

UNCLASSIFIED

HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 1
6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

July – November
1971



The EC-47 History Site

W. H.

[REDACTED]

HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 1
6994 SECURITY SQUADRON
1 JULY THROUGH 12 NOVEMBER 1971
RCS: USS-D3

and

SPECIAL HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 1
6994 SECURITY SQUADRON
CLOSURE
2 JUNE THROUGH 12 NOVEMBER 1971



1 February 1972



6994 Security Squadron, APO San Francisco 96307



[REDACTED]

HISTORY of DETACHMENT 1

6994 Security Squadron

1 July 1971 through 12 November 1971

RCS: USS-D3

AND

SPECIAL HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 1

6994 Security Squadron

CLOSURE

2 June through 12 November 1971

[REDACTED]


Approved:

Grover S. McMakin
GROVER S. MCMAKIN, LtCol, USAF
Commander, 6994 Security Squadron

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)



F R O N T I S P I E C E

As a military unit is born, history begins. When it dies, all that remains is history. So it is with all that has meaning - even human life. Once the door is closed, it is good to view the past and to reflect upon all that has transpired, both the good and the bad. In reflecting upon the history of Detachment 1, 6994 Security Squadron, we see a unit whose conception was to fulfill a wartime need. Through the short life of the Detachment (short when compared to the complete course of human events) historical documentation proves that it fulfilled its purpose admirably. In this presentation, marking the end of an era, it is fitting that tribute be paid to three members of Detachment 1 who gave their all. Thus, the names TSgt Raymond Leftwich, A1C Charles Land, and A1C Daniel Reece are imprinted upon the indelible pages of history. Killed in action on 9 March 1967 when their EC-47 was downed by enemy anti-aircraft fire, it is in memory of these fallen comrades that this final Detachment 1 history is written and dedicated.



FOREWARD

This history is written in two major parts. Part I covers the operational aspects of the Detachment from 1 July through 12 November 1971. Part II covers the activities involving the 6994th Security Squadron Complex relative to the closure of Detachment 1.

It is significant to note that many actions outlined have been duplicated in other histories. However, to provide an all inclusive history of every action evolving from the closure of the unit, some redundancy was necessary. Where possible, these repetitions items have been pointed out in footnotes.

The objective of Part II of this history is to point out, as thoroughly as possible, every aspect of a unit closure, when the mission facilities as well as mission activities are essential to the continued support of Tactical Warfare. Every effort has been made to point out both successes and failures, and to summarize the entire activity with the important lessons learned.

This history is subject to revision. Additional information or suggested corrections will be welcomed.

This report was prepared by the 6994th Security Squadron Unit Historian, MSgt Kyle L. Emerson, with valuable research and on the spot observations provided by Captain Kermit J. Wegner of Detachment 1. Additional credit is due the Programmed Actions Directive Monitors of Detachments 1 and 2, and the outstanding contributions of MSgt John T. Koraska, Programmed Actions Directive monitor for the 6994 Security Squadron.

[REDACTED]


ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

COMMANDER	Major John V. Thompson
OPERATIONS OFFICER	Captain Kermit J. Wegner
FIRST SERGEANT	TSgt Freddie H. Coburn
NCOIC OPERATIONS	MSgt Keith N. Owens
NCOIC MAINTENANCE	TSgt Larius L. McDonald
NCOIC SUPPLY	MSgt Joseph L. Morris
NCOIC COMMUNICATIONS	TSgt Hugh K. Foster
NCOIC SECURITY POLICE	SSgt Joe L. Baskin
NCOIC ADMINISTRATION	SSgt Stephen Willis
NCOIC PERSONNEL	TSgt Freddie R. Coburn
NCOIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS	MSgt Ronald C. Hain
NCOIC STANDARDIZATION/EVALUATION	MSgt Thomas R. Craig
NCOIC MISSION MANAGEMENT	SSgt Stephen G. Transue
NCOIC EXPLOITATION	MSgt John E. Glenn Jr.

The Commander was air evacuated from Phu Cat to Cam Ranh Bay on 31 October. Major Thompson suffered a knee injury during a touch football game, requiring surgery. It was expected that he would undergo this surgery at Tachikawa Air Base, Japan and that his convalescence would last for approximately six weeks.

Captain Kermit J. Wegner, the only remaining officer assigned, assumed command of the Detachment on 31 October.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]



CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE i

FRONTISPIECE ii

FOREWARD iii

REGISTER OF KEY PERSONNEL iv

CONTENTS v

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART vii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS viii

CHRONOLOGY ix

PART I - USS-D3 HISTORY 1

 Chapter I - MISSION AND ORGANIZATION 2

 Mission 2

 Organization 3

 Internal Organizational Structure 3

 Chapter II - SIGINT TASKING AND COLLECTION 6

 Basic Missions 6

 Tasking Cycle 7

 Collection 8

 Chapter III - SIGINT PROCESSING AND REPORTING 16


 Reporting 16

 Chapter IV - PERSONNEL 18

 Shortage of Airborne Mission Supervisors 18

 Chapter V - SPECIAL INTEREST ITEMS 20

 Air/Ground/Air Communications Test
 (Project Cumbersome) 20





FIX/FAC Program (Brown Beaver) 23

FOOTNOTES 26

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 32

GLOSSARY OF CODENAMES 36

PART II - DETACHMENT 1 DEACTIVATION 37

 BACKGROUND 38

 Phu Cat Closure (Monograph) 40

 PART II FOOTNOTES 81

 GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 85

APPENDIX I - SEA ARDF AREAS I-1

APPENDIX II - COMBAT CROSS CONFIGURATION II-1


APPENDIX III - MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT/PRODUCTIVITY STAISTICS .. III-1

APPENDIX IV - BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF COMMANDER IV-1

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS



ORGANIZATIONAL CHART





LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Charts:

Organizational Chart Page vi

Basic Combat Cross Configuration Page II-1

Mission Accomplishment Data Page III-1

ARDF Productivity Page III-2

ACI Productivity Page III-3

2. MAPS:

SEA ARDF areas and 6994 SS Sites Page I-1

3. ILLUSTRATIONS:

Basic Combat Cross Configuration Page II-2

4. PHOTOGRAPHS:

Portrait of Unit Commander Page IV-2



[REDACTED]

CHRONOLOGY

Part I

05 July 1971 Initial test of Project Cumbersome begun.

14 July 1971 509 RRG queried on clarification of early/late ITOT reporting IAW Techins 2038.

15 July 1971 330 RRFs/23 Army Division request for speed-up of passing of Fix data received.

01 August 1971 Project Cumbersome test halted due to break-down of KY-8 cypher equipment.

28 August 1971 ITOT changes requested.

19-20 September 1971 ITOT changes made by ACC.

20 October 1971 Installation of new antenna at Ubon, Thailand for Project Cumbersome completed.

21 October 1971 USAFSS waiver of flying hour limitations received in response to Det 1 request, due to lack of AMS personnel.

25 October 1971 New 30 day test of Project Cumbersome begun.

26 October 1971 Detachment 1 involvement in FIX/FAC (Brown Beaver) begun.

Part II

02 June 1971 7AF announcement made that Phu Cat Air Base was scheduled for closure on 30 November 1971.

01 July 1971 Joint 460 TRW/7AF/6994SS meeting held to discuss transfer of TEWS Command and Control and relocation of Det 1/361 TEWS.

01 July 1971 483 TAW Lt Cam Ranh Bay chosen as TEWS command and control. Initial plans indicated movement of Det 1/361 TEWS to Cam Ranh Bay.

15 July 1971 Cam Ranh Bay/Phan Rang appear as 7AF first/second choices for Det 1/361 TEWS relocation.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

05 August 1971 Cam Ranh Bay meeting of all concerned held to discuss the 460 TRW deactivation and assumption of TEWS Command and Control by 483 TAW and related Det 1/361 TEWS relocation. Tentative target date for relocation set for 15 October.

08 August 1971 7AF announced plans for establishment of PAD to cover transfer of Det 1/361 TEWS to Cam Ranh Bay.

10 August 1971 Formal approval to resubordinate TEWS to 483 TAW received by 7AF.

11 August 1971 Planning meeting for PAD on movement of Det 1/361 TEWS to Cam Ranh Bay held at 7AF.

13 August 1971 Commander, 7AF apprised of USAFSS desire to effect drawdown within 6994SS complex, resulting in resumption of discussions concerning alternate sites for relocation of Det 1/361 TEWS facilities.

16 August 1971 7AF agree to consider total deactivation of Det 1/361 TEWS and transfer of some assets to Danang.

31 August 1971 JCS advised that national level action would require deactivation of 480 TFW (Phu Cat) vice transfer to Danang as originally planned, making ramp space for Det 1/361 TEWS EC-47s available at Danang.

31 August 1971 460 TRW deactivated at Tan Son Nhut and Command and Control of TEWS officially transferred to 483 TAW, Cam Ranh Bay.

01 September 1971 Drawdown actions which could result in withdrawal of 8 - 12 EC-47s from SEA and USAFSS support announced.

2-3 September 1971 7AF team visits Danang to survey available facilities for Det 2/362 TEWS to absorb Det 1/361 TEWS assets.

12 September 1971 All plans continued to favor transfer to Danang.

14 September 1971 7AF outlined specific recommendations/justification for transfer to Danang.

15 September 1971 7AF submitted final draft plan for movement to Danang to CINCPACAF. Target date for expansion of facilities at Danang set for 31 October 1971.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

18 September 1971 Information concerning approval of 2500-3000 cryptologic spaces for SVN and potential impact upon ARDF received. Indications of deactivation of all Army ARDF and retention of all EC-47 platforms made. Cam Ranh Bay again mentioned as EC-47 staging base.

19 September 1971 NSA rejection of Cam Ranh Bay as EC-47 staging base announced.

26 September 1971 Hold placed on all actions pending outcome of Joint Cryptologic Conference to be held at Saigon on 4-8 October.

28 September 1971 PacSctyRgn recommendation for deactivation of Det 1/361 TEWS and merger with Det 2/362 TEWS received.

1-10 October 1971 Development of 7AF PAD covering transfer/Phu Cat closure completed.

12 October 1971 483 TAW submitted initial proposal for Aircraft transfer.

13 October 1971 PacSctyRgn advised 6994th of their intention to develop a PAD concerning transfer of Phu Cat Det 1 assets.

14 October 1971 6994SS personnel assignment/realignment proposals provided to PacSctyRgn and USAFSS.

17 October 1971 7AF advised caution on all actions pending CINCPACAF approval of the 7AF PAD.

17 October 1971 First 6994th PAD progress report forwarded to PacSctyRgn.

19 October 1971 Permission for personnel reassignments IAW 6994SS proposals received.

19 October 1971 CINCPAC raises question concerning scheduled redeployment of six EC-47s to CONUS.

22-23 October 1971 Typhoon Hester strikes Danang, placing hold on all construction projects.

23 October 1971 USAFSS support of redeployment of six EC-47s announced to AFSSO PACAF.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

26 October 1971 7AF advised CINCPACAF of the need for immediate action to be taken for approval of PAD actions.

27 October 1971 CSAF approval of transfer of 15 EC-47s to Danang received.

30 October 1971 7AF PAD and all associated actions reinstated.

30 October 1971 Final decision made to hold six EC-47s scheduled for CONUS redeployment at Tan Son Nhut in a non-operational status pending JCS direction.

31 October 1971 Final schedule for Aircraft movement provided by 483 TAW.

03 November 1971 Det 1 submitted proposed personnel transfer schedule.

05 November 1971 Last operational sortie to recover at Phu Cat flown.

06 November 1971 Eight EC-47s depart Phu Cat for Danang/Tan Son Nhut.

07 November 1971 Five EC-47s transferred to Tan Son Nhut.

07 November 1971 Last operational mission flown, last DURMIS transmitted.

08 November 1971 Seven EC-47s deadheaded to Tan Son Nhut, last EC-47s of the Phu Cat contingent.

09 November 1971 All communications circuits deactivated by 0800 hours local (2359Z).

10 November 1971 Maintenance facility turned over to host base.

12 November 1971 Cryptographic material couriered to Danang.

12 November 1971 All Supply accounts cleared.

12 November 1971 Det 1 SI facility degaussed and turned over to host base.

13 November 1971 Last of Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron personnel depart Phu Cat Air Base, RVN.

[REDACTED]

PART I
USS D-3 HISTORY

[REDACTED]

Chapter I

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

[REDACTED] Detachment (Det) 1, 6994th Security Squadron (Scty Sq) continued as an element of the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) contingent tasked with Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) in Southeast Asia (SEA). Directly subordinate to the 6994 Scty Sq at Tan Son Nhut Airfield (Afld.), Republic of Vietnam (RVN), the Detachment, along with parent and sister units of the squadron complex, performed the unique mission of providing timely ARDF fixes on enemy locations to both Army and Air Force tactical units, thereby allowing for timely targeting against the enemy.

Mission

[REDACTED] Headquarters for Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq was located at Phu Cat Air Base (AB), RVN. The operational mission of the Detachment was to conduct ARDF and specified Airborne Communications Intelligence (ACI) against enemy targets in the SEA ARDF Areas seven (primarily Binh Dinh, Pleiku, and Kontum Provinces), the Quang Ngai and Quang Tin provinces of SEA Area 8, SEA Area 10 in Southern Laos, and SEA Area 20 in eastern Cambodia. (1)* ARDF/ACI missions were accomplished in a fleet of 20 EC-47 ALR-34 Combat Cross⁺(CC) aircraft, under the control of the 361st Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (TEWS).

*See Appendix 1 for map depicting various SEA areas.

+See Appendix 2 for configuration details of EC-47 ALR-34 CC aircraft.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

.Organization

[REDACTED] Within the USAFSS structure, the Commander, 6994 Scty Sq, Tan Son Nhut Afld., RVN exercised command supervision and administrative control of Detachment 1. The Commander Seventh Air Force (7AF) maintained command control of the EC-47 fleet, through the 361st TEWS. The TEWS unit was subordinate to the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW), Tan Son Nhut Afld., RVN from 1 July through 31 August 1971, at which time the 460 TRW was deactivated.⁽²⁾ From 1 September through 12 November (close out date for this history), command control was maintained by the 483rd Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW), Cam Ranh Bay, RVN.

[REDACTED] Operational control of ARDF facilities and utilization of same was vested in the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). All MACV requirements were routed through the ARDF Coordination Center (ACC), operated jointly by the 509th Radio Research Group (RRG) and the 6994th Scty Sq, in accordance with MACV Directive 381-23. Field Force Commanders, through appropriate Collection Management Authorities, stated their requirements which were subsequently tasked by the ACC. Collection Management Authority (CMA) responsibilities were managed by the 330th Radio Research Company (RRCo), Nha Trang AB, RVN (SEA Areas 7 & 8), and the 7th Radio Research Field Station (RRFS), Udorn, Thailand (SEA Area 10).

.Internal Organizational Structure

(U) As with the majority of USAFSS units, Detachment 1, 6994 Scty Sq consisted of command function, an Operations Division, Logistical

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Support, and various other supporting sections, including Communications, Personnel, Security and Law Enforcement, and Administration. The Operations Division was sub-divided into five separate sections with designation and duties as follows:

Awards and Decorations:

(U) The purpose of this office was the monitoring of flying activities of assigned personnel, assisting supervisors in the submission of recommendations for the award of appropriate decorations, and insuring adherence to all governing directives associated with the award of various medals associated with the unit mission.

Mission Management:

[REDACTED] Preparation of the Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS), a vehicle for apprising all concerned at all levels of command of the daily activities of the unit, was the primary duty of this section. Monitoring mission accomplishment, preparation of evaluations and statistical studies, to discern trends in production, and maintenance of the unit Master Program were all duties with which this section was tasked.

Standardization Evaluation:

[REDACTED] A section unique to units with airborne missions, the Standardization Evaluation section was responsible for monitoring the airborne operator progression, and insuring that the unit was in full compliance with all regulations and directives concerning airborne operations.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Flight Operations:

[REDACTED] The Flight Operations section was responsible for the maintenance of air crew records, scheduling operators for missions, and insuring that flight time was equitably distributed among all operator and analytical personnel.

Analysis and Reporting:

[REDACTED] Preparation of daily reports on all ARDF and ACI was the primary function of this section, with additional responsibilities of providing analytical personnel for flight analyst duties.⁽³⁾

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Chapter II

SIGINT TASKING AND COLLECTION

[REDACTED] The Commander, MACV exercised operational control of the ARDF/ACI activities performed by Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq. Technical control of assigned ARDF/ACI production activities was exercised by the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA).

[REDACTED] The Detachment was tasked with ARDF, ACI, Processing, and Reporting of Southeast Asia Communist high frequency (HF) manual morse communications.

[REDACTED] Collection was accomplished through the use of EC-47 aircraft manned by Manual Morse Systems Specialists.

Basic Missions

[REDACTED] For the period of this report, Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq, staging from Phu Cat Air Base, RVN, was tasked with flying ARDF missions in SEA Areas 7 and 8 in South Vietnam, SEA Area 10 in the southern Laotian Panhandle, and SEA Area 20 in eastern Cambodia. The primary objective of these missions was to obtain accurate locations (through ARDF) of Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces operating in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In addition, the secondary mission was to collect target communications data in order to derive exploitable intelligence. These missions were accomplished with EC-47 Combat Cross, ALR-34 equipped aircraft.⁽¹⁾

COMBAT CROSS (CC)

[REDACTED] The primary objective of the CC missions was to fix enemy target transmitters deemed priority targets by MACV. CC aircraft were

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

configured with two individual SIGINT positions: ARDF and ARDF acquisition. These positions were designated "X" and "Y"^{*} respectively. The "X" position was capable of fixing targets within a frequency range of 2-16 megahertz (MHZ). During fix operation, the "Y" console provided supporting intercept copy of ARDF targets and when time permitted, performed a COMINT collection mission directed toward maximum continuity and development of all hostile target transmitters.⁽²⁾ With a frequency range of .5 to 30 MHZ, continuity and development copy was directed toward the intercept of low level encryption systems that were exploitable in the field and which were invaluable in determining enemy activities.⁽³⁾

Tasking Cycle

[REDACTED] The tasking cycle for the ARDF/ACI collection missions flown by Detachment 1, 6994 Scty Sq was unique for USAFSS units outside the 6994 Scty Sq complex, in that the tasks were designed to provide constant tactical support to Air Force, Army, and Naval units in a highly fluid armed conflict.

[REDACTED] ARDF/ACI tasking originated with Army and Navy field commanders, the Cryptologic Community, and 7AF submission of requirements for the coming week. These requests were submitted to MACV J2-114. On Wednesday of each week, MACV (J2-114) submitted the proposed tasking to the ARDF Coordinating Committee. This committee consisted of representatives (usually Operations Officers) of the 509 RRG; 6994 Scty Sq, ACC, MACV (J2), 7AF, Department of Defense Special Representative (DODSPECREP), Controlled American Source (CAS), Saigon,

*See Appendix II for full "X" and "Y" position capabilities.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

and the Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV). The coordinating committee then passed these recommendations to MACV (J2) for final approval and return to ACC for issuance. While these procedures were taking place, the 460 TRW (from 1 September through 12 November the 483 TAW) provided the ACC with an aircraft availability forecast for the tasking week in question. ACC then assigned individual missions to fulfill the tasking requirement originally generated by the Field Force Commanders to each Collection Management Authority (CMA) and Detachment 1 on Thursday of each week. At the same time, ACC provided a sanitized version of the tasking to 7AF for issuance of the required Fragmentary Order (Frag Order) for each mission to be flown. On Friday, the Detachment received position tasking from the appropriate CMA having the SIGINT collection, processing, and reporting responsibility for the specific target area of operations concerned. Prior to each day's series of missions, the applicable CMA provided the majority of technical data on assigned/available targets in the form of Target Data Listings (TDLs). Once airborne, CC crews, through Air/Ground/Air contact with Direct Support Units (DSUs), had access to additional technical data for individual FRAG areas. In addition, DSUs accepted all fixes from the airborne platform, passed tip-offs to the Aircraft, and accepted messages which were deemed exploitable by the Airborne crew.

Collection

[REDACTED] With any Airborne unit, collection is affected by the amount of fraged time which is actually accomplished. Without a [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

high rate of accomplishment in this respect, the volume of ARDF/ACI is somewhat below expectations. Due to this situation, the Fraggd/Accomplished ratio is given full consideration.

Mission Accomplishment (Fragged VS Accomplished)

[REDACTED] During the period covered by this report, Detachment 1 was fragged for 1588 missions, with 1505 or 94.8% being accomplished. In August, 412 missions were fragged and all were flown. Again, in the first tasking week of November, 67 missions were tasked and a 100% accomplished rate was realized. The lowest rate was in July when 312 of 375 missions were accomplished for a rate of 83.2%. The majority of those missions that were listed as unaccomplished were as a result of bad weather.

[REDACTED] While the above shows a commendable rate, the hours flown versus hours fragged ratio for Detachment 1 was equally noteworthy, of 11116 hours fragged flying time, 9926 or 89.3% were accomplished. Since this ratio is affected by air aborts for weather, fuel, airframe problems, "back-end" maintenance, etc., such a rate is considered well above the minimum acceptable. Finally, time over target (TOT) compared to actual flying time gives an indication of what percentage of time the platform was able to effectively cover its assigned mission. In this respect, Detachment 1 logged 7007 hours over target, for a TOT rate of 70.6%*.

*See appendix 3 for statistical presentation of Mission Accomplishment Data.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ARDF Productivity:

[REDACTED] In the area of ARDF productivity, several different aspects must be considered. Of prime importance is the number of targets worked. Without a high performance rate in this area, it is obvious that none of the other objectives can be fulfilled: However, the fix/targets worked rate is indicative of the expertise of the "X" operator/Navigator team. To expand upon the effectiveness, by comparing the number of targets identified against the number fixed/cut, gives an indication of the value of the identification aids provided the operators. Such statistics are also of value in determining the effectiveness of the Airborne Analyst Program.⁽³⁾ To provide a gauge of the ability of the ARDF platform to provide fix information on those targets MACV has deemed important, it is necessary to compare the number of targets fixed/cut which were designated as priority. Finally, the number of targets fixed which are in a radius of less than 1000 meters must be considered, since the objective is to obtain an accurate location of each transmitter worked. In each of these areas, Detachment 1 maintained respectable percentages. In the ratio of targets worked versus targets fixed/cut, the average for the entire period stood at 87.7 percent. Of 7046 targets fixed/cut, 3100 or 38.7% were identified. Further breaking down the identification rate, 2375 or 29.6% of the targets fixed/cut were identified as priority targets. Based upon the lack of accurate scheduled working data, and the lack of actual scheduled operation employed by the enemy, such an

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

identification rate is considered acceptable. Finally, of the 6358 targets fixed, 5272 were below 1000 meters for an 80.6% ratio.*

ACI Productivity:

[REDACTED] In the area of intercept, it must be remembered that all the missions flown by Detachment 1 were primarily ARDF, with any ACI being provided from the "Y" position. Since the basic purpose of the "Y" position is to obtain back-up copy on ARDF targets being worked on the "X" console, very little of the allocated time is available for Continuity and Development (C&D) purposes. Of 7836.6 hours available to Detachment 1 "Y" operators, 575.0 were spent in productive copy for an effectiveness of 7.8%. While this appears low in comparison with ground site productivity, it is completely within acceptable bounds in an ARDF oriented mission. Of perhaps more significance than simple hours of copy is the value of the intercept obtained. In this respect, Detachment 1 was primarily interested in obtaining messages transmitted via low level exploitable crypto systems. The success of this mission was evidenced by a ratio of 38.6% of all messages copied falling into this category. Highest exploitable productivity was realized during the months of September and October when 188 and 189 messages were copied, constituting respective percentages of 61.8 and 57.4% of total message intercept.†

*See Appendix 3 for ARDF Productivity statistics.

†See Appendix 3 for presentation of ACI productivity statistics.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The volume of message copy, particularly in the exploitable area, was noted by USAFSS in September, and a query was forwarded to Pacific Security Region (PacSctyRgn). In their answer, PacSctyRgn pointed out that the favorable increase was due in part to increased technical exchanges between Detachment 1 and the CMA, enabling complete briefing of airborne crews on exploitable systems to be found within the various mission areas.⁽⁴⁾ In recognition of the high volume of exploitable intercept being obtained, PacSctyRgn congratulated the Detachment for their accomplishments.⁽⁵⁾ The value of this copy was made further evident in a message from the 509 RRG, congratulating Detachment 1 for the excellent effort expended in the recovery of high priority targets associated therewith.⁽⁶⁾

Adjustment of Initial Time Over Target (ITOT)

[REDACTED] In a letter of 28 August, the Detachment pointed out to 6994 Scty Sq the fact that productivity statistics (including targets worked on ARDF and minutes of copy obtained for continuity and development) when recorded by the hour showed that during the late evening hours, productivity dropped off drastically. This was due to a number of reasons, major of which was the fact that enemy transmitters in mission areas ceased to transmit after dusk, and those that were still active were extremely difficult to work because of interference from sky waves. As a means of correcting this deficiency and increase mission effectiveness, Detachment 1 suggested adjustment of ITOT for both early morning and afternoon flights, thereby providing

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

more time over target during the morning hours and creating an overlap between the two missions during the hours of midday peak activity.

[REDACTED] This ITOT adjustment proposal was coordinated with MACV by 6994 Scty Sq and approval was obtained to make the necessary ITOT changes. In a message of 15 September, 6994th advised Detachment 1 that MACV had agreed with our proposal, stressing that close Air to Air coordination between mission aircraft would be necessary during overlap periods to prevent duplication of effort.⁽⁷⁾ On 19 and 20 September ACC took necessary steps to adjust ITOT's to coincide with hours of high activity levels.

Actions by Support Units to Maximize Time On Target

[REDACTED] In a letter of 8 August 1971, 460 TRW outlined procedures to be used by the various TEWS in flying to and from target areas. By establishing guidelines for the various power settings and ground speeds to be utilized, maximum utilization of fuel was expected which would, in turn, provide the greatest amount of time over target for mission accomplishment. On five hour missions, as much as one-half hour additional TOT could be realized, if authorized by the ACC and recommended by the USAFSS Airborne Mission Supervisor (AMS). In setting forth these standards, 460 TRW stressed the fact that although their objective was to provide all possible user support, the flight safety would not be compromised in any way.

Delays in Passing ARDF Fixes Air to Ground (A/G):

[REDACTED] On 15 July 1971, the 330th RRFS, Nha Trang AB, RVN advised
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Detachment 1 (as well as Detachment 2, 6994 Scty Sq, Danang AB, RVN) of a requirement of the army's 23rd Division Artillery to receive fixes from aircraft as soon as possible. This was based on the fact that the 23rd Division commander desired feedback on artillery results. In order to provide this information, the Division felt that if they could receive fixes while the enemy was still transmitting, results of the artillery strikes would be noted in enemy communications, in the form of procedural signals on morse transmissions, or through background noise associated with voice operation. In an effort to provide the field commander with an evaluation of this suggested system, the 330 RRFS requested the Detachments (both 1 and 2) to provide answers to three specific areas of contention: (1) The in-station time requirement for passing fixes A/G; (2) The principle reasons for delay in passing fixes; and (3) any suggestions for speeding up the passing of fixes to DSUs.

[REDACTED] In response to this message both Detachment 1 and 2 provided rationale for the apparent slowness of crews to pass fixes to the DSU, pointing out a number of reasons why the stated objectives would be virtually unattainable. Reasons stated were as follows: (1) Targets rarely remained active for the period of time necessary to fix the target, compute the location, and pass it to the ground; (2) The time delay between the last line of position (LOP) used for computing varied from 10 minutes to 49 minutes, with a mean average of 24 minutes. This time was dependent upon the experience level of the navigator, the

[REDACTED]

volume of targets being worked at any given time, and the time spent in obtaining doppler updates to ensure accuracy of fixes; (3) The time expended between receipt of the fix by the operator and the time passed to the LSU was contingent upon the volume of ARDF in progress, and quality of A/G communications. It was pointed out that the use of frequency modulated (FM) transmitters aboard the mission aircraft interfered with the ARDF ("X") position. In the event priority targets were being worked by the "X" position, it would be necessary to hold the fix until the TDI schedule would allow use of the FM transmitter; (4) If the mission aircraft was depended upon to obtain intercept of the target's reaction to the artillery, the necessity of standing-off would reduce capability of the aircraft to pursue ARDF mission cover in the assigned area, while the artillery activity would make it impossible to work the area being fired upon. (12-13)

[REDACTED] Both Detachments reiterated that in-house procedures required operators to pass fixes as soon as possible, acknowledging the fact that timely action was recognized as being extremely important.

[REDACTED] The general consensus of both Detachment 1 and 2 was that while feedback to the artillery unit had its benefits, the limitations inherent in the program and the resultant loss of ARDF capabilities during artillery strikes would overshadow any benefits to be gained.

[REDACTED]

Chapter III

SIGINT PROCESSING AND REPORTING

[REDACTED] The bulk of the SIGINT processing and reporting carried out by Detachment 1 was in the area of preparation of technical reports. Processing was limited to the cursory examination of traffic for identification and preparation for technical reporting. Technical reports for which the Detachment was responsible included the Southeast Asia Technical Summary (SEATS), the ARDF Recovery Report (ARR), and the Exploitable Message Report (EMR).⁽¹⁾

Reporting

Southeast Asia Technical Summary (SEATS)

[REDACTED] This report was the most voluminous and time consuming of all reports issued by the Detachment. Requirements of the governing directive, Technical Instructions (TECHINS) 2037, as implemented on 4 May 1971 remained constant, with no changes being made during the period of this report.

Airborne Direction Finding Recovery Report (ARR)

[REDACTED] For the most part, submission of this report followed the guidelines as outlined in the revised TECHINS 2038 as implemented on 30 April 1971.⁽²⁾

[REDACTED] One exception was the lack of clarification of the reporting of early or late ITOT. The 509 RRG was queried on this subject on 14 July 1971. In reply, they advised that the 15 minute (plus or minus) deviation of the scheduled ITOT as outlined in MACV Directive 381-23

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

and 6994th/460 TRW Joint Operations Agreement (JOA) 55-1 would be used as reporting criteria. The 509th further advised that they would request an electrical change to TECHINS 2038 to levy specific time requirements for reporting early or late ITOTs.

Exploitable Message Report (EMR)

[REDACTED] During this period, the importance of the EMR as a time consuming duty of the analyst section greatly increased. This was primarily due to the large rise in exploitable message volume realized during the months of August, September, and October. Although all the missions scheduled from Detachment 1 were primarily ARDF, a total of 526 exploitable messages were logged by Detachment 1 operators during this three month period.*

Aircraft Incident Report (AIR)

(U) No AIRs were forwarded by Detachment 1 during this period.

*See Appendix III, page III-C for comparative statistics.

[REDACTED]

Chapter IV

Personnel

([REDACTED]) Throughout the period of this report, Detachment 1 continued to be plagued with a shortage of A292X1 operators, a situation that had existed throughout the calendar year. During the early part of 1971, 6994th obtained USAFSS/PacSctyRgn approval to augment Detachment 1 by Temporary Duty assignments (TDY) from other units within the (1-2) complex.

Shortage of Airborne Mission Supervisors

([REDACTED]) Although sufficient operators were made available through TDY augmentees, a continuous problem existed in maintaining sufficient Airborne Mission Supervisor qualified personnel to fly on each mission in accordance with existing directives. This situation resulted in those highly qualified persons being required to fly many more missions than would ordinarily be expected.

Waiver of AFR 60-1 Maximum Flying Time Requirements Requested.

([REDACTED]) In view of the scarcity of Airborne Mission Supervisors (AMSs), it became necessary to request a waiver to the provisions of AFM 60-1 which limits air-crew members to 125 hours within any calendar month. Through prior coordination with 6994th, it was discovered that although they could provide sufficient Class III operators, the requirement for AMS and Instructor Radio Operators (IROs) to carry on their own training program made it impossible to augment Detachment 1 in that respect. As an alternative, on 21 October, Detachment 1 requested waiver of AFR 60-1 to cover the period of October, and later

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

requested an extension to cover the first 15 days of November, at which
time deactivation of the unit was suspected to be complete.⁽³⁾ USAFSS
approval of this request was received on 21 October⁽⁴⁾ and the extension
was granted on 29 October.⁽⁵⁾

ec47.com

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Chapter V

SPECIAL INTEREST ITEMS

[REDACTED] This chapter is devoted to discussion of subjects which are not directly related to any other chapter, but which are of sufficient importance to discuss as separate entities. Two specific subjects have been selected for presentation in this chapter, both having direct impact upon the Detachment's mission, and both exhibiting sufficient uniqueness to set them aside from that information presented in other chapters. First of these subjects is the establishment of reliable Air/Ground/Air communications facilities in Laotian areas not covered by established BSU's. Codenamed Project Cumbersome, Detachment 1 was directly involved throughout the planning stage; however, early November closure prevented anything more than cursory involvement in actual operation. The other item chosen for presentation as a Special Interest Item deals with what has been tabbed the "FIX/FAC Program". This program was first envisioned at Tan Son Nhut as a means of passing fixes to Forward Air Controllers (FAC) to allow for immediate Visual Reconnoitering (VR) of fixed targets. The success of the Tan Son Nhut program prompted 7AF to expand it to other units, with the code name "Brown Beaver" applied to the Detachment 1 portion of the program.

Air/Ground/Air Communications Test (Project Cumbersome)

[REDACTED] On 15 April 1971, plans were laid out for implementation of a test to determine the capability of Detachment J, 7 RRFS at Ubon, Thailand to act as a tip-off site for ARDF Aircraft fraggged into Southern
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Laos. Codenamed Project Cumbersome, the entire plan was formulated during the months of May and June, 1971. At the end of June, National Security Agency Representative Vietnam (NRV)(C) had been tasked with determining if VRC-12 VHF equipment was available for installation at all Laos Air/Ground/Air sites. (1)

([REDACTED]) In a 01 July message, [REDACTED] [REDACTED], advised all concerned that a test of the project was scheduled to commence on 2 July, concomitant with the completion of a special ground plane antenna system at Det J, 7 RRFS. In this message, they stressed that all procedural systems previously outlined in a DIRNSA message of May 1971 be adhered to. All aircraft flying in Southern Laos were directed to monitor a special VHF frequency for tip-offs from ground to air, while 7 RRFS, Udorn Thailand was advised to insure that Detachment J was made aware of all ARDF sorties scheduled for Southern Laos. (2) In a follow-up message, PacSctyRgn directed monitoring of the special frequency, and directed thorough crew briefings of all applicable procedures. (3) In a 7 RRFS message of 4 July, concerned parties were advised that all was in readiness for commencement of the test, and that actual testing would begin at 0445Z, 5 July. (4) After less than one month (on 01 August), 7 RRFS advised that the project was temporarily halted due to KY-8 secure voice cipher switch malfunctions. (5)

([REDACTED]) As of 1 August, the project had failed to achieve desired results. A multitude of equipment problems had been encountered,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

negating the effectiveness of the ground site. Since the KY-8 cipher problem had caused total shut down while awaiting new parts, it was suggested that the ground plane antenna be replaced with a DISCONE, available through the [REDACTED]

In a 2 August message, 7 RRFS advised DIRNSA of USM-7J recommendations for location of the antenna, and suggested that another test be implemented, once all antenna/communications equipment problems were resolved. It was pointed out that by utilizing the "lessons learned" during the initial test, combined with a more efficient antenna and higher equipment reliability, a second test had the potential for yielding much better results. 7 RRFS further pointed out that the test period of July had been plagued with numerous aircraft aborts due to weather, equipment malfunctions had been a recurring problem, and the lack of ground-based operator expertise had detracted from the overall effectiveness.⁽⁶⁾ DIRNSA concurrence with 7 RRFS proposals was forthcoming on 6 August.⁽⁷⁾

[REDACTED] Word was received on 24 August that the necessary parts for repair of KY-8 equipment had been delivered.⁽⁸⁾ Additionally, pre-shipping information indicated that the antenna would be shipped from [REDACTED] on or about 16 September 1971.⁽⁹⁾ In response to a 7 RRFS query on 22 September DIRNSA advised that effective with resumption of the project, both Detachment 1 and 2 of 6994 Scty Sq, as well as Detachment 3 would be full participants in the program.⁽¹⁰⁾

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 20 October 1971, NRT(C) advised all concerned of an additional block of frequencies that had been authorized for Project Cumbersome by Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI).⁽¹¹⁾ Also on 20 October, 7 RRFS informed all parties that antenna installation was complete and that AN/VRC-47/KY-8 equipment had been successfully tested on 18 October. A new 30 day test was scheduled to begin at 0001Z on 25 October 1971.⁽¹²⁾ On 27 October, 6994 Scty Sq directed all Detachments to report Project Cumbersome communications results in Section 9 of the ARDF DURMIS on a daily basis until termination of the test.

[REDACTED] As of cessation of mission activity on 7 November, Detachment 1 had logged only one successful contact, when one tip-off was received and fixed on 5 November.

FIX/FAC Program (Brown Beaver)

[REDACTED] The system of linking an ARDF and Forward Air Controller (FAC) mission was first developed at Tan Son Nhut Afld., Vietnam as a joint 6994 Scty Sq/7AF test. The test proved fruitful and was made a permanent part of the Hq 6994 Scty Sq mission.⁽¹⁵⁾ By assigning specific ARDF missions to work areas of high interest with a FAC, any reliable (1000 meter radius or less) fix could be passed via secure voice to a FAC who could immediately visually reconnoiter (VR) the fix area for a potentially lucrative target for follow-up strikes. Since prior experience had pointed out that the enemy would often set up communications at some distance from the main cadre, strikes directed at ARDF fixes without the benefit of VR could result in the destruction of communications only, while the remainder of the military complex therewith

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

associated would not be harmed: However, once VR'd, the Fac could determine if and at what exact location, a strike would be advantageous. (16)

[REDACTED] Detachment 1 involvement in the FIX/FAC program began on 26 October for missions flying in SFA Area 10 (the Bolovens Plateau area of Southern Laos) and continued until unit deactivation. Concept of operations for the program was contained in a 7AF message of 2 October. (17) Stated purpose of the program was to determine the effectiveness of near real time exploitation of ARDF by Forward Air Controllers.

[REDACTED] Mechanics of the operation required EC-47 back-end crews to contact the Airborne Command Control Center (ABCCC) via non-secure voice. After contact, the EC-47 was to advise ABCCC to go secure. Once secure contact was made, the fix information, prefixed by the group "Oscar India" to indicate source of the data, was to be passed to the ABCCC for subsequent relay to the FAC. This system differed somewhat from that employed in the Tan Son Nhut project, in that EC-47 crews engaged in FIX/FAC missions were able to contact the FAC directly. 7AF stressed that all possible precautions would be taken to prevent disclosure of the ARDF function of the EC-47s. (18)

[REDACTED] In another 02 October message, 7AF outlined communications procedures to be used in contacting and passing traffic to ABCCC, the system for fragging Brown Beaver missions, and Call-sign allocation. All Brown Beaver mission scheduling was controlled by 7AF, with EC-47s

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

assigned a callsign of "Pullover", plus a two digit number that changed for each different mission.

[REDACTED] Between 26 October and 5 November (when the last operational mission was flown by Detachment 1), a total of 7 Brown Beaver missions were fragged, with only two fixes being passed. No feedback was provided on either of these tip-offs.

ec47.com

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Footnotes completely redacted. Following 5 pages removed to reduce file size.

EC47.com

[REDACTED]

GLOSSARY

ABBREVIATIONS

A

AB Air Base

ABCCC Airborne Command Control Center

ACC ARDF Coordination Center

ACI Airborne Communications Intelligence

Afld Airfield

A/G Air to Ground

AMS Airborne Mission Supervisor

ARDF Airborne Radio Direction Finding

ARR Airborne Radio Direction Finding Recovery Report

B

C

CAS Controlled American Source

CC Combat Cross

C&D Continuity and Development

CMA Collection Management Authority

COMNAVFORV Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam

D


Det Detachment

DIRNSA Director National Security Agency

DODSPECREP Department of Defense Special Representative

DSU Direct Support Unit

[REDACTED]



DURMIS Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary

E

EMR Exploitable Message Report

F

FAC Forward Air Controller

FM Frequency Modulated

FRAG ORDER Fragmentation Order

G

H

I

IRO Instructor Radio Operator

ITOT Initial Time Over Target

J

JOA Joint Operations Agreement

K

L

LOP Line of Position


M


MACTHAI Military Assistance Command, Thailand

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MHZ Megahertz

N





NRV ■ National Security Agency Representative, Vietnam ■

NVA North Vietnamese Army

O

P

PacSctyRgn Pacific Security Region

Q

R

RRCo Radio Research Company

RRFS Radio Research Field Station

RRG Radio Research Group

RVN Republic of Vietnam

S

Scty Sq Security Squadron

SEA Southeast Asia

SEATS Southeast Asia Technical Summary Report

T

TAW Tactical Airlift Wing

TDL Target Data List


TDY Temporary Duty

TECHINS Technical Instructions

TEWS Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron

TOT Time Over Target

TRW Tactical Reconnaissance Wing





U

USAFSS United States Air Force Security Service

V

VC Viet Cong

VHF Very High Frequency

VR Visual Reconnoiter

W

X

Y

Z

7AF Seventh Air Force






Glossary of Codenames

- BROWN BEAVER ARDF/Forward Air Controller operation in Southern Laos involving the passing of fix information from the ARDF mission to the Forward Air Controller for visual reconnoitering.
- COMBAT CROSS ARDF EC-47 aircraft/program identifier.
- CUMBERSOME Air/Ground/Air communications test involving a site at Detachment J, 7th Radio Research Field Station, Ubon, Thailand and ARDF aircraft from Detachments 1, 2, and 3 of 6994th Security Sq.

EC47.com



ec4.com

PART II

Detachment & Deactivation

[REDACTED]

PART II

DETACHMENT 1 DEACTIVATION

BACKGROUND

[REDACTED] When the national government stated the objectives to be followed in the Vietnamization of the war in Southeast Asia (SEA), all concerned began to take a long look at their mission. What was the impact of that mission to the overall war effort? What effect would unit withdrawal have on the ultimate outcome? Would the cessation of activity by a given unit cause undue hardship on those remaining? Would the success of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) be lessened through deletion of a unit? These were only a few of the questions asked, and the 6994 Security Squadron (Scty Sq) with its three subordinate detachments was no exception. Some levels were of the opinion that the Airborne Direction Finding (ARDF) mission of the 6994 Scty Sq would drawdown at a rate commensurate with that of all other U. S. Forces. Although Seventh Air Force (7AF) had been a prime user of the ARDF information supplied by ARDF throughout the war, this attitude was initially adopted by 7AF planners. It was only after strong pressure by Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) that 7AF recognized the need for retention of an ARDF effort. Through the joint efforts of MACV, 6994 Scty Sq, and 7AF intelligence, it became generally accepted that retention of ARDF was as important to the success of the drawdown as it had been to the normal pursuit of war objectives. With both 7AF and MACV supporting retention of the ARDF mission, specific arguments as follows were presented: As the drawdown of forces progressed, ARDF

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

would become a critical factor in the location of enemy forces that would be in a position to disrupt or attack remaining U.S. or ARVN forces: As combat resources were withdrawn, accurate and timely information concerning enemy location to enable timely and accurate counter-measures would be essential. 7AF was very strong in their support of continued ARDF coverage when they made it known that nearly 80% of the order of battle information available on Viet Cong (VC)/North Vietnamese (NVA) forces was derived from ARDF, while in Cambodia and Laos, ARDF was often the only source of such information. After taking this stand, 7AF joined MACV in stressing the desirability of retaining maximum EC-47 ARDF Posture in Southeast Asia for an indefinite period.⁽¹⁾

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Phu Cat Closure Announced

[REDACTED] The impact of SEA reduction on the 6994 Scty Sq was felt in early June 1971, when announcement was made on the impending closure of Phu Cat Air Base (AB), host base for Detachment 1, no later than 30 November 1971.

Early Planning Actions

[REDACTED] With such an announcement, concern was paramount as to the future location of the 20 EC-47 Combat Cross (CC) aircraft that were at that time staging from Phu Cat. Since these 20 aircraft constituted over one third of the EC-47 ARDF inventory in SEA, their retention was of paramount importance to both MACV and 7AF intelligence. Several requirements were of essence in consideration of an alternate base. By virtue of the nature of ARDF, a base sufficiently close to the target areas to allow for maximum Time over Target (TOT) was a basic requirement.* The influx of 20 aircraft, adequate revetment space, housing for crews, maintenance facilities, and permanence of the chosen base in respect to SEA reductions were all of importance. 6994 Scty Sq was concerned over the availability of Special Intelligence (SI) secure area space, communications facilities, and the cryptologic headroom ceiling for Vietnam. By 19 June, a number of proposals had been made, with all concerned having both good and bad points. (2)

Phan Rang Air Base, Republic of Vietnam:

[REDACTED] Initial 7AF suggestion of Phan Rang AB, Republic of Vietnam (RVN) was based on the premise that this would be one of the last bases

*See Appendix 1 for location of all sites given consideration and an outline of target areas in need of coverage [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

in Vietnam to be turned over to the VNAF: However, the opposition to Phan Rang pointed out that the distance from this base to the target area would reduce TOT to such a point that mission effectiveness would be reduced by nearly one third. Additionally, there were no existing SI facilities at Phan Rang.

Cam Ranh AB, RVN:

[REDACTED] At the outset of planning, Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN was strongly considered. Since Detachment 1, 6990 Scty Gp was scheduled for deactivation at Cam Ranh, SI secure areas, communications facilities, and ramp space would be available: However, the distance from Cam Ranh to the target areas posed the same limitations as Phan Rang. Additionally, the tenure of Cam Ranh was uncertain, which resulted in this location being ultimately rejected.

Ubon AB, Thailand:

[REDACTED] When the location of Ubon was considered in relation to the target area, this appeared to be the most logical choice. In arguments against, it became apparent that it would be impossible to give Ubon serious consideration due to the cryptologic headroom limitations that prevailed in Thailand.

Tan Son Nhut Airfield, RVN:

[REDACTED] Tan Son Nhut could not be seriously considered due to a lack of ramp space for 20 additional aircraft, and the distance from the target area which would be even greater than Cam Ranh or Phan Rang.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand:

[REDACTED] The same prohibitive argument that applied to Ubon, Thailand was pertinent in consideration of Nakhon Phanom - that being the Thailand cryptologic headroom ceiling. Additionally, the distance from the target area would be far too great to allow for effectively fulfilling mission objectives.

Danang Air Base, RVN:

[REDACTED] Danang was an obviously advantageous choice in relation to target areas, and ramp space would be available. Combination of Detachment 1 and 2, 6994 Scty Sq would provide necessary SI secure work area. Existing communications facilities would be adequate, and the cost of construction involved for additional living quarters rehabilitation would not be prohibitive. On the other hand, it was pointed out that a combination of three different ARDF systems (ALR-34, ALR-35, and ALR-38) at Danang would create a great deal of complications for maintenance personnel, and would necessitate movement of ALR-34/ALR-35 Avionics Ground Equipment (AGE) to Danang. One additional potential problem area would be the mix of R1830/2000 engine types at Danang which would bring about problems for the TEWS Aircraft maintenance personnel.⁽³⁾

Relationship Between Phu Cat Closure/460 TRW Deactivation

[REDACTED] On 1 July a meeting was held between the 460 Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW), 7AF Plans, 7AF Reconnaissance Operations, 360 Tactical Warfare Squadron (TEWS), and 6994 Scty Sq.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Although the primary objective of this meeting was to determine the ultimate control of the various TEWS once 460 TRW was deactivated*, the relativity to this action and the closure of Detachment 1 and 361 TEWS resulted in this subject also being addressed at this meeting.⁽⁴⁾ The point was made that Cam Ranh Bay was the "most likely" for relocation of the Phu Cat EC-47 assets, relative to the choice of the 483 Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW) as the organization to replace the 460 TRW as the TEWS parent unit.⁽⁵⁾

[REDACTED] In a 9 July 1971 letter, the DCS Intelligence, 7AF, while addressing the TEWS parent unit problem, reiterated the still unsolved problem of relocation of Detachment 1, 6994 Scty Sq/361 TEWS, mentioning both Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Rang as potential sites.⁽⁶⁾ This letter was essentially an abbreviated version of a 6994 Scty Sq CC letter of 8 July which had outlined 6994 Scty Sq stand on the entire 460 TRW closure/361 TEWS, Detachment 1 relocation.

[REDACTED] On 11 July, all actions involving the TEWS resubordination to that date were outlined in a lengthy CC message from 6994 Scty Sq to Pacific Security Region (PacSctyRgn). All pertinent facts concerning Detachment 1/361 TEWS relocation were addressed therein.⁽⁷⁾

[REDACTED] PacSctyRgn advised on 14 July that Pacific Air Force (PACAF) had assured that joint PACAF/PacSctyRgn discussions would be held prior to any firm decision on the location of Detachment 1/361 TEWS being made.⁽⁸⁾ However, PACAF had evidently been discussing this subject with 7AF, since a 12 July message (7AF Plans to Commander In

*See reference to deactivation of 460 TRW in Part I, Chapter 1 this History.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Chief, PACAF (CINCPACAF)) failed to mention any alternatives other than the repeated Phan Rang/CamRanh Bay references.⁽⁹⁾

[REDACTED] As the month of July progressed, it appeared that Phan Rang or CamRanh Bay, despite arguments against such location, was the final choice of 7AF planners. 6994 Scty Sq had practically given up on any other alternative, since none of the discussions held had been afforded more than polite listening by 7AF. Although Detachment 1 closure was tentatively scheduled for November 30, 1971, the choice of either Phan Rang or Cam Ranh Bay for relocation had the potential for demanding delay for two specific reasons: (1) Should the Compass Flag/Senior Book test at Nakhon Phanom be unsuccessful,⁽¹⁰⁾ the retention of Detachment 1, 6990th at Cam Ranh Bay would negate the advantage to be gained through availability of SI facilities and secure communications at that location; and (2) due to the lead time necessary for the construction of SI facilities and the installation of secure communications, selection of Phan Rang would create an indefinite hold. In a 17 July message (CINCPACAF to 7AF) it was obvious that no firm plans as to the ultimate disposition of Detachment 1/361 TEWS had been made at that level.

[REDACTED] Further confusion was added to the 6994 Security Squadron tabbed "Musical Gooney Bird" problem by information contained in a briefing to the DCS Operations, 7AF on 25 July. At that time, the obvious mission degradation that would result from relocation to Cam Ranh Bay was pointed out, stressing the loss of time over target

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TOT) that would result. After isolating 20 aircraft (EC-47 N/P) for turn over to the RVNAF,⁽¹¹⁾ the subsequent location of all EC-47Q (R2000 engines) at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, and retention of the remaining EC-47 N/P (R1830 engines) at a Vietnamese base (Danang, Phu Cat, and Cam Ranh Bay were mentioned) was discussed. It became evident at that point that the retention of Phu Cat was a possibility. Purpose of this proposal was to consolidate EC-47 resources in such a manner as to reduce maintenance base support, with very little consideration being given to ARDF mission objectives/requirements.

Planning Actions for Relocation to Cam Ranh Bay Begun:

[REDACTED] On 5 August, representatives of 6994 Scty Sq, Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq, 7AF DCS Operations, 7AF DCS Communications, 7AF DCS Intelligence, 460 TRW Director of Material, 460 TRW Director of Operations, 361 TEWS, and 483 TAW met at Cam Ranh Bay to discuss the impending deactivation of 460 TRW and assumption of TEWS control by 483 TAW. Related was the discussion of transfer of 361 TEWS/Detachment 1, 6994 Scty Sq to Cam Ranh Bay, with a tentative target date of 15 October. 483 TAW advised that such action was entirely dependent upon the movement of other units, specifically Detachment 1 6990 Scty Gp, 556th Reconnaissance Squadron, and Detachment 2, 834 Air Division. This conference pointed out three positive points: (1) Phu Cat was going to close, the relocation of 361 TEWS/Detachment 1 6994 Scty Sq resulting: (2) All concerned were looking toward Cam Ranh Bay, however such action was tenuous due to lack of facilities and entirely dependent upon the movement/deactivation of three

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

other units at Cam Ranh Bay: and (3) 6994 Scty Sq was forced to begin actions to work out interim arrangements in the event Detachment 1 was forced to move before facilities could be readied. A 483 TAW message of 7 August outlined all the actions necessary to effect transfer of 361 TEWS/Detachment 1, primarily in relation to maintenance aspect as it would affect the 483 TAW. (12-13)

[REDACTED] In a 8 August message, 7AF Plans announced their intent to establish a Programmed Action Directive (PAD) covering the move of 361 TEWS/Detachment 1 to Cam Ranh Bay, with a PAD meeting scheduled for 11 August 1971 at 7AF. A representative of 6994 Scty Sq was invited to attend this meeting. (14)

[REDACTED] On 9 August, PacSctyRgn stated the command position concerning the impending relocation of Detachment 1. They stated that early November was the scheduled time frame for deactivation of Detachment 1, 6990 Scty Gp and reiterated the fact that SI facilities were of utmost importance, consequently it was considered appropriate to slip the scheduled move of Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq for approximately two weeks, which would still meet the deadline for Phu Cat Closure. (15)

[REDACTED] Formal approval of the 7AF proposal to resubordinate the TEWS units to the 483 TAW at Cam Ranh Bay was received on 10 August 1971.

[REDACTED] A planning meeting was conducted by 7AF on 11 August, with the objective of making preliminary plans for a Programmed Actions Directive (PAD) covering the relocation of 361 TEWS/Detachment 1, 6994 Scty Sq from Phu Cat to Cam Ranh Bay. 7AF staff elements were tasked

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

with providing their inputs for PAD consolidation not later than 21 August 1971. No firm date for the relocation was established; however, 31 October was the date most frequently mentioned. 6994 Scty Sq continued to press for recognition of the fact that any relocation action was contingent upon the deactivation of Detachment 1, 6990 Scty Gp. In view of this fact, 7AF planners requested that 6994 Scty Sq identify Detachment 1 communications and facilities requirements in consideration of Detachment 1, 6990 Scty Gp move/no move or possible movement slippage contingencies. In a 12 August message to PacSctyRgn, 6994 Scty Sq pointed out that it appeared Detachment 1 was going to be forced to move to Cam Ranh Bay prior to the Detachment 1, 6990 Scty Sq/556 Reconnaissance Sq deactivation and that it would be necessary to "squeeze in" with Detachment 1, 6990 Scty Gp. As a result, 6994 Scty Sq commenced preliminary arrangements for communications facilities and operations space to augment the 6990th SI facility. To this end, the Security Service Liaison Office (SSLO) at Tan Son Nhut was asked to determine if vans were available in the SEA area to fulfill this requirement.

[REDACTED] 7AF issued plans for the permanent transfer of the 360, 361, and 362 TEWS from the 460 TRW at Tan Son Nhut to the 483 TAW at Cam Ranh Bay, concomitant with the deactivation of the 460th on 31 August 1971. At the time of this action, every indication was that the 361 TEWS and Detachment (Det) 1, 6994 Scty Sq would physically move to Cam Ranh Bay at a later date: This indication/assumption was to be short lived.⁽¹⁸⁾

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Disadvantages of Moving to Cam Ranh Bay Aired:

[REDACTED] On the following day (13 August), 7AF Commander was apprised of the USAFSS desire to effect a drawdown within the 6994 Scty Sq complex. Since 7AF was already aware of the TOT degradation that transfer to Cam Ranh Bay would cause, alternate choices were again considered. The most promising alternative was the transfer of Detachment 1 assets to Danang, RVN, and concomitantly close 361 TEWS/Detachment 1 in their entirety. In a 13 August message, 6994 Scty Sq advised PacSctyRgn that 7AF Plans was preparing a formal paper for staffing and that close coordination would be maintained to insure the proper mix of aircraft to provide the maximum mission capability.⁽¹⁹⁾

[REDACTED] Naturally, this action returned 6994 Scty Sq to a position which was felt to have been eliminated. When initial notification of the closure of Phu Cat was received and when closure of 460 TRW became an actuality, 6994 Scty Sq made a point of the fact that the control function of the TEWS should be co-located with one of the operational units. With the decision to close Detachment 1/361 TEWS at Phu Cat and transfer the units to Cam Ranh Bay, this condition no longer presented a problem: However, transfer of Phu Cat assets to Danang would leave the 483 TAW, command and control for the TEWS in a position of "remote control" so to speak. The 6994th had continually stressed that this situation could potentially have an adverse effect upon the ARDF mission. ⁽²⁰⁾ This attitude was re-emphasized to 7AF on 14 August 1971, in a 6994 Scty Sq letter requesting parallel action to be taken to reexamine the issue

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

of TEWS command and control. As an alternate measure, retention of the command and control function at Tan Son Nhut, under the auspices of 834
(21)
Air Division was suggested.

[REDACTED] Concurring with the USAFSS suggestion to deactivate 361 TEWS/Detachment 1, 6994 Scty Sq, 7AF forwarded a proposal to MACV, which recommended elimination of those units, addition of eight EC-47s to the Danang inventory, and the subsequent deployment of 11 aircraft to CONUS. It was pointed out that such action would result in the elimination of 300 manpower spaces, and retain nearly the same TOT that would have been realized by staging out of Cam Ranh Bay. Linked with this proposal was the retention of a Tactical Fighter Squadron which had been requested
(22)
by MACV.

[REDACTED] On 16 August, PacSctyRgn was apprised of the 7AF action, and further advised of the 6994 Scty Sq position in relation to the relocation of EC-47 assets within the complex. These were outlined as follows: (1) Deploy eight ALR-35 equipped EC-47 (R1830) to Danang from Tan Son Nhut: (2) Replace Tan Son Nhut losses with nine ALR-34 (R1830) from Phu Cat: (3) Exchange five ALR-35 (R1830) at Nakhon Phanom for five ALR-35/ALR-38 equipped R2000 from Danang: and (4) Identify ALR-34 AGE/Spares required for Vietnamization Improvement and Modernization (VIM) program and forward recommendations concerning redeployment/cannibalization of residual ALR-34 equipped EC-47 N/P (R1830). It was further pointed out that in view of the magnitude, this would have to be a time

[REDACTED]

phased operation to minimize downtime and PacSctyRgn was made aware of the 6994 Scty Sq position concerning the subordination of the TEWS to the 483 TAW at Cam Ranh Bay. (23-24)

Positive Decision Still in Limbo:

[REDACTED] Due to the fact that no positive decision had been made at any level, the first part of August required a multitude of planning actions to cover any and all contingencies. 6994 Scty Sq was forced to plan for a possible move to Cam Ranh Bay, which posed any number of extenuating circumstances. It was also necessary to make recommendations as to the potential redistribution of EC-47 resources (as well as personnel and maintenance facilities) in the event deactivation of Det 1 was the chosen course of events. Although not directly related, the problem of deactivation of the 460 TRW and assumption of TEWS command and control by the 483 TAW at Cam Ranh Bay was a constant problem. It remained the contention of 6994 Scty Sq that the command and control function should be collocated with an operational unit.

[REDACTED] 483 TAW at Cam Ranh Bay was also forced to make plans for several contingencies. Their first consideration was the impending assumption of command and control of the TEWS'. While the transfer of Det 1/361 TEWS to Cam Ranh Bay would simplify matters in that respect, the matter of space, billets, and other support was a high priority item with which they had to contend. Since the plans were in limbo as late as 23 August, 483 TAW was required to proceed for plans in both directions.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 460 TRW was scheduled for deactivation on 31 August. A goodly share of their functions had been redistributed among existing units at Tan Son Nhut. However, the uncertainty about 361 TEWS required them to plan for retention of sufficient personnel to provide 483 TAW with guidance as they assumed command of the TEWS'.

[REDACTED] 7AF was directly affected - more so than any other SEA unit. It was 7AF that had to contend with every contingency. Their views could not be shrouded by any single consideration - every possible situation had to be considered. Paramount was the long range plans for drawdown of U.S. Air Power in SEA. It was this situation that prompted deactivation of 460 TRW and the closure of Phu Cat Air Base. While drawdown was of the essence, 7AF and MACV desired to retain as much ARDF capability within SEA as possible. Although all desires were listened to and studied, many requirements had to be considered, and priorities had to be established. It was that role that 7AF Plans division assumed, on a scope that could never have been comprehended without the daily contact between 7AF and 6994 Scty Sq.

7AF Presents Alternate Proposals to MACV:

[REDACTED] As August progressed, 6994 Scty Sq worked in close harmony with 7AF to prepare statistical background on the mission degradation the move to Cam Ranh Bay would impose in relation to TOT and to arrive at acceptable alternatives. Data base was provided to encompass each of three separate proposals: (1) Deploy all Phu Cat aircraft to Cam Ranh Bay which would result in a 29 percent degradation of mission TOT and

[REDACTED]

further complicate maintenance matters because of a lack of ALR-34 AGE (under the VIM program, a certain amount of ALR-34 AGE was scheduled to be turned over to the VNAF): (2) Transfer 10 aircraft to Danang and reserve 11 for stateside redeployment, resulting in a 37% loss of mission capability: and (3) Transfer 12 aircraft to Danang and reserve nine (25) for deployment, with a capability loss of 25 percent.

[REDACTED] Additional impact upon 7AF/6994 Scty Sq plans was received on 31 August, when Joint Chief of Staff advised 7AF that not more than 10 squadrons of F4 fighter/bombers were to be retained in SEA. As a result, the 480 Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Phu Cat was tapped for deactivation, vice transfer to Danang as planned. This action made ramp space available at Danang, and reduced/eliminated the necessity to reduce TEWS strength to accomplish drawdown objectives, an item that had been an arguing point both for and against movement of the TEWS to Cam Ranh Bay. In a 6994 Scty Sq message of 31 August, PacSctyRgn was advised of this turn of events which had brought about two significant points: (1) The only rationale for not moving to Cam Ranh Bay was the degradation of TOT and the availability of AGE for the VIM program: and (2) Assuming that the VIM program had priority, MACV would be in a position to argue against the degradation of ARDF coverage, since the deactivation (vice transfer of 480 TFW to Danang) would provide adequate ramp space for 30 EC-47s at Danang, resulting in within plus or minus 10 hours of the weekly TOT realized from Det 1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

facilities staging from Phu Cat. At that time, there was a tentative plan for the redeployment of eight to 12 aircraft to the Continental U.S. (CONUS).⁽²⁶⁾

Programmed Action Directive Actions:

[REDACTED] Throughout the entire planning/discussion period, PacSctyRgn was kept advised on each development within country. As it became generally accepted that Detachment 1 was to be relocated at Cam Ranh Bay, PacSctyRgn began development of a Programmed Actions Directive (PAD) to insure close monitoring of the transfer. On 30 August, the fact that Danang (Detachment 2, 6994 Scty Sq/362 TEWS) might be chosen to absorb Det 1/361 TEWS facilities, manpower and mission, prompted 7AF to announce that their PAD concerning the transfer to Cam Ranh Bay was being held, pending review of the newly developed alternatives. In light of this development, 6994 Scty Sq suggested that PacSctyRgn take the same action: However, Region decided to continue development of a draft of this PAD and directed 6994th to take steps to cover all contingencies, particularly the possibility of Danang being selected as the relocation point. Toward this end, PacSctyRgn suggested initiation of planning to determine facilities available at Danang to satisfy consolidation of Detachment 1/Detachment 2 operations to include: (1) Both air and non-air conditioned billets: (2) Power: (3) communications facilities: (4) expanded maintenance and supply requirements: (5) messing and base support (financial, medical, and dental) facilities: (6) transportation: and (7) determine what Phu Cat assets would be available for transfer to Danang.⁽²⁷⁻²⁹⁾

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PacSctyRgn/USAFSS Position Outlined:

[REDACTED] PacSctyRgn position in relation to the alignment of ARDF facilities was stated in an 01 September message. Basic position was that USAFSS would support all cryptologic withdrawals from South Vietnam that could be accomplished without undue degradation of the ARDF mission. It was further pointed out that the question as to the deployment of eight - 12 aircraft to CONUS was not of significant impact and was completely dependent upon the VIM/MACV ARDF requirements. PacSctyRgn felt that the most important concern of USAFSS should be the availability of adequate facilities to support a (30) 25-30 EC-47 fleet operation at Danang.

Positive Course of Action Still Undetermined:

[REDACTED] A 7AF team visited Danang on 2 and 3 September to examine facilities that would be available for additional EC-47 aircraft and their associated support. The Commander, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq met with this team and stressed pertinent requirements of Det 2 to accommodate this anticipated expansion. In a 4 September message, 6994 Scty Sq apprised PacSctyRgn of the developments, advising that a trip report was being prepared by 7AF which would outline available facilities, ramp (31) space, and cost of rehabilitation of crew quarters.

[REDACTED] A virtual "bomb-shell" was unearthed through the relationship of a 7AF study to possibly retain Phu Cat Air Base, reduce Cam Ranh Bay, and close Phan Rang Air Base. With such actions even being considered, it was evident that plans were still far from static and the

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

the 6994 Scty Sq Complex was still in limbo as to the steps that were to be taken. Although the study group leaned toward the closure of Phu Cat, the continual uncertainty of every previously suggested plan placed all actions in a hold, pending high level decision/direction. (32)

Possibility of Cryptologic Community Drawdown Becomes Pertinent:

[REDACTED] During mid-September, all actions came to a standstill, pending high level (JCS/Commander in Chief Pacific/National Security Agency) instructions. It became evident that the ultimate actions in respect to Det 1 relocation, especially in respect to the redistribution of EC-47 assets and the Cryptologic headroom ceilings, were dependent upon such high level decisions. In view of this situation, MACV simply assumed an attitude of "foreseeno reduction in ARDF requirements" and requested further guidance from CINCPAC. National Security Agency Representative, Vietnam (C) (NRV(C)) queried DIRNSA (at the request of MACV) for guidance for the cryptologic community aspect: However, since 7AF had apparently not been advised of the new developments in the cryptologic drawdown area, that headquarters finalized plans for the closure of Phu Cat Air Base, the deactivation of 361 TEWS/Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq, and the relocation of 15 EC-47s to Danang. (33)

Planning for Expansion of Danang Facilities Continues:

[REDACTED] In anticipation of the increase of EC-47 facilities at Danang, 366 Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), host wing for Detachment 2 at Danang, queried 7AF concerning the anticipated alignment of EC-47 facilities to facilitate planning for support of additional aircraft.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

366th stated requirements included decision as to where phase maintenance would be performed on aircraft scheduled for use at Nakhon Phanom, positive information as to type system (ALR-34/ALR-35), the type generators and inverters used by the aircraft, and type engines (R1830 or R2000).⁽³⁴⁾ Direct impact was felt by Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, since advance notice to allow for funding and budget revision was necessary, within the 1 - 20 September time frame. Since no positive decision had been made, Det 2 was unable to meet a base Director of Material deadline for submission of special supply levels on ALR-35⁽³⁵⁾ parts.

Positive Recommendation made by 7AF:

[REDACTED] After completion of a number of studies, and following inhouse studies of every proposal, 7AF arrived at a suggested realignment of facilities that appeared to satisfy most of the program requirements. In making their recommendation to Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF), 7AF stressed the previously stated TOT advantage to be gained through relocation of facilities at Danang, vice Cam Ranh Bay. This recommendation, dated 14 September 1971, proposed the following actions: (1) Deactivate 361 TEWS/Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq effective 1 November; (2) Increase 362 TEWS/Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq unit equipment (UE) and assigned aircraft to 27 effective 1 November 1971; (3) Redeploy six EC-47 to CONUS. 7AF further stated that this action would require modest expansion of 362 TEWS/Det 2 6994 Scty Sq facilities at a cost of approximately \$65,000. By comparison, benefits to be derived were

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

listed as follows: (1) Provide approximately the same TOT capability as could be realized by retention of 361 TEWS at Phu Cat AB: (2) Reduce USAF in-country forces by six EC-47s and approximately 241 manpower spaces: and (3) Save approximately \$100,000 per month in operating costs. 7AF further stressed that approval of the proposal in as timely a manner as possible was of essence, to enable submission to Commander, U.S. Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) at the earliest possible date, and to permit preparation of Danang facilities for the support of additional U.E.⁽³⁶⁾

Wrap-Up of To-Date Activities and Anticipated Configuration of 6994 Scty Sq Complex Provided all 6994 Scty Sq Units:

[REDACTED] To insure that up to date information was available to the entire Complex, 6994 Scty Sq, in a 16 September message, outlined the status of negotiations to date and presented a "line-up" of EC-47 resources to be realized, providing 7AF proposals were approved by CINCPACAF and MACV. The proposed aircraft realignments provided for the following: (1) Transfer the 5 ALR-35 aircraft (TDY to Nakhon Phanom from Tan Son Nhut) to Danang and replace them with two ALR-38s and three R2000 engined ALR-35s, thereby increasing TOT and VHF Direction Finding capability: (2) Increase Danang UE to 27 aircraft (seven ALR-38, 13 ALR-35, and seven ALR-34s): (3) Hold Tan Son Nhut UE at 20 (All ALR-34s), for scheduled turn over to the VNAF: and (4) Reserve six ALR-34s at Tan Son Nhut for future redeployment to CONUS. This action involved the transfer of all Tan Son Nhut ALR-35s to Danang, movement of seven ALR-34s

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

from Phu Cat to Danang, movement of five ALR-35s from Nakhon Phanom to Danang and replacing them with two ALR-38s and three ALR-35s, and transfer of 13 ALR-34s from Phu Cat to Tan Son Nhut (six for subsequent transfer to CONUS).⁽³⁷⁾

7AF Announces Submission of Final Alignment Proposal to CINCPACAF:

[REDACTED] 7AF announced that the Commander, 7AF had approved the proposed alignment as listed above and that the plan had been submitted to CINCPACAF for approval. It was stated that once CINCPACAF approval was received, formal submission would be made to COMUSMACV and the actions would be incorporated into official planning and programming documents. Prior to submission to CINCPACAF, the proposal had been informally coordinated with both J-2 and J-3 of MACV and unofficial concurrence had been obtained. In the interim, 7AF stressed that it was essential that the facilities necessary for Danang to accept the additional EC-47s

be programmed as soon as possible. In an internal letter of 15 September, the plans division of 7AF informed action offices of the minimum essential facilities to accommodate the increase, which included 362 TEWS Administrative/Support buildings, Detachment 2, 6994 Sq SI secure area annex expansion, at least one additional maintenance dock, and necessary billeting for crews. Target date for availability of these expanded facilities was set for 31 October 1971. A second maintenance dock was targeted for completion on 15 November 1971.⁽³⁸⁾

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6994 Scty Sq Begins Action on Personnel Realignment:

([REDACTED]) With the closure of Det 1 and the impending removal of six EC-47s from the operational inventory of the Squadron complex, realignment of personnel strengths between Headquarters, 6994 Scty Sq and Det 2 became an important consideration. Personnel balance within the Unit was dependent upon the VIM program at Tan Son Nhut. Since the training program called for 10 VIM missions per day in December and 11 per day in January, 1972, 6994 Scty Sq Hq would be required to fly only three missions per day after that date. Both maintenance and operational spaces were affected. In recognition of the need for a complete realignment of personnel slots, a message outlining proposed manning was forwarded to PacSctyRgn on 17 September 1971, advising that a Manpower Change Request would be initiated if all concerned were in agreement, concomitant with the placement of 27 EC-47s at Danang. (39)

Information Concerning Status of High Level Planning Received:

([REDACTED]) Although it appeared that positive action and a direct course for that action to follow had been decided upon, a 18 September PacSctyRgn message provided information concerning high level (DIRNSA/USAF/USAFSS) actions and plans which seemed to completely upset all plans that had been made locally (within SEA). In essence, PacSctyRgn announced the tentative approval for retention of 2500-3000 cryptologic spaces in South Vietnam through fiscal year 1973. General indications were that USAF would take over all ARDF functions in SEA, and that the Army facilities would be removed. With this new development to consider

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

it appeared that it would be necessary to retain all EC-47 resources in SEA: 20 for VIM, 32 for U.S. manning in South Vietnam, and five at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. It was also announced that USAFSS was still faced with a basing problem, since the National Security Agency (NSA) was apparently thinking in terms of 19 aircraft at Danang, 14 at Cam Ranh Bay, and 20 at Tan Son Nhut, with one Not Operationally Ready (NOA) to be retained at Cam Ranh Bay. At this time, PacSctyRgn advised that they were awaiting further guidance from Headquarters USAFSS before proceeding with Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq relocation/closure actions. (40)

[REDACTED] In response to this information, 6994 Scty Sq notified PacSctyRgn that 7AF had a proposal in draft to close Cam Ranh Bay in April 1972. 6994th stressed at this point that 20 aircraft at Danang and 13 at Cam Ranh Bay would be beneficial from the standpoint of keeping ALR-34/ALR-35 facilities separated, thereby simplifying maintenance functions. (41)

[REDACTED] The reconsideration of Cam Ranh Bay was very short lived. A great deal of clarification on the magnitude of the entire SEA ARDF situation was revealed on 26 September, in a PacSctyRgn message quoting DIRNSA and USAFSS inputs. DIRNSA was concerned over the number of cryptologic personnel that would be retained in SEA throughout fiscal year 1973. The final decision as to assignment of these personnel (whether to Army/Navy/Air Force, ARDF/Ground Sites, etc.) had a definite impact upon the future of 6994 Scty Sq and specifically upon the final disposition of Det 1 aircraft resources. Since final resolution of this facet

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

was not to be forthcoming until after a joint Pacific Command/DIRNSA conference (which was scheduled for the week of 4-8 October), no positive plans beyond those already tentatively outlined could be made. Further insight into the impending action was provided by USAFSS, which implied that Army Security Agency (ASA) had requested the retention of a small Army ARDF effort. It was also implied that DIRNSA did not consider Cam Ranh Bay as an acceptable base, particularly if any ASA ARDF facilities were retained. Final basing decision was expected to be made at the joint conference to be held at Saigon. (42)

PacSctyRgn Study of ARDF Alignment Received:

[REDACTED] As activity concerning closure/relocation continued to gain impetus, a PacSctyRgn message (referencing both DIRNSA and USAFSS messages which had implied that ARDF assets in SEA were to be reduced) outlined a series of studies that had been made to determine the best possible way to maximize ARDF coverage with the available resources. These studies were based on a series of assumptions, outlined as follows:

- (1) Phu Cat Air Base would no longer be available as a launch/recovery site after 31 October;
- (2) MAGV desired continued coverage of SEA areas seven, eight and nine, while Military Assistance Command, Thailand, [REDACTED], and Controlled American Source (CAS) would resist any change in Laotian ARDF coverage;
- (3) A minimum of 20 EC-47s would continue to operate from Tan Son Nhut (to eventually be assigned to the VNAF 718th Reconnaissance Squadron);
- (4) only minimal coverage of SEA areas five and six would be [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

required by MACV, which could be covered from Tan Son Nhut with EC-47 (CC) with 4.5 and 4.0 hours TOT respectively: and (5) A high threat area in northern Laos would continue to make it necessary for RVN based EC-47s to enter/exit Laos at approximately 1430N/10630E latitude/longitude.

[REDACTED] After consideration of all these aspects, relocation of the 20 Phu Cat aircraft, on or about 31 October, to either Cam Ranh Bay, Ubon, Thailand, Danang Airfield, or combinations of the three was studied. Distances from current points from which EC-47 missions are scheduled to center their mission operations (Frag points) to each of these locations were considered; the objective being to determine the TOT to be realized with any one of the potential solutions. This proved that basing of the total 20 aircraft at either Cam Ranh Bay or Ubon would result in severe degradation of coverage in the more distant areas. For example, missions fragged for SEA area eight would require three and one half hours of their available seven hours (CC mission) in transit time to and from the target area. When mixed locations (Cam Ranh Bay/Danang and Ubon/Danang) as well as all 20 aircraft at Danang were considered, specifics in relation to actual aircraft basing/distribution were determined. The results of this exercise significantly favored a Ubon/Danang arrangement vice Cam Ranh Bay/Danang, since Ubon/Danang would provide 25 percent greater TOT, the equivalent of two additional sorties per day. This Ubon/Danang arrangement was also 18 percent more lucrative than the Danang proposal, while basing 32 at Danang (with five TDY to Nakhon

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Phanom) would provide 10 percent more TOT than the Danang/Cam Ranh Bay option.

[REDACTED] In summary, PacSctyRgn stated that the preferred option would be to relocate 361 TEWS/Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq to Ubon, Thailand and divert a portion of the facilities to Danang. However, the cryptologic head room ceiling limitations within Thailand would prohibit such action. Consequently, PacSctyRgn recommended that the consideration of Cam Ranh Bay be abandoned and that the more productive (within limitations) alternative of deactivation and merger with Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq/362 TEWS at Danang be adopted. (43)

Combined Cryptologic Conference Stresses Aircraft Disposition:

[REDACTED] At a Combined Cryptologic Conference held in Saigon on 4-8 October 1971, all concerned were briefed on the impact of the cryptologic authorizations for South Vietnam. MACV was vitally concerned, since a great portion of the successful Vietnamization of the war, lay in the level of training Special Security Technical Branch (SSTB - the Vietnamese equivalent of the U.S. Cryptologic community) would received and their subsequent ability to assume intelligence and ARDF collection/processing roles. National Security Agency (NSA) representatives briefed that an overall ARDF mission degradation of approximately 20 percent was anticipated, based on six month review of fix rate per hour over target. Expansion of the degradation in terms of potential total TOT increased this percentage slightly. NSA projected level of tasking was for 194 missions per week. Resource designation

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

as outlined by NSA called for 19 aircraft at Danang and 13 at Tan Son Nhut: However, basing in accordance with tasking, aircraft configuration, VIM assumption of 20 aircraft at 75% tasking, and AGE constraints commensurate with 7AF beddown capability was understood. In view of all these extenuating circumstances, the following basing proposal was presented:

Tan Son Nhut	6 ALR-34	(5 CC/1 CCZ)
SSTB (TSN)	20 ALR-34	(16 CC/4 CCZ)
Danang	7 ALR-34	(6 CC/1 CCZ)
	13 ALR-35	CCZ
	7 ALR-38	CCZ
Nakhon Phanom	2 ALR-38	CCZ
	3 ALR-35	CCZ

At this point, 7AF announced that current plans were for the ultimate turnover of 23 aircraft to VNAF (20 UE, 2 NOA, and 1 for attrition).⁽⁴⁴⁾ Even at this point in planning, NSA had been unaware of this figure.

Personnel Relocation/Reassignment Problem Reiterated:

[REDACTED] The general agenda of the Combined Cryptologic Conference and the attitudes stressed by 7AF and MACV conferees, indicated that although a drawdown of EC-47 assets was impending, both these headquarters preferred retention of all facilities in country. Pending formal decision on the final disposition of the six aircraft affected by the manpower limitations, 6994 Scty Sq again apprised PacSctyRgn and USAFSS of the necessity for immediate action to effect reassignment of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Det 1 personnel to either Det 2 at Danang or squadron headquarters at Tan Son Nhut. Generally, it was suggested that manning at Det 2 be increased to a level commensurate with the facilities to be assigned (27 total EC-47s), and that the remainder be assigned to Tan Son Nhut to cover contingencies that might arise if retention of the six EC-47s tentatively scheduled to be re-deployed to CONUS were retained in-country in an operational/tasked status.

This was based on informal MACV/7AF agreement of Tan Son Nhut as the most logical location. 6994 Scty Sq outlined proposed manning and requested higher headquarters decision at the earliest possible time. (45)

7AF Programmed Actions Directive (PAD) 72-7-2 Actions:

[REDACTED] During the period of discussion as to the ultimate disposition of Det 1/361 TEWS assets, 7AF began development of a Programmed Actions Directive (PAD) to govern the closure of Phu Cat operations and subsequent relocation of the bulk of the assigned EC-47 resources to Danang. A great deal of expansion (as was determined by the 7AF team that visited Danang on 2 and 3 September) was needed, including flight line facilities, living quarters, expanded SI facilities, increased transportation requirements, and a number of related logistical actions. Prior to complete approval, and even though there was a great deal of uncertainty at higher levels, 7AF approved the commencement of expansion of flight line facilities to accommodate the additional aircraft, work on certain billeting to house crews, the expansion of SI space, and construction of space for 362 TEWS expansion. By early October a great

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

deal of action had already been taken. Construction had begun on revetments, two of which were being modified to accept Singapore Shelters which were to serve as phase maintenance docks. Framework to pour foundations for a 362 TEWS operations building, a TEWS life support facility, and a Det 2 maintenance building addition. A five ton air conditioner had been procured and was being installed in the Det 2 maintenance facility. Three 30X20' "modular" buildings were to be shipped from Tan Son Nhut to be erected within the Det 2 SI area to accommodate the additional mission requirements. Twenty-two quonset huts (housing 8 men each) were in the process of being rehabilitated through contract. Two "community" latrine facilities were being prepared for use. A work order had been submitted for construction of a bridge across a large drainage ditch which ran between the quonset hut area and the SI facility. Request for two vehicles - preferably one ton step vans - had been submitted; however, host base had implied that any help in this area would have to come from other than base sources. 7AF was advised of the critical transportation problem and preliminary steps were taken to attempt to secure transportation from Phu Cat resources. Based on an estimated increase in Det 2 strength of 100 (total base population increase was estimated at 1,000), Det 2 had taken necessary steps to order troop support items (beds, wall lockers, and office furniture) to accommodate the personnel increase. At the time this action was reported, a copy of the 366 TFW (Danang) Logistics Action Directive (LAD) was provided PacSctyRgn, 6994 Scty Sq, and Det 1, 6994th. From the content of this LAD, it appeared that all contingencies had been considered and

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

that except for very incidental items, Danang would be well prepared to receive the influx of personnel and equipment by 1 November as scheduled. (46)

Follow-up on Personnel Actions:

[REDACTED] To insure compatibility of planning as concerned personnel transfers, 6994 Scty Sq requested approval of a number of recommendations that were designed to simplify the actions necessary to effect transfer. On 14 October, these proposals were addressed to both PacSctyRgn and USAFSS, and included: (1) Approval of the 6994 Scty Sq proposed realignment by USAFSS, with the understanding that complete refinement would need to be made in subsequent quarters: (2) Clarification on the retainability factor involved in "Permanent change of station" (PCS) actions: (3) A block of line numbers/authority for publication of PCS orders: and (4) command authority to publish "multi-name" orders. In making this proposal, 6994 Scty Sq stressed that early decision was necessary to alleviate an already serious moral problem. (47) USAFSS response indicated that there was no specified minimum retainability for PCS moves within SEA, a block of line numbers had been allocated for publication of orders, 6994 Scty Sq was instructed to report any personnel overages with preferences for reassignment via priority message, those persons assigned to Tan Son Nhut who were to be transferred to Danang were to be reported in the same manner, and Unit Detail List (UDL) changes realigning 6994 Scty Sq and Det 2 for fiscal year 1973 were consistent with USAFSS cryptologic ceiling for SVN as developed at the Saigon Combined Cryptologic Conference of 4-8 October 1971. (48)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] To arrive at logical planning for maintenance personnel, the 6994th pointed out that a number of the Phu Cat 301/304 personnel had very short retainability and that their experience was limited to ALR-34 systems. In this regard, 6994 Scty Sq planned to transfer maintenance personnel within the squadron complex to result in the strengthening of Danang for ALR-35/ALR-38 maintenance and placing most of the Phu Cat ALR-34 experience at Tan Son Nhut. (49)

[REDACTED] Permission to pursue personnel assignment actions as recommended by 6994 Scty Sq was received and implemented on 19 October 1971. (50)

Transfer of Aircraft Correspondence Begins:

[REDACTED] Initial correspondence dealing with the transfer of specific tail numbers began in mid October. Although all previous planning had indicated that 15 aircraft would be added to the 362 TEWS/Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq UE at Danang and that six EC-47s would be tabbed for redeployment to CONUS, a CINCPAC message of 16 October stressed the fact that the results of the Combined Cryptologic Conference (referred to as the Pacific Command/DIRNSA Saigon conference by CINCPAC) had leaned toward the retention of all EC-47 assets in SEA. As a result of this tentative plan, CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF and COMUSMACV that they intended to propose retention of all SEA EC-47 assets through FY-73. (51)

[REDACTED] Even though action had not been approved, the 483rd TAW (in accordance with 7AF PAD 72-7-2) began plans for the actual movement of aircraft, with "Y" date undetermined. All 20 Phu Cat EC-47s (ALR-34 systems) were scheduled for transfer to Tan Son Nhut and Danang during a

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

three day span. In addition, ten EC-47s at Tan Son Nhut were to be moved to Danang. 483rd TAW requested 7AF approval of this movement plan. (52-53)

Caution Advised by 7AF:

[REDACTED] To add to an already confusing situation, 7AF advised of the fact that 7AF PAD 72-7-2 had not been approved beyond CINCPAC level; consequently, no authority had been granted to relocate TEWS assets in any manner. In quoting a CINCPACAF message, 7AF reiterated that the ultimate beddown of SEA EC-47s could not be determined until final decision at national level on the aircraft requirement was made. (54)

Question of Disposition of Six EC-47s Scheduled for CONUS Deployment

Raised:

[REDACTED] On 19 October, CINCPAC raised a question concerning the attitude of MACV in relation to the redeployment of six EC-47s to a CONUS base. CINCPAC pointed out that on 28 September, MACV had given tentative approval for the redeployment: However, in a 14 October message, MACV had stated that reduction of SEA ARDF resources would seriously degrade their ability to fulfill responsibilities for SEA Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) operations. To avoid this degradation, 737 additional ARDF spaces had been tentatively requested. Since the request for additional personnel appeared to conflict with the initial attitude of MACV and impacted upon CINCPAC plans for redeployment, MACV was asked to review their requirements and provide comments/recommendations not later than 26 October. (55)

[REDACTED] Since a number of different headquarters (7AF, MACV, CINCPAC) had stated their preferences/recommendations concerning the CONUS deploy-

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ment of six aircraft without the USAFSS position having been thoroughly outlined, PacSctyRgn, in a message to PACAF presented the USAFSS views. It was pointed out that as a result of extensive studies of the pros and cons of a drawdown of ARDF facilities, it had been generally agreed that the scheduled removal of the six aircraft would have little impact upon the coverage of SEA ARDF areas that were still lucrative from a targeting standpoint. PacSctyRgn further pointed out that the quantity/quality and tactical use of ARDF was expected to improve through the implementation of a number of more refined technical procedures and the expanded program of providing Forward Air Controllers with timely fixes for visual reconnoitering.
(56)

PacSctyRgn PAD 71-300 Actions:

[REDACTED] On 13 October, PacSctyRgn advised 6994 Scty Sq that although firm approval for the final aircraft UE in regards to Phu Cat closure had not been received, action should progress on the basis of ultimate basing of 27 UE at Danang and 26 at Tan Son Nhut. At the same time, Region advised that a PAD covering Detachment 1 closure was being prepared with electrical release anticipated not later than 15 October 1971.

[REDACTED] In the interim, 6994 Scty Sq had set up a sample PAD for control of actions taken pending receipt of the PacSctyRgn directive: However, upon receipt of the notification of the early release of the Region PAD, this vehicle was cancelled.

[REDACTED] The first progress report was forwarded to PacSctyRgn on 17 October. At that time, the majority of the administrative functions were progressing on schedule, with a number already closed. Likewise,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

communications, materiel, operations and security functions at Detachment 1 were progressing rapidly, well within schedule. Even at this early date, it became obvious that construction of facilities at Danang was the most critical of all actions. Modular buildings for operations expansion had not been received, and a two week construction period was anticipated after arrival: However, it appeared that although the schedule was "tight", the majority of the required actions would be completed on schedule. The only critical problem anticipated was the lack of vehicles to support the additional transportation requirements that mission expansion would levy on Detachment 2. All possible actions had been taken to establish requirements and request the necessary vehicles. These requests had been approved, although actual vehicles were not available at Danang to satisfy the requirements.

Hold Placed on All Actions by 7AF:

[REDACTED] On 26 October, 6994 Scty Sq was advised that the hold on relocation of Phu Cat assets was still in effect and that no action for aircraft movement could be taken until Chief of Staff, Air Force approval was received. At the same time, 483 TAW advised that once approval was received, it would take at least five to seven days to reinstate their actions. In view of this situation, 6994 Scty Sq stated that they could forsee no relocation actions prior to 7 November. (57)

[REDACTED] This situation was aired in a 7AF message to CINCPACAF, stressing that the move to Danang was well under way, with facilities being prepared to receive the aircraft, personnel, and expanded operational

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

requirements. At that time (26 October), to change bases of relocation would have been a major undertaking that would have resulted in a great waste of resources and potential mission degradation. Consequently, 7AF stated that immediate action needed to be taken to reinstate that portion of 7AF PAD 72-7-2 concerning relocation of 15 EC-47 aircraft to Danang. (58)

Chief of Staff Concurrence With Move Received:

[REDACTED] Final approval from CSAF was received at 7AF on 27 October, for the transfer of 15 EC-47s to Danang and six to be deployed to CONUS. Upon receipt of this information, 7AF reinstated that portion of their PAD and begin immediate plans for a transfer with "Y" date set for 5 November. Since 6994 Scty Sq had already coordinated with 483 TAW and 7AF on the actual tail numbers to be transferred and those to be held for CONUS re- (59)
deployment, immediate scheduling action was possible.

[REDACTED] 7AF took action on 30 October to reinstate their PAD, with instructions for the transfer action to begin on 5 November. Movements were to cover a three day span as already proposed by 483 TAW. Aircraft tail numbers were determined jointly by 483 TAW/6994 Scty Sq, with 7AF logistics approval. Final decision was made to hold the six EC-47s scheduled for CONUS redeployment at Tan Son Nhut in a non-operational storage (60-61)
category, pending approval/direction from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[REDACTED] A daily aircraft movement plan was issued by 483 TAW on 31 October, including tail numbers involved in each of the three daily (62)
increments, with all but five of 27 different sorties to be ARDF tasked.

[REDACTED] To facilitate the movement, Detachment 1 prepared a detailed, well organized Personnel Movement Plan that provided for movement of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

all except the final "close-out" crew of nine individuals. At that time the Detachment predicted complete closure of the Phu Cat facility by 12/13
(63)
November.

Typhoon Hester Delays Action:

[REDACTED] On 22-23 October, the weather added its bit of harassment to an already tenuous situation. Typhoon Hester struck Danang on these dates with 100 mile winds and a deluge of rain. As a result, construction work came to a standstill. The damage done to already occupied structures required immediate repair; consequently construction crews were diverted, as was a certain amount of supplies on hand for rehabilitation of quarters.

[REDACTED] A PAD progress report of 30 October outlined the entire problem concerning living quarters, assigning a "Red Flag" category. This report pointed out the fact that on base quarters had suffered severe damage as a result of the typhoon. To satisfy immediate needs of the base, the quonset area was opened for immediate occupancy, while an alternate selection had to be made for Detachment 2 expansion. The only alternate available was in need of extensive repair, latrine facilities were deplorable, and supplies (bedding, lockers, etc.) for additional personnel were
(64)
at a premium.

FacSctyRgn PAD 71-300 Actions Continued:

[REDACTED] The first PAD progress report released from 6994 Scty Sq following Typhoon Hester reiterated the effect this natural disaster had perpetuated on the relocation of Detachment 1. In addition, a "Red Flag" was placed on transportation, since only four vehicles were available.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

With the added tasking the unit would be picking up concomitant with the expansion of Detachment 2, the only apparent relief for this situation lay in the possibility of transferring certain Phu Cat transportation assets to Danang.

[REDACTED] As of 2 November, all remaining PAD items were on schedule. One "caution" item concerning the receipt of Modulux buildings for operational space expansion was listed. Although these buildings had been shipped from Tan Son Nhut and were scheduled to arrive at Danang on 14 October, they had not yet been delivered. (64)

(U) In follow-up correspondence of 3 November, Det 2 advised of the receipt of the modulux buildings for expansion of the operations facility. Those received were reported to be in extremely poor condition; so bad in fact that construction crews doubted their ability to erect anything substantial from them. In this informal exchange, the presence of two modulux structures at Danang that would be satisfactory was stated. 6994 Scty Sq was asked to approach 7AF as to the availability of these buildings. (65)

The Last Days at Phu Cat

Operations

[REDACTED] The last mission to recover at Phu Cat was flown on 5 November 1971, and as the tradition for "fini" flights of the TEWS/6994th teams, was thoroughly hosed down upon its return. Eight aircraft departed Phu Cat on 6 November - four to Danang, and four to Tan Son Nhut. Five departed on 7 November - destination Tan Son Nhut. The last contingent departed Phu Cat and deadheaded to Tan Son Nhut on 8 November 1971. (66-70)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The last operational flight was flown on 7 November, and on that date the last Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS) was forwarded, containing a bit of nostalgic Detachment 1 history, as the text quoted below will attest. The majority of the operational personnel flew to Danang on mission aircraft.

Text of Last Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq DURMIS: Quote: "This will be the final DURMIS for Det 1, 6994 Security Squadron. Since its activation in July 1966, Det 1 has flown more than fifteen thousand combat sorties in support of allied operations in Southeast Asia. This is a real tribute to the men who flew and otherwise supported these missions. The dedication and personal sacrifices made by these men have contributed to a fine record of achievement - one of which they can be justly proud. I believe special mention should be made of TSgt Raymond Leftwich, A1C Charles Land, and A1C Daniel Reece, Radio operators who were killed in action when the EC-47 they were manning was downed by enemy anti-aircraft fire on 9 March 1967. Our last operational mission is scheduled to depart Phu Cat AB at 0435Z 7 Nov, and barring any unforeseen delays, the Det 1 facilities will be turned over to the base NLT 12 Nov 1971. Although Det 1 is being deactivated, most of the people are remaining within the 6994 Security Squadron Complex and the professionalism and pride which has been apparent at this unit will continue to support our Southeast Asia combat operations." Unquote.

Communications:

[REDACTED] All communications circuits were deactivated at 0800L 9 November 1971. By that afternoon, the equipment had been dismantled by the E & I team, and the crypto gear was crated that evening. On 12 November, the crypto material and other classified courier material (com-

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

prising 3400 pounds was airlifted to Danang by 483 TAW C-7 (Caribou), guarded by Detachment 1 communications personnel).

Maintenance:

(U) The aircraft that deadheaded to Tan Son Nhut on 8 November were used to transport maintenance equipment, supplies, and some personnel. Other maintenance personnel obtained transportation via ATCO. On 10 November building 704 and one pickup truck that had been utilized by Detachment 1 was turned over to the host base.

Supply:

(U) All supply accounts were cleared by 12 November. To meet this date had required dedicated effort of the Detachment supply personnel and full cooperation of the host Equipment Management Office.

Personnel:

(U) Mass out-processing was established for all personnel which immensely facilitated the personnel movements. All personnel scheduled for transfer had departed Phu Cat by 13 November.

Aerospace Security:

(U) Building 476 (SI facility) was officially declared degaussed on 12 November 1971, at which time 24 hour security guard was dropped and the building was surrendered to the host base.

Administration:

(U) Armed Forces Courier service was utilized for the transfer of all classified material, except for the 600 pounds that was couriered to Danang with the communications equipment.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Flaudits:

([REDACTED]) It would not be fitting to close a unit without a certain amount of nostalgia; however, when a unit ceases to be, the void created in the mind of loyal personnel can be filled with pride by the memory of what has been. Since the central theme in the mission of Detachment 1 had always been satisfaction of those agencies utilizing the Detachment's product, it was with a certain amount of pride that a 330th Radio Research Field Station message was received on 5 November. In essence, this unit, primary consumer of Detachment 1 mission results, paid tribute to the high caliber support the Detachment had always provided. (71)

Aftermath:

(U) Although the Detachment was formally closed on 12 November 1971, the troubles with relocation were not to be resolved so easily. The location of the major portion of the Detachment resources and personnel at Danang had created housing problems, personnel equipment supply problems, and had aggravated an already critical transportation problem. Nature too, in the form of Typhoon Hester, had added to the complications. Even though 12 November saw the closure of Detachment 1, it was obvious that the complete "settling in" process at Danang would take quite a while before personnel comforts and operational fluidity would be realized.

Summary/Observations

([REDACTED]) As with most major undertakings, the deactivation of Detachment 1 went smoothly once positive decisions were made. The planning process was hindered by several aspects:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1. Primary purpose for closure was the planned return of Phu Cat AB to the RVNAF. This situation was a direct result of the Vietnamization plan for the overall war effort and the overall drawdown of American manpower.

2. Concomitant with the plan to close Phu Cat, a drastic drawdown of Cryptologic Spaces took place, making it necessary to closely scrutinize the ARDF mission to determine what actions could be taken to reduce the USAF ARDF force in SEA.

3. MACV and 7AF had continually stated the need for retention of the major portion of the ARDF force in country, due to the inherent value of the system for keeping close scrutiny on enemy movements.

4. Personnel requirements/aircraft system types were virtually impossible to stabilize, due to the ever changing requirements stated from different sources.

5. Planning was begun at lowest levels, with no prior knowledge of high-level requirements. As a consequence, firm planning and subsequent approval by the final authority placed the entire project in limbo a great amount of the time.

6. Conflicting objectives prevailed. One overall objective was an "across the board" reduction of Air Force personnel and facilities in SVN. This was complicated by the ever present fact that a number of those individuals in positions of authority were unaware of the significance and value of ARDF to the war effort. Consequently, other objectives often took precedence over the ARDF mission, making it necessary for 6994 Scty Sq to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

constantly monitor all actions to prevent total disregard of USAFSS requirements and objectives.

7. Training of Vietnamese to assume the ARDF mission was advancing on schedule in one respect, E.G., the actual operators for manning the ARDF/ACI platforms: However, the training of SSB personnel to assume ground related duties was not in consonance, requiring at least one U.S. operator on each ARVN manned mission.

8. Lack of Vietnamese front-end crews required retention of a full complement of TEWS personnel.

[REDACTED] In spite of these obvious restrictive conditions, at no time did any concerned agency "drag their feet". Close day to day coordination between two primary participants, 7AF and 6994 Scty Sq was necessary to keep all factions aware of the status and limiting factors of any actions proposed.

[REDACTED] Perhaps one of the most pointed lessons learned during the entire deactivation process was the fact that the first consideration to any move must be the mission requirements that had to be met. Unfortunately, at the outset of discussions where Phan Rang and Cam Ranh Bay were prime possibilities for relocation, the mission objective of the unit was more or less ignored with Air Force Command and Control/Chain of Command being given top priority consideration. Only after lengthy studies was it possible to make all concerned aware of the fact that relocation to either of these sites would result in prohibitive mission degradation. Had mission requirements been given first priority consideration, Danang would have been chosen at the outset, preventing the last minute rush with

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
resulting support problems which prevailed throughout and after the move.

[REDACTED] After all is said and done - in spite of the many frustrations with which planners were faced throughout the pre-move period, the ease with which the actual aircraft/mission transfer was made was remarkable. Mission loss was negligible, with even the loose administrative ends being quickly resolved. From the standpoint of logic, it would appear that all considerations on a move of the magnitude of this one should be made at a national level. Once every aspect had been considered and a firm decision made, local planners could then proceed to formulate execution plans. Had this system been followed, the cryptologic community would have been kept advised by DIRNSA, while CSAF would have kept other agencies current on developments as they occurred. On the other hand, the axiom that "first hand knowledge is more capable of understanding the complexities of any given situation" cannot be overlooked. Consequently, making recommendations for future actions of this nature, based upon the lessons learned during the deactivation/relocation of Detachment 1 is a virtual impossibility. No two situations will ever be the same; extenuating circumstances such as personnel authorizations, mission requirements, available facilities, and overall objectives will render each subsequent exercise an entity of its own. Since this is the first war in which the U.S. has been involved that has required us to "guard our backs" as we withdraw, there was no prior precedence set. Hopefully, this will be the last time such a necessity exists. It is primarily the complexity and very nature of the war in which we are involved that makes unit closure/deactivation/relocation actions completely unique, and without precedence.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Footnotes completely redacted. Following 3 pages removed to reduce file size.

©CC477.com



GLOSSARY

ABBREVIATIONS

A

AB Air Base
AD Air Division
AGE Avionics Ground Equipment
ARDF Airborne Radio Direction Finding
ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam

B

C

CC Combat Cross
CINCPAC Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCPACAF Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces
COMUSMACV Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CONUS Continental United States

D

Det Detachment
DIRNSA Director, National Security Agency
DURMIS Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary

E

F

Frag Point Predetermined points within a target area from which EC-47 missions are tasked with ARDF collection.

G

H



I

J

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

K

L

LAD Logistics Action Directive

M

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

N

NKP Nakhon Phanom, Thailand

NRV(C) National Security Agency Representative, Vietnam (C)

NVA North Vietnamese Army

O

P

PACAF Pacific Air Force

PAD Programmed Actions Directive

PCS Permanent Change of Station

Q

R

RTAFB Royal Thai Air Force Base

RVN Republic of Vietnam

RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Air Force

S

Scty Sq Security Squadron

[REDACTED]

SEA Southeast Asia

SI Special Intelligence

SIGINT Signal Intelligence

SSTB Special Security Technical Branch

T

TAW Tactical Airlift Wing

TEWS Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron

TFW Tactical Fighter Wing

TOT Time Over Target

TRW Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

U

UE Unit Equipment

USAFSS United States Air Force Security Service

V

VC Viet Cong

VIM Vietnamization Improvement and Modernization

W

X


Y

Z

7AF Seventh Air Force

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX I
SEA ARDF AREAS



APPENDIX II
COMBAT CROSS CONFIGURATION

[REDACTED]

BASIC COMBAT CROSS CONFIGURATION

"Y" Position

G133 HF Receiver
Frequency Range - .5-30 MHz
G176 Tape Recorder
Spectrum Display Unit

"X" Position

ALR-34 or ALR-35
Frequency Range - 2-16 MHz
C-12 Compass
Panaramic Scope

Function: X Position - ARDF; "Y" Position - Target Aquisition/Air/
Ground comms.

Flight Time: Seven hours

Cruise Speed: 120 Knots

Crew Composition: Pilot, Copilot, Navigator, Flight Mechanic and two
Operators.


Communications Radios: One UHF radio, one VHF radio, one HF radio, and
one FM radio.

Navigation Equipment: TACAN, Weather Radar, and Doppler

Navigator's Position Includes: Plotting table and Franklin Printer
that provides fix data readout from "X" position.

The ALR-35 system differs from the ALR-34 in that it is coupled with
a data processor. The processor converts the target magnetic bear-
ings to true bearings, calculates target location relative to the
selected doppler set point, and determines the circular error of the
fix. In the ALR-34 system, these functions are performed manually
by the navigator.

COMBAT CROSS (CC)



II-2

ec4.com

APPENDIX III

MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT/PRODUCTIVITY

STATISTICS



MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT DATA

	JULY	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	TOTAL
MSNS SCHEG	375	412	379	355	67	1588
MSNS FLOWN	312	412	368	346	67	1505
ACCOMPLISH RATE	83.2%	100%	97.1%	97.5%	100%	94.8%
HOURS FRAGGED	2625	2884	2653	2485	469	11116
HOURS FLOWN	2027	2784	2492	2181	442	9926
% FRAG TIME FLOWN	77.2	96.5	94.6	87.8	94.2	89.3
TOT HOURS OVER TGT	1436	1954	1764	1538	315	7007
% FLYING TIME OVR TGT	70.8	70.2	70.8	70.5	71.3	70.6



[REDACTED]

ARDF PRODUCTIVITY

	JULY	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	TOTAL
TGTS WORKED	1447	2249	2172	1793	351	8012
TGTS FIXED	1107	1791	1749	1423	288	6358
TGTS CUT	106	192	175	166	29	668
% WORKED FIXED/CUT	83.8	88.2	84.0	88.6	90.3	87.7
FIXES/CUTS ID	600	877	897	606	120	3100
ID RATE (%)	41.5	39.0	41.3	33.8	34.2	38.7
FIXES/CUTS ID PRIORITY	407	608	826	453	81	2375
PRI ID RATE (%)	28.1	27.0	38.0	25.3	23.1	29.6
FIX RADIUS 250-1000M	913	1484	1499	1143	233	5272
1001-2000M	151	296	193	227	55	922
% BELOW 1000M	82.5	82.9	85.7	80.3	80.9	80.6

[REDACTED]

ACI PRODUCTIVITY

	JULY	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	TOTAL
HOURS TASKED	1763.2	1953.7	1816.4	1541.5	308.8	7836.6
HOURS COPY	105.7	149.2	156.8	133.6	29.7	575.0
% EFFECTIVENESS	06.0	07.6	08.6	08.6	09.6	07.8
MSGS COPIED	395	467	304	329	53	1546
EXPLOITABLE MSGS COPIED	49	149	188	189	22	597
% COPIED MSGS EXPLOITABLE	12.4	31.9	61.8	57.4	41.5	38.6

APPENDIX IV
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

COMMANDER'S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

MAJOR JOHN V. THOMPSON

Major Thompson was born and reared in Brownfield, Texas. He attended local schools and graduated from Brownfield High School in 1950.

He attended Texas Technological College in Lubbock, and received a BS degree in Secondary Education with a major in Physical Education and minors in Government and Mathematics. Awarded an athletic scholarship, he lettered in varsity football for three consecutive years, receiving recognition for pass interceptions and returns.

Major Thompson began his military career when he enrolled in the Texas Tech ROTC program in February 1951. He was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant on 26 January 1955 and entered active military service on 13 April 1955. He received his navigator rating upon completion of the primary basic navigator course of flying training in May 1956 at Ellington Air Force Base, Texas. He has served as a Military Air Transport Service Line Navigator at Kelly Air Force Base Texas, as Air Training Command instructor in navigational training at Harlingen and James Connally Air Force Bases, Texas, and as Chief Navigator at Headquarters, United States Air Force Security Service. Major Thompson is a Master Navigator. Except for a brief period between January 1958 and November 1959, Major Thompson has been on continuous active duty since April 1955.

Major Thompson is married to the former Janet Weatherred. The Thompsons have four children, Tammy Lu (10), Tracy Kim (11), Terry Aniese (7), and Tommy Warren (3).



DISTRIBUTION PAGE

Part I and Part II:

FacilityRgn (HO) (3)
USAFSS (HO) (3)
6940 Security Wing (TAL) (1)
Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron (HO) (1)
Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron (HO) (1)

Part II only

6924 Security Squadron (HO) (1)
6903 Security Squadron (HO) (1)
6921 Security Group (HO) (1)
6922 Security Group (HO) (1)
6918 Security Squadron (HO) (1)
6990 Security Group (HO) (1)
6987 Security Group (HO) (1)
6988 Security Squadron (HO) (1)
6908 Security Squadron (HO) (1)
6926 Security Squadron Mobile (HO) (1)

[REDACTED]
A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

RR YMDNK

DE YHLAKZ 95401 2610000

ZNY MDTGH

R 172336Z SEP 71

FM USR

TO USA-561/LOR

INFO USA-562/DO

ZEM

[REDACTED]
SUBJ: EXPLOITABLE MSG COPY AT DET ONE

REF USAFSS DO 151940Z SEP, SAME SUBJ.

1. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS WERE PROVIDED TO USAFSS IN RESPONSE TO REF, QUOTE: PHJ CONTINUES TO REPORT FAVORABLE NUMBER OF EXPLOITABLE MESSAGES INTERCEPTED COMPARED TO THEIR OVERALL TOTAL MSGS INTERCEPTED. THEIR EXPLOITATION SECTION HAS INFORMALLY NOTIFIED THIS HQ THAT ONE REASON HAS BEEN INCREASED TECH EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE GMA AND THE UNIT. THIS HAS ENABLED THE PHJ ANALYTICAL SECTION TO THOROUGHLY BRIEF THE CREWS ON EXPLOITABLE SYSTEMS THAT ARE TO BE FOUND WITHIN THEIR MISSIONS AREAS,

[REDACTED] THIS ENHANCING OPERATOR RECOGNITION OF EXPLOITABLE SYSTEMS. UNQUOTE.

2. UNLESS YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS OR RATIONALE AVAIL OVER AND ABOVE WHAT HAS BEEN PROVIDED, NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON REFERENCE.

180

0000

NNNN

A true extract copy.

Henry X Moduski
HENRY X MODUSKI, 1st Lt., USAF
Historical Officer

[REDACTED]
Doc # 1

TOZORDA 150FEN [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
PT YMRDNK
DE YHLAKZ 0010 2820110
ZNY MMNSH
R 090115Z
FM PSS
TO 6994SCTYSO/CO/DO
INFO RET 1 6999SCTYSO/CO/DO
ZEM

001
0491

SUBJECT: INCREASED EXPLOITABLE MESSAGE PRODUCTIVITY
1. I HAVE BEEN PLEASED TO NOTE A STEADY INCREASE IN THE TOTAL
AMOUNT OF INTERCEPT BEING COLLECTED BY DETACHMENT 1 AS WELL AS
THE CLIMBING RATE OF EXPLOITABLE TRAFFIC.
2. PLEASE RELAY MY APPRECIATION TO ALL CONCERNED IN ACHIEVING
THIS PROGRESS.
001
0010

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NNNN

DIC #2

NOTE: Many documents completely redacted. These have been removed to reduce file size.

EC47.com

NA 08 120RA 013

//ROUTINE//

SSN 0320

FM 6094TH SGTY SQ

TO DET 1, 6094TH SGTY SQ

R 123910Z

ZEM

CCN 08
15-189
[Handwritten signature]

SUBJ: MISSION EFFECTIVENESS

REF YOUR LTR DATED 28 AUG 71

1. NACV HAS AGREED TO ADJUST ITOT'S TO ALLOW MISSIONS TO BE ON TARGET DURING OPTIMUM TIME PERIODS. RATHER THAN REDUCE THE MISSION HOWEVER THEY WILL CONTINUE TO FLY FULL FRAGGED SORTIE TIME. IN THOSE AREAS WHERE TWO SORTIES ARE SCHEDULED IN THE SAME DAY OCCASIONAL OVERLAP WILL OCCUR. DURING THESE PERIODS WHERE AN OVERLAP DOES OCCUR SUGGEST CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN MISSION AIRCRAFT W/ AIR/AIR COMND TO PREVENT DUPLICATION OF EFFORT.

2. UNLESS YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTIONS WE ARE RECOMMENDING THE FOLLOWING ITOT CHANGES FOR THE TASKING PERIODS 18-20 SEP.

203 BRAVO CHANGE ITOT FOR 19, 21, 23 SEP FROM 0600 TO 0700Z.


204 BRAVO CHANGE ITOT FROM 0600 TO 0700Z FOR 22 SEP TO 2300Z.

3. ADVISE ASAP OF ANY FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS YOU MAY HAVE.

10

3707

20813



DOC #4

NAC0060R0035

//ROUTINE//

SSN 8236

R 100240Z

FM 6994 SCTY SQ

TO 509 RRG (AOC)

DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ

DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ

DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

ZEM

SUBJ: MAXIMIZING TIME ON TARGET

REF MY CG 890950Z JUL 71.

FOLLOWING LETTER DATED 8 AUG 71 FROM USAF (DOD) DIRECTED TO
SUBORDINATE TENS UNITS SUPERCEDES LETTER TRANSMITTED IN ABOVE REF.
QUOTE.

1. IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE TIME ON TARGET FOR TENS MISSIONS THE FOLLOWING
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES WILL APPLY:

A. MISSIONS SCHEDULED FOR FIVE HOURS:

(1) AIRCRAFT WILL BE FLOWN TO THE TARGET AREA AT POWER SETTINGS
AS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE (TGT) (AS OF 15 MINS). (GROUP)
WILL BE USED FOR RETURN FROM TARGET AREA WHEN SUFFICIENT FUEL
IS AVAILABLE TO MEET RECOVERY REQUIREMENTS.

(2) AIRCRAFT MAY REMAIN IN THE TARGET AREA UP TO 30 ADDITIONAL
MINUTES PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA:

- (A) AIRCRAFT COMMANDER DETERMINES THAT FUEL IS AVAIL-
ABLE AND WEATHER CONDITIONS PERMIT EARLY RECOVERY.
- (B) AMS COORDINATES WITH AOC TO ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY FUEL
REMAINING ON TARGET FOR THE ADDITIONAL PERIOD.

B. MISSIONS SCHEDULED FOR SEVEN HOURS:

(1) TOTAL SORTIE TIME WILL NOT BE EXTENDED EXCEPT FOR NECESSARY
RECOVERY REQUIREMENTS.

(2) AIRCRAFT WILL BE FLOWN TO THE TARGET AREA AT POWER SETTINGS
AS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE (TGT) (AS OF 15 MINS). (GROUP)
WILL BE USED FOR RETURN FROM TARGET AREA WHEN SUFFICIENT FUEL
IS AVAILABLE TO MEET RECOVERY REQUIREMENTS.

2. THE INTENT OF THE ABOVE PROCEDURES IS STRATEGY

SUPPORT FOR OUR CUSTOMER; IT IS IN NO WAY INTENDED TO COMPROMISE OR AFFECT
SAFETY.

3. FOR MISSION PLANNING PURPOSES, 10% GS ENROUTE WILL BE USED TO
DETERMINE TAKE-OFF TIME. EARLIER TAKE-OFF (EARLIER THAN 15 MIN-
UTES BEFORE SCHEDULED TGT) ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.

4. THIS LETTER SUPERCEDES THE LETTER DATED 8 JUL 71, SAME SUBJECT.

UNQUOTE.

GP-1

400

8236

Doc # 7

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION



TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
----------	------	-------	--------

PRECEDENCE

ACTION	ROUTINE
INFO	ROUTINE

DTS 17/0230Z JUL 71

*File
Ops Agn
S*

FROM: USA-562

TO: USM-604

INFO: USA-561
USA-563

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

SUBJ: DELAY IN PASSING ARDF FIXES

1. REF UR 150135Z JUL 71
2. UNDERSTAND UR INTENTIONS IN THE ABOVE REF, HOWEVER, BELIEVE WHAT YOU ARE SUGGESTING WOULD BE NEARLY UNATTAINABLE IN MOST CASES FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS. PRIMARILY, TARGETS RARELY REMAIN ACTIVE FOR THE TIME IT TAKES TO FIX THE TARGET, MANUALLY COMPUTE THE LOCATION AND PASS IT TO THE GROUND.
3. A RANDOM SAMPLING OF ONE HUNDRED TARGETS OBTAINED IN AREAS IN THE CLOSEST PROXIMITY TO CHU LAI REVEALS THE FOLLOWING:
 - A. THE AVERAGE TIME DELAY FROM THE TIME OF LAST LOP UNTIL THE FIX WAS PASSED TO THE RADIO OPERATOR WAS TWENTY FOUR MINUTES. THE LONGEST TIME WAS FORTY-NINE MINUTES AND THE SHORTEST WAS TEN. THIS TIME WILL VARY GREATLY CONTINGENT UPON THE EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF THE NAVIGATOR, THE VOLUME OF TARGETS WORKED AT ANY GIVEN TIME AND THE TIME SPENT IN OBTAINING DOPPLER UPDATES TO ENSURE ACCURACY OF FIXES.

DATE	TIME
MONTH	YEAR
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES

TYPED NAME AND TITLE
SAME AS RELEASER

PHONE

DRAFTER

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
CHARLES A. SCOTT, SSGT
RADIO OPERATOR

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY
ACTION ROUTINE	
INFO ROUTINE	

B. TIME DELAY FROM THE TIME THE RADIO OPERATOR RECEIVES THE FIX UNTIL IT IS IN THE HANDS OF THE DSU AVERAGED SEVEN MINUTES. IN THE MAJORITY OF CASES THE TIME WAS LESS THAN FIVE MINUTES. A FEW ISOLATED INSTANCES OF PASS TIMES OF 20-40 MINUTES RAISES THE AVERAGE. AGAIN THIS TIME IS CONTINGENT UPON CONTACT WITH THE DSU AND TARGET ACTIVITY AT THE TIME THE FIX IS AVAILABLE FOR PASSING.

4. LOCAL DIRECTIVES SPECIFY THAT FIXES WILL BE PASSED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. PASS TIME FIGURES WOULD INDICATE THIS REQUIREMENT IS BEING COMPLIED WITH.

5. THE PRINCIPLE REASON FOR THE DELAY IN PASSING FIXES IS QUITE NATURALLY BASED ON THE TIME IT TAKES THE NAVIGATOR TO COMPUTE THE FIX TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACTORS CITED IN 3A ABOVE.

6. OTHER THAN TO REITERATE STATION POLICY TO PASS FIXES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THERE IS LITTLE WE CAN SUGGEST TO SPEED UP PASSING OF FIXES.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		1	2		
[REDACTED]				DEGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	

WVWVZ02CRD1 WC

RR YRDNK

DE 90070 19 0040

TO US - 307
INFO USA - 301/00
US - 307/00
724

JUL 71

REF: 8-18P/532 AFL 15 125Z JUL 71

1. TWO PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO PROVIDE FIX INFORMATION AS RAPIDLY AS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO IDENTIFY SPECIFIC TARGETS. REF: 8-18P/532

A. AN INHERENT PROBLEM IN OUR AIRBORNE SYSTEMS IS THE INABILITY TO TRANSMIT OR RECEIVE WITHOUT SERIOUSLY DEGRADING PERFORMANCE. SIGNALS ARE NOT BEING DEPICTED, COPIED, OR SEARCHED FOR. FOR THIS REASON WE TEND TO SEND FIXES IN GROUPS, TO MINIMIZE THE AMOUNT OF TIME SPENT ON THE AIR.

B. AFTER A FIX HAS BEEN TAKEN, IT MUST BE PROCESSED BY THE NAVIGATOR AND A DOPPLER UPDATE MADE, TO INSURE THAT ALL FIX INFO IS BASED ON ACCURATE AIRCRAFT POSITION DATA. THIS TAKES FROM 5 TO 30 MINUTES, DEPENDING ON THE POSITION OF THE AIRCRAFT AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE NAVIGATOR.

2. THE CASE OF A SUCCESSFUL ARTY DESTRUCTION OF A TARGET WHILE STILL IN CONTACT IS VERY REWARDING TO ALL CONCERNED, BUT RARELY OCCURS. THE LAST ONE OCCURRED AT NIGHT IN APRIL DURING OPERATION SCOTT ORCHARD. IT WAS THIS CASE WHICH MET

3. OUR OPERATORS ARE BRIEFED THAT FIXES ARE TO BE PASSED WHEN FIVE FIXES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED, OR 30 MINUTES AFTER THE LAST OF THE OLDEST FIX, WHICHEVER IS EARLIER.

4. UNDER PROGRAM ENVISIONED, WHO WOULD ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF TARGET HAD BEEN DESTROYED, ACHT OR GROUND BASED INTERCEPT UNIT (GCI) WILL ESTIMATE HOW LONG AFTER FIX IS CALLED TO BE THAT ARTY WILL BE EXPECTED TO EFFECT OR ARTY IS, OF COURSE, TO CLOSE TO A TARGET AIRCRAFT FOR THE DURATION OF THE FIRING. THIS MAY REDUCE OUR ABILITY TO GET FURTHER FIXES IF THE AREA IS ONE WHERE SEVERAL ARTY TARGETS ARE LOCATED, SUCH AS NEAR HQ FRONT 4.

5. PER OUR J: FOR BOVEE... AF TFC FA GENT W/BOX 10 HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS HIGH GRADE IN EMPLOYMENTS WE HAVE GOTTEN BACK SO FAR.

428
0024



Clifton
WVWVZ

DOC#10

2948152
2948154
2948156
2948158
2948160
2948162
2948164
2948166
2948168
2948170
2948172
2948174
2948176

2948151 ZCZCR08550RDM072
PP YARDOR
DE YARDNK 0805 2948146
ZNY MMINSH
P 210145Z OCT 71
FM DET 1,6994 SOTY SQ
TO USAFSS/00R
INFO PACSOTYRGN/DO
6994 SOTY SQ/DO
OCT 2, 6994 SOTY SQ /DO
ZEM

SUBJ: WAIVER OF MAXIMUM FLYING TIME

1. REQUEST WAIVER OF 125 HOURS MONTHLY MAXIMUM FOR PERSONNEL LISTED:
READ: RANK/NAME/SSAN/HOURS/ACCUMULATED AS OF 19 OCT 71

SSGT BROWN, GARY	[REDACTED]	69:45
SSGT BROWN, NATHANIEL	[REDACTED]	82:10
SGT CRABB, JAMES D. JR.	[REDACTED]	72:18
MSGT CRAIG, THOMAS R.	[REDACTED]	75:40
SSGT GUSMAN, JOEL H.	[REDACTED]	85:35
SSGT KESSELRING, ALLEN L.	[REDACTED]	74:25
SSGT KLUGE, JOHN F.	[REDACTED]	79:15
SGT RITOLA, LARS G.	[REDACTED]	78:25
SSGT SADDLER, MATTHEW	[REDACTED]	92:05
SGT SALLEY, RUSSELL A.	[REDACTED]	80:18
SSGT WOOD, LARRY H.	[REDACTED]	74:50

2. ALTHOUGH AMPLE CAT III TDY ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN RECEIVED AT THIS UNIT, THERE IS A SHORTAGE OF AMS PERSONNEL, REQUIRING THOSE AVAILABLE TO FLY MORE THAN 125 HOURS.

3. REQUEST WAIVER THROUGH 30 NOV 71.

242

0805

NNNN
2948282

DOC # 12

[REDACTED]

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

ZNY OOOOO

R 211650Z OCT 71

TO RUMHWA/PSR/DOR/WHEELER APB HAW

INFO RUMMESA/6994SCTYSQ/DO/TSN AFID VIETNAM

RUMUJGA/DET 1 6994SCTYSQ/DO/PHU CAT AB VIETNAM

RUMUJBA/DET 2 6994SCTYSQ/DO/DANANG VIETNAM

BT

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: WAIVER OF MAXIMUM FLYING TIME (U)

REFS: A. DET 1, 6994SS MSG DO 210145Z OCT 71

B. DET 1, 6994SS MSG DO 210850Z OCT 71

1. WAIVER OF 30-DAY FLYING-HOUR RESTRICTION IS GRANTED FOR INDIVIDUALS LISTED IN REF ALPHA. INDIVIDUALS MAY NOT EXCEED 160 FLYING HOURS DURING ANY CONSECUTIVE 30-DAY PERIOD OR 330 HOURS PER CALENDAR QUARTER.

2. THIS WAIVER EXPIRES 31 OCT 1971. GPA

BT

#2247

NNNN

A true extract copy.

Henry X Mioduski
HENRY X MIODUSKI, 1st Lt., USAF
Historical Officer

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DOC# 13

3830150
3050132
3830134
3830156ZCZCR08308RDM087
PP YMRDQR
DE YMQADK 0026 3021555
ZNY MMNSH
P 291510Z OCT 71
FM USAFSS
TO PSR/DOR
INFO 6994 SCTYSQ/DO
DET 1 6994 SCTYSQ/DO
ZEN

30 OCT 1971 01 20

31
16


- SUBJ: WAIVER OF MAXIMUM FLYING TIME
- REFS: A. DET 1, 6994 SS MSG DO 210000Z OCT 71
 - B. DET 1, 6994 SS MSG DO 210000Z OCT 71
 - C. USAFSS DOR 211630Z OCT 71
 - D. DET 1, 6994 SS MSG DO 290510Z OCT 71

PROVISIONS OF WAIVER TO MAXIMUM 30-DAY FLYING HOUR RESTRICTION AS REQUESTED IN REFS ALPHA AND BRAVO HAD GRANTED IN REF CHARLIE WITH EXPIRATION DATE OF 30 OCT 71 IS EXTENDED UNTIL 15 NOV 71.
120
0026

NNNN

DOC# 14

1:30354
1:30356
1:30358
1:30360
1:30362
1:30364
1:30366
1:30368
1:30370
1:30372
1:30374
1:30376
1:30378
1:30380
1:30382
1:30384
1:30386
1:30388
1:30390
1:30392
1:30394
1:30396
1:30398
1:30400



1:30394Z OZOROA 062
PP YMRONK
DE YHLAKZ 0033 182235Z
ZNY MANSB
P 01225Z
FM PSR
TO USA-501
USA-502
USA-503
USA-504

NSAPAC
USM-7
USM-7J
NSAPAC REP VIETNAM
ASAPAC
USAFSS
ZEN


00R

DELIVER FIRST DUTY HOUR
SUBJ: CUMBERSOME

REF NRT 012325Z JULY 71 (NOTAL USM-7J, USAFSS)

1. UPON RECEIPT OF USM-7J MSG ON ACTIVATION OF GROUND-AIR TIP-OFF STATION, REQUEST ARDF ACFT OVER SOUTHERN LAOS MONITOR 47.3 RPT 47.3 Mhz TO ACCEPT ARDF TIP-OFFS.
2. OPERATIONS OFFICERS SHOULD ENSURE ALL OPERATORS, PARTICULARLY AMS, ARE FULLY AWARE OF OPERATING PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CUMBERSOME. INITIALLY, THIS SHOULD BE AN ITEM OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS DURING PRE-MISSION BRIEFINGS.

160
0033



NNNN



DOC 16

[REDACTED]

TO: SAC, [REDACTED] (100-1181)
FROM: SAC, [REDACTED] (100-1181)
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
DATE: OCT 1971
RE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 100-1181
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (100-1181)
1. [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT AS OF 25 OCT 71, [REDACTED] TESTS OF PROJECT [REDACTED] WERE INITIATED.
2. [REDACTED] REPORT SUCCESS/FAILURE TO COMBAT UNIT IN SECTION [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] VIA REF UNTIL TESTS ARE INITIATED. NEED AT THE REPORTING [REDACTED].
100-1181

Roger [unclear]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DOC# 26

[REDACTED]

CIP NR 71-30

SUBJECT: PROJECT CUMBERSOME [REDACTED]

EFFECTIVE 30 October 1971

1. This CIP supercedes CIP 71-28.
2. Effective immediately all aircraft flying in SEA Area Ten (10) will monitor FM frequency 47.3 (CIPHER MODE) RPT (CIPHER MODE) for Ground to Air tip-offs from USM-7C at UBON. The ground station callsign will be "NETTLES DEVICE" RPT "NETTLES DEVICE." Your callsign will be your primary mission callsign.
3. This will be a 30 day test. For best results attempt to contact the ground station (In Cipher Only) as soon as you reach your mission area, and advise him that you will be standing by for tip-offs. If you cannot contact NETTLES DEVICE on the primary frequency (47.3), attempt to contact him on one or both of the alternate frequencies which are 43.4 and 70.9.
4. If you receive a tip-off, log it on the operator tip-off log and treat it as a normal DSU tip-off. After contact has been established, query if they want all targets or just the results of the tip-off passed to them.
5. Frequency and callsign information are posted in the mission book on the DSU information page.
6. Once again keep in mind that all communications with "NETTLES DEVICE" will be made only in the CIPHER MODE RPT CIPHER MODE.
7. This test project is in no way related to the BROWN HEAVEN project.

KEITH W. OWENS, MSgt, USAF
NCOIC Operations

AUTHORITY: USM-7 Mag 200200Z Oct 71 and [REDACTED] Mag 200613Z Oct 71.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DOC# 27

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY

[REDACTED]

BOOK MULTI SINGLE

TY [REDACTED]

PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO

805 Z JUL 71

FROM: 6994 SGT1 SQ TSM RVN

TO: PER/IR

INFO USAFES/DO/KR

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[REDACTED]

SUBJ: SEA RESTRICTIONS (U)

REF BY DG 300900Z JUL 71

1. REF MEETING WAS HELD 1 JUL IN 460TH COMBATTING ROOM AND WAS CHAIRED BY COL DALE FLOWERS, 460TH COMMANDER. REPRESENTATIVES FROM 7AF PLANS, 7AF RECON OPS, 460TH OPS, 360THS AND 6994 DO WERE PRESENT.

2. INITIAL DISCUSSION WAS CHANNLED TOWARDS RESPONSE TO PACAF QUERIES CONCERNING POSSIBLE NEW TFW WING AT TSM. THE ADVANTAGES OF COLLOCATION OF CENTRALLY BASED MANAGEMENT WERE DISCUSSED. 7AF IF TOOK A STAND THAT THERE WAS MUCH PRESSURE TO REDUCE USAF PARTICIPATION AT TSM AND TURN AS MUCH OVER TO THE VIETNAMESE AS POSSIBLE, AND AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. WE WERE UNABLE TO OFFER CONVINCING AND COMCLUSIVE RATIONALE FOR ESSENTIALITY OF RETAINING TWS MANAGEMENT AT TSM. OUR ARGUMENTS CENTER AROUND EASE OF COORDINATION AND INTANGIBLE LOSSES IN EFFICIENCY IF ANOTHER DISTANT WING TOOK OVER TWS. 7AF IF AND 460TH

DATE	TIME
2	1430
MONTH	YEAR
JUL	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

Do file

DRAFTER

[REDACTED]

PHONE

489

SIGNATURE

[REDACTED]

Sgt. AS RELEASER/dns

DAVID H KDDY, Major, USAF
Operations Officer

SECURITY

[REDACTED]

Doc # 30

DI

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY
ACTION PRIORITY	
INFO	

MEMOS ARE UNABLE TO VIEW CRITICALLY OF THIS PARENT LOCATION IN SAME LIGHT AS WE DO.

3. THE 460TH DO PRESENTED HIS PROPOSAL FOR ASSIGNING TMS TO EXISTING WINGS; HOWEVER IN HIS INTRODUCTION THE 460TH CG STATED THAT HE PREFERRED SINGLE MANAGEMENT HENCE THE SINGLE WING PHILOSOPHY WAS ACCEPTED BY ALL.

4. THE DISCUSSION CONTINUED IN AN EFFORT TO AGREE ON WHICH WING 7AF WOULD PROPOSE. THE 315 TAW WAS MENTIONED AGAIN AS WELL AS A WINGCOMER FOR CONSIDERATION, THE 483 TAW AT CRB. THIS WING IS CURRENTLY MADE UP OF SEVEN C-7 SQUADRONS AND WAS INTRODUCED BECAUSE OF OUR REQUIREMENT FOR SECURE FACILITIES. AT THIS POINT CRB WAS AGAIN MENTIONED AS THE MOST LIKELY FOR RELOCATION OF PRJ EC-47 ASSETS. THE 6994 DO AND 460 DOJ CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR CENTRAL MANAGEMENT AT TSN AND RESULTANT DISCUSSION LED TO RECOGNITION THAT AT LEAST A WING LIAISON FUNCTION WAS REQUIRED AT 7AF. 2-4 SPACES WERE ENVISAGED, A NUMBER THAT WE BELIEVE IS TOO RESTRICTIVE TO ACCOMPLISH NECESSARY FUNCTIONS.

5. WE ARE UNSURE AT THIS TIME EXACTLY WHAT 7AF RESPONSE WILL INCLUDE. IN ALL PROBABILITY NO RESPONSE WILL BE MADE UNTIL AFTER GEN KEEN'S VISIT DURING WEEK OF 11TH. HE IS EXPECTED TO COMMENT ON THE TENDRE OF CRB AS WELL AS OTHER AF BASING DECISIONS. IT DOES NOT APPEAR HOWEVER THAT IF 7AF IS TO BE SWAYED FROM THEIR POSITION OF NO TSN WING AT TSN, MORE EMPHATIC DIRECTION WILL HAVE TO COME FROM PACAF.

CONT		PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	INITIALS
		2	2	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		CLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS		

DD

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE
ACTION PRIORITY
INFO

RELEASED BY
Major Eddy

USA 103

RECOMMEND YOU ATTEMPT TO HAVE PACAF DIRECT/STRONGLY SUGGEST A "LEAF"
TSN TEWS WING. IF YOU AGREE AND IF YOU INTEND TO PURSUE THIS FURTHER,
PLS ADVISE AND WE WILL SEEK ALLIES AT THIS END (EG MACV). ALSO REQUEST
YOU ENUMERATE ARGUMENTS FOR LOCAL TEWS WING TO ENSURE WE HAVEN'T OVER-
LOOKED ANYTHING.

6. RELATED SUBJECT: REQUEST COMMENTS PERTINENT TO MY MSG DO 220655Z
JUN 71, CONCERNING CLOSURE/REDISTRIBUTION OF PFI ASSETS.

SECRET

CONTROL NO	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
SECURITY	CA			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	


DOC# 30-2

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION PRIORITY			
INFO			

11/02002
 DTG 10/2000Z JUL 71

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ
 TO: FSR/DO/XR
 USAFSS/DC/XR



[REDACTED] CC

SUBJ: SEA REDUCTIONS

1. AT MY REQUEST, ON 3 JULY 71 MAJ EDDY AND I MET WITH 7AF (XP) STAFF IN ANOTHER EFFORT TO CONVINCE THEM OF NEED TO RETAIN THEIR COMMAND AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT ELEMENTS AT TSN. OUR BEST ARGUMENTS FAILED TO SWAY THEM, PRINCIPALLY DUE TO DIFFICULTY IN THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF INTRICACIES OF ARDF OPERATIONS, AND WERE LOOKED UPON AS A MATTER OF CONVENIENCE RATHER THAN NECESSITY. 7AF (XP) STILL PROPOSES TO RESUBORDINATE TEWS, PROBABLY TO AOSTAN AT GBB, AND RETAIN A SMALL WING LIAISON FUNCTION AT TSN. WE THEN SPoke TO B/CEN JOHN WHO AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER AND WHILE SYMPATHETIC, ADVISED THAT CURRENT REDUCTION EXERCISE WOULD MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO RETAIN OR ESTABLISH A WING AT TSN.

2. ON 7 JULY 71, I HAD OPPORTUNITY TO VIEW PROPOSED 7AF (XP) RESPONSE TO PACAF (XP) MSG 230011 JUN 71, PRESENTLY IN 7AF (XP) CHANNELS FOR COORDINATION PRIOR TO COORDINATION BY COMMAND SECTION.

DATE	TIME
10	1045L
MONTH	YEAR
JUL	1971
PAGE NO.	TOTAL OF PAGES
1	1

POSITIONS CHALLENGED WILL CALLS FOR RE-EVALUATION OF WASTE OF SERVICES

DRAFTER
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

RELEASED
 [Signature]
 NAME S INCE, COL, USAF

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED] TIONS

DOC # 32

BD 173

MAY BE USED

FORM 1045-107-001

ABBREVIATED JOINT HEADQUARTERS
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE [RELEASED BY]

ACTION PRIORITY
INFO

IN PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES WITH ELIMINATION OF 460TRW, AND FACT THAT THIS IS 7AF/MACV APPROVED UNIT DEACTIVATION, AND LITTLE CONSIDERATION WAS ACTUALLY GIVEN TO FORMATION OF SMALL TEWS WING SINCE IT WOULD BE INCONGRUENT WITH PREVIOUSLY AGREED ACTION TO REDUCE FORCES AT TSN. GEN JOHN ASKED FOR MY COMMENTS, AND AFTER "BRAINSTORM" SESSION WITH 699LSS AND 460TRW (DCJ) REPRESENTATIVES, WHICH PRODUCED FEW NEW IDEAS, I PREPARED PAPER FOR GEN JOHN, OUTLINING OUR CASE AND STATING THAT DEGRADATION IN RESPONSIVENESS OF 22-47 ARDP PROGRAM WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY OCCUR IF PRESENT COURSE OF ACTION IS FOLLOWED. I PERSONALLY FEEL VERY STRONGLY, INTUITIVELY AND FROM MY EXPERIENCE WITH THE PROBLEMS AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS INVOLVED IN THE ARDP PROGRAM, THAT RESUBORDINATION OF TEWS AWAY FROM TSN WILL IMPACT UNFAVORABLY UPON THE ENTIRE EFFORT. OBVIOUSLY, THIS CANNOT BE "PROVEN" UNTIL IT HAPPENS, AND WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE, SO FAR, TO SATISFACTORILY DEMONSTRATE THE ESSENTIALITY OF OUR CONTINUOUS DIALOGUE WITH THE 460TRW TO MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. THE 460TRW HAS NOT TAKEN A FIRM STAND AGAINST RESUBORDINATION, AND THE DCJ STAFF SEEMS TO EXERT RELATIVELY LITTLE INFLUENCE IN THE MATTER, WHICH WEAKENS OUR CASE. THE FACT IS THAT WE NEED THE WING STAFF CLOSE AT HAND MORE THAN THEY (REALIZE) THEY NEED US.

3. ON 8 JULY 71, I DISCUSSED SITUATION WITH GEN JOHN. (COPY OF RATIONALE PAPER BEING FORWARDED TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS VIA COURIER)

MAIN POINTS I BROUGHT OUT WERE:

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	CLASSIFICATION	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
SECRET			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	

DOC # 32-1

PRECEDENCE
ACTION PRIORITY
INFO

RELEASED BY
[REDACTED]

- A. RESUBORDINATION WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE AN ALREADY COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP SYSTEM AND PHYSICALLY REMOVE TWS MANAGEMENT FROM OTHER FIVE ELEMENTS IN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT (MACV, AEC, DODSPECREP, 7AF, AND 6994SCTYSQ), ALL OF WHOM MUST WORK IN CONCERT.
- B. WING LIAISON FUNCTIONS AT TSN WOULD NOT SATISFY TIMELY COORDINATION REQUIREMENT, SINCE WE WOULD WIND UP DEALING WITH A RELAY FUNCTION VICE A DECISION MAKING AGENCY, ESPECIALLY IN MATTERS INVOLVING POLICY, CRITICISM, ETCETERA, WHICH WING WOULD WANT TO HANDLE. PRESENT SUCCESSFUL ARRANGEMENT WITH 460TH (DOJ) WOULD BE LOST IF IT IS PART OF COLOCATED WING STAFF WITH IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO DATA BASE, GUIDANCE, ETCETERA. MUCH OF DAY TO DAY COORDINATION DEALS WITH SHORT FUSED AND QUASI-POLICY SITUATIONS. NET RESULT: LOSS OF COORDINATION RESPONSIVENESS AND INCREASED ADMINISTRATIVE WORKLOAD.
- C. 460TWS HAS CERTAIN RESPONSIBILITIES IN EC-47 VIM PROGRAM (WAF, PILOT TRAINING, ETCETERA) WHICH WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO MONITOR EFFECTIVELY BY REMOTE WING.
- D. REQUIREMENT TO "BEEF UP" NEW WING WITH TWS FUNCTIONS (EC-47 STAND/EVAL, TRAINING, CURRENT OPS, BCC/COMMAND POST, LIAISON FUNCTION, ETCETERA) WOULD ENHANCE CONSIDERABLY, ANTICIPATED MANPOWER SAVINGS ACCRUING TO DEMISE OF 450TRW.
- E. LENGTHY EDUCATION PROCESS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ORIENT NEW TWS PARENT WING TO TOTAL PROGRAM FOR EFFECTIVENESS. EVEN AT TSN IT HAS

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 22	NO. OF PAGES 6	CLASSIFICATION	LS
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS		DOC # 82-2	

73-1

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY
ACTION PRIORITY	
INFO	

BEEN DIFFICULT TASK OVER THE YEARS DUE TO DIFFERING ORIENTATIONS OF "FRONT END/BACKEND" PERSONNEL. NECESSARY RAPPORT WOULD BE VERY HARD TO MAINTAIN.

F. MACV PROGRAM MANAGER, J21, WAS UNAWARE UNTIL RECENTLY OF PLANNED 460TAW DEACTIVATION, AND ORIGINAL PLANS STAFFING DID NOT INCLUDE THAT ELEMENT (NOR THE 6994 SCTY SQ).

4. GEN JOHN RECOGNIZED INTANGIBLE NATURE OF ABOVE ARGUMENTS, AND WHILE SYMPATHETIC TO OUR CAUSE, DID NOT FEEL THEM SUFFICIENTLY COMPELLING TO "PROVE" ANOTHER ARRANGEMENT UNWORKABLE (SUCH AS MOVE TAW WING WITH TSN LIAISON ELEMENT). (AGREED!) I REITERATED MY BELIEF THAT REGARDLESS OF NOMENCLATURE (WING, GROUP, OTHER) IT IS IMPORTANT TO RETAIN THIS COMMAND AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AT TSN IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. GEN JOHN DID NOT COORDINATE ON PROPOSED 7AF (XP) MSG (WHICH IS IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED PACAF MSG) AND SENT MEMO TO XP (9 JUL 71) FOLLOWING PARAPHRASED POINTS. (COPY OF MEMO BEING FORWARDED VIA COURIER).

COVERING
A. EVEN THOUGH MACV CONCURRED IN WING DEACTIVATION, IT DOES NOT RULE OUT PROPOSING A REDUCED TAW WING STRUCTURE AT TSN, ESPECIALLY SINCE ARDP PEOPLE AT MACV WERE NOT CONSULTED ORIGINALLY. MACV (J211) HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT MOVE OF TAW CONTROL ELEMENT AWAY FROM TSN.

B. AGREED THAT ASSIGNMENT OF TAW TO ANOTHER EXISTING WING COULD BE DONE WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE MISSION DEGRADATION AND WITH MANPOWER SAVINGS.

C. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO ASSIGN TAW TO A WING NOT COLOCATED

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		4	6		
SECURITY	CLASSIFICATION	INSTRUCTIONS			

DOC#32-3

ABBREVIATE OR CONTINUE

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY
ACTION	
INFO	

WITH A TEW SQ. CRB WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE, PROVIDING EARLY DECISION IS MADE TO TRANSFER 361TEWS FROM PHU CAT TO CRB.

D. FROM PURELY ARDP MANAGEMENT STANDPOINT, BEST ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE CREATION OF SMALL HEADQUARTERS AT TSN TO PERMIT CONTINUED, DIRECT, AND DAILY INTERFACE BETWEEN TEWS MANAGEMENT, 698A BCTY SQ, AND MACV/ACC.

E. IF FIRM DECISION IS MADE NOT TO RETAIN A TEW WING OR GROUP STRUCTURE AT TSN, DETERMINATION OF WHICH WING TO TAKE OVER TEWS SHOULD AWAIT FINAL DECISION REGARDING RELOCATION OF 361TEWS.

5. HAVE JUST BECOME AWARE THAT THERE IS LARGER GAP IN TEWS PRESENTHOOD PLANNING THAN I HAD ENVISIONED. ACCORDING TO 460TRW DEACTIVATION PAD, WHICH WE HAD NOT SEEN TILL TODAY, WING DEACTIVATION 1 SEP 71, WITH EFFORT TO COMPLETE ALL ACTIONS BY 14 AUG 71. ONLY MENTION OF TEWS IS THAT THIS MATTER WOULD BE TREATED SEPARATELY (SIG!). AS I CAN GATHER, 460TRW IS SUPPOSED TO BE WORKING ON A PAD TO ADDRESS TEWS MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY, YET 460 (DOJ) REPRESENTATIVE, WHO SHOULD BE MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE INDIVIDUAL ON TEWS MATTERS, IS APPARENTLY UNAWARE OF BASIC PLANNING TO DATE. IT SEEMS THAT NO REAL PLANNING/PROGRAMMING HAS BEEN DONE ON SUCH ITEMS AS SECURE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN NEW WING AND ACC, MOVE OF ROC, ETCETERA, ETCETERA. IN FACT, SINCE IT HASN'T BEEN DECIDED WHICH WING TO PUT THE TEWS UNDER, NO PREPARATIONS HAVE BEGUN FOR A SPECIFIC WING TO UNDERTAKE THIS NEW RESPONSIBILITY. THEREFORE,

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 5	NO. OF PAGES	ORIGIN IDENTIFICATION	REMARKS
SECURITY	CLASSIFICATION	RESTRICTIONS			DOC #32-4

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE
and/or CONTINUATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY
ACTION	
INFO	

[REDACTED]

THE 460TH PHASES OUT IN LATE AUGUST AND MOVE OF 361/DET 1, 699ASS
WON'T OCCUR TILL LATE FALL, AND CONSIDERING LEAD TIME IN COMMUNICA-
TION PROGRAMMING, FOR EXAMPLE, IT APPEARS THAT THERE WILL BE A PRO-
LONGED GAP IN TWS MANAGEMENT, UNLESS, OF COURSE, A TWS CONTROL
ELEMENT IS RETAINED AT TSN FOR THE INTERIM, AT LEAST. (11) ALSO,
AVAILABILITY OF CBB AS HOST FOR 361/DET 1, (11) TWS BEING HINGED
ON SUCCESS OF COMPASS FLAG/SENIOR BOOK OPERATIONS AT HRP, WHICH WOULD
DETERMINE WHEN DET 1, 699ASS FACILITIES COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE. IF
PHAN RANG IS DECIDED UPON, LEAD TIME FOR ST. FACILITIES, SECURE COMMUNI-
CATIONS, ETCETERA, WOULD INVOLVE CERTAIN DELAYS. IT WOULD APPEAR
INCREDIBLE THAT TWS MANAGERSHIP WOULD BE ALLOWED TO FLOUNDER DUE TO
PRESSURE TO CLOSE 460TRW BY A CERTAIN DATE. OBVIOUSLY, THE POTENTIAL
IMPACT ON THE ARDY PROGRAM WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE IF THIS SITUATION
WAS ALLOWED TO OCCUR.

6. WE ARE THOROUGHLY CONVINCED THAT ALL AVAILABLE AGENCIES SHOULD BE
USED TO EFFECT A DECISION WHICH WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH STATED
USAFSS/PSR/699A SCTY 30 OBJECTIVE.

[REDACTED]

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 6	NO. OF PAGES 6	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
-------------	---------	------------	----------------	------------------------	----------

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	DD	DOC #32-5
-------------------------	------------	------------	------------	----	-----------

14 JUL 1971 03 59

195035;ZCZCRDA145
RR YMRDQR
DE YPLAKZ 0015 1950305
ZNY MMNSH
R 140227Z
FM PSR
TO 6994/CC
ZEM

Handwritten: 94/17

SUBJ: SEA REDUCTIONS

REFERENCE YOUR CC MSG 110200Z JUL 71. PACAF HAS ASSURED US THAT PRIOR TO ANY FIRM DECISIONS ON THE RELOCATION OF THE 361 TEWS (AND CONSEQUENTLY, DET 1, 6994TH), AND TEWS CONTROL, JOINT PSR/PACAF DISCUSSIONS WILL BE HELD ON THE SUBJECT. PACAF IS AWAITING THE 7TH AF INPUT AT THIS TIME. AS YOU KNOW, WE SUPPORT YOUR RATIONALE AND HAVE PRESENTED SAME TO PACAF. YOU WILL BE ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR. BELIEVE HOWEVER, THAT IF PACAF DECIDES TO RELOCATE THE MANAGEMENT FUNCTION TO OTHER THAN TSN, THE 6994TH WILL PLAY AN EVEN LARGER ROLE IN THE COORDINATION/LIASION PROCESS WITH MACV/7TH AF. AS THE SOLE REMAINING LOCAL AUTHORITY ON ARDF MATTERS, ENVISION THAT YOUR SERVICES WILL BE EVEN MORE VALUABLE IN THE FUTURE PLANNING/DECISION MAKING PROCESS AT THAT LEVEL. WISH TO THANK YOU AGAIN FOR KEEPING US WELL INFORMED.

180
0015

[Large redacted area]

NNNN

DOC #33

ACFT MESSAGE

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO			

DTG 06 0730Z AUG 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: PSE/DO

INFO USAFSS/DO

DET 1 6994 SCTY SQ
DO

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

RO

2

DO. R/P

SUBJ: MOVEMENT OF DET 1 TO CRB AND CAC OF 483 TAW.

1. A CONFERENCE WAS HELD ON 5 AUG IN THE 483 TAW CONFERENCE ROOM, CAM RANH BAY AIR BASE, TO DISCUSS THE DEPENDENCY OF 361 TAW AND DET 1, 6994 SS TO CRB. ATTENDING WERE CAPT [REDACTED] AND MSGT TEAGUE, 6994 SS; MAJ THOMPSON, SMSGT SCOTT AND TSGT [REDACTED], DET 1, 6994 SS; PLSG REPS FROM 7AF DO, IN AND DC; 460 TAW RM AND DO; 483 TAW DO AND DC; AND 483 TAW DO AND DC.

2. 7AF HAS RECOMMENDED TO PACAF THAT THE TAW BE SUBORDINATED TO THE 483 TAW. WILSON HAS STATED THAT HE WANTS COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS AT CAM RANH BAY BY 31 AUG, THE DAY THE 460 TAW CEASES TO EXIST. 483 TAW SEEMS TO THINK THAT THE NECESSARY COMMS CAN BE SET UP AND PERS ONNED IN PLACE IN TIME.

3. 7AF HAS A TARGET DATE OF 1 DEC 71 FOR CLOSURE OF PHU CAT AB. THEY WREVISION 361/DET 1 MOVEMENT TO CRB O/A 15 OCT. 483 (CRB BASE HOST) STATED THEY WOULD TELL 7AF THAT MOVEMENT WAS IMPOSSIBLE UNLESS

DATE	TIME
MONTH	YEAR
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
2	2

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	MANAGER
	Capt Perkins, [REDACTED]	[REDACTED] 801	[REDACTED]
RELEASEE	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	REMARKS/INSTRUCTIONS	
	DAVID S EDDY, Major, USAF Group and Officer	[REDACTED]	

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	REMARKS/INSTRUCTIONS
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

DOC # 35

ABBREVIATE
and/or CO. JOINT MESSAGE
IDENTIFICATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY
ACTION ROUTINE	Major [REDACTED]
INFO	[REDACTED]

OTHER UNITS MOVED OUT (EG 556 REGON, DET 1, 6990, DET 2, 834 AD).
WE ARE UNCURE AT THIS TIME IF THESE UNITS WILL BE OUT IN TIME AND
HAVE BEGUN ACTIONS TO WORK OUT INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS IN CASE WE
ARE FORCED TO MOVE REGARDLESS.
3. WILL ADVISE.

ec47.com

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		02	2		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS	DOC # 35-1

[REDACTED]

ROUTINE

PT 89758

THE CITED CONFERENCE WAS CONDUCTED AS A FEASIBILITY STUDY ONLY, THIS UNIT DOES NOT ANTICIPATE ADDITIONAL PLANNING ACTION UNTIL FURTHER GUIDANCE IS RECEIVED ON UNIT RELOCATION. 0794

BT

#998

NNNN

ec47.com

[REDACTED]

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
			XX
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO			

DTG 11/0850 1 11 73

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ/TAN SQN BRIG ABN BVT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: 483 TAN/ENL/CAN BASH BAY AB BVT

RL

(1)

PER: LT COL MURPHY

SUBJ: FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS PER MOVE OF DET 1, 6994SS TO CAN BASH BAY.

PER YOUR REQUEST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FURNISHED:

A. IF THE MOVE IS DELAYED UNTIL DET 1, 6994SS MOVE TO CAN WITH VERY LIMITED ADDITIONAL ACCOMMODATE DET 1, 6994SS MOVE TO CAN WITH VERY LIMITED ADDITIONAL NEEDS. THE FOLLOWING IS OUR DESIRED COURSE OF ACTION IN THIS CASE:

(1) DET 1, 6994SS PRESENTLY OCCUPYING BLDG 02 BY AT BLDG 017 ON CAN. THIS BLDG IS AN ACCREDITED, FINISHED, AND HAS A GOOD TRACK RECORD. WE BELIEVE THIS FACILITY IS ADEQUATE TO HOUSE DET 1, 6994SS CDR/OPS/MAINT FUNCTIONS. USING USAFCON 86-C STANDARDS, WE COMPUTE CDR SPACE AS 130 SF, OPS (TO INCLUDE OPS WORK/BOOKS/COMM/ EVAL/MSG CONTROL/ANALYSIS/ARR OPS AND TRG/ INCREAS FEEDBACK/REPAIRING AND TRAINING ROOM/AND ARM BATTY) AS 1800 SF, MAINT (TO INCLUDE MAINT/ELECTRICAL, SHOP AREA, AND SHIPT WORK) AS 1070 FOR A TOTAL OF 3,000 SQ FT. ALLOWING FOR LATHRES, HALLWAYS, PARTITIONS, ETC, THIS WOULD REQUIRE

DATE	TIME
11	1850
MONTH	YEAR
11	73
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	3

CO RIF

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE <i>gm</i> MSGT Koraska	PHONE 427	EXTENSION
	APPROVED NAME AND TITLE LT COL MURPHY, USAF		
	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS		

DOC#38

ABBREVIATED SUMMARY
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DATE
ACTION ROUTINE	MAJ EDDY	NOV 1971
INFO		

THE 3,200 SQ FT BLDG VACATED BY DET 1, 6990SS.

(2) IN THE AREA OF COMPS, WE NEED MINIMUM OF 915 SQ FT. REQUEST APPROPRIATE SPACE WITHIN THE SI SECURE AREA BE IDENTIFIED TO HOUSE THE COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY.

21
(3) ASSUMING THE ABOVE FUNCTIONS ARE PLACED IN EXISTING SI AREA PRESENTLY OCCUPIED BY DET 1, 6990SS, THIS LEAVES ONLY SUPPLY AND THE GSN/ADMIN FUNCTIONS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR. DET 1, 6990SS PRESENTLY HAS AN AGREEMENT WITH 595TH TO USE SPACE WITHIN THEIR AREA NEXT TO BLDG 317 FOR BRIEFINGS, ETC.,. ASSUMING THAT THE 361ST WILL TAKE OVER THESE BUILDINGS (NR 312 AND 311) POSSIBLY WE COULD WORK OUT AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY DET 1, 6990SS COULD LOCATE THE GSN/ADMIN FUNCTIONS (160 SF) IN ONE OF THE EXISTING OFFICE AREAS AND ALSO THE SUPPLY FUNCTION (800SF) IN THE BOTTOM FLOOR OF ONE OF THESE BUILDINGS. IF THIS COULD BE ARRANGED, THE ONLY ITEMS LEFT TO RESOLVE ARE BILLETING, TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT, AIR TIE-UP SUPPORT ETC.

22
B. IF THE MOVE IS FORCED BEFORE DET 1, 6990SS CAN BE DEACTIVATED, O/A 1 NOV 71, THEN WE MUST HAVE SI FACILITIES AVAILABLE AT CRE TO ACCOMMODATE DET 1, 6990SS PRIOR TO START OF THE MOVE; DET 1, 6990SS FACILITIES ARE NOT ADEQUATE FOR A CONSOLIDATED DET 1, 6990SS/DET 1, 6990SS OPERATIONS. BASED ON USARV 26-8, WE COMPUTE

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	3		
				REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS	DOC # 38-1

ABBREVIATED MESSAGE
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	
ACTION ROUTINE	NAI E	
INFO		

OUR NEEDS FOR A NEW AREA AS FOLLOWS:

OPS/ADM SCTY/COMM	-	3090 SF
CDR/ADM/GSU	-	450 SF
MAINT/SUPPLY	-	1870 SF
TOTAL	-	5370 SF

1. THE 5,370 SF IS IN ADDITION TO THE 1,200 SF PRESENTLY OCCUPIED BY DET 1, 6990SS WHICH WILL STILL BE IN OPERATION IF THE MOVE TAKES PLACE PRIOR TO DET 1, 6990SS DEACTIVATION.

2. AS PREVIOUSLY STATED BILLING REQUIREMENTS FOR 130 PERSONNEL, (84 OF WHICH ARE AUTH AIR COND QTRS), IS ALSO REQUIRED. GP-4



CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		3	3		
				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	DOC#38-2

ADMINISTRATIVE MESSAGE
and/or CONTINUATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY
ACTION ROUTINE	Maj Boly
INFO	

TASKING DURING THIS PERIOD OF PERHAPS 5 SORTIES PER DAY.

3. WE POINTED OUT THAT THE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED RELOCATION DATE OF 31 OCT WAS NECESSARILY CONTINGENT ON DEACTIVATION OF DET 1, 699088 ON TARGET (1 NOV 71) IF, FACILITIES OF THIS UNIT WERE TO BE UTILIZED BY DET 1, 6994SS. IN VIEW OF THIS CONTINGENCY, IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE ACTUAL DATE FOR RELOCATION COULD BETTER BE DETERMINED AT A LATER TIME AS OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS BECOME KNOWN. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES A "Y" TARGET DATE WAS ESTABLISHED AS THE EARLIEST PRACTICAL COMPLETION OF 5 AIRCRAFT RELOCATE.

4. THE 6994SS WAS TASKED TO IDENTIFY DET 1 COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS. ADDITIONALLY, 7AF (CR) AND 483 TAW (INL) REQUESTED THAT 6994SS PROVIDE FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS IN CONSIDERATION OF DET 1, 699088 MOVE/NO-MOVE OR SLIPPAGE CONTINGENCIES.

5. THE 483 TAW REPRESENTATIVE WAS ADVISED THAT DELAYING FOR APPROXIMATELY 130, (84 REQUIRING AIR CONDITIONED QUARTERS), DET 1 PERSONNEL WOULD BE REQUIRED. HE WAS ALSO ADVISED THAT FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE FORWARDED ASAP. THESE FIGURES BEING FORWARDED THIS DATE BASED ON REFERENCED PFM MESSAGE.

6. ACKNOWLEDGING THE FACT THAT WE HAVE TO REQUEST FACILITIES IAW REF MSG, REALISTICALLY SPEAKING, BELIEVE WE ARE GOING TO BE FORCED TO MOVE TO CRB PRIOR TO DET 1, 699088 DEACTIVATION AND WILL HAVE TO SQUEEZE IN WITH THE 699088. TO THIS END, WE HAVE BEGUN PRE-

CONTROL NO.	FOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	2		
SELECTION				UPGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	

DOC # 40-1

ABBREVIATED CONTENT
and/or CONTINUATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY
ACTION ROUTINE	MAJ EAGY
INFO	

PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR OPS SPACE, COM'S, ETC. WE HAVE ALSO
REQUESTED THE SSLO TO DETERMINE AVAILABILITY OF VANS IN THE THEATER.

GP-3

SECRET

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
SUBJECT MATTER			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	
			DOC #40-2	

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY [REDACTED]

TYPE MSG BOOK MULTI SINGLE
I

PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY
INFO

DTG 13 0357Z AUG 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: PSN/DC

INFO USAFSS/DC/IR

[REDACTED] DO

SUBJ: SEA REDUCTIONS

1. DURING GEN STAPLETONS DISCUSSIONS WITH GEN LAVELLE, M/GEN HARDIN, COL NOVY AND LT COL MCMAKIN, THE SUBJECT OF 361 TFW/DET 1, 6994 SS RELOCATION TO CRB WAS RAISED. BASED ON GEN LAVELLE'S FAMILIARITY WITH THE MISSION TOT DEGRADATION, AND GEN STAPLETONS DESIRE TO EFFECT DRAWDOWN ACTIONS WITH THE 6994TH COMPLEI, ^{NEW} NEW ACTIONS ARE UNDERWAY.
2. GEN LAVELLE SUGGESTED THAT, SINCE A FORTY PERCENT REDUCTION IN TOT WOULD RESULT FROM THE MOVE TO CRB, PERHAPS A BETTER SOLUTION WOULD BE TO INCREASE DEG UE BY SOME 8-10 AIRCRAFT, AND DRAWDOWN THE 361/DET 1, 6994 ENTIRELY. REMAINING ASSETS WOULD BE DISPOSED OF (CLARK AB, CONUS NOTHBALL, SCRAPPED, ETC.) THESE ADDITIONAL ASSETS COULD BE USED TO INCREASE STEEL TIGER COVERAGE THROUGH DAILY (WEEKLY) TDY MISSIONS TO HKP THUS SKIRTING THE THAI HEADROOM ISSUE.
3. 7AF PLANS PERSONNEL ARE PREPARING A FORMAL TALKING PAPER FOR STAFFING TODAY. WE ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THEM TO ENSURE PROPER MIX OF AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT. PRICE SET OF PERSONNEL.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Ⓢ

DATE	TIME
13	1000
MONTH	YEAR
AUG	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

TYPED NAME AND TITLE
Maj Eddy/drs

PHONE [REDACTED]

SIGNATURE
TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
DAVID H EDDY, Major, USAF

SECURITY [REDACTED]

DOC#42

Do. RIT

ALL

ABBREVIATED INT MESSAGE
and/or CONFIRMATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY		
ACTION PRIORITY	Maj Eddy	Maj Gen	
INFO			

INVOLVED WILL BE DERIVED FROM MCR 94-70-3, DATED 24 DEC 70.

4. GEN STAPLETON AND PARTY ARE FAMILIAR WITH ACTIONS TO DATE.

SUBSEQUENT MSGS DEALING WITH PROGRESS OF ACTIONS OUTLINED IN

PARA THREE WILL INCLUDE PARTY AS ADDRESSEE. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

ec47.com

[REDACTED]

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
SECURITY CL				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	
					DOC#42-1

JOINT MESSAGE FORM

SECURITY			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		I	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION PRIORITY			
INFO			

DTG 16 0600 Z AUG 71

FROM: 6994 SCYI SQ
 TO: RSE/DO
 INFO USAFSS/DO/IE
 6918
 6994 SCYI SQ

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[REDACTED] DO

6918
 6994 SCYI SQ DELIVER TO GEE STAPLETON DURING SCYI MEETING OR DEFINITELY BEFORE HE DEPARTS.

SUBJ: SBA RESTRICTIONS
 REF MY 130255Z AUG 71

1. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN A REPORT, 7AF HAS FORWARDED PROPOSAL OUTLINED IN REF TO MACV.
2. 7AF XP 141100Z AUG 71 (TS) RECOMMENDS ELIMINATION OF THE 311 TENS IN OCT 71. CONCURRENTLY EIGHT EC-47S WOULD BE MOVED TO THE BANGOR UE AND 11 EC-47S WOULD BE REDEPLOYED. A SAVING OF 300 SPACES WOULD RESULT. WHILE DET 1, 6994 SCYI SQ IS NOT MENTIONED IN THE MESSAGE THE SPACES MENTIONED INCLUDE ORES AS A RESULT OF A MSG BY 7AF BOPHE. JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS PROPOSAL IS BASED ON REDUCING MINIMUM TENS ON TARGET RESULTING FROM A MOVE TO ORES AND IDENTIFICATION OF SUSPECTIVE SPACES TO RETAIN A TAC FTR SQUADRON ALSO DERIVED BY MACV.

DATE	TIME
16	2315
MONTH	YEAR
AUG	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

Do P/F

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	R E L E A S E I N F O
	Major Eddy/drs	4891	
SECURITY CL	TYPED NAME AND TITLE		R E L E A S E I N F O
	Major E WOOD, Major, USAF Squadron Officer		
REMARKS/INSTRUCTIONS		DOC # 44	

ABBREVIATED, GINT MESSAGE
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY
ACTION PRIORITY	Major Eddy
INFO	

3. ASSUMING THIS PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTED OUR ACTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
 - A. DEPLOY 8 ALR-35 EQUIPPED EC-47H/P FROM TSN TO DEG.
 - B. REPLACE TSN LOSSES WITH 9 ALR-34 EQUIPPED EC-47H/P FROM PFI (20 VIM UE, 2 NOA).
 - C. EXCHANGE 5 ALR-35 EQUIPPED EC-47H/P AT HCP FOR 5 ALR-35/38 EQUIPPED EC-47H FROM DEG.
 - D. IDENTIFY ALR-34 AGE/SPARES REQUIRED FOR VIM AND FORWARD RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING REDEPLOYMENT/CANNIBALIZATION OF RESIDUAL ALR-34 EQUIPPED EC-47H/P (11).
4. OBVIOUSLY, DUE TO THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS PROPOSAL AND THE IMPACT ON FACILITIES, SPARES, TRAINING ETC, A TIME PHASED APPROACH MUST BE CONSIDERED. IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE MOVE CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT SOME DOWN TIME HOWEVER WE WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH 7AF PLANNERS IN AN ATTEMPT TO MINIMIZE THE IMPACT ON MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
5. FYI, WE HAVE FORWARDED A REQUEST TO 7AF DC/XP/IN THAT THE SUBJECT OF TSN'S COMMAND AND CONTROL BE REEXAMINED IN LIGHT OF THE NEW PROPOSAL WE CONSIDER COMMAND AND CONTROL WITHOUT THE ATTENDANT COLOCATION OF 361 TSN/DST 1, 6994 AT CRB UNDESIRABLE AND DEGRADING TO THE MISSION.
6. REQUEST COMMENTS.



CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
SECURITY CLASS				REGRAIDING INSTRUCTIONS	
				DOC#44-1	

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECRET



TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE
ACTION PRIORITY
INFO

DTG 260915 Z AUG 71

FROM: 6994 SGTY SQ

TO: PSR/DO

INFO USAFSS/DOB



CC


SUBJ: SEA REDUCTION

REF YOUR DG 260237Z AUG 71

1. 7AF/6994TH REPS HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR THE PAST FOUR DAYS TO PROVIDE BACKGROUND WHICH GEN LAVELLE WOULD USE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH MACV. OUR FIGURES ON DEGRADATION OF THE FUEL GAP MISSION WERE BASED ON A 25 WEEK DATA BASE. AT THE ONSET OF GEN LAVELLE'S DISCUSSION WITH GEN ABRAMS ON 25 AUG, THERE WAS AN APPARENT DISCREPANCY BETWEEN OUR FIGURES AND THOSE PREPARED FOR GEN ABRAMS. AT HIS DIRECTION REPS FROM MACV J2/7AF/6994TH TODAY REVIEWED ALL DATA AVAILABLE AND ARRIVED AT A STANDARD DATA BASE. OUR FIGURES PREVAIL.
2. TOMORROW, 27 AUG, MACV J2 REP (COL GRASSBROOK) WILL MEET GEN LAVELLE AND GEN ABRAMS IN THAT ORDER. GENS LAVELLE/ABRAMS WILL THEN START TO BARGAIN AND WE CAN ONLY HOLD OUR BREATH AND AWAIT THE OUT COME.
3. FYI, THE THREE CALCULATIONS WHICH WILL BE PRESENTED ARE:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Handwritten initials and a circled 'P'



DATE	TIME
26	1700
MONTH	YEAR
AUG	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

DO R/F

TYPED NAME AND TITLE
 DRAFTER
 Major Eddy

PHONE

SIGNATURE
 TYPED NAME AND TITLE
 GEORGE S. MORGAN, Lt. Col., USAF

SECURITY CLASS

45

ABBREVIATED INT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONSULTATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY
ACTION PRIORITY	Lt Col [REDACTED]
INFO	

- A. ALL PHJ AIRCRAFT TO CRB WHICH RESULTS IN A DEGRADATION OF 29 (TWENTY NINE) PERCENT AND FURTHER DEGRADES VIM BECAUSE OF LACK OF ALB-34 AGE.
- B. TEN AIRCRAFT TO DNG (2 TDY TO NKP) AND ELEVEN REDEPLOY WHICH RESULTS IN A DEGRADATION OF 37 (THIRTY SEVEN) PERCENT.
- C. TWELVE AIRCRAFT TO DNG (2 TDY TO NKP) AND NINE REDEPLOY RESULTING IN A DEGRADATION OF 25 (TWENTY FIVE) PERCENT. WE (6994) BELIEVE THIS OPTION MAY BE ACCEPTABLE TO MACV.
4. SHOULD EITHER OPTION (B) OR (C) BE ACCEPTED WE WILL STRESS AGAIN THE ISSUE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2	2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
SECURITY C	[REDACTED]				DOC 45-1

JOINT MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTY

SINGLE

XX

PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

DTG

31 0950 2 AUG 71

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: 6994 SOTY SQ

TO: PSR/DO

INFO: US:PSR/DO/IR

DO

SUBJ: SEA REDUCTIONS

1. NEW DEVELOPMENT: 7AF PLANS HAS JUST ADVISED THAT JCS HAS DETERMINED THAT NOT MORE THAN 1050 OF F-15S REMAIN IN CONTROL. AS A RESULT THE 480 TFW WILL NOT BE RETAINED (REMOVED).

2. IMPACT. 7AF NOW LOGGES THE ARGUMENT POINT THAT SPACES ARE CRITICAL AND REDUCTION IN TFW STRENGTH IS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THEM. GEN LAYELLE HAS AN APPOINTMENT WITH COMS MACV ON 4 SEP FOR WHAT HAS TO BE FINAL DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT OF TFW/RET T COMS CHANGE.

BECAUSE OF THE ABOVE ACTION WE SEE TWO SIGNIFICANT POINTS.

A. THE ONLY RATIONALE FOR NOT WALKING TO ONE IS IMPACT IMPACT IS DEGRADATION AND AGE FOR F-15.

B. ASSUMING F-15 HAS PRIORITY, THERE CAN NOT BE ANY POSITION OF NO DEGRADATION OF BOMB COVERAGE. AS THE ABOVE WILL NOT BE RETAINED ADEQUATE RAMP SPACE FOR 30 AIRCRAFT IS AVAILABLE AT TFW. THIS NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT WILL PROVIDE WITHIN CURRENT NEEDS TO END OF THE TFW/IR

DATE	TIME
31	0950
MONTH	YEAR
AUG	71
PAGE NOS	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

RECEIVED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DOC # 46

DD FORM 173

☆ GPO (1969-257-001)

PRECEDENCE
ACTION PRIORITY
INFO

RELEASED BY
[REDACTED]

NOT REALIZED IN PHU CAT AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.

3. (REDACTED): WE DO NOT SEE ANY RATIONALE FOR ARGUING AGAINST THIS POSITION OTHER THAN WANTING TO REDUCE THE FORCE. REQUEST ANY IDEAS/ ASSISTANCE YOU MAY OFFER TO ARGUE THE POINT OF REDEPLOYING 8-12 AIRCRAFT TO COMUS.

ED
7
COM

[REDACTED]

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2	2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]				REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS	DOC #46-1

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION



TYPE MSG

BC

I

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

ROUTINE

INFO

DTG 30 0200 Z AUG 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ TSM RVN

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: PSL/DOX/DOB/WHEELER AFB HAWAII

INFO DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ/DO/PMS CAT AB RVN

USAFSS/XRP/SAN ANTONIO TEXAS

DO

SUBJ: RELOCATION OF DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ

REF YOUR DOX 240227Z AUG 71 (EGTAL)

7AF XPFU HAS ADVISED THAT THEIR PAD IS IN HOLD STATUS PENDING

REVIEW OF RELOCATION DECISION. IN VIEW OF LIKELIHOOD THAT

DECISION WILL BE CHANGED, SUGGEST YOUR PAD ALSO BE HELD. CP-4

Do R/R

DATE	TIME
30	0200
MONTH	YEAR
AUG	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE

(699)

SIGNATURE

Capt Purkias/drs

RELEASER

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
DAVID H HEDY, Major, USAF
Operations Officer

SECURITY

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DOC # 47

DD FORM 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO 1969-357-001

[REDACTED]

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

RR YMRDQR

DE YHLAKZ ~~0005~~ 2422242

ZNY MMNSH

R 302216Z AUG 71

FM PSR

TO USAFSS/XRP

INFO 6994SCTY SQ/DO/SSLO

6990SCTY SQ/DO

ZEM

[REDACTED]

SUBJ: RELOCATION OF DET 1, 6994 SS TO GRB/TERMINATION OF DET 1,
6990 SCTY SQ.

REFS: A. YOUR XRP 101618Z AUG 71 (NOTAL 6990SS).

B. 6994SS EO 300200Z AUG 71 (NOTAL 6990SS).

1. BASED ON RECOMMENDATION IN REF B, WE ARE HOLDING FURTHER ACTION ON DET 1, 6994SS PAD. FYI, WE HAVE DRAFT APPROX 80 PERCENT COMPLETE.
2. REF A, PARA 2 STATES TARGET DATE FOR TERMINATING DET 1, 6990TH OPS REMAINS 1 NOV. IN VIEW OF GROUNDING OF QU-22B AND POSSIBILITY OF DELAY IN ACHIEVING COMPASS FLAG OPERATIONS ON 1 NOV, QUERY IF THIS DATE REMAINS CONCRETE.

135

~~0005~~

NNNN

A true extract copy.

Henry X. Mioduski
HENRY X. MIODUSKI, 1st Lt., USAF
Historical Officer

[REDACTED]

DOC # 48

COMM CENTER NBR: 1906
TIME OF RECEIPT: 31/1045Z AUG 71
DATE TIME GROUP: 31/0150Z AUG 71
PREC: ROUTINE
FM: PACSOTYRGN
TO 6994 SOTYSQ (OO)
ZEM

Handwritten:
7/1
DO
DO
DORM

SUBJ: DET-1, 6994 SOTYSQ
REFS: A. MY DOX 302216Z AUG 71
B. YOUR DO 300200Z AUG 71
C. YOUR CC 261121Z AUG 71
D. MY DOX 092249 AUG 71

1. AS STATED IN REF ALFA, PARA 1, OUR DRAFT PAD COVERING MOVE OF DET 1 TO ORB IS APPROX 80 PERCENT COMPLETE. ALTHOUGH NO FURTHER FORMAL ACTION WILL BE TAKEN PENDING REVIEW OF RELOCATION DECISION, WE WILL FINALIZE OUR DRAFT IN ORDER TO BE PREPARED SHOULD THE MOVE GO AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED.
2. IN VIEW OF REF BRAVO, ALSO CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL TO BE PREPARED SHOULD RELOCATION BE DROPPED IN FAVOR OF OPTION 3B OR 3C, REF CHARLIE. TOWARD THIS END, SUGGEST YOU INITIATE PLANNING ACTIONS TO ACCOMMODATE TRANSFER OF 10 (OR 12) AIRCRAFT TO DANANG. DIALOGUE SHOULD BE STARTED BETWEEN YOUR HEADQUARTERS, DET 1 AND DET 2 TO DETERMINE FACILITIES AVAILABLE/NEEDED AT DANANG TO SATISFY A CONSOLIDATED DET 1/DET 2 OPERATIONS. REQUIREMENTS SUCH AS AIR-NON AIR CONDITIONED BILLETTS, POWER, COMMUNICATIONS, EXPANDED LOGISTICS (MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT), MESSING AND BASE SUPPORT (FINANCIAL/MEDICAL/DENTAL/TRANSPORTATION/MAIL/ETC) SHOULD ALL BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL. ADDITIONALLY, ASSETS AT PHU CAT THAT WOULD BE NEEDED AT DANANG SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED.
3. REF DELTA IDENTIFIED OUR REQUIREMENTS AT ORB. QUICK IDENTIFICATION OF OUR REQUIREMENTS/IMPACT AT DANANG UNDER THE OTHER TWO OPTIONS COULD POSSIBLY INFLUENCE AN EARLY DECISION AS TO WHICH DIRECTION WE WILL PROCEED.
4. PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU ANTICIPATE ANY PROBLEMS IN MEETING PARA 2 (ABOVE) TASKING AND OF ANY ASSISTANCE REQUIRED FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS.

350

NNNN

Handwritten: DOC#49

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DO *OK*

COMVONTER NO: 0 1 2 7
TIME OF RECEIPT: 0 1 2 3 02 SEP
DTG: P 0 1 0 0 2 Z SEP 71
FM PACSOTYRC
TO 6994SS/CC/NO/CM
INFO USAFSS/CC/NO/CM
ZEM

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CITE 50

DELIVER FIRST DUTY HOUR
SUBJ: SEA REDUCTIONS.

REF YOUR 00 410051Z AUG 71.

1. REF MESSAGE RECEIVED HERE TOO LATE TO PROVIDE COMMENTS PRIOR TO
CAF/ACV MEETING OF 1 SEP 71. HOWEVER, SEE NO NEED TO ARGUE POINT
OF REDEPLOYING 12 AIRCRAFT TO CONUS.

2. IT IS OUR POSITION THAT WE WILL SUPPORT ALL CRYPTOLOGIC WITHDRAWALS
FROM SVN THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH NO, OR AN ACCEPTABLE DEGREE OF,
MISSION DEGRADATION. THEREFORE, DEACTIVATION OF DET-1, 6994SS WITH
COMPENSATING REALIGNMENT OF EC-47'S TO SATISFY VIM/ACV ARDF
REQUIREMENTS ARE IN LINE WITH THIS POLICY.

3. OF MORE CONCERN THAN RAMP SPACE IS ADEQUACY/AVAILABILITY OF
FACILITIES TO ACCOMMODATE A 25-30 EC-47 ACFT OPERATIONS FROM DANANG.
DET-2 FACILITIES ARE AT A PREMIUM AS YOU KNOW. IF THE DECISION IS MADE
TO ADD 10-12 AIRCRAFT TO DANANG, WE WISH TO BE ASSURED THAT ADEQUATE
OPS/MAINT/QUELTING SPACE WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE NEAR EXISTING
FACILITIES FOR THE EXPANDED EFFORT.

4. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST OF ANY DECISION REACHED IN 1 SEP MEETING.
258

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Doc # 50

[REDACTED]

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		II	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO			

DTG 04 0215 Z SEP 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: ISR/DO

INFO: USAFSS/DO/IR

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DO

SUBJ: SEA REDUCTIONS

1. A 747 TEAM VISITED DMC ON 2, 3 SEP 71 WITH THE INTENT OF EXAMINING FACILITIES WHICH MIGHT BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR ADDITIONAL B-17 AIRCRAFT/SUPPORT. WE WERE NOT INVITED TO ATTEND BUT DID DISCOVER THAT MAJ LEDNEY WAS CONTACTED BY THE TEAM.

2. A TRIP REPORT SUMMARIZING TEAM FINDINGS AS REGARDS AVAILABLE FACILITIES, RAMP SPACE, COST OF REHAB FOR X NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT IS BEING PREPARED. OUR INPUTS HAVE BEEN MADE AND ACCEPTED. ONCE GEN BAYLIS IS SATISFIED THAT HE IS COMPLETELY FAMILIAR WITH ALL THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE HE WILL MEET WITH COMUS MACV. NO DATE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED.

3. EVERY ONE HERE, AS WE ARE SURE YOU ARE, IS ANXIOUS THAT A DECISION BE MADE. DEPENDANT UPON THE DECISION ON HOW MANY AIRCRAFT WILL MOVE THERE ARE SEVERAL LONG LEAD TIME ITEMS IE RAMP CONSTRUCTION, REHAB OF ENLISTED QUARTERS, OPS FACILITIES ETC. WHILE WE CAN ANTICIPATE, THERE IS LITTLE FIRM PLANNING THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED. WE WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

DATE	TIME
04	0930
MONTH	YEAR
SEP	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

DRAFT

PHONE	SIGNATURE
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
DATE	TYPED
[REDACTED]	DAVID

Same as releasor

DOC #51

[REDACTED]

Phu Cat (Limiting Factors - Ramp, Quarters)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
361 TEWS	(19) EC-47	In Place	
310 TALS	(11) C-123	Phan Rang	OL at DNG (5)
457 TALS	(14) C-7	Cam Ranh Bay	(4 NOA) (6) OL Bien Hoa
458 TALS	(14) C-7	Cam Ranh Bay	(4 NOA) (6) OL Bien Hoa
8 SOS MSB	(10) A-37	Phan Rang	(15) OL Bien Hoa
480 TFS	(18) F-4	In Place	Hvy Maint. DNG
C-7 Trng	(8) C-7	Phan Rang	
3 ARRG Det	(2) HH-43	In Place	

Case A Residuals (CRB)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
21 TASS	(30) C-2/OV-10	Retain MSB at CRB
39 ARMS	(11) C-130	Retain at CRB
634 Det 2	(14) C-130 ROTE	Inactivate
504 TASG	(Assign TAS Sqs to Host Wg)	Inactivate
Navy Det	(6) P-3	Retain at CRB
Army Det	(6) Variable, plus helio retrograde	Retain CRB

Case A Residual (PRG)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
9 SOS	(7) C-2/(4) C-47	Inactivate or CRB

b. Case B. (Optimistic)

ASSUMPTIONS

- (1) Three F-4 squadrons in RVN; 480 TFS redeploy from Phu Cat.
- (2) 361 (19 UE) and 362 (13 UE) TEWS are consolidated at Da Nang with 21 UE EC-47. Redeploy 11 EC-47's.
- (3) Accelerated reduction of in-country airlift assets. C-7's (2 Sqdns) would be turned over to VNAF in 2/72, remaining USAF airlift would be the 310 TALS (C-123K - 16 UE) and 458 TALS (C-7A - 16 UE).

(2)

DOC #52-2

BEDDOWN

Da Nang (Limiting Factor - Ramp)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
3 TFS	(54) F-4	In Place	
362 TEWS	(21) EC-47	In Place	8 UE increase from Phu Cat
20 TASS	(29) C-2/CV-10	In Place	43 Acft at Ols
37 ARRS	(10) HH-53	In Place	
3 ARRG	(2) HH-43	In Place	
18 SOS (OL)	(6) AC-119K	In Place	
310 TALS (OL)	(5) C-123K	In Place	
20SOS	(15) UH-1N	Cam Ranh Bay	Revets required \$300,000
9 SOS	(7) O-2B/(4) C-47	Phan Rang	DNG OL (2) C-2/(2) C-47

Phu Cat (Limiting Factors - Ramp, Quarters)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
310 TALS	(11) C-123K	Phan Rang	(5) OL Da Nang
458 TALS	(14) C-7A	Phan Rang	(6) OL Bien Hoa (4 NOA)
8 SOS (MSB)	(10) A-37	Phan Rang	(15) OL Bien Hoa
21 TASS	(40) C-2/OV-10	Phan Rang	(40) Acft at Ols
C-7 Trng	(8) C-7A	Phan Rang	
39 ARRS	(11) HC-130	Cam Ranh Bay	
3 ARRG	(2) HH-43	In Place	
C-130 ROTE	(6) C-130	Cam Ranh Bay	Reduced 14 to 6

Case B Residuals

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
C-130 ROTE	(14) C-130	(Reduce to 6) Phu Cat
504 TASS		Inactivate
Navy Det	(6) P-3	Phu Cat
Army Det	(6) Various	Move - Vung Tao
457 TALS	(16) C-7A	Inactivate (To VNAF)
535 TALS	(16) C-7A	Inactivate (To VNAF)
480 TFS	(18) F-4	To CONUS
361 TEWS	(11) EC-47	To CONUS

3. Following the move, redeployment or inactivation of all flying units and the redeployment of other units (Red Horse Squadron (400) and R&I Squadron (245)) at Cam Ranh Bay, the following activities would remain there for reasons indicated (manpower figures are broad estimates).

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REQUIREMENT</u>
Combat Spt Gp	140	Base Support
Trans. Maint.	64	Base Support
Supply	200	Base Support
Munitions Maint.	117	Base Support
Security Police	470	Base Support
Civ. Eng.	400	Base Support
Transportation	120	Base Support
Services	100	Base Support
Hospital	374	Command Support
Comm. Sq	192	Flt facilities, tower, etc.
Aeromed Flt	50	Drug abuse program
Aeromed Evac.	61	Patient through-put
Wea Det	19	Wea. Sta.
Special Invest.	5	OSI
MASS (MAC)	83	C-5
ALCC	22	Airlift Support
BX	35	
Procurement	9	Contract Admin.
Aerial Port Sq	423	In/Out cargo Hand. & Storage
Tac Cont Sq	53	Ops/Maint Radar FAC
TOTAL	2937	

4. Following are some of the impacts associated with Case A.
- a. At least eight unit moves required.
 - b. Requires reinstitution of CE projects at Phu Cat, \$1 million. Essential maintenance allowed to slip for closure, \$.5 million.
 - c. Relocates two major maintenance facilities and people (TASS and 8 SOS MSB) from Phan Rang to Phu Cat. Units are just completing move from Bien Hoa. Increases distance from A-37 and C-7 OIs at Bien Hoa to MSB at Phu Cat.
 - d. Completely saturates Phu Cat and Da Nang facilities.
 - e. Numerous phasedown actions at Phu Cat, now underway, must be reversed; e.g: personnel pipeline, facility repair and supply drawdown.
 - f. Preparation of added aircraft parking estimated to cost \$300,000.
 - g. Closing a base other than Phu Cat would require major revisions to Increment Nine troop list, impacting upon other services' list (JCS approval required). Troop list changes at this late date could make it extremely difficult to meet the troop withdrawal deadline of 30 November. (CINCPAC redeployment conference, set for 30 Sep - 2 Aug, has already been postponed once to allow consideration of late changes. A proposal now to retain Phu Cat would create confusion at this conference).
 - h. Anticipate MACV opposition to early Cam Ranh Bay phasedown.

i. VNAF has expressed an interest in Phu Cat; if the base is saturated, chance of their take over is diminished.

j. Messages at Attachment #1 contain latest traffic between 7AF and GSAF on retention of Phu Cat in lieu of Phan Rang or Cam Ranh Bay.

5. Case B impacts are essentially the same as Case A; however, under Case B there would be no residual flying units at Cam Ranh Bay. Anticipate that the Army would want to continue using Cam Ranh Bay for fixed wing aircraft and helicopter retrograde.

6. In summary, all units from Phan Rang could be located at Da Nang or Phu Cat. Under the most constraining assumptions, most flying units could also be relocated from Cam Ranh Bay. A substantial USAF contingent would be left at Cam Ranh in any case.

Advantages of Phu Cat Continuance:

- a. Dispersal for F-4s on geographically suited bases.
- b. Best basing for 361 TEWS if MACV disapproves consolidation.
- c. Solves "caretaker" vs "abandon" problem for Phu Cat, creates time for VNAF to work problem of taking over Phu Cat, joint occupancy possible.
- d. Draws Cam Ranh population down from 7600 to approximately 3000.

Disadvantages of Phu Cat Continuance:

- a. Late date changes increase costs, create personnel turbulence, requires inter-service coordination (risk of disapproval after delay).
- b. Saturates Phu Cat and Da Nang - billeting (especially for crews), ramp space.
- c. Leaves vulnerable assets still at Cam Ranh (e.g: ammo dump).
- d. Closure of Phan Rang leaves Cam Ranh with us to the end.
- e. Remote MSB for A-37s at Bien Hoa.

7. By June of next year we will be down to one C-7 squadron, one C-123 squadron and an A-37 squadron that goes to the VNAF in FY 1/73. We can also expect to have the 21st TASS and VNAF C-7 training, along with some aerial port requirements - all of which could be accommodated at Phan Rang. At the current drawdown rate we should be able to close the hospital at Cam Ranh Bay in FY 4/72.

RECOMMENDATION

8. ■ As an alternative to retaining Phu Cat, closing Phan Rang and reducing Cam Ranh Bay, recommend closure of Phu Cat as scheduled and that we begin planning now for closure of Cam Ranh Bay in FY 4/72.

John F. Nuding
JOHN F. NUDING, Colonel, USAF
Director of Programs

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE MSG

BOOK MONTH SINGLE

X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

ROUTINE

INFO

DTG 10 0710 Z SEP 71

FROM 6994 SCTY SJ

TO: PSR/DC

INFO USAFSS/DC/XR

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

(e)

SUBJ: SEA REDUCTIONS

REF A. MY DC 070915Z SEP 71

B. FOUR IR 072110Z SEP 71

1. HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO REVIEW MACV MSG TO CINCPAC ADDRESSED IN REF ALPHA. A MEETING, SCHEDULED FOR 9 SEP TO ADDRESS IMPACT OF PROPOSED REDUCTIONS WAS NEVER HELD. MACV J2 STAFF HAS APPARENTLY THROWN UP THEIR HANDS IN DESPAIR, STATED THEIR STANDARD FORCE IS REDUCTION IN REQUIREMENT TERMS, AND REQUESTED FURTHER GUIDANCE FROM CINCPAC.

2. REF(C), AT MACV REQUEST, HAS SUPPOSEDLY QUERIED DIRNSA TO THE SAME END. IT APPEARS THAT THE PLAN IS SUCH AN ACCELERATED ONE THAT NO ONE KNOWS WHERE TO BEGIN, AND ALL ARE NOW AWAITING IN DEPTH INSTRUCTIONS FROM JCS/CINCPAC/DIRNSA LEVEL.

3. 7AF HAS NOT (TO OUR KNOWLEDGE) BEEN ADVISED OF NEW DRAWDOWN PLANS AND WILL PROPOSE THE CLOSURE OF PHJ, DEACTIVATION OF 361 TENG/

DATE	TIME
10	1500
MONTH	YEAR
SEP	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE Major Eddy/dra	PHONE 4891	SIGNATURE
			TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE DAVID H EDDY, Major, USAF Operations Officer

SECURITY CLASSIF	REG	Doc 53
------------------	-----	--------

20 R/P

ABBREVIAT. JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE	Major Eddy		
INFO			

DET 1, 6994 SQTY SQ, AND THE RELOCATION OF 15 ADDITIONAL EC-47S TO
DNG. APPARENTLY THIS NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN AGREED TO BY GEN
ABRAMS AND LAVELLE.

4. WILL FORWARD 7AF MSG AND ADDITIONAL INFO AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

ec47.com

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	2		
SECURITY				REGARDING INST	3-1

DD

WHICH MAY BE USED.

15 SEP 55

75
12

ZCZCRDE 171
RR YAKOC
DE YAKOC 254 25315
ZNY
S 150000Z SEP 55
FM JTF 2 6904SOTY 30
TO 6904 SOTYSO/DO/DY
ZEV

SUBJ: RESUPPLY OF A/C

1. ACCORDING TO THE LATEST INFORMAL WORD FROM UR HQ, MACV PLANS TO HAVE A TOTAL OF 32 ALR-34-35-37 EQUIPPED EC-47 AC AT THIS UNIT.
2. 362 TSN AND 365 TFW RECEIVED A MSG 14 SEP 55 FROM 7AF WHICH DIRECTED THEM TO PREPARE TO SEND TWO EC-47(C) MAXI AND THREE EC-47(C)

ALR-35 A/C TO WKP ON A TOY BASIS AND PREPARE TO RECEIVE (TOY FROM TSN) FIVE EC-47(N)/ALR-35 A/C. NO OTHER TRANSFER (CROSS OR TOY) WAS INVOLVED. IN DISCUSSION WITH THE 366TFW/DY THE QUESTION OF TSN PULLING PHASE ON THE A/C TOY FROM THEM CAME UP AND WAS REFERRED BACK TO 7AF ON THE SUBJECT OF PREPOSITIONING OF SPARES AT WKP. THE WING HERE INDICATED INSUFFICIENT R-2002 ENGINE SPARES EXIST TO SEND ENGINES TO WKP. I INDICATED THAT NO ALR-35 SPARES WERE IN PLACE AT WKP.

3. IT APPEARED FROM CONVERSATIONS THAT THE 7TH AF PLAN IN PARA 2 WOULD HAVE THE 7TH AF WISHES THAT EC-47 ASSETS IN COUNTRY BE REDUCED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. APPARENTLY SPARE ASSETS FROM PHU CAT AND TSN PHASE OUT WILL BE SHIPPED OUT OF COUNTRY OR TURNED OVER TO VNAF AS SOON AS AVAILABLE. THEREFORE NO INCREASE IN PERMANENT A/C ASSETS WAS BEING PROGRAMMED FOR THIS UNIT. A POINT WAS MADE THAT MACV WOULD NOT BE INFO ON CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING 366TFW PREPARATION FOR THE 7TH AF PLAN.

4. THE 366TFW IS NOT PLANNING ON ANY FURTHER INCREASE ABOVE THE PRESENT NUMBER OF A/C. HOWEVER, THE 7TH AF PLAN DOES NOT AGREE WITH WHAT UR ASST DO TOLD US ABOUT MACV PLANS. PROBABLY THE DIFFERENCE STEMS FROM THE FACT THAT MACV IS NOT AS ANXIOUS AS 7TH AF TO SHIP OUT EC-47 ASSETS AND IS LOOKING AROUND FOR A PLACE TO LODGE THE EXTRAS CREATED BY PHU CAT CLOSING. ALSO SUSPECT MACV WOULD LIKE TO KEEP THE SEAT OF A/C OPERATIONS CLOSE TO HOME AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT BE EAGER TO CLOSE DOWN THE TSN LOCATION OF 6904TH-366TFW. SINCE YOU ARE IN THE CENTER OF THIS POLITICAL SCENE, WE WOULD APPRIQATE SOME WORD ON HOW THE TWO PLANS WILL EVENTUALLY BE RESOLVED.

5. WE HAVE A BUDGET REVISION DUE ON 27 SEP 55. SHALL WE INCREASE FUNDING BASED ON INCREASED A/C ASGN OR GO IN WITH NO CHANGE? THE WING HQ HERE EXPECTS US TO SUBMIT 1955 REQUEST FOR SPECIAL SUPPLY LEVELS ON ALR-35 PARTS. HOW MANY A/C WE SUPPORT? CP-A

458
0304



DOG# 55

NNNN

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY [REDACTED]

TYPE MSG [REDACTED] MULTI [REDACTED] SINGLE [REDACTED]

PRECEDENCE [REDACTED]

ACTION [REDACTED]

INFO [REDACTED]

DTG

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM:

TO:

- A. INACTIVATION OF 361 TEWS EFFECTIVE 1 NOV 71.
- B. INCREASE 362 TEWS UE AND ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT TO 27 EFFECTIVE 1 NOV 71.
- C. REDEPLOYMENT OF SIX EC-47'S TO CONUS.
- 3. MODEST EXPANSION OF 362 TEWS AND 6994 SCTY SQDN (DET 2) FACILITIES AT DA NANG IS REQUIRED AND CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED USING IN-COUNTRY RESOURCES AT COST OF APPROXIMATELY \$65,000 AND WITHOUT IMPACTING I&M. BY COMPARISON, ABOVE PROPOSAL WOULD PRODUCE FOLLOWING BENEFITS:
 - A. PROVIDES APPROXIMATELY SAME TOT CAPABILITY AS COULD BE GENERATED BY 361 TEWS FROM CAM RANH BAY AS CURRENTLY PROGRAMMED WITH AT PHU-CAT.
 - B. REDUCES USAF IN-COUNTRY FORCES BY SIX EC-47'S AND APPROXIMATELY 241 MANPOWER SPACES.
 - C. SAVES APPROXIMATELY \$100,000 PER MONTH IN OPERATING COSTS.
- 4. REQUEST APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL IN PARA 2 ABOVE. WILL THEN SUBMIT TO COMUSMACV; MACV HAS CONCURRED INFORMALLY. IN VIEW OF PROGRAMMED MOVE OF 361ST BY 31 OCT, APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL REQUIRED

DATE 10	TIME
MONTH SEP	YEAR 71
PAGE NO. 2	NO. OF PAGES 3

DRAFTER: [REDACTED] PHONE: [REDACTED] 2366

LT COL CLARK/heb

RELEASED BY: [REDACTED] SIGNATURE: *[Signature]*

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: [REDACTED]

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: [REDACTED] REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS: [REDACTED]

DOC# 56-1

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CL



TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
----------	------	-------	--------

PRECEDENCE

ACTION


INFO

DTG

FROM:

TO:

SOONEST TO PERMIT PREPARATION OF DA NANG. GP-4.



SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DATE	TIME
10	
MONTH	YEAR
SEP	1971
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
3	3

ABBREVIATED AIR MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECRET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	[REDACTED]
ACTION ROUTINE	Major Eddy	Major Eddy
INFO		45%

OBVIOUS: INCREASED TOT AND VHT/DF CAPABILITY. THESE ARE ATTENDANT PROBLEMS WHICH MUST BE FACED, MOSTLY IN THE LOGISTIC AREA OF SUPPORT FOR ALR-38S AND R2000 ENGINES AT HRP.

3. 7AF HAS RECENTLY PROPOSED (TO PACAF) THE DEACTIVATION OF THE 261TENS/694TH, 6994TH ACTIVITY AT PHE CAT. THE PROPOSAL IS IN KEEPING WITH THE GENERAL DRAWDOWN OF FORCES IN SEA. MACV, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN QUITE AWARE IN THEIR POSITION OF NOT WANTING ANY DEGRADATION IN TOT. IN A MOVE TO SATISFY BOTH DRAWDOWN AND MACV, THE 7AF PROPOSAL INCLUDES AN INCREASE IN THE DNG FORCE TO 27 AIRCRAFT (26 UR, 1 MCA). ONCE PACAF APPROVES THE 7AF PROPOSAL, IT WILL BE FORWARDED TO MACV. AS J2 HAS INFORMALLY AGREED, NO OPPOSITION IS EXPECTED AND A DECISION SHOULD BE REACHED BY 25 SEP. ONCE APPROVED THE TENS/6994TH MUST UNDERGO A GREAT DEAL OF SHUFFLING. TO ESTABLISH THE CORRECT MIX OF AIRCRAFT SOME OF THE FLY ACFT WILL BE MOVED TO TSN (7), SOME TO DNG (7), AND SIX WILL PROBABLY REDEPLOY TO THE CONUS. AT THE SAME TIME, ALL ALR-35 EQUIPPED ACFT AT TSN MUST BE MOVED TO DNG. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THESE ACTIONS CAN BE COMPLETED BY 15 NOV AND OUR RESULTING STRUCTURE WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. TSN: 20 ALR-34, EC-47 N/P ACFT.
- B. DNG: 27 ACFT
 - (1) 7 ALR-38 EC-47/A ACFT (R2000/DNG)
 - (2) 13 ALR-35 EC-47H/P ACFT

CONTROL NO.	AGE	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
SEC	ON		REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS	


DDC#57-1

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

PROPERTY OF THE COMMUNICATION CENTER

Filed
320
HS

SECURITY



TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

I

PRECEDENCE

ACTION SCOTTIES

INFO

DTG 160110 Z SEP 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: 6994 SGTI SQ/DORT/MESSROOM

DET 1 6994 SGTI SQ

DET 2 6994 SGTI SQ

DET 3 6994 SGTI SQ

DO

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS



SUBJ: CURRENT PLANNING

1. DURING THE PAST FEW MONTHS, AND IN PARTICULAR THE TIME SINCE GEN STAPLETON'S VISIT, WE HAVE BEEN QUITE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN PLANNING WITH WAF/MAGY/PER IN AREAS DIRECTLY AFFECTING THE ARCV POSTURE IN SEA. PORTIONS OF THESE PLANS HAVE BEEN PASSED ON IN ALL OR PART DURING VISITS BY LT COL NOMAKIN AND PERSONNEL OF MY STAFF. WHILE VERY LITTLE HAS BEEN FINALIZED IT IS APPROPRIATE TO ADVISE YOU OF THESE ACTIONS UNDERWAY AND TO BRING UP UP TO SPEED AS WE SEE IT NOW.

2. IN AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE THE AF ARCV COVERAGE IN LAOS, OUR FIRST ACTION INVOLVES THE SHUFFLE OF HCP ASSETS. AS YOU ARE AWARE YOU CURRENTLY HAS 5 ALB-35 EQUIPPED AIRCRAFT TBT TO HCP. IN ACTION TO BE COMPLETED BY 15 OCT, THESE FIVE AIRCRAFT WILL BE TRADED WITH 5 FROM HNG, 2 ALB-38S AND 3 ALB-35S. THE BENEFITS FROM SUCH A MOVE ARE

DATE	TIME
16	0900
MONTH	YEAR
SEP	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE

SIGNATURE

DRAFTER

Major Kddy/drs

4801

RELEASER

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

DAVID N SNEY, Major, USAF
Operations Officer

SE

REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS

57

ABBREVIATED INT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECRET [REDACTED]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	[REDACTED]
ACTION ROUTING INFO	Major Eddy	Major Eddy 4094

- (3) 7 ALR-34 EC-47H/P ACFT
0. REF: 2 ALR-38, 3 ALR-35 EC-47C ACFT (RECOGNIC)
4. AS THE YEAR PROGRESSES, WE CAN FORESEE MANY OTHER DRAWDOWN ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT OCCUR. FOR EXAMPLE:
- A. THE VIM TRAINING PROGRAM HAS BEEN QUITE SUCCESSFUL. BY DECEMBER ARVN OPERATORS WILL BE MANNING 9-10 SORTIES A DAY. 6994TH DORT PARTICIPATION WILL BE LIMITED TO 2-3 SORTIES AND A REORGANIZATION OF THE SQUADRON COULD RESULT IN MANPOWER SAVINGS.
 - B. RETAINING THREE ARDP SYSTEMS AT DMG IS IMPRACTICAL. AS SOON AS A RELAXATION OF MACV POLICY IS SEEN, WE WILL PROPOSE ELIMINATION OF THE SEVEN ALR-34 EQUIPPED ACFT, THEREBY REDUCING DMG TO 20 UE.
5. ONE QUESTION IMMEDIATELY RAISED IS ONE OF ADMING TO DISPEL ANY NUMBERS, IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT THE SQUADRON IS UNDERMANDED IN SEVERAL CRITICAL AFSCS. WHILE THE DRAWDOWN WOULD APPEAR TO RELEASE PERSONNEL FROM THEIR TOURS, WE DO NOT ENVISION ANY EXTENSIVE CURTAILMENT OR DEMOS ROLLBACK AT THOSE UNITS INVOLVED. MANPOWER ACTIONS WILL BE INITIATED AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER DECISIONS ARE MADE TO PRECLUDE EXTENSIVE OVER MANNING THEREBY KEEPING WORKLOADS AS CONSTANT AS POSSIBLE.
6. IT BECOMES VERY OBVIOUS FROM THE ABOVE THAT THE FACE OF THE SITUATION IS CHANGING. THERE WILL BE A MULTITUDE OF EVENTS REQUIRING

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	INITIALS
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION							[REDACTED]

DOC # 57-2

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DATE	TIME
ACTION ROUTINE	Major Eddy [REDACTED]	Major Eddy [REDACTED]	1890
INFO			

[REDACTED]

SHORT LEAD TIME ACTIONS SUCH AS PERSONNEL/EQUIPMENT RELOCATION,
 NEW TASKING TO ADJUST TO AND CHANGES IN ANALYTICAL AND REPORTING
 PROCEDURES. IT MUST BE OUR GOAL TO ACCOMPLISH ALL ACTIONS WITH
 MINIMUM MISSION DEGRADATION AND PERSONAL HARDSHIPS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS		
[REDACTED]			[REDACTED] DOC#57-3		

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

320
728

SECUR



TYPE MSG BOOK MULTI SINGLE

ACTION INFO

DTG 27 0655 Z SEP 71

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: 6994 SCYSSG

TO: PBR/DOR/AR/DP/DK

INFO DET 2 6994 SCY SS/DO/DP/DK

USAFSS/XRM/DOR/DP/DK

Do DHE [initials]
DI [initials]
Dm [initials]
cc Will see [initials]



DO

SUBJ: PROPOSED MANNING FOR 6994 SS AND DET 2, 6994 SS

ICM 150730Z SEP 71, SUBJ: SS REDUCTIONS

2. ICM 150635Z SEP 71, SUBJ: EC-47 TRANSFER

1. WE HAVE COMPLETED TENTATIVE PLANS FOR REALIGNING PERSONNEL AT 6994SS AND DET 2, 6994 SS BASED ON DECISION TO PLACE 26 EC-47 US AND 1 BOM AT DANANG. FORMAL MCR ACTION WILL BE INITIATED BY ALCON AND GENERALLY AGREED AND THE DANANG US PLACEMENT IS TOTALLY APPROVED.

2. DURING DEC 71, VIM OPERATORS WILL BE FLYING 10 MENS PER DAY AND WILL ASSUME ANOTHER (11 per day) in JAN 72. ONLY ONE WS OPERATOR WILL BE NEEDED FOR EACH VIM MSN AND 6994 SS WILL ALSO FLY THREE FRANCED AIR-3400 MENS PER DAY. OPERATIONAL FLYING SPACES HAVE BEEN

COMPUTED AT 100 HOURS PER MONTH AND INCLUDES 12 PERCENT FOR RMR/BRIF/

LV. FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED 6994SS MANNING. ONLY THOSE FUNCTIONAL

CODES WHERE SPACE INCREASES/DECREASES WILL OCCUR ARE LISTED. FURTHER,

DATE	TIME
17	0600
MONTH	YEAR
SEP	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

DRAFTER

OMSG

PHONE

4001

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
DAVID H EIDY, Major, USAF
Operations Officer

REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DOC# 59

★ WFO 1308-257-00

Side

ABBREVIATE UNIT MESSAGE FORM
and/or COMBINATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	GRADE
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO	for Eddy		

WHEN EVALUATING THESE, CONSIDER THE FUNCTIONAL CODE AS DELETED AND RE-ESTABLISHED AS SHOWN. FUNCTIONAL CODES NOT LISTED REMAIN THE SAME SPACE-WISE AS IN 30 JUN 71 UDL; HOWEVER, SOME MINOR GRADE CHANGES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORMAL MCR.

u/s
WE
102
103

EAU	1105 ADMIN COMM/PUB/DOC	2/72	3/72	4/72	
	R70250A ESG	1	1	1	
	R70250A SGT	1	1	1	
	R70250A SGT	1	1	1	
		3	3	3	
JMM	2630EA ABN RAD MAIN				
	A30173 MSG	2	2	2	
	A30173 TSG	2	2	2	1
	A30173 TSG	2	2	2	
	A30153 SSG	5	5	5	2
	E30153 SSG	4	4	4	
	A30153 SGT	4	4	4	2
	A30153 SGT	4	4	4	
		23	23	23	
MP	4370 SCTY POLICE				
	R81170 TSG	1	1	1	
		1	1	1	

CONTROL NO.	TOR/T	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
				REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS	DOC # 59-1

ADVERSE
 31/01

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	GROUP	DATE
ACTION	ROUTE		
INFO			

EPA	3510HA OPS ADMIN	270	372		7
	R70250 SSG	1	1	1	
	R70250 SGT	1	-	-	
		2	1	1	
YPD	3510HA ARDF FLT OPS				
	E8035 MAJ	1	1	1	
	E8035 CPT	1	-	-	
	E8035 LT	1	-	-	
	A29271 MSG	3	1	1	
	A20371 MSG	1	-	-	
		7	2	2	
YFDA	3515AB ARDF COLL				
	A20371 TSG	2	-	-	
	A29271 TSG	6	1	1	1
	A20351 SSG	5	-	-	1
	A29251 SSG	21	3	3	7
	A20351 SGT	11	-	-	1
	A29251 SGT	37	6	6	9
		83	10	10	
YFB	3510HR ANAL/RPTG/TECH SUP				
	A20270 MSG	1	-	-	

ECA
 COM

CONTROL	DD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
SECURITY		3	1		
				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	DOC#59-2

ABBREVIATE UNIT OPERATIONS
and/or COMBINATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	
ACTION/ROUTINE	Major Eddy	
INFO		

A20270 TSG		1	-	-	7
A20250 SSG		2	-	-	1
A20250 SGT		7	-	-	1
R20270 TSG		1	1	1	
R20250 SSG		2	1	1	1
R20250 SGT		-	3	3	2
		14	5	5	
YPG	3510HA ARDF TSG				
	B8035 CPT	1	1	-	
	E2044 LT	-	1	1	
	A29271 MSG	3	3	3	
	A30173 MSG	3	3	3	
	A29271 TSG	6	6	6	
	A30173 TSG	6	6	6	
	A29251 SSG	4	13	13	
	R70250 SSG	1	1	1	
		24	33	33	
	TOTAL SQ STRENGTH W/THESE CHANGES	221	172 ³	172	

224
27
150

30

3. MANNING FOR OCT 2, 6994 SS IS BASED ON PLANNED 29 SS WHICH INCLUDES 7 ALB-38Q, 13 ALB-352M/P AND 7 ALB-34CC. OPERATIONAL FLYING SPACES ARE BASED ON 100 FLYING HOURS PER MONTH PLUS ADDITIONAL 12 PERCENT FOR BAR/DMIF/LV. MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT SPACES HAVE

173

CONTROL		PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		4			
SECURITY		REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS			Doc# 59-3

ABBREVIATED UNIT DESIGNATION
and/or COMPOSITION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY
ACTION ROUTINE	Major [REDACTED]
INFO	[REDACTED]

BEEN ADJUSTED BASED ON TOTAL UNIT INCREASE. ONLY FUNCTIONAL CODES WHICH CHANGE ARE LISTED (AS DISCUSSED ABOVE PARA). FUNCTIONAL CODES NOT LISTED REMAIN AS SHOWN IN 30 JUN 71 ULL; HOWEVER, SOME MINOR GRADE CHANGES MAY BE INCLUDED IN FORMAL MGR.

1 [REDACTED] IE CC
ADD
↓

AU	351LAB UNIT ADMIN	2/72	3/72	4/72
	R10090 MSG	1	1	1
	R70270 TSG	1	1	1
		2	2	2
JMM	2600 QND COMM/ELECT MAIN			
	R4044 CPT	1	1	1
	R30194 SMS	1	1	1
	R70250 SSG	1	1	1
		3	3	3
JMM	2630EA ABM RAD MAIN			
	A30173 MSG	2	2	2
	A30173 TSG	3	3	3
	R30173 TSG	3	3	3
	A30153 SSG	8	8	8
	R30153 SSG	6	6	6
	A30153 SGT	7	7	7
	R30153 SGT	7	7	7

[REDACTED]

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	5			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS	

Doc# 59-4

ABBREVIATED DINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CO. SITUATION SHEET

[REDACTED]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	[REDACTED]	INDEX
ACTION ROUTINE	Major Eddy	CSgt DEVID	4891
INFO			

JNME 4450 STRUCTURES

R55250 SSG 1 1 1

1 1 1

MC 3854CA OPS COMM

R29270 TSG 1 1 1

~~R20270 TSG 1 1 1~~

R29150 SSG 3 3 3

~~R20250 SSG 3 3 3~~

R29150 SGT 6 6 6

~~R20250 SGT 6 6 6~~

10 10 10

MP 4370 SCTY POLICE

R81170 TSG 1 1 1

R81150 SSG 1 1 1

2 2 2

YP 3510 HA ARM OPS

R8035 CPT 1 1 1

R8035 LT 1 1 1

A29292 SSG 1 1 1

R70250 SSG 2 2 2

5 5 5

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	6	?		

SECURITY	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
[REDACTED]	DOC#59-5

ABBREVIATE
and/or COMBINATION

CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE	Major Ray	Chief Davis	4891
INFO			

YPB 3510BC ARDP STAN/EVAL

A29271 MSG	1	1	1
A20371 MSG	1	1	1
A29271 TSG	2	2	2
A20270 TSG	1	1	1
	5	5	5

YPC 3510HB MSE MGT

A29271 MSG	1	1	1
A29251 SSG	2	2	2
	3	3	3

YPDA 3515AB ARDP COLL

A29271 TSG	8	8	8
A20371 TSG	2	2	2
A29251 SSG	35	35	35
A20351 SSG	11	11	11
A29251 SSG	64	64	64
A20351 SSG	15	15	15
	135	135	135

YPE 3510HH ARDP ANAL RPTG-TECH SUP

A20270 MSG	1	1	1
QA20270 TSG	1	1	1
A20270 TSG	2	2	2

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		7			
SECURITY				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	
				Doc# 59-6	

ABBREVIATED MESSAGE SHEET
and/or CONSOLIDATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	[REDACTED]
ACTION ROUTINE	Major Eddy	[REDACTED]
INFO		[REDACTED]

A20250 SSG	[REDACTED]	9	9	9	7
A20250 SGT		14	14	14	
		27	27	27	

NOTE: TOTAL DET 2, 699488 STRENGTH INCLUDING THESE CHANGES IS 261.

- WE ARE CONSIDERING ASSIGNING 1 OFFICER AND 1 NCO AT CRD TO COORDINATE WITH 483 TAM. THESE SPACES ARE NOT REFLECTED IN THE PROPOSED CHANGES IN PARA 2 BUT MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE FORMAL MCR.
- FURTHER CHANGES WILL PROBABLY BE APPROPRIATE DURING 3/72 AND 4/72, BUT THEY WILL HINGE ON FURTHER DRAWDOWN/CONSOLIDATION ACTIONS. AS THOSE ACTIONS PROGRESS WE WILL MAKE FURTHER MANNING ADJUSTMENTS TO ADEQUATELY MAN THE SQUADRON COMPLEX. WE ARE TRYING TO PLAN OUR MANPOWER NEEDS AS EARLY AS PRACTICABLE TO ASSIST YOUR HQS IN INITIATING ASSIGNMENT ACTIONS. FURTHER WE WOULD LIKE TO MINIMIZE PERSONAL HARSHIPS FOR THOSE ESSENTIALLY ASSIGNED/BEING ASSIGNED TO OUR SEA UNITS.

[REDACTED]

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	8	8		
SECURITY	[REDACTED]	REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS			
					Doc #59-7

File 320

COMM CENTER Nbr: 1 1 4 0
TON: 1 8 3 7 8 2 2 SEP 71
DIG: P 1 8 3 2 1 22 SEP 71

FM Pbn
TO: 3994TH SQ SQ (OO)
INFO: DET 2 3994 SQ (OO)

BT
[REDACTED] LUX

DELIVER FIRST JULY HOUR

SUBJ: SEA REDUCTIONS.

REF YOU: 03 170600Z SEP 71.

1. PLEASE HOLD MCR DISCUSSED IN REF MSG. WE HAVE JUST LEARNED INFORMALLY FROM USAFSS THAT MR. PACKARD HAS APPROVED ADM GAYLER'S REQUEST FOR 2000-2200 CRYPTOLOGIC RESOURCES FOR SVN THROUGH FY 73. IT APPEARS NOW THAT USAF WILL TAKE OVER ALL ANDF IN SVN AND THE ARMY WILL COME OUT. THIS MEANS WE KEEP 27 IE AIRCRAFT IN SEA; 20 FOR VIN UNTIL DEC 72, 32 FOR SVN, AND 5 AT NKP. THE 32 WILL BE USED TO SATISFY TASKING HANDLED BY THE ARMY AS WELL AS THAT YOU HAVE BEEN HANDLING.

2. USAFSS IS NOW PHASING OUT THE NUMBER OF RESOURCES NEEDED FOR BOTH PACAF AND USAFSS. BASING QUESTION IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION. APPARENTLY, NVA IS THINKING OF 19 AGFI AT DANANG, 14 AT CAM KANH BAY, AND 20 AT TON. THE ONE NVA WILL BE AT LNB. HOWEVER, SINCE BASING IS IN PACAF AREA, SUBJECT TO MACV AND/OR CINCPAC CONCURRENCE, WE MADE THEM AWARE OF THIS LATEST DEVELOPMENT ON 16 SEP. NO ACTION TAKEN AT THAT LEVEL AT THIS TIME OTHER THAN QUERY FOR CONFIRMATION WAS SENT TO USAF. 3. WE ARE AWAITING FURTHER GUIDANCE FROM HQ USAFSS BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH DET-1, 3994SS CLOSURE/RELOCATION ACTIONS. WILL ADVISE YOU IMMEDIATELY AS INFO BECOMES AVAILABLE.

BT

[REDACTED]

NNNN

DOC # 60

JOINT MESSAGE CENTER

TYPE MSG	BOOK	CLASS	CLASS
		XI	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO			

DTS 200605 2 Sep 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: FSR (DOX/DOET)

INFO: DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ (DO)

DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ (DO)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[REDACTED] DO

SUBJ: SEA REDUCTIONS

REF: A. R DOX 150810Z

B. MY DO 170605Z

APPROXIMATE BLOCKBUSTER (REF ALFA)

2. IF SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF HIS NATURE ARE TAKING PLACE AT YOUR LEVEL, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THERE IS A TAP PROPOSAL IN DRAFT TO CLOSE CAN BARR S&B IN APR 72. ALSO, WE BELIEVE THAT 20 KNOT AT BANANG LNO 13 AT OBB (OR WHEREVER) IS MORE FEASIBLE SO THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE OX 14-35 WITH THE SAMANINGO 14's.

3. MANNING FIGURES IN REF BRAVO FOR 6994S TAP WORK MUST REMAIN VALID AS THEY ARE DEPENDENT UPON THE VIM PROGRAM. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK ON THIS PORTION OF THE MGR.

4. WE CONTINUE TO SMILE AND GRIT OUR TEETH WHILE AWAITING THE NEXT NEW PLAN, CHEERS.

DATE	TIME
20	1000
MONTH	YEAR
SEP	71
PAGE NO.	TOTAL OF PAGES
1	1

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	Capt. Perkins/mkg	6994	DAVID H EDDY, Maj, USAF
	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE		
	[REDACTED]		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED] DOC#61

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

PP YMRDQR

DE YHLAKZ 0011 1730215

ZNY MMNSH

P 300158Z SEP 71

FM PSR

TO 6994SCTYSQ/SSLO

ZEM

DO

HOLD FOR LT COL GAGLE

SUBJ: ARDF REALIGNMENT

REFS: A. DIRNSA ADRM 128-71 190051Z SEP 71.

B. USAFSS XRP 241515Z SEP 71.

1. THE IMPACT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT MADE IN REF, THAT ARDF RESOURCES ARE TO BE REDUCED, HAS BEEN REVIEWED WITH AIM OF MAXIMIZING ARDF COVERAGE WITH AVAILABLE RESOURCES. THE FOLLOWING WERE ASSUMPTIVE IN OUR REVIEW:

A. PHU CAT AB WILL CEASE TO BE AVAILABLE AS A LAUNCH/RECOVERY LOCATION ON/OR ABOUT 31 OCTOBER 71.

B. MACV WILL DESIRE NO DILUTION OF PRESENT EC-47 COVERAGE IN SEA AREAS SEVEN, EIGHT, AND NINE. SIMILARLY, US MISSION LAOS, AND TFA WILL RESIST ANY CHANGE TO CURRENT ARDF COVERAGE IN LAOS. THEREFORE, CURRENT EC-47 COVERAGE WILL LIKELY BE REDUCED OR MARKEDLY ALTERED ONLY IN SEA AREAS ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR, AND TWENTY.

C. A MINIMUM OF 20 EC-47'S WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE FROM TAN SON NHUT (THESE TO BE EVENTUALLY ASSIGNED TO THE VNAF 718TH RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON).

D. MACV WILL REQUIRE ONLY MINIMAL COVERAGE OF SEA AREAS FIVE AND SIX AND THIS REQUIREMENT CAN BE EASILY ABSORBED BY EC-47 (CC) AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM TAN SON NHUT (CURRENT COVERAGE OF THESE AREAS IS APPROXIMATELY 24 RU-8 SORTIES WEEKLY WITH AN AVERAGE OF ABOUT SIX FIXES DAILY. IF DESIRED, AN EC-47 (CC) LAUNCHING FROM TAN SON NHUT COULD EASILY ACHIEVE 4.5 HOURS TOT IN AREA FIVE OR 4.0 IN AREA SIX).

E. CURRENT HIGH THREAT RESTRICTION WILL CONTINUE TO REQUIRE RVN BASED EC-47'S TO FLY TO APPROXIMATELY 1430N, 10630E AS THE EARLIEST ENTRY POINT FOR LAOTIAN COVERAGE.

2. WITH THE ABOVE IN MIND WE SET OUT TO DETERMINE THE BEST LOCATION FOR THE 20 AIRCRAFT THAT MUST BE RELOCATED FROM PHU CAT ON OR ABOUT 31 OCT. BASES CONSIDERED WERE CAM NENG D LACK OF ALTERNATE RVN FACILITIES CRB WAS CONSIDERED EVEN THOUGH REF BRAVO DISCOUNTS ITS UTILIZATION).

DOC#63

[REDACTED]

3. IN ORDER TO OBJECTIVELY ASSESS THE MOST DESIRABLE LOCATIONS FROM A MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT STANDPOINT, WE USED DISTANCES TO AND FROM CURRENT PHU CAT FRAGGED MISSION AREAS TO MEASURE TOTAL TIME ON TARGET IN THESE AREAS. IT BECAME IMMEDIATELY APPARENT THAT BASING ALL 20 ASSETS AT EITHER CRB OR UBON WOULD RESULT IN SEVERE DEGRADATION OF COVERAGE IN THE MOST DISTANT AREAS. E.G., CAM RANH TO AREA 208C WOULD REQUIRE HALF THE MISSION DURATION OF A SEVEN-HOUR SORTIE IN TRANSIT TIME TO AND FROM THE TARGET AREA. CONSEQUENTLY, WE THEN CONSIDERED MIXED LOCATIONS (I.E., CRB/DANANG AND UBON/DANANG) AS WELL AS ALL 20 AIRCRAFT AT DANANG AS THE MOST DESIRABLE SOLUTIONS. COMPARISONS OF THESE ALTERNATIVES WERE MADE BY SIMULATING 13 AIRCRAFT EACH AT UBON AND CAM RANH BAY AND THE REMAINDER AT DANANG, AS WELL AS ALL ADDITIONAL 20 AT DANANG). TASKING WAS SIMULATED BASED SOLELY ON FRAG AREA PROXIMITY TO LAUNCH LOCATION. THE RESULTS OF THIS EXERCISE SIGNIFICANTLY FAVORED THE UBON/DANANG ALTERNATIVE AS OPPOSED TO CRB/DANANG (25 PERCENT GREATER TOTAL TOT-EQUIVALENT OF TWO ADDITIONAL SORTIES PER DAY) OR THE DANANG OPTION (15 PERCENT GREATER TOTAL TOT). THE DANANG OPTION (WHICH INCIDENTLY RESULTS IN A TOTAL OF 32 UE AIRCRAFT AT THAT LOCATION) PROVIDES TEN PERCENT GREATER TOTAL TOT IN THE AFFECTED AREAS THAN THE CRB/DANANG OPTION.

4. AS THE ABOVE WILL INDICATE, WE WOULD PREFER TO RECOMMEND THE RELOCATION OF DET 1/364ST ASSETS TO CRB BE COMPLETELY ABANDONED AND THE LESS ATTRACTIVE, BUT MORE PRODUCTIVE ALTERNATIVE OF DEACTIVATION AND MERGER WITH DET 2/362ND BE ADOPTED. FYI, WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY THE 6994TH THAT 7AF IS CIRCULATING A DRAFT PROPOSAL TO CLOSE CAM RANH BAY DURING APRIL 1972. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS SOONEST.

620
0011

This is a certified true extract copy.

Henry X. Mioduski
HENRY X. MIODUSKI, 1st Lt., USAF
Historical Officer

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

JOINT MESSAGE FORM

File 32

ATTENTION

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
----------	------	-------	--------

PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

DTG 070300Z OCT 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ


TO: USAFSS/DO/IR

INFO PSR/DO

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

SUBJECT: PY73 DETREMENT/SVN PY73 ADD ON

1. THE COMBINED CRYPTOLOGIC CONFERENCE COMMENCED WITH BGEN GORMAN (CINCPAC) OUTLINING PURPOSE, PROCEDURE AND GOAL OF CONFERENCE. OPENING REMARKS BY MACV REP (COL DEFRANCO) INCLUDED POSITION STATEMENT AS OBSERVER/ADVISOR TO INSURE REQUIREMENTS WERE SATISFIED UNDER PROPOSED 3000 PACKAGE. MACV REQUIREMENTS REMAIN UNCHANGED WITH FUTURE INCREASE VISUALIZED.
2. PRESENTATION BY DR JACKSON (NSA) OUTLINING PROPOSED FORCE STRUCTURE, MISSION COVERAGE BY AREA AND ENTITY, REALIGNMENT OF RESOURCES/MISSION, REPORTING, AND FORECASTED DEGRADATION, WAS RECEIVED WITH GREAT APPREHENSION BY MACV. MAJOR CONCERN WAS TWO FOLD: (1) ~~REQUIREMENT~~ REQUIREMENT FOR BASE/UNIT SECURITY (2) RELIANCE ON SCHEDULED TIME PHASED VIETNAMESE ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY.
3. OVERALL ARDF MISSION DEGRATION WAS BRIEFED AT 20% BY NSA BASED ON SIX MONTH REVIEW OF FIX RATE. EXPANSION OF DEGRADATION REVIEW INTO



DATE	TIME
MONTH	1500
POST NO.	NO. OF PAGES
	3

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
		4891	<i>[Signature]</i>
	TYPED NAME AND TITLE		

SECURITY CLASS

DOC # 64

ABBREVIATED UNIT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	CLASSIFIED BY	FORM
ACTION PRIORITY			1581
INFO			

AREA OF TOT INCREASED FIGURE SLIGHTLY. PROJECTED LEVEL OF TASKING IS 194 MSNS/WEEK.

4. ALTHOUGH NSA PRESENTS ADF RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION AS 19 AT DANANG, 13 AT TSN, REALIGNMENT IN VIEW OF TASKING, VIMP ASSUMPTION OF 20 ACFT AT 75% TASKING, AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION AND AGE RESTRAINTS IS FULLY SANCTIONED COMMENSURATE WITH 7AF BEDDOWN CAPABILITY. THEREFORE PROPOSE FOLLOWING: *ARE UNDERTAKEN*

- TSN (6) ALR-34 5CG/1Z
- DNG (7) ALR-34 6CG/1Z
- (13) ALR-35Z
- (7) ALR-38Z
- NKP (2) ALR-38Z
- (3) ALR-35Z

5. IN AREA OF VIM TURNOVER, 7AF SUBPACED NEW FIGURE OF 23 VICE 20. 7AF 250625Z SEP 71 MSG TO PACAF/DMX ATTN: MR TOLLESTRUP, PROPOSED TURNOVER OF 23 HC-47 (ALR-34): 20 UE, 2 NOA, 1 ATTRITION. FURTHER STATE THIS TO BE IN CONCERT WITH OSD PROJECT 781-782, VIETNAMESE LOGISTICS DIRECTIVE, ANNEX R. NSA WAS UNWARE OF INCREASE.

6. GEN POTTS WAS BRIEFED ON CONFERENCE PROPOSALS/FINDINGS. REACTION WAS IN THE AREA OF CAVEAT PROGRAMS - VIM, ASA/AKVN SIDESADDLE AT NHA TRANG/PLEIKU AND CAN THO, ACRP PROGRAMS FLAG/BOOK. MAIN INTENT

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	3		
CLASSIFICATION				ACTIONS	

DOC #64-1

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	[REDACTED]	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION PRIORITY	[REDACTED]		4891
INFO	[REDACTED]		

IS TO MAINTAIN US RESOURCES TO COVER POSSIBLE FAILURE OF TURNOVER PROGRAM.
7. GEN ABRAMS WILL BE BRIEFED BY POTTS SHORTLY. AWAITING FURTHER DISPOSITION. WILL SUBMIT FINAL REPORT, IF AVAILABLE, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FOR HAWAII 9 OCT 71. BENSON/BERG SENDS.

ALL CALLS

ec47.com

[REDACTED]

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[REDACTED]		3	3		
SECURITY	[REDACTED]	REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS			
		DOC #64-2			

JOINT MESSAGE

SECURITY [REDACTED]

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO

DTG 08 0750 Z OCT 71

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: 6994 SCTY BQ

TO: PSR/DC/DP

USAFSS/DC/IR/DP

[REDACTED] DC/DP

SUBJ: MANNING FOR 6994SS AND DET 2, 6994SS

REFS: A. NY DO 170655Z SEP 71

B. PSR DOX 180210Z SEP 71, SUBJ: SEA REDUCTIONS (NOTAL)

C. 7AF XP 020345Z OCT 71

D. NY CC/DP 280400Z SEP 71, SUBJ: SEA ASSEN PREFERENCE (NOTAL PSR)

E. CINCPAC 030451Z OCT 71 (PASSED IN PSR DOX 070310Z OCT 71)

1. REF ALPHA OFFERED PROPOSED MANNING OF 6994SS UNITS, PREDICATED ON PHU CAT CLOSURE, FOR STUDY. REF BRAVO DEFERRED DECISION UNTIL FURTHER GUIDANCE WAS AVAILABLE CONCERNING RE-47 ASSETS. REF BIRD CONCERNED IN DEACTIVATION OF 361ST TWS AND REASSIGNMENT OF 15 RE-47S TO 6994. REF CHARLIE IS 7AF PAD FOR PHU CAT CLOSURE. REF DELTA REQUESTED 6994TH DETACHMENT PERSONNEL PROVIDE THEIR PREFERENCE FOR USAFSS UNITS IN SEA SHOULD IN COUNTRY REASSIGNMENT BE REQUIRED.

2. WITH THE DEACTIVATION OF THE 361 TWS/DET 1, 6994 SGT FOR 1 NOV,

DATE	TIME
08	1330
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
2	3

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

Major Eddy/ [REDACTED]

PHONE

4891

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

DAVID H ENBY, Major, USAF

Operations Officer

SECURITY C [REDACTED]

REMARKS/INSTRUCTIONS

DOC# 65

Do P/H

ABBREVIATED DUTY ROSTER
No. 2 of COORDINATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	PHONE
ACTION PRIORITY	Major Ego	1951
INFO	Major Ego	

TIME IS EXTREMELY CRITICAL. WE SEE NO OTHER OPTION THAN TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSED DET 2 MANNING IN REF ALPHA AND PROCEED WITH REASSIGNMENT ACTIONS. FURTHER, AS A DECISION CONCERNING THE REMAINING SIX AIRCRAFT IS STILL TO BE MADE, RECOMMEND TSM BE CONSIDERED AS THEIR LOCATION. MACV AND 7AF (INFORMALLY) HAVE AGREED THAT SHOULD JCS/JEC DIRECT RETENTION OF ALL EC-47 ASSETS (REF BGHO) TSM IS THE MOST LOGICAL LOCATION. RECOMMEND CHANGE TO REF ALPHA AS PERTAINS TO TSM IS INCLUDED BELOW:

A. PAR 2

JMM	2/72	3/72	4/72
A30173 TSG	3	3	3
A30173 SSG	7	7	7
A30153 SGT	6	6	6
TOTAL	28	28	28
YPDA			
A29271 TSG	7	2	2
A20351 SSG	6	1	1
A29251 SSG	28	10	10
A20351 SGT	12	1	1
A29251 SGT	46	15	15
TOTAL	101	29	29

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	3		
SECURITY	REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS			DOC #65-1	

ABBREVIATED MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY		
ACTION PRIORITY	Major Eddy	Major Eddy	4891
INFO			

YFE

A20250 SSG	3	1	1
A20250 SGT	8	1	1
R20250 SSG	3	1	1
R20250 SGT	-	5	5
TOTAL	17	10	10

B. PARA 3

YFDA

A29271 MSG	1	1	1
A29271 TSG	7	7	7
A29251 SGT	2	2	2
TOTAL	137	137	137

3. WE HAVE IDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS FOR PCS BASED ON MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND INHL PREFERENCES. PRIOR TO TAKING ANY FURTHER ACTION, WE REQUIRE USAFSS GUIDANCE ON RETAINABILITY REQUIRED FOR PCS MOVES. WE CAN THEN PROVIDE NAMES OF PERSONNEL TO COMMAND, OBTAIN AAN/TED DATA FROM THEM, AND PUBLISH PCS ORDERS.

4. REQUEST IMMEDIATE DECISION ON OUR PROPOSED ACTIONS CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT WE HAVE LESS THAN THREE WEEKS BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF DEPT AND PERSONNEL RELOCATION



CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		3	3		
SECURITY CLASS	REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				DOC #65-2



201
17
320
JAN
-9 OCT 1971 10 58

DM
KAC

C
RW
2:21034
2:21036
2:2103;
2:21030
2:217427 OZ ORD 9042RDM4 39
OO YMRD CR
DE YMRDZC 2017 202 1050
ZNY MANSB
O R 090901Z ZYH OCT 71
FM DET 2 6994 SOTY SQ
TO PSR (OO/DM)
INFO 6994 SOTY SQ (OO/DO/DM)
DET 1-6994 SOTY SQ (OO)
ZEM

SECTION ONE OF THREE CO
UEJ: STATUS OF DET 2 EXPANSION.

1. IN RESPONSE TO PSR MSG DOR 081850Z OCT AND TO ADVISE YOU OF CURRENT HAPPENINGS AT DA NANG REGARDING 362 TEWS AND DET 2 EXPANSION, AM SUBMITTING THIS WRAP-UP.

A. CONSTRUCTION. WITH 7AF APPROVAL OF THE CONSTRUCTION PROJECT, RED HORSE IS BACK ON THE JOB. REVETMENTS ARE BEING CONSTRUCTED; TWO BEING MODIFIED TO ACCEPT SINGAPORE SHELTERS TO BE USED AS PHASE DOCKS. RED HORSE IS ALSO LAYING OUT FRAMEWORK TO POUR FOUNDATIONS FOR TEWS OPS, LIFE SUPPORT, AND DET 2 BRAVO MAINTENANCE SHOP (TEN-FOOT ADDITION TO PRESENT BUILDING). IN ADDITION, THRU SELF-HELP, WE ARE HOOKING UP A FIVE-TON AIR CONDITIONER TO THE MAINTENANCE BUILDING--THE UNIT WAS ONE BROUGHT IN FROM THE PLEIKU MOVE. THE THREE 30X20 EACH MODULUX UNITS TO BE PLACED ADJACENT TO THE NORTH AND EAST SIDES OF THE PRESENT OPS BUILDING WERE SHIPPED FROM TAN SON NHUT ON 3 OCTOBER. FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT THESE WILL BE PLACED AS FAR AWAY FROM THE FENCE AS POSSIBLE-- ABOUT 25 FEET BETWEEN THE FENCE AND THE BUILDINGS.

B. LIVING QUARTERS. THERE ARE 22 QUONSET HUTS (PREVIOUSLY USED BY MARINE WARRANT OFFICER'S UNTIL LAST MARCH) AVAILABLE TO US PLUS TWO COMMUNITY LATRINES. PHIL CO-FORD CONTRACTOR IS PRESENTLY SHAPING THEM UP. EACH QUONSET IS DIVIDED INTO 4 (FOUR) INDIVIDUAL ROOMS WITH ENTRANCES, NO INNER CONNECTING DOORS. EACH ROOM CAN HOUSE TWO PERSONS. AIR CONDITIONING SPACES ARE PROVIDED FOR ONE UNIT ON EACH END OF EACH QUONSET, EACH UNIT COOLING TWO ROOMS. I HAVE SUBMITTED A WORK ORDER TO BRIDGE A LARGE DRAINAGE DITCH WHICH SEPARATES THE PRESENT COMPOUND FROM THE QUONSET AREA. THIS IS ALSO NECESSARY TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO A RENOVATED DINING HALL WHICH IS TO OPEN SOON IN THE CAMP SWAMPY (QUONSET) AREA. Dec # 66



[REDACTED]

C. TRANSPORTATION. I SUBMITTED REQUEST FOR TWO VEHICLES, PREFER-
ABLY STEP-VANS, TO THE BASE VEHICLE UTILIZATION BOARD, ONE VAN EACH
FOR OPS AND MAINT. BASE TRANSPORTATION OFFICER STATES THERE ARE NO
RESOURCES ON BASE TO MEET TEWS/DET2 REQUIREMENTS AND HE HAS SO
ADVISED 7AF TO ATTEMPT OBTAINING VEHICLES FROM PHU CAT.

2. HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM A MEETING CALLED BY 366TFW/DOX ATTENDED BY
WING COMMANDER, BASE COMMANDER, THEIR STAFFS, 562 TEWS AND MYSELF.
PURPOSE WAS TO ALIGN ACTIONS WITH THE 7AF PAD 72-7-2. ESTIMATED
INCREASE IN PERSONNEL IS ONE THOUSAND CONSIDERING TEWS/DET 2
INCREASE AND ATTENDANT INCREASE IN BASE SUPPORT SUCH AS FIELD
MAINTENANCE, ENGINE BUILD UP, ETC. (SINCE I HAVE NO FIGURES ON
INCREASE OF DET PERSONNEL I AM USING ONE HUNDRED AS AN INCREASE
ESTIMATE; I.E., PFD 125 PLUS 25 DUE THIS MONTH WITH ONE DEPARTURE
AND ESTIMATE OF 100 PEOPLE FROM DET 1 TO GIVE ME ABOUT 250
PERSONNEL ON BOARD BY NOVEMBER.)

A. THE WING COMMANDER EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS RE MOVING PERSONNEL
OF SEVERAL UNITS ON BASE TO BEST ACCOMMODATE THE INCREASE AND
KEEPING IN MIND THE REQUIREMENT TO PLACE AIRCREWS IN AIR CONDITIONED
QUARTERS. HE DIRECTED THAT LT COOLS BE DOUBLED-UP AND THAT
AIR CONDITIONERS BE INVENTORIED TO RETRIEVE UNAUTHORIZED ONES.
SEVENTY-FOUR AIR CONDITONERS UNITS HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY BASE
SUPPLY BUT AVAILABILITY IS NOT DETERMINED. WING COMMANDER DID
ESTABLISH PRIORITIES FOR AIR CONDITIONING QUARTERS: DRIVERS FIRST,
OTHER RATED NEXT, FOLLOWED BY BACK-ENDERS. HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT
ALL AIRCREWS WOULD BE TAKE CARE OF BY NOVEMBER.

B. A CURRENT LUMBER SHORTAGE IS NOT EXPECTED TO DELAY RED HORSE
CONSTRUCTION.

3. TO WORK UP FIGURES FOR SUPPLIES I HAVE INSTRUCTED MY STAFF TO
CONSIDER AN INCREASE OF 100 PEOPLE. AF FORMS 60B ARE BEING PRE-
PARED FOR BEDDING, LOCKERS, CHAIRS, DESKS, TYPEWRITERS, ETC. THERE
ARE ONLY TEN EXTRA BEDS ON BASE, ACCORDING TO SUPPLY REP. HE
ADVISED OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE 7AF PAD AND INSTRUCTIONS TO
12 TFS. SEEMS LIKE PAD CALLS FOR A UNIT MOVE TO INCLUDE HOUSEHOLD
AND OFFICE FURNITURE BUT 12 TFS STATES THIS IS TO BE TURNED OVER TO
VNAF WITH THE BASE. CLARIFICATION HAS BEEN REQUESTED FROM 7AF.
I AM TRYING TO GET M-16S AND 38S FROM DET 1 BUT I GUESS IT DEPENDS
ON WHAT THE PHU CAT CHIEF OF SUPPLY DICTATES.

4. FOLLOWING IS 366TFW LOGISTICS ACTION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 72-7-2,
5 OCT 71, SUBJ: 366TFW/LG LAD 72-2-2 SECRET

GP-4

983

8017

[REDACTED]

NNNN

DOC#66-1

7070200713/30
00 YMB00
DE YMB07 2010 2821030
7NY VVNSI
O R 6030217 ZYH OCT 71
FM DET 2 6094 SCTY SQ
TO FOR (00/00)
INFO 6094 SCTY SQ (00/00/DW)
DET 1 6094 SCTY SQ (00)
707

Handwritten: 2157
17
11 45
Signature: [Illegible]

SECTION TWO OF THREE 00

1. AUTHORITY: 2AF SAC 72-7-2
2. GENERAL: 15 ADDITIONAL EC-47 AIRCRAFT ALONG WITH MISSION TRACKING EQUIPMENT ARE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO 362TENS/DET 2, 6094 SS. L2 WILL ASSUME SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITY EQUIVALENT TO WHAT IS BEING PROVIDED NOW TO THOSE UNITS FOR 12 AIR CRAFT.
3. OBJECTIVE: THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS DIRECTIVE IS TO PROVIDE FOR THE PROPER PREPARATION FOR ASSUMPTION OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITY.
4. DIRECTIVE FORMAT: PARAGRAPHS OF THE LAC ARE KEYED TO PARAGRAPHS OF 2AF SAC 72-7-2.
5. L2 WILL, M T 13 OCT 71, DETERMINE ADDITIONAL MANPOWER REQUIRED BY:
 - (1) DETERMINING AVERAGE MONTHLY DIRECT LABOR MANHOURS USED TO SUPPORT THE 12 AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED TO 362TENS.
 - (2) MULTIPLY BY FRACTION 27/12 TO PROJECT DIRECT LABOR TO 27UE.
 - (3) DIVIDE BY 3.6 TO ARRIVE AT TOTAL DIRECT (60PERCENT) AND INDIRECT (40PERCENT) LABOR TO SUPPORT 27UE.
 - (5) INCREASE RESULTING FIGURE BY 10PER CENT TO PROVIDE FOR MAINTENANCE OVERHEAD.
 - (6) SUBTRACT CURRENT TOTAL OF MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS IN THE UGL CODED FOR EC-47 SUPPORT INCLUDING ANY MAINTENANCE OVERHEAD SPACES. RESULT IS ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE ADDITIONAL 15 AIRCRAFT.
5. ANNEX A - OPERATIONS
- 5R(3) (0) 2. DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS WITH COUNTERPARTS TO INSURE THAT IT IS RESPONSIBILITY IS DISCHARGED IS ENCOURAGED, HOWEVER KEEP LGX ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS.
- 5R(3) (0) 3. DOX IS ARRANGING FOR BILLETING FOR INCOMING PERSONNEL IN 362ND AND 6904TH, C/M, MVS AND FMS SHOULD MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BILLETING THEIR NEW PERSONNEL. TEN OF ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT WILL BE POSITIONED IN AREA FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY 344TH'S 2123. THE OTHER FIVE WILL BE POSITIONED IN TAMCO AREA WITH PRESENT EC-47'S. AMS AND F-8 WILL ARRANGE THRU L2 TO PROVIDE LOGISTICS SUPPORT EQUIPMENT COMING FROM PHU CAT AFTER IT ARRIVES AT SA NANG.

Handwritten: DOC#66-2

7 ANNEX C - MATERIEL

A. GENERAL LOGISTICS CONCEPT. ZAF HAS NOT INCLUDED MANY SPECIFICS. LGX INTERPRETS THIS PARAGRAPH AS MEANING THAT WE (366TH & 12TFW) ARE TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS AMONG OURSELVES. TO INSURE THAT ONE OFFICE HAS THE WHOLE PICTURE, PROVIDE LGX WITH A COPY OF ALL OUTGOING COMMUNICATIONS AND INCOMING LETTERS. (NOTE: DO NOT RELY ON TELEPHONE CALLS - GET IT IN WRITING!)

B. MAINTENANCE

72(2)(A). TO INSURE THAT WE GET THE NECESSARY PERSONNEL RESOURCES WE SHOULD DETERMINE WHAT WE NEED AND ADVISE 12TFW ACCORDINGLY. FMS WILL DETERMINE ITS MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS BY SHOP/AFSC/GRADE. AMS HAS DONE SO. LGX WILL CONSIDER AMS AND FMS STATED REQUIREMENTS ALONG WITH MAINTENANCE OVERHEAD NEEDS AND WILL DETERMINE OVERALL MAINTENANCE NEEDS WHICH SHOULD NOT EXCEED TOTAL ADDITIONAL MANPOWER CALCULATED IN PARA 4F ABOVE. REQUIREMENTS WILL BE PASSED TO 12TFW BY LGX WITH REQUEST THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO FILL THE NEED WITH 12TFW PERSONNEL. THE TIMING OF PERSONNEL TRANSFERS SHOULD ALSO BE ADDRESSED. TARGET DATE: 14 OCT 71.

72(2)(C). WE SHOULD NOT RELY ON 12TFW TO DETERMINE WHAT EQUIPMENT WE NEED. AMS AND FMS WILL DETERMINE THEIR EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AND SUBMIT THEM TO LGX. REQUIREMENTS WILL BE COORDINATED WITH LGSE TO INSURE TA ALLOWANCES ARE NOT EXCEEDED. ALSO, CONSIDER THE REQUIRED TIMING OF TRANSFER OF INDIVIDUAL ITEMS - ANY CRITICAL ITEMS WITH RESPECT TO ARRIVAL TIME? TARGET DATE: 18 OCT 71.

72(2)(D). 366TFW WILL HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY REGARDLESS OF HOW WELL 12TFW DOES ITS PART. THEREFORE, IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT EACH MAINTENANCE FUNCTION STAY ON TOP OF THE SITUATION; ACT AS QUALITY CONTROL ON 12TFW ACTIONS. DO NOT ASSUME IT IS BEING DONE - CHECK. KEEP PROJECT OFFICER ADVISED.

C. SUPPLS

72(1). WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW ALL HOUSEKEEPING AND ADMINISTRATIVE EQUIPMENT PRESENTLY IN USE BY 366TFW TO AUTOMATICALLY BE SHIPPED HERE UNLESS WE NEED IT. LGX WILL COORDINATE WITH 362ND AND DET 2, 366TH TO INSURE THAT THEY MAKE KNOWN THEIR HOUSEKEEPING AND

932

7219

ANNEX

DOC # 66-3

2:21146
2:2114:0
2:2115ZCZORDAT466V3DM448
OO YMRDOR
DE YMRDZO 2819 282133Z
ZNY MM SF
O P 090921Z ZYH OCT 71
FM OCT 2 6994 SCTY SQ
TO PSR (DC/DW)
INFO 6994 SCTY SQ (CC/DC/DW)
OCT 1 6994 SCTY SQ (CC)
ZEM

Handwritten signature/initials

FINAL SECTION OF THREE CC
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT NEEDS TO LGSL; TARGET DATE: 810
OCT 71. AMS, FMS AND C/M WILL SUBMIT REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCH EQUIP-
MENT TO LGSE NLT 12 OCT 71. LGSE WILL DETERMINE DANANG REQUIRE-
MENTS AND ADVISE 12TFW ACCORDINGLY NLT 15 OCT 71. LGSE SHOULD
EVALUATE NEED FOR HAND TOOLS MENTIONED. LGSS WILL INSURE THAT
TO TFW LOS ORDERS ITEMS FOR ALR 34 AND ALR 35 "BACKEND" EQUIPMENT
AS WELL AS FOR THE AIRCRAFT ITSELF.

7D - TRANSPORTATION
7D(1). IF THE 25 DAY PERIOD FOR TRANSPORTATION IS NOT COMPATIBLE
WITH OUR ASSUMING COMPLETE RESPONSIBILITY BY (YPLUS12 TO YPLUS17)
AND PROVIDE ALTERNATE RECOMMENDATION AND WRITTEN JUSTIFICATION TO
LGX FOR TRANSMITTAL TO 7AF, IF APPLICABLE - TARGET DATE: 14 OCT 71.
SECURITY OF EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL TRANSFERS BY SKILL SHOULD
BE GIVEN TO 12 TFW LGX NLT 16 OCT IF APPLICABLE.

7D(2) (E) & 7D(2)(C)1. 7AF IS APPARENTLY NOT MAKING ANY EFFORT
TO TFW REFER TO US ANY PHU CAT VEHICLES MADE EXCESS BY THIS MOVE.
WE SHOULD ASK FOR WHAT WE NEED. LGX WILL COORDINATE WITH 22ND AND
DET 2, 6994 TO HAVE THEM SUBMIT REQUIREMENTS TO TFW FOR VMS
VALIDATION AND FORWARDING TO LGS AT AN EARLY DATE. LGS WILL
COMMENCE NEGOTIATION ASAP AFTER RECEIPT OF VALID VEHICLE REQUIRE-
MENTS.

- 8. ANNEX D - CIVIL ENGINEERING
 - 9A. LGX WILL MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH BE ON PROJECTS.
 - 11. ANNEX M - MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION. SEE PARAGRAPH 4F.
 - 14 IMPLEMENTATION. REQUESTS FOR PAD CHANGES WILL BE FORWARDED
THRU LGX.
 - 15. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND CONTROLS.
 - 4. LGV AND LGS WILL SUBMIT REGULAR PROGRESS REPORTS TO
LGX NLT 1600 THE 15TH AND 30 OF EACH MONTH. LGX WILL PREPARE
LG REPORT FOR FORWARDING TO ADM ON 15TH AND 31ST (OR 1ST OF THE
FOLLOWING MONTH). FIRST REPORT IS DUE 15 OCT 71.
 - 6. LGV, LGS, AMS, AND FMS WILL EACH APPOINT A PROJECT OFFICER
FOR THIS EFFORT. LGX IS OPR.
 - 17. SECURITY. SAME AS PAD 72-7-2.
 - 18 TERMINATION. SAME AS PAD 72-7-2.
- SIGNED BY ROY F. NAHODIL, COLONEL, USAF,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR LOGISTICS.
COPIES SENT TO FMS, AMS, LGV, LGS, TFW, DET 2, LGX.
3. MY CONCERN AT PRESENT IS TO GET A FEEL FOR THE NUMBERS AND
TYPES OF PERSONNEL ACTUALLY BEING ASSIGNED TO DET 2 WITH THE MOVE.
WELCOME ANY QUESTIONS OR DISCUSSION ON POINTS MADE IN THIS SUMMARY.
WILL ADVISE AS THINGS DEVELOP.

GP-4
738
2819



Doc #66-4

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

ACTION			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		XX	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION PRIORITY			
INFO			

DTG 14/ 00 25 3 OCT 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ
 TO: FSR DO/DM
 USAFSS/DO/IR/DM
 INFO: DET 1 6994 SCTY SQ

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

SUBJ: RELOCATION OF DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ

REF: A. FSR DGM 130205Z OCT 71

B. MY CC/DO/DP 080750 OCT 71

1. ACTIONS ADDRESSED IN REF ALPHA WELL UNDERWAY AND PROGRESSING SMOOTHLY.

2. PARAGRAPH THREE OF REF ALPHA DOES CAUSE CONSIDERABLE CONCERN AT THIS LEVEL AS IT ALUDES TO THE FACT THAT THE APPROACH ENVISIONED IN REF BRAVO MAY HAVE BEEN IGNORED. THAT APPROACH WAS OFFERED IN AN EFFORT TO ACCOMPLISH AS MANY ACTIONS AS POSSIBLE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL DURING THIS COMpressed TIME FRAME. WE STILL BELIEVE IN THAT FACT AND TO REITERATE, THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED:

A. COMMAND APPROVAL OF OUR PROPOSED MANNING (PASSED IN MY 170655Z SEP AND AMENDED IN REF BRAVO AND MY 111652Z OCT). IT WOULD SEEM TO SERVE LITTLE PURPOSE TO OVER SCRUTINIZE THIS PLAN AT THIS TIME FOR THE

DATE	TIME
14	0808
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

D R A F T	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	Sans as releaser/tec	4591	
			TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
			DAVID R EDDY, Maj, USAF
			Operations Officer
			REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS
			DOC# 67

ADDRESS AND/OR ORIGINATOR

PRECEDENCE
ACTION PRIORITY
INFO

RELEASED BY
Maj Eddy

FEW SPACES DOWN IN THE NOISE LEVEL. THIS CAN BE DONE DURING FINAL APPROVAL ON SUBSEQUENT QUARTERS.

B. INSTRUCTIONS/CLARIFICATION ON THE ESTAINABILITY FACTOR FOR PCS MOVES, IF ANY. THIS PERMITS IMMEDIATE IDENTIFICATION OF THOSE ELIGIBLE AND SELECTION BY BASE OF CHOICE WHERE PRACTICAL. PREFERENCE STATEMENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SOLICITED, RECEIVED AND COMPILED.

C. COMMAND PROVIDE A BLOCK OF LINE NUMBERS/AUTHORITY SO THAT PCS ORDERS MAY BE GUT. THIS BLOCK SHOULD NOT BELONG TO A UNIT MORE AS THIS RELOCATION DOES NOT FIT THAT CATEGORY. E.G. ^{LINCOLN} ~~ENGINEERS~~ AND MAINT PERSONNEL WILL PCS FROM TSN TO ENQ, OPERATOR/MAINT PERSONNEL WILL PCS FROM PHJ TO BOTH TSN AND ENQ. THIS MULTIFES TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL OBVIOUSLY DUE TO THE RESULTING MIX OF AIRCRAFT AT EACH BASE.

D. COMMAND AUTHORITY IF REQUIRED TO PUBLISH NIGHT NAME PCS ORDERS. WHILE NOT AN ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT, CERTAINLY BENEFICIAL IN TERMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE WORKLOAD.

3. IT CANNOT BE OVER EMPHASIZED THAT FURTHER DELAY IN A FIRM DECISION WILL AGGRAVATE AN ALREADY SERIOUS MORALE PROBLEM. IN ADDITION, WE CAN EXPECT DEGRADATION TO BOTH THE OPERATIONAL MISSION AND ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS, A SITUATION WHICH WE DO NOT BELIEVE WOULD OCCUR.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
INSTRUCTIONS				DOC # 67-1	

[REDACTED]

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

P 151848Z AUG 71

FM USAFSS

TO RUEHWHA/PSR/DOX/WHEELER AFB HI

INFO RUMHSA/6994SCTYSQ/DO/TAN SON NGUT AFLD RVN

BT

[REDACTED] XRP

SUBJ: INACTIVATION OF DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ

REF. A. YOUR DOX 130205Z OCT 71

M. MY XRP 132208Z OCT 71 (NOTAL 6994SS)

O. 6994SS DO 140025Z OCT 71

1. REF C, PARA 2B. THERE IS NO SPECIFIED MINIMUM RETAINABILITY FOR PCS MOVES BETWEEN UNITS/LOCATIONS IN SEA, INCLUDING THAILAND.
2. REF C, PARA 2C. WE HAVE PROVIDED 6994TH A BLOCK A LINE NUMSEPS FOR PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO PHU CAT. IF 6994TH HAS PEOPLE AT PHU CAT WHO ARE NOT REQUIRED AT EITHER LOCATION, REPORT THEM BY PRIORITY MESSAGE FURNISHING ASSIGNMENT PREFERENCES. WILL PROVIDE NEW ASSIGNMENTS AND LINE NUMBERS FOR THESE PEOPLE. PERSONNEL NOW ASSIGNED TO TSN WHOM YOU DESIRE TO MOVE TO DNG SHOULD BE REPORTED BY MSG FOR INDIVIDUAL LINE NUMBERS.
3. PARA 2D, COMMAND AUTHORITY IS NOT REQUIRED TO PUBLISH

PAGE 2 RUWTEJA1284 [REDACTED]

MULTI-NAME PCS ORDERS.

4. UDL CHANGES REALIGNING 6994 AND DET 2 CONTAINED IN REF B. MANPOWER SPACES FOR FY73 CONSISTENT WITH USAFSS CRYPTOLOGIC CEILING FOR SVN AS DEVELOPED AT CONCPAC SAIGON MEETING 4-8 OCT 71.

GP-4

BT

#1284

This is a certified true extract copy.

Henry A. Moduski
HENRY A. MODUSKI, 1st Lt., USAF
Historical Officer

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NOC#68

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION



TYPE MSG BOOK MULTI SINGLE
 I



PRECEDENCE

ACTION **OPERATIONS**
 INFO **ROUPLER**

DTG 16 02 57 OCT 71

FROM: 6994 30TY SQ PHU CAT AS RVN

TO: USAPPS/LI/DM/DO/SAN ANTONIO TEXAS

YSA/DR/DA/DC/WHEELER AFB HAMATI

INFO DMT 1 6994 30TY SQ PHU CAT AS RVN

DMT 2 6994 30TY SQ DANANG AB RVN

DMT 3 6994 30TY SQ MARSON PLACON KTAPE THAI

6902 30TY SQ/CHPO/WHEELER AFB HAMATI

09/DM/DP

USAPPS UP FOR COL HALLS, AME FOR LT COL WALLER. PER DM FOR COL

CORRETT, UP FOR LT COL MESTAGER, 6902 FOR LT COL ROBINSON.

REF A. USAPPS DTGS 151310Z OCT 71

B. DM DO 140025Z OCT 71

1. DO NOT CONCERN WITH MIST ALPHA AS PERTAINS TO 301/304 ASSIGNMENTS

OB. THAT OF SGT ABEL, JOE L, [REDACTED]. IT APPEARS THAT THE

CONCERN HE EXPRESSED IN REF BEAVO, PARA 20, WAS REALITY.

2. REQUEST UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT ON FOLD UNIT BE CHANGED TO 6994SS.

A. SGT KEAL, BG [REDACTED]

B. SGT HARRIS, AM [REDACTED]

C. SGT SUTTON, AM [REDACTED]

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DATE	TIME
16	0930
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE Major [REDACTED]	PHONE 3891	SIGNATURE
	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE DAVID M KEUL, Major, USAF Operations Officer	
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS		DOC # 69	

DD FORM 173 NOV 68

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH MAY BE USED.

FORM 1050-887-001

PRECEDENCE	RELEASE BY	CLASSIFICATION	DATE
ACTION: IMMEDIATE	Major 244	SECRET	1952
INFO: ROUTINE			

- D. TSGT SAWYER, CW, [REDACTED]
- E. TSGT McDONALD, RL, [REDACTED]
- F. SSGT NEASE, JD, [REDACTED]
- G. SSGT WILHELM, LD, [REDACTED]
- H. TSGT CREEK, RWTS, [REDACTED]
- I. SSGT HALL, BR, [REDACTED]
- J. SGT DOWLER, BK, [REDACTED]
- K. SSGT HASELIN, JL, [REDACTED]

3. ADDITIONALLY REQUEST FOLG INDIV CURRENTLY ASSG TO 6994SS BE ASSGD TO DET 2, 6994.

- MSGT BREWER, AB, [REDACTED]
- TSGT HEDDERSON, RL, [REDACTED]
- SSGT KANE, RD, [REDACTED]
- SSGT MAIZE, JH, [REDACTED]
- SSGT EINIG, JA, [REDACTED]
- SSGT EDWARDS, BW, [REDACTED]
- SSGT HENRY, JY, [REDACTED]
- SSGT TOWERS, LE, [REDACTED]
- SSGT SHARATURA, G, [REDACTED]
- SGT HATHORN, PC, [REDACTED]
- SGT OUELLETTE, CF, [REDACTED]

4. REQUEST FOLG INDIV CURRENTLY ASSG TO 6994SS BE ASSGD TO DET 3, 1

CONTROL NO.	TOP/T	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		3		
SECURITY			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	DOC# 69-1

ABBREVIATED UNIT DESIGNATION
and/or OPERATIONAL SYMBOL

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	CLASSIFIED BY	DATE
ACTION IMMEDIATE	Major Eddy	Major Eddy	1997
INFO ROUTINE			

6994.

TCGT HORDLE, V.A.,

SGT KESN, KL,

5. AS THE MAJORITY OF 301/304 ASSGD TO DET 1 6994 HAVE ONLY AIR 34 EXPERIENCE AND GENERALLY SHORT RETAINABILITY, LITTLE IS GAINED BY TRANSFER TO DET 2. THOSE INDIVIDUALS IN PARA 3 ARE FAMILIAR WITH AIR 35 EQUIP AND TO SOME EXTENT AIR 38. INDIVIDUALS IN PARA 4 FILL AN URGENT MANNING REGT AT DET 3. ADDITIONALLY, ALIGNMENT AS ABOVE STRENGTHENS MANAGEMENT WITH THE ENTIRE MAINTENANCE COMPLEX AS REGARDS THE RETENTION OF SGTs ORKEN, HALL, AND SUPPES IN PARA 2. WE BELIEVE THE CRITICAL MAINT MANNING WITHIN THE 6994 HAS BEEN DISCUSSED ENOUGH TO PRECLUDE THE EXTENSIVE CERTAINMENT PLANNED IN NEW ALPHA.

6. REQUEST UR CONCURRENCE AND EARLIEST REPLY.

GP-1

CONTROL NO.	AGE	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
SECURITY	REGRAIDING INSTRUCTIONS			DOC #69-2

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

P 190116Z OCT 71

FM 6902SPTSQ WHEELER AFB HI

TO RUMRBA/6994SCTYSQ TAN SON NHUTAFD RVN DO DP

INFO RUMUJGA/DET 1 6994SCTYSQ PHU CAT AB RVN DP

RUMTEJA/USAFSS DPRAO

BT

UNCLAS [REDACTED] CBPC-ASGN-R

SUBJ: AUTHORITY TO ISSUE PCS SPECIAL ORDERS

1. REF YOUR DO/DP 160845Z OCT 71. AGREE WITH YOUR PROPOSAL-
FUTURE ACTIONS WILL BE ADDRESSED TO YOU FOR ACTION.
2. REF YOUR DO/DM/DP 160255Z OCT 71 AND DPRAS 161540Z OCT 71.
AUTH IS GRANTED TO ISSUE PCS ORDERS IAW REFERENCED MSGS.
INSURE SIX COPIES OF EACH S.O. ISSUED IS FORWARDED TO THIS
CBPC-ADM ASAP.
3. REF PARA 3 OF YOUR DP 160830Z OCT 71. PLEASE ADVISE
USAFSS, INFO THIS CBPO, OF RECOMMENDED ACTION ON THESE PERSONNEL.
4. REF YOUR DP/CC 160956Z OCT 71. UPON RECEIPT OF AANS
FROM DERAS, AUTH IS GRANTED TO ISSUE PCS ORDERS: EDCSA WILL
BE AS INDICATED BY USAFSS.

BT

#3179

This is a certified true extract copy.

Henry X. Mioduski
HENRY X. MIODUSKI, 1st Lt., USAF
Historical Officer

DOC # 70

230252Z OCT 71

FM USARPAC

DE USARPAC 004-29683-26

ZNY WASH

P 230252Z OCT 71

FM USARPAC

TO: 6994 SOTYSO/00/00

ZNY

SUBJ: WITHDRAWAL OF SIX EC-47 AIRCRAFT FROM RVN (C)
THE FOLLOWING PSR MESSAGE IS READDRESSED FOR YOUR INFO.
REQUEST YOUR FULL SUPPORT OF CINCPACAF PROPOSAL TO REDEPLOY
SIX EC-47 AIRCRAFT TO CONUS AND PSR POSITION OUTLINED

BELOW:

QUOTE:

P 230252Z OCT 71

FM USARPAC

TO: AFSSOPACAF/IN

INFO: 500 MACV/J2

AFSSO 7AF/IN

CINCPAC

USARPAC/00/00

AFSSO USAF/AFIN

ZNY

SUBJ: WITHDRAWAL OF SIX EC-47 AIRCRAFT FROM RVN (C)
REF: CINCPACAF XP 190605Z OCT 71 (PAGEP USAFSS) NOTAL AFSSO
USAF

1. REF MSG STATES THAT REASSIGNMENT OF 15 EC-47 AIRCRAFT OF THE 361 TENS (PHU CAT) TO THE 366 TENS DA NANG WILL NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADE THE TOTAL TENS COVERAGE. CONSOLIDATION OF THE EC-47S AT DA NANG INTO 27 UE-50 RESULTS IN A MAJOR SAVING OF APPROXIMATELY \$100,000 PER MONTH IN OPERATING COSTS AND WOULD PERMIT REDEPLOYMENT OF SIX EC-47 AIRCRAFT TO CONUS.
2. THIS HQ STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE POSITION STATED IN REF. CONUS DEPLOYMENT OF THE SIX EC-47 ACFT SHOULD NOT APPRECIABLY DEGRADE THE ARDF COVERAGE BEING PROVIDED BY THE 6994 SOTYSO. WE HAVE NOTED THE STEADILY INCREASING SUCCESS OF THE VJM ARDF EFFORT AND CORRESPONDING DECREASE IN TASKING OF USAF ARDF MISSIONS OPERATING FROM TA SON WHUT. ADDITIONALLY, THE ORANGING OF U.S. MEDICAL FORCES FROM MR III AND MR IV HAS REDUCED OUR OPPORTUNITIES FOR TIMELY PROVISION OF ARDF DATA DIRECT TO U.S. COMMANDERS IN THOSE AREAS. BELIEVE THAT THE 27 ACFT SCHEDULED FOR VJM TURNOVER AT TA SON WHUT SHOULD BE ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT CURRENT ARDF REQUIREMENTS IN SE1 AREAS 1, 2, 3, 4, AND 24 (SOUTHERN SVN AND CAMBODIA BORDER AREA).
3. CURRENT EFFORTS TO ENHANCE ARDF SUPPORT THROUGH IMPROVED TECHNICAL PROCEDURES (REFINED TASKING, REEVALUATION OF PRIORITY TARGET SYSTEM AND IMPROVED TECHNICAL DATA LISTS) WILL HELP TO SUSTAIN AND INCREASE THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF ARDF DATA WHICH WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE 27 ACFT REMAINING AT DA NANG. ADDITIONALLY, BUREAU PROGRAMS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE TACTICAL UTILIZATION OF THE ARDF PROGRAM (BLUE BEETLE, BLACK BEAR, BROWN BEAVERS) OFFER A PROMISING AREA FOR INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REMAINING FLEET.

333

0044

DEC 76

ACTION			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		XX	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION PRIORITY			
INFO			

DYB 26/1525 8/ CGM 71

FROM: 6994 SGTY SQ

TO: PER/DOE/DCE/DM

USAFSS/DOE/XE/DM

DET 1, 6994SS

DET 2, 6994SS

DO

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS



SUBJ: MC 47 TRANSFER, DET 1, 6994 CLOSURE

REF BY 16/0730Z OCT 71

1. EBF PASSES TAF MSG ADVISING THAT RELOCATION OF TENG ASSETS HAS NOT BEEN AUTHORIZED.
2. WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED INFORMALLY TODAY (TAF BOERE) THAT THE NEED ON RELOCATION OF PAM CAS ASSETS IS STILL IN EFFECT. NO ACTION WILL BE TAKEN TO RELOCATE 15 AIRCRAFT TO DEG UNTIL CSAF APPROVAL IS RECEIVED. THE 483RD TAW ADVISED THAT ONCE GO AHEAD IS RECEIVED IT WILL TAKE THEM 5-7 DAYS TO REINSTATE THEIR ACTIONS. WE DO NOT POSSESS ANY RELOCATION OF ASSETS MUCH PRIOR TO 7 NOV.
3. FOR USAFSS/SSB. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFO YOU CAN PROVIDE ON STATUS OF CSAF COMMENTS. DISCUSSION WITH SOME MEMBERS OF TAF STAFF LEAD US TO BELIEVE THAT CSAF MAY NOT BE AWARE THAT ALL ACTIONS ARE HINGING ON THEIR BLESSING THE MOVE.

DATE	TIME
26	1525
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES

DISTRIBUTION	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	Maj. Eddy/mlg		SIGNED
			TYPED NAME AND TITLE
			DAVID H JODY, Maj, CSAF
			Operations Officer

DOC # 77

NAD015NKC012

//PRIORITY//

SSN-0045

P 030400Z NOV 71

FM DET 1 6994 SCTY SQ

TO 6994 SCTYSQ/CC

INFO DET 2 6994 SCTYSQ/CC

DET 3 6994 SCTYSQ/CC

ZEM

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL MOVEMENT PLAN

1. FOLLOWING IS A PERSONNEL MOVEMENT PLAN WHICH MAY BE OF ASSISTANCE TO YOUR STAFF SECTIONS IN THE PLANNING FOR THE IMPENDING CLOSURE OF DET ONE.

A. ON 6 NOV, SSGTS FEINBERG, NAKAI, BANGHART, SGTS LOPES, BRADSHAW, AND HIGHT (ALL 292'S) AND TSQT AUER AND SSGT JORDET (202'S) WILL DEPART PHU CAT FOR DANANG VIA ATCO ACFT. ADDITIONALLY, SGTS TUALUULUU, SHEEMAN, AND BLOOMFIELD TOY TO DET 1 WILL RETURN TO DET 2 ON THE SAME ACFT. ETD UNK AT THIS TIME.

B. ON 6 NOV, TWO MSN CREWS WILL DEPART PHU CAT FOR DET 2. CREW NR ONE WILL BE SSGTS SADDLER/BAUGHN AND CREW 2 WILL BE SGTS CRABB/MERRITT. ETD UNK AT THIS TIME.

C. ON 6 NOV, AIC NIELSON TOY TO PHU CAT WILL RETURN TO TSN VIA ATCO ACFT. ETD UNK.

D. ON 6 NOV, SIX MSN CREWS WILL DEPART PHU CAT FOR 6994SS TSN. CREW 1 WILL BE MSGT HAIN/SSGT G BROWN/SGT MACE, CREW 2 SGT SALLEY/KAMAE, CREW 3 SGTS JONES/LAVELLE, CREW 4 SSGTS N BROWN/SGT ELSLEGER, CREW 5 SGTS KESSERLING/BRADLEY, CREW 6 SGT RITOLA/SALE.

E. ON 7 NOV, CREWS LISTED IN PARA 1D ABOVE/EXCEPT TOR MSGT HAIN WILL FLY ALR-35 MSN ACFT FROM TSN TO DNG. REQUEST CREWS DEPART TSN IN REVERSE ORDER FROM WHICH THEY ARE LISTED ABOVE. ETD TSN UNK AT THIS TIME.

F. ON 7 NOV, FIVE MSN ACFT WILL DEPART PHU CAT FOR TSN. CREW 1 SSGT WRIGHT/SSGT SMITH, CREW 2 SSGT TRANSUE/SSGT WILLIE (TDY), CREW 3 SSGT GUSSMAN/SSGT ALLEN (TDY), CREW 4 SSGT KLUGE/SGT RICHARDSON (TDY), AND CREW 5 SSGT SELLERS/SGT HOUSE (TDY). ETD UNK AT THIS TIME.

G. ON 7 NOV, FOLLOWING 202'S WILL DEPART PHU CAT FOR DNG VIA ATCO ACFT. MSGT GLENN, SSGTS KOEPKE, LUKER, SUEBKAMP AND SGT ROTH, ETD UNK.

H. ON 9 NOV, PHU CAT PERSONNEL LISTED IN PARA 1F ABOVE WILL FLY MSN ACFT FROM TSN TO DNG. REQUEST THEY BE SCHEDULED OUT IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER: CREW 1 SSGT SELLERS/TRANSUE, CREW 2 SSGT GUSSMAN/KLUGE, CREW 3 SSGT WRIGHT/SMITH/MSGT HAIN. MSGT HAIN WILL ACT AS MISSION COORDINATOR AND BACKUP CREW MEMBER WHILE AT TSN.

I. ON 8 NOV, SSGT HARPER, TSG SAFFELL, MSGT GREEN AND SSGT NEAL (MAINT) WILL DEPART PHU CAT FOR TSN VIA ATCO ACFT. ETD PHU CAT 1300.

J. ON 8 NOV, SSGTS FREDRICK, OLSON, EDDLEMAN (292'S) AND SSGT WILLIS, (702) WILL DEPART PHU CAT VIA ATCO ACFT FOR DNG. ETD UNK.

K. ON 9 NOV, SSGT HALL, SGT SEXTON (MAINT), WILL DEPART PHU CAT FOR TSN VIA ATCO ACFT. ETD UNK.

DOC # 83


File
3/0553Z
137
DO
DORM
copy to DEPT
scheduling
07P



- L. ON 19 NOV, SSGTS DUPRE AND WILHELMUS(MAINT) WILL DEPART PHU CAT FOR TSN VIA ATCO ACFT. ETD UNK.
 - M. ON 10 NOV, SSGT SHARPE AND SGEAIELS(291'S) WILL DEPART PHU CAT VIA ATCO ACFT FOR DNG, BUT ONLY IF THE PLUG IS PULLED ON THE COMM EQUIP ON 9 NOV(WHICH IS CURRENTLY ANTICIPATED). NO ETD AT THIS TIME.
 - N. ASSUMING CIRCUIT DEACTIVATION DATE IN PARA IM ABOVE, TSCT BARGER, SSGT LEPRONHON, SGTS BROWN AND MACK(291'S) WILL COURIER COMM EQUIP TO DNG ABOARD TMO AIRLIFT. ETD UNK, EST 17 NOV.
 - O. SGT MEINTSMA(291) WILL BE ON R AND R EFF 5 NOV, BUT WILL REPORT TO DNG PRIOR TO DEPARTING FOR R AND R.
 - P. FOUR AEROSPACE SECURITY TECHNICIANS ARE CURRENTLY AWAITING PORT CALLS FOR DET 3, 6994 SS. THESE INCLUDE SSGTS LEIERZAPF, RICHARDSON, SGTS WALKER, CARTER.
 - Q. PLANS/ACTIONS FOR SSGT DILLARD, SGTS FLYNT, ENTERLINE, RAGG, JULIEN, HENICK, SSGT JORDAN ARE STILL PENDING.
 - R. SGT RAISKUP(292) AND SSGT BIRCH(202) WILL BE ON LEAVE OVER THE MOVE. SSGT BIRCH WILL REPORT TO DNG UPON RETURN. SGT RAISKUP IS ON EMERGENCY LEAVE POSSIBLY AWAITING HUMANITARIAN REASSIGNMENT.
 - S. TSCT CARTER(292) IS DUE IN TO THIS UNIT AND A LINE NR. HAS BEEN REQUESTED. UNIT OF REASSIGNMENT UNK AT THIS TIME.
 - T. SGT LYMAN(732) AND SSGT NESBIT(702) SSGT JORDAN(292) RECENTLY SIGNED INTO THIS UNIT. LINE NBR'S HAVE BEEN REQUESTED, UNIT OF REASSIGNMENT UNK AT THIS TIME.
2. THE ABOVE INCLUDES MOST PERSONNEL. THERE ARE SOME WHO WILL REMAIN UNTIL THE LAST DAYS AS REQUIRED TO ENSURE ALL NECESSARY ACTIONS ARE COMPLETED THESE INCLUDE MSGSTS STAPCHUCK, OWENS, MORRIS, OOBURN, TSCT McDONALD, SSGTS BASKIN, REBERT, REINERTSON, AND MYSELF. FINAL DATE AT PHU CAT DEPENDS LARGELY ON THE DISPOSITION OF THE COMM EQUIPMENT. IF THE CKTS ARE DEACTIVATED AND THE EQUIPMENT AIRLIFTED OUT OF PHU CAT BY 12 NOV, ANTICIPATE THAT ALL DET ONE PERSONNEL WILL BE OFF PHU CAT NLT 12 TO 13 NOV 1971. GP-4.
- 900



NNNN



DOC# 83-1

[REDACTED]			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		II	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO			

[REDACTED]

DTG 02/ 023800 Z NOV 71

FROM: 699A SQTY SQ/TAN SON HENT APD HAW

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: PACESTRICH/DOC/WHOLE. APD HAWAII

INFO: DET 1 699A SQTY SQ/PHU CAT AB HPH

DET 2 699A SQTY SQ/DANANG AB HPH

BY BOX #

[Handwritten initials]

SUBJ: PROGRESS REPORT, PER PAD 71-300, DEC 1, 699A SQTY SQ (U)
PAD 71-300 PROGRESS AS OF 31 OCT 71 FOLLOWS, (READ: ITEM 18, STATUS,
ACTION):

01 ON SCHED. DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. NEARLY 800
DOCUMENTS WILL BE TRANSFERRED BY 8 NOV 71.

02 ON SCHED. RAP AND REP REVISION DRAFTS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.
PUBLICATION IS BEING WITHHELD UNTIL COMPLETION OF WORK SO THAT ALL
NECESSARY ITEMS CAN BE INCLUDED.

03 ON SCHED. NO ADDL. SCHED. CRITICISM CIRCUITS WILL BE REQUESTED. A
TOTAL OF 39 KTK-3'S ARE REQUIRED TO PERFORM ALL MISSION FUNCTIONS,
BUT DO NOT KNOW IF THIS NUMBER WILL BE REACHED WITH THOSE FORTH
COMING FROM PHU CAT. ON ARRIVAL OF ALL EQUIPMENT FROM PHU CAT, THE

BALANCE OF REQUIREMENTS WILL BE IDENTIFIED FROM AFHQ. TELEPHONE
INSTALLATION REQUIREMENT IS DELAYED PENDING RECEIPT OF MESSAGE PAPER

DATE	TIME
02	1400
MONTH	NOV
NOV	71
PAGE NO.	NL. OF PAGES
1	2

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	ONE
	Majt Karaska/tec	1441

RELEASED BY	SIGNATURE
OPERATIONS OFFICER	[REDACTED]
TYPED NAME AND TITLE	
OPERATIONS OFFICER	

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	[REDACTED]
-------------------------	------------

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	Doc#84
------------------------	--------

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE
and/or COMBINATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY
ACTION ROUTINE	MaJ Eddy	USgt [redacted]
INFO		

AND DEPARTMENT OF CONSTRUCTION. SEE D18.

01 ON SCHED.

02 ON SCHED. THE ASSISTANCE IS BEING PROVIDED AS NEEDED.

03 COMP.

04 ON SCHED. HQ REQUESTED BY USAFOS FROM PACAF.

04A COMP. ROST SUBMITTED. BSGIP TURNED IN TO TMO ON 14 OCT.

05 COMP. ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE WITH HOST TMO TO PICK UP PERSONNEL BANGOR ON 26 OCT BUT WAS DEFERRED UNTIL 1 NOV. ALL OTHER INFO WAS PASSED TO TMO ON SCHED.

06 COMP. APPROVAL REQUESTED FROM PACAF ON 21 OCT.

07 COMP. COMMANDER IS PROJECT OFFICER FOR LIAISON WITH 366TH. SSGT MURKIN, SSGT CARING (699488) ARE ASSISTING WITH REQUIRED ARRANGEMENTS AS IS SSGT WHEATON (PSS).

07A ON SCHED. STAFF AGENCIES HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF ADDITIONAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS AS THEY ARE DETERMINED.

07B COMP. ANTICIPATE STORING ARCHIVING EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES IN EXISTING FACILITIES OR IMMEDIATE UTILIZATION AS ARTICLES ARRIVE.

07C RED FLAG. TYPHOON HESTER CAUSED REALIGNMENT OF DANANG BILLBOARD SPACES BECAUSE OF SEVERE DAMAGE TO ON-BASE QUARTERS. QUONSET BETH PREVIOUSLY SET ASIDE FOR EXPANSION HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED PERMANENTLY BY BASE SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON. MODULAR DORMITORY (BDDO 1631) IS

CONTROL NO.	[redacted]	PAGE NO.	2	NO. OF PAGES	1	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	[redacted]	INITIALS	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]					REGRAD	[redacted]		84-1

ABBREVIATED MINI MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY
ACTION PRIORITY	14j Edgy	14j Edgy
INFO		

NOW PROJECTED FOR NET 2 EXPANSION. INSPECTION OF BLDG 1631 ON 29
 OCT REVEALS THAT BLDG IS NOT READY TO ACCEPT FLIGHT CREWS. THE BLDG
 IS IN 2ND-POOR CONDITION: BROKEN WINDOWS; INCOMPLETE CONSTRUCTION
 IN THAT ONLY FIRST FLOOR HAS BEEN SECTIONED INTO 12 ROOMS OF APPROX
 190 SQ FT EA, WITHOUT DOORS; WIRING INSTALLATION IS INCOMPLETE; 2ND
 FLOOR REMAINS OPEN RAY; LATRINES IN DEPLORABLE CONDITION AND GENERAL
 CONDITION OF BARRACKS IS DISAPPOINTABLE AT BEST. WITH EXTENSIVE SELF-
 HELP THE BARRACKS COULD BE CLEANED UP, BUT LACK OF SUPPLIES AND
 MATERIAL SEVERELY LIMITS THIS CAPABILITY. 3 INF PERSONNEL WERE
 OFFERED, BUT COM FOR ADVISES ALL MATERIALS HAVE BEEN DIVERTED FOR
 EMERGENCY TYPEWORK REPAIRS AND AT PRESENT COULD NOT PROVIDE SELF-
 HELP MATERIAL. WITH 30 AVAILABLE BEDS IN EXISTING UNIT COMPLEX,
 ANTICIPATE PUTTING 3 MEN PER ROOM IN BLDG 1631 FIRST FLOOR AS SOON AS
 IT IS IN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION. CANNOT ESTIMATE DATE THIS WILL
 OCCUR. SUPPLY BEDDING FOR 100 PEOPLE HAS BEEN RECEIVED, BUT NO
 BEDS, MATTRESSES, OR LOCKERS. COM HAS REQUESTED LATERAL SUPPORT,
 BUT ~~NO~~ REPORTS THESE ITEMS MAY HAVE TO COME FROM PHU CAT. NO
 PLANS ARE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY TO SECURE AS MUCH EQUIPMENT FROM
 PHU CAT AS POSSIBLE. 30 BEDS HAVE ALREADY BEEN IDENTIFIED FOR
 REFER TO LAMANG. 306TFW/DOX ADVISES BLDG 1631 REPAIR PROJECT DOES
 INCLUDE AIR CONDITIONING BUT TIME FRAME FOR THIS IS UNKNOWN.

CONTROL NO.	PAGE NO.	PAGES	IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
	2	1		
			REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS	

84-2

ABBREVIATED MESSAGE
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	INITIATED BY	CLASS
ACTION ISPTIME	MaJ Eddy	Maj Eddy	441
INFO			

07D RED FLAG WITH THE RECENT LOSS OF THEIR ONLY CREW VAN TO SALVAGE. DET-2 CURRENTLY HAS ONLY FOUR VEHICLES ASSIGNED. DURING THE LAST WEEK IN OCT, THE OPERATIONS VEHICLE OVERHEATED THREE TIMES, HAD A WATERPUMP FAILURE, A LEAKING RADIATOR FOR WHICH NO REPLACEMENT IS AVAILABLE AND ON 29 OCT THE BREAKS WERE OUT. WITH THIS VEHICLE IN THE REPAIR SHOP AND A VERY GOOD POSSIBILITY THAT IT COULD BE TURNED INTO SALVAGE, THE SITUATION IS PRESENTLY UNDESIRABLE. BASE TRANSPORTATION HAS LOANED DET 2 A 1970 GIL-PAK BUS THAT VEHICLE IS PROJECTED FOR TURNOVER TO THE VNAF SO DON'T KNOW HOW LONG IT CAN BE RETAINED. ON 28 OCT DET 2 SENT A LETTER TO THE BASE TRANSPORTATION SQN COMMANDER WITH COPIES TO THE BASE COMMANDER, 699486, AND PER REQUESTING IMMEDIATE RELIEF. 699486 COORDINATED ISSUE WITH 7AF. 7AF STATED THAT PHU CAT HAD BEEN TASKED TO IDENTIFY THE NUMBER/TYPE VEHICLES WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE/AVAILABLE FOR TRANSFER. ONCE THIS INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE, THE SITUATION MAY BE REDUCED TO A LESS CRITICAL PROPORTIONS. 7AF FURTHER INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM NO LOWER THAN THE BASE LEVEL.

07E COMP. ADDITIONAL MAG TAPE HAS BEEN ORDERED. STOCKS OF 6-PLY AND TELETYPE PAPER ARE ADEQUATE. LEVELS HAVE BEEN ADJUSTED.

07F COMP. C-RATIONS ARE USED FOR IN FLIGHT MEALS AT BANANG. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS ARE WELL WITHIN LOCAL CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT AND NO PROBLEMS ARE FORESEEN

CONTROL NO.	FOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		4	7		
SECURITY CLASSIFIC				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	84-3

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	FORWARDED BY
ACTION ROUTINE	Maj Eddy	
INFO		

C8 CH SCHED. HOST EMO HAS AGREED TO TRANSFER EQUIP IDENTIFIED BY DET-1 TO DESIGNATED LOCATIONS.

C9 CH RQD. RECOMMEND END DATE BE CHANGED TO 8 NOV.

C10 CH RQD. RECOMMEND DET 1 REPLACE 699488 AS ACTION AGENCY. ARRANGEMENTS FOR TERMINAL AUDIT HAVE BEEN MADE AND WILL BE COMPLETED WHEN FIRM TERMINATION DATE IS ESTABLISHED.

C11 CH RQD. RECOMMEND END DATE BE CHANGED TO 8 NOV. DENNIS EMO HAS COORDINATED SHIPMENT WITH FB5263. NORMAL BULK SUPPLY PROCESSING PROCEDURES WILL APPLY ON RECEIPT. DEMAND DATA, RATHER THAN SPECIAL LEVEL (FORM 1996), IS BEING LOADED IN ORDER TO HOLD ASSETS AT FB5263. MOST ASSETS INVOLVED IN TRANSFER ARE IN-COORD, AND WOULD REQUIRE THREE MONTHS FOR DEPOT APPROVAL.

C12 CH RQD. RQST END DATE BE CHANGED TO 3 NOV WHICH ANTICIPATED DATE FOR COMPLETION.

C13 CH SCHED. ESTIMATE COMPLETION DATE ON 6 NOV.

C14 CH RQD. RQST END DATE BE CHANGED TO 8 NOV; HOWEVER, ESTIMATE COMPLETION BY 3 NOV.

C15 CH RQD. RQST END DATE BE CHANGED TO 8 NOV. DET-1 WILL PROVIDE ONLY SUPPLY AND BENCH STOCK ASSETS AND TECH FEES WHICH WILL BE SHIPPED ASAP.

C16 CH RQD. RQST END DATE BE CHANGED TO 10 NOV AS CUSTODY ACCOUNTS

CONTROL NO.	TCR/100	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE	INITIALS
		5	7		
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS					84-4

PRECEDENCE
SYSTEM ROUTING
INFO

STATION BE CLEANED UNTIL TERMINATION OF OPERATIONS AND INTERLOCK BE
NEXT END.

017 CH BGL. PRESENT HOST-TENANT AGREEMENT IS PRESENTLY UNDER
REVIEW AT HIGHER HEADQUARTERS; THIS DEC-2 HAS NO BACK FROM WHICH TO
RENEGOTIATE. NEXT END DATE BE CHANGED TO 1 DEC.

018 COMP ESTIMATE ACTUAL, SCHEDULE BY 3 NOV.

019 COMP APPROVAL COMPLETED IN FEB FEB 71-7-27.

020 CH BGL. APPROVAL OBTAINED. TRAINING TO BE BY 30 NOV.

021 COMP.

022 COMP.

DIA CH BGL. REB WORK CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED. REGRADING COMPLE-
TION 5 NOV. NEXT END DATE BE CHANGED TO 5 NOV. DELAY WAS DUE TO THE
PROG BUDGET AND TEMPORARY REGRADING OF 1 UNIT.

D18 CAUTION. MULTIPLE UNITS REPORTED FROM THE CH 5 UNIT SUPPORTING
ARRIVED BEHIND SCHEDULE WITHIN PERM OF 14 OCT. PER LAST UNIT CONSTAT-
ING UNITS HAVE NOT BEEN LOCATED. A TAP INSPECTION VISITING
BASED ON 29 OCT INDICATED SEARCH WAS IN. WITH TWO UNITS ANTICIPATED
FOR END WORK BY OCT OF THE 30 NOV COMPLETION DATE REMAINS ON
REMOVED ONLY IF UNITS ARE LOCATED ON TIME. CONCRETE FOUNDATIONS
WILL NOT BE PROVIDED. WHEN LOCATED, UNITS WILL BE SET UP ON
SCHEDULE ACTUAL.

CONTROL NO.	TOP	NO.	NO. OF PAGES	DESCRIPTION	INITIALS
		6	7	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	

1 NOV 68 174-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 68 WHICH MAY BE USED.

84-5

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DATE	PROJECT
ACTION	No. 204		
INFO			

F7C CH REQ. POST END DATE BE CHANGED TO 30 NOV. DELETION OF
 GUNNET HVT DOES NOT NEGATE REQUIREMENTS FOR DRAINAGE BENCH BRIDGE
 SINCE ACCESS WILL BE REQUIRED TO "CAMP SWAMPY" FOR DINING HALL.
 BECAUSE OF TYPHOON BOE CANNOT PROVIDE AN ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE.

D2A CH SCHED. SEE CTC.

D2B CH SCHED. SEE CTC.

D3 COMP. BLUE-LINE DRAWINGS DISPATCHED TO TEL/DEP.

E3 COMP. NO WAIVER FOR SIGNED PER REQUIRED FOR SET 4 PER.

E4 CAUTION. PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED ORDERS WILL REQUIRE AMENDMENT
 FOR NEW TED'S. FORM PER DO NOT HAVE FOR ORDERS. SET 2 UP
 MSG 240755Z OCT 71, TO 6902 SET 50, REFERS.

F1 CH REQ. POST END DATE BE CHANGED TO 8 NOV.

F2 CH REQ. SAME AS F1.

F3 CH REQ. SAME AS F1.

F4 CH REQ. SAME AS F1.

F5 CH REQ. SAME AS F1.

F6 CAUTION. CLEARANCES FORWARDED ON ALL BUT THE FOUR PER REFERRED
 TO IN ITEM E4. THESE CLEARANCES WILL BE SENT UPON RECEIPT OF ASSET
 INSTRS.

F7 COMP. REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED TO SET 1 AND BASE
 SUPPLY.



CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		7	7		
				REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS	84-6

ABBREVIATED SHORT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CO VOUCHER SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE	Mr. Eod	Mr. Karaka	4531
INFO			

- F8 CONF. 7AF(US) APPROVAL NOT REQUIRED. DRY 1 AND DRY 2
COORDINATION WITH RESPECTIVE EMO'S REVEAL NO PROBLEM IN SHIPMENT OF
SP EQUIPMENT EXCESSES FROM PEU CAT TO DAKANG.
- F9 CH REQ. REF D1B, ABOVE. DUE TO DELAY IN ARRIVAL OF MODULOES,
RQST EMO DATE BE CHANGED TO 1 DEC.
- F10 ON SCHED. DATE OF APPROVAL CONTINGENT ON COMPLETION AND
CERTIFICATION OF FACILITIES. SEE F9 AND D1B, ABOVE, FOR POTENTIAL
PROBLEM AREA.
- F11 ON SCHED. PRESENT AUTHORIZATIONS ARE SUFFICIENT; HOWEVER, 100
PER CENT MANNING AGAINST EXISTING SLOTS WILL BE REQUIRED.
- G1 COMP. ACTION COMPLETION ON 1 OCT.
- G2 CONF. REVIEWED AND ACCOMPLISHED.
- G3 CH REQ. RQST EMO DATE BE CHANGED TO 8 NOV.
- G4 CH REQ. SAME AS G3.
- G5 CH REQ. SAME AS G3.
- G6 COMPL. DRY 1 HAS NO CRATO AGCT WITH 120SS/TSCG.
- G7 CH REQ. RQST EMO DATE BE CHANGED TO 1 NOV. DUE TO REVISED
DATE, DRY 1 WILL ADVISE ARPOGS TO DISCONTINUE DELIVERY AFTER 7 NOV
AND TO CONTINUE PICK-UP SERVICE UNTIL 15 NOV. EXCESSING MATERIAL
WILL BE RE-ROUTED BY ARPOGS TO DRY 2 AFTER 7 NOV.
- G8 CONF 120SS(LA) WAS ADVISED ON 14 OCT TO FORWARD OFFICIAL MAIL

CONTROL NO.	NO. OF PAGES	IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
	9		
REGRAIDING INSTRUCTIONS			84-7

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DATE	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE	Maj Eddy	[REDACTED]	4/547
INFO			

RECEIVED AFTER CLOSURE DATE TO 699486 (DA).

CG9 CH RPD. CHANGE END DATE TO 1 NOV. MSG WAS SENT TO USAFES (DAAC) ON 20 OCT ADVISING DELETION FROM USAFES 11-1 EFFECTIVE 1 NOV. MSG BEING AMENDED TO REFLECT EFFECTIVE DATE OF 8 NOV.

GP-4

ec47.com

[REDACTED]

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	9	9		
				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	Doc # 84-8

DD FORM 1 NOV 62 173-1

//////////////////////////////////INFORMAL//////////////////////////////////

TO 6994SS
FM DET 2, 6994SS
NOTG:039900Z

file
32c
KLE

[REDACTED]

DO NOV 71

MOULDEXES FOR OPS ARRIVED TODAY. CONDITION EXTREMELY BAD. RED HORSE
WILL ATTEMPT TO PUT SOMETHING UP, BUT ARE HIGHLY DOUBTFUL. CAN ANY
ONE AT 7AF GET OTHER ONE? FYI THERE ARE TWO AT DNG WHICH ARE OWNED
BY NON-APPROPRIATED FUNDS FOR EDUCATION CENTER CLASSROOMS. RED

HORSE SAYS THAT 7AF COULD, THEY THINK APPROVE SHIFT OF THESE TO

US. COULD YOU INVESTIGATE THIS AND ADVISE.

WE EXPECT E J HOME TOMORROW SOMETIME.

CHEERS

//////////////////////////////////END INFORMAL//////////////////////////////////

NNNN

DOC # 95



176
15
07 15


3100750ZCZCR04972PO
FP YMRDQR
DE YMRDNK 0007 3100714
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK PP ILH DE
P 060545Z NOV 71
FM USA 562
TO PACSOTYRGN/DOR
INFO DIRNSA
USAFSS/DORT/DMN
USA561/DORM
ZEM

[Redacted] DORM

XXMPSR 01FQ 005111 SA687
XXCC

AA: USA562 ABN COMINT PSR 046
BB: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM007/.DEB007 VOL 1-72-1 EB0008 PAGE
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 43-15112
BB: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM012/.DEB012 VOL 1-72-1 EB0008 PAGE
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 42-93166
CC: EFF: 0012 06111
DD: LOSSES PAR UNIT DEACTIVATION. ACFT WILL BE ASGND TO TSN.
XXHH
EE: FINAL REPORT. ACFT 5112 IS PRESENTLY IN IRAN AND 3166
IS IN CORROSION CONTROL. MY PSR 040 AND 044 REFER.

150
0007



NNNN

DOC#86

6 NOV 1971

0100734Z 020000128DM295
PP YARD
DE YARD
ZNY
ZKZK PP JLH DE
P 022545Z NOV 71
FM USA
TO
INFO
USAFS
USA
ZEN



XXM PSC 150301100A650

YKCO
AA: USA
BB: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
CC: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
DD: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
EE: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
FF: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
GG: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
HH: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
II: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
JJ: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
KK: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
LL: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
MM: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
NN: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
OO: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
PP: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
QQ: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
RR: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
SS: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
TT: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
UU: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
VV: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
WW: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
XX: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
YY: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244
ZZ: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM037.DEB005 VOL 1-72-1
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 45-1244

DD: ADPT WILL RECOVER AND BE PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED TO
HAWAIIAN DEACTIVATION PLAN.

EE: ANNUAL REPORT. MY PSC 241 REFERS.



DOC 492



20708005769DM028

-8 NOV 71 02 00

PP YMRDOR
DE YMRONK 0001 312020
ZNY MVMNH
BKZK PP ILH DE
#702157 NOV 71
FM USA 562
TO PACSOTYRGN/DOR
INFO DIRNSA
USAFSS/DORT/DN
USA561/DORM
ZEM

92
18



BORM

KXMP SR 21E0007111NSA637
XXCC

AA: USA562 ABN COMINT PSR 019
BB: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM021/ .DEB001 VOL 1-72-1-250008 PAGE
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 43-48765
BB: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM019/ .DEB010 VOL 1-72-1-250008 PAGE
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 43-48765
BB: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM022/ .DEB000 VOL 1-72-1-250008 PAGE
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 43-48765
BB: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM023/ .DEB027 VOL 1-72-1-250008 PAGE
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 RE-29865
BB: LOSS: (PERM:) .DEM027/ .DEB027 VOL 1-72-1-250008 PAGE
419 ROW 1 EM0013 PAGE 419 ROW 5 43-48765
CC: EFF: 04302 0711
DD: ACFT WILL RECOVER AND BE PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED TO TSM
IAW UNIT DEACTIVATION PLAN

XXHH
EE: FINAL REPORT, MY PSR 001 REFERS.
210
0001

NNNN



DOCS 89

03



ecfx.com

