


UNCLASSIFIED

# HISTORY OF THE 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

January – June  
1970






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
HISTORY  
 OF  
 THE  
 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON  
 1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1970  
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15 OCTOBER 1970



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
HISTORY OF THE 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

1 January 1970 through 30 June 1970


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Approved:



LEON S. INGE, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Commander





FOREWORD

This historical report covers the period 1 January 1970 through 30 June 1970 for those operations performed by the 6994 Security Squadron and staged from Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Republic of Vietnam.

The report concerns itself with the overall operational concepts of the 6994 Security Squadron in the day-to-day performance of a direct support mission for Tactical Field Commanders. This record has been compiled in an effort to provide a continuity of documentation of the Airborne Radio Direction Finding program in support of an armed conflict.

Historical accounts of Detachments 1, 2, and 3 of the 6994 Security Squadron have been documented individually by these units.

This history is subject to revision. Additional information or suggested corrections will be welcome.

This report was prepared by Technical Sergeant Anthony J. Sichenzia and typed by Staff Sergeant Calvin D. Stahl.






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
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
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[REDACTED]

Chapter 1

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

MISSION

[REDACTED] Headquarters for the 6994 Security Squadron (Scty Sq) was located at Tan Son Nhut Airfield (AFLD), Republic of Vietnam (RVN). The operational mission of the 6994 Scty Sq was to conduct Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) and specified Communications Intelligence (COMINT) collection against enemy targets in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) and Cambodia in direct support of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).<sup>1</sup>

[REDACTED] In addition to the mission performed in III and IV CTZ's, the 6994 Scty Sq provided Command, Operational, and Administrative control for the three subordinate units located at Phu Cat Air Base (AB), RVN, Pleiku AB, RVN, and Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB), Thailand.<sup>2</sup>

[REDACTED] The Command, Administration, Personnel, Communications and Operations Branches were located in the Air Force Special Security Office (AFSSO) Compound with the 7th Air Force (7AF) Headquarters complex at Tan Son Nhut AFLD, RVN.<sup>3</sup>

[REDACTED] The 6994 Scty Sq Logistics Branch was located on the flight line adjacent to the 360 Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (TEWS). The 360 TEWS directly supported the 6994 Scty Sq by providing





CHART #1





ARDF

TECHNICAL CONTROL






CHART #2





ARDF

OPERATIONAL CONTROL





CHART #3



[REDACTED]

the necessary aircraft and operational crews. The 360 TEWS was subordinate to the 460 Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) whose detached units, 361 TEWS, 362 TEWS and Detachment 1, 360 TEWS supported the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) operations at Phu Cat AB, Pleiku AB, RVN and Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand, respectively.<sup>4</sup>

[REDACTED] The 6994 Scty Sq performed the ARDF mission in South Vietnam and Cambodia aboard EC-47 platforms throughout the entire reporting period and were tasked with the completion of either one of three types of missions utilizing two separate position/equipment configurations; COMBAT CROSS (CC) and COMBAT CROSS ZULU (CCZ). In subsequent portions of this historical account the specific tasking for each of these positions and configurations is outlined in further detail.<sup>5</sup>

[REDACTED] The nickname of the Air Force (AF) ARDF operation in Southeast Asia as performed by the 6994 Scty Sq was changed from COMBAT COUGAR to COMBAT CROSS on 25 June 1970 as a result of a suspected compromise.<sup>6</sup>

#### ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

[REDACTED] The 6994 Scty Sq was administratively subordinate to the 6922 Security Wing (Scty Wg), located at Clark AB, Republic of the Philippines from 1 January 1970 to 31 March 1970. Effective 1 April 1970, the reorganization of the Pacific Security Region

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

## ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

6994TH SS

COMMAND RELATIONSHIP

(1 Jan - 31 Mar 70)




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


## ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

6994 SCTY SQ

## COMMAND RELATIONSHIP

(1 Apr - 30 Jun 70)




\* DET 2 RELOCATED TO DA NANG  
EFFECTIVE 15 JUN 70

CHART #5

6994 SCTY SQ

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



\* EFFECTIVE 1 APR 70

CHART #6

DA-Administration; DP-Personnel; DO-Operations; DC-Communications; SP-Security; LO-Logistics  
DOC-COMSEC; DORA-ACC; DORT-Local Ops; DORM-Sq Msn Mngt; LOM-Maintenance; LOS-Supply; DORTS-  
Stan/Eval; DORTM-Abn Man Mngt; DORTF-Abn Sked'ng; DORTX-Anal/Reporting

[REDACTED]

(PacSctyRgn) was implemented under the provisions of Program Action Directive (PAD) 69-12. Under this PAD, the 6922 Scty Wg was deactivated and administrative command support functions fell directly under the auspices of PacSctyRgn located at Wheeler AFB, Hawaii. The deactivation of this Scty Wg brought forth the assimilation of Detachment 5, 6922 Scty Wg as an integral branch of the 6994 Scty Sq.<sup>7</sup>

[REDACTED] In view of the daily intra-service involvement throughout the entire ARDF program in Southeast Asia (i.e., Army, Air Force, Australian, Vietnamese), the general operational control of the entire operation was exercised by MACV (J2).<sup>8</sup>

#### ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

##### Joint Operating Agreements - 460TRW/6994Scty Sq

[REDACTED] As was reported in the last 6994 Scty Sq History, the initial 460 TRW/6994 Scty Sq Joint Operating Agreement (JOA), was negotiated and drafted during the closing weeks of December 1969. JOA 2-1 was published and implemented on 4 January 1970 and this document established the authority and responsibilities for joint actions by the two organizations and their subordinate units.<sup>9</sup>

[REDACTED] Since 4 January 1970, six more JOA's have been published and implemented. The 460 TRW and the 6994 Scty Sq, through these documents, have been able to conduct a combined daily operation whereby policies and procedures are commensurate with the requirements of each unit and aligned with the tasked responsibilities of MACV (J2).<sup>10</sup>

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Relocation of 362 TEWS/Detachment 2, 6994 Soty Sq

[REDACTED] At the close of the previous reporting period the decision on relocation of the 362 TEWS and Detachment 2, 6994 Soty Sq had not been reached and five separate proposals remained in consideration relative to the resolution of this problem.<sup>11</sup>

[REDACTED] On 3 January 1970, PacSotyRgn notified the 6994 Soty Sq that Headquarters, Pacific Air Force (PACAF) had agreed to delaying the move of the 362 TEWS and Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq from Fiscal Year (FY) 3/70 to FY 4/70 to provide 7AF adequate time to study the most suitable location for the two units.<sup>12</sup>

[REDACTED] On 20 March 1970, in a message to the Commanding General (CG), XXIV Corps, Da Nang, the Commander, United States MACV (COMUSMACV) summarized the discussions to date on the units move and provided the reasons for not selecting the initial four proposals outlined in the 6994 Soty Sq History for the period ending 31 December 1969. On this date COMUSMACV provided MACV views and comments relative to prior proposals and also stated that it was imperative to resolve the 362 TEWS closedown issue now so that interrelated plans could be solidified. In addition, the rationale for selection of Da Nang for the final relocation site was primarily the optimization of operational posture and availability of aircraft support assets. This policy ruled out Chu Lai and Hue/Pnu Bai, both of which would require major infusion of USAF support which runs counter to consolidation efforts and would produce

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

more problems than were faced at Da Nang. Additionally, there was no other airfield in South Vietnam with the requisite USAF support facilities acceptable and the increased distance to target areas made other airfields unfeasible. Relocation at a base in Thailand (UDORN) was ruled out in view of the Cryptologic Ceiling and Headroom Space limitations [REDACTED]. Problems were foreseen regarding ramp space and billets, therefore, COMUSMACV requested coordinated arrangements for accommodating the 362 TEWS and the 6994 Scty Sq Detachment at Da Nang be furnished not later than 1 April 1970.<sup>13</sup>

[REDACTED] Although COMUSMACV resolved the problem of where to relocate the TEWS, no provision was made or implied that Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq would become a part of this move, even though the 7AF package presented to COMUSMACV incorporated both units.<sup>14</sup>

[REDACTED] On 21 March 1970, the 6994 Scty Sq informed 7AF of this fact and also requested (1) that both 362 TEWS and Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq would require support from the host unit Commander, (2) billeting arrangements and priority as previously outlined would apply to both units, and (3) both units would indeed be relocated at Da Nang as one entity.<sup>15</sup> On 23 March 1970, 7AF advised the 6994 Scty Sq and confirmed that although not specifically stated, our Detachment was in fact included in the 362 TEWS Da Nang proposal and would definitely relocate in June 1970.<sup>16</sup>

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 29 March 1970, 7AF, in a message to the Commander In Chief PACAF, advised that the proposed relocation would be effected on or about 15 June 1970. In addition, authority was requested to proceed with the move and appropriate action be taken by CINCPACAF to secure changes to Program Directive 72-1.<sup>17</sup>

[REDACTED] One of the key factors governing the decision to move the 362 TEWS was the relocation of the 138 Aviation Battalion to Phu Bai and thereby providing the necessary ramp space for the 362 TEWS resources at Da Nang. After extensive coordination extending through March 1970, the CG XXIV Corps directed that the 138 Aviation Battalion move to Phu Bai on or about 15 May 1970 allowing 10 to 15 days for this move. The proposal to move the 362 TEWS was also established for 15 June 1970. Aside from some minor agreements and arrangements, as of 4 April 1970, preliminary/final planning actions for the relocation had been resolved. On 6 April 1970, Hq PacSctyRgn published Movement Order Number 11 which provided complete justification and the final authorization for the relocation of the two units.<sup>18</sup>

[REDACTED] On 9 April 1970, a tentative outline of actions for the impending move was published by the 6994 Scty Sq. Actions to occur and the dates were as follows:<sup>19</sup>

11 April	7AF pre-PAD meeting
15 April	EC-47 revetment construction initiated in area previously occupied by 138 Aviation Battalion

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1 May	7AF PAD Publication
18 May	Rehabilitation of the Hue/Phu Bai airfield completed
19 May	138 Aviation Battalion moves to Hue Phu Bai
28 May - 2 June	138 Aviation Battalion completes move
15 June	Revetment construction for EC-47's complete
15 June	Commence movement of aircraft/personnel to Da Nang from Pleiku
16 June	Complete move of aircraft to Da Nang
16-30 June	Close facilities at Pleiku and ship materials to Da Nang

[REDACTED] On 16 April 1970, COMUSMACV concurred with all actions pertinent to the relocation and stated the entire move would commence on 15 June 1970 and be completed not later than 30 June 1970.<sup>20</sup>

[REDACTED] As scheduled, the 362 TEWS and Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq effected the move of personnel and aircraft resources from Pleiku to Da Nang on 15 and 16 June 1970 with relatively no detracton from the operational functions of either unit in relation to MACV tasking for that specific period.

Buildup at Nakhon Phanom (NKP)

General

[REDACTED] The buildup at Detachment 3, 6994 Scty Sq remained an outstanding problem through this reporting period. The most critical

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

factor being the RTG's approval to continue basing five EC-47 aircraft at NKP. In the interim, a "tradeoff" procedure was initiated while discussions took place in a concentrated effort to resolve this matter.<sup>21</sup>

[REDACTED] The "tradeoff" procedure entailed the use of EC-47 resources based at Tan Son Nhut AFLD, RVN, on a scheduled basis. Temporarily, this provided a solution; however, numerous factors made the continuance of this practice unfeasible if continued for an extended period. As a result, recommendations were forwarded to discontinue this "tradeoff" for the following reasons.<sup>22</sup>

(1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] expressed a desire for a minimum of 200 hours per week for time on target against Laotian ARDF entity coverage.

(2) A stated requirement by COMUSMACV that Laotian ARDF coverage should be granted the highest priority after consideration had been given to those targets deemed priority in South Vietnam by MACV.

(3) Finally, in the event the two additional aircraft were forced to leave Thailand, operations from bases in South Vietnam would be impractical due to the distance to/from the target areas.

[REDACTED] In an effort to resolve these problems and provide a solution to all interested parties, MACV, on 16 March 1970, outlined the aforementioned points to CINCPAC and requested consideration be given to:<sup>23</sup>

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

(1) Requesting 7AF to take the appropriate actions to operate five EC-47's on a sustained basis from NKP.

(2) Contact the RTG and obtain approval for the extension of the TDY of the fourth and fifth EC-47's through 25 April 1970.

(3) Devote consideration to the amount of Headroom Spaces and that as of March 1970, the allocation of 89 Headroom Spaces at NKP was fourth on the requirements listing established by MACV.

[REDACTED] Through 30 June 1970, the following items were under primary consideration in relation to this buildup and the problems outlined in previous paragraphs.

(1) The acquisition of specific project identifiers for TDY personnel which were necessary for support of the NKP operation in conjunction with;

(2) The Headroom Space/Cryptologic Ceiling limitations [REDACTED] and;

(3) The overall Augmentation of Commando Forge Operations at NKP.

[REDACTED] The following paragraphs are included to provide further documentation of those actions taken in relation to the above through the end of this reporting period.

Project Identifiers

[REDACTED] On 5 February 1970, PacSctyRgn provided a Project Identifier TVU-104 necessary for the 18 TDY billets at Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq until [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

27 April 1970. In addition, PacSotyRgn notified the 6994 Soty Sq that they had blanket area clearance for 10 spaces in Thailand for use by Region and field station personnel during operational assistance visits.<sup>24</sup>

(U) In view of the constant TDY assistance the 6994 Soty Sq was required to provide Det 3, 6994 Soty Sq a two to three space identifier for squadron use was requested from PacSotyRgn on 23 March 1970.<sup>25</sup> On 27 March 1970, although region did not provide the requested two/three spaces, a suggestion was tendered that the 6994 Soty Sq personnel use the 7AF blanket authority for Thailand TDY's until a firm set of procedures could be established.<sup>26</sup>

(U) On 27 April 1970 this problem was completely resolved when the RTG approved 89 PCS spaces for use at Det 3, 6994 Soty Sq and Project Identifiers for TDY personnel were no longer required.<sup>27</sup>

Extension of TDY Authority for Two EC-47's at NKP

[REDACTED] In conjunction with the problems of securing project identifier's, authority to retain two additional EC-47's on a PCS basis was also a problem faced by the 6994 Soty Sq.

[REDACTED] On 23 April 1970, NSAPAC informed [REDACTED] that the JCS was in the process of publishing a Deployment Adjustment Notification (DAN) dated 27 April 1970. This document would authorize the two EC-47's and associate personnel to remain at NKP on a PCS basis. As a result, NSAPAC stated that there wasn't any reason why personnel and equipment

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

could not remain in place at NKP on a PCS basis.<sup>28</sup>

[REDACTED] On 24 April 1970, PacSctyRgn provided the 6994 Scty Sq the authority (citing NSAPAC's message) for the retention of our TDY support for the two additional EC-47's at NKP.<sup>29</sup> However, in that the TDY authority for the aircraft and crews was due to expire on 27 April 1970, 7AF requested a ten day interim extension in the event the DAN was not received in sufficient time.<sup>30</sup> As a result, on 24 April 1970, [REDACTED] informed all concerned that coordination with MACTHAI, AMEB, RTG was being conducted and that the two EC-47's were authorized to remain at NKP beyond 27 April 1970 and until the RTG granted PCS status for these resources.<sup>31</sup>

[REDACTED] On 1 May 1970, final approval was received from the RTG through the AMEB in coordination with USAFSS, PacSctyRgn, JCS, PACAF, 7AF and the 6994 Scty Sq to operate five EC-47 aircraft on a permanent basis from NKP. As a result, this action resolved the numerous problems generated by the buildup at NKP and satisfied all customers of Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq's end-products. The Augmentation of Commando Forge Operations at Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq is discussed in further detail in subsequent chapters of this historical account.<sup>32</sup>

#### Proposed Reorganization of the ARDF Coordination Center (ACC)

[REDACTED] Throughout this reporting period the question of the ARDF Coordination Center (ACC) reorganization remained an outstanding item.<sup>33</sup>

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The governing directive for this office, MACV Dir 381-23, which outlines the tasks, responsibilities, and concepts of the ACC remained in a rewrite status during the entire reporting period. On 16 March 1970, the draft of this document was forwarded to PacSctyRgn for their review and coordination prior to the final publication and implementation. The revision of this directive contained four major changes, a summation of which was forwarded to PacSctyRgn via electrical means.<sup>34</sup> On 20 March 1970, PacSctyRgn, although not in receipt of the draft 381-23, stated they could envision no requirement for a change in the organizational structure of the ACC. Furthermore, they requested that the 6994 Scty Sq relate this policy statement to MACV J2.<sup>35</sup>


[REDACTED] On 2 April 1970, the 6994 Scty Sq reiterated its stand on the requirement for a continued joint control of the ACC.<sup>36</sup> Further, on 16 April 1970, the 6994 Scty Sq forwarded a complete resume of the 6994 Scty Sq/509 Radio Research Group's (RRG) proposal for the re-subordination of the ACC to PacSctyRgn for their review and final approval. As of 30 June 1970, the final decision on the publication and implementation of the revised 381-23 remained an outstanding item and the ACC continued to operate as a joint function, manned by both the 6994 Scty Sq and the 509 RRG.


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CHAPTER II

## SIGINT TASKING AND COLLECTION


## SIGINT TASKING



 The Commander, MACV exercises operational control of the ARDF/Collection activities performed by the 6994 Soty Sq. Technical Control of assigned ARDF/Collection-Production activities was exercised by the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA).<sup>1</sup>

 The 6994 Soty Sq was tasked with ARDF, Collection, Processing and Reporting of the following entities:

- (1) Southeast Asia (SEA) Communist High Frequency (HF)/Very High Frequency (VHF) tactical voice, single-channel communications.
- (2) SEA Communist HF/VHF manual morse communications.
- (3) All other entities that may be assigned by applicable authorities.<sup>2</sup>

## BASIC MISSIONS

 For the period of this report the 6994 Soty Sq, staging from TSN AFLD, RVN, was tasked with flying missions in SEA Areas 01, 02, 03, 04 and Cambodia. The primary objective of these missions was to obtain accurate locations through ARDF, of Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces operating in South Vietnam

[REDACTED]

and Cambodia. In addition, the secondary mission was to collect target communications data in order to derive exploitable intelligence. The 6994 Scty Sq utilized two basic methods of operation in accomplishing this assigned mission.<sup>3</sup>

(1) COMBAT CROSS (CC) - The primary objective of CC missions was to fix enemy target transmitters deemed priority targets by MACV. CC aircraft were configured with two individual SIGINT positions; the "X" Console and the "Y" Console. The "X" Console was designated the ARDF Acquisition position and was capable of fixing targets within a frequency range of .2 to 16 Megahertz (MHz). During fix operation, the "Y" Console provided supporting intercept copy of ARDF targets and when time permitted, performed a COMINT collection mission directed toward maximum continuity and development of all hostile target transmitters. The "Y" Console operated within a frequency range of .5 to 30 MHz.<sup>4</sup>

(2) COMBAT CROSS ZULU (CCZ) - This platform differed from the CC configuration in that besides the "X" and "Y" Consoles, a "Z1" and "Z2" Console was also an integral part of the overall platform configuration. In normal operation the "Z1" Console was configured for both HF/VHF operation and the "Z2" Console for strictly HF operation. This enabled the "Z1" operator to exploit voice targets from .2 to 300 MHz and the Z2 to be used for manual morse targets from .2 to 30 MHz.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CCZ configured aircraft were responsible for and tasked with the completion of two different types of missions; Primary Collection and Primary ARDF. On those missions tasked with primary ARDF operations, a collection mission was immediately undertaken whenever equipment failure precluded fix operations against enemy target transmitters.<sup>5</sup> The tables on the following pages are provided for further amplification of these two configurations of the aircraft operated by the 6994 Scty Sq during this period.

#### TASKING CYCLE

[REDACTED] The tasking cycle for the ARDF/Collection missions flown by the 6994 Scty Sq was unique for a USAFSS unit in that the tasks were designed to provide constant tactical support in a highly fluid armed conflict.<sup>6</sup>

[REDACTED] ARDF/Collection tasking originated with Army Field Commanders, the Cryptologic Community and 7AF submission of requirements for the coming week. These requests were submitted to MACV (J2-114). On Wednesday of each week, MACV (J2-114) submitted the proposed tasking to the ARDF Coordinating Committee. The Committee consisted of representatives (usually Operations Officers) of the 509 Radio Research Group (RRG), the 6994 Scty Sq, ACC, MACV (J2),

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

BASIC COMBAT CROSS CONFIGURATION

G-133 HF  
RECEIVER  
.5-30 MHz

ALR-34 or ALR-35  
2-16 MHz  
C-12 COMPASS  
PAN SCOPE

G-133 RCVR

TAPE RECORDER

"X" POSITION

SPECTRUM  
DISPLAY UNIT

"Y" POSITION

Capability: "X" Position= ARDF, "Y" Position= Target Acquisition.

Flight Time: 7 Hours

Cruise Speed: 120 Knots

Crew: Pilot, Copilot, Navigator, Flight Mechanic and 2 Operators.

Communications Radios: 1 VHF Radio, 1 FM Radio, 1 HF Radio and 1 UHF Radio.

Navigation Equipment: TACAN, Weather Radar and Doppler.

Navigator's Position Includes: Plotting table and Franklin Printer that provides fix data readout.

The ALR-35 system differs from the ALR-34 in that it is coupled with a data processor. The processor converts the target magnetic bearings to true bearings, calculates target location relative to the selected doppler set point and determines the circular error of the fix. In the ALR-34 system these functions are performed manually by the navigator.

TABLE 1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

COMBAT CROSS ZULU CONFIGURATION

G-133 MF RECEIVER .5-30 MHz	G-133 HF RECEIVER .5-30 MHz	G-133 RECEIVER .5-30 MHz	ALR-34 or ALR-35 2-16 MHz C-12 COMPASS PAN SCOPE
G175J VHF 10-260 MHz	G-133 REC	G-133	"X" POSITION
TAPE RECORDER	TAPE RECORDER	TAPE RECORDER	
			SPECTRUM DISPLAY UNIT
"Z1" POSITION	"Z2" POSITION	"Y" POSITION	

Capability: "X" Position= ARDF, "Y" Position= Target Acquisition/ Intercept, "Z1" Position= Intercept, "Z2" Position= Intercept.

Flight Time: 5 Hours.

Cruise Speed: 120 Knots.

Crew: Pilot, Copilot, Navigator, Flight Mechanic, 4 Operators and 1 Airborne Analyst.

Communications Radios: 1 VHF Radio, 1 FM Radio, and 1 UHF radio.

Navigation Equipment: TACAN, Weather Radar and Doppler.

The ALR-35 system differs from the ALR-34 in that it is coupled with a data processor. The processor converts the target magnetic bearings to true bearings, calculates target location relative to the selected doppler set point and determines the circular error of the fix. In the ALR-34 system these functions are performed manually by the navigator.

TABLE 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

COMBAT CROSS ZULU MINI-MOD

G-133 HF RECEIVER .5-30 MHz	G-133 HF RECEIVER .5-30 MHz	G-133 HF RECEIVER .5-30 MHz	ALR-38 MINI-MOD 16-50 MHz G-12 COMPASS PAN SCOPE
G175J VHF 10-260 MHz	G-133 REC	G-133 REC	"X" POSITION
TAPE RECORDER	TAPE RECORDER	TAPE RECORDER	
			SPECTRUM DISPLAY UNIT
"Z1" POSITION	"Z2" POSITION	"Y" POSITION	

Capability: "X" Position= ARDF, "Y" Position= Target Acquisition/ Intercept, "Z1" Position= Intercept, "Z2" Position= Intercept.

Flight Time: 7 Hours.

Cruise Speed: 140 Knots.

Crew: Pilot, Copilot, Navigator, Flight Mechanic, 4 Operators and 1 Airborne Analyst.

Communications Radios: 1 VHF Radio, 1 FM Radio, 1 HF Radio and 1 UHF Radio.

Navigation Equipment: TACAN, Weather Radar and Doppler.

The ALR-38 system is basically the ALR-35 with the directional finding capability expanded to include the VHF portion of the frequency spectrum.

TABLE 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


7AF, the Department of Defense Special Representative (DODSPECREP), and the Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV). The Coordinating Committee then passed these recommendations to MACV (J2) for final approval and return to ACC for issuance. While these procedures were ironed out, the 460 TRW provided the ACC with an aircraft availability forecast for the tasking week in question. ACC then assigned individual missions to fulfill the tasking requirement originally generated by the Field Force Commanders.<sup>7</sup>

[REDACTED] The 6994 Scty Sq received all initial and subsequent mission tasking changes via electrical means from ACC, on Thursday morning of each week. At the same time, ACC provided a "sanitized" version of the tasking to 7AF for issuance of the required Fragmentary Order (FRAG ORDER) for each mission to be flown.<sup>8</sup>

[REDACTED] Prior to each days series of missions, the applicable Collection Management Authority (CMA) provided the majority of technical data. Once airborne, COMBAT CROSS/COMBAT CROSS ZULU crews, through Direct Support Units (DSU's) had access to additional technical data for individual frag areas. In addition, DSU's accepted all fixes from the airborne platform, passed tip-offs to the aircraft and accepted all messages which were deemed exploitable by the airborne crew.<sup>9</sup>


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



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27



SEA ARDF  
 AREAS AS  
 OF 30JUN78



[REDACTED]

Tasking for COMBAT CROSS Collection Missions

[REDACTED] Since the initiation of the program, the EC-47 platforms have always had collection resources available. However, specific guidance for target entity identification and exploitation through directed collection tasking had yet to be resolved or published.

[REDACTED] On 5 June 1970, PacSctyRgn suggested to Hq USAFSS that DIRNSA be approached with a proposal to initiate a study which would aid in determining more effective methods of directing COMBAT CROSS ZULU positions aboard ARDF aircraft whenever these missions were originally tasked with a primary collection function. Region personnel also brought to light the point that this subject had been raised by the 6994 Scty Sq in conferences with National Security Agency Representative Vietnam (NRV(C)) and CMA's. Although NRV(C) agreed to support the task, CMA's expressed both a reluctance and an inability to perform these functions.<sup>10</sup>

[REDACTED] USAFSS, prior to broaching this subject/proposal to NSA, requested they be provided with all background data which had occurred prior to this date.<sup>11</sup>

[REDACTED] In response to the USAFSS query, on 10 June 1970, PacSctyRgn informed USAFSS that prior to the original query, only preliminary discussions had taken place and as of that time no definite procedures had been decided upon or levied on these platforms.<sup>12</sup>

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 30 June 1970, PacSctyRgn informed the 6994 Scty Sq that actions were being taken to effect direct technical tasking for both ARDF/Collection positions on aircraft in direct support of MACV requirements. In addition, DIRNSA had taken the initial steps to revise Annex India to Techins 1056 and related tasking documents. This entire package was to be introduced into formal coordination in the near future and as of the close of this reporting period this item remained outstanding.<sup>13</sup>

TASKING - GENERAL

AN/ALR-38 Mini-Mod Utilization

[REDACTED] On 12 January 1970, the 6994 Scty Sq advised Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq that a major topic of discussion at a CMA conference on 19 to 20 January would deal with Mini-Mod. On this date, Det 2 was requested to compile data necessary to refute present usage and provide facts to support recommendations for better utilization.<sup>14</sup>

[REDACTED] On 17 February 1970, NRV(C) forwarded a memorandum to MACV outlining the total success of the two mini-mod missions flown in SEA Area 12 for ARDF/Collection against the VHF voice environment.<sup>15</sup> NRV(C) stated that these missions had provided adequate evidence to strongly consider continued signal exploitation/development of this area.<sup>16</sup>

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 13 March 1970, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq was tasked by the 6994 Scty Sq to provide a data base on SEA Area 12, and the VHF voice mini-mod collection efforts therein. Originally this request was generated by 7AF.<sup>17</sup>

[REDACTED] On 23 March 1970, AFSSO USAF queried AFSSO PACAF in reference to the increase in quality and quantity of the productivity by AN/ALR-38 missions and as such had prompted several questions.

- (1) What are the primary operating areas of the aircraft?
- (2) What was the exact nature of the targets being fixed?
- (3) What was the overall data flow?
- (4) What was being done with the product upon mission recovery?<sup>18</sup>

On 24 March 1970, USAFSS requested assistance in providing responses to these queries from PacSctyRgn.<sup>19</sup> The 6994 Scty Sq provided the answers to these queries on 26 March 1970 and in addition, 7AF expanded on these procedures.<sup>20</sup>

#### COLLECTION DEVELOPMENTS - GENERAL

##### Augmentation of Commando Forge

[REDACTED] In conjunction with the overall buildup of resources at NKP, the escalation of the Laotian situation brought forth yet

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

another tasking/collection requirement which was levied on the personnel and resources of the 6994 Scty Sq.

[REDACTED] On 20 March 1970, MACV (J2) informed the 6994 Scty Sq of a possible requirement to deploy two additional COMBAT CROSS ZULU aircraft and supporting personnel within 12 to 24 hours to Detachment 3, 6994 Scty Sq.<sup>21</sup> This requirement was levied in view of MACV's desire to obtain the maximum collection in the Plain of Jars, Laos, through the month of April 1970. PacSctyRgn was advised of this tasking and augmentation of Commando Forge operations and informed that the following personnel (by AFSC) would accompany these additional aircraft to NKP:<sup>22</sup>

- (1) A203X1MD - Four
- (2) A292X1 - Twelve
- (3) A202X0 - Two
- (4) A301X1 - Two
- (5) R645X0 - One

On 21 March 1970, the 460 TRW informed all subordinate units and the 6994 Scty Sq of pending plans and provided an itinerary for this pending deployment.<sup>23</sup>

[REDACTED] On 21 March 1970, the following actions were taken to implement this deployment:<sup>24</sup>

- (1) The 460 TRW informed all of the detached operating
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

units (360 TEWS/TSN, 362 TEWS/PKU, Det 2, 460 TRW/NKP) and 7AF of all impending actions necessary to support this deployment of forces.

(2) The 6994 Scty Sq informed detachments 1, 2, and 3 of the 460 TRW's planned actions and also provided specific information and instructions for Detachment 2, 6994 Scty Sq augmentees.<sup>25</sup>

(3) 7AF informed the 6994 Scty Sq and the 460 TRW that COMUSMACV had approved the deployment and directed that two COMBAT CROSS ZULU configured aircraft and required personnel be deployed from TSN on 22 March 1970.<sup>26</sup> Throughout this period, 7AF stated that these resources were subject to MACV ARDF tasking as directed in 7AF Frag Order to 7AF Operations Order (OPORD) Nr. 550-69, dated June 1969.<sup>27</sup>

[REDACTED] On 30 March 1970, SSO MACV directed the return of the entire augmentation force from NKP and that this action be completed not later than 31 March 1970.<sup>28</sup>

[REDACTED] On 7 April 1970, PacSctyRgn requested the 6994 Scty Sq provide all pertinent details concerning the redeployment of the aircraft/personnel. Additionally, future requests for special and/or unusual movements of this type would be brought to Region's attention.<sup>29</sup>

(U) Per the request of PacSctyRgn, the 6994 Scty Sq, on 8 April 1970 provided a summary of this deployment and outlined all aspects of the requirement.<sup>30</sup>

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EC-47 Operations Stops (OPSTOPS)

[REDACTED] On 9 January 1970, NRV(C) conducted a meeting at MACV to discuss the possibility of resuming OPSTOPS at Phu Bai and/or Da Nang. The basic decision reached on this date indicated NRV(C) would recommend the continuance of procedures (COURIER) already being used would remain effective vice the implementation of OPSTOPS at either of the aforementioned bases.<sup>31</sup>

[REDACTED] On 26 January 1970, MACV formerly directed that all EC-47 OPSTOPS at Da Nang would be discontinued and electrical forwarding of intelligence would continue.<sup>32</sup>

[REDACTED] On 6 June 1970, the subject of OPSTOPS was again brought forth. USM-607 proposed to the ACC that all CCZ aircraft completing missions in SEA Areas O1 and O2 made OPSTOPS at Binh Tuy AB, RVN. This recommendation was generated so that the aircraft could drop off all voice intercept tapes and thereby enable more expedient processing and reporting of perishable intelligence by USM-607 for these two MACV areas.<sup>33</sup>

[REDACTED] On 9 June 1970, the 6994 Scty Sq advised all applicable units that it was the desire of 7AF to eliminate all OPSTOPS and that MACV had agreed to this policy so long as the 24-hour limit from time of intercept to report delivery could be maintained.<sup>34</sup> The 6994 Scty Sq and 460 TRW concurred in this decision and as of the close of this reporting period no further problems have been experienced.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Water Soluble Paper

[REDACTED] The problem of using Water Soluble paper aboard all CC/CCZ missions for mission essential technical data continued to be a major topic of discussion between all levels of the ARDF community.<sup>35</sup>

[REDACTED] On 3 January 1970, PacSctyRgn informed the 6994 Scty Sq that Hq USAFSS had disapproved the initial request for a waiver of that portion of USAFSS Manual 205-7 "Safeguarding Special Security Material," in relation to the use of Water Soluble Paper. PacSctyRgn tendered the suggestion that negotiations be conducted with the 460 TRW to restore the five-gallon cans of water aboard each mission aircraft.<sup>36</sup> This suggestion was brought to the attention of the 460 TRW. At the same time the 6994 Scty Sq began consolidating all forms taken aboard the mission aircraft for final publication on this specialized paper. These forms/logs were then forwarded to USAFSS for final publication on Water Soluble Paper.<sup>37</sup>

[REDACTED] On 23 January 1970, PacSctyRgn and Detachments 1, 2, and 3 of the 6994 Scty Sq were informed that adequate five-gallon water cans were to be installed aboard each mission aircraft. In addition, these units were notified that all forms were soon to be published on the specialized paper by USAFSS and would be forthcoming to all field units.<sup>38</sup>

[REDACTED] On 26 January 1970, a waiver was requested from USAFSS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

concerning Cherry Sheets and the NSA Negative Task List. This request was generated in lieu of the voluminousness of the NSA Negative Task List and the rapid turnover and variance in length of the CMA/NSA produced Cherry Sheets carried aboard all mission aircraft.<sup>39</sup> While approval of this waiver request was pending, the 460 TRW was officially requested to restore the five-gallon water cans aboard all EC-47 mission aircraft.<sup>40</sup> On 25 February 1970, USAFSS granted the 6994 Scty Sq a waiver for the Cherry Sheets/NSA Negative Task Lists and only requested that all other forms/technical data be published on Water Soluble Paper when carried aboard the mission aircraft.<sup>41</sup>

[REDACTED] On 26 June 1970, the 6994 Scty Sq was able to close-out the problem of Water Soluble Paper for use on EC-47 platforms. As of this date all required forms were being printed or were still in publication or enroute to field units. The 460 TRW, on this same date, also directed each of the TEWS squadrons to insure that five-gallon cans of water were carried on all operational EC-47 mission aircraft not later than 30 June 1970.<sup>42</sup>

#### New Criteria for Mission Accomplishment

[REDACTED] In a concentrated effort to aid in the standardization of the ARDF program, with special emphasis placed on the flying portions, revised procedures were published by MACV on 17 February 1970.<sup>43</sup>

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The biggest single factor of this procedure change resulted from the establishment of an Initial Time On Target (ITOT) for each ARDF mission. Effective on 21 February 1970, missions had to be scheduled to meet this ITOT within 15 minutes (plus or minus). On 12 April 1970, MACV tasked the 6994 Scty Sq with providing an evaluation of the new ITOT against the previous Time On Target (TOT). MACV requested the study encompass a period 60 days prior to 21 February and 60 days after. From the results of this comparison MACV hoped to establish some "norm" for all ARDF missions and the hours spent on target.<sup>44</sup> On 23 April 1970, the 6994 Scty Sq provided MACV (J2-114) with the results of this comparison study.<sup>45</sup>

[REDACTED] Since the implementation of the ITOT concept of operations, all missions flown have met with success in arriving on target within 15 minutes of the scheduled time. Reduced mission computation and management reporting has only been marginally affected by this change. However, reporting documents utilized for reflection of the day-to-day operations underwent numerous revisions. In addition, the standard ITOT has provided 85 percent assurance of target time availability to tasking agencies and permitted stricter adherence to crew duty day limitations. Overall, the new mission criteria for mission accomplishment has benefited every aspect of the ARDF operations performed by the 6994 Scty Sq.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Vietnamization of EC-47

[REDACTED] On 1 May 1970, the 6994 Scty Sq was informed by Hq USAFSS that DIRNSA and the JCS had been provided a proposal for the turnover of EC-47 aircraft to the Royal Vietnamese Air Force (RVNAF). The tentative schedule of this action was as follows:<sup>46</sup>

FY71 - 3 CC Aircraft and 1 CCZ Aircraft

FY72 - 4 CC Aircraft and 2 CCZ Aircraft

FY73 - 7 CC Aircraft and 3 CCZ Aircraft

[REDACTED] On 2 June 1970, DIRNSA officially tasked USAFSS and the Army Security Agency (ASA) with developing a plan to train "backend" Vietnamese crews for EC-47 aircraft to meet the proposed aircraft turnover schedule outlined in the above paragraph.<sup>47</sup> The 6994 Scty Sq was informed of this tasking by PacSctyRgn on 9 June and on this date the region, although not in receipt of any specific tasking, anticipated some and requested the 6994 Scty Sq identify the requirements necessary for the EC-47 turnover and submit these to PacSctyRgn not later than 26 June 1970. In addition, the 6994 Scty Sq was given the authority to participate in pertinent discussions with 7AF and NRV(C) on this subject. However, this unit was directed not to make any commitments without further guidance.<sup>48</sup>

[REDACTED] On 11 June 1970, USAFSS stated that authority had been received to proceed with the EC-47 Vietnamization program

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

planning and that Headquarters was in the process of formulating a detailed plan for training adequate RVNAF personnel to perform "backend" functions aboard EC-47 platforms. On this same date, USAFSS also stated that the 6994 Scty Sq should assist 7AF in the construction of a RVNAF squadron for 20 EC-47 aircraft but should not be considered a valid office of authority for operations outside the 6994 Scty Sq area of responsibility.<sup>49</sup>

[REDACTED] On 16 June 1970, the 6994 Scty Sq informed PacScty-Rgn that AFSSO PACAF had tasked 7AF with providing a status report on the planning actions for a VNAF EC-47 ARDF capability. 7AF in turn, requested assistance from NRV(C) on various specific questions but they did not request any assistance from the 6994 Scty Sq. As a result, neither commitments or proposals were tendered to 7AF relative to this planning action by this squadron.<sup>50</sup>

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] on 26 June, forwarded notification to 7AF that they were planning an effective Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) to operate and support the RVNAF ARDF EC-47 program. Additionally, NRV(C) also requested 7AF to cooperate with the 6994 Scty Sq and provide them (NRV(C)) with the specific nomenclature and Federal Stock Number of all required "back-end" equipment necessary to implement this program.<sup>51</sup>

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In view of the development cited in the previous paragraph, the 6994 Scty Sq developed an entire manning and equipment requirements listing for the implementation of this program. At the close of this reporting period no further actions had been taken regarding this program. Following 15 pages present suggested UDL for program as developed by 6994 Scty Sq.

QRC-346 System - COMJAM

[REDACTED] On 31 March 1970, USAFSS requested AFSSO USAF's comment, with regard to the retention of the ARC-346 System. These comments were necessary to evaluate and justify the retention of this Communications Jamming (COMJAM) equipment in view of the negative use of the system, the continued personnel training requirements and the expense encountered by maintenance personnel for the upkeep, preventive maintenance and storage of components.<sup>52</sup>

[REDACTED] On 22 April 1970, the CSAF stated that the policy on the requirement for COMJAM capabilities within SEA remained a valid item. Furthermore, the QRC-346 System must be capable of being installed and operational aboard EC-47 platforms within 48 hours of initial notification that subject tasking was to be implemented.<sup>53</sup>

[REDACTED] The 6994 Scty Sq, in May 1970, suggested relocation of our COMJAM aircraft/positions to Detachment 1, 6994 Scty Sq at

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

VIETNAMIZATION OF THE ARDF PROGRAM

This proposed UDL for Vietnamization of the ARDF program is based on the following data:

1. Turn over rate of EC-47 aircraft: Present projections call for transfer of EC-47 aircraft resources as follows:

- a. FY71 3 CC A/C 1 CCZ A/C
- b. FY72 4 CC A/C 2 CCZ A/C
- c. FY73 7 CC A/C 3 CCZ A/C

2. In determining the UDL authorizations for aircrew billets the following manning factors (MF) were used:

a. Collectors: (The term "collectors" is used to identify AFSC's 292X1 and 203X1MD. No differentiation is made in the UDL since VNAF personnel should experience no difficulty in achieving full interchangeability between the two skills). An MF of 2.0 is utilized in calculating collector manning requirements. Each CC aircraft mission requires two collectors, while each CCZ aircraft requires four collectors.

b. Pilots: Each aircraft regardless of configuration requires two pilots (Aircraft Commander and pilot). An MF of 2.0 was used to calculate total requirements.

c. Navigators and Flight Engineers: Requirements for navigators and flight engineers are based on MF of 2.0. Each aircraft regardless of configuration requires one navigator and one flight engineer.

d. Mission Equipment Maintenance Technicians: Requirements for mission equipment maintenance technicians is based on MF 1.0 for each CC aircraft and 1.5 for each CCZ aircraft.

e. All remaining UDL positions were based on existing UDLs for the 6994 Scty Sq and the 360 TEWS and the size and configuration of the projected VNAF ARDF EC-47 fleet. Personnel savings were achieved by combination of like functions in both organizations (e.g., elimination of one Commander and one First Sergeant) and elimination of functions which will not transfer to the VNAF (e.g., ACC and COMSEC).

3. The proposed UDL envisions a gradual Vietnamization beginning in FY71 and being completed in FY73. As a result of this gradual period of transition, many pertinent questions arise which are beyond the jurisdiction of this organization, but which should be given serious consideration by appropriate authority.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

a. Is 7AF willing to agree to allowing VNAF personnel to participate as members of mixed crews (USAF & VNAF) during the initial stages of "Vietnamization"?

b. Will MACV acquiesce in the transfer of aircraft to VNAF control as shown in paragraph 2, or will operational control be transferred only in FY73?

c. Will tasking of VNAF aircraft be conducted separately from other USAF ARDF resources?

d. Will the cryptologic community agree to allow mixed crews on CCZ missions during the transition period?

e. Is 7AF willing to relax professional crew standards for VNAF personnel? (e.g., specific requirements for Global Survival Training (SV-80), PACAF Jungle Survival School (PJSS) and PACAF Life Support School (PLSS)).

f. It appears obvious that secure voice equipment cannot be turned over to VNAF, therefore A/G reporting is not foreseen for VNAF ARDF missions. Are any provisions being made to allow VNAF to develop their own system of A/G reporting?

g. Will the effectiveness of the VNAF ARDF program continue to satisfy consumer requirements without A/G reporting?

h. During FY71 and FY72 a separate VNAF aircraft maintenance facility may not be economically feasible nor organizationally possible. Will provisions be made to assign VNAF personnel to existing maintenance facilities where they will benefit from the on the job supervision of qualified USAF personnel?

4. Assumptions: In addition to the questions posed in paragraph 3, satisfaction of the following assumptions appears to be necessary if the Vietnamization of the ARDF Program is to be successful:

a. VNAF personnel assigned to the ARDF program will be fully trained and qualified in their individual skills.

b. VNAF personnel assigned to ARDF aircrews will have full crew member qualifications.

c. Mission maintenance personnel are fully qualified in their electronics skills and will be airborne qualified if their duties call for airborne check rides.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

d. That provisions are being made to provide the cryptologic support necessary whenever the ARDF program is fully "Vietnamized".

e. That provisions will be made for continuation of Techrep assistance to theVNAF when the program is fully "Vietnamized".

ec47.com

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PROPOSED VNAF UDL

SUPERVISORY/MANAGEMENT

Commander	0026	1
Executive Officer	E7024	1
First Sergeant	10070	1
Admin Spec	702X0	$\frac{2}{5}$

OPERATIONS

Operations Officer	8035	1 *
Assistant Operations Officer	Pilot	1
Chief Navigator	Navigator	1
Operations NGOIC	Collector	1 *
Operations Staff	Collectors	3 *
Standardization/Evaluation	2-Collectors 1-Pilot 1-Navigator	4 (2) *
ARDF Processing	Collector	5 *
Air Operations Spec	271X0	2
Mission Management	Collectors	6 *
Admin Spec	702X0	2
Analysts	202X0	$\frac{20}{46}$ *

AIRCRAFT SURVIVAL/PROTECTION EQUIPMENT

Protection Equipment Supervisor	92270	1
Protection Equipment Spec	92250	2
Appr Protection Equipment Spec	92230	$\frac{2}{7}$

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence		1
Intelligence Operations Tech	20470	1
Intelligence Operations Spec	20450	$\frac{1}{3}$

MAINTENANCE (MISSION EQUIPMENT)

Chief of Maintenance	E3216	1 *
NGOIC Maintenance	301XX/304XX	1 *
Maintenance Technicians	301XX/304XX	23 *
Supply Spec	645XX	1
Admin Spec	702X0	$\frac{2}{28}$

SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

Communications	1-29170 5-29150	6 *
Security Police	1-81170 5-81150	6
Administration	11-702X0 1-751X0 2-732X0	14
Supply	1-E6424A 4-645XX	$\frac{5}{31}$



AIRCRAFT CREWS

Pilots	80
Navigators	40
Flight Engineers	40
Collectors	104
Analysts	<u>12</u>
	276

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Chief Maint F/C 210000	
Aircraft Maintenance Officer	1
NCOIC Maintenance	1
Inspection Tech	2
Functional Check Flight Officer	1
Maintenance Control Officer	1
Maintenance Control Techs	7
Plans & Sched	3
Training Control	1
Maint Analysis	1
Material Control	1
Repairable Proc AWP	3
Key Punch	2
Veh EQ Records	2
Reports	1

AVIONICS Maint F/C 240000

Radio	13
Radar	22
Elect Maint	1
Instruments	9
Field Maintenance F/C 230000	
Machine Shop	1
Metal Process	1
Structural Repair	7
Paint	3
Survival Equip	4
Corrosion Control	18
Recip Engines	28
Propellor	7
Aerospace Systems	1
Repair/Reclamation	8
Fuel Systems	1
Pneudraulics	3
Wheel & Tire	1
AGE	10
Periodic Maint Officer	1
Periodic Maint	21
Flight Line A Maint	102
Organ Maint	6
Electrical Sys	<u>9</u>
	304



[REDACTED]

PROPOSED PHASE IN OF VNAF ARDF UDL


	FY71	FY72	FY73
<u>SUPERVISORY/MANAGEMENT</u>			
Commander	1	1	1
Executive Officer	1	1	1
First Sergeant	1	1	1
Admin Spec	1	2	2
<u>OPERATIONS</u>			
Operations Officer	1	1	1
Assistant Operations Officer	1	1	1
Chief Navigator	0	1	1
Operations NCOIC	1	1	1
Operations Staff	1	2	3
Standardization/Evaluation	3	3	4
ARDF Processing	1	3	5
Air Operations Spec	1	2	2
Mission Management	1	3	6
Admin Spec	1	1	1
Analysts	4	10	20
<u>AIRCRAFT SURVIVAL/PROTECTION EQUIPMENT</u>			
Protection Equipment Supervisor	1	1	1
Protection Equipment Spec	1	1	2
Appr Protection Equipment Spec	0	1	2



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

	FY71	FY72	FY73
<u>INTELLIGENCE</u>			
Intelligence Officer	1	1	1
Intelligence Tech	0	1	1
Intelligence Spec	0	0	1
<u>MAINTENANCE MISSION EQUIPMENT</u>			
Chief of Maintenance	1	1	1
NCOIC Maintenance	1	1	1
Maintenance Techs	5	12	23
Supply Spec	1	1	1
Admin Spec	1	1	2
<u>SUPPORT FUNCTIONS</u>			
Communications	2	4	6
Security Police	6	6	6
Administration	3	7	14
Supply	1	3	5
<u>AIRCRAFT CREWS</u>			
Pilots	16	40	80
Navigators	8	20	40
Flight Engineers	8	20	40
Collectors	20	52	104
Analysts	2	6	12
<u>AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE</u>			
(Chief Maint F/C 210000)			
Aircraft Maintenance Officer	1	1	1
NCOIC Maintenance	1	1	1
Inspection	1	1	2
Functional Check Flight Officer	1	1	1

	FY71	FY72	FY73
Maintenance Control Officer	1	1	1
Maintenance Control Techs	2	4	7
Plans & Sched	1	2	3
Training Control	1	1	1
Maintenance Analysis	1	1	1
Material Control	1	1	1
Reparable Proc AWP	1	2	3
Key Punch	1	2	2
Veh EQ Records	1	2	2
Reports	1	1	1
(AVIONICS Maint F/C 240000)			
Radio	3	7	13
Radar	5	11	22
Elect Maintenance	1	1	1
Instruments	2	5	9
(Field Maintenance F/C 230000)			
Machine Shop	1	1	1
Metal Process	1	1	1
Structural Repair	2	4	7
Paint	1	2	3
Survival Equipment	1	2	4
Corrosion Control	4	9	18
Recip Engines	6	14	28

	FY71	FY72	FY73
 Propellor	2	4	7
Aerospace Systems	1	1	1
Repair/Reclamation	2	4	8
Fuel Systems	1	1	1
Pneudraulics	1	2	3
Wheel & Tire	1	1	1
AGE	2	5	10
Periodic Maintenance Officer	1	1	1
Periodic Maintenance Techs	5	11	21
Flight Line A Maint	21	52	102
Organ Maint	2	3	6
Electrical Systems	2	5	9

## UDL BREAKOUT BY FUNCTIONAL AREA

## PART I SIGINT PERSONNEL

Operations Officer	1	8035
Operations NGOIC	1	Collector
Operations Staff	3	Collector
Standardization/Evaluation	2	Collector
ARDF Processing	5	Collector
Mission Management	6	Collector
Analysts	20	202X0
Chief of Maintenance	1	E3216
NGOIC Maintenance	1	301XX/304XX
Maintenance Techs	23	301XX/304XX
Communicators	6	29150
Collectors	104	Collectors
Airborne Analysts	<u>12</u>	A202X0
	185	

## PART II FRONT END OPERATIONS

Commander	1	0026
Executive Officer	1	E7024
First Sergeant	1	10070
Admin Spec	2	702X0
Assistant Operations Officer	1	Pilot
Chief Navigator	1	Navigator
Standardization/Evaluation	2	1 Pilot/1 Navigator
Air Operations Spec	2	271X0
Admin Spec	1	702X0
Protection Equipment Supervisor	1	92270
Protection Equipment Spec	2	92250
Appr Protection Equipment Spec	2	92230
Intelligence Officer	1	
Intelligence Operations Tech	1	20470
Intelligence Operations Spec	1	20450
Supply Spec	1	645XX
Admin Spec	2	702X0
Security Police	6	1 81170/5 81150
Administration	14	11 702X0/2 732X0/1 751X0
Supply	5	1 E6424A/4 645XI
Pilots	80	
Navigators	40	
Flight Engineers	<u>40</u>	
	208	

## PART III AIRCRAFT MAINT/AVIONICS/FIELD MAINTENANCE

## SECTION A AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Aircraft Maintenance	1
NGOIC Maintenance	1
Inspection Tech	2
Functional Check Flight Officer	1
Maintenance Control Officer	1
Maintenance Control Techs	7
Plans & Sched =	3
Training Control	1
Maint Analysis	1
Material Control	1
Reparable Proc AWP	3
Key Punch	2
Veh EQ Records	2
Reports	$\frac{1}{27}$

## SECTION B AVIONICS

Radio	13
Radar	22
Elect Maint	1
Instruments	$\frac{9}{45}$

## SECTION C FIELD MAINTENANCE

Machine Shop	1
Metal Process	1
Structural Repair	7
Paint	3
Survival Equip	4
Corrosion Control	18
Recip Engines	28
Propellor	7
Aerospace Systems	1
Repair/Reclamation	8
Fuel Systems	1
Pneudraulics	3
Wheel & Tire	1
AGE	10
Period Maint Officer	1
Periodic Maint	21
Flight Line A Maint	102
Organ Maint	6
Electrical Systems	<u>9</u>
	232
TOTALS FOR PART III	
Section A	27
Section B	45
Section C	<u>232</u>
	304



[REDACTED]

Phu Cat AB, RVN. On 12 May 1970, PacSctyRgn informed this unit that Hq USAFSS strongly objected to this measure and also requested additional comments be forwarded to Region headquarters. These comments were to also include any indications the 6994 Scty Sq might have had of MACV planning for location of the Tan Son Nhut based QRC-346 resources.<sup>54</sup>

[REDACTED] On 25 May 1970 the 6994 Scty Sq informed PacSctyRgn that the proposal to move the QRC-346 components/aircraft to Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq was based on two factors:

(1) A desire to retain all COMJAM aircraft and consoles at one single location.

(2) A requirement to maintain all aircraft capable of accepting Zulu Consoles at TSN, NKP and at DNG.

An alternate consideration tendered to Region would be to retain all the consoles at Tan Son Nhut and divide the COMJAM aircraft between TSN and Phu Cat. Unless contrary to the desires of USAFSS and/or PacSctyRgn, the 6994 Scty Sq indicated that execution of the alternative consideration, outlined above would be acted upon.<sup>55</sup> At the close of this reporting period, no further action had been decided upon and the proposals tendered by the 6994 Scty Sq were implemented as stated in the previous paragraphs.

#### Cambodian ARDF Missions

[REDACTED] The massive allied push into Cambodia in an effort to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

locate and capture VC and NVA sanctuaries, provided the 6994 Scty Sq yet another opportunity to outline the value of Security Service support of an armed conflict and ranks as the most important and significant development during this reporting period. On 2 May 1970, the 6994 Scty Sq launched the initial four missions into the "Parrots Beak" in support of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and into the "Fish Hook" area in support of operations being conducted there by the US 1st Airborne Calvary.<sup>56</sup>

[REDACTED] After the initial four missions were fraged into Cambodia, the beginning weeks of this operation saw the 6994 Scty Sq become the recipient of numerous and widespread tasking changes and requirements levied by a number of agencies.<sup>57</sup>

[REDACTED] On 3 May, NRV(C) directed a dedicated ARDF effort be inaugurated against Communist Headquarters, South Vietnam (COSVN) and Headquarters, South Vietnam (Hq SVN) units of COSVN. Ten specific targets were identified in this tasking which were to be fixed as often as possible, relayed air-to-ground, and in turn, passed to NRV(C) via Operations Communications (OPSCOM) circuits at FLASH precedence. This procedure would insure COMUSMACV had access to every possible piece of information relative to enemy target locations in the most timely manner.<sup>58</sup>

[REDACTED] On 4 May 1970, the ACC stated that MACV had directed

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


take 24-hour coverage be maintained in the Fish Hook area. Coordination was immediately effected between Air Force and Army Aviation units to develop and implement alternate execution procedures necessary to comply with this tasking and to provide for any and all eventuality due to weather, air and/or ground aborts.<sup>59</sup>

[REDACTED] As of 30 June, the 6994 Scty Sq flew 95 missions in support of these operations, dedicated to maintaining absolute continuity on the movements of COSVN and related units. Intermittently during this period aircraft were tasked with CAST IRON coverage against this target and throughout the period 24-hour coverage was expended.<sup>60</sup> The Cambodian operations provided the 6994 Scty Sq an opportunity to explore means of expanding the potential for ARDF exploitation in an armed conflict. In coordination with the 46C TRW and 7AF, the 6994 Scty Sq instituted procedures to pass fix information to an orbiting RF-4C Photo Reconnaissance aircraft. In June, the first mission under this concept was flown and the operation continued for seven days. After the initial seven days, this procedure was altered. Selected fixes were sanitized and passed to the 46C TRW and they in turn, launched a photo reconnaissance aircraft to cover the target areas. On 30 June, this phase of the operations was terminated along with the entire test.

[REDACTED]



IR




SEA ARDF  
AREAS AS  
OF 30 JUN 76

INITIAL MISSIONS



IK



SEA AROUND AREAS AS OF 30 JUNE 78

THROUGH 30 JUNE



[REDACTED]

Throughout the period of this test, 412 fixes were passed and as a result, 65 photo runs were conducted. In view of the high interest in this type of coordinated effort, 7AF was exploring the possibility of expanding this operation to include Forward Air Control (FAC) aircraft, photo-reconnaissance and other tactical strike aircraft such as AC-119 Gunships.<sup>61</sup>

[REDACTED] At the close of this reporting period, the 6994 Soty Sq has continued flights into Cambodia on a regular basis, along with areas immediately adjacent to the border in support of allied operations being conducted there.

Operational Test of Radio Fingerprinting in Airborne Platform (ARDF)

[REDACTED] On 23 April 1970, Hq USAFSS informed the 6994 Soty Sq that preliminary plans had been taken to conduct an operational test of Radio Fingerprinting (RFP) aboard a zulu-configured EC-47 platform. This test was to be conducted utilizing a LEFAIR KNEE RFP System on loan from the Army. USAFSS indicated that this equipment would reach their headquarters not later than 1 August 1970; and the system was scheduled for field testing at Detachment 3, 6994 Soty Sq on or about 15 September. This time-table would permit two weeks for equipment installation and engineering checkouts by headquarters USAFSS personnel prior to delivery overseas.<sup>62</sup>

[REDACTED]

ec4477.com

ec4477.com



ec4477.com

ec4477.com

ec4477.com

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The purpose of this test was to determine the intelligence value of the LEFAIR KNEE collection capability during an ARDF mission with emphasis directed toward overall utility and speed/accuracy of an analysis effort. Hq USAFSS requested that DIRNSA secure the support of NRV (C), [REDACTED], and MACV (J2) for this program in that the tasking of a COMBAT CROSS Zulu position might have to be altered or cancelled entirely for the duration of this test. NRV(C) then approached MACV for approval to conduct a 30-day operational test of the LEFAIR KNEE RFP equipment using a Tan Son Nhut based EC-47 Zulu configured aircraft. NRV(C) stated that although the ARDF/Collection capability of the aircraft would not be impaired by the test, manning and weight would have to be primary considerations. Most likely, flight duration would be reduced to some extent. On 21 June 1970, approval for the conduct of this test was granted by MACV.<sup>63</sup>

MERCURY GRASS COLLECTION [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 17 January 1970, MACV directed Army LAFFING EAGLE and COMBAT CROSS ZULU aircraft be tasked to search for VHF Multi-channel communications, specifically, MERCURY GRASS (SNVCCO) between 60 and 90 MHz.<sup>64</sup> Specific tasking for this effort was provided by the ACC on 19 February along with instructions that this

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

tasking would encompass all assigned mission areas but would be conducted so as not to interfere with normal ARDF/Collection operations. Guidance and traffic analysis assistance was requested from NEV(G) to supplement this tasking and on 20 February, NEV(G) provided all technical details and forwarding instructions relative to tapes and raw traffic produced from intercept of this entity.<sup>65</sup>

[REDACTED] While keeping PacSctyRgn informed of the above developments, the 6994 Scty Sq also suggested that all intercept data from COMBAT CROSS platforms be forwarded to USM-808 for final processing and end-product reporting. This recommendation was generated in view of the shortage of qualified linguistic (A203KLND) personnel within the 6994 Scty Sq.<sup>66</sup> PacSctyRgn, on 25 February 1970, approved this action in full.<sup>67</sup>

[REDACTED] To date, only the COMBAT CROSS Zulu configured aircraft staging from Detachment 2, 6994 Scty Sq have experienced positive reflections of this communications entity in SEA. The activity has been noted within a frequency range extending from 60 to 69 MHz and overall, has been very sparse.<sup>68</sup>

ARDF Improvement Actions (C) - Project VACUUM CLEANER

[REDACTED] On 19 February, the Commander, 509 Radio Research Group (RRG), informed the 6994 Scty Sq that a review of the ARDF Airborne System and their ability to satisfy MACV Essential Elements

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

of Information (EEI's) had been conducted by the ACC. As a result of this review and coordination/discussion with AFSSO 7AF, the Commanding Officer, 175 Radio Research Company (RRCO), NRV(C), a test concept was developed and identified as Project VACUUM CLEANER. This test was designed to compare several totally different methods of ARDF acquisition through statistics compiled during the test. Through this compilation and the analysis of comparative data, a review of the entire spectrum of ARDF Operations was accomplished. When completed, it was hoped that the final product of this test would provide an increase in productivity of all available ARDF resources. In addition to the primary purpose of this project a synopsis of the test concept was also published on 19 February.<sup>69</sup> Specific tasking, sortie alignment, and aircraft configuration requirements necessary for this test were published by the ACC on 20 February.<sup>70</sup>

[REDACTED] To further outline the results of this test the charts/graphs on the following pages have been included in lieu of a voluminous narrative summation.

[REDACTED]

# VALUITY LEANER PHASE 1

69

		21		22		23		24		25		TOTAL	
<b>TOTAL TARGETS WORKED (ARR)</b>		35		72		20		9		83		219	
<b>Fixes &amp; Cuts (ARR)</b>		34		62		20		8		69		193	
<b>Fixes &amp; Cuts w/4's</b>		30	88%	59	94%	18	90%	7	89%	62	90%	170	88%
<b>Fixes &amp; Cuts w/4's - IDENTED</b>		15	50%	34	58%	10	56%	2	29%	37	59%	98	58%
<b>Unique RAs - Fixed &amp; Cut</b>		11		22		6		2		18		59 31%	
<b>Priority One</b>	TOTAL	1	7%	4	9%	0	0%	0	0%	1	1%	12	15%
	UNIQUE	1	7%	3	14%	0	0%	0	0%	3	17%	7	12%
<b>Priority Two</b>	TOTAL	0	0%	3	9%	1	10%	0	0%	3	8%	7	7%
	UNIQUE	0	0%	2	9%	1	17%	0	0%	2	11%	5	8%
<b>Priority Three</b>	TOTAL	7	47%	14	41%	6	60%	1	50%	17	44%	45	46%
	UNIQUE	3	27%	6	27%	2	35%	1	50%	4	22%	16	29%
<b>TOTAL PRIORITIES</b>		8	53%	21	62%	7	70%	1	50%	27	73%	67	69%
		4	36%	11	50%	3	50%	1	50%	9	50%	28	47%

**PHASE ONE Criteria:**

1. One EC-47CC (AIR-35).
  2. Different FRAG each day.
  3. Attempt to fix all VC/NVA tgts betwn 44-6800KH26.
  4. No tip-offs from the ground.
  5. No Tech Data on board.
- No effort to obtain complete copy.

# VACUUM CLEANER PHASE 2

(DFR)

	26	27	28	29	30	TOTAL	
TOTAL TARGETS WORKED (MR)	28	18	21	15	(ALR-34) 59	141	
Fixes & Cuts (DFR)	26	12	18	11	41	108	
Fixes & Cuts w/cls.	26 100%	12 100%	17 81%	10 67%	54 83%	99 92%	
Fixes & Cuts w/cls - IDENTED	13 50%	9 75%	11 62%	5 45%	18 44%	56 52%	
Unique RDs - Fixed & Cut	9	7	9	5	16	46 43%	
Priority One	TOTAL	2 15%	0 0%	1 7%	0 0%	4 22%	7 15%
	UNDEF	2 22%	0 0%	1 11%	0 0%	3 19%	6 13%
Priority Two	TOTAL	1 8%	1 11%	3 29%	2 14%	5 17%	10 20%
	UNDEF	1 11%	1 14%	2 22%	2 14%	2 13%	8 17%
Priority Three	TOTAL	4 31%	3 33%	5 45%	1 20%	2 11%	15 29%
	UNDEF	2 22%	2 29%	4 44%	1 20%	2 13%	11 24%
TOTAL PRIORITIES	TOTAL	7 54%	4 45%	9 83%	3 68%	9 50%	32 59%
	UNDEF	5 56%	3 43%	7 78%	3 60%	7 44%	25 54%

**PHASE TWO Criteria:**

1. One EC-4700 (ALR-35).
2. Different frag each day.
3. Attempt to fix all VC/NVA tgts btwn 44-6800 KHZ.
4. No tip-offs from the ground.
5. C/S & RD list on board-reduce nr of dupe fixes on RDs.
6. No effort to obtain complete copy.



# VACUUM CLEANER

## PHASE 3

(DPR)

03 04 05 06 07 TOTAL

TOTAL TARGET WORKED (ARR)		10	55	18	10	62	155						
Fixes & Cuts (DPR)		7	49	15	7	60	138						
Fixes & Cuts with C/Ss		7	70%	49	100%	23	87%	6	86%	55	92%	130	94%
Fixes & Cuts with C/Ss - IDENTED		4	57%	34	69%	10	77%	3	50%	33	60%	84	65%
Unique RDs - Fixed & Cut		3	16	7	2	20	48	35%					
Priority One	TOTAL	1	25%	4	11%	0	0%	0	0%	3	9%	8	10%
	UNIQUE	1	33%	2	12%	0	0%	0	0%	2	17%	5	14%
Priority Two	TOTAL	0	0%	3	8%	2	20%	0	0%	4	12%	9	11%
	UNIQUE	0	0%	2	12%	2	29%	0	0%	3	15%	7	18%
Priority Three	TOTAL	2	50%	7	25%	6	60%	5	100%	0	0%	20	24%
	UNIQUE	1	33%	2	12%	3	43%	2	67%	0	0%	8	17%
TOTAL Priorities	TOTAL	5	75%	16	44%	8	80%	5	100%	7	21%	37	44%
	UNIQUE	2	67%	6	38%	5	71%	2	67%	5	25%	20	42%

**PHASE THREE Criteria:**

1. One EC-47CC (AIR-35)
2. Different frag each day.
3. Attempt to fix all VC/RVA tgts btwn 44-6800KHZ.
4. Tip-offs w/be accepted and will pre-empt abn tgts being worked.
5. C/S & RD list on board to reduce nr of dupe fixes on RIs.
6. No effort to obtain complete copy.

# VACUUM CLEANER

## PHASE 4

(DFR)

12

	08	09	10	11	12	TOTAL	
TOTAL TARGETS WORKED (ACT)	17	36	19	5	14	91	
Fixes + Cuts (DFR)	17	28	19	5	12	81	
Fixes + Cuts w/C/Ss	15 / 88%	28 / 100%	19 / 100%	4 / 80%	12 / 100%	78 / 96%	
Fixes + Cuts w/C/Ss - IDENTED	7 / 47%	21 / 75%	13 / 68%	3 / 75%	12 / 100%	56 / 69%	
UNIQUE RDs - Fixed + Cut	6	17	10	2	12	47 / 84%	
Priority One	TOTAL	3 / 43%	3 / 14%	0 / 0%	0 / 0%	5 / 42%	11 / 102%
	UNIQUE	3 / 50%	2 / 12%	0 / 0%	0 / 0%	5 / 42%	10 / 112%
Priority Two	TOTAL	0 / 0%	3 / 14%	4 / 31%	0 / 0%	2 / 17%	9 / 142%
	UNIQUE	0 / 0%	3 / 18%	3 / 30%	0 / 0%	2 / 17%	8 / 172%
Priority Three	TOTAL	0 / 0%	5 / 24%	5 / 38%	2 / 67%	1 / 8%	13 / 232%
	UNIQUE	0 / 0%	4 / 24%	5 / 30%	1 / 50%	1 / 8%	9 / 192%
TOTAL Priorities	3 / 43%	11 / 52%	9 / 43%	2 / 67%	8 / 47%	33 / 592%	
	3 / 50%	9 / 53%	6 / 60%	1 / 50%	8 / 67%	27 / 52%	

**PHASE FOUR CRITERIA:**

1. One EC-47CC (AIR-35).
2. Different Frag each day.
3. Attempt to fix all VC/NVA tgts btwn 44-6800KHZ.
4. Accept tip-offs & pass ARDF results air-ground.
5. Utilize Cherry Sheets & Tech Aids.
6. No effort to obtain complete copy.

# VACUUM CLEANER

(DFR)

PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 PHASE 4 ALL-PHASES

		PHASE 1		PHASE 2		PHASE 3		PHASE 4		ALL-PHASES	
TOTAL TARGETS WORKED (DPR)		219		141		155		91		606	
Fixes & Cuts (DPR)		193		108		138		81		520	
Fixes + Cuts w/C/Ss		170	88%	99	91%	130	91%	78	96%	497	96%
Fixes + Cuts w/C/S-IDENTED		98		56		84		56		294	
Unique RDs - Fixed & Cut		59		46		48		47		200	
Priority One	TOTAL	12		7		8		11		38	
	UNIQUE	7		6		5		10		28	
Priority Two	TOTAL	7		10		9		9		35	
	UNIQUE	5		8		7		8		28	
Priority Three	TOTAL	45		15		20		15		95	
	UNIQUE	26		11		8		7		44	
Total Priorities		64		32		37		33		166	
		28		25		20		27		100	


FIXES & CUTS  
-1019  
IDENTIFIED

PHASE 1

PHASE 2

PHASE 3

PHASE 4




--- Vacuum Cleaner Effectiveness

--- Normal ARDF Effectiveness (straight CC-1-15 Feb)




75

# FIXES & CUTS WITH CALL SIGNS




--- Vacuum Cleaner Effectiveness  
 --- Normal MRDE Effectiveness (straight line - 1-15 Feb)

# UNITED PRIORITIES



UNIQUE ADS -  
FIXED + CUT



--- Vacuum Cleaner Effectiveness  
- - - Normal ARDF Effectiveness (straight CC - 1-15 Feb)

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER III

SIGINT PROCESSING AND REPORTING

GENERAL

[REDACTED] During the period 1 January to 30 June 1970 the processing and reporting functions of the 6994 Scty Sq Local Operations Branch remained relatively stable. The only major problem experienced in the area of processing occurred in conjunction with the move of Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq from Fleiku AB to Da Nang AB and the relocation of the 138 Radio Research Company to Phu Bai. This problem is covered in detail in subsequent paragraphs of the report. The reporting functions also underwent one major change and one revision of procedures. The day-to-day reporting deviations are discussed in brief in this chapter but the majority of this text centers on DANCER\* Transcription Support to USA-563 and the receipt/implementation of Provisional Techins 2038, "ARDF Technical Reporting."<sup>1</sup>

SIGINT PROCESSING

ARDF Feedback

[REDACTED] During the latter part of February 1970, the 6994 Scty Sq was placed on distribution for a number of ARDF Feedback reports issued by the various U.S. Army field units. Although these reports were not specific in nature, 6994 Scty Sq personnel were

\*DANCERS: ARVN Personnel used to transcribe voice intercept tapes and provide USAFSS/ASA personnel with a reliable/readable transcript for [REDACTED] subsequent reporting.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

provided with data relative to the individual fix locations and the date the fix was obtained. By reviewing these feedback reports as received, operations personnel of the 6994 Scty Sq were able to establish a program whereby this information could be correlated to an individual crew/mission. In addition, wherever possible, information of this nature was incorporated into the Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS) and the Weekly Combat Cross Report. Inclusion in these two reports enabled the 6994 Scty Sq to provide higher echelons with information relative to significant ARDF contributions to field force commanders.<sup>2</sup>

[REDACTED] Although this program established the basic foundation for a composite feedback program throughout the USAFSS ARDF units, a method whereby continuing data, specific in nature, had yet to be agreed upon by operational and customer agencies. Coordination has continued, and in recent weeks, MACV has stated their desire to develop a substantial feedback program for all units participating in the ARDF mission in Southeast Asia.<sup>3</sup>

Voice Processing - USA-563/USM-604

[REDACTED] For the period 1 January through mid May 1970, all voice intercept tapes obtained by crews assigned to Detachment 2, 6994 Scty Sq were being forwarded to USM-604 after mission recovery. USM-604 then transcribed this intercept and returned the finished product to Det 2

[REDACTED]

6994SSHR 1-70

[REDACTED]

for final reporting.

[REDACTED] On 15 May 1970, USM-604 notified Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq that the Army unit (138RRC) would be moving the majority of their transcription resources to Ihu Bai but that Det 2 would have access to DANCER personnel available for transcription duties through 29 May 1970.<sup>4</sup> Det 2 stated they would forward all plaintext intercept to USM-808 for processing in the interim. On receipt of the finalized transcripts from USM-808, Det 2 then prepared and forwarded the Southeast Asian Technical Summary (SEATS) Report on this intercept.<sup>5</sup>

[REDACTED] Although this procedure was somewhat complicated and time consuming, customers were receiving their product on a basis which provided them with the most accurate possible transcript/trans-lation. The following paragraphs are provided to further expand upon the transcription problems at Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq and the actions generated by the squadron as a result to try and resolve this problem.

#### DANCER Transcription Support

[REDACTED] During this reporting period, one of the most significant developments relative to the transcription/processing of ARDF products, specifically Vietnamese Voice intercept, centered on the availability of competent transcribers. This problem became even more acute as the result of the move of USM-604. The paragraphs below are included to amplify the considerable correspondence/coordination per-

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

inent to this problem and the resultant actions as of 30 June 1970.

[REDACTED] DANCER transcription support was originally initiated for Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq as a product of a detailed test conducted between November 1969 and January 1970. This test proved that DANCER processing was the most superior method of obtaining a reliable transcript of Vietnamese voice. Prior to the initiation of this test, all magnetic tapes were forwarded via courier to USM-808 for processing. On 19 May 1970, in conjunction with the move of the 138 RRC the 6994 Scty Sq informed PacSctyRgn that NRVC(C) had expressed the desire that Det 2 be provided with a permanent DANCER capability in lieu of regressing to courier procedures. NRVC(C) expressed this desire for two reasons:

(1) Will all processing being completed at Det 2, the reporting timeliness was substantially increased and;

(2) The voice processing capabilities (203XLMD) at USM-808 were already saturated with ground-based intercept take. Admittedly, a few obstacles were presented by the assignment of two DANCER personnel at Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, but it was felt that pursuit of this action was justifiable.<sup>6</sup>

[REDACTED] PacSctyRgn, in response to the above proposal, informed the 6994 Scty Sq that they did not concur with the squadron's efforts to obtain two DANCER personnel on a permanent basis at Det 2.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Additionally, PacSctyHgn stated this action conflicted with the Headquarters and Region policy and pending the outcome of further discussions, the 6994 Scty Sq should refrain from pursuing this project further.<sup>7</sup>

[REDACTED] The 6994 Scty Sq however, felt that adequate justification existed for the continuance of this project and on 22 May 1970 tendered the following recommendations in favor of retaining the two DANCER personnel at Det 2:

(1) The fact that NRV(C) had a stated position as the SIGINT advisor to COMUSMACV would direct Det 2 to continue all processing/reporting functions as was in effect (i.e., making full use of DANCER personnel) and;

(2) The stated COMUSMACV's policy that a requirement would be generated which would levy Det 2 with processing and reporting all voice intercept as soon as possible and in no case would this timeliness exceed 24 hours after initial intercept.<sup>8</sup>

[REDACTED] The demand for 24 hour timeliness, coupled with the proven factor that USAFSS/ASA linguists were unable to produce reliable/accurate transcripts on the majority of G/G VC plaintext/chatter, were also major proponents for the continuance of this method of operations at Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq. Additionally, the relocation of the 138 RRC to Phu Bai and Det 2's move to Da Nang would preclude the

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

availability of timely courier service for these products. Without the support of DANCER's than, MACV could readily reinstitute OPSTOPS at Phu Bai; a policy not concurred with by either 7AF or 460TRW. At the same time, Det 2's operation would revert to being one of a "collector only" in the area of voice intercept.<sup>9</sup>

[REDACTED] Although correspondence continued between units on this subject throughout May 1970, distinct actions of any kind remained vague.<sup>10</sup> On 11 June 1970, the 509RRG verbally submitted a proposal to the 6994 Scty Sq which would move 37 personnel to Da Nang from USM-808. Included in this figure were 21 DANCER personnel. This agreement, if activated, would be beneficial to the 509 RRG in that they would have a processing facility at Da Nang and eliminate OPSTOPS at USM-808. The 6994 Scty Sq would have available DANCER personnel to perform the bulk of voice transcription duties. On this same date, PacSctyRgn was also informed that MACV (J-21) and NRK(C) had approved of this action and that a detailed plan was being submitted to USASAPAC for approval.<sup>11</sup>

[REDACTED] On 15 June 1970, the 6994 Scty Sq informed PacSctyRgn of the myriad details commensurate with a DANCER effort at Da Nang in conjunction with Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq's operation. PacSctyRgn was also advised that no commitments had been made regarding the billeting of personnel, administrative support, logistics support,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

messing facilities/support, etc., and that the 509 had was shooting for a target date of 1-10 July 1970.<sup>12</sup>

[REDACTED] Through 30 June 1970, negotiations between the 509 HRC, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 6994 Scty Sq and PacSctyRgn continued. As of the close of this reporting period the problem, although partially resolved/agreed upon by all agencies, had not yet become a reality. A workable system to provide the maximum transcription effort against all intercepted enemy voice traffic was still being sought after and of major concern to all parties.<sup>13</sup>

#### SIGINT REPORTING

##### GENERAL

[REDACTED] Overall, the reporting process within the 6994 Scty Sq Operations Branch underwent only one major change. Personnel continued utilizing the Exploitable Message Report (EMR); weekly Combat Cross Report; Southeast Asian Technical Summary (SEATS); Commando Forge Operations/Exploitation Summary; and the Technical Weekly Recapitulation (TECHMECAP). All of these reports were documented in the 6994 Scty Sq Historical Report for the period ending 31 December 1969.<sup>14</sup>

[REDACTED] During this reporting period, the 6994 Scty Sq reporting functions implemented the ARDF Recovery Report (ARR). The following

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

paragraphs detail the events prior to the implementation of this reporting vehicle, the governing document and the results of the reports utilization through 30 June 1970.

[REDACTED] In May 1970, through coordination with NRV(C), the 6994 Scty Sq was advised of the possible implementation of TECHINS 2038 (Provisional), which outlined the criteria for "ARDF Technical Reporting." However, this action was contingent on the following items:

- (1) The complete approval of the procedures by Analysis and Reporting personnel of the 6994 Scty Sq.
- (2) The acceptance by MACV of the Daily Vietnamese Communist SIGINT Locations report (DVCSLR) (report includes data extracted from ARDF/MRDF/SRDF) instead of the Sanitized Daily Fix Report (SDFR).
- (3) MACV's willingness to slip time requirements for the Intelligence Data Handling Section (IDHS) production of the Daily Intelligence Reports. Additionally, notification was provided that consultation with MACV would be conducted on the above procedures and the 6994 Scty Sq analysis and reporting personnel would be queried relative to their views on this document and the procedures therein.<sup>15</sup>

[REDACTED] On 7 May 1970, instructions for the initiation of the new machine-formatted ARDF Recovery Report (ARR) were received from the ARDF Coordinating Center, and notification that these procedures

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

would become effective on 23 May 1970.<sup>16</sup>

[REDACTED] On 15 May 1970, DIRNSA informed the 6994 Scty Sq that provisional TECHINS 2038 was being forwarded under a separate cover and that they required comments as soon as possible. DIRNSA also stated that the subject document was to be implemented in full on 6 June 1970.<sup>17</sup>

[REDACTED] On 5 June 1970, USAFSS stated that they had informed DIRNSA that they concurred with the implementation of this provisional document but that due to the late receipt subsequent changes/recommendations might be forthcoming.<sup>18</sup>

[REDACTED] As directed, the 6994 Scty Sq and all subordinate units implemented the procedures outlined in Provisional TECHINS 2038 and began reporting ARDF Fix information via the ARDF Recovery Report. Since that time, relatively few problems in this area have been encountered by any of the 6994 Scty Sq units. As necessary due to day-to-day fluctuations in mission tasking, changes/revisions are submitted to DIRNSA after complete coordination with field units and customer agencies for inclusion into the hard copy TECHINS.<sup>19</sup>

#### ACRP TACREP Handling Procedures

[REDACTED] On 1 January 1970, the 6994 Scty Sq was informed by [REDACTED] that all Tactical Reports (TACREPS) received by Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq from orbiting ACRP aircraft would be handled in

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

accordance with a DIRNSA message published in November 1969.<sup>20</sup> This message outlined the requirement for Det 3 to accept, receipt for, and provide CRITCOM insertion of all ACRP generated TACREPS. These procedures were relayed to USA-564, USA-522, USA-522J and USM-808 on the following day.<sup>21</sup>

[REDACTED] In conjunction with the procedural change cited above for ACRP TACREP handling, PacSctyRgn also published an electrical change to PacSctyRgn Operations Order (OPORD) 100-69 to reflect these changes and included the procedures for the handling/relay of TACREPS and/or product reports received via the URC-53 System. At this point in time it became evident that the reporting role of Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq would become unique for an ARDF unit. Numerous problems were to arise in this area during the reporting period, the major ones being documented in the following paragraphs.<sup>22</sup>

[REDACTED] On 27 February 1970, PacSctyRgn issued Change Nr. Three to PacSctyRgn OPORD 100-69. This change levied analysis personnel at Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq with the requirement to provide the 6994 Scty Sq with a tip-off via OPSCOM, whenever a CRITIC was issued. This tip-off would include the report subject, details and all supporting technical data necessary for clarity.<sup>23</sup>

[REDACTED] Prior to the occurrence above, on 24 February 1970, DIRNSA provided Det 3 with the authority to release lateral and follow-up CRITICS. As a result, another change was made necessary to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FacSctyRgn OPOFD 100-69.<sup>24</sup>

[REDACTED] In direct conjunction with the buildup of the activity in Laos (Plain de Jar), DIRNSA revised the TACREP reporting criteria for both USA-564 and USM-7. These changes include two major items:

(1) Elimination of TACREP's issued relative to unknown target transmitters and receivers and;

(2) The elimination of TACREP's regarding locations of Viet Cong elements more than five nautical miles of U.S. and/or allied forces sites.<sup>25</sup>

[REDACTED] Through mid June 1970, TACREP reporting and handling procedures at Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq remained fairly consistent with only minor changes. In conjunction with the above paragraph a discrepancy was noted in reporting practices used by the two units. This discrepancy was noted after a TDY trip by two ACC individuals to both USA-564 and USM-7. It was noted that the conflict centered around fix locations of VC forces in excess of 5 nautical miles from U.S./Allied forces/sites. Review of subject reports and queries forwarded to Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq revealed that the difference existed in view of the fix radius of an individual fix and that strict adherence to this criteria was nearly impossible.<sup>26</sup>

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sanitized ARDF Reporting Air-to-Ground in SEA Area 01

[REDACTED] In December 1969 and January 1970, a concentrated operation by ARVN forces in the area of the U Minh Forest in the Delta Region of South Vietnam afforded the 6994 Scty Sq an opportunity to exploit another facet of the ARDF operations conducted from Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN in support of a specific armed conflict.

[REDACTED] On 19 December 1969 the 6994 Scty Sq received authority from MACV to initiate air-to-ground reporting sanitized fix locations to the 21 Division Combat Advisory Team (21 DCAT) in support of ARVN forces mentioned above.<sup>27</sup> During the remainder of December 1969, final coordination of this action was conducted with S30 Can Tho and the initial operations for this project commenced on 1 January 1970.<sup>28</sup>

[REDACTED] This project required the ARDF aircraft to pass the fix location (UTM Coordinates) of enemy target transmitters along with the time the fix was acquired, A/G to the 21 DCAT. This was accomplished utilizing a separate cipher keylist from that which was used to pass the complete fix data A/G to the DSU at Can Tho.

[REDACTED] Although this operation was initiated on 1 January 1970 the initial fix was passed on mission 801F flown on 10 January 1970. Prior to this date, minor problems were experienced establishing cipher contact with the ground unit. The project continued until 4 February with sporadic results due to negative contact and on this date the ACC instructed the 6994 Scty Sq to discontinue this project

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

during the TET holidays which were scheduled to occur between 4 and 10 February. Later this same date, the entire project was discontinued for an indefinite period and no further actions were taken by the 6994 Scty Sq.<sup>29</sup>

SEA Air-Related CRITIC Reporting

[REDACTED] In that Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq maintained A/G communi- cations with ACRP aircraft operating over South Vietnam/Laos/Cam- bodia and the adjacent overwater routes (i.e., Gulf of Tonkin) they were also tasked with relaying CRITIC and follow-up information from these aircraft in conjunction with TACREP handling procedures. A problem centered on this reporting procedure arose during April and May 1970.

[REDACTED] During the latter part of April and May correspon- dence between [REDACTED] PacSctyRgn, [REDACTED] 6994 Scty Sq and Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq relative to this subject resulted in the fact that the 6994 Scty Sq and subordinate detachments were tasked to issue CRITIC re- ports on the event that a Combat Cross Zulu aircraft were lost due to hostile fire. In that the 6994 Scty Sq was issuing Airborne Incident Reports (AIR) whenever ARDF aircraft met with hostile fire it was felt that CRITIC reporting of these actions was unnecessary. However, the recommendations to retain CRITIC relay responsibilities

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

at Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq was also tendered in view of the ACRP flying in that area of operation. In reply, on 23 May 1970, PacSctyRgn advised that efforts were being made to relieve the 6994 Scty Sq units of this tasking requirement but until achieved, original instructions published by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] would remain in effect.<sup>30</sup>

[REDACTED] In addition, it was suggested to Region that NEW(C)/ [REDACTED] and/or DIRNSA extract pertinent data from individual unit AIR's and issue the CRITIC's accordingly.

[REDACTED] On 23 May 1970, DIRNSA published instructions which stated that the 6994 Scty Sq and subordinate units had a definite requirement to hold TECHINS 4019 and all supplements in that these units had CRITIC reporting responsibilities. These instructions indicated that SEA ADF units would issue CRITICS on all SIGINT platforms that are attacked by or are lost due to North Vietnamese Fighter/SAM activity.<sup>31</sup>

[REDACTED] As of the close of this reporting period, all units within the 6994 Scty Sq hold and have implemented these instructions for CRITIC reporting.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

## FOOTNOTES

## CHAPTER I

1. 6994 Scty Sq Historical Report, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 1969, 15 Mar 70, [REDACTED]
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. OPINS 3561, 12 Dec 69, [REDACTED].
6. Msg, 2515484, CSAF to 6994 Scty Sq, 25 Jun 70, [REDACTED], Doc #1.
7. 6994 Scty Sq Historical Report, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 1969, 15 Mar 70, [REDACTED]
8. Ibid.
9. 460TRW/6994 Scty Sq, Joint Operating Agreement Nr. 2-1, 4 Jan 70, [REDACTED]
10. 460TRW/6994 Scty Sq, JOA 55-1, Mission Profile, 14 Feb 70, [REDACTED]  
460TRW/6994 Scty Sq, JOA 55-2, Mission Accomplishment, 21 Feb 70, [REDACTED]  
460TRW/6994 Scty Sq, JOA 55-5, Replot Procedures, 13 Mar 70, [REDACTED], Doc #5.  
460TRW/6994 Scty Sq, JOA 55-7, Alternate Execution Procedures, 24 Mar 70, [REDACTED], Doc #6.  
460TRW/6994 Scty Sq, JOA 60-3, Participation in Flights Aboard EC-47 Aircraft, 22 May 70, [REDACTED], Doc #7.

[REDACTED]

460TRW/6994 Scty Sq, JCA 5-1, Construction of Joint Operating Agreements, 23 May 70, (U), Doc #8.

11. 6994 Scty Sq Historical Report, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 1969, 15 Mar 1970, [REDACTED]
  12. Msg, 022145Z, Pac Scty Rgn to 6994 Scty Sq, Relocation of 362 TEWS, 2 Jan 70, [REDACTED] Doc #9.
  13. Msg, 201530Z, COMUSMACV to CG XXIV Corps, Relocation of 362 TEWS, 20 Mar 70, [REDACTED], Doc #10.
  14. Ibid.
  15. Msg, 210250Z, 6994 Scty Sq to 7AF, relocation of 362 TEWS, 21 Mar 70, [REDACTED], Doc #11.
  16. Msg, 230700Z, 7AF to 6994 Scty Sq, Relocation of 362 TEWS, 23 Mar 70, [REDACTED], Doc #12.
  17. Msg, 290202Z, 7AF to CINCPAC, Relocation of 362 TEWS, 29 Mar 70, [REDACTED] Doc #13.
  18. Movement Order, Nr. 11, Hq Pac Scty Rgn, 6 Apr 70, [REDACTED], Doc #14.
  19. Msg, 090311Z, 6994 Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, Relocation Agenda for 362TEWS/Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 9 Apr 70, [REDACTED] Doc #15.
  20. Msg, 160645Z, COMUSMACV to 7AF/6994 Scty Sq, Relocation of 362 TEWS, 16 Apr 70, [REDACTED], Doc #16.
  21. 6994 Scty Sq Historical Report, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 1969, 15 Mar 70, [REDACTED]
  22. Ibid.
  23. Msg, 160055Z, SSO MACV to SSO CINCPAC, Headroom Space Ceiling for EC-47 Operations from Thailand (COMMANDO FORGE) [REDACTED] 16 Mar 70, (SHVCCO), Doc #17.
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

24. Msg, 052310Z, Pac Scty Rgn to 6994 Scty Sq, Area Clearance/  
Project Identifier, 5 Feb 70, [REDACTED], Doc #18.

Msg, 062118Z, Pac Scty Rgn to 6994 Scty Sq, Area Clearance,  
6 Feb 70, (U), Doc #19.

25. Msg, 232305Z, 6994 Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, Project Identifi-  
fiers, 23 Mar 70, [REDACTED], Doc #20.

26. Msg, 270017Z, Pac Scty Rgn to 6994 Scty Sq, Status Report  
on Manpower/Ceiling Problem at Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq, 27 Mar 70,  
[REDACTED] Doc #21.

27. 6994 Scty Sq, Weekly Activity Report, 27 Apr 70, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

28. Msg, 232020Z, NSAPAC to [REDACTED], Expiration  
of TDY Authority for Two EC-47's at NKP, 23 Apr 70, [REDACTED],  
Doc #22.

29. Msg, 240045Z, Pac Scty Rgn to 6994 Scty Sq, Expiration of  
TDY Authority for Two EC-47's at NKP, 24 Apr 70, [REDACTED] Doc #23.

30. Msg, 240800Z, AFSSC 7AF to NSAPACREF Vietnam(C), Request for  
Interim Extension TDY EC-47 Acft at NKP, 24 Apr 70, [REDACTED],  
Doc #24.

31. Msg, 240928Z, [REDACTED] to 6994 Scty Sq, TDY/PCS  
Status for Two EC-47's at NKP, 24 Apr 70, (SHVCCO), Doc #25.

32. Msg, 010740Z, [REDACTED] to DIRNSA, PCS Status  
for Two EC-47 Aircraft at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand, 1 May 70,  
[REDACTED], Doc #26.

33. 6994 Scty Sq Historical Report, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 1969, 15 Mar  
70 [REDACTED]

34. Msg, 160925Z, 6994 Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, MACV Dir 381-23,  
16 Mar 70, [REDACTED] Doc #27.

35. Msg, 200207Z, Pac Scty Rgn to 6994 Scty Sq, MACV Dir 381-23,  
20 Mar 70, [REDACTED], Doc #28.

36. Msg, 020848Z, 6994 Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, ACC Subordination,  
2 Apr 70, [REDACTED], Doc #29.

[REDACTED]



## FOOTNOTES



## CHAPTER II

1. OPINS 3561, 12 Dec 69, [REDACTED].
2. Ibid.
3. 6994 Scty Sq Historical Report, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 1969, [REDACTED].
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Msg, 050158Z, Pac Scty Rgn to USAFSS, Specific Tasking for CCZ Collection Positions, 5 Jun 70, [REDACTED], Doc #30.
11. Msg, 052025Z, USAFSS to Pac Scty Rgn and 6994 Scty Sq, Specific Tasking for CCZ Collection Positions, 5 Jun 70, [REDACTED], Doc #31.
12. Msg, 102125Z, Pac Scty Rgn to USAFSS, Specific Tasking for CCZ Collection Positions, 10 Jun 70, [REDACTED], Doc #32.
13. Msg, 300408Z, Pac Scty Rgn to 6994 Scty Sq, Tasking for CCZ Collection Positions, 30 Jun 70, [REDACTED], Doc #33.
14. Msg, 120855Z, 6994 Scty Sq to Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, Mini-Mod Utilization, 12 Jan 70, [REDACTED], Doc #34.
15. Memorandum, DODSPECREP (MACV) F46/097 to 6994 Scty Sq, Mini-Mod Missions in SEA Area 12, 17 Feb 70, [REDACTED], Doc #35.

- [REDACTED]
16. Ibid.
  17. Msg, 130134Z, 6994 Scty Sq to Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 13 Mar 70, Doc # (unavailable).
  18. Msg, 232031Z, AFSSO USAF to AFSSO PACAF/USAFSS, VHF D/F (Mini-Mod), 23 Mar 70, [REDACTED], Doc #36.
  19. Msg, 241940Z, USAFSS to Pac Scty Rgn, VHF ARDF, 24 Mar 70, [REDACTED] Doc #37.
  20. See Doc #36.  
Msg, 260855Z, 7AF to [REDACTED], VHF D/F Productivity, 26 Mar 70, Doc # (unavailable).
  21. Msg, 200839Z, 6994 Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn and Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq, Deployment of Aircraft, 20 Aug 70, [REDACTED], Doc #38.
  22. Ibid.
  23. Msg, 210430Z, 460TRW to 360TEWS, 362TEWS, Det 2, 460TRW, Aircraft Deployment, 21 Mar 70, [REDACTED] Doc #39.
  24. Msg, 211035Z, 460TRW to 360TEWS, 7AF, 362TEWS, Det 2, 460TRW, Resource Augmentation for Det 2, 460TRW, [REDACTED] Doc #40.
  25. Msg, 211050Z, 6994 Scty Sq to Det 1, 2, and 3, 6994 Scty Sq, NKP Augmentation, 21 Mar 70, [REDACTED], Doc #41.
  26. Msg, 211110Z, 7AF to 460TRW/6994 Scty Sq, Augmentation of COMMANDO FORGE, 21 Mar 70, [REDACTED] Doc #42.
  27. Ibid.
  28. Msg, 301256Z, SSC MACV to AFSSO 7AF/6994 Scty Sq, Return of Two EC-47's CCZ's from NKP RTAFB to RVN, 30 Mar 70, [REDACTED] Doc #43.
  29. Msg, 070045Z, Pac Scty Rgn to 6994 Scty Sq, Movement of Aircraft and Personnel, 7 Apr 70, [REDACTED] Doc #44.
  30. See Doc #43.
- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
31. Msg, 120502Z, 6994 Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, Resume of Meeting Held by NRV(C) on 9 Jan 70, 12 Jan 70, [REDACTED], Doc #45.
  32. Msg, 260915Z, SSO MACV to AFSSO 7AF/6994 Scty Sq/509RRG, OPSTOPS At Da Nang by EC-47's, 26 Jan 70, [REDACTED], Doc #46.
  33. Msg, 060330Z, USM-607 to USM-704, COMBAT COUGAR Zulu OPSTOPS, 6 Jun 70, [REDACTED], Doc #47.
  34. Msg, 090713Z, USA-561 to USM-607, COMBAT COUGAR OPSTOPS, 9 Jun 70, [REDACTED], Doc #48.
  35. 6994 Scty Sq Historical Report, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 1969, 15 Mar 70, [REDACTED]
  36. Msg, 030222Z, Pac Scty Rgn to 6994 Scty Sq, Water Soluble Paper, 3 Jan 70, [REDACTED], Doc #49.
  37. Weekly Activity Report, 6994 Scty Sq, 12 Jan 70, [REDACTED].
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- [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]




  
GLOSSARYA

AB	Air Base
ACC	ARDF Coordinating Center
ACRF	Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Platform
AF	Air Force
AFB	Air Force Base
AFIL	Airfield
AFSC	Air Force Speciality Code
AFSSO	Air Force Special Security Office
AMEB	American Embassy
ARDF	Airborne Radio Direction Finding
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASA	Army Security Agency
ASAPAC	Army Security Agency, Pacific
AVN	Aviation

C

CAS	Controlled American Source
CC	Combat Cross (also Commander)
CCZ	Combat Cross Zulu
CG	Commanding General



[REDACTED]

COMCPACAF            Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Force

COMA                Collection Management Authority

COMINT             Communications Intelligence

COMJAM             Communications Jamming

COMMANDO FORGE    Deployment of USAF ARDF Aircraft to Thailand to satisfy CSAF requirements for USAFSS personnel to acquire expertise in collection, transcription, analysis, reporting, and targeting through the use of ARDF

COMNAVFORV        Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam

COMUSMACV         Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

CGSVN              Central Office, South Vietnam

CTZ                 Corps Tactical Zone

D

DAN                Deployment Action Notification

DETS               Detachments

DIR                Directive

DIRNSA            Director, National Security Agency

DNG                Da Nang

DODSPECREP        Department of Defense Special Representative

DSU                Direct Support Unit

F

FAC                Forward Air Controller

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



FRAG Fragmentary

FY Fiscal Year

H

HF High Frequency

HQ Headquarters

I

ITOT Initial Time On Target

J

JCS Joint Chiefs-of-Staff

JOA Joint Operating Agreement

M

MACTHAI Military Assistance Command, Thailand

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam


N

NKP Nakhon Phanom



NRV National Security Agency Representative,  
Vietnam





NSA National Security Agency  
NVA North Vietnamese Army

O


OPORD Operations Order  
OPSCOM Operations Communications  
OPSTOPS Operations Stops


P

PACAF Pacific Air Force  
PACSECOPRGN Pacific Security Region  
PAD Programmed Action Directive  
PCS Permanent Change of Station  
PHC Phu Cat  
PRU Pleiku

R

RFP Radio Fingerprinting  
RRCC Radio Research Company  
RRGP Radio Research Group  
RTAFB Royal Thai Air Force Base  
RTG Royal Thai Government





RVN Republic of Vietnam  
RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

S


SOXY SQ Security Squadron  
SOXY WG Security Wing  
SEA Southeast Asia  
SSO Special Security Officer

T

TACREP Tactical Reports  
TDY Temporary Duty  
TEWS Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron  
TOT Time On Target  
TRW Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

U

UDL Unit Detail Listing  
UHF Ultra High Frequency  
USAFSS United States Air Force Security Service  
USIB United States Intelligence Board



V

VC Viet Cong  
VHF Very High Frequency  
VNAF Vietnamese Air Force

PROJECT NICKNAMES

COMBAT CROSS The basic configuration of the USAF ARDF electronic warfare platform EC-47 aircraft utilized by the 6994 Security Squadron

COMBAT CROSS ZULU Identical to COMBAT CROSS except that two additional collection positions have been installed

LEFAIR KNEE Replaced SHORT SKIRT. ASA developed solid state, radio fingerprinting system designed primarily for use in ARDF operations in SEA

LAFFING EAGLE The Army airborne direction finding in Vietnam using U-21 aircraft



Listing of Key Personnel

Commander - Lt Col Leon S. Inge (Biographical sketch of Lt Col  
Duane M. Russell in previous history)

First Sergeant - TSgt Robert W. Loy

Operations Officer - Lt Col Jack Barnes

Assistant Operations Officer - Maj Marlan Holmes/Capt Gary D. Belcher

NOIC Operations - SMSgt James L. Norwood

OIC ACC - Maj William E. Dorffi

NOIC ACC - SMSgt John H. Thompson

OIC Mission Management - Capt Richard T. Osborne/Capt Edward J. Miller

NOIC Mission Management - SMSgt Alfred M. Robbins

OIC Airborne Operations - Capt Michael T. Christy/Capt William E.  
Sayles

NOIC Airborne Operations - MSgt Leroy Maness

Logistics OIC Maintenance - Maj William B.F. James

NOIC Maintenance - MSgt Robert G. Fitz

OIC Supply - Capt Dennis J. Sheridan

NOIC Supply - MSgt A.J. Edwards

OIC Communications - Capt Curtis C. Yahnke

NOIC Communications - SMSgt Ervin J. Furol

NOIC Administration - TSgt Billy G. Shepard

NOIC Security Police - TSgt Norman L. Shelton

NOIC Personnel - SMSgt Kenneth L. Galloway





## BIOGRAPHY

### UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

#### LIEUTENANT COLONEL LEON S. INGE

On 29 July 1970, Lt Col Leon S. Inge assumed command of the 6994 Security Squadron, Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Republic of Vietnam. His previous assignment was at Hq European Security Region, Frankfurt, Germany. While stationed in Germany, Lt Col Inge served as Director Systems Management and for the last two years as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations.

Born July 9, 1928, in New York City, New York, Lt Col Inge attended Regis High School from which he graduated in 1946. He graduated from Fordham University, New York, in 1950 and received a B. A. degree in Constitutional History, simultaneously receiving a commission in the Air Force through the ROTC program.

After a short tour with Hq First Air Force, Mitchell AFB, New York, he applied for Flight Training and received his Navigator wings at Ellington AFB, Texas, in October 1951. After additional training, his first assignment was to the 90th Bomb Sq, 3rd Bomb Wing, Korea, where he flew combat missions in B-26s as a navigator-bombardier. Lt Col Inge was then assigned in August 1952, to the 314th Troop Carrier Wing, Sewart AFB, Tennessee, where he flew C-122 and C-119 aircraft until June 1955. While at Sewart he

attended the Squadron Officers School at Maxwell AFB. He volunteered for USAFSS training in 1955, completed the Communications Intelligence Officer's course in 1956 and after special training at Kelly AFB, Texas, was assigned to the 6901st Special Communications Group (SCG), Zweibrucken, Germany until July 1959.

Upon his return from Germany, Lt Col Inge was assigned to the Strategic Air Command and served on a combat crew as a Senior Standboard Navigator with the 91st Air Refueling Squadron, Lockbourne AFB, Ohio, from 1959 to 1963, during which time he received a regular commission, and from 1963 to 1965 he served as Senior Standboard Navigator with the 9th Air Refueling Sq, Mountain Home, Idaho. After graduating from the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia, in June 1965, Lt Col Inge was assigned to the 6937th Communications Group, Peshawar, Pakistan until July 1967. Lt Col Inge received a consecutive tour with Hq European Security Region, Frankfurt, Germany, where he served as Director of Systems Management and Evaluation and then as Assistant DCS Operations from 1967 to 1970. He received a third consecutive overseas tour in 1970 as Commander, 6994 Security Squadron, Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Vietnam, his current assignment.

Lt Col Inge's decorations include the Distinguished Flying Cross, Air Medal with one oak leaf cluster, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Force Commendation Medal with one oak leaf cluster, and the Combat readiness Medal.

Lt Col Inge's wife, Lynn and two daughters, Lisa, 17, and Lauren, 12, reside in Laurel, Maryland.

1950           Commissioned 2nd Lt, ROTC, Fordham University

1950           Hq 1st Air Force, Mitchell AFB, New York

1950-1951      Student Pilot Training, Waco, Texas (ATC)

1951           Student-USAF Navigator School, Ellington AFB, Tex (ATC)

1951           Student-B-26 CCTS, Langley AFB, Virginia (TAC)

1952           Navigator/Bombardier B-26, 3rd Bomb Wing, Kunsan, Korea

1952-1955      Navigator-Troop Carrier, Sewart AFB, Tenn. (TAC)

1953           Student-Squadron Officers Course, Maxwell AFB

1955-1956      Student-Communications Intelligence Officers School,  
Kelly AFB, Texas (USAFSS)

1956-1959      Chief Transec Analysis Branch, 6901 Special Communi-  
cations Group, Zweibrucken, Germany

1959           KC-97 CCTS, Randolph AFB, Texas

1959-1963      KC-97 Standardization Evaluator, 376th BW, Lockbourne  
AFB, Ohio

1963-1965      KC-97 Standardization Evaluator, 9th SAW, Mountain  
Home, Idaho

1965           Student-A<sup>4</sup>med Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia

1965-1967      Mission Mgt Officer, Asst Operations Officer, 6937 Comm  
Gp, Peshawar, Pakistan

1967-1970      Director Systems Management, Assistant DCS Operations,  
Hq European Security Region, Frankfurt, Germany

July 1970      Commander 6994 Security Squadron, Tan Son Nhut AFLD,  
Vietnam

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Temporary</u>	<u>Permanent</u>
2nd Lt	13 Jun 1950	13 Jun 1950
1st Lt	05 May 1952	09 Oct 1953
Captain	29 Dec 1955	01 Feb 1956
Major	15 Jul 1963	27 Jul 1964
Lt Col	31 Oct 1966	

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Distinguished Flying Cross  
Air Medal (w/1-OLC)  
Meritorious Service Medal  
AF Commendation Medal (w/1-OLC)  
Combat Readiness Medal  
National Defense Service Medal  
Armed Forces Reserve Medal  
Air Force Longevity Services Award  
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award  
Korean Service Medal  
United Nations Service Medal  
Expert Marksmanship Ribbon

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[REDACTED]  
JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT, 2-1

BETWEEN

460TH TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE WING

AND

6994 SECURITY SQUADRON

[REDACTED] The purpose of this Letter of Agreement is to establish authority and responsibilities for joint action in areas of mutual interest between the Commander, 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing and the Commander, 6994 Security Squadron and their subordinate units.

IT IS HEREBY AGREED THAT:

1. (U) Joint Operating Agreements governing areas of mutual interest will be published and considered binding on both aforementioned organizations and their subordinate units.
2. [REDACTED] Joint Operating Agreements will be annotated 460TRW/6994SS JOA followed by serialization based on USAF major category series.
3. (U) Joint Operating Agreements will be drafted by the office of primary interest in either organization and forwarded to all offices of interest in both organizations for coordination.
4. (U) Joint Operating Agreements will be signed by commanders of both organizations in order to become binding on subject organizations.
5. (U) This agreement does not preclude either organization from publishing directives governing their respective subordinate units in areas not of mutual interest.
6. [REDACTED] Periodic review of Joint Operating Agreements will take place quarterly and at such other times as requested by the Commander 460TRW or Commander 6994 Security Squadron.
7. [REDACTED] Under terms of this agreement the 6994 Security Squadron is responsible:
  - a. For procurement, storage, installation and maintenance of USAFSS equipment.
  - b. To provide pre-mission briefings for all aircrew personnel. This briefing will include, but not be limited to, a recommended mission profile.
  - c. To establish criteria for ground or air abort of any mission based on USAFSS equipment malfunction.
  - d. To train 6994th personnel in operation of USAFSS equipment.
  - e. To assign personnel to man the USAFSS equipment for each mission.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
JOA 2-1  
4 Jan 1970

[REDACTED]

f. To establish criteria for reduced missions based on the limitations of USAFSS equipment caused by atmospheric disturbances.

g. To coordinate with MACV J2114 and ACC to establish criteria and procedures for diversion to productive alternate areas.

h. To have 6994 crew members participate in periodic specialized aircraft emergency training on a quarterly basis. (crash landings, ditchings, emergency evacuation, survival, etc).

i. To participate in the daily mission planning meeting for the next day's operation conducted by the local Electronic Warfare organization.

j. To establish criteria for mission profile changes based on operational tasking received while airborne.

8. [REDACTED] Under terms of this agreement the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing is responsible:

a. To procure, store, install and maintain other than USAFSS equipment.

b. To assign personnel to the flight crew positions for each mission.

c. To establish criteria for ground or air abort based on all factors except USAFSS equipment malfunction or limitations.

d. To provide and maintain Life Support equipment for the entire crew.

e. To provide pre-mission briefings for all aircrew personnel, on flying safety, weather, intelligence and flight facilities.

f. To provide specialized aircraft emergency training on a quarterly basis. (Crash landings, ditchings, emergency evacuation, survival, etc).

g. To conduct a daily meeting with representatives from 6994th Detachment, Base Maintenance organization, Electronic Warfare Organizational Maintenance, and Electronic Warfare Operations to determine total capability and method of meeting the following day's fraged missions.

9. [REDACTED] The responsibility for command and control of the aircraft and its crew rests with the Aircraft Commander. In this joint operation both organizations agree that the EC-47 crew navigator will be the mission coordinator between the flight crew and USAFSS crew in all matters pertaining to:

a. Mission Security

b. Diverting to alternate areas.

c. Changing target areas.

d. Target area arrival and departure.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

e. Conditions for mission abort.

f. Changing sortie/target time duration.

10. [REDACTED] The mission coordinator is responsible to see that identical information is recorded and reported. Both organizations will establish and use the same form and information to report take-off, landing, on target, off target times and reasons for deviations or aborts.

11. [REDACTED] 460th TRW will host, and the 6994th will attend, a joint weekly coordination meeting to discuss and resolve mutual problems and ideas relative to:

- a. Objectives
- b. Effectiveness
- c. Capabilities
- d. Equipment alignment
- e. Equipment configuration
- f. Plans, policies, and procedures

AGREED TO:

*H. M. Chapman*  
H. M. CHAPMAN, Colonel, USAF  
Commander, 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

*Duane E. Russell*  
DUANE E. RUSSELL, Lt Col, USAF  
Commander, 6994th Security Squadron



[REDACTED]

JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT  
460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing  
and  
699th Security Squadron (USAFSS)

460TRW/6994SS JOA 55-2

21 February 1970

Operations

(U) MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

1. (1) The purpose of this JOA is to standardize procedures utilized in the accomplishment of a fraged mission and are directive upon units under the command of the 460th TRW and the 6994th Scty Sq.

2. [REDACTED] Definitions:

a. Cancelled Mission. A cancelled mission occurs when the ARDF coordinating Center (ACC) cancels the mission. These will not be counted as a scheduled mission.

b. Ground Abort. Any abort which occurs before take-off. This term covers all malfunctions which may occur prior to take-off.

c. Initial Time On Target (ITOT). That time the aircraft penetrates the boundary of the fraged mission area.

d. Air Abort. Any situation that occurs after take-off that dictates that the aircraft return to base (RTB).

e. Reduced Mission. Any mission that does not fly the fraged mission sortie duration as determined by the aircraft configuration (minimum 5 or 7 hours) or does not meet the designated ITOT, plus or minus, 15 minutes.

f. Unaccomplished Mission.

(1) All missions not flown and not cancelled by the tasking authority.

(2) A mission flown but never reaches the fraged mission area or alternate area tasked by ACC.

3. [REDACTED] Procedures:

a. 460th TRW and TEW Units

(1) Prepares flight plans in a manner to preclude late ITOT and to achieve maximum time over target (TOT).

(2) Notifies the ROC and requests additional fraging information when it is determined a mission will be more than one hour late in meeting ITOT due to a ground abort/delay.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(3) Notifies their respective ground operations and requests instructions when an air diversion is required. The appropriate TEW unit will request alternate frugging from the ROC and when received, will ensure that the airborne aircraft is furnished new instructions.

(4) Mission Coordinator reviews the mission profile with the Senior Radio Operator (SRO) and coordinates aircraft positioning to assure optimum coverage of the mission area.

(5) When contacted by TEW units, ROC will relay information to AGC and subsequent instructions back to the appropriate TEW unit.

b. 6994th Sq and Detachments:

(1) The SRO notifies his ground station through appropriate communications channels and requests instructions and additional target data when an air diversion is confirmed. When received, he will review new mission requirements with the Mission Coordinator.

(2) The SRO is responsible for all decisions concerning the operational status of USAFBS equipment aboard the aircraft. The SRO will inform the Mission Coordinator when a ground or air abort situation exists.

c. Mission Reporting. The Mission Coordinator and SRO will record ground aborts, late ITOT, air aborts, and diversions on the appropriate forms/logs. Reason for deviations will also be identified and substantiated as required.

d. Criteria for Negative Launch/Re-launch:

When the aircraft is unable to achieve ITOT plus three hours after ground abort.

When the aircraft is unable to achieve ITOT plus three hours after air abort.

e. Criteria for Bravo Air Aborts:

**CC MISSIONS** - An abort will be declared any time there is a complete loss of the X position and/or if the information being printed out is to be by the Mission Coordinator in obtaining a fix.

CCZ MISSIONS:

**PRIMARY ARDF** - When the X position becomes inoperative then revert to secondary mission of collection. The mission will not be aborted unless there is a complete loss of X and both Zulu positions.

[REDACTED]

(b) PRIMARY COLLECTION - When the collection positions become inoperative then revert to secondary mission of ARDF. The mission will not be aborted unless there is a complete loss of X and both Zulu positions.

(3) A minor malfunction that does not meet the above criteria will not constitute an air abort situation on any mission. The scope on the X position does not meet an air abort criteria. Operators will continue to operate at a reduced capability.

f. Initial Launch of Aircraft. Aircraft Commanders will insure that all mission essential equipment is operational aboard their aircraft before take-off. Mission essential equipment is identified as all USAFSS equipment, doppler, C12 compass, FM radio, and KY-8. In addition, all missions flown over Laos must have an operational UIC-2 radio.

AGREED TO:

  
H. M. CHAPMAN, Colonel, USAF

Commander, 260th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing



DUANE E RUSSELL, Lt Col, USAF  
Commander, 699th Security Squadron

14 FEB 1970

Operations

MISSION PROFILE (U)

1. (U) The purpose of JOA 55-1 is to standardize mission procedures and to insure identical mission data are reported by both units concerned.

2. (U) The policies and procedures established herein are directives upon units under the command of the 460th TRW and the 6994th Secy Sq.

3. Definitions:

a. Total Flying Time (TFT). That time accrued between take off and landing of the aircraft.

b. Fragged Mission Areas. MACV has divided SEA into major areas for ARDF coverage. These major areas are known as "effective" areas. At times, these effective areas are further broken down into what is known as "absolute" areas. All areas are converted into specific frag points, lines, or areas and passed down from MACV in UTM coordinates to the appropriate units.

c. Effective Mission Frag:

(1) Mission to be flown will have a frag point to indicate the area, but will be flagged "effective" in the remarks section. (E.g. effective coverage SEA area SIX).

(2) Effective mission areas will not have a letter suffix. (E.g. 802, 803, 805, etc).

d. Absolute Mission Frag:

(1) Circle - radius of the frag point, to be adequately covered, will be 20NM (37 KM) (e.g. Frag Point: BRAVO VICTOR 6305).

(2) Frag points other than 30(1) will include specific frag data. This data may form the mission area into a triangle, rectangle, line, etc. (E.g. FRAG DATA: LINE, BRAVO MIKE 5090 to BRAVO KILO 5020).

(3) Absolute mission areas will be flagged with a letter suffix. (E.g. 802A, 803B, 907E, etc).

e. Airborne Diversions: Any frag point change while airborne.

3. Initial Time On Target (ITOT). The time of the day, tasked by MACV and published in 7AF Frag orders that prescribes arrival time on target. ITOT is further defined as that time when the aircraft penetrates any point of the fringed area boundary. (E.g. ABSOLUTE AREAS - Circle, rectangle, triangle, etc. REFERENCE AREAS - Major SEA areas). For a line frag, the ITOT will be determined when the aircraft reaches any point on the frag line.

4. Time off target. That time when the aircraft egresses the frag area boundary either for diversion or return to base (RTB).

5. Total Time Over Target (TTOT). Time accrued between initial time on target and time off target.

#### 4. Procedures:

a. For Force airborne ARDF/Collection missions will be tasked by total ITOT time (TTOT). A minimum sortie duration of five hours will be tasked for 7AF configured RC-47 N/P aircraft and a minimum sortie duration of seven hours will be tasked for all other aircraft. Any mission that does not fly the tasked five or seven hours will be a reduced mission. Tasked mission will be fringed by initial time on target (ITOT). The ITOT must be met within, plus or minus fifteen minutes. Each flight will be planned to gain maximum time over target. The 460th TRW units will determine take off times to achieve the tasked ITOT and the flight navigator will determine the off-target time and time to return to base (RTB).

b. Targets may be worked to and from the fringed mission area. It is the responsibility of the mission coordinator (MACV) and the senior radio operator (SRO) to jointly determine whether targets will be worked enroute to and from the fringed area. Targets enroute to the frag area will be worked in such a manner which precludes late arrival on target. Targets of unusual significance enroute to the target area may be worked only if considered by the mission coordinator to be of such import as to warrant unique action. This refers to those targets that exceed priority one in significance. Technical data (Charty Sheet) in conjunction with a priority target should not constitute a significant cause for late arrival. When the aircraft is late on target due to working an unusual target such as a priority target, technical data as necessary to justify actions taken will be placed in remarks section of appropriate logs and forms, and the scheduled TTOT will be logged.

c. The navigator is responsible for recording both initial time on target and time off target. He will inform the (SRO) of same. The Navigator/SRO will record time on their appropriate forms, whereby the ground reporting station will forward identical statistics to higher echelons.

d. All ground stations will utilize TTOT recorded by the navigator/SRO to determine accomplished time of coverage to higher echelons.

*John C. Ryan*  
John C. Ryan, Colonel, USAF

Commander, 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

*Duane E. Russell*  
DUANE E. RUSSELL, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Commander, 699th Security Squadron

[REDACTED]

JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT  
460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing  
and  
6994th Security Squadron (USAFSS)

460TRW/6994SS JOA 55-5

13 March 1970

Operations

REPLOT PROCEDURES (U)

1. [REDACTED] The purpose of the JOA is to establish the procedures used in replotting fixes, thereby insuring accuracy of same. This JOA applies to 460TRW/6994SS and their subordinate units.

2. [REDACTED] RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. 460TRW and TEW Units:

(1) Replotting fixes while airborne.

(a) All priority targets will be replotted by the mission navigator while airborne. However, only priority one targets must be replotted before they are passed to the ground.

(b) Any request for a replot received from a ground station will be replotted by the mission navigator while airborne as soon as practical.

(2) All priority fixes will be replotted after recovery of the mission. Any change in fix location that exceeds the reported fix radius will be reported to the 6994th reporting section via secure phone.

(3) Any flash precedence request for replot received from the 6994th SS/Detachments will require replot of the identified fix and response within 30 minutes of the request. The duty navigator will replot the target identified in the request and pass results by secure phone to 6994th SS/Detachments. Expeditious handling procedures will be established by each TEW unit to assure a maximum 30 minute response time.

b. 6994SS and Detachments:

(1) ROs will inform the navigator of the target priority designator (i.e. P1, P2, P3) and last known location, if known, while working each target.

(2) ROs will immediately advise the navigator when a replot request is received from a ground station. After appropriate action by

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] 6994SS DO-70-01

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*g. l. m.*

[REDACTED]

the navigator, the RO will either confirm the target location or pass corrected information.

(3) When the reporting section receives a flash precedence request from a consumer, it will contact the appropriate TEW unit via secure phone and request a replot for the particular target. When the replot information is received from the TEW unit, the reporting section will relay the data to the requestor as expeditiously as possible.

AGREED TO:

*H. M. Chapman*

H. M. CHAPMAN, Colonel, USAF  
Commander, 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

*Duane E. Russell*

DUANE E. RUSSELL, Lt Col, USAF  
Commander, 6994th Security Squadron



JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT  
460TH TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE WING (PACAF)  
AND  
6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSS)

460TRW/6994SS JOA 55-7

24 March 1970

Operations

ALTERNATE EXECUTION PROCEDURES (U)

1. (U) The purpose of this Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) is to standardize procedures for requesting, implementing and coordinating alternate execution. This JOA applies to 460TRW/6994SS and their subordinate units.

2. (U) Definitions:

a. Alternate Execution. Any circumstance or combination thereof which would result in a deviation from the fragged mission.

b. Absolute Coverage. Reference para 3d, 460TRW/6994SS JOA 55-1.

c. Effective Coverage. Reference para 3c, 460TRW/6994SS JOA 55-1.

d. Frag. Assigned area of coverage as directed by 7AF (DOCRS).

e. Refrag. A new mission number as designated by 7AF (DOCRS).

f. Initial Time On Target (ITOT). Reference para 3f, 460TRW/6994SS JOA 55-1.

g. Estimate Time in Commission (ETIC). That time which maintenance forecasts that the aircraft will be available for duty.

h. Divert. Change in the area of coverage.

3. (C) Responsibilities:

a. 460th TRW and TEW Units:

(1) The TEW crew will contact the 460th TRW ROC for divert instructions.

(2) 460th ROC will relay divert request to ACC.

(3) 460th ROC will relay divert instructions to the TEW crew.

(4) TEW crew will implement divert instructions and notify USAFSS crew of new area of coverage.

b. 6994th Security Squadron and Detachments:

(1) The USAFSS crew will contact the CMA and request technical data for new area of coverage.



[REDACTED]

(2) If TEW crew is unable to contact ground station within 10 minutes the USAFSS crew will contact CMA/ACC/J2 for divert instructions.

(3) The USAFSS crew will relay divert instructions to Mission Coordinator upon receipt.

4. [REDACTED] Procedures:

a. Primary Procedures:

(1) Absolute Coverage. When it becomes apparent that an aircraft will be forced to depart an ABSOLUTE COVERAGE area for any reason other than one which necessitates the immediate return to base, the following procedures will apply and be strictly adhered to:

(a) The aircraft commander will notify the USAFSS crew that a departure from the fragged target area is imminent.

(b) The aircraft commander will notify the 460th TRW ROC, through the most appropriate means, that a departure from the assigned target area is imminent or has been effected and request divert instructions.

(c) If unable to remain in absolute area while awaiting divert instructions, the aircraft will assume coverage in the assigned effective area.

(d) The following information will be relayed to the ROC from the aircraft commander when requesting a divert:

1. Reason for divert.

2. Total flight time remaining.

3. Possible execution plan based on the aircraft commander's estimate of the situation. This information will be passed using points of the compass, i.e. North, South, East, West, etc.

(e) ROC will notify and apprise ACC of the situation and relay current information from the aircraft commander and request divert instructions for the affected aircraft.

(f) Upon receipt of the divert instruction from ACC, ROC will pass this information to the TEW crew. The ACC will also contact the CMA and direct them to pass appropriate technical data to the USAFSS crew.

(g) If the aircraft commander determines that the aircraft can not assume the new target (refrag), procedures outlined above will be repeated.

(h) The aircraft commander, upon arrival in the new frag area, will advise the ROC that he is in the new frag area.

[REDACTED]

(2) Effective Coverage: When it becomes apparent that an aircraft will be forced to depart an EFFECTIVE COVERAGE area for any reason other than one which necessitates the immediate return to base, the procedures for diverting from an ABSOLUTE COVERAGE area will apply with one exception. The exception is that when diverting from an EFFECTIVE COVERAGE area the aircraft will proceed in the general direction of home base and assume EFFECTIVE COVERAGE of the first effective coverage area of opportunity. This orbit will be maintained until aircraft is required to return to base under the original frag or other instructions from ACC are received.

b. Alternate Procedures:

(1) If the TEW crew is unable to contact the ROC within 10 minutes for any reason the USAFSS crew will use the following procedures when requesting an alternate area of coverage:

(a) The USAFSS crew will receive divert information from the mission coordinator and pass the following to the ground station:

1. Reason for divert.
2. Total flight time remaining.
3. Possible execution plan based on the aircraft commander's estimate of the situation. This information will be passed using points of the compass, i.e. North, South, East, West, etc.

(b) If USAFSS crew cannot make radio contact, the aircraft will be flown in the direction of the planned diversion (i.e. North, South, East, West, etc), until radio contact can be established.

(c) ACC will, upon receipt of the divert request, notify the 460 TRW ROC and relay the divert to them for relay to the aircraft commander.

(d) ACC will notify the CMA and have them relay divert instructions and appropriate technical data to the USAFSS crew.

(e) The TEW crew will, upon receipt of the divert instructions from the USAFSS crew, notify USAFSS crew if the new target area (refrag) can be assumed.

(f) The aircraft commander, upon arrival in the new frag area, will advise the ROC that he is in the new frag area.

(g) If the aircraft commander determines that the new target area cannot be assumed he will attempt to use primary procedures for further divert or if necessary use alternate request procedures.

(2) The USAFSS crew route for requesting divert instructions is to be used only as an alternate means for requests if the primary method fails. The USAFSS crew will only use its route of communications for

[REDACTED]

divert requests upon instruction from the aircraft commander. ACC will notify 7AF (DOCRS), after confirmation from the aircraft that it has arrived in its refrag area or of any divert where the aircraft is required to move from its original SEA area to another SEA area, i.e. area 09 to 08, etc.

c. Ground Abort/Delay in Takeoff: When a ground abort/delay in takeoff in excess of one hour occurs or is expected as a result of an ETIC, the following procedures will apply and be strictly adhered to:

- (1) The TEW unit will immediately notify ROC of the ground abort/delay in takeoff. The TEW unit will also specify cause and include an ETIC and/or availability for takeoff.
- (2) ROC will immediately notify and apprise ACC of the situation.
- (3) If the TEW unit is unable to provide an ETIC/availability for takeoff when originally notifying ROC, they will do so as soon as possible.
- (4) ROC will notify ACC of the ETIC/availability for takeoff and request instructions concerning possible diversion of the aircraft.
- (5) If the ground abort/delay in takeoff is such that the aircraft would be unable to meet the ITOT plus three (3) hour criteria, JOA 55-2 applies.
- (6) If the ground abort/delay in takeoff is such that the aircraft will be able to meet the ITOT plus three (3) hour criteria, the ACC, in coordination with MACV and the appropriate CMA, will determine if consumer requirements dictate a full five or seven hour mission. If so, ACC will notify ROC who in turn will inform the aircraft commander. If consumer requirements do not dictate a full five or seven hour mission, ACC will provide ROC with a time off target. The ROC will in turn notify the aircraft commander of the time off target and the aircraft will depart the fragged mission area at that time and return to home base.

d. Air Aborts: When a mission is air aborted for any reason, ROC will be immediately notified and will pass the information to ACC. If the air abort is such that the aircraft failed to achieve total flight time of five or seven hours, depending upon aircraft configuration, ROC will notify and apprise ACC if relaunch will be attempted. (Para 3d, JOA 55-2 specifies criteria for negative relaunch). ACC will provide divert instruction if necessary.

e. Other:

- (1) Under those circumstances when a TEW unit is aware that a fragged sortie will have to be dropped, the TEW unit will notify 460 TRW ROC. ROC will in turn notify ACC. ACC in coordination with 7AF (DOCRS) will notify 460 TRW ROC of action to be taken.

[REDACTED]

(2) 7AF (DOCRS) will be notified through normal command channels when a requirement exists for a completely new mission.

(3) Any time either ACC or ROC is in doubt as to whether a mission is properly fragged, they will contact 7AF (DOCRS) for clarification.

AGREED TO:

*H. M. Chapman*

H. M. CHAPMAN, Colonel, USAF

Commander, 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

*Duane E. Russell*

DUANE E. RUSSELL, Lt Colonel, USAF

Commander, 6994th Security Squadron

ec47.com

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT  
460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing  
and  
6994th Security Squadron (USAFSS)

460TRW/6994SS JOA 60-3

22 May 1970

Flying

PARTICIPATION IN FLIGHTS ABOARD EC-47 AIRCRAFT

This Joint Operating Agreement establishes the policy for participation in flights aboard EC-47 aircraft under the operational control of the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing.

1. Terms Explained:

a. Aerial Combat Missions. A flight scheduled against a tactical objective for reconnaissance purposes on which OI-time is logged in the AFTO Form 781.

b. Functional Check Flight. A mission to satisfy the requirements of T.O. 1C-47A-6 and T.O. 1-1300.

c. Operations Check Flight. A flight to check the operation of auxiliary systems or components and as an aid to maintenance in solving complex recurring discrepancies.

d. Ferry Flight. A flight for which:

(1) The destination is other than Vietnam or Thailand.

(2) The purpose is for delivery incidental to accomplishment of IRAN, corrosion control, modification, or transfer.

2. Policy:

a. Participation in EC-47 missions by other than mission required authorized crew members will be held to a minimum consistent with efficient mission accomplishment and upgrade training. Access to the back end of the aircraft during actual mission operation will be limited to personnel possessing both the need to know and a minimum security clearance of secret.

b. Approval by the 460th TRW Deputy Commander for Operations and 6994th SS Operations Officer is required for personnel not assigned to the 460th TRW or the 6994th SS as EC-47 crew members for any type of flight with the following exceptions:

(1) Aerial Combat Missions:

(a) Non crew members of the 6994 USAFSS who are required/authorized by USAFSS aeronautical orders to fly as part of their primary assigned duties.

[REDACTED]

Copy 63 of 65 copies

[REDACTED]

(b) Flight Surgeons attached to the squadrons for flying.


(2) Operational Check Flights: Non crew members on aeronautical orders, technical representatives of Sanders Associates Inc. and Bendix Corporation, when their participation as maintenance/engineering experts is essential to the mission, or their flying contributes to the more effective accomplishment of their assigned duties.

(3) Ferry Flights: TEW Squadron Commanders may approve participation in ferry flights for all personnel who possess orders authorizing TDY or leave. All higher headquarters directives must be complied with and no extra enroute stops for the convenience of the passengers will be authorized.


3. Training of Non Crew Members: The TEW unit concerned is responsible to assure that the training required by Section IX, 460TRW 51-47 has been completed prior to the participation of non crew members on an EC-47 Aerial Combat mission. A certificate from the unit to which the individual is assigned will be satisfactory proof that necessary training has been accomplished.

4. Release from Claim for Injury or Death: Civilian personnel will sign a release in accordance with AFR 76-6 prior to participation in an EC-47 flight.

AGREED TO:

  
JAMES E. TILTON, Colonel, USAF

Commander, 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

  
DUANE E. RUSSELL, Lt Col, USAF  
Commander, 6994th Security Squadron

23 May 1970

Publication Management

CONSTRUCTION OF JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENTS

1. The purpose of this Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) is to standardize procedures for writing, coordinating, and publishing JOA's. This JOA applies to 460TRW/6994SS and their subordinate units.
2. Responsibilities:
  - a. The office of primary responsibility (OPR) will prepare the JOA in draft form for coordination. The OPR will initially determine and assign appropriate security classification for the JOA.
  - b. 460th TRW, DCOEO and 6994th SS, Ops will be the local points for development and coordination of all JOAs.
  - c. Final approval authorities for all JOA's rests with the commanders of the 460TRW and the 6994 Scty Sq. They must be signatories to all 460th/6994th JOA's.
3. Format for Joint Operating Agreements:
  - a. Identification of JOA's will be identified by a 460TRW/6994SS JOA number. The numbering system used will conform to the USAF major category series whenever possible.
  - b. Purpose. Paragraph one of each JOA will contain a purpose statement and the applicable units.
  - c. Definitions. To clarify interpretations of policies and procedures, definition may be included in JOA's as required.
  - d. Responsibilities. Each JOA will contain a responsibilities section having two major sub-sections. The individual responsibilities of each unit will be clearly identified in the appropriate sub-section.
  - e. Procedures. The procedures section will contain a comprehensive narrative of the procedures, tasks etc.
4. Preparation.
  - a. The OPR will prepare the proposed JOA or changes to existing JOA's in draft form, in proper format. When the designated OPR is subordinate to the 460TRW or the 6994SS, the designated OPR will coordinate the JOA at local level before forwarding same to the focal point of either 460TRW or 6994SS

operations. All units recognizing a need for Joint Regulatory action are encouraged to initiate proposals to their parent organization.


5. Review. The DCS Operations of 460TRW and the 6994SS Operations Officer will meet periodically to review existing JOA's, draft new JOA's and recommend changes to JOA's. They shall be mutually responsible for resolution of differences in JOAs. The Commander, 460TRW and 6994SS, will receive the JOAs typewritten on multilith masters only after their respective staff have completed coordination. The JOAs, when signed and published, are directive in nature.

6. Distribution. Sixty five copies of all JOAs will be produced. The 6994SS will be responsible for making appropriate distribution to the following units/offices:

Copies	1 - 25	460TRW (Will make distribution to subordinate units.)
Copies	26 - 40	Pac Scty Rgn
Copies	41 - 43	Det 1, 6994SS
Copies	44 - 46	Det 2, 6994SS
Copies	47 - 49	Det 3, 6994SS
Copies	50 - 52	6994SS/DCRT
Copy	53	6994SS/LO
Copy	54	6994SS/DORA
Copy	55	7AF/DOCR-S
Copy	56	7AF/DOE
Copies	57 - 58	7AF/DIO
Copies	59 - 65	6994SS/DO/File

AGREED TO:

  
JAMES E. TILTON, Colonel, USAF  
Commander, 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

  
DUANE E. RUSSELL, Lt Col., USAF  
Commander, 6994th Scty Sqdn



ROUTINE

6994SCTISQ

DET 1 6994SCTISQ

DET 2 6994SCTISQ

DET 3 6994SCTISQ

FILE

3/0850Z JAN 70  
20  
DUE 20580/8

OPS JAN 70

SUBJ: RELOCATION OF 362 TEWS/DET 2, 6994 SCTISQ

FMG PACSCTYRGN MSG IS QUOTED FYI: QUOTE:

P 022145Z

FM PACSCTYRGN

TO USAFSS/TDC/TAD

INFO: 6922 SCTYWG/OPS

6994 SCTISQ/OPS/SSLO

OPS-R

SUBJECT: RELOCATION OF 362 TEWS (U)

MY OPS-R 292121Z DEC 69

PACAF HAS CONCURRED IN DELAYING MOVE OF 362D TEWS FROM FY3/70

(MARCH) TO FY4/70 (JUNE) TO PROVIDE 7AF ADEQUATE TIME TO STUDY THE

MOST SUITABLE LOCATION FOR THE UNIT. UNQUOTE.

3  
JAN 70  
1 1

4891

MAJOR HOLMES

JAMES W. JOHNSON, JR., Lt Col, USAF  
Operations Officer

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ROUTINE  
ROUTINE

*094312 APR 74*

6994 SCTY SQ

PACSCYRGN

INFO: DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ

6924 SCTY SQ



DO APR 70.

SUBJ: RELOCATION OF AVIATION UNITS

1. SEVERAL ACTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE RECENT PAST CONCERNING THE MOVE OF 362 TENS/DET 2 6994 SS TO DANANG. XXIV CORPS MSG 040851Z APR AND 7AF MSG 070700 APR (BOTH QUOTED BELOW) REPRESENT A CONSOLIDATED, COORDINATED PLAN FOR RELOCATION OF 362 TENS/DET 2 6994 SS TO DANANG AND 138 AV CO TO HUE PHU BAI AS REQUESTED IN COMUSMACV 201530Z MAR 70 QUOTED IN MY 240420Z MAR.

2. ESSENTIALLY, THE FOLLOWING IS THE BASIC GENERAL OUTLINE OF ACTIONS PERTAINING TO RELOCATION OF 362 TENS/DET 2 6994 SS AND 138 AV CO AS OF NOW:

A. 11 APR - 7AF PRE-PAD MEETING (6994 SS/DET 2 6994 SS WILL ATTEND AND INSURE ACTIONS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT RELOCATION OF DET 2 6994 SS ARE ENTERED INTO 7AF PAD).

9  
APR 70

B. 15 APR - EC-47 REVETMENT CONSTRUCTION BEGINS IN 138 AV CO

1 2

4891

MAFLAN HOLMES, MAJOR



JAMES W. JOHNSON JR., LT COL, USAF  
OPERATIONS OFFICER

ROUTINE

AREA.

- C. O/A 1 MAY - 7AF PAD WILL BE PUBLISHED.
- D. 18 MAY - HUE PHU BAI AIRFIELD REHABILITATION COMPLETED.
- E. 19 MAY - 138 AV CO COMMENCES MOVE FROM DANANG TO HUE PHU BAI.
- F. 28 MAY - 2 JUNE - 138 AV CO COMPLETES MOVE.
- G. 19 - 28 MAY - DEPLOY DET 2 TEAM TO DANANG AS REQUIRED. TEAM WILL ACT AS ADVANCE PARTY FOR COORDINATION/LIAISON PURPOSE; PROVIDE CONTINUITY OF OCCUPANCY OF BUILDINGS AS VACATED BY 138 AV CO; AND START SELF-HELP PAINT/CARPENTRY EFFORT ON 138 AV CO BILLETING FACILITIES.
- H. O/A 15 JUNE - REVETMENT CONSTRUCTION FOR EC-47'S COMPLETED.
- I. 15 JUNE - COMMENCE MOVEMENT OF AIRCRAFT/PERSONNEL FROM PLEIKU TO DANANG.
- J. 16 JUNE - COMPLETE MOVE OF AIRCRAFT FROM PLEIKU TO DANANG.
- K.. 16 - 30 JUNE - CLOSE FACILITIES/SHIP MATERIALS FROM PLEIKU.
- 3. TENTATIVE ALLOCATION OF OPERATIONAL/BILLETING FACILITIES FOR DET 2, 6994 SB IS CONTAINED IN MY 080740Z APR 70.
- 4. FING IS QUOTE OF CG XXIV CORPS 040851Z APR 70: QUOTE  
///COMM CNTR PLS QUOTE ATTACHED CG XXIV CORPS 040851Z APR 70///  
UNQUOTE.
- 5. FING IS QUOTE OF 7AF MSG 070700 APR 70. QUOTE  
///COM CNTR PLS QUOTE ATTACHED 7AF MSG 070700Z APR 70/// UNQUOTE.  
///COMM CNTR PLS RETURN ATTACHED MSGS TO DO. TKS///

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NNNNZCZCRDA893AA755ZCKZA263  
RR YMAOQA  
JE YMLAKZ 15 0360247  
R 05231Z  
FM PACSCTYRGN  
TO 6994 SCTYSQ  
ZEM



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OPS-R


SUBJECT: AREA CLEARANCE/PROJECT IDENTIFIER.

- REFS: A. 6994 SS DIR 2011Z JAN 70.  
B. CINCPACAF OPLM 220014Z JAN 70.  
C. 699453 OPS 001100Z JAN 70.  
D. 699458 OPS 001100Z FEB 70.

#24

1. RESOLUTION OF PROJECT IDENTIFIER PROBLEM HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. PI TVB 124 WILL COVER THE 18 TOY SPACES TILL 27 APR 1970.
2. THIS HQS WAS INFORMED THAT PACAF (OPLM) WILL SATISFY REQUIREMENT FOR 5 ADDITIONAL TOY SPACES FOR G-1166.
3. SLOTS 70-89 ARE A CURRENT PROBLEM BEING DISCUSSED WITH PACAF AND THIS HQS. WE EXPECT RESOLUTION SHORTLY WHICH WILL ENABLE YOU TO MAN THE ENTIRE 89 SPACE REQUIREMENT AT OET 3 WITH POS PERSONNEL.
4. WILL KEEP YOU APPRISED OF FUTURE ACTIONS. GP-4.

ANNON





UNCLASSIFIED

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0372123  
0372130  
0372132ZCZCRDA612LAA951ZCZOKZA393  
RR YMRDQR  
DE YHLAKZ 39 0372118  
R 062118Z  
FM PACSCTYRGN  
TO 6994SCTYSQ  
ZEM

REF ID: A1550

UNCLAS E F T O ADM  
REFERENCE YOUR CDR 062001Z FEB 70. THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS  
BLANKET AREA CLEARANCE FOR 10 SPACES FOR TRAILING. THESE  
SPACES ARE FOR USE OF PERSONNEL THIS HEADQUARTERS AND THOSE  
OF FIELD UNITS WHO HAVE NEED FOR CLEARANCE. THIS HEADQUARTERS  
PROCURES ALL PROJECT IDENTIFIERS FOR USE WITH THE BLANKET  
CLEARANCE. FORMAT FOR REQUEST IS PROVIDED IN AFM 56-11 PART  
SUP 1, PARAGRAPH 12006A (1) (C). SUBMIT YOUR REQUESTS NO  
LATER THAN 10 DAYS BEFORE DESIRED TRAVEL DATE EXCEPT FOR  
EXTREME EMERGENCIES. WE HAVE REQUESTED 10 FOR YOUR TRAVEL  
IN MARCH.

110

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

*3:16 OPS-12*  
*9/13*

[REDACTED]			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO			

*23* | *2305Z* *Mar 70*

FROM: 6994SCFY9Q

TO: PACSCTYRCN

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[REDACTED] DC

- REF A. 6994OPS 080800Z JAN 70
- B. UR OPS-R 052310Z

WE HAVE THIS DATE FORWARDED BY SEPERATE MSG A REQUEST FOR PROJECT IDENTIFIER FOR MSGT WHITMAN. AS YOU KNOW THIS IS THE FOURTH REQUEST FOR PROJECT IDENTIFIERS WITHIN TWO WEEKS FOR THE CONDUCT OF NECESSARY SQUADRON OPERATION. IN THE CASE OF SGT WHITMAN IT IS ACTUALLY DETRIMENTAL TO THE MISSION TO WAIT UNTIL THE IDENTIFIER IS OBTAINED. WITH THE ADVENT OF ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS BEING PLACED ON THE LOATION SITUATION AND OUR EXPANSION OF OUR RESOURCES AT NKP. OUR REQUIREMENT FOR GUIDANCE TDY IS GROWING REPIDLY. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY EFFORT YOU CAN MAKE TO EXPEDITE A 2-3 SPACE PROJECT IDENTIFIER DEDICATED TO THIS UNIT AS REQUESTED IN REF A AND REFERENCED IN REF B.

DATE	TIME
<i>23</i>	<i>1623</i>
MONTH	YEAR
<i>MAR</i>	<i>70</i>
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	[REDACTED]	<i>1601</i>	[REDACTED]
RELEASER	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS	
	<i>JAMES W JOHNSON, JR., LtCol, USAF</i> <i>Operations Officer</i>		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			

0300203  
0300243  
0300242  
030244ZCZCR03039  
RR YNBL  
DE YHLAKZ 0306440  
R 27017Z  
FM PACSCTY  
TO 0304SCTYS/00/ADM  
Z-M

055

SUBJ: STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING CEILING PROBLEM AT DET 3, 6994  
SCTY 34 (U).

REF: A. YOUR OPS 202300Z JAN 70  
B. CINCPACFLT OPLM 220117Z JAN 70  
C. CONVERSATION BETWEEN MAJOR HOMES (YOUR UNIT) AND CMSGT  
PLACE THIS HQ ON 0 MAR 70

1. CURRENT INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM USAFSS (XRM) INDICATES THAT COMMAND HAS APPROVED OUR REQUEST FOR THE 09 SPACE AUTHORIZATION AT DET 3, 0304SCTY (REFERENCE C REFERS). THIS INCREASED AUTHORIZATION WILL APPEAR IN THE 4TH QUARTER FY70 ULL.
2. THIS HQ IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH PACAF AND NSAPAC TO RESOLVE THE CEILING INCREASE PROBLEM IN THAILAND.
3. CANNOT DETERMINE AT THIS TIME WHEN THE INCREASED THAILAND CEILING (POS) WILL BE RESOLVED. WHEN APPROVED, WE WILL STILL BE FACED WITH THE PROBLEM OF PERSONNEL (PFD) UNTIL NEWLY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ARE ON STATION.
4. THIS HQ HAS DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR 25 RPT 25 HEADROOM TTY EXTENSION FOR DET 3 (I.E., 10 TTY FOR TWO ADDITIONAL ACFT AND FIVE TTY FOR G-1100 WITH NSAPAC AND CINCPAC.)
5. IN REGARD TO REF DELTA, PACAF HAS RULED THAT ALL REQUESTS FOR TTY INTO THAILAND MUST BE FULLY SUBSTANTIATED ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS AND SEPARATE REQUESTS BE SUBMITTED AS REQUIRED. REF CANNOT EXPLAIN.
6. RECOMMEND YOU ATTEMPT USE OF TAF BLANKET AUTHORITY FOR PROJECT IDENTIFIERS FOR THAILAND AS AN INTERIM MEASURE TO SATISFY YOUR 2-D SPACE TTY REQUIREMENT. REF ABL STATED THIS WAS PERMISSIBLE UNDER PACAF 35-3 AND TAF SUP TO AFM 36-11. ADDITIONALLY, IT IS THIS HQ'S OPINION THAT CREW MEMBERS ARE EXEMPT FOR PROJECT IDENTIFIERS.
7. BE ASSURED THIS HQ IS TAKING EVERY POSSIBLE ACTION TO SATISFY YOUR TRAINING REQUIREMENTS. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED OF ACTIONS.

LY [REDACTED] 001DP

ec47.com

1148598



1148554  
1148556ZCZCRDA284  
NR YMRDQR  
DE YMLAKZ 13 1148189  
R 240045Z  
FM PA00CTYRGN  
TO 6994SCTY8Q/CC  
ZEM



DOXM

SUBJECT: EXPIRATION OF TDY AUTHORITY FOR TWO EC-478 AT SUP.  
REF NSAPAG OP252020Z APR 78, SAME SUBJ.  
USING ABOVE CITED REF, AUTHORITY IS GRANTED TO CONTINUE  
NECESSARY MANNING ON TOSCYASIS TO SUPPORT THE ADDITIONAL  
EC-478.  
078



NNNN

ec4477.com



PRINT MESSAGEFORM

RECORD [REDACTED]

TYPE NO.	BOOK	SERIAL	INDEX
			I

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

TIME

RESERVED FOR USE BY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

12/0925Z MAR 70

FROM: 6994SEVTISQ

TO: PACSCTIRGN

[REDACTED] DO MAR 70

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

#33

SUBJ: MACV DIR 381-23

1. WE ARE FORWARDING BY COURIER THIS DATE A DRAFT OF A NEW VERSION OF MACV DIR 381-23. FYI SOME PERTINENT CHANGES PROPOSED ARE:

A. AGAIN RAISES THE ISSUE OF JSOC. UNDER PROVISION OF THIS PROPOSAL THE JSOC WILL BE STAFFED AND MAINTAINED BY CG'S 509 AND 6994. NEV(C) WILL PROVIDE REPRESENTATION AS DETERMINED BY J2. THE JSOC FUNCTIONS WILL BE IDENTICAL TO THE PRESENT ACC. BUT UNDER THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF J2.

B. THE DRAFT CONTAINS 5 ANNEXES (1) ANNEX A - AIRBORNE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT. THIS ANNEX ESTABLISHES THE PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTED AIRBORNE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT. IT IDENTIFIES THE SEA AREAS AND PRIORITY SYSTEM ETC.

(2) ANNEX B - AIRBORNE CRYPTOLOGIC OPERATIONS. DEALS WITH GENERAL OPERATING PROCEDURES APPARENTLY DESIGNED TO STANDARDIZE AF AND ARMY PROCEDURES. IT DEFINES PRIMARY AND SECONDARY MISSIONS AS WELL AS SUCH THINGS AS MISSION DURATIONS AND MISSION PROGRAMS.

(3) ANNEX C - JOINT SPECIAL OPERATION CENTER. DEALS WITH THE JSOC AND IS ESSENTIALLY THE PROPOSAL AS MADE BEFORE. THE DIRECTIVE PLACES JSOC UNDER COMUSMACV DELEGATED CONTROL TO J211-4 AS AN AGENT OF J2. THE CHIEF OF THE JSOC WILL BE APPOINTED FROM THE J211-4 STAFF. (THIS IS A MAJOR CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS PROPOSAL) WITH THE 6994 AND 509 EACH HAVING A DEPUTY CHIEF. EACH INDIVIDUAL ASSIGNED TO THE JSOC TO BE RATED BY HIS IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR.

(4) ANNEX D AND E DEAL WITH OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE (INTENT IS TO MAKE THE CURRENT ACC WORKING AIDS MACV OR J2 DIRECTIVES.

2. WE ARE ADVISING 7AF AND MACV THAT THE DRAFT IS BEING RETURNED TO YOUR HQ FOR REVIEW AND POSITION AND ARE REQUESTING EXTENSION OF CURRENT 23 MARCH SUSPENSE.

3. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

DATE	TIME
16	
MONTH	YEAR
MAR	70
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
3	5

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ZCZCRDA598  
PP YMRDQR  
DE YHLAKZ 14 0790209  
P 200207Z  
FM PACSCTYRGN  
TO 6994SCTYSQ/DO  
ZEM

20 MAR '70 5 36 Z PM

# 34

[REDACTED] DO

SUBJ: MACV DIRECTIVE 381-23.  
REFS: A. UOUR 160925Z MAR 70.  
B. YOUR 190825Z MAR 70.

1. HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED DRAFT COPY OF SUBJECT DIRECTIVE, THEREFORE, CANNOT COMMENT ON DETAILS THEREIN. PSR POSITION REMAINS AS STATED BY CV ON STAFF VISIT TO 6994SS; I.E., WE CAN SEE NO REQUIREMENT FOR CHANGE IN PRESENT ACO ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.
  2. SUGGEST YOU SO ADVISE J2/MACV.
- 130

NNNN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ADM 5  
ALS

02/0848Z Apr 70



X

ROUTINE

699A SCTYSQ

PACSCTYREN/DC

#35



CC.

SUBJECT: ACC Subordination. REFER DO 012148Z APRIL 70. MET WITH COL WESTENDORF, DEP CC, 509 RRG, TODAY TO DISCUSS REQUIREMENT BY J2 MACV TO DEVELOP WORKABLE ARRANGEMENT. HE ADVISED THAT COL HIGGINS INTENDS TO PUSH DRAFT 381.23, WE BUILT 28 MARCH (SEE MY CC 280800Z MAR). IF J2 DISSENTS, HE INTENDS TO NEGOTIATE ON GIC, ACC, SLOT. I ADVISED COL WESTENDORF THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT OIC ROTATION OR EXTERNAL OIC RATING. HE AGAIN ASSURED ME THAT COL HIGGINS UNDERSTANDS AND ACCEPTS OUR POSITION, AND ALSO DISAGREES WITH J2 PROPOSAL. WE ARE STILL WAITING ON J2114 REVIEW OF OUR PROPOSED 381.23 WHICH IS A REBUTTAL OF J-2 PROPOSAL DATED 14 MARCH 70. UPON RECEIPT OF THAT REVIEW, WE WILL FACE COL DESSERT, DEP J-2 MACV. PERTINENT EXTRACT OF OUR PROPOSAL (28 MAR) FOLLOWS:

2. ORGANIZATION:

A. THE ACC IS A JOINT OPERATION UNDER THE COMMAND OF CO,	2	1535
509 RR GP AND CO, 6994TH SS. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF 509 RR GP AND	AFR	70
6994TH SS ARDF/ACI FUNCTIONS IS DELEGATED BY COMSMACV TO MACV J2	1	2

4437

Lt Col Russell

DUANE E. RUSSELL, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Commander



ROUTINE

Lt Col Russell

Lt Col Russell

4437

AND FURTHER TO MACV J211-4 AS AN AGENT FOR MACV J2, CO, 509 RR GP AND CO, 6994TH SS HAVE DESIGNATED THE OIC'S ACC, AS THEIR AGENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF MACV TASKING AS PROVIDED HEREIN.

B. THE ACC WILL CONSIST OF TWO OIGS, ONE EACH APPOINTED BY CO, 509 RR GP AND CO, 6994TH SS AS THEIR AGENTS AND SUCH OTHER OFFICERS AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL OF THE 509TH RR GP AND 6994TH SS AS MAY BE DETERMINED JOINTLY BY THEIR COMMANDERS. EITHER OIG IS EMPOWERED TO TAKE ANY ACC ACTION AUTHORIZED BY THIS DIRECTIVE AND REQUIRED FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

C. ACC PERSONNEL WILL REMAIN ASSIGNED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE UNITS.

D. EACH INDIVIDUAL ASSIGNED TO ACC WILL BE RATED AND INDORSED BY THE NEXT HIGHER INDIVIDUALS IN THE CHAIN OF ACC SUPERVISION/PARENT COMMAND WHO ARE OF HIS PARENT SERVICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARENT SERVICE REGULATIONS. COMMENT OF INTERMEDIATE SUPERVISORS OR MACV J2 STAFF PERSONNEL MAY BE FORWARDED TO THE RATER/INDORSER WHO WILL CONSIDER THESE COMMENTS IN RECOMMENDING FORMULATING THEIR RATING.

ZCZCRDB143  
RR YMRDQR  
DE YHLAKZ 26 15 ,200  
R 050158Z  
FM PACSCTYRGN  
TO USAFSS/DOR  
INFO 6994SS/DOR  
ZEM

5 JUN 70 8:40

**TO: DOR**

**SUBJECT: SPECIFIC TASKING FOR COZ COLLECTION POSITIONS**

1. THE "Z1", "Y", AND "Z2" POSITIONS ABOARD COMBAT COUGER AIRCRAFT FLOWN ON PRIMARY COLLECTION MISSIONS ARE INTENDED TO FUNCTION AS AIRBORNE COLLECTION POSITIONS TASKED WITH INTERCEPTING AND COPYING LOW LEVEL ENEMY MORSE AND VOICE COMMUNICATIONS. HOWEVER, THE CURRENT TASKING FOR THESE POSITIONS USUALLY RESULTS IN NO MORE THAN GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO SEARCH A LOW FREQUENCY BAND FOR ANY ENEMY EXPLOITABLE TRAFFIC.
2. 6994TH SOTY SQ OPERATIONS PERSONNEL HAVE IN THE PAST RAISED THE ISSUE OF A NEED FOR SPECIFIC TASKING OF THE COLLECTION POSITIONS AT CONFERENCES WITH THE CMA'S AND NRV (C). NRV(C) HAS INFORMALLY SUPPORTED THE POSITION THAT MORE SPECIFIC INTERCEPT TASKING IS SORELY NEEDED. THE CMA'S HOWEVER, HAVE EXPRESSED BOTH A RELUCTANCE AND AN INABILITY TO PERFORM THIS TASK.
3. THE CMA POSITION IS UNDERSTANDABLE WHEN THEIR PRESENT GROUND PROCESSING WORKLOAD PLUS THE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES POSED BY ENEMY COMM CHARACTERISTICS, MOBILITY OF ENEMY UNITS AND THE GENERAL TACTICAL SITUATION ARE CONSIDERED. HOWEVER, THESE DIFFICULTIES DO NOT RENDER THE TASK IMPOSSIBLE AND SHOULD NOT PREVENT A CONCENTRATED EFFORT TO CONSTRUCT AT LEAST A PARTIAL SOLUTION. WE BELIEVE THE CURRENT PROCEDURE RESULTS IN AN INEFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF VALUABLE AIRBORNE INTERCEPT RESOURCES.
4. 6994TH ANALYSIS SECTIONS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO PROVIDE LIMITED INTERCEPT GUIDANCE TO THE ZULU POSITIONS BUT THEIR CAPABILITY IS MINIMAL DUE TO THE LACK OF AN EXTENSIVE DATA BASE. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE THEY CAN PROVIDE TECH DATA GUIDING ZULU INTERCEPT TOWARD NETS SUSPECTED OF PASSING EXPLOITABLE TRAFFIC, THEY ARE UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF THIS INTERCEPT IS UNIQUE OR IF IT IS BEING DUPLICATED BY GROUND STATION COPY. IF AN IMPORTANT ENEMY COMM NETWORK IS ISOLATED WHICH CAN BE INTERCEPTED EXCLUSIVELY BY AN AIRBORNE PLATFORM OR FOR WHICH AN ACFT PROVIDES HIGHER QUALITY INTERCEPT, IT WOULD SEEM LOGICAL THAT THIS FACT SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED AND THE APPROPRIATE ABN PLATFORM THEN TASKED SPECIFICALLY WITH LOCATING, INTERCEPTING, AND MAINTAINING CONTINUITY ON THIS ENTITY.
5. WE RECOGNIZE THAT TRADITIONAL MISSION ASSIGNMENTS ON THE ZULU POSITIONS ARE PROBABLY NOT FEASIBLE. HOWEVER, WE FEEL CERTAIN THAT MUCH MORE CAN BE DONE TO PROVIDE CONTROLLED INTERCEPT GUIDANCE AND MORE EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF THESE RESOURCES. DIRNSA AND/OR THE CMA'S ARE THE ONLY AGENCIES CAPABLE OF ACCOMPLISHING THIS. REQUEST THEREFORE, THAT YOU APPROACH NSA WITH THIS PROBLEM AND PROPOSE THE INITIATION OF A STUDY TO DETERMINE MORE EFFECTIVE METHODS OF DIRECTING ZULU POSITION INTERCEPT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ZCZCR09320  
PP YMRDQR  
DE HVCASK 02 1302040  
P 002025Z  
FM USAFSS  
TO PACSOTY:GM  
0994SCTYS  
ZEM

4/ 20/ 70  
copy

[REDACTED]

SUBJ: SPECIFIC TASKING FOR COZ COLLECTION POSITIONS [REDACTED]

REF: PSM VSS DPM 001700 JUN 70

REQUEST THAT YOU PROVIDE ANY BACKGROUND DATA ON THIS SUBJECT  
SUCH AS PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE CMAS, MACV, NRV(C),  
ETC, WHICH WILL SUPPORT OUR APPROACH TO DIRNSA.

150

MYRE: LITTHAL  
HAS SOMETHING ON  
THIS.

NNNN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

ZCZCROT404  
RR YMRDQR  
DE YHLAKZ 45 161213Z  
R 102125Z  
FM PACSCTYRGN  
TO USAFSS/DOR  
INFO 6994SS/DO  
ZEM

[REDACTED] DOR  
SUBJ: SPECIFIC TASKING FOR CCZ COLLECTION POSITIONS

REFS: A. OUR DOR 050158Z JUN 70.  
B. USAFSS DOR 052025Z JUN 70.

TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, SUBJECT TASKING HAS NEVER PROCEEDED BEYOND THE DISCUSSION STAGE DUE TO OPPOSITION FROM THE CMA'S. WE BELIEVE THAT A USAFSS/DIRNSA EXCHANGE ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD FOCUS HIGH LEVEL INTEREST ON THE PROBLEM AND BE INSTRUMENTAL IN OVERCOMING CMA RELUCTANCE TO ADDRESS THE TASK. REF ALPHA WAS GENERATED AS A RESULT OF PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS BY A RECENT OFFICER SEA RETURNEE AND WE DO NOT HOLD PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE ON THIS SUBJECT. FOR 6994SS: TAKE REF BRAVO FOR ACTION AND REPLY TO DIRECT TO USAFSS, INFO THIS HQS IF YOU HOLD REQUESTED CORRESPONDENCE.

185

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NNNNZ QZ CRDU95DRA576  
RR WRDQR  
DE YMLAKZ 32 181042Z  
R 300408Z  
FM PACSCTYRGN  
TO 6994SCTYSQ/DOR  
INFO DET 3 6994SCTYSQ/DOR  
ZEM

30 JUN 78 7 1 21

[REDACTED] DOR

SUBJ: TASKING OF OCZ COLLECTION POSITIONS.

1. DIRNSA HAS ADVISED THAT ACTIONS ARE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY TO EFFECT DIRECT TECHNICAL TASKING OF POSITIONS (ARDF AND COLLECTION) ABOARD MAJOR DIRECT SUPPORT RESOURCES. DIRNSA HAS DRAFTED ANNEX INDIA TO TECHINS 1056 PLUS NECESSARY CHANGES TO EXISTING TECHINS AND THE PACKAGE WILL BE INTRODUCED INTO FORMAL COORDINATION CHANNELS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

2. NEW SUBJECT: [REDACTED] COLLECTION. THE FOLLOWING USAFSS MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE:

R 262202Z  
FM USAFSS  
TO ZEN/CHIEF USAFSS/FM  
INFO PACSCTYRGN

[REDACTED] DOR

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] COLLECTION (S)

REFERENCE YOUR 241937Z JUNE 70

1. IT IS NOT WITHIN EXISTING USA-564 CAPABILITY TO TRANSCRIBE OR SCAN AND TAOREP [REDACTED] TAPES. THE SIX VIETNAMESE LINGUISTS ARE FULLY EMPLOYED MANNING AIRBORNE ARDF COLLECTION POSITIONS AND PROCESSING USA-564 VOICE EXPLOITABLE MESSAGE REPORTS (EMR). AUGMENTED MANNING, IF AVAILABLE, AND INSTALLATION OF DEMUR EQUIPMENT WOULD ALSO AGGREGATE THE ALREADY CRAMPED WORKING AREA IN THE H-1 VANCOMPLEX.

2. ON 21 JUNE THE [REDACTED] (C) REP CONTACTED USA-564 O OFFCOM AND POSED QUESTION WHETHER USA-564 COULD INCLUDE HELICOPTER DELIVERED [REDACTED] TAPES IN USA-564S DAILY TRAFFIC/TAPE POUCH TO USM-7. THE ANSWER WAS AFFIRMATIVE PENDING RECEIPT OF COMPLETE DETAILS AND FINAL ARRANGEMENTS.





12/08557 dnn 70

COS  
22  
COS  
Mime:  
NURW:00

PRIORITY

6994SCTTSC

DET 2 6994SCTTSC



JAN 70

SUBJ: MINI-MOD UTILIZATION.

1. MINI-MOD UTILIZATION WILL BE A TOPIC OF DISCUSSION DURING FORTHCOMING AIDF/MSD COLLECTION CONFERENCE AT HANOI (19 - 20 JAN).

2. AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED THIS SUBJ IN DETAIL, REQUEST YOU COMPILE THAT DATA NECESSARY TO REFUTE BREXIST UTILIZATION. FEEL YOU SHOULD HAVE STATISTICS TO PROVE THE POINT THAT THERE ARE TOO MANY DMZ (AREA 9) MSMS AND THAT THE MINI CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED IN A BETTER VHF ENVIRONMENT (AREAS 11 AND 12). SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING DATA BE COMPILED.

3rd/4


- A. AVERAGE WEEKLY MINI RESOURCE EXPENDITURE IN AREA 9.
- B. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE EFFECTIVENESS OF VHF COLLECTION IN AREA 9, 11, AND 12 (MSMS/POS'S PLOM VS COLLECTION OBTAINED).
- C. VHF FIX RATIO PER TOT PLS PLOM IN AREAS 9, 11 AND 12.
- D. VHF HD'S THAT WERE HF PARALLEL (I.E. WHAT VHF TOTS CAN/CANNOT BE LOCATED, FOR CONTINUITY PURPOSES, BY STRICTLY HF CAPABLE MSMS). JAN 70
- E. AVERAGE STANDOFF RANGES FOR AREA 9, 11, 12 VHF TOTS. 1 2

4891

MSST/ALISK



JAMES W. JOHNSON, JR., LtCol, USAF  
Operations Officer



F. DATA NECESSARY TO POINT OUT FACT THAT HIGH NUMBERS OF LOPS/CUTS ARE DUE TO FACT THAT MANY TOTS ARE NORTH (AND GIVE DISTANCE) OF THE DMZ AND ARE NOT POSING IMMEDIATE TACTICAL THREAT TO PWMS IN NORTHERN QUANG BINH PROVINCE.

G. ANY OTHER DATA YOU FEEL APPLICABLE.

3. RECALLS YOU PROB DO NOT HOLD THAT DATA IN PARA 2D, THEREFORE, IT MAY BE BENEFICIAL TO ONE OF US CONFERENCE REPS DEPART EARLY TO CHECK THAT INFO IS OK FOR CONFERENCE.

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

*File OPS  
JK*

TYPE MSG

**I**

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

*PRIORITY*

INFO

DTG

*26/0230Z NweTe*

FROM: 6994SCTYSQ

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: PACSCTYRGN/DO/

INFO: AFSSO 7AF/DIOR/

DO

SUBJ: VHF D/F PRODUCTIVITY.

1. FOLLOWING AFNICAC MSG OBTAINED FROM 7AF DIO QUOTED FOR UR INFO:  
QUOTE.

R 232031Z

FM AFSSO USAF

TO AFSSO PACAF/DIPS

USAFSS/DCY

INFO AFSSO 7AF/DIOR

SUBJ: VHF D/F (MINI MOD). RECENT USAFSS WEEKLY REPORTS, SPECIFICALLY THE ONE COVERING PERIOD OF 7 - 13 FEB 70, INDICATE THAT AIR-38 (MINI MOD) SYSTEMS ASSIGNED TO PLEIKU HAVE INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY IN QUALITY AND QUANTITY. THIS SUCCESS HAS PROMPTED SEVERAL QUESTIONS FROM ACSI. YOUR ASSISTANCE IN PROVIDING ACCURATE RESPONSE IS REQUESTED. (1) WHAT ARE THE CURRENT PRIMARY OPERATING AREAS OF THESE AIR-

DATE	TIME
26	0810
MONTH	YEAR
MAR	70
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE

4391

SMOET MILLER

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

JAMES W JOHNSON, Jr., LtCol, USAF

*Operations Officer*

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DD FORM 173  
NOV 63

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM  
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRIORITY	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION INFO			

CRAFT? (2) WHAT IS THE NATURE OF TARGETS FIXED ON VHF? (3) WHAT IS DATA FLOW FOR VHF COLLECTED? (4) WHAT IS BEING DONE WITH DATA COLLECTED?/ARE THERE ANY KNOWN SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN AS A RESULT OF VHF ARDP?

UNQUOTE.

2. IN EVENT USAFSS/PACAF SOLICIT UR ASSISTANCE, THE FOLLOWING INFO, KEYED TO SEQUENCE OF QUESTIONS ABOVE, IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR POSSIBLE USE.

A. PRIOR TO 15 FEB 70, MINI-MOD MANS WERE FLOWN ONLY IN SEA AREA 9 AND 11 AND WERE TARGETED PRIMARILY AGAINST NVA TARGETS ACROSS THE DMZ. FOR THE MOST PART THOSE TARGETS WERE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FIX DUE TO STANDOFF RANGE AND SHORT TRANSMISSIONS. ON 15 AND 16 FEB THE FIRST MINI MSNS WERE FLOWN IN SEA AREA 12, WHICH WAS THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY WE HAD TO WORK VHF TARGETS IN THE ACCEPTED MANNER I.E. CLOSE AND CIRCUMVENT THE TGT. (FOR 15/16 FEB MINI MSN RESULTS SEE MY OPS 180940Z FEB 70). SINCE 15 FEB WE HAVE BEEN FLYING APPROX THREE MINI MSNS IN AREA 12, FOUR MINI MSNS IN AREA 11 AND THREE MINI MSNS IN AREA 9 EACH WEEK. AREA 12 CONTINUES TO BE THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR FOR VHF FIXES. MAJORITY OF VHF TGTS FILED ARE COMS/AAA/ARTY RELATED.

C. VHF DATA IS TREATED IN THE SAME MANNER AS HF FIX/COLLECTION DATA I.E. PASSED A/G TO DSU/CMA, ENR'D, INCLUDED IN RECOVERY REPORTS, ETC.

D. VHF (AS IS HF) DATA IS UTILIZED TO ASSIST IN THE FORMULATION OF ALC LIGHT BOXES, TAC AIR STRIKES AND FIRE SUPPORT MSNS. RESULTS ARE NORMALLY UNKNOWN AT THIS LEVEL.

READ FILE

NNNNZCZCRDA288  
RR YMRDGR  
DE YAQADK 48 0831945  
R 241948Z  
FM USAFSS  
TO PACSCTYRGN  
INFO 6994SCTYSG  
ZEM

25 FEB 78 15:37 Z

339

[REDACTED] DOR

SUBJECT: VHF ARDF

1. THE FOLLOWING AFSSO USAF (AFNICAC) MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO AND ACTION.

QUOTE:

R 232031Z  
FM AFSSO USAF  
TO AFSSO PACAF/DIPS  
USAFSS/DOX  
INFO AFSSO 7AF/DIOR


SUBJECT: VHF ARDF (MINI MOD). RECENT USAFSS WEEKLY REPORTS, SPECIFICALLY THE ONE COVERING PERIOD OF 7-13 FEB 78, INDICATE THAT ALR-38 (MINI MOD) SYSTEMS ASSIGNED TO PLEIKU HAVE INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY IN QUALITY AND QUANTITY. THIS SUCCESS HAS PROMPTED SEVERAL QUESTIONS FROM ACSI. YOUR ASSISTANCE IN PROVIDING ACCURATE RESPONSE IS REQUESTED. (1) WHAT ARE THE CURRENT PRIMARY OPERATING AREAS OF THESE AIRCRAFT? (2) WHAT IS THE NATURE OF TARGETS FIXED ON VHF? (3) WHAT IS DATA FLOW FOR VHF COLLECTED? (4) WHAT IS BEING DONE WITH DATA COLLECTED? ARE THERE ANY KNOWN SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN AS A RESULT OF VHF ARDF?

UNQUOTE.

2. REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE IN PROVIDING ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS (2), (3), AND (4) IN QUOTED MESSAGE. THE WEEKLY REPORTS REFERRED TO ARE INFO COPIES OF THE ARDF WEEKLY BRIEFING NOTES.

[REDACTED]

20/0839Z Mar 70



circ  
F  
CNS

PRIORITY

6994SCTYSQ

740SCTYREN (CV/DO)

DET 1, 6994SCTYSQ

INFO:

DET 1 6994SCTYSQ

DET 2 6994SCTYSQ



DC MAR 70

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT OF AIRCRAFT

1. THIS HQ, NAVY, IS PROVIDING 6994S33 AND 74F WITH ALERT NOTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE FORTHCOMING REQUIREMENT TO DEPLOY TWO ADDITIONAL ZULU AIRCRAFT TO NEP WITHIN NEXT 12 - 24 HOURS.

2. REQUIREMENT STEMS FROM ACUTE INTEREST IN OBTAINING MAXIMUM COLLECTION IN PLAIN OF JARS DURING NEXT 30 DAYS. UNDERSTAND REQUIREMENT LEVIED BY WCS.

3. WE HAVE IDENTIFIED REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE 21 SLOTS IN SUPPORT OF THESE TWO ZULU AIRCRAFT AS FOLLOWS:

A. A309A1E - FOUR (4)

B. A309A1I - TWELVE (12)

C. A309A1S - TWO (2)

	20	1515
MAR	70	
	1	2

D. A309A1R - TWO (2)

E. A309A1C - ONE (1)

4. CONTINGENCY PLAN BEING ADVISED AND NECESSARY ACTIONS BEING TAKEN TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO NAVY REQUIREMENT.

5. THIS MESSAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED.

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**JOINT MESSAGEFORM**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

MULTI SINGLE

PRECEDENCE

ACTION **IMMEDIATE**

INFO

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

316018-9  
 110

DTS 21/11077 N...

FROM: 6994SCTYSQ

TO: DET 1 6994SCTYSQ  
 DET 2 6994SCTYSQ  
 DET 3 6994SCTYSQ

DDQ MAR 70

SUBJ: NKP AUGMENTATION

- PLS PASS FIMG QUOTED MSG TO APPROPRIATE TMS UNITS. QUOTE.  
 / / / / / COMM CENTER PLS QUOTE &6018W MSG / / / / / / UNQUOTE.
- FOR DET 1: THIS CONFIRMS VOCC REQ TO TRANSFER THREE PERSONNEL TO PLEIKU. TRANSPORTATION FROM PLEIKU TO NKP WILL BE AS OUTLINED IN PART THREE QUOTED MSG.
- FOR DET 2: DET 2 AUGMENTIES WILL TRANSFER TO NKP ON 360 TMS ACFT AS OUTLINED PART TWO QUOTED MSG. PHU CAT AUGMENTIES HAVE BEEN ADVISED TO CONTACT OPS EXT 3291 UPON ARRIVAL. PLS PROVIDE ALL POSS ASSISTANCE. THREE INDIV ARE SKED TO DEPART PHU CAT FOR PLEIKU VIA C-7, TOMORROW A.M.
- FOR ALCOW: ORDERS WILL BE HANDCARRIED FOR ALCOW BY 6994SS PERSONNEL.
- ABOVE ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO WACC MSG QUOTED BELOW.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DATE	TIME
MONTH	REGD
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE

4891

MAJ HELMES

SEC

SIGNATURE

TYPED (for stamp) NAME AND TITLE


JAMES W JOHNSON JR IACOL USAR

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NAVJIN



7 APR 70 14:45

ZCZC 000430

FM YAKUB  
TO YAKAZ 19 074000  
FM PACSCTY ROK  
TO 074SCTY 00/BU



MOVEMENT OF AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL.

REFS: A. 07455 20 MAR 70  
B. 07458 20 MAR 70


C. [REDACTED] F-47/0410-10 200917Z MAR 70.

U. LET 07458 COMM 21 1512Z MAR 70 (JURMIS 310330)

1. REF ALFA ADVISED US OF AN ANTICIPATED MAOV ALERT NOTIFICATION TO DEPLOY TWO ZOLU ACFT AND CREWS TO NKP FOR THIRTY DAYS. IT ALSO STATED THAT A RECRUITMENT FOR TWENTY ONE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL TO SUPPORT THE TWO ZOLU ACFT AT NKP HAD BEEN RECOGNIZED.

2. REF BRAVO (AMMIA 1005) MAOV 21 1512Z MAR 70 AND [REDACTED] 21 0022Z MAR 70 CONTAINS ALL PERTINENT DEPLOYMENT INFO INCLUDING AIRCRAFT AND CREW LISTINGS AND RECORDS TO SATISFY SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TWENTY ONE PERSONNEL TO BE DEPLOYED AND ALL NECESSARY SVR WOULD BE REDUCED TO 20% OF NORMAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE SPECIAL MSNS BE PROVIDED TO [REDACTED].

3. REF CHARLIE ADVISED THAT THE TWO ACFT HAD RETURNED TO TSN AND THAT [REDACTED] AS TO THE [REDACTED] ACFT. 4. REF DELTA INFORMED US WITH ALL PERTINENT DETAILS CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE TWO ACFT FROM NKP AND THE [REDACTED] OF THE [REDACTED] AND THE [REDACTED] PROVIDE THIS IN ALL SUBMITTED REPORTS BY RBF CHARLIE. 5. IN THE [REDACTED] THAT [REDACTED] IS KEPT FULLY COGNIZANT OF ALL OPERATIONAL MOVEMENTS OF AIRCRAFT OR PERSONNEL.



I

ROUTINE

205027 Jan 70

6994SCTYS4

PACSTYGH/OPS-A/

INFO: 6922SCTYNG

D.F. - 6994 Sops Sp In

427



OPS

SUBJ: RESUME OF MEETING HELD BY 14V(C) ON 9 JAN 70.

1. A MEETING WAS CONVENED BY 14V(C) ON 9 JAN 70 AT 0900 HOURS. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO PROVIDE AN EVALUATION OF A SIX WEEK VOICE PROCESSING TEST CONDUCTED BY USA-563, USM-604, AND USM-808 AS A RESULT OF 7AF/460TRM DECISION TO DISCONTINUE OPS STOPPING AT HIE PHU BAI AND DANANG. THE TEST COMMENCED 22 NOV 69.

2. THE MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF 14V(C), USM-808, USM-704, USA-563, ACC AND 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON.

3. IN DISCUSSION CONCERNING RESULTS OF THE TEST, THE FOLLOWING WAS PROVIDED BY 14V(C): ~~THE FINDING INDICATES THAT THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING WERE OPS STOPS.~~

A. FIRMA CONDUCTED A STUDY OF TRANSLATIONS PRODUCED BY USM-808 FROM USA-563 VOICE INTERCEPT: 12

(1) 01-31 November - Average TIME LAPSE FROM TOI - DTG: 24 JAN 70  
 HOURS 59 MIN. TWENTY THREE OF THE SEVENTY SEVEN TRANSLATIONS DID NOT 1

4891

HAS BEEN



JAMES W JOHNSON, JR., LtCol, USAF  
Operations Officer

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

MEET THE 24 HOUR DEADLINE REQUIREMENT.

(2) 22 NOV - 2 JAN - AVERAGE TIME LAPSE FROM TOI - DTG  
14 HOURS 06 MIN. EIGHT OF THE 170 TRANSLATIONS ISSUED DID NOT MEET  
THE 24 HOUR REQUIREMENT.

B. SIMILAR DATA PROVIDED BY USM808 WAS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) 23 OCT - 21 NOV - AVERAGE TIME LAPSE FROM TOI-DTG: 26  
HRS 53 MIN. IN-STATION HANDLING TIME - 6 HOURS 54 MINUTES.

(2) 22 NOV - PRESENT (7 JAN 70)-AVERAGE TIME LAPSE FROM  
TOI - 11 HRS 50 MIN. INSTATION HANDLING TIME 5 HRS 10 MIN. REDUCED  
IN-STATION HANDLING TIME IS ATTRIBUTED TO INCREASED ACCURACY OF EBR  
PRODUCT FROM USA-563 AND USM-808 OBTAINING TRANSLATIONS DIRECT  
FROM EBR VICE RAW TRAFFIC PRODUCED BY DANCERS.

C. USM-808 REPRESENTATIVES INDICATED THAT THEY COULD NOT FIND  
ANY INSTANCES WHEREIN PRODUCT, INTELLIGENCE OR TECHNICAL REPORTS  
WERE MISSED DUE TO PROCEDURES USED DURING THE TEST PERIOD.

D. IN AN EFFORT TO PROVIDE USA-563 WITH A BETTER IDENTIFICATION  
CAPABILITY AND AS A RESULT OF DIRNSA TASKING USA-563 TO PRODUCE  
EMR'S, USM-808 HAS PROVIDED USA-563 WITH 32 CRYPT SYSTEMS KNOWN  
TO BE USED IN AREAS OF INTEREST TO USA-563 MISSION.

E. USM-808 REPORTED INCREASED ACCURACY IN USA-563 REPORTING  
CONTAINED IN BEATS AS A RESULT OF USA-563/USM-808 COORDINATION ON  
BEATS REPORTING CRITERIA AND DATA ENTRY PROCEDURES.



[REDACTED]

4. USM-808 RECOMMENDED THAT EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY, THE TEST OFFICIALLY TERMINATE; EFFECTIVE THAT SAME DATE, USA-563 CEASE FORWARDING MAGNETIC TAPES TO USM-808 FOR TRANSCRIPTION; THAT USM-604 DANCERS PERFORM TRANSCRIPTION OF PLAINTEXT AND FIGURE/LETTER TRAFFIC FOR USA-563. USA-563 WILL CONTINUE TO TRANSCRIBE AND REPORT AS REQUIRED, ALL FIGURE TYPE TRAFFIC. TRANSCRIPTIONS BY USM-604 DANCERS WILL BE RETURNED TO USA-563 IN PAGEPRINT FORM FOR IHR REPORTING AS NECESSARY. USM-808 ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT ANALYTIC PERSONNEL FROM USA-563 PERFORM TDY TO USM-808 FOR UPDATE AND FAMILIARIZATION WITH T/I, G/A AND REPORTING PROCESSES. THE ABOVE RECOMMENDATIONS WERE FAVORABLE TO ALL REPRESENTATIVES.

5. USM-808 ADDITIONALLY RECOMMENDED THAT USA-563 BE PROVIDED WITH TWO DANCER PERSONNEL ON A FULL TIME BASIS, HOWEVER, DANCER PERSONNEL ARE NOT CURRENTLY AVAILABLE.

6. 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON REP CONCURRED IN REQUIREMENT FOR ANALYST EXCHANGE BETWEEN USA-563 AND USM-808; INDICATED THAT USA-563 WAS CAPABLE OF CONTINUING THE PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN THE TEST ON AN INDEFINITE BASIS AND AGREED THAT USA-563 PERSONNEL WILL WORK WITH USM-604 IN ESTABLISHING COURIER TIMES THAT WILL PROVIDE MOST RAPID EXCHANGE OF MATERIAL BETWEEN THE DANCERS AND THE USA-563 PERSONNEL.

7. USM-704 REPRESENTATIVE AGREED TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING DANCER PERSONNEL AVAILABLE FROM NOON TO MIDNIGHT VICE SWINGS ONLY. THIS WILL PROVIDE FOR EARLIER RETURN TO USA-563 OF MATERIALS INTERCEPTED ON EARLY MISSIONS AND SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSCRIBED BY DANCERS. CURRENTLY ALL THREE DANCER PERSONNEL WORK ONLY THE SWING SHIFT.

8. NAV(C) WILL FORMALIZE RESULTS OF MEETING AND PROVIDE RECOMMENDATION TO MAFV THAT PRESENT PROCEDURES CONTINUE TO BE USED VICE REIMPLEMENTATION OF OLD STOP PROCEDURE.

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[REDACTED]

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06/03/548

INT 1  
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Direct copy has

NADC17KAA002  
// IMMEDIATE//  
SSN 009  
O 060330Z ZYH  
FM USA 607  
TO: USM 724 (FOR ACC)  
INFO USA 561  
ZEM

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(ACC PLS PASS TO USA561)

IAPV3350PS/ASMS

SUBJ: COMBAT COUGAR ZULU OPSTOPS

IF VOICE INTERCEPT IS ACQUIRED:

1. REQUEST COMBAT COUGAR ZULU MISSIONS IN SEA AREAS ONE AND TWO MAKE OPSTOPS AT BINH TUY AFB, FOR PURPOSE OF DROPPING VOICE TAPES.

2. COMBAT COUGAR ZULUS CALL GROUND STATION, (335TH) 30 MINS PRIOR TO OPSTOP TO INSURE BEING MET AND TAPES PICKED UP.

120

NNNN

[REDACTED]

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR ( ) TELETYPE CENTER

INT  
③

TYPE MSG

XX

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

ROUTINE

INFO

DTG 9:11 32 JUN 70.

FROM: USA-561

TO: USM-607

INFO: USM-70A/ACC

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FOR

SUBJ: COMBAT COUGAR OPS STOPS

REFER 060330Z.

BECAUSE OF THE FLIGHT SAFETY HAZARDS AND INCREASED TIME ON TARGET INCURRED AS A RESULT OF OPS STOPS, 7TH AF APPROACHED MACV WITH A PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE ALL AIR FORCE OPS STOPS. THE AF POSITION WAS THAT THEY HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE ELIMINATION OF OPS STOPS AS LONG AS THERE WAS NO DEGRADATION OF THE CMA INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT. TO ENSURE THERE WAS NO PRODUCT DEGRADATION A TEST WAS CONDUCTED AT DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ, PLEIKU AND 8TH BRFS DURING NOV 69 - JAN 70. THE TEST RESULTS PROVED THE AF ABILITY TO ACCURATELY TRANSMIT THE INTERCEPT AND FORWARD ENRVS WHILE STILL MEETING THE MACV 24 HOUR FM INTERCEPT TO PUBLICATION TIME REQS. THAT PROCEDURE IS STILL INBEING BETWEEN DET2 AND THE 8BRFS AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN USED BETWEEN 6994TH SS AND THE 175TH RQC AND DET3, 6994SS AND 7TH BRFS. ADDITION-

DATE	9	YEAR	
MONTH	JUN	YEAR	70
PAGE NO.	1	NO. OF PAGES	2

ALLY, EVERY AF MISSION MAKES EVERY EFFORT TO PASS EXPLOITABLE TRAFFIC A/G TO THE SUPPORTED CMA. SHOULD THE ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES NOT BE FULFILLING YOUR REQS, PLEASE ADVISE AND WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE YOUR TIMELY RECEIPT OF OUR INTERCEPT.

REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS

SECURITY

ZGZCR0271

RR YMRDQR  
DE YHLAKZ 30 0030238  
R 030222Z  
FM PACSCTYRGN  
TO 6994SS OPS  
INFO 6922SW OPS  
ZEM

3 JAN 70 07 12

OPS-A

SUBJ: WATER SOLUBLE PAPER

- REFS: A. 6922SW/OPS 030755Z DEC 69.
- B. PACSCTYRGN OPS-A 042227Z DEC 69.
- C. USAFSS/CSP-S 191735Z DEC 69.
- D. 6922SW/OPS-M 300515Z DEC 69.
- E. 6994SS/OPS 020812Z JAN 70.


1. REF A PASSED 6994SS RATIONALE FOR WAIVER OF REQUIREMENT TO CARRY WATER SOLUBLE PAPER ABOARD COMBAT COUGAR ACFT. REF B PASSED THIS RATIONALE TO USAFSS AND ASKED FOR WAIVER. REF C DENIES WAIVER, STATING THAT EC-47 WATER CONTAINER HOLDS TWO GALLONS WHICH COULD BE USED FOR DESTRUCTION PURPOSES. REF D ALSO REQUESTS WE CONTACT 460TRW AND URGE THAT FULL TWO GALLONS BE CARRIED. REF E ASKS STATUS OF ACTION ON REF C. REF E ASKS STATUS OF REF A.

2. IT APPEARS TO US THAT ACTION REQUESTED IN REF D IS NOT REALISTIC. IT WOULD SEEM MORE LOGICAL TO ATTEMPT TO RESTORE 5 GALLON JERRY CAN FOR THIS PURPOSE. REQUEST YOU ATTEMPT TO HAVE JERRY CANS PLACED ABOARD COUGAR FOR DESTRUCTIONS PURPOSES.

250

*Handwritten notes:*  
 CA 70  
 How to...  
 with the...  
 I need to know...  
 what goes on...  
 and...  
 also

NNNN



230333 Z Jan 70

ROUTINE  
ROUTINE


6994 SCTY SQ

PACSCYRGN /OPS-A/

INFO: DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ

DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ

DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ



OPS JAN 70

SUBJ: DOCUMENT DESTRUCTION ON EC-47.

REF YOUR OPS-A 200142Z JAN 70 (NOTAL)

THE 460TH TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE WING HAS AGREED TO RESTORE A 5-GALLON CAN OF WATER ABOARD EACH EC-47 FOR PURPOSE OF DESTROYING CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS. IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE PROCESSING AND CONSOLIDATING ALL CLASSIFIED FORMS CARRIED ABOARD MISSION ACFT AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. THESE ARE BEING FORWARDED TO USAFSS FOR PRINTING ON WATER SOLUBLE PAPER. FORMS ALREADY PROCESSED AND FORWARDED TO USAFSS INCLUDE (A) POST MISSION DEBRIEF, (B) HANDLOG FOR GDRS MSGS, AND (C) MAINTENANCE DEBRIEF. THREE ADDITIONAL FORMS (MISSION BRIEFCASE CHECKLIST, ARDF OPERATOR WORKSHEET, AND ARDF TIP-OFF LOG) HAVE BEEN FINALIZED AND WILL BE FORWARDED IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. INDIVIDUAL POSITION CHECKLISTS ARE ALSO BEING REPRODUCED ON WATER SOLUBLE PAPER.

22  
Jan 70  
1 1

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CMSGT NORWOOD

JAMES W JOHNSON JR, LT COL, USAF  
OPERATIONS OFFICER



26/00052 Jan 70

OPS 3  
HAS SEEN



CMR  
*[Signature]*

ROUTINE  
ROUTINE

6994 SCTY SQ

PRECEDENCE /OPS-A/

INFO: DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ

DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ

DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

4/12



OPS JAN 70

SUBJ: WATER SOLUBLE PAPER

REF: A. YORK OPS 200142Z JAN 70 (NOTAL)

B. NY OPS 230331Z JAN 70

C. USAFS USF-S 261357Z DEC OCT 69 (NOTAL)

1. IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 12057 CONCERNING WATER SOLUBLE PAPER BOARD MISSION AIRCRAFT, A CONSIDERABLE WORKLOAD IS INVOLVED IN TRANSFERRING DATA FROM CHERRY SHEETS. THE 6994 SCTY SQ ALONE IS PRESENTLY RECEIVING THREE CHERRY SHEETS DAILY WITH AN AVERAGE OF 750 GROUPS EACH. THESE CHERRY SHEETS HAVE TO BE REPRODUCED UPON RECEIPT SO THAT SUFFICIENT COPIES ARE AVAILABLE FOR EACH MISSION DURING THE DAY. SOME (APPROXIMATELY FIVE DAILY) HAVE TO BE REPRODUCED FOR A TOTAL OF 15 COPIES AND ALL REQUIRE AT LEAST ONE REPRODUCTION TO PROVIDE SIX COPIES.

2. EXTRACTING THE DATA AND TYPING ON INDIVIDUAL SHEETS OF WATER

26  
26  
Jan 70  
1 2

4891

CMSGT NORWOOD

*[Signature]*  
MARIAH BOINES, MAJOR, USAF  
ASST OPERATIONS OFFICER



ROUTINE  
ROUTINE

MARIAL MILLES, MAJ, USAF

CASUAL REPORT

4092

SOLUBLE PAPER WILL REQUIRE TWO ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AT THIS UNIT AND AT DETACHMENTS ONE AND TWO. DETACHMENT THREE WILL REQUIRE ONE ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUAL.

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE AND PRIOR TO OUR SUBMISSION OF ISL CHANGE FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL, REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING A RECLAMA OF PARAGRAPH TWO, REF 0000, CONCERNING CHEMICAL SUPPLY. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING ROLLS OF WATER SOLUBLE PAPER, PREFERRED IN 5 COPIES, SO THAT REPRODUCTION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED ON TELETYPE MACHINES. WE UNDERSTAND THE CURRENT STOCK OF SUCH PAPER IS RESTRICTED TO 5 X 10 1/2 INCH SHEETS (STOCK NO 733-068-2032).

4. RE: THE SUBJECT REQUEST THIS UNIT AND SUBORDINATE DETACHMENTS BE GRANTED A WAIVER OF PARAGRAPH 20.3.2.10, CHAPTER II, MANUAL 205-7 FOR THE USE NEGATIVE FILM FOR LISTING CARRIED ABOARD EACH MISSION AIRCRAFT. THIS DOCUMENT IS AVAILABLE AND CONTAINS APPROXIMATELY 65 PAGES WITH 1000 COPIES OF EACH PAGE. IT IS REPRODUCED ON 6 X 9 INCH PAPER WITH THE LETTERS IN ALL CAPS. MONTHLY BASIS. THIS DOCUMENT IS ESSENTIAL FOR SUCCESSFUL MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. REF 0000 GRANTED VIA THE NEXT PAGE.



25 JAN 70 19:55 Z

480

ops


ZCZCRDA999  
RR YMRDQR  
DE YHQADK 1448561730  
R 251610Z  
FM USAFSS  
TO PACSCTYRGN/SP  
6994SCTYSQ/SP  
ZEM

SUBJ: WATER SOLUABLE PAPER

1. REFERENCES:
  - A. PSR MSG 272142Z JAN 70
  - B. 6994TH MSG 260005Z JAN 70.
2. A WAIVER OF PARA 11-3 BRAVO, CHAPTER 11, USAFSSM 205-7, IS GRANTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF CARRYING NSA TASKING LISTING AND MISSION PRIORITY LISTINGS (CHERRY SHEETS) ABOARD MISSION AIRCRAFT ON OTHER THAN WATER SOLUABLE PAPER.
3. THIS WAIVER EXPIRES 31 JUL 70 UNLESS SOONER VACATED OR NEGATED THROUGH CHANGE TO THE PRESCRIBING DIRECTIVE.

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NNNN



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FM 1100Z  
DE WASH DC 17 045000Z  
TO AFHQ 17 045000Z  
INFO WASH DC 17 045000Z  
INFO WASH DC 17 045000Z  
INFO WASH DC 17 045000Z

17 FEB 70 10:10

Policy

Ops - dissemination

to PSR  
BAA

LS

27 045000Z FEB 70 17 045000Z FOR DIOB AND OOCR. 589TH HOLD AND PASS TO ACC

SUBJ: STANDARDIZATION OF MACF AROF AIRBORNE COLLECTION PROGRAM.  
1. IN ORDER TO OPTIMIZE RESULTS, AROF AND AIRBORNE COLLECTION AIR-  
CRAFT ARE REQUESTED TO BE IN A SPECIFIC AREA AT THE MOST LUCRATIVE  
TIME. ADHERE TO THE ESTABLISHED INITIAL TIME ON TARGET  
(ITOT) AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE PREDERMINED TOTAL TIME OVER TARGET  
IS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER THAT MEANINGFUL EVALUATION OF AND IMPROVE-  
MENTS TO THE PROGRAM CAN BE MADE. ALTHOUGH ADHERENCE TO THESE TIMES  
IS OF THE MOST IMPORTANCE IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS  
MAY OCCUR WHICH DELAY TAKE-OFFS OR CAUSE MISSION HOUR REDUC-  
TIONS. IT IS THEREFORE RECOGNIZED THAT THE ACTIVITY LEVEL OF THE ENEMY  
IS USUALLY SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT SUCCESSFUL MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

2. IN ORDER TO STANDARDIZE, INSO MUCH AS POSSIBLE, THE FLYING  
HOURS OF THE AROF AIRBORNE COLLECTION PROGRAM AND AT THE SAME TIME  
ACHIEVE A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF COLLECTIONS EFFECTIVE 14 FEB 1970 ALL  
MISSIONS WILL BE TO BE WITHIN AN INITIAL TIME ON TARGET (ITOT). IT IS  
RECOGNIZED THAT THE ITOT MAY NOT BE MET WITHIN A PLUS OR MINUS 15 MINUTES. IN  
THE EVENT THE ITOT CANNOT BE MET THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES WILL BE

- (A). MISSIONS THAT ARE DELAYED ONE HOUR OR LESS WILL CONTINUE AS PLANNED AND THE TIME ON TARGET WILL BE EXTENDED FOR THE AMOUNT OF THE DELAY TO MINUTES FOR THE DELAY.
  - (B). MISSIONS IN EXCESS OF ONE HOUR WILL BE COORDINATED WITH THE ACC TO DETERMINE IF TARGET ACTIVITY WARRANTS EXTENDING THE MISSION TO COVER THE DELAY.
  - (C). MISSIONS THAT DO NOT PRODUCE THE MAXIMUM FLYING HOURS POSSIBLE FOR THE 15 AND 45 OR 2 HOURS FOR THE ARMY WILL BE CONSIDERED A SHORTFALL. AS REQUIRED, AS REQUIRED, AS REQUIRED.
3. AS THE ACTIVITY LEVEL OF THE ENEMY, MAINTENANCE SCHEDULES, AND FLYING PRO-  
CEDURES CHANGE BETWEEN THE SERVICES, IT WILL BE AN INDIVIDUAL  
SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY TO ESTABLISH THOSE PROCEDURES NECESSARY TO  
MEET THE MACF AIRBORNE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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CC

23 April 1970

Initial evaluation of TOT vs ITOT Tasking. (U)

SSO MACV (J211-4)

1. (U) The following data is submitted in response to your verbal and electrical tasking to evaluate the TOT/ITOT tasking systems.
2. (U) At the time that the ITOT system of tasking was started, this unit attempted to establish a norm against which to compare the new results.
3. (U) The method used, was to screen from records of the 90 days prior to ITOT implementation, figures of actual accomplishment for each frag point. It was felt that a 90 day average of actual TOT and total flying time for each frag point was an adequate sample.
4. (U) It will be noted in attachment 1, that while the frag point stays constant, usage of that point does not. Old ones are used in degree varying from daily to seldom, while new ones are added.
5. (U) In an attempt to evaluate the general concept and determine if ITOT was good or bad in concept as compared to the old system of fragmenting time on target, it was decided that a general summation and averaging of those frag points used constantly and in comparison to the previous 90 day average would be adequate. Since bad days (i.e., a mission with a short time due to air abort, etc.), were not counted in establishing the original average, it was decided to omit them from the comparative statistics.
6. (U) The basic technique used was to establish by frag point, the old average total flying time (TFT) and time on target (TOT), then then using current figures, establish the new average TFT and TOT. As an example:

	<u>OLD</u>		<u>NEW</u>	
	<u>TFT</u>	<u>TOT</u>	<u>TFT</u>	<u>TOT</u>
XTD040	7.0	6.7	7.1	6.4
XTD060	6.9	5.9	7.1	6.4
XTD020	7.1	7.3	7.0	6.3

7. (U) Once the average was established, it would demonstrate the increase or decrease by frag point.

8. (U) The next step was to take a given time period (in this case, 01 Apr to 12 Apr 70) and multiply old averages and new averages by the number of missions flown. This would demonstrate ten in hours of flying

time whether there was an increase or decrease due to the new system. To increase the validity, it was decided that only those frag points with 15 or more missions flown would be used. As an example, the TSN figures are listed below:

<u>FRAG POINT</u>	<u>NEW</u>		<u>NO. OF MISSIONS</u>	<u>OLD</u>	
	<u>TFT</u>	<u>TOT</u>		<u>TFT</u>	<u>TOT</u>
XS3040	7.3	6.5	34	7.0	6.7
NR1550	7.2	5.3	26	7.3	5.8
VT9010	7.2	6.1	15	7.0	5.7
VS9045	5.2	3.6	25	5.3	3.5
XT0090	7.1	6.3	17	7.2	6.4
XT3060	7.1	6.4	72	6.9	5.9
XT6000	5.1	4.7	19	5.1	4.5
YU3010	7.1	6.1	33	7.0	5.9
YT5020	7.1	6.4	32	7.1	6.3

a. (1) These figures when multiplied out as described above, indicate as follows:

	<u>TFT</u>	<u>TOT</u>
NEW	1852.0	1599.4
OLD	<u>-1838.6</u>	<u>-1566.0</u>
	13.4	33.4

b. So that while we see more total time being delivered, we also see the time actually delivered on target has increased beyond that due solely to increased flying time.

8. Using this same technique throughout the squadron we find that there has been an overall two percent increase in target time. While that increase alone may not seem to have warranted the change, we feel that we now have a more tangible management tool against which the entire program can be measured and with diligent application and monitoring, we believe that even greater returns can be achieved.

DEWITT S. RUSSELL, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Commander

1 Atch  
1. Local ITOT for  
period 01 Mar - 10 Apr 70 (3), lcy.

Loss TOT for Period 01 Mar - 10 Apr 1970

AREA	FRAG PT.	MINS	L F T	TOT	AVG/FR	AVG/TOT	OLD
801A	XS-3040	34	249.4	221.1	7.3	6.5	7.0/6.7
801B	WR-1080	14	101.2	74.7	7.2	5.3	
	WJ-1090	01	7.2	4.8			
	WR-1550	26	187.9	138.0	7.2	5.3	7.3/5.8
802A	WT-9010	15	107.6	91.9	7.2	6.1	7.0/5.7
	AT-3020	06	30.3	26.3	5.0	4.4	
802D	ZM1090	23	120.9	105.3	5.3	4.6	
	ZS1090	01	7.3	6.6			
802F	XS-0080	01	7.0	6.4			
802I	XT-8040	01	7.0	6.4			
802J	VS9045	25	132.4	89.0	5.2	3.6	5.3/3.5
802H	VS-4050	24	125.7	83.0	5.2	3.5	
	VS-4050	02	14.0	11.2	7.0	5.6	
802L	WT-4000	01	5.3	4.5			
803C		15	107.7	98.2	7.2	6.5	
803A	AT-0050	01	5.2	4.3			
803B	XT-9090	17	120.5	107.0	7.1	6.3	7.2/6.6
	XT9000	06	42.5	37.4	7.1	6.2	
	AT-8590	06	42.5	36.9	7.1	6.1	
803D	AT-3060	72	514.3	460.0	7.1	6.4	6.9/5.9
	AT-3060	03	15.4	13.0	5.1	4.3	
	AT-8090	03	21.2	18.8	7.1	6.3	
803F	XT-6000	19	97.5	90.1	5.1	4.7	5.1/4.5
	AT-6000	05	35.5	34.2	7.1	6.8	7.3/6.8
	XT-5000	01	7.0	6.7			
	XS-6580						
Reduced mission only one flow.							
804A	IU-3010	33	235.2	199.9	7.1	6.1	7.0/5.9
	IU-3010	07	36.4	26.3	5.2	3.8	5.0/4.0
	IU-2010	34	242.5	207.2	7.1	6.1	
804C	YT-5020	32	227.2	203.4	7.1	6.4	7.1/6.3

Atch 1

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COM 423  
TO USAF 66  
TO PACS LIAISON VDC  
INFO 69945CTY 66/DC  
AF/AF 66 11 11  
TTL 112/302  
ZFM

- REF: A. YOUR LIAISON REPORT JUN 70
- B. YOUR LIAISON REPORT JUN 70
- C. YOUR LIAISON REPORT JUN 70
- D. YOUR LIAISON REPORT JUN 70
- E. YOUR LIAISON REPORT JUN 70

SUBJ: OPERATIONAL PLAN (OPERATION)

REF: A. REPLY TO THE DIFFICULTIES YOU AND 69945 ARE ENCOUNTERING IN THE CONDUCT OF YOUR PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING ACTION PLAN 71-73 AND IN YOUR WORK ON FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OF EC-27 AIRCRAFT. WE WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT OUR ENDEAVORS HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE TO KEEP YOU CONSCIOUS OF THE LIAISON PLANNING AND REPORTING AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

REF: B. EC-27 PROVIDES YOU WITH THE LATEST PLANNING FOR VIETNAMIZATION OF EC-27. IT PROVIDES SPECIFICS ON DELTA TOSSOVER AND CONCURRENT REDUCTION OF USAFSS FORCE STRENGTH AND LOGISTICS. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED AUTHORITY TO PROCEED WITH VIETNAMIZATION PLANNING AND WE CURRENTLY IN THE PROCESS OF FORMULATING A DETAILED PLAN FOR TRAINING VNAF PERSONNEL AND SEVERAL STAFF WHICH MUST BE WORKED OUT THAT ARE IN EFFECT TODAY. THE DRAFT PLAN WILL HAVE TO BE REVIEWED AT NSA/ESA THEREFORE, PLEASE ANTICIPATE DELIBERATION BEFORE AUG 1970. BE KEPT ADVISED ON ACTIONS UNDERWAY. AS YOU ARE AWARE, SEVERAL QUESTIONS WHICH WILL BE STRIKE OPERATIONS TO EC-27 VIETNAMIZATION WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT A LOW LEVEL.

REF: C. REVIEW OF YOUR PROPOSAL FOR VNAF SQUADRON APPEARANCE WILL BE FOR BACK LATE OPERATIONS. ONLY QUESTIONABLE AREA WOULD BE 2-3 TRAINING AIRCRAFT AS COMPARED TO 1-3 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONS. THIS INCREASE IS ACCEPTABLE, HOWEVER, IF OPERATIONS BY VNAF. THESE FRONT-END/SUPPORT FUNCTIONS ARE NOT WE CAN NOT OPERATE THEM, BUT STRONGLY RECOMMEND AN INTEGRATED FRONT-END AND BACK-END OPERATION BY VNAF PERSONNEL.

3. REF: C. YOUR PROPOSAL IN REF 1 APPLIES. USAFSS HAS A NUMBER OF FRONT-END OPERATIONS. 69945 SHOULD ASSIST THE (OPERATIONS) IN CONSTRUCTION. VNAF SQUADRON SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED VALUABLE CAPABILITY FOR OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE AREA OF REPLY TO THE DIFFICULTIES YOU AND 69945 ARE ENCOUNTERING IN THE CONDUCT OF YOUR PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING ACTION PLAN 71-73 AND IN YOUR WORK ON FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OF EC-27 AIRCRAFT.

4. YOUR LIAISON REPORT ON EC-27 TRAINING. 69945 SHOULD ASSIST THE (OPERATIONS) IN CONSTRUCTION. VNAF SQUADRON SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED VALUABLE CAPABILITY FOR OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE AREA OF REPLY TO THE DIFFICULTIES YOU AND 69945 ARE ENCOUNTERING IN THE CONDUCT OF YOUR PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING ACTION PLAN 71-73 AND IN YOUR WORK ON FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OF EC-27 AIRCRAFT.

PLANNING FOR VIETNAMIZATION OF  
US AIRCRAFT WITHIN THIS TIME IS THAT USAF  
AND PERSONNEL IN FY 71-73 LAW, 20-71-73  
SPECIFICS FOR PROVIDING TRAINING ARE  
INSTRUCTOR PERSONNEL, TRAINING EQUIPMENT  
IDENTIFIED. SPECIFICS WILL BE INCLUDED IN  
WILL BE PROVIDED A DRAFT COPY OF A RELIABLE  
PROGRAMING-PAPER; DOCUMENTS REFLECTING  
APPEAR IN CONSTANT DPC TIME AND EVENTS HAVE  
CONTAINED SOME OF THESE DOCUMENTS REF DELTA  
REDUCTION OF THIRTY AIRCRAFT IS CONSIDERED. BECAUSE  
WHICH MUST BE MADE AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL, FIRM  
EC-47 EMPLOYMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE. USAS Concept  
INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR PLANNING. A  
AVAILABLE IN SE. AF 72 IS RECOMMENDED REDUCTION OF THIRTY  
HOWEVER RECENT EC-47 AIRCRAFTS THIS NUMBER TO  
72 US RECOMMENDS IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF 20-71-73  
WHEN DIRECTED BY USAF. PLAC TWENTY - ONE EC-47 IN  
AVAILABLE (NOR RPS NOR) STATES TWENTY OF THESE  
BE USED FOR VIETNAMIZATION, 4-71-73-72  
ONE EC-47 WILL BE NOR FOR US OPERATIONS. THE  
OF THE TWENTY - 8 IDENTIFIED UNDER 72 IS WILL  
ASSIGNED UNTIL 72 12 ON COMPARABLE DOCUMENTS  
THIRTY-9 EC-47 AIRCRAFT WILL REMAIN IN SEA FOR  
UPON IMPLEMENTATION OF 72 12 AND 3 OR COMPARABLE  
THIRTY-9 AIRCRAFT COULD BE USED FOR NXP  
VIETNAM US OPERATIONS, THIRTY-1 US AND EIGHT  
EC-47 AVAILABLE FOR POLI SEA US OPERATIONS. 16 OF THESE  
COULD BE EMPLOYED AT PACAF (CLARK AB) 15 IN COMBINATION  
4 FOR OCS AT DYESS AFB AND 4 FOR NVA (CLOCK  
A TIME FRAME FOR ABOVE HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED  
ANTICIPATED THAT POST VIETNAM US OPERATIONS  
72 AND POLI SEA COULD BE BY 73. TIME FRAME  
EL-47 TO NVAH IS FORM NO ESTABLISHED IN  
WITHIN EACH FY IS CONTINUED UNLESS ABILITY TO PROVIDE PERSONNEL  
THEIR ABILITY TO COMPLEMENTARILY ACCEPT THE MISSION ESSENTIAL  
VIP OF REL DIRECT SUPPORT TO RVN.

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INT 15  
③

16/0840Z JUN 70

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ROUTINE

6994 SCTY SQDN

PACSTIRGN (DO)

[REDACTED]

20 JUN 70.

SUBJ: ARDF PROGRAMMING

REF: YOUR 152139Z JUN 70.

1. AFSSG PACAF 114816Z JUN QUERIED 7AF REGARDING ARDF PROGRAMMING ACTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE: REQUEST A STATUS REPORT ON PLANNING ACTIONS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH VMAF HC-47 ARDF CAPABILITY, SPECIFIC AREAS OF INTEREST INCLUDE MANNING OF BACK-END EQUIPMENT (ARDF OR VMAF), U.S. TRAINING RESPONSIBILITIES (USAF AND ARMY) GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF ACFT, TASKING ARRANGEMENTS AND RELATION WITH ARVN GROUND STRIKE UNITS AND MAINTENANCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOTH AIRPLANE AND BACK-END EQUIPMENT UNQUOTE.

2. 7AF HAS ASKED NAV (C) FOR ASSISTANCE IN PROVIDING COMMENTS/ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN ABOVE MESSAGE. NAV (C) RESPONSE, CURRENTLY IN DRAFT STAGE PROVIDES GENERAL ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS OUTLINED ABOVE. NAV (C) ANSWER TO MANNING OF BACK END EQUIPMENT DID NOT ADDRESS SPECIFIC QUANTITY/TYPE PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED. NSAFAC IS INFO ADDED ON NAV (C) RESPONSE.

16  
JUN 70  
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3. WE HAVE NOT BEEN APPROACHED BY 7AF TO PROVIDE RESPONSE TO ABOVE QUESTIONS NOR HAVE ANY COMMITMENTS/PROPOSALS TO NAV (C)/7AF SINCE:

- A. USAFSS 112035Z INDICATES PLANNING ACTIONS ARE BEING ACCOMPLISHED BY USAFSS.
- B. PROPOSED UDL OUTLINED IN OMR 250114Z MAY HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED BY YOUR HQS.
- C. NJCS 202-70 (CRYPTO ATAB) NOT AVAILABLE AT 6994SS.

4. RECOMMEND COORDINATION ON ABOVE QUOTE BE ACCOMPLISHED BY LR HC/NSAFAC/PACAF

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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RR YMAOQR  
DE YHQALK 75 0902311  
ZKZK RR NAL DE  
R 012300Z  
FM USAFSS  
TO AFSSD USAF  
INFO PACSCTYRGN  
0994SCTYSQ  
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*Feb -*

PASS TO AFNICAG  
SUBJECT: QRC-346 SYSTEM

1. MACV J2114 HAS INFORMALLY ADVISED 0994TH SCTY SQ THAT THERE COULD BE REQUIREMENT TO JAM SELECTED VC RADIO COMPLEX. AS RESULT, QUESTION HAS ARISEN AS TO UNIT CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE OPERATIONAL JAMMER MISSIONS WITHIN PRESCRIBED 48-HOUR LIMIT. QUERY HAS SERVED TO HIGHLIGHT CURRENT STATUS AND CAUSE REEVALUATION OF QRC-346 SYSTEM.

2. THE QRC-346 HAS BEEN IN THE FIELD FOR OVER THREE YEARS BUT HAS NEVER BEEN USED OPERATIONALLY. WHILE THE EQUIPMENT WAS INSTALLED ABOARD THE A/C, MACV WOULD NOT GRANT PERMISSION TO ACTIVATE THE TRANSMITTING SYSTEMS. IN OCT 69, PERMISSION WAS GRANTED TO REMOVE THIS EQUIPMENT FROM THE A/C BECAUSE OF GROSS WEIGHT LIMITATIONS AND PLACE IT IN STORAGE WITH THE PROVISION THAT IT COULD BE REINSTALLED AND OPERATIONAL WITHIN 48 HOURS. DURING RECENT WEEKS, 0994TH SCTY SQ INITIATED A PROGRAM TO PROVIDE LOCAL OPERATOR/MAINTENANCE TRAINING ON THE EQUIPMENT. A MOUNTAIN WAS CONSTRUCTED FROM COMPONENTS REMOVED FROM THE A/C. PROVISION WAS MADE FOR OPERATION WITH A DUMMY LOAD, THUS PERMITTING POWER TO BE APPLIED TO THE TRANSMITTER SECTION FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THREE YEARS. AS A RESULT, NUMEROUS HERETOFORE UNEXPECTED FAULTY COMPONENTS WERE ISOLATED. THESE EXTENSIVE SYSTEM CHECKS COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOUNTAIN. IN ADDITION, 0994TH SCTY SQ WAS HAMPERED BY THE FACT THAT ADEQUATE TECHNICAL DATA FROM THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOT PROVIDED WITH THE SYSTEM. THE 0994TH SCTY SQ SUBMITTED A LOGS MESSAGE ON 19 MAR 1970 FOR A LARGE QUANTITY OF PARTS/ SUPPLIES NECESSARY TO REPAIR AND MAINTAIN THE SYSTEM. INDICATIONS ARE THAT AN INCREASED BUDGET WILL BE REQUIRED TO KEEP THE SYSTEM IN OPERATIONAL CONDITION AND THAT IMPROVED TEST EQUIPMENT AND TECH SUPPORT WILL BE REQUIRED. ESTIMATED COST OF REQUESTED PARTS/SUPPLIES IS APPROXIMATELY 20K DOLLARS. WRAMA/RENTO, ROBINS WFO, SA, HAS INDICATED THAT THE EARLIEST DATE OF DELIVERY WOULD BE 60-90 DAYS. THIS HQ HAS DEFERRED ASSISTANCE ACTION TO OBTAIN THE MANUFACTURER'S PLACING YOUR REPLY.

3. WORK ON SYSTEM COU, CONTINUED PERSONNEL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND TRAINING EXPENSE TO INCLUDE APPROXIMATELY 12K DOLLARS EACH TO TR FOR QRC-346 SERVICES AT SANDERS ASSOCIATES COMBINE TO QUESTION SYSTEM RECEPTION. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE DEVELOPMENTS, REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS.

ec47.com

NNNNZ OZ GRDAM72L AA5430. A575

RR YMRDOR

DE YHLAKZ 55 1922354

R 122353Z

FM PACSCTYRGN

TO 6994SCTYSG

ZEM



AP 70 1:10

*Handwritten notes:*  
LATS  
10/1/70  
CPT

[REDACTED] DOR

REF USAFSS DOR 212201Z MAY 75.

SUBJ: RELOCATION OF C-47 (COMJAM) ACFT TO PHU CAT

1. REF MSG STATES USAFSS OBJECTION TO PLANNED RELOCATION OF COMJAM ACFT/POSITIONS TO PHU CAT.

2. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE YOUR COMMENTS DIRECT TO THIS HQS.N PLEASE ADVISE OF ANY INDICATIONS YOU MAY HAVE OF MACV PLANNING FOR LOCATION OF COMJAM ACFT/EQUIP.

GP-1.

092


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250122 May 70



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ROUTINE

cc 2  
LO [Signature]  
25 May 70

6994 SCTY SQ/TAN SON NHUT AFLD/VIETNAM

PACSTYRON/WHEELER AFB/HAWAII



00 MAY 70.

SUBJ: QRC-346 AIRCRAFT RELOCATION

REF: A. PACSTYRON DOR 122353Z MAY 70.

B. USAFSS DOR 082201Z MAY 70.

40 1-1-20

1. PROGRAMMED RELOCATION OF QRC-346 AIRCRAFT/CONSOLES OUTLINED IN PACSTYRON LTR 23 APR 70 WAS BASED ON DESIRE TO RETAIN ALL COMJAN AIRCRAFT AND CONSOLES AT SINGLE LOCATION AND REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN ALL AIRCRAFT CAPABLE OF ACCEPTING ZULU CONSOLES AT PHUKU/DANANG AND TAN SON NHUT/NAKON PHANOM.

2. ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERATION WOULD BE TO (1) RETAIN ALL CONSOLES AT TAN SON NHUT AND (2) SPLIT COMJAN AIRCRAFT BETWEEN TAN SON NHUT AND PHUCAT. THIS WOULD RETAIN ALL TEN ALR-34 "A" WIRED AIRCRAFT IN ADDITION TO ALL ALR-35 AIRCRAFT NOT LOCATED AT DANANG. UNIT CONFIGURATION WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. TAN SON NHUT/NKP
  - 10 ALR-34 "A" WIRED
  - 13 ALR-35

24  
May 70  
1 3

4891

18

MARLAN HOLMES, Major, USAF

MARLAN HOLMES, Major, USAF  
Asst. Operations Officer





**ROUTINE**

3 AIR-34 COMJAN AIRCRAFT  
26 ACFT (1 NOA) (ALL N/P MODEL)

**B. PHU CAT**

18 AIR-34

2 AIR-34 COMJAN AIRCRAFT  
20 ACFT (1 NOA) (ALL N/P MODEL)

**C. DANANG**

10 AIR-38

3 AIR-35  
13 ACFT (ALL C MODEL)

**E. ALL DANANG AIRCRAFT WILL BE SHIFTED TO TAN SON NHUT. TAN SON NHUT WILL HAVE 19 ZULU AIRCRAFT, 5 OF WHICH BEING LOCATED AT HUP.**

**3. LOCATION OF TWO COMJAN AIRCRAFT AT PHU CAT WOULD NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT CAPABILITY TO RECONFIGURE AIRCRAFT WITHIN 48 HOURS. IF IMPLEMENTATION OF "MONKEY POD" IS REQUIRED, ONE COMJAN AIRCRAFT WILL BE DEPLOYED TO TSN ASAP, FROM PHU CAT. THE SECOND AIRCRAFT WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO TAN SON NHUT IN TIME TO ACCEPT COMJAN CONSOLES CURRENTLY AT GOOD FELLOW.**

**4. THIS WOULD ALLOW COMJAN CONSOLES TO BE RETAINED AT TSN AND WOULD HAVE MINIMUM IMPACT ON 6994 SS CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO MONKEY POD REQUIREMENTS WITHIN 48 HOURS.**

**5. We are currently planning to split COMJAN soft location as outlined in para 2. If contrary to USAFSS desire, pls advise.**

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PRIORITY//  
020



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
P 020000Z  
FM 699ATH SCTY SQ/DORA (ACC)  
TO ZEN/460TH TRW/OCDE  
ZEN/460TH TRW/RDE  
ZEN/7TH AIR FORCE/DOCR-S  
INFO 699ATH SCTY SQ/DO  
ZEN/360TH TWS  
ZEN

ACC ZENOS

SUBJ: ARDP SPECIAL EMPHASIS IN THE FISH HOON AREA  
1. MAJOP HAS DIRECTED THAT THE MISSIONS FRAGGED INTO THE  
AREA ARE OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT 24 HOUR  
COVERAGE, BY BOTH ARMY AND AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT, BE MAINTAINED  
IN THIS AREA. IN THE EVENT OF DELAYS OR ABORTS, ON MISSION  
FOR THIS AREA OTHER AIRCRAFT WILL BE DIVERTED TO THE 05 LMA  
2. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ALTERNATE  
EXECUTION PROCEDURES IN JOA 55-7 BE CLOSELY FOLLOWED SO THAT  
THE ACC CAN MAINTAIN THE 24 HOUR COVERAGE IN THE AREA.

GP-4  
120

NNNN



NNNN

RR YMRDQR

DE YHQADK 96 113215Z

ZKZK RR NRL DE

R 232156Z

FM USAFSS

TO ZEN/DIRNSA/K23

INFO ZEN/CHIEF USAFSS/FM

USASA/IARD-KOOPYACSOYTAGN/OPS-R

699450TYSQ/NKS

ZEN

REFERENCE:

*RK*  
*27 Apr Det 3*  
*promised returned*  
*you info purposes*  
*(DDMM)*  
*J*

SUBJ: OPERATIONAL TEST OF RFP IN AIRBORNE PLATF  
AK (ARFPGM (U). @58431) NSA MSG K23-1469 DTG 832017Z JUL 69.


1. TENTATIVE PLANNING FOR USAFSS TEST F ARFP INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:
  - A. ARMY WILL LOAN ONE COMPLETE LEFAIR KNEE RFP SYSTEM TO BE RECEIVED AT THIS HQ NLT 1 AUG 70.
  - B. TWO-WEEK INSTALLATION AND ENGINEERING CHECK-OUT AT THIS HQ.
  - C. TEST SYSTEM FOR 30 DAYS ON ONSECARU AIRCRAFT GROUP A'D FOR 2' ORN- SOLE OPERATING FROM NKP, THAILAND TO BEGIN O/A 15 SEP 70.
  - D. TEST ZTSIGNEDING DETERMINE INTELLIGENCE VALUE OF LEFAIR KNEE DATA COLLECTED DURING AN ARFP MISSION IN TERMS OF UTILITY AND SPEED-ACCURACY OF ANALYSIS.
  - E. TEST PERSONNEL TO BE SELECTED BY THE HQ WILL INCLUDE ONE OPERATOR-ANALYST AND ONE TEST ENGINEER.
2. REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE IN SECURING NRV(C) AND MAGV J-2 SUPPORT FOR THIS TESTING EFFORT WHICH MAY REQUIRE DETASKING OF ZULU POSITION (S).
3. ALSO, PLEASE CONFIRM YOUR OFFER TO PROVIDE ANALYST TRAINING FOR OUR OPERATOR-ANALYST.

130

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21/0305Z Feb 70

PRIORITY

*file*

69948CTISQ

PACSOYRGN

INFO:

DET 2 69948CTISQ



OPS FEB 70

SUBJ: MERCURY GRASS

- REFS: A. 3SC MACV 170236Z FEB 70 MAC 2211 INTEL (NOTAL)
- B. USM-704 190710Z FEB 70 IAFVACG (NOTAL)
- C. USAPACREP VIETNAM (C) 201021Z FEB 70 7461-0885-70 (NOTAL)
- D. PACSOYRGN 200210Z FEB 70 OPS-A

1. REF A REPRESENTED A J2 STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENT REQUESTING ~~THE~~ <sup>NECESSARY</sup> ACTION BE TAKEN TO INITIATE SEARCH FOR VHF MULTICHANNEL COMMS (MERCURY GRASS) BETWEEN 60-70 MHz ON ALL MSNS WITH APPROPRIATE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES I.E., COMBAT COUGAR ZULU AND LAFFING EAGLE.
2. REF B REPRESENTS CHANGE IN TASKING FOR LAFFING EAGLE ACFT TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF MERCURY GRASS COMMS ALONG THE SVN BORDER AND TASKS USAF MISSIONS POSSESSING ZULU CONFIGURED COMBAT COUGAR ZULU AIRCRAFT TO, ON A TIME AVAILABLE BASIS, SEARCH FOR AND RECORD VHF MULTI-CHANNEL MERCURY GRASS SIGNALS WHILE FLYING THEIR ASSIGNED

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FEB	70
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MAJOR HOLMES

4891

JAMES W JOHNSON, JR., Lt Col, USAF  
Operations Officer



MISSION AREAS. REF ALSO REQUESTS NEW (C) PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR IDENTIFICATION, ACQUISITION, RECORDING AND FORWARDING OF MERCURY GRASS SIGNALS. REF B HAS BEEN DELETED BY NAVY J2.

3. REF C PROVIDED MERCURY GRASS DESCRIPTION, RF RANGE, CHANNEL STRUCTURE (NORMAL) SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS, RECORD INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: FOR OPTIMUM RESULTS, MG SHOULD BE RECORDED AT 15 IPS, HOWEVER, 7.5 IPS WILL PROVIDE ADEQUATE BANDWIDTH FOR RECORDING CHANNELS ONE AND TWO. NO RECORD SPEED OF LESS THAN 7.5 IPS SHOULD BE USED. REPORTING AND FORWARDING: ALL TRAFFIC AND TAPES FROM THE SPECIAL LAPPING EAGLE MISSIONS SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY MARKED AND FORWARDED TO USM-806 FOR PROCESSING. USM-806 WILL PROVIDE ALCON WITH RESULTS OF THE SPECIAL MISSIONS. MERCURY GRASS INTERCEPT BY OTHER THAN SPECIAL MISSIONS (LAPPING EAGLE) MAY BE PROCESSED AND REFS PREPARED BY THE AVIATION UNIT CONCERNED WITHIN THEIR CAPABILITY TO DO SO. WHETHER THIS IS DONE OR NOT, ALL TRAFFIC AND TAPES SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO USM-806 FOR PROCESSING REPORTING.

4. ALL 6994 SGTYSQ UNITS WERE ACTION ADDRESSES ON REFS C AND D.

5. PARA 1, REF D. DET 2 STATEMENT APPARENTLY MISINTERPRETED BY DIRNSA. TECH ITEM CONTAINED STATEMENT QUOTE DUE TO CURRENT EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION/CONFIGURATION MAGNETIC TAPES WERE RECORDED AT 7 1/2 IPS VICE 15 IPS UNQUOTE. ALCON IN SEA ARE AWARE THAT G-176 DOES HAVE CAPABILITY TO RECORD MERCURY GRASS SIGNAL WITH NO DEGRADATION TO SIGNAL AT <sup>15</sup>IPS MODE. G-176 RECORDERS CURRENTLY INSTALLED DO NOT HAVE CAPABILITY TO SWITCH FROM 7.5 IPS TO 15 IPS. 6994 MAINTENANCE IS CURRENTLY MODIFYING ALL G-176 RECORDERS TO PROVIDE CAPABILITY TO RECORD AT EITHER 7.5 IPS OR 15 IPS.

6. REF PARA 2, REF D. G-276 DEMODULATORS CURRENTLY REINSTALLED ON ALL EC-47C AIRCRAFT AT DET 2, 600XSGTYSQ. INTENT IS TO REINSTALL ALL G-276A ASSETS ON COMBAT COUGAR JULIA AIRCRAFT.

7. INTEND TO COLLECT MG ONLY. DO NOT INTEND TO DO ANY PROCESSING/REPORTING FUNCTIONS ON MERCURY GRASS BEING INTERCEPTED. CURRENT AND PROJECTED 2031L MANNING IS SUCH THAT FUNCTIONS CURRENTLY BEING PERFORMED WOULD HAVE TO BE DROPPED IN ORDER TO PROCESS MERCURY GRASS. QUERY REGION POSITION ON PROCESSING/REPORTING OF MERCURY GRASS.


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NNNNZCZCRDA808RDC16  
PP YMRDQR  
DE YHLAKZ 10 0560247  
P 250221Z  
FM PACSCTYRGN  
TO 6994SCTYSQ/OPS  
INFO DET 2 6994SCTYSQ/OPS  
ZEM

SECRET

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OPS-A

SUBJ: MERCURY GRASS COLLECTION  
YOUR 210525Z FEB 70

CONCUR THAT OUR OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE COLLECTION ONLY. DO NOT  
FEEL THAT CURRENT MANNING WILL PERMIT VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION  
OF ADDITIONAL TASKS. PROCEED AS PER NRV(G) 201021Z FEB AND  
FORWARD TRAFFIC TO USM-808 FOR PROCESSING.

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XI

PRIORITY

190955Z MAY 70

6994 SCTY SQ

FMGCTY/INR/DOR

DET 2, 6994SCTY/DO

SUBJ: DANCER Transcription Support.

1. Effective 0/a 1 Jun 70 the CMA located at Pleiku (USM-604) will move to Nha Trang.
2. As you are aware, Det 2 has been receiving voice transcription support from the DANCERS located at USM-604. This support was provided after a transcription test, conducted during Nov 69-Jan 70 revealed that DANCER processing was superior to U.S. linguistic efforts.
3. Concurrent with the move of USM-604 to Nha Trang, DANCER support will no longer be available.
4. NAV(C) desires that Det 2 be provided with a DANCER capability (two) vice dispatching to courier of Det 2 voice tapes to USM-808 for processing, as was the case prior to the Nov-Jan test. The primary reasons that NAV(C) wants Det 2, 6994SS to have DANCERS are (1) timeliness of reporting increased substantially with all processing done at

19

MAY

1970

1

4891

Major Holmes/cd

MARLAN HOLMES, Major, USAF  
Asst Operations Officer

[REDACTED]

Pleiku (USM-604 and Det 2) and (2) voice processing capability at USM-808 is saturated.

5. Assignment of two DANGERS to Det 2, 6994SS has certain ramifications. First, the unit collection, processing, reporting capability at point of origin would be maintained, thus conforming to current USAF/USAFSS program objectives. Secondly, it would impose an additional burden on Det 2 since, as we currently understand it, Det 2 would be responsible for arranging for messing, billeting, transportation, and provision of working space for these people.

6. Despite additional burden and complications caused in conjunction with moving these people twice, once from USM-604 to Det 2 at Pleiku on 1 Jun and secondly from Pleiku to Danang on 15 Jun, we feel that ultimate benefits far outweigh temporary impositions while continuing to support long range goals of the command.

7. ~~THE~~ We intend to pursue actions to get two DANGERS assigned to Det 2, 6994SS. Due to lead time required and short notice of availability as a result of USM-604, IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

8. Please advise ASAP if you non-concur.

[REDACTED]

ZCZCROB 190  
PP YMRDQR  
DE YHLAKZ 1 1400021  
P 192345Z  
FM PACSCTYRGN  
TO 6994/DO  
ZEM

20 MAY 70

44

file

Dist 5

[REDACTED] DO

DELIVER FIRST DUTY HOUR.  
SUBJ: DANGER TRANSCRIPTION SUPPORT.  
REF YOUR DO 190951Z MAY 70, SAME SUBJECT.  
1. DO NOT CONCUR WITH YOUR INTENT TO ATTEMPT TO GET DANGERS  
ASSIGNED TO DET 2.  
2. ASSIGNMENT OF DANGER PERSONNEL TO THE 6994, OR ITS DETS, IS  
IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH USAFSS AND PACSCTYRGN POLICY CON-  
CERNING GROUND PROCESSING OF VOICE INTERCEPT.  
3. WE ARE CORRESPONDING WITH AFSS ON THE SUBJECT AND WILL  
INFORM YOU OF THE FINAL DECISION. HOWEVER, UNTIL YOU ARE  
FURNISHED ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE DO NOT PURSUE THE DANGER PROJECT

100

NNNN

[REDACTED]

*cc [signature]*

XX

PRIORITY

220915Z

*70 [signature]*

6994 SCTY 94

FAGSCTYRGN (DO)

[REDACTED]

SUBJ: DANGER TRANSCRIPTION SUPPORT.

REF: A. UR DO 192345Z MAY 70.

B. MY DO 190955Z MAY 70.

C. MY OIS 120502Z JAN 70.

1. HAVE ADVISED NRV(C) TO HOLD ALL ACTION ON DANGER PROCUREMENT, HOWEVER, STRONGLY RECOMMEND THE PGR/USAFSS POSN THIS SUBJ BE REFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING:

A. HAVE BEEN INFORMALLY ADVISED THAT NRV(C) WILL, AS THE SENIOR ADVISOR TO COMUSMACV, DIRECT DET 2 TO CONTINUE ALL PROCESSING AND REPORTING PRESENTLY BEING ACCOMPLISHED. COMUSMACV THROUGH NRV HAS STATED THAT HE WANTS ALL INTERCEPT PROCESSED AND REPORTED ASAP AND IN NO CASE IS THAT PROCESSING AND REPORTING TO BE LAGGED 24 HOURS AFTER INTERCEPT (REF C). THAT REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE MET BY COURIERING INTERCEPTED TAPES TO PHU BAI. ALSO, IT IS A PROVEN FACT THAT AMERICAN LINGUISTS CANNOT PRODUCE RELIABLE/ACCURATE TRANSCRIPTS ON THE MAJORITY OF GROUND TO GROUND VIETNAMESE PLAINTEXT/CHATTER ENCOUNTERED. (REF C) THEREFORE, FOR THAT REASON ALONE, FEEL IT ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR US TO HAVE NATIVE ASSISTANCE TO PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTREME EMBARRASSMENT TO USAFSS DUE TO OUR NOT BEING ABLE TO PROFESSIONALLY ACCOMPLISH ASSIGNED TASKS.

22  
MAY  
1970

B. WITH THE 132PRC MOVE TO PHU BAI, AND THE DET 2 RELOCATION TO DA NANG, THE FEEDBY DA NANG TO PHU BAI COURIER SERVICE WILL BE LOST AND, IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE PROCESSING/REPORTING, IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT COMUSMACV WILL DIRECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE PHU BAI OPS STOPS. THAT DECISION IS MOST UNDESIRABLE FROM A JAF POINT OF VIEW PLUS THE FACT THAT DET 2 WILL ONCE AGAIN BE DEGRADED TO STRICTLY COLLECTORS IN THEIR VOICE EFFORT.

C. SHOULD THE ABOVE FACTS CHANGE, PLEASE ADVISE ASAP.

[REDACTED]



300817Z May 70

PRIORITY

6994 SCTY SQ/TAN SON BENT APID/VIETNAM

PACSCITRON/DO/WHEELER AFB/HAWAII

INFO: ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ/FLEIKU AB/VIETNAM



SUBJ: DANCER TRANSCRIPTION SUPPORT.

REFER DO 270345Z MAY.

1. NRV (C) IS CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS TO OBTAIN DANCER ASSISTANCE FOR DET 2 AND HAVE INFORMALLY ADVISED, HARRING UNFORESEEN COMPLICATIONS, THAT DET 2 WILL BE PROVIDED WITH TWO DANCERS CONCURRENT WITH THE DET 2 RELOCATION TO DA NANG ON 15 JUN. DET 2 WILL BE WITHOUT DANCER SUPPORT BETWEEN 1 AND 14 JUN, HOWEVER, THAT IS ACCEPTABLE BY ALL CONCERNED.

2. IN DISCUSSION WITH NRV (C) IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE DANCERS WILL HAVE TO BE BORNE BY DET 2 AS THERE ARE NO SIGNIT UNITS OTHER THAN UNAFSS ON DA NANG AB. (ONLY OTHER SIGNIT UNIT IN DA NANG AREA IS USN-414, LOCATED ACROSS THE RIVER NEAR MONKEY MOUNTAIN, USN-414 HAS DANCERS ASSIGNED BUT THEY ARE ALL WITH FORWARD UNITS IN THE FIELD, THEREFORE, THEY DO NOT HAVE THE FACILITIES TO PROVIDE NECESSARY LOGISTICAL SUPPORT). REALIZE THAT COURSE OF ACTION IS NOT THE ONE CHOSEN, HOWEVER, FEEL THE BENEFITS GAINED FAR OUTWEIGH THE DISADVANTAGES INVOLVED IN PROVIDING THE NECESSARY DANCER LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. ALSO, NRV (C) PERSONNEL HAVE ADVISED THAT IT IS, FROM AN EFFICIENCY/WORK OUTPUT STANDPOINT, MOST DESIRABLE TO HAVE THE DANCERS PHYSICALLY LOCATED WITH THE SUPPORTED UNIT (SINCE THEY HAVE A HABIT OF GOING AWOL, LATE FOR WORK, EXCESSIVE SICKNESS, ETC WHEN NOT UNDER DIRECT CONTROL). FOR US INFO ASA/PRECOORDINATES WITH THE JAPANESE, NOW ARE THERE PLANS TO MAKE THEM AVAILABLE THE FACT THAT DET 2 IS NOT A DEDICATED DANCER SUPPORT.

30  
May 70  
1 2

3. IN VIEW OF ABOVE FACT IT ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR DET 2 TO ACCEPT SCHEDULED RELOCATION TO DA NANG AB ON 15 JUN. PSE ADVISE.



SSN 289

R/F

322



FM [REDACTED]  
DE MILANZ 5.4 162041Z  
N 90400Z ZFF-4  
FM FACSCYRGN  
TO 0994 2/100  
NR 00240  
480

CONFIDENTIAL



SUBJECT: UPDATE ON FACSCYRGN ACTION PERTAIN TO YOUR ACTIVITIES.  
REFERENCE, A 0994 00R 308812Z MAY 70.  
1. 0994 00R 308817Z MAY 70.  
2. 00R 00R 2235 2 JUN 70 (ACTAL).  
3. 00R 00R 031735Z JUN 70 (ACTAL).  
1. REFERENCE 181A PASSED REFERENCE BRAVO TO USAFSS. WE HAVE CONCURRED WITH DETACHMENT 2 0994S ASSUMING DANCER SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES AND HAVE SO ADVISED USAFSS.  
2. REFERENCE C PASSED REFERENCE A AND OUR CONCURRENCE TO USAFSS. THE ONLY PORTION OF ACTION OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH TWO REFERENCE A WE WERE AWARE OF WAS THE FACSCYRGN OF 120218Z MAY MESSAGE. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO ALIGN 311 TO REFLECT REALISTIC ALL 202 MANNING. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

302





[REDACTED]

ROUTINE

6994 SCTYSQ

PACSGTYRGE/DO

INFO: DET 2 6994 SCTYSQ

SSO MACV/J-21

NSAPACREF (VIETNAM)(C)

USM 704

[REDACTED] CC

SUBJ: DANGER TRANSCRIPTION SUPPORT

LT COL HOWARD, EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE 509TH BRG VEBALLY SUBMITTED FOR OUR CONSIDERATION A PLAN TO MOVE APPROXIMATELY 37 PERSONNEL FROM USM 808 TO DA NANG. FIGURE INCLUDES APPROXIMATELY 21 DANGERS. THIS ACTION WOULD ALLOW THE 509TH TO ESTABLISH A PROCESSING CENTER AT D A NANG AND ELIMINATE OPS-STOPS AT USM 808. PROCESSING CENTER FACILITIES WOULD BE HOUSED IN TWO 10 BY 20 FOOT PRE-FAB SHELTERS PROVIDED BY THE 509TH BRG. THE 509TH IS ASKING SUFFICIENT SPACE WITHIN DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ COMPOUND AT DA NANG TO PLACE SHELTERS AND HAVE STATED THAT THEY WOULD ARRANGE FOR ALL ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF ALL PERSONNEL MOVED FROM USM-808. ALL PROCESSING WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE TWO SHELTERS TO INCLUDE PREPARATION OF PRE-PUNCHED TAPE FOR DATA TRANSMISSION. THEY HAVE ASKED TO USE COMM FACILITIES OF DET 2 TO TRANSMIT PROCESSED DATA TO USM-808. THIS PLAN WOULD BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL IN THAT 509TH BRG HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE DANGER SUPPORT TO DET 2. MACV J-21 AND MRV(C) CONCUR WITH THE PROPOSAL. MAJ HOLMES IS TDY TO FLEIKU AND DA NANG TO ASSIST IN FINAL STAGES OF DET 2 MOVE AND TO VERIFY FEASIBILITY OF THIS PLAN. HAVE MADE NO REPEAT NO AGREEMENTS WITH 509TH BRG PENDING RESULTS OF MAJ HOLMES INVESTIGATION O/A 13 JUN AND YOUR COMMENTS. DETAILED PLAN IS BEING PREPARED BY 509TH BRG TO BE SUBMITTED TO USASAPAC FOR APPROVAL. REQUEST REPLY SOONEST.

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JUN	71
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INT 18  
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
PRIORITY

150835Z JUN 70

6994 Scty Sq

FACSCYTRGN/DO

info; Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq



SUBJ: Dancer Transcription Support.

REF: A. Your DOA 112150Z Jun

B. My CC 110923Z Jun

1. Processing huts mentioned in Ref Bravo would be located in North-east corner of secure area in Det 2, 6994SS compound. This would place huts immediately inside secure area with hut doors facing security guard. Movement control of Dancers would be under constant ~~surveillance~~ surveillance of security guard. Dancers would not approach single entry ~~point~~ point of Det 2 ops area or comm van both of which are located on South side of ops bldg. Power and telephone access points are both located in Northwest corner of compound area.

2. 509RRGp intends to ask for dedicated circuit between Det 2 ops area and USM-808. During local coordination with 509RRG, they were informed of communications problems inherent to three circuit operation from single comm van, i.e., no back-up, loss of circuit for PMI

15

JUN

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4891

Maj Holmes

*JH*  
MARLAN HOLMES, Major, USAF  
Operations Officer



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

equipment problems, line problems would necessitate dropping third circuit (Det 2 to USM-808). Also informed the 509th that authorization for operating three circuits from single comm was contingent upon approval from your headquarters. If your hqs concurs with three ~~circuits~~ circuits operation, believe arrangement can be accommodated until comm center rehab is accomplished subsequent to survey being made by MSgt Boyles. Feel above arrangements preferable to alternatives expressed in Ref Alfa or establishment of dedicated circuit in existing comm center.

3. Arrangements for power and telephone for processing huts will be made thru 366 ECE and 1972 Comm Sq respectively.

4.. No commitments have been made regarding billeting of personnel, administrative support, logistics support, HI messing support etc. Liaison officer, 509RRG/24 Corp was point of contact at Danang. All supporting requirements outlined in this para were referred to either Naval Support Activity, 366 Combat Spt Gp or appropriate Marine unit.

5. 509RRG is shooting for start date of 1-10 July, pending ASAPAC ~~approval~~ approval and completion of negotiations.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

JOINT MESSAGE FORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

INT  
⑤

SECURITY C

TYPE MSG

SINGLE

X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

DTG

27/0950Z JUN 70

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: PACSCTYRGN/DOR

INFO: DET 2 6994 SGTYSQ

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

SUBJ: DANCER TRANSCRIPTION SUPPORT

REF PACSCTYRGN 200630Z JUN 70. NO FURTHER ACTION BY DET 2, 6994 SS OR NRV (C) HAS BEEN TAKEN PENDING OUTCOME OF PROPOSED MOVE OF CONTINGENT FROM USM-808 TO DA NANG. IF THE ~~HEM~~ MOVE IS MADE THE USM - 808 CONTINGENT WILL PROVIDE DANCER SUPPORT TO DET 2 6994 SS. IF NOT DET 2, 6994 SS WILL REQUIRE SUPPORT AS STATED IN MY DOR 300817Z MAY 70. NRV (C) HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT. 509TH BRG IS AWARE OF OUR PROPOSAL TO HAVE THE CONTINGENT MOVE INTO THE OLD TACAN AREA ACROSS THE STREET FROM DET 2 6994 SS COMPOUND AND THE 509TH HAS BEEN ADVISED OF OUR PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE A CIRCUIT TO USM-808 WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT USM 808 WILL PROVIDE OUR CRITICOM INPUT. THE 509TH HAS RECEIVED A QUERY FROM ADAPAC REF THEIR PLAN FOR THE MOVE AND ASKING MORE DETAILED INFO ON THE OPERATION OF THE CONTINGENT. 509TH REPLY SHOULD BE SENT NLT 29 JUN 70. 509TH HAS NOT YET RESOLVED HOUSING AND MESSING PROBLEM AT DA NANG. WILL CONTINUE COORDINATION WITH 509TH AND DET 2 AND KEEP YOU ADVISED.

DATE	TIME
27	1640
MONTH	YEAR
JUN	70
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

LT COL BARNES

PHONE

1137

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

JACK BARNES, Lt Col., USAF  
Commander

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P 052040Z  
FM USAFSS  
TO DIRNSA/B6  
PACSCTYRGN/DOR  
USA-561/DO  
INFO CHIEF USAFSS/FM  
ZEM

SUBJECT: PROVISIONAL TECHINS 2038 (U)

REF: DIRNSA B6-275-70, 152151Z MAY 70

1. CONCUR WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF PROVISIONAL  
TECHINS 2038. HOWEVER, SINCE THIS HQ DID NOT RECEIVE  
THIS TECHINS UNTIL 28 MAY, SUFFICIENT TIME TO  
COORDINATE WITH SUBORDINATE UNITS WAS NOT  
AVAILABLE. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS/PROPOSED CHANGES MAY BE  
FORTHCOMING.

2. FOR PSR: IF THERE ARE QUESTIONS BY OUR FIELD UNITS  
WHICH WERE NOT ANSWERED DURING DRAFT COORDINATION CONDUCTED  
BY NRV(C), PLEASE ADVISE.

ec47.com

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PP YMLAKZ 2 0010040  
P 010007Z  
FM PACSCTYRGN  
TO 6994SCTYSQ  
INFO: 6990 SCTYSQ  
6922SCTYWG  
6924SCTYSQ  
ZEM

[REDACTED] OPS

6994SS PLEASE PASS TO SSLO.

SUBJ: TACREP FROM USA-564.

REFS: A. 6994SS OPS 310850Z DEC 69 (NOTALBLM

B. DIRNSA 140026Z NOV 69 (QUOTED IN 6994SS CDR 170808Z DEC 69.

TACREP PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED IN REF BRAVO WILL BE FOLLOWED

BY USA-564. WE INTERPRET THESE PROCEDURES TO INCLUDE THE

ACCEPTANCE OF, RECEIPTING FOR, AND ENTERING OF ACRP TACREPS

INTO CRITICOM SYSTEM. PSR OPORD 100-69 (SEA TRENDS), NOW BEING

STAFFED FOR REVISION, WILL CONTAIN THESE NEW PROCEDURES

145

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ROUTINE

020515Z JAN 70

OPS. H

USA-561

USA-564

INFO: USM-808

USA-522

OPS JAN 70

SUBJ: ACRP TAGREP HANDLING PROCEDURES

REF: A. DI NSA P2-2810, 140026Z NOV 69

B. PACSCTYRGN OPS 010007Z JAN 70 (NOTAL)

1. REF BRAVO PROVIDES GUIDANCE ON THE HANDLING OF TAGREPS RECEIVED FROM ACRP AIRCRAFT.
2. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY YOUR UNIT WILL ACCEPT, RECEIPT FOR, AND ENTER INTO THE CRITICOM SYSTEM THOSE TAGREPS RECEIVED FROM ACRP AIRCRAFT. REF ALFA APPLIES.
3. PACSCTYRGN OPORD 100-69 BEING REVISED TO INCLUDE THESE NEW PROCEDURES.

2	
Jan	70
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4891

CMSGT NORWOOD

JAMES W. JOHNSON JR., LT COL, USAF  
OPERATIONS OFFICER

ec47.com

27 MAR 70 18:50 Z

FILE IN  
TACREP  
FOLDER

471

ZCZCROB755  
44 6.4514  
33 6 )-( 28 0368131  
R 270134Z  
FM PACSCTYRGN  
TO 6994SS DOR  
INFO UET 3 6994SS  
ZEM

[REDACTED] DOR  
SUBJ: ARDF REPORTING IN LAOS.

1. [REDACTED] 240929Z MAR 70 IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO. QUOTE:

R 240929Z  
FMNAPAC REP THAILAND (C)  
TO DIRNSA  
INFO NSAPAC  
NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C)  
CG USASA  
USAFSS  
CG USASAPAC  
PACSCTYRGN  
ZEM

F47/-0457-70 F47/0-163-70 ARDF REPORTING, LAOS

A. YOUR 86-121, 251946Z FEB 70

B. MY F47-0257, 160540Z FEB 70

1. THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT OR MISUNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTRIBUTION BEING MADE BY ARDF TO THE US/ALLIED EFFORT IN LAOS. ARDF INFORMATION IS BEING USED FOR A VARIETY OF TARGETING PURPOSES, AS EARLY WARNING INFORMATION, AS INDICATION OF ENEMY INTENTIONS, AND IN A MULTITUDE OF OTHER CLASSIC INTELLIGENCE MODES. THERE IS UNANIMOUS RECOGNITION IN THE FIELD BY CUSTOMERS AND PRODUCERS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CONTRIBUTION.

THEREFORE, WHETHER ARDF INFORMATION IS SIGNIFICANT IS NOT A POINT AT ISSUE. THE INTENT OF PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE ON THIS SUBJECT IS TO POINT OUT THAT OUR CURRENT SERVICE TO OUR PRIME CUSTOMERS MAY NOT BE BEST TAILORED FOR THEIR SPECIFIC NEEDS.

2. AS SUGGESTED PARAGRAPH 1, REF A, A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT PRODUCT REPORTING SEQUENCE IS A LOGICAL PRELUDE TO CONSIDERING CHANGES TO IT. THIS SEQUENCE IS NOW AS FOLLOWS:

A. UPON RECEIPT OF ARDF RESULTS PASSED AIR-TO-GROUND FROM INFLIGHT AIRCRAFT, EITHER USA-7 OR USA-564 ISSUES TACREP'S TO ESTABLISHED DISTRIBUTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING CRITERIA. (IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE HERE THAT [REDACTED] ONE OF THE PRIME CUSTOMERS, IS NOT ON USA-564'S H20/ZB, THE DISTRIBUTION IN WHICH THE BULK OF USA-564'S TACREP'S ARE PUBLISHED) (SEE MY F-47-0102, 190636Z JAN 70, AND YOUR P2-152, 231409Z JAN 70 FOR PERTINENT EXCHANGE ON THIS POINT)

B. UPON RECOVERY OF USAF ARDF AIRCRAFT AT

MISSION PHANOM (MOP), USA-564 ISSUES TACREP'S TO  
H20/ZULU (A/B/D/OR D) IAN EXISTING CRITERIA.  
C. UPON RECOVERY OF ARMY ARDF AIRCRAFT AT  
UDORN, USM-7 ISSUES TACREP'S/SPOTS IAN EXISTING  
CRITERIA.

D. UPON RECEIPT OF RECOVERY REPORTS FROM EITHER  
AVIATION ELEMENT, USM-7 ISSUES A "SPECIAL TACREP"  
(TO [REDACTED] AND AFSSO UDORN (FOR D17/13AF) ONLY)  
IAN YOUR 861-2581, 122047Z SEP 69.

E. AS ARDF RESULTS ARE RECEIVED WHICH MERIT IT,  
USM-7 PUBLISHES TACREPS TO G3/M AND SPOT REPORTS  
TO G3/A IAN ESTABLISHED CRITERIA.

F. AS FIXES REPORTED INITIALLY AS U/I MAY BE  
IDENTIFIED FROM FURTHER COPY OBTAINED THROUGH  
IN-STATION OFF-LINE WIDEBAND RETRIEVAL, USM-7  
PUBLISHED TACREPS/SPOTS IAN ESTABLISHED CRITERIA.

G. USM-7 SUMMARIZES ALL ARDF RESULTS FOR THE  
DAY IN ITS SLR, CURRENTLY PUBLISHED AT FLASH  
PRECEDENCE.

3. AS ADVISED IN REF BRAVO, AND IN RESPONSE TO  
PARA 4, REF ALFA, THE SITUATION HAS BEEN REVIEWED  
AND DISCUSSED WITH [REDACTED] AND D17/13AF. FOR THE  
REASONS PREVIOUSLY GIVEN THESE CUSTOMERS HAVE  
AGREED TO THE FOLLOWING:

A. TACREP'S TO BE PUBLISHED ONLY ON THE FOLLOWING  
TARGET CATEGORIES.

(1) ALL FIRMLY IDENTIFIED FIXES ON TARGETS APPEARING  
AS PRIORITY ONE ON THE WEEKLY COORDINATED U.S.  
MISSION LADS REQUIREMENTS STATEMENTS (EXEMPLIFIED  
BY [REDACTED] 230856Z FEB 70). REPORTS TO BE  
PUBLISHED BY EITHER USM-7 OR USA-564, WHICHEVER  
IS FIRST ABLE TO MAKE IDENT.

(2) ALL TARGETS EITHER IDENTIFIED TO RO OR  
IDENTIFIABLE AS VC MILITARY FIXED WITHIN 5 KILOMETERS  
OF STIPULATED U.S./ALLIED BASES OR POSITIONS. (FLAGGED  
CUSTODY OR GATEOUSE, AS APPROPRIATE). (LIST TO BE  
COMPILED AND PROVIDED BY [REDACTED])

B. ALL OTHER FIXES TO BE REPORTED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) IAN EXISTING CRITERIA AS TACREP (E.G. SONG-O  
BIRD, CUSTODY, ETC), OR SPOT.

(2) SUMMARIZED IN THE DAILY SIGINT LOCATION  
REPORT FROM USM-7, AT IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE.

4. [REDACTED] HAS ADVISED THEY HAVE INITIATED ACTION  
IN [REDACTED] CHANNELS TO HAVE THEMSELVES ADDED TO USA-564  
H20/ZULU DISTRIBUTION. COMPLETION OF THIS ACTION IS  
NECESSARY TO ENSURE [REDACTED] RECEIPT OF ALL  
REPORTS IN CATEGORIES OUTLINED PARA 3.A., ABOVE.

5. IMPLEMENTATION OF REPORTING CRITERIA OUTLINED  
IN PARA 3, ABOVE, WILL ELIMINATE CURRENT HIGH-  
PRECEDENCE RAPID REPORTING NOT NEEDED, WILL END  
THE CONFUSION CURRENTLY CAUSED BY CHANGES TO  
IDENTS, AND YET WILL NOT DENY SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE  
INFORMATION TO THE PRIME CUSTOMERS. REQUEST  
NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS BE ISSUED TO FIELD STATIONS.

UNQUOTE.

2. WE EXPECT DIRNSA TO ISSUE NEW/ADDITIONAL REPORTING  
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USA-564 AND USM-7 IN THE NEAR FUTURE.  
HOWEVER, UNTIL THE NEW INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUED CONTINUE TO  
USE THE CURRENT REPORTING CRITERIA.

908



NAD0321ZA012

//ROUTINE//

SSN504

R 250705Z

FM DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ

TO 6994 SCTY SQ

ZEM

DO JUN 70

SUBJ: TACREP REPORTING, LAOS

REF: A. YOUR DOR JUN 70, SUBJ: ARDF REPORTING, LAOS.

B. DIRNSA B6-162, 272257Z MAR 70.

PART I.

A. OUR TACREP 623-70 REPORTED AN IDENTIFIED UNIT WITHIN A 975 METER RADIUS OF UG017320 WHICH WAS APPROXIMATELY 9KM FROM LS204. THE 975 METER RADIUS FROM THE GRID COORDINATE COULD PLACE THE UNIT WITHIN 25 METERS OF THE 8KM REPORTING CRITERIA.

B. OUR TACREP NR621-70 PLACED AN UNIDENTIFIED UNIT WITHIN AN 800 METER RADIUS OF UH089078 WHICH WAS APPROX 9KM FROM LIMA SITE 50. AN 800 METER RADIUS FROM THE GRID COORDINATE COULD PLACE THE UNIT WITHIN 200 METERS OF THE 8KM REPORTING CRITERIA.

C. OUR TACREP 617-70 REPORTED AN IDENTIFIED UNIT WITHIN A 3200 METER RADIUS OF TG950314 WHICH WAS APPROXIMATELY 9KM FROM LIMA SITE 72. THE 3200 METER RADIUS COULD PLACE THE UNIT WITHIN 5.8KM FROM THE LIMA SITE.

PART II.

A. BECAUSE OF THE RAPIDLY CHANGING TACTICAL SITUATION DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE DISTANCE FACTOR SHOULD BE STRICTLY LIMITED TO 8KM. THE FACT THAT AN ENEMY FORCE IS ONLY 25 METERS OR 200 METERS BEYOND THE ESTABLISHED 8KM CRITERION SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE THE ISSUANCE OF THE TACREP WHEN THE ISSUANCE OF THAT REPORT COULD BE THE ONLY NOTIFICATION TO THE TACTICAL COMMANDER THAT AN ENEMY FORCE IS RELOCATING WITHIN STRIKING DISTANCE OF HIS LOCATION.

B. THEREFORE, UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED BY YOUR HEADQUARTERS, WE WILL CONTINUE TO USE THE 8KM DISTANCE AS A GUIDELINE FOR TACREP REPORTING AND WILL ISSUE TACREPS AS THE TACTICAL SITUATION WARRANTS. DO NOT BELIEVE THAT STRICT ADHERENCE TO 8KM IS REALISTIC WHEN CONSIDERING THAT THE SAFETY OF US/FRIENDLY FORCES MIGHT BE AT STAKE.


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NNNN

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

*IntB*  
*(3)*

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION



PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

DTG

*270401Z June 70*

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM USA-561

TO:



DCR JUN 70

SUBJ: TACREP REPORTING, LAOS

REF DIRNSA 96-162, 272257Z MAR 70.

1. HAVE DISCUSSED WITH USA-564 BASIS FOR ISSUING TACREPS CONCERNING FIX LOCATIONS OF INH/VC ELEMENTS IN EXCESS OF 5 NM (8KM) OF US/ALLIED BASES. RATIONALE IS THAT WHEN CONSIDERING THE RADIUS OF THE FIX LOCATIONS, THE TARGETS ARE WITHIN A FEW METERS OF THE 5 NM (8 KM) CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY THE ABOVE REF.
2. PLEASE ADVISE IF THIS PROCEDURE IS SATISFACTORY OR IF STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE 5NM CRITERIA IS DESIRED.

DATE	TIME
JUN 70	
MONTH	YEAR
JUN	70
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

DR A P T E R

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

ONEST RORWOOD

PHONE

4501


SIGNATURE

*Marian Holmes*

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

MARLAN HOLMES, Major, USAF

SECURITY



DD FORM 139

WHICH MAY BE USED.

ec47.com

PRIORITY  
ROUTINE

6994 SCTY SQ

FACSIMILE (DO)

INFO: DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

Do File copy

[REDACTED] DC MAY 70.  
SUBJ: [REDACTED]-RELATED CRITIC REPORTING.  
REF: A. [REDACTED] 110630Z MAY 70.  
B. [REDACTED] 080152Z MAY 70.  
C. [REDACTED] 071015Z MAY 70.

1. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] EXCHANGES LEADING UP TO THE [REDACTED].  
1. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] SUBJECT HAS MUSHROOMED COMPLETE [REDACTED] OF [REDACTED]  
TION AND [REDACTED] BE OBJECTIVELY REVIEWED FOR APPLICABILITY TO [REDACTED]  
UNITS. [REDACTED] DO NOT FEEL THAT THE LOSS OF AN [REDACTED], UNDER [REDACTED]  
CONDITIONS, FALLS UNDER THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF [REDACTED] FOR [REDACTED]  
CRITICAL [REDACTED] [REDACTED] TO HIGH LEVEL NATIONAL CONSIDERS. I.E., [REDACTED]  
TO COMMENCING [REDACTED] OPERATION. IN [REDACTED], THOSE AUTHORITIES [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]  
ACCEPTED THE RISKS INVOLVED/AUTHORIZED [REDACTED] OPERATIONS UNDER  
COMBAT CONDITIONS.

2. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] INSTRUCTIONS AND AUTHORITY [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
UNREALISTIC/UNAUTHORIZED FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. THE MAIN [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

SHORT [REDACTED] 4891

WILLIAM [REDACTED], Major, USAF  
Asst. Operations Officer

PRIORITY  
ROUTINE

MAJ HOLMES

SECRET

A. THE 6994SS IS NOT SUPPORT NOT IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR  
PRODUCT/TECH REPORTING (UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF DIRECT SUPPORT, THE  
SUPPORTED COMMAND DETERMINES CONTACT REPORTING VEHICLES AND DISTRI-  
BUTION THEREOF).

B. A CCS IS NOT A "COMBAT" PLATFORM BUT AN ADF PLATFORM  
WITH A COMBAT CAPABILITY.

C. IN ACTUALITY, THE ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CC AND CCZ IS THE  
PERSONNEL IN. ONLY THE CREW COMPLEMENT IS GREATER AS BOTH TYPES OF  
AIRCRAFT COLLECT THE SAME INFORMATION.

D. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT AN EC-47 WILL BE "ENGAGED" BY A  
HOSTILE AIRCRAFT BEING DESTROYED, THEREFORE, THE MEANS  
UTILIZED FOR AIRCRAFT DESTRUCTION WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY NOT BE  
KNOWN TO THE CREW OF A CCZ OR "ENGAGEMENT" BY THOSE SYSTEMS  
APPEARING TO BE HOSTILE TO US.

3. THE UNARMED REPORTING VEHICLE (AIR) IS FULLY ADEQUATE FOR  
REPORTING SUCH INCIDENTS AGAINST ARDF.

4. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN TO HAVE  
OUR MAIN SUPPORT AIRCRAFT REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO THE DEY  
DELAY OF REPORTING TO US. DEY 3 WILL ONLY BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE  
REPLY OF THE AIRCRAFT FROM ARDF ACFT.

5. THE MAIN SUPPORT AIRCRAFT ARE COLLECTION PLATFORMS (LAUNCHING



PRIORITY  
ROUTINE

WAS HOLMES

EAGLE AND CRELIN (LION), HAVE NO CRITIC REPORTING RESPONSIBILITY  
FOR THE LOSS OF THEIR ACFT.

6. FSB ADVISE ASAP.

DocuSign





ZCZCRD996

RR YMRDR

DE YHLAK 19 143015Z

FROM RR RMH 10M HAD DE

R 250146Z

FM PACSCTYRGN

TO USA-561/DO

139

DIRNSA

INFO NSAPAC

USAFSS/DMX

FM

SUBJ: SEA AIR-RELATED CRITIC REPORTING  
REF: YOUR DO 220930Z MAY 78 CRITIC

1. PARAGRAPH TWO ALPHA ABOVE REFERS TO  
PARAGRAPH 22 STATES: QUOTE. THE OPERATIONAL  
DIRECT SUPPORT RESOURCES IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE  
COMMANDER. THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER'S  
TASKING OF HIS DSU, EMANATING FROM HIS  
IS FO THE ESSENCE AND THE TASK IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE,  
THE DIRECTOR, NSA, MAY LEVY CRITIC REPORTING  
CONCURRENTLY INFORMING THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER OF HIS  
JUDGEMENT OF THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER, THE  
WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OR OPERATIONAL  
FORCES BEING SUPPORTED, HE MAY ASSIGN SUCH TASKING  
A LOWER PRIORITY THAN INTERNALLY ASSIGNED TASKING  
THE DIRECTOR, NSA, AND THE JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF.  
IN THE CASE OF LEVYING CRITIC REPORTING  
AS THE AGENT FOR DIRNSA, AND THEREFORE REPLY  
OF THE ABOVE QUOTED PARAGRAPH TO A POINTING OUT  
THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER, I.E. MACV HAS  
DESIRES.

2. THE INTENT OF OUR EARLIER CORRESPONDENCE WAS  
TO OBTAIN RELIEF FROM ISSUING A CRITIC REPORTING  
FOR YOU AND YOUR DETACHMENTS; HOWEVER, SUCH  
THE INTEGRITY OF THE DIRNSA INSTRUCTION PARAGRAPH  
MAINTAINED.

3. FOR [REDACTED] AND DIRNSA; NEITHER USA-561 (USA-564 EXCEPTION) HAVE T4019 AND 1-1-78  
THE REPORTING FOUNDATION TO ACCOMPLISH [REDACTED]  
DIRNSA P2-1149 302115Z, AND [REDACTED]  
NECESSITATE NEW DISTRIBUTION LISTS AND [REDACTED]  
ALL USA-561 UNITS. SINCE PAST PROCEDURES HAVE ALREADY  
THE AIR INCIDENT REPORT (AIR) TO RAPIDLY [REDACTED]  
MATION OF A DOWNED ARDF AIRCRAFT, SUCH [REDACTED]  
THIS SYSTEM FOR COMBAT COUGAR AND COMBAT COUGAR [REDACTED]  
NSA ARE ON DISTRIBUTION FOR THE AIR. [REDACTED]  
CRITIC APPEARS WARRANTED ON A DOWNED ARDF COMBAT COUGAR [REDACTED]  
EITHER NRV(C) OR NSA ISSUE THE CRITIC.

4. YOUR COMMENTS INVITED.

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