IF FAF IS TO BE SHAVED FROM THEM POSITION OF NO TENUE

 WING AT THE, MINES EMPHATIC DIRECTION WILL HAVE TO COME FROM PACAY.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NC, OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
SECURT		2	3_		
			`	TAC#	45-1
				The state of the s	-

ABBREVIATED JOHN MESSAGEFORM.

SECURATY CLASSIFICATION

MONTH OF THE RESIDENCE AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY OF THE PA	
PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY
ACTION FRICKLINY	
And the second section of the section of	on or Edity
INFO	Charles and an annual off

RECOMMEND YOU ATTEMPT TO HAVE PACAF DIRECT/STRUNGLY SUCCEST A CENT.

THE TEMP MING. IF YOU AGREE AND IF YOU INTEND TO PURSUE THIS FURTHER,

FLS ADVISE AND WE WILL SEEK ALLIES AT THIS END (NG MACV). ALSO REQUEST

TOU ENUMERABLE ANGUMENTS FOR LOCAL TEMS WING TO ENSURE WE HAVEN'T OWNEL
LOCKED ANTIBURG.

6. RELATED SUBJECT: RESIDENT COMMENTS PRETIDENT TO MY MSG DO 2206557.

THE 71. RESERVICES CLASSIES/REDISTRIBUTION OF PHJ ASSETS.

CONTROL NO. TOR/TOD PAGE NO. OF MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION INITIALS NO. PAGES NO. OF MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION INITIALS DOC#55-2.

DD , 🎢

EN MAY BE UDED.

ROBERTOEN FOR COM-DIFFCATION C	EALLE	
JOHT MESSAGEPORM		200
		32
TYPE MEG		1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1
PRECEDENCE 1//0200 2		
NEO DE LA LABORE JUL 7/		
6994 SCTY SQ	SPECIAL !	N\$TRUCTIONS
TO: PSE/DO/ZE		
us afec/fic/la		
SEA REDICTIONS		3
, AT MY REQUEST, OF 3 JULY 71 HAS REDUY AND MYSELF HET WITH TAF (XP)		
STAFF IN ANOTHER LEPPORT TO CONTINCE THEN OF HEED TO RETAIN YEAR		
COMMAND AND OFFICERS MANAGEMENT REMEMBERS AT TSN. OUR BEST		
ARGUMENTS FAILED TO SWAY THEM, PRINCIPALLY DUE TO DIVFICULTY IN THEIR		
INDERSTANDING OF INTRICACIES OF ARDY OPERATIONS, AND WERE LOCKED UPON		
AS A MATTER OF CONVENIENCE RATHER THAN MECESSITY. TAF (AP) STILL		
-roposes to resubstantiate tems, probably to 483 tan at CRB, and Revalu	**************************************	
SHALL WING LIAISON PUNCTION AT ISN. WE THEN SPOKE TO BOGEN JOHN		
TO ACRESSO TO LOOK BUTC THE METTER AND WHILE SYMPATHELIC, ALVISED		
PHAT CURRENT SERVING EXERCISE WOULD HAKE IT EXTREMELY DIPPICULE TO		
LET TO ONLY A HOUSE TO MAKE HOUSE HO MINTEN	- The state of the	
. OF 7 JULY 1 A PPOSTURITY TO VIEW PROPOSED 7AF (XP)	DATE	TIME
RESPONSE TO PACAP (IP) MICE ASCOLL JUN 71, PRESENTLY IN 7AF (IN)	монтя	VEX454
HAMBLE FOR COORDINATION PRIOR TO COORDINATION BY COMMAND SECTION.	PASE NO.	NO? SI
THE WALL WITH CALLS MAN TO PROPERTY OF SALES		
Red Ass Litter & The		
S TYPED (er stampost) NAME AND TITLE R IRON S INCE, COL, US AF		
RECORD TY		
BU BUTTON OF I MAY SO WHICH MAY BE USED.	1 50	1

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATEM SHEET

DRAFTED BY

SECUR

HONE

PRECEDENCE PROFESSION AND ADDRESS. ACTION

MALN POINTS I BROKENT OUT WEEK:

RELEASED BY

INFO

IN PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES WITH ELIMINATION OF 460TEM, AND FACT THAT THIS IS TANGED APPROVED UNIT DEACTIVATION, AND LITTLE CONSI-DERATION WAS ANNALY GIVEN TO PORNATION OF SHALL TERS WING SINGE IT HOULD BE INDERSUMENT WITH PREVIOUSLY ACRESD ACTICA TO DELVICE FORCES AT TON. GET JOHN ASERD FOR MY COMMENTS, AND AFTER "BRAINSTORM" SESSION WITH 699435 AND 160TEN (DOJ) REPRESENTATIVES, WHICH PRODUCED FRW NEW IDEAS, I PREPARED FAFRE FOR CEN JOHN, OUTLINENG OUR CASE AND STATING THAT DECEMBRATION IN MESPONSIVENESS OF MC-47 ARDF PROCESAM WOULD UNHOUSINGDLY OCCUR IP PRISERY COURSE OF ACTION IS FOLLOWED. I PERSONALLY FERL VERY STRONGLY, INTULTIVELY AND PROK MY EXPERIENCE WITH THE PROBLEMS AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS INVOLVED IN THE ARDY PROGRAM. THAT RESUBBLIGHTON OF TENS ANAI FROM ISN WILL IMPACT UNFAVORABLY UPON THE SITTER EFFECT. OBVIOUSLY, THIS CANNOT HE "PROVER" UNTIL IT HAPPENS, AND WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE, SO FAR, TO SATISFACTORILY DEMONstructs the seconticity of our centimuous DIALOGUE WITH THE 460TRW TO TISSION REPORTED SAN THE ABOTH HAS NOT TAKEN A PIRM STAND AGAINST RESURCEDITATION OF THE BOJ STAFF SEEMS TO EXERT RELATIVELY LITTLE INFLUENCE IN THE PACT IS THAT WE MEED THE SIME SAME AT HAND MORE THAN THEY (REALIZE) THEY NEED US. 3. ON 6 WILL 71, I DISCUSSION SITUATION WITH GIR JOHN. (COPY OF RATIONALE PAPER BEING FORWARDED TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS VIA COURLER!)

	-			_ •	
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD		NO. OF MESSAGE	IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
ê êA'	NEW SK AND SWIFE IN A C.			RUCTIONS	DOC#St-1
-		1 NO:			The state of the s

ABBREVIATED JOINT WESLAGEFORM

RELEASED BY

GRAFTED BY

HOLE

RELATIONSHIP SYSTEM AND PHYSICALLY REMOVE TEWS MANAGEMENT PROM OTHER
MAD PLYS ELEMENTS IN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT (MACV, ACC, DODSPECREP, 7AF,
AND 59945CTTCQ), ALL OF WHOM HUST WORKSIN CONCERT.

B. WING MINISON FUNCTIONS AT TSM MOULD NOT SATISFY TIMELY COORDINA-

- THEN SECULBERSHIP, SINCE ME MOULD WIND UP DEALING WITH A RELAY FUNCTION WITTER A SECURISE, MAKING AGENCY, ESPECIALLY IN MATTERS INVOLVING POLICY, METHODESE, MAKING AGENCY, ESPECIALLY IN MATTERS INVOLVING POLICY, METHODESE, METHODES
- G. ASCINE HAS CERTAIN RESPONSIBILITIES IN EC-47 VIN PROGRAM (NAV., PLICIT TRAINING, STUDINGA) WHICH WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO MONITOR EPOPECTIVELY MI MEMORE WING.
- 5. APCINENCE OF SUMMER OF MAN MING WITH TENS FUNCTIONS (EC-47
 STAND/STALL TRAINING, CHRENTY OFS, RCC/COMMAND POST, LIAISON FUNCTION,
 ETCETERA) MULTI MORE CONSTRUCTION, ANTICIPATED MANPOWER SAVINGS
 ACCRUING TO REMISE OF ADDISA.
- E. LENGTHY EXCHATION PROCESS SOULD HE REQUIRED TO GRIENT NEW TEAS FARGET WANG TO TUTAL PROGRAM FOR EXPECTIVENESS. EVEN AT ISB IT HAS

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE	NO. OF PASES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
MESSETY CLASSIFICA			0		
		<i>.</i>		DOC	#56-2
	to the same of		*5.		1917-1914-1914-1914-1914-1914-1914-1914-

ABBREVIATED JOINT ASSAGEFORM and/ar CONTINUAL SHEET

SECURITY OLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE

HARO

RELEASED BY

DRAFTED BY

BEEN DAFFICULE TASK OVER THE YEARS DUE TO DIFFERING ORIENTATIONS OF THE FRONT SUD/BACKSUND FRESCHNEL. NECESSARY RAPPORT WOULD BE VERY HARD TO MAINTAIN.

- P. MACY FROMEIN HANAGER, J21, WAS UNAWARE UNTIL RECENTLY OF PLANNED AGOTES DEACTIVECTOR, AND ORIGINAL PLANS STAFFING DID NOT INCLUDE THAT ELEMENT (NOR THE 6994 SCPT SQ).
- A. GEN JOHN EECOCHIED INTANCIBLE NATURE OF ABOVE ARGUMENTS, AND WHILE SYMPATRIETIC TO OUR CAUSE, DID NOT FERL THEM SUFFICIENTLY COMPRISING TO "VEOVE" ANOTHER ARRANGEMENT UNMORKABLE (SUCH AS, REMOTE WING WITH TSN LIALSON SLEMENT). (AGREED!) I RESTERATED MY BELLEF THAT REGARDLESS OF MOMENCLATURE (NING, GROUP, OTHER) IT IS IMPORTANT TO BETAIN TENS COMMAND AND OFFERETORS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AT TSN IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.

 GEN JOHN GID NOT COORDINATE ON PROPOSED 7AF (XP) MSG (WHICH IS IN COVERING RESPONSE TO REFERENCED PACAF MSG) AND SENT MEMO TO XP (9JUL 71) FOLLOWING PARAPHRASED POINTS. (COPY OF NEWO BEING FORWARDED VIA COURIER).

EVEN THOUGH MACU CONCURRED IN WING DEACTIVATION, IT DOES NOT RULE DUT PROPOSING A MEDICAL TRUE WING STRUCTURE AT TSN, ESPECIALLY SINCE ARDY PROPILE AT MACY WERE NOT CONSULTED ORIGINALLY. MACY (J211) HAS EXPRESSED CONCREM ARRY MARK OF TEMS CONTROL ELEMENT AWAY FROM TSN.

- B. AGREED THAT ASSIGNMENT OF TEWS TO ANOTHER EXISTING WING COULD BE LONG WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE MISSIGN DEGRADATION AND WITH MANPOWER SAVINGS.
- C. IT WOULD BE IMAPPROPRIATE TO ASSIGN TEWS TO A WING NOT COLOCATED

CONTROL HO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO, OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION		INITIALS
		A.	6			
SECU	TION			rions	Doc#	56-3

DD , 200 43 173-1

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE RELEASED BY DRAFTED BY PHONE

SECURITY

WITH A TEN SQ. CRE WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE, PROVIDING EARLY DECISION IS MADE TO TRANSPER 361TEMS FROM PHU GAT TO GRE.

- D. FROM PURELI ANDY MANAGEMENT STANDPOINT, BEST ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE CREATION OF SMALL HEADQUARTERS AT TSM TO PERKUT CONTINUED, DIRECT, AND DAILY INTERPRCE HAVELED YEAR MANAGEMENT, 6994 SCTY SQ, AND MACY ACC.
- AT THE DETERMINATION IS MADE NOT TO RETAIN A TEW WING OR GROUP STRUCTURE AT THE DETERMINATION OF WHICH WING TO TAKE OVER TEWS SHOULD AWAIT PINAL DECISION REGARDED HELOCATION OF 361TEWS.
- 5. HAVE JUST SECOND AMARE THAT THERE IS LARGER CAP IN TEWS PARENT—
 BOOD PLANNING THAT I HAD ENVISIONED. ACCORDING TO 460TRW DEACTIVATION
 PAD, WHICH WE HAD NOT SEEN TILL TODAY, WING DEACTIVATES I SEP 71, WITH
 ERRORT TO COMPLETE ALL ACTIONS BY 14 AUG 71, ONLY MENTION OF TEWS IS
 THAT THIS MATTER WHILD BE TREATED SEPARATELY (SIC!). AS I CAN GATHER,
 460THM IS SUFFEED TO BE WERKING ON A PAD TO ADDRESS TEWS MANAGERSHIP
 PLENDING TO THE MENTIONS, IS AFPARENTLY UNAWARE OF BASIC
 PLANNING TO THE TEMS WATERS, IS AFPARENTLY UNAWARE OF BASIC
 DONE ON SUCH THAT WO REAL PLANNING/FROGRAMMUND HAS REEN
 LONE ON SUCH THAT WE THAN IN PACE, SINCE IT HASN'T BEEN DECIDED
 WHICH WING TO FUT THE TEMS UNDER, SO PREPARATIONS HAVE REGUN FOR A
 SPECIFIC WING TO UNDERTAKE THIS NEW RESPONSIBILITY. THEREFORE,

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD		NO. OF	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		3	9		
	rion			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	WC #56-4
				<u>*************************************</u>	AV 36"7

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PAECEDENCE ACTION INFO RELEASED BY

DRAFTED BY

THE 460TH PHARMS OUT IN LATE AUGUST AND MOVE OF 361/DET 1, 6994SS THE COCUR TILL LATE PAIL, AND CONSIDERING LEAD TIME IN COMMENCE.

THOSE PROCESSANTING, PROCESSANTING, IT APPEARS THAT THERE WILL BE A PRO-

REMORD GAP IN THIS MANAGEMENT, UNLESS, OF COURSE, A TENS CONTROL

ELEMENT IS RETAILED AT THE POR THE INTERIM, AT LEAST. (!!) ALSO,

AVAILABILITY OF CRE AS HOST FOR 361/DET 1, 699435/TEWS WING HINGES

CH SUCCESS OF COMPAN FLAC/SHITCH BOOK OPERATION AT NKP, WHICH WOULD DETERMINE WHEN BEY 1. AS PACILITIES COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE. IP

PHAN RANG IS DECIDED WITH, LEND TIME FOR SI PACILITIES, SECURE COMMUNICATION

CATIONS, EXCEPTION WOULD INVOLVE CERTAIN DELAYS. IT WOULD APPEAR

TECRESIES THAT THE MEMORISHIP TOLD BE ALLOWED TO FLOUNDER DUE TO

PRESSURE TO CLOSE LANGE BY A CRETAIN DATE. OBVIOUSLY, THE POTENTIAL

IRPACT ON THE AND PROGRAM TOULD BE CONSIDERABLE IF THIS SITUATION

WAS ALLOWED TO COCKE.

SED TO YES THE THE PERSON THAT ALL AVGILABLE AVENUES SHOULD BE

USAPRO FRANCISCO CONTRACTOR

CONTROL NO.	TOR/750	I DAGE	HO OF	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
(S. 4.)		HO	PAGES	IMPOONED INCIDENTIAL	
				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	Dec 36-5

PERSONAL PROPERTY OF LAND WAY BE USED

THIS IS A TRUE COPY:

133234ZCZCRDC872
PP YMRDQK YMRDQR
DE YWQADK 0070 1332204
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK PP NRL DE
P 132200Z
FM USAFSS
TO PACSCTYRGN/DOX
6994 SCTYSQ/CC
INFO CINCPACAF/XR
7AF/XR
ZEM

- 1. REQUEST THAT YOU: (A) DETERMINE THE LEVELS OF COMSED SUPPORT TO BE PROVIDED TO 7AF IN SEA FOR FY72-FY74; AND (B) PROVIDE PERSONNEL STRENGTH LEVELS AT SPECIFIC POINTS WITHIN THE STATED TIME FRAME FOR THE 6994 SCTY SQ. THIS SHOULD REFLECT THE CHANGES DUE TO WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES FROM SEA AND USAFSS RESPONSE THERETO.
- 2. THIS INFORMATION IS REQUIRED BY NSA ON 17 MAY 71. YOUR REPLY SHOULD ARRIVE AT THIS HEADQUARTERS IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO ENABLE US TO MEET THIS SUSPENSE DATE. GP-1 150 0070

This is a certified true copy:

GEORGE F. LOGAN, Jr., Capt. USAF

Operations Officer

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH AIR FORCE (PACAF) APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: DCO

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: COMSEC Support (monitoring)

TO: 6994 Security Squadron

- 1. Reference your 6894 Scty Sq (DOS) message 1302252 May 71.
- 2. The levels of COMSEC support to be provided to 7AF in SEA for FY 71-74 will be the same as in FY 70-71. You will be advised of any changes in COMSEC support due to withdrawal of U.S. forces from SEA.

FOR THE COMMANDER

W.A. OWEN Jr., Lt Col, USAF Director of Communications Operations DCS/Communications-Electronics

This is a certified true copy:

GEORGE F. LOGAN, Jr., Capt., USAF

Operations Officer

	JOINT MESSAGEFORM						SE	SECURITY CU					
ĺ		DRAFTER OR RELEASER TIME			LMF	CLASS	cic	FOR MES		DAT	E - TIME	IR ON MONTH	YR
-	01 ог 02		11			cccc				15	03152	MAY	71

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

BOOK YES

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ/TAN SON NHUT AFLD, RVN
TO: PSR/DOS/WHEELER AFB, HAWAII

SUBJ: 7AF COMSEC MONITOR SUPPORT (U)

REF USAFSS DOS 132200Z MAY 71

- 1. REF MSG FIRST INDICATION THIS UNIT AND 7AF HAS OF REQUIREMENT TO ESTABLISH DRAWDOWN ACTIONS FOR COMSEC SUPPORT TO 7AF/MACV. WE WILL CONTINUE TO COORDINATE WITH 7AF AND MACV TO ESTABLISH FUTURE REQUIREMENTS AND CHANGES THERETO FOR TACTICAL COMSEC SUPPORT.
- 2. 7AF RESPONSE TO USAFSS MSG QUOTED FOR YOUR ACTION: LTR FROM 7AF (DCO) TO 6994 SCTY SQ DTD 15 MAY 71, SUBJ: COMSEC SUPPORT (MONITORING) QUOTE:
- 1. REFERENCE YOUR 6994 SCTY SQ (DOS) MESSAGE 130225Z MAY 71 (THIS WAS RETRANSMITTAL OF USAFSS MSG).
- 2. THE LEVELS OF COMSEC SUPPORT TO BE PROVIDED TO 7AF IN SEA FOR FY71-74 WILL BE THE SAME AS IN FY:70-71. YOU WILLBE ADVISED OF ANY CHANGES IN COMSEC SUPPORT DUE TO WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES FROM SEA. UNQUOTE. SIGNED BY W. A. OWEN JR. LT COL USAF, DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS?

DISTR:

	AFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE CMSgt Livingston, NCOIC DOS, 4891	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Ę	TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE DARY D. BELCHER, Capt, DO, 4891	
E A S	SIGNATURE	DOC#59
E R	Security of the least characteristic field of the security report	SECURITY C

DD FORM 173

3

0

R TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE

R SIGNATURE

A S S E R

DD FORM 173

This is a true copy

26705010 2670510ZCZCRDA462 PF YMRDQR DE YHLAKZ 0008 2670204 ZNY MMNSH P240145Z SEP 71 FM PACSCTYRGN TO 6994SCTYSQ/SSLO ZEM

SUBJ: COMSEC SUPPORT 7AF
REVIEW OF PLANNING INFO ON SEA RESIDUAL CRYPTOLOGIC FORCES INDICATES
NO PROVISION FOR RETAINING COMSEC SUPPORT FOR 7AF.
REQUEST YOU ADVISE 7AF OF THIS MATTER. IF 7AF DESIRES
CONTINUENCE OF THIS SUPPORT, REQUEST THEY PROVIDE A
STATEMENT OF SUPPORT AND TIME FRAME REQUIRED. IN VIEW
OF CURRENT PROGRAMING ACTIONS TO REALIGN CRYPTOLOGIC
RESOURCES, REQUEST ABOVE INFORMATION BE OBTAINED AS SOON
AS FOSSIBLE.

GP-1 110 0008

This is a certified true copy:

CEORGE F. LOGAN Jr., Capt., USAF

Operations Officer

Ь

1 2 1

0

ZOZOROBUSS

PP YMRO OR

DE YM QADK SEA 7 2672014

ZNY MMNSH

P 242005Z SEP 71

FM USAFSS

TO PSA/DO

6994 SOTYSO/ OU

ZEM

38 STERM \$ 52

1. IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE USAFS REPRESENTATIVES WILL ATTEND A MEETING AT MACV HEAD QUARTERS TO DECIDE THE TOTAL OR YPTOLOGIC POSTURE IN SOUTH VIETNAM FOR THE NEXT FISCAL SEAR. AS PART OF THIS MEETING THE NEED FOR THE CURRENT USAFSS DIRECT COMSEC SUPPORT EFFORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE ADDRESSED.

2. THE CURRENT USAFSS POSITION IS DEPENDE UPON THE COMPONENT COMMANDER'S REQUIREMENT FOR DIRECT SUPPORT.

3. REQUEST YOU CONTACT PACAF AND/OR TAF TO CONFIRM THE ABOVE REQUIREMENT AND DETERMINE ANY CHANGE IN TOTAL EFFORT CAUSED BY REDUCTION. THESE COMMANDS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT OUR CURRENT COMSEC EFFORT WILL BE COMPETING AGAINST OTHER RESOURCES IN A MANDATORY REDUCTION ENVIRONMENT.

4. SUBJECT TO PACAFY 7AF RESPONSE AND/OR THE IR EXPRESSED NEEDS, HE WILL NEED YOUR ASSESSMENT AS TO:

A. NUMBER AND TYPE OF COMSEC POSITIONS WHICH SHOULD BE RETAINED IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

B. NUMBER OF FER SONNEL REQUIRED TO CONTINUE THE DIRECT SUPPORT MISSION.

. YOUR RESPONSE IS REQUIRED AT THE EARL IEST POSSIBLE TIME AND CERTAINLY BEFORE THE MEETING AT MACV PRESENTLY SCHEDULED FOR FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER 1971.
24 9
0047

NNNN

THIS IS A TRUE COPY:

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH AIR FORCE (PACAF) APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: DCO

28 Sep 1971

SUBJECT: COMSEC Support to 7AF (SSLO 25 Sep 71)

TO: USAFSS/7AF Limison Officer

- 1. CINCPACAF message DCO 150101Z May 71 requested a time for eliminating COMSEC support provided by the 6994 Security Squadron. 7AF DCO 211015Z May 71 established a time frame of FY 4/72-1/73.
- 2. Subsequent developments indicate that tactical COMSED support can be eliminated during FY 4/72.
- 3. (U) This answers your letter, subj: COMSEC Support to 7AF, dated 25 September 1971.

FOR THE COMMANDER

FRANK M MILLIKEN, Lt Col, USAF Asst Director of Communications Operations DCS/Communications-Electronics

This is a certified true copy.

ZEORGE F. LOGAN, Jr., Capt, USAF

Operations Officer

