HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 2
6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

July – December
1969

The EC-47 History Site

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ON FILM

HISTORY

OF

DETACHMENT 2, 6994 SECURITY SQUADRON

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1969

RCS: USS-D3

15 MARCH 1970

[redacted]

Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron, APO San Francisco 96295

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USAFSS - SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

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HISTORY

OF

DETACHMENT 2, 6994 SECURITY SQUADRON

1 July - 31 December 1969

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE

[redacted]

F O R E W O R D

This operational history of Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron is a narrative depicting the significant Detachment accomplishments from 1 July through 31 December 1969. The highest classification of the material contained in this history is [redacted].

This history was prepared by additional duty information personnel. All comments and suggestions are welcomed and should be directed to the Operations Officer, Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron.

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[redacted]

CHAPTER I

COMMAND

Mission

[redacted] Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron was an element of the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) conducting Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) and airborne communications intelligence (COMINT) collection in support of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and 7 Air Force (7AF) requirements.[1] Personnel of the 362 Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (TEWS) operated the assigned EC-47 mission aircraft while operational tasking and technical support was provided by the ARDF Coordination Center (ACC) and the appropriate Collection Management Authorities (CMAs). Two Army Security Agency (ASA) CMAs, the 8 Radio Research Field Station (RRFS) at Nha Phu-Bai, Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and the 330 Radio Research Company (RRC) at Engineer Hill, Pleiku, RVN, provided essential Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) mission support to this unit. The 1 Radio Battalion which supported the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), the military authority for I Corps, also provided technical assistance.[2]

Command Interest

Organization

(U) The Detachment had an integral support element consisting of administration, personnel, supply, airborne equipment maintenance, communications, and security and law enforcement sections (Fig. 1-1).

[redacted]

[redacted]



Figure 1-1, Organizational Structure

(U) The Detachment located at Pleiku Air Base, RVN was subordinate to the Commander, 6994 Security Squadron, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN. The command lines were as depicted in Figure 1-2.

Headquarters, United States Air Force Security Service
Headquarters, Pacific Security Region
Headquarters, 6922 Security Wing
6994 Security Squadron
Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron

Figure 1-2, Lines of Command

[redacted] The Detachment provided the radio operators, linguists, and analysts for operational missions while the aircraft were provided by Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and operated by the 362 TEWS. The Detachment also provided logistical and maintenance support of USAFSS airborne and ground equipment. Limited personnel support was provided by the Detachment Orderly Room while personnel records were maintained at Headquarters, Pacific Security Region (Hq, Pac Scty Rgn), Wheeler AFB, Hawaii. Routine personnel and financial support was provided by the host base Consolidated Base Personnel Office (CBPO).

Change-of-Command

(U) During change-of-command ceremonies conducted 3 July 1969, Captain Brian D. Connett[3] assumed the duties of Commander vice Major Philip D. Carlson. Promoted to Major on 1 November, he continued in command through 31 December.[4]

[redacted]

(U) With the emergency reassignment in August of MSgt Rufus E Blair, First Sergeant duties were temporarily assumed by MSgt Gerald D Patterson, who continued in this position until his rotation in September. MSgt John R. Herridge replaced Sergeant Patterson, serving as First Sergeant through 31 December.

(U) Other key personnel at the beginning and end of this historical period are reflected in Fig. 1-3.

1 July 1969		31 December 1969
Maj Philip D Carlson	Commander	Maj Brian D Cornett
Capt Kenton E Lammers	Operations Officer	Capt Kenton E Lammers
Capt Thomas G Wallace	Materiel Officer	Capt Thomas G Wallace
MSgt Rufus E Blair	First Sergeant	MSgt John R Herridge
MSgt Alfred E Joers	NCOIC, Communications	MSgt Alfred E Joers
TSgt Joseph H Arcovitch	NCOIC, Administration	SSgt Floyd Dawkins, Jr
MSgt Rufus E Blair	NCOIC, Personnel	SSgt Peter G Mayo
SSgt Douglas M Lawrin	NCOIC, Security & Law Enforcement	SSgt Jackie G Vallion

Figure 1-3, Key Personnel Roster

IG Team Visit

[redacted] A thorough inspection was conducted of the Detachment operations, support, and administrative functions 6 through 10 September by the USAFSS Command Inspector General (IG) Team.[4] The overall management effectiveness of the unit was rated satisfactory while the management and accomplishment of the primary mission by the local Operations Branch was deemed outstanding. Plans, Administration, Office Management, and

[redacted]

Security Police functions were considered below desired standards. The Commander had recognized the need for improvement in these areas, and established a management system which included priorities for correcting deficiencies.

(U) Relationship with the 362 TEWS was excellent. Detachment personnel played an active role in planning for missions, scheduling of missions, and pre-mission briefings. Personnel were found to be motivated towards mission accomplishment. This motivation was evident in the high in-place extension rate enjoyed by the Detachment.

(U) Excellent progress had been made in general housekeeping within the Detachment offices since the last IG inspection in July 1968. Airmen dormitories were crowded to the point of making good housekeeping within the Bachelor Airman's Quarters (BAQ) all but impossible. Considerable attention by the Commander was given to living conditions within the unit dormitories and a program of progressively increasing standards was instituted. The senior NCO quarters were considered outstanding. Morale in the unit was high and personal appearance in spite of meager facilities was excellent.

Top Three Program

(U) Detachment reenlistment figures during the July - December 1969 period pointed out the need for an effective "Top Three" program.[5] The unit's top three committee, consisting of Detachment senior NCOs, set about increasing the rather poor (4 percent) reenlistment rate of first term airmen by developing programs aimed at presenting the attractiveness of an Air Force career.

[redacted]

WAPS

(U) Weighted Airman Promotion System (WAPS) testing was initiated at this unit in November.[6] Maximum participation of personnel in Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) 702 and 202 was realized as all eligible personnel were afforded the opportunity to compete. Testing of personnel in AFSC 292 was delayed due to lack of adequate base testing facilities.[7]

BAQ

(U) Increasingly crowded conditions in the BAQ caused by a large influx of new personnel resulted in the transfer to the Detachment of the lower floor of Building 222 on 15 December.[8] This brought the total barracks authorization to three full buildings consisting of Buildings 220, 222, and 229; housing 178 personnel in grades E5 and below, all within close proximity.

Personnel and Administration

CHPO Relocation

(U) With the relocation of CHPO functions at Wheeler AFB, Hawaii, the responsibility and control of airman records was transfered from 6922 Security Wing, Clark AFB, Philippines to Hq Pac Sety Rgn on 1 July.[9] Concurrent with this relocation, the CHPO converted to the Phase II Base Level Military Personnel System (BLMPS). Revised Detachment reporting instructions required up-to-date personnel status and other reports to be prepared in accordance with USAFSSM 35-1.

APRs

(U) With the implementation of strict quality control procedures and a more realistic suspense system, Airman Performance Report (APR) discrepancies

were reduced to the absolute minimum.[10] These measures considerably enhanced AFR quality and timeliness ratings of the Detachment, and contributed significantly to the decreased error rate enjoyed by the 6994 Security Squadron throughout this period.

Statistics

(U) Pertinent personnal statistics include the following. There were nine in-place extensions and 42 consecutive overseas tours approved; 481 military pay orders and 125 travel vouchers processed, and one Article 15 administered resulting in a suspended demotion and forfeiture of two months pay. The average turnover rate of personnel was 27 per month.[11]

Footnotes

Chapter I

1. Hist., CDR, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69
2. Ibid.
3. For a biographical sketch of Maj Cornett, see attachment 1.
4. Hist., CDR, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69. IG Team consisted of Lt Col Kevin C Mullaney, Maj Cecil B Fulford, Maj Joseph W Riley, Capt Charles J Henicke, and Capt Elmer N Shropshire.
5. Ibid.
6. Msg, USAFSS, FMP 161701Z Aug 69 as quoted in msg, 6994 Scty Sq, 210840Z Aug 69 (Doc 1) and subsequent msg, 6994 Scty Sq, 211500Z Aug 69 (Doc 2).
7. This situation was rectified with the construction of a modular facility, and WAPS testing was completed in January 1970.
8. Hist., FSGT, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
9. Hist., PER/ADM, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.

CHAPTER II

Operations

[redacted] Encompassing all facets of mission accomplishment, the Operations branch was the focal point of the Detachment. Tasked with many myriad functions pertinent to organizational objectives (Fig. 2-1), the Operations elements directed, coordinated, and controlled aircraft, personnel, and mission equipment resources to maximize mission achievements.[1]



Figure 2-1, Operations Systems

Organization

(U) Significant alteration of the Operations organizational structure occurred when the linguist section and the combined offices of scheduling and awards and decorations were incorporated into Airborne Operations on 25 October (Fig. 2-2). This realignment allowed greater flexibility within the flight scheduling function resulting in a more efficient utilization

[redacted]

of manpower resources while reducing last-minute schedule changes. In addition, scheduling and awards and decorations were moved from their location in H-1 van number one into the main Operations building. This move allowed more space in van one to accommodate voice transcription equipment.[2]



Figure 2-2, Operations Organizational Structure

1 July 1969		31 December 1969
Capt Kenton E Lammers	Operations Officer	Capt Kenton E Lammers
SMS Kenneth J Seals	NCOIC, Operations	SMS Kenneth J Seals
MSgt Gerald D Patterson	NCOIC, Airborne Operations	MSgt Joseph J Garrity
MSgt Donald H Ritter	NCOIC, Analysis	MSgt Donald H Ritter
TSgt James A McCoy	NCOIC, Training	TSgt William H Clark
SSgt Duane V Larkin	NCOIC, Plans	TSgt James A McCoy
SSgt Philip L Ehrhorn	NCOIC, Stand/Eval	SSgt Raymond E Cook
SSgt Donald R Davis	NCOIC, Operations Admin	SSgt Donald R Davis
SSgt Clayton C Cooper	NCOIC Mission Management	SSgt David A Highlands

Figure 2-3, Operations Key Personnel Roster

Airborne Operations

(U) The Airborne Operations Office consisted of the three operational flights and the scheduling, awards and decorations, and linguist functions. The office provided manning for all operational missions on a regularly scheduled basis and performed details necessary to support flying personnel; e.g., crew-van driver and duty flight commander and NCO.[3]

(U) Flight Commanders were responsible for scheduling crewmembers and conducting on-the-job training (OJT) of student operators through selected Instructor Radio Operators (IROs). The flight schedules were submitted to scheduling personnel who coordinated them with schedules from other Operations sections manned by flying personnel performing additional ground duties and then published the weekly flight schedule. Flight Commanders also monitored the in-station evaluations and took corrective actions in areas of substandard performance.

Mission Management

(U) Mission Management personnel provided Detachment representation at 362 TEWS and 633 Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (CAMS) weekly scheduling.[4] These meetingsdetermined aircraft scheduling requirements and were conducted to ensure optimal resource utilization. Because of the established professional reputation enjoyed by the Mission Management personnel, senior field grade officers sought and implemented their recommendations, resolving problems arising from schedule and aircraft changes.

[redacted] The section served as the focal point for mission and aircraft

related correspondence with the AOC at Tan Son Nhut, and higher-level echelons within the Command.[5] A comparatively new program, the ARDF effort was faced with a lack of precedent in many areas of operations. As a result it fell to the Detachment to resolve numerous, challenging problems through coordination with AOC and the 6994 Security Squadron. This often required informal discussions via operations communications (Ops Comm) circuits and quick, sound decisions. In each situation pertinent data and background material provided by Mission Management personnel served as a basis for decision making and procedure implementation.

Analysis

[redacted] Tasked with the immediate identification and reporting of ARDF target data intercepted by Combat Cougar aircraft, the Analysis Section conducted an intensive briefing program geared to thoroughly familiarizing aircrewmembers with mission objectives.[6] Analysis personnel provided comprehensive briefings to Detachment operators as well as sanitized briefings to aircraft commanders and navigators. Effectively utilizing current charts, maps, and collateral intelligence, analysts were able to recommend platform positioning within the target area to best accomplish the desired mission objectives.

[redacted] Supplying feedback data compiled from various intelligence sources, the section conducted an effective incentive program by recognizing outstanding crew accomplishments. Through this program operators were made aware of the tangible results of their efforts and became cognizant of their important role in the war effort.

[redacted]

Thus motivated, they continually achieved outstanding qualitative and quantitive results, contributing to the high degree of success enjoyed by the Detachment.

Standardization and Evaluation

(U) The Standardization and Evaluation (Stand/Eval) Section conducted comprehensive ground training for all newly assigned radio operators and provided initial, semi-annual, and no-notice check flights in accordance with USAFSSM 55-7 and USAFSSR 60-1 to ensure continued operator proficiency and correct adherence to operating procedures.[7] Monitoring the efforts of the IROs, the section provided them with training aids and technical assistance. In addition, Stand/Eval Flight Examiners (SEFEs) maintained comprehensive Crew Information Letter (CIL) files designed to give wide dissemination of procedural changes to all operators.

(U) Among the many routine administrative duties attended to by Detachment SEFEs were those pertaining to preparation of monthly reports concerning the number of assigned personnel by AFSC and those failing to meet minimum proficiency requirements. This summary was forwarded to 6994 Security Squadron for the records of the Squadron SEFE. Central files were also maintained for individual crewmember flight records (AF Forms 846) in the Operations section and mission flimsies and checklists were updated.

Plans and Training

[redacted] The Plans function entailed all aspects of plans management, control and emergency destruction procedures, and emergency action plans.[8]

[redacted]

In addition, the office became the focal point for all correspondence concerning the development of a Detachment movement plan to be implemented upon deactivation of Pleiku Air Base.

(U) The Operations Training office served the vital function of supervising the Detachment's up-grade training (UGT) programs in all AFSCs.[9] Among the many myriad tasks associated with this responsibility was the briefing of personnel on the use of the Consolidated Operational Career Development Course (COCDC), maintenance of all training records, and administration of Progress Review Exercises and End of Course examinations. In addition, training personnel monitored requests for classifications actions resulting from training, established procedures for conducting the training programs, and ensuring the supply of required training materials.

Airborne Operations

NKP Deployment

[redacted] In addition to conducting operations locally, the Detachment provided personnel for operational support to Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thailand Air Force Base (RTAFB), Nakhon Phanom (NKP), Thailand.[10] Further personnel commitments to the airborne effort staged from NKP were made as a result of emergency ARDF requirements received from 509 Radio Research Group (ACC) on 1 July 1969, requesting one Combat Cougar aircraft with appropriate crew be deployed for a two-week period beginning 2 July to Udorn RTAFB, Thailand.[11] Subsequent instructions contained in a message transmitted at FLASH precedence directed the emergency deployment to NKP instead of Udorn.[12]

[redacted]

[redacted] Upon receipt of followup instructions, this unit immediately requested TDY orders and instructed an airborne Combat Cougar configured aircraft (tail number 43-48158) to recover at NKP following completion of its mission to fulfill the emergency requirements. The crew of this aircraft was not prepared for a prolonged TDY at NKP, and crewmembers were replaced on 2 July by a specially selected crew deployed for the two-week period.[13] This crew augmented Detachment personnel already TDY at NKP since April 1969.

[redacted] On 6 July, three 292X1 personnel were released to Detachment 3 to relieve TDY personnel who had been at NKP since 10 April.[14] This procedure continued on a 30 day rotational basis until 23 September except for one man who remained at NKP until 15 November.

[redacted] This Detachment submitted a modification to the NKP manning and deployment concept on 23 July[15] with a follow-up on 11 August.[16] This unit recommended that missions flown in the 901B area be staged from Pleiku every other day instead of every day. Under these proposals aircraft would remain overnight at NKP and fly the same mission on alternate days. This would enable the unit to obtain an additional hour of target time while reducing expenses by eliminating the necessity of deploying personnel TDY for 30 day periods. The 6994 Security Squadron informed the Detachment that this suggestion was being held in abeyance pending resolution with 7AF of aircraft maintenance support facilities and parking space problems at NKP.[17]

[redacted] The practice of remaining overnight (RON) at NKP on

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

alternate days was initiated on a regular basis on 5 October, and 30 day deployments of TDY personnel from this unit were terminated on 15 November.[18] This policy remained in effect through 31 December and has been successful in maintaining excellent mission continuity.

Aircraft Incidents

(U) Aircraft 43-48959 (tail number) sustained major structural damage when it crashed on takeoff at Hue Phu-Bai Air Base, RVN on 30 September 1969.[19]

[redacted] Aircraft 43-48959 made a scheduled operational (OP) stop at Hue Phu-Bai after successful completion of mission 902AA. After refueling, the aircrew conducted normal pre-flight briefings and checks before starting engines. After a normal engine start, the aircraft was taxied to the engine run-up area for runway 27 where run-up and before takeoff checklists were completed. The aircraft tactical callsign was CAP 54.

[redacted] When CAP 54 was cleared to take the active the pilot taxied onto the runway and held. The lineup checklist was completed on the active runway. After a wait of approximately 30 seconds to a minute the tower cleared CAP 54 for takeoff (time 1507:30H) without traffic advisories.

[redacted] Just prior to the time CAP 54 started its takeoff roll, BLACK CAT 27, a UH-1 Army helicopter, was approaching the departure end of runway 27 on a course north of the runway and parallel to it. Prior to reaching a point abeam the EC-47, BLACK CAT 27 was cleared to land (time 1507:15H). He continued the approach, passing abeam of the EC-47 at an altitude of approximately 75 feet, descending to hovering

[redacted]

position on DELTA taxiway. Estimated lateral separation of the two aircraft was less than 150 feet.

[redacted] CAP 54 was cleared for takeoff (time 1507:30H). Aircraft control and acceleration was normal. Shortly after the 60 knot check, the pilot noted the helicopter (BLACK CAT 27) ahead and to the right, paralleling his course. At this point the aircraft started to turn to the right, and the pilot put in a correction to the left. The helicopter was noticed in a low hover to the right of the aircraft and turning to the right. After the initial correction to the left the aircraft veered sharply to the left with the left wing down.

[redacted] At the time CAP 54 was experiencing these directional control difficulties the helicopter was upwind and abeam the EC-47. Operating from this position, the helicopter created a severe hazard especially since a ten knot crosswind was moving the helicopter rotor wash across the active runway.

[redacted] Before CAP 54 could be leveled, the aircraft had proceeded off the narrow 72 foot runway and onto the asphalt runway base (30 feet wide) that adjoins and parallels the runway. The left wing struck the 2000 foot marker, damaging the wing and aileron control surface. The pilot, applying extreme pressure on the aileron control and left rudder, was able to bring the aircraft to an approximate wings level position but not before the right wing tip struck the ground. The aircraft was no longer flying at this point, and the retracting left wheel allowed the left wing to settle and caused the left prop to

separate from the engine. The left wing tip then contacted the sod adjacent to the asphalt runway base and the aircraft pivoted counter-clockwise about the wing tip, shearing the right landing gear. It then slid to a stop near taxiway number two, left of the runway. The right fuel tanks ruptured and the escaping fuel ignited as the aircraft came to rest.

(U) When the aircraft came to a stop and the crew realized that the aircraft was burning, the pilot pulled the mixture controls to idle cut-off and called for the immediate evacuation of the aircraft. One of the radio operators opened the main cargo door and all crewmembers evacuated the aircraft through this primary exit, following emergency procedures.

(U) Crewmembers sustained no major injuries.[20] The navigator had a slight contusion of the thigh believed to have been caused by striking the driftmeter during evacuation, and one radio operator suffered a superficial nose laceration.

[redacted] The 8 RRFS provided cleared personnel to guard the aircraft wreckage until the Detachment Commander and accompanying maintenance personnel arrived at Hue Phu-Bai to inspect the wreckage and effect removal of USAFSS mission equipment.[21] After arrival of this party at Hue Phu-Bai on 2 October and subsequent accident investigation, the mission equipment was removed and returned to Pleiku Air Base, with the exception of the collection consoles.[22]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The 362 TEWS crewmembers of CAP 54 consisted of Lt Col John F. Viazzini, aircraft commander; 1st Lt Howard W. Hamilton, pilot; TSgt Thomas J. Berridge, flight mechanic; and Maj Ronald V. Villafranco, navigator. Detachment personnel consisted of SSgt Curtis G. Simonson, Senior Radio Operator; Sgt Robert B. Bateson, linguist; and Sgt Billy C. Robbins and Sgt Wayne E. Rostad, radio operators.

[redacted] Aircraft (tail numbers) 43-48402 and 43-30730 received minor shrapnel damage on 2 September when an enemy rocket exploded on impact in the ramp area.[23] Damage to aircraft 48402 consisted of a small hole in the airframe. A UHF antenna on aircraft 30730 was severed. Repairs to both aircraft were completed and no loss of mission capability was realized due to the complete cancellation of all missions that day because of severe weather warnings.

OP Stops

[redacted] Prior to the crash of CAP 54 on 30 September, mission aircraft made daily OP stops at Hue Phu-Bai to deliver tapes and traffic collected from mission area nine to the 8 RRFS. Runway conditions, helicopter traffic, and constant crosswinds had been a continuous source of complaints from crewmembers of both 362 TEWS and the Detachment.

[redacted] After the events of 30 September, OP stops were rescheduled to be made at DaNang Air Base. Collection results were released to the 138 Aviation Company for courier handling to the 8 RRFS. On 26 October, MACV J2 tasked NSA Representative, Vietnam (NRV) [redacted] with determining the necessity of continuing OP stops at DaNang by assessing

[redacted]

alternate procedures that could be utilized to meet MACV reporting requirements. NRV [redacted] recommended a test of electrical reporting of intelligence from the Detachment to 8 RRFS be conducted over a period of six weeks.[24]

[redacted] Beginning 22 November, the Detachment implemented electrical forwarding of voice intercept obtained on missions flown in SEA area nine eliminating CP stops for this area completely. Tapes were transcribed by Detachment linguists to obtain digital traffic for immediate forwarding. The tapes were then sent by courier to 330 RRC for further transcription by native Vietnamese (DANCER) translators. The test continued throughout the remainder of the period. NRV [redacted] then called a conference of all test participants to be held in Saigon 9 and 10 January 1970.[25]

Water Boy

[redacted] As a result of severe flood damage caused by a seasonal typhoon, the ground controlled intercept (GCI) facility at Dong Ha (Water Boy) ceased operations on 16 September. Directly affected were missions launched to areas 902A and 999; the latter frag line 12 miles east of the North Vietnamese coast between Tiger Island to the south and Dong Hoi to the north.[26] The nearest comparable facility was Panama at DaNang RVN; however, this facility could not provide radar control for aircraft not equipped with IFF/SIF transponders, nor could continuous radar coverage be provided for the northwest extremities of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) areas where positive radar control was a prerequisite.

[redacted] Because of reduced safety factors in area 902A resulting from the loss of Water Boy, mission aircraft were limited to flying only the eastern half of the frag line. Due to the surface-to-air missile (SAM) threats which required positive radar control of all mission aircraft in area 999, that area was deleted from coverage pending resumed radar operations.

[redacted] Further mission restrictions were imposed on 20 October when the lack of positive radar control prevented coverage of areas 909M and 909L. As a result, the Detachment initiated recommendations to cancel these missions and that they be scheduled elsewhere.[27]

[redacted] During the period of this history, no action to rebuild or resume ground controlled intercept facilities at Dong Ha was initiated. Missions to area 999 were no longer launched, and the area was eventually deleted permanently from tasking. Area 902A, which had been reduced in size 50 percent to allow coverage of the eastern portion of the original frag line, was reestablished 1 December when "PAMPER", a new ground controlled intercept facility at Quang Tri became operational.[28]

[redacted] No major adverse effects on mission accomplishment were felt by deletion of mission area 999. Traditionally an area of little ARDF results due to the mandatory standoff range from the North Vietnamese coast, the platform was more productive in terms of collection. Cancellation of these sorties released aircraft resources for more effective utilization in other more productive mission areas.

Revised Flying Time Criteria [redacted]

[redacted] In order to establish more realistic flying time requirements for the EC-47 N/P aircraft, missions where these aircraft were to be utilized were fragged for five hours total flying time instead of seven, effective 20 September.[29] This action eliminated the necessity for the EC-47 N/P aircraft to make refueling stops at various bases often at the expense of interrupted target time. As a result, the number of reduced missions due to lack of sufficient fuel decreased significantly, as did the number of sorties per mission caused by added stops for fuel.

[redacted] Optimal aircraft utilization was realized by scheduling the more powerful EC-47Q aircraft to those areas where longer periods of coverage were desired. By careful planning and coordination, mission effectiveness was enhanced by the revised criteria with no appreciable loss in accomplished target time.

Flight Scheduling

(U) A highly flexible function, the flight scheduling section was responsible for crewmember resource utilization. Compiling personnel input from three operational flights, the section prepared crew schedules to meet weekly tasking requirements. Because of the many dynamic variables affecting scheduling, the section was organized to facilitate frequent, last-minute tasking and personnel changes. In addition, the section provided centrally located schedules in the BAQ area for the convenience of crewmembers.

[redacted] Among the many problems encountered by the section was the

[redacted]

necessity of scheduling instructors and students together and Standardization and Evaluation check flights. Problems posed by unscheduled overnight recoveries at other bases and crew rest requirements were somewhat alleviated by changes in the length of fragged target time to provide more realistic flying hours for the EC-47 N/P aircraft[30] and implementation of the policy not to task more than seventy-five percent of the available, operational aircraft fleet per day.

[redacted] During this period 1936 sorties were scheduled for an average of 78.5 sorties per week.[31] It is noteworthy that regardless of the problems mentioned above, crew manning requirements were met by flight scheduling in every instance.

Awards and Decorations

(U) Procedural changes were implemented within the Awards and Decorations section with the adoption of the WAPS to ensure prompt credit for Air Medal awardees.[32] Previous procedure delayed recommendations for Air Medals and appropriate clusters until tour completion. With WAPS points assigned to the Air Medal it became imperative that recommendations be submitted upon meeting of the criteria for each award. This policy was initiated and copies of all special orders and citations were forwarded to CHPO, Pacific Security Region upon receipt.

(U) Statistics depicting submission, approval/disapproval, and awards pending of decorations are outlined in Figure 2-4.

Award	Submitted	Approved	Disapproved	Pending
Bronze Star Medal	7	2	0	5
Air Medal	331	205	0	126
AF Commendation Medal	31	12	2	17
Distinguished Flying Cross	33	0	0	33

Figure 2-4, Status of Awards

The fact that no action was taken on the Detachment's 33 recommendations for the awarding of the end-of-tour Distinguished Flying Cross was attributed to the lack of determining criteria established by 7AF review boards.

Linguist Branch

[redacted] The period from 1 July to 31 December proved to be one of numerous changes for the linguist section.[33] Constantly plagued with manpower problems, the section not only managed to continue normal operations, but assumed increasing responsibilities due primarily to the discontinuance of CP stops in SEA area nine. The changes resulted in a considerable increase in the timeliness of reporting exploitable traffic.

[redacted] During July the section relied on 20XX1 MB linguists TDY from 6990 Security Squadron to alleviate a serious manpower shortage. These operators performed exceptionally well in view of their lack of training, but were unable to provide accurate handcopy to aid in the timely analysis of traffic. On 23 July the first of 8 20331 MBX linguists arrived from the 6990 Security Squadron. These linguists had attended a seven week course in basic Vietnamese, and were able to provide sufficient handcopy to enable analysts to readily identify

[redacted]

exploitable traffic. These linguists did much to aid the section in the accomplishment of its mission.

[redacted] In early August the squadron was tasked with the reporting of intelligence by means of the Southeast Asia Technical Summary (SEATS). Although none of the voice operators had previous experience in preparing this report, the section was able to undertake necessary action with little difficulty.

[redacted] On 3 and 4 October, a General Directorate of Rear Services (GDRS) seminar was held in Saigon,[34] and was attended by one of this Detachment's most experienced linguists. The information provided by the conference gave the individual operators a clearer concept of action taken on voice collection. As a result, each operator became more aware of what type of traffic was most exploitable and more concentrated effort was made to obtain this traffic.

(CHVCCO) In the first part of October the section was informed that Detachment 1, 6994 Security Squadron had received the first of eight 203X1 MD personnel and that they had no experienced personnel or equipment available to conduct training. The student linguist were sent TDY to this unit for training purposes and to perform operational tasks. They were trained in an absolute minimum of time, filling the slots left vacant by the return of the MBX linguists to the 6990 Security Squadron.[35]

[redacted] In early November the section was informed of a six week test in the transcription of exploitable messages. Because of the loss of

aircraft 43-48959 at Hue Phu-Bai, OP stops were no longer being made in SEA area nine. It was determined that the linguists at this unit would fully transcribe digital traffic, sending the results electrically in Exploitable Message Report (EMR) format to 8 RRFS.[36] Linguists would attempt to identify the traffic prior to transmitting it. Upon receipt of the EMR, 8 RRFS would analyze the traffic and send an EMR to DIRNSA. The test was initiated during a period of a large turnover of 203X1 personnel. Most of the new operators were forced to make the transition into the program while learning the basics of the job. In spite of the training problems and a lack of adequate transcription facilities, the section was able to perform all the requirements of the new procedure. During the test only four percent of these message had failed to meet MACV requirements, compared with 42.9 percent previously.[37]

Mission Management

(U) Numerous changes involving both reporting criteria and administrative procedure occurred during this period within the Operations Mission Management Section.[38] For the first time, a comprehensive Job Continuity Folder was published, making available working aids and containing detailed instructions including job descriptions designed to enable a smooth turnover of section personnel with no loss of reporting quality.

[redacted] A complete revamping of the section filing system was accomplished, reducing the amount of classified material to that sufficient to section needs. The Manual of United States SIGINT Operations

(MUSSO) library was reviewed and reorganized, with the elimination of all classified documents not pertinent to local operations requirements. (U) Charts depicting mission status and recurring reports were reaccomplished. Job proficiency guides were developed and incorporated into the training records of all section personnel. Stressing areas of planning, coordination, and control, these guides contributed to increased proficiency and general knowledge of section personnel.[39]

In-Station Evaluations

(U) With the initiation of the Operations In-Station Evaluation program on 26 July 1969,[40] the Mission Management office was transformed from strictly a reporting function into an integral part of the planning process. Time required to conduct statistical research was greatly reduced as productivity figures and mission effectiveness ratings were compiled on a daily basis and published in consolidated reports. These evaluations became effective management tools providing accurate data in easily understood format, allowing the forwarding within hours of precise statistical summaries of specific areas upon request from higher echelons, and enabling operations supervisory personnel to immediately determine and eliminate potential weak areas. They became the basis for initiation of tasking changes to further enhance mission effectiveness.

(U) With the incorporation of a quality control evaluation on 27 September 1969,[41] and publication of a compilation of statistics from four tasking weeks, flight effectiveness ratings were given wide dissemination,

reaching all levels of supervision. With data provided him by Mission Management in these evaluations, the Flight Commander's awareness of performance standards enabled him to initiate timely action to correct areas of substandard performance. Before publication of the evaluations, action could only be taken considerably after the fact. These compilations also provided productivity norms as a basis for measuring trends and bringing to light significant deviations.

DURMIS

(U) Significant format changes were incorporated into the Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS) on 25 October 1969 with the implementation of USAFSSM 200-4, Vol XV.[42] Transition from the previous format to the new encountered minor difficulties, but eventually the new method proved to be less cumbersome and considerably easier to use as a management tool.

[redacted] Under the new directive, major DURMIS reporting sections were separated from each other. Combining of the VHF collection performance data into the same reporting section as the HF collection reduced the time spent to extract data as much as twenty-five percent. Standardization of abbreviations and definition of terms eliminated previous areas of confusion. Expansion of the remarks section provided a means of reporting areas related to but not directly connected with all facets of Detachment operations.

[redacted] SEATS statistics were included in the DURMIS on 6 September.[43] SEATS provided a means of reporting the identification rate of target

intercept.

[redacted] Reporting of post mission test (PMT) results were discontinued.[44] These reports gave results of calibration tests when DF equipment was launched against a transmitter whose coordinates were known.

(SHVCCO) Reporting of targets with a fix radius of zero to 500 meters and 500 to 1000 meters was incorporated in the remarks section on 25 December,[45] elaborating on the entry depicting fixes of zero to 1000 meters already required.

(U) With the adoption of stringent quality control measures within the section, DURMIS errors were reduced to the absoluts minimum. Close coordination with the Detachment Communications Center contributed further to the elimination of format errors.

Position Status Reports

[redacted] The Electronic Warfare Position Status Report (EWPSR) format was revised with the implementation of Techins 1056, Annex F on 8 September 1969.[46] This change incorporated machine format reporting into the EWPSR.

[redacted] A total of 373 EWPSRs were issued by this unit during 1969; 210 during the period 1 July through 31 December.[47]

AVN Report

[redacted] The Aviation (AVN) Unit Daily ARDF Status Report underwent minor format changes on 22 December.[48] This report was used by ACC as a basis for determining sortie capability for scheduling purposes. In addition, it provided ARDF results for each mission area flown for each day.

[redacted]

TECH Wecaps

[redacted] This Detachment initiated Technical Weekly Recapitulation (TECH Wecap) reporting on 25 December.[49] TECH Wecaps provide for reporting of additions, changes, and deletions to Techins 1043, Annexes D and H.

Commando Forge Operations/Exploitation Summary

[redacted] On 19 December, the Mission Management Section compiled and transmitted the Detachment's first Commando Forge Operations/Exploitation Summary concerning mission performance in the Steel Tiger (Laos; from northwest of the DMZ (Area 912A) to the Cambodia/South Vietnam tri-border area). The report replaced the AFSSO NKP Commando Forge Daily Activity Report, and provided 6994 Security Squadron with information for forwarding to 7AF concerning ARDF operations in Laos.[50]

Aircraft

Aircraft Assigned 1 July			Aircraft Assigned 31 December		
Aircraft	Type	Equipment	Aircraft	Type	Equipment
43-39771	EC47Q	ALR-38/Z1,Z1	43-39771	EC47Q	ALR-38/Z1,Z1
43-49208	EC47Q	ALR-38/Z1,Z1	43-49208	EC47Q	ALR-38/Z1,Z1
43-30730	EC47Q	ALR-38/Z1,Z1	43-30730	EC47Q	ALR-38/Z1,Z1
43-16029	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1	43-16029	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
43-49570	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1	43-49570	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
43-48959	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1	43-51131	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
43-51131	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1	42-93704	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
42-93704	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1	45-00937	EC47NP	ALR-35
45-00937	EC47NP	ALR-35	43-48072	EC47NP	ALR-35
43-48072	EC47NP	ALR-35	43-23882	EC47NP	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
43-23882	EC47NP	ALR-35/Z1,Z1	44-77254	EC47NP	ALR-35/Z1,Z2
43-49013	EC47NP	ALR-34	43-48402	EC47NP	ALR-35/Z1,Z2
43-48158	EC47NP	ALR-34	43-48702	EC47NP	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
44-77254	EC47NP	ALR-34	-15133	EC47NP	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
43-48402	EC47NP	ALR-34/Z1,Z1	-24313	EC47NP	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
43-49703	EC47NP	ALR-34/Z1,Z2	43-49491	EC47NP	ALR-35
43-15979	EC47NP	ALR-34/Z1,Z2			
42-00665	EC47NP	ALR-34/Z1,Z2			
43-48702	EC47NP	ALR-34			

Figure 2-5, Aircraft Status

[redacted] The total number of ARDF mission aircraft assigned to the 362 TEWS decreased from 19 on 1 July to 16 on 31 December (Fig 2-5).[51] Numerous reconfigurations were undertaken resulting from periodic aircraft TDYs to Taiwan for inspection and repair as needed (IRAN) and to Kadena Air Base, Okinawa for corrosion control. These reconfigurations involved downloading of collection consoles (Z1 and Z2 positions) from aircraft departing TDY and subsequent uploading in operational aircraft having only DF and target acquisition (X and Y positions) capability.

[redacted] Aircraft 00665 departed to Tan Son Nhut for modification to the ALR-35 system. It was then reassigned permanently to 360 TEWS. Aircraft 77254 was modified to the ALR-35 system at Tan Son Nhut 31 July through 8 August. Aircraft 48158 was reassigned permanently to 361 TEWS on 14 August. Aircraft 48702 was modified to the ALR-35 system at Tan Son Nhut 19 August through 10 September.

[redacted] Aircraft 15133 was reassigned to this station permanently from the 361 TEWS on 21 August. Aircraft 49013 was reassigned PCS to the 361 TEWS on 23 August. Aircraft 24313 arrived PCS from the 360 TEWS on 3 September. Aircraft 15979 departed PCS to the 360 TEWS on 10 September. Aircraft 48959 crashed and burned on takeoff at Hue Phu-Bai on 30 September. On 2 October the aircraft was determined to be a total loss and was released for salvage.

(U) On 8 October all 362 TEWS aircraft began fuel cell modification on a rotational basis at Tan Son Nhut. This involved the installation of a highly absorbent, cellular foam designed to permit slow

burning of fuel in event of fuel tank rupture by tracer ammunition thereby lessening considerably the chances of losing a wing to fuel explosion. Aircraft were still undergoing modification through 31 December.

(U) An interesting study is the chronological events of aircraft 16029 which departed for corrosion control at Okinawa on 8 July. The aircraft finished corrosion control and departed Kadena on 13 August. It recovered at Taiwan where it was grounded while awaiting a fuel pump replacement. After replacement of the fuel pump, it departed Taiwan for Clark AFB, Philippines where it developed engine problems. It departed Clark AFB on 5 September for Pleiku, but was diverted to Phu Cat AB, Republic of Vietnam due to weather. It finally arrived at Pleiku on 6 September, underwent acceptance inspection, and was found to be internally corroded. The aircraft was then ferried to Tan Son Nhut for corrosion control on 15 September, returning to Pleiku on 8 October. This made a total of three months that this aircraft was not available for mission tasking due to corrosion control and assorted maintenance difficulties.

Mission Accomplishment

[redacted] Criteria for determining whether a mission was accomplished, unaccomplished, or reduced varied among operational units and report consumers.[52] MACV, 7AF, ACC, 460 Tactical Recon Wing (TRW) and the 362 TEWS all operated under the seven/five hour total flying time concept; i.e., if a mission launched and flew a total of seven/five

hours (based on engine model and configuration) it was an accomplished mission. USAFSS criteria, reflected in DURMIS reporting, was based on accomplishment of the full fragged target time as established in the weekly tasking schedule published by ACC.

[redacted] Reduced missions were reported to Command echelons in the DURMIS when the mission failed to accomplish its full fragged target time. They were reported to ACC in the AVN Status Report when they did not complete seven/five hours total flying time. Among other problems, the varying criteria was a source of numerous conflicts between the Detachment and the 362 TEWS on proper procedures for executing mission diversions.

[redacted] Adverse weather conditions during the monsoon season often prohibited successful accomplishment of scheduled missions in many areas. When a particular area was "weathered in", the aircraft could not fly its fragged mission. Normal procedure required Detachment crewmembers to contact the Direct Support Units (DSUs) for diversion instructions, however it was not unusual to find the entire northern section of South Vietnam weathered in to such an extent that the aircraft could not effectively fly any desired mission area. Further, in those instances when one area was clear, there was often a congestion of various Army and Air Force platforms within the area, providing both duplication of effort and increasing safety hazards.

[redacted] In instances when no area could be flown, and no diversion instructions were available, there still remained the 362 TEWS requirement for seven/five hours of flying time to forego logging an

unaccomplished mission. The Detachment held that in instances when no effectiveness could be realized on a mission due to adverse weather, the mission should return to base.

[redacted] Lack of standard abort criteria also resulted in the continuation of missions with no DF and/or collection capability. Numerous occasions arose when the mission equipment was turned off because of electrical (generator, inverter) problems, yet the aircraft remained airborne. When certain of the mission equipment became inoperable, questions arose as to the desireability of continuing on or returning to base for repairs; thereby sacrificing fragged target times. Determining criteria in these instances was drawn up to reflect the tasking on the fragged schedule; e.g., if the mission was "SPECIAL" (primary collection) and the DF equipment became inoperative after takeoff, the mission would continue. However, if the right side of the aircraft (collection positions) malfunctioned the aircraft would abort for repairs. Conversely, if the mission was primary DF and the X console or doppler became inoperative, the mission would abort.

(U) These situations pointed out the need for joint operating agreements between the "back-end" and flying units. To this end, the Detachment staff representative at the 6994 Security Squadron[53] began drafting and coordinating standard operating procedures to be agreed upon and adhered to by both the 6994 Security Squadron and 460 TRW units. These agreements were in the planning stage on 31 December.

Analysis

[redacted]

SEATS

[redacted] SEATS processing and reporting procedures were implemented on 1 September 1969.[54] These procedures established that all Viet Cong (VC) voice and morse data would be processed and reported as outlined in TECHINS 2037 and subsequent electrical guidance from DIRNSA. The program had achieved prior success at the 6994 Security Squadron and Detachments 1 and 3, and was instrumental in effecting expanded target identification.

[redacted] In order to facilitate SEATS processing, working aids obtained from DIRNSA and in-station data base records were revamped to assist in identifying North Vietnamese Army (NVA) target entities. As a result of these efforts, the Detachment achieved an average identification rate of 42 percent during the initial 1 September through 31 December period following SEATS implementation. The outstanding success of the SEATS program throughout the Squadron was cited on 1 August by the Commander, USAFSS.[55]

ARDF Reporting

[redacted] In an effort to provide 7AF with a target base for B52 "ARC LIGHT" missions and TAC air strikes, this unit was tasked with the timely reporting of ARDF fix data on the NVA base camp area 611. This area was located in Laos, surrounding position UTM Coordinates YC2099.[56] The reporting period involved Combat Cougar missions during the period 3 through 27 September 1969, and was accomplished immediately upon recovery via OPS COMM to 7AF DICWA through the 6994 Security Squadron.

[redacted] The unit's outstanding success in this effort provided 7AF Directorate of Operational Intelligence Warning Analysis (DICWA) with 299 fixes and 88 cuts on the desired targets. In subsequent correspondence from AFSSO, 7AF, the Detachment was cited for providing fixes that "led to collateral collection efforts south of the original target area" specifically resulting in TAC air strikes against enemy military structures on 10 and 24 September, and B52 bombing missions on 30 September.[57]

Area Redesignation

[redacted] J2, MACV deleted MACV area designations on 22 September and redesignated them as SEA areas.[58] Under the new system, MACV areas 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 became SEA areas 12, 11, 10 (former areas 1 and 2), 9, 8 and 7 respectively. These changes were undertaken to provide a common base among consumers for stating requests for ARDF and airborne collection support.[59]

Communications Change

[redacted] A major communications change was reflected 1 October on internal NVN military and naval facilities, and external NVA forces and Laos communications.[60] This resulted in the declaration by DIRNSA of SIT II-VC,[61] which was subsequently terminated 30 October.[62] Identification became severly hampered as a result of the change which involved the realignment of callsign basics and books.

EMR

[redacted] Due to the increasing importance of EMRs, DIRNSA became

action addressee on 15 November.[63] Information in previous EMRs was relayed through the appropriate Collection Management Authority (CMA) (8 RRFS and/or 330 RRC) to DIRNSA, resulting in the delay of an average of 20 EMRs intercepted by Detachment Combat Cougar missions daily. [redacted] EMRs were prepared and forwarded immediately upon recovery of the aircraft at IMMEDIATE precedence. Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron was included as addressee on EMR data intercepted in SEA areas 10, 11 and 12.[64]

Revised TECH Data

[redacted] Arbitrary Radio Station Designators (Trigraphs) were replaced on 13 December by Reference Designators (RDs) on all technical data placed aboard mission aircraft.[65] This was accomplished to bring the airborne procedures more in line with tasking requirements by establishing the RDs as a primary means of identifying NVA target entities and to limit tech support material carried on the aircraft to the Category II level.[66]

Conferences

[redacted] The quarterly ARDF/Collection Conference sponsored by the 330 RRC convened at 0810 on 25 July 1969 at Nha Trang Air Base, Republic of Vietnam.[67]

[redacted] The quarterly CMA ARDF Conference, sponsored by the 8 RRFS was conducted 15 through 16 September.[68]

Standardization and Evaluation

Accomplishments

(U) The section supervised the successful training of 98 students during the 1 July through 31 December period.[69] Detachment SEFEs

performed 123 Category III and 36 Category IV check flights and administered 27 no-notice examinations. Sixteen operators failed to meet the stringent performance requirements designed to maintain maximum quality and were subsequently retrained and reexamined in accordance with 6994 Security Squadron Regulation 60-3.

(U) Numerous individual achievements were realized by Detachment SEFEs during this period.[70] Staff Sergeant Philip L. Ehrhorn, NCOIC, Stand/Eval and holder of the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Air Medal with 13 clusters, flew his 300th combat mission launched from Pleiku on 4 October 1969. This feat was duplicated on 1 December by Staff Sergeant Fred J. Daring, Assistant NCOIC, Stand/Eval and also holder of the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Air Medal with 13 clusters.

SEFE Conference

[redacted] The 6994 Security Squadron hosted a SEFE conference on 6 October for the purpose of revising checklists and mission flimsies.[71] Attended by representatives from SEFE sections of all Detachments and chaired by the Squadron SEFE, the conference standardized and incorporate into the checklists and test correct emergency procedures in accordance with Tech Orders 1C-47-1 and 1C-47(E) N-1.

Squadron SEFE Visit

(U) The Detachment SEFE section was visited on 8 November by the Squadron SEFE.[72] At his suggestion, all airborne training course certificates were incorporated into the AF Form 846. All other facets of the local SEFE office were found to be satisfactory,

meeting desired standards of excellence.

Checklists

[redacted] As a result of the SEFE conference and subsequent visit of the Squadron SEFE, a new checklist and mission flimsy were published on water soluble paper on 5 December 1969.[73] The use of this paper provided for complete, emergency destruction of the sensitive material within ten minutes.

[redacted] Incorporated into the new checklist was a revised list of 25 BRAVO landing codes. This allowed for more specific air-to-ground communications concerning mission equipment outages, and enabled maintenance personnel to meet the returning aircraft sufficiently equipped to more rapidly effect repairs. Turn-around and relaunch time was reduced considerably due to the increased efficiency permitted by these codes, saving considerable target time and enhancing mission effectiveness.

Plans and Training

(U) By virtue of their limited manning strength and physical collocation with each other, the offices of Plans and Training constituted one major section, sharing Hl van number two with the Stand/Eval Section which, because of its scope, remained an individual function.

Movement Plan

(U) In preparation of the imminent deactivation of the 633 Special Operations Wing and relocation of tenant units, the Detachment was

tasked with preparing an annex to the Base Movement Plan.[74] The annex was designed to organize and define the actions required by this unit to respond quickly and efficiently on short notice to a unit PCS movement. Published on 15 November, the annex enabled the Detachment to maintain constant readiness capability to execute emergency and/or orderly redeployment when directed.[75]

Plans Management

(U) A new Plans Management Directive in the form of a Detachment Operating Instruction (DOI) was established on 16 November.[76] Designed to fix responsibilities and outline procedures for maintaining, reviewing, and coordinating Detachment plans, the directive proved an effective management tool used to ensure continuous plan management and training.

Emergency Action Plan

[redacted] Change One to Emergency Action Plan (EAP) 1-69 was published 20 November to reflect administrative amendments as recommended by Pacific Security Region Post Publication Review dated 19 August.[77] It established new destruction priorities and destruction time frames for Priority One, Two, and Three material. It also implemented instructions and procedures for using the M-3 incendiary document destroyers.

Control and Emergency Destruction Procedures

[redacted] In order to provide a basis for devising procedures to effect the control and emergency destruction of classified material

[redacted]

and equipment on hand, a complete inventory of these items was conducted on 2 December.[78] In compliance with Hq USAFSS instructions,[79] the inventory accounted for all COMINT and COMINT related documents and equipment by name and the total volume of COMINT and COMINT related documents by cubic feet. Also included was the amount (cubic feet) of COMINT and COMINT related correspondence on hand. The inventory further provided a measurement of all collateral classified material on hand.

Training

UGT

AFSC	5-level	7-level
292X1	1	15
203X1	10	0
202X0	0	1
301X3	1	1
304X4	0	1
732X0	2	0

Figure 2-6, Personnel in UGT

(U) At the end of the 1 July through 31 December period, the Detachment had a total of 32 airmen in UGT (Fig 2-6), and a total of 14 enrolled in the mandatory COCDC program (5-29271; 1-20270; 1-30474; and 7-20351).[80] Of the 32 airmen in UGT only three were in periods of excessive training. These individuals were placed in remedial training status, and their duty schedules were adjusted to allow maximum time for study.

(U) Plagued with an extremely low (0.3 percent) passing rate in the COCDC, a study was conducted in November to determine the cause of so many failures. It was found that the major contributing factor to the excessive (99.7 percent) failure rate was the lack of recent Progress Review Exercises (PREs). Prior to 15 November the Detachment possessed only the "A" version of the PRE, obtaining the "C" version somewhat belatedly. Since receipt of the "C" version of the PRE, UGT trainees were placed on rigid training schedules in an effort to increase the quality of instruction and the COCDC passing rate.

Proposed Relocation

[redacted] Speculation concerning the relocation of the Detachment to one of several rumored bases throughout the Republic of Vietnam and Thailand developed when word was received in early November concerning the deactivation of the 4 Special Operations Squadron scheduled for December 1969.[81] The most popular rumors held that the unit would be moved to NKP, while less optimistic guesses ranged from DaNang to Phu Cat, with a few hard-core peseimists firmly convinced that the unit would be going to Hue Phu-Bai.

[redacted] Following the trend of correspondence concerning the subject, it seemed assured that certain of the aircraft and crewmembers would be sent to DaNang with the remainder following at a later date. The question then became when rather than where. As early as 14 November communications were noted reflecting surveys being conducted of logistical capabilities available at DaNang for

providing support to a six aircraft operating location (OL).[82]

[redacted] Taking into consideration all the myriad problems associated with such a move, a conference was called for the purpose of establishing a program action directive (PAD) on 16 November.[83] This meeting was attended by the Detachment Commander.[84]

[redacted] In the meantime, concern for the defensive posture at Pleiku Air Base was becoming paramount.[85] During a period of gradual, large scale phase down of USAF personnel at the base, this unit was becoming hard pressed to provide personnel for duty as perimeter guards and augmentees. Further, a buildup of enemy troops in the vicinity pointed out the rather precarious position the Detachment was finding itself being drawn into.

[redacted] Severe shortage of ramp space at DaNang caused by the influx of 100 aircraft scheduled for the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) soon made obvious the fact that any relocation of the Detachment to this base would not be immediate and, in fact, may be delayed until March 1970.[86] It was equally evident that lack of adequate knowledge of facilities at NKP would not permit consideration of any rapid relocation to Thailand. It was noted during these discussions that the 362 TEWS enlisted personnel required air conditioned quarters at DaNang while enlisted personnel at this unit had no such requirement.[87] Continuing surveys were conducted to determine requirements necessitated by the pending move.[88]

(699488 031950Z Jan 70)(Doc 48). With this information rumors became less frequent and concern about the move less evident. Some question about the defensive situation at Pleiku Air Base remained, however it caused no great anxiety among Detachment personnel.

Footnotes

CHAPTER II

1. Hist., OPS, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
2. Ibid.
3. Hist., OPS-1, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
4. Hist., OPS-2, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
5. Ibid.
6. Hist., OPS-3, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
7. Hist., OPS-4, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
8. Hist., OPS-5, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
9. Ibid.
10. Hist., OPS-1, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
11. Msg, ACC, IAPG/ACC 9182-2488 011117Z Jul 69 (Doc 3).
12. Msg, ACC, IAPG/ACC 9182-2489 011457Z Jul 69 (Doc 4).
13. Msg, Det 2, OPS-2 020927Z Jul 69 (Doc 5).
14. Msg, Det 2, OPS-2 020725Z Jul 69 (Doc 6).
15. Msg, Det 2, OPS 231000Z Jul 69 (Doc 7).
16. Msg, Det 2, OPS 110605Z Aug 69 (Doc 8).
17. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS (TCR) 130040Z Aug 69 (Doc 9).
18. Hist., OPS-1, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
19. Hist., OPS-2, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
20. Interview by author with SSgt Curtis G. Simonson, Senior Radio Operator, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 15 Oct 69.
21. Msg, Det 2, CDR 010020Z Oct 69 (Doc 10)
22. For a history of the collection consoles, see Chapter IV.

23. ARDF DURMIS, Det 2, OPS-2 020800Z Sep 69 (Doc 11).

24. Msg, NRV [redacted], F46-6621 310459Z Oct 69 as referenced in Msg, SSO MACV, MAC 1196 INTEL 260915Z Jan 70 (Doc 12).

25. Msg, NRV [redacted], F46-7433 260620Z Dec 69 (Doc 13). Test results showed that electrical forwarding had improved intelligence reporting timeliness by an average of 10 to 12 hours, and tests procedures were implemented permanently.

26. Msg, Det 2, OPS-2 161015Z Sep 69 (Doc 14).

27. Msg, Det 2, OPS 200615Z Sep 69 (Doc 15).

28. Interview by author with Capt Kenton E. Lammers, Operations Officer, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 5 Mar 70.

29. Msg, 460 TRW, DCCOE 161203Z Sep 69 as referenced in Msg, Det 2, OPS 161300Z Sep 69 (Doc 16).

30. Ibid.

31. Hist., OPS-1, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Resume of GDRS Seminar, 3-4 Oct 69, dated 15 Oct 69 (Doc 17). Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq representatives were SSgt Dee J. Bramley, Analysis; and SSgt John D. Price, linguist.

35. Msg, Det 2, OPS 190835Z Nov 69 (Doc 18).

36. Msg, NRV [redacted], F46-6621 310459Z Oct 69 as quoted in Msg, 6994 Soty Sq, OPS 010636Z Nov 69 (Doc 19).

37. A conference was held in Saigon on 9 and 10 January 1970 to discuss

the impact of the test (NRV [redacted] F463 7433 260620Z Dec 69). All representatives at the conference agreed that the test was a success and recommended that the new procedure be continued. The test had resulted in improved timeliness, reduced handling, and valuable feedback for Detachment operators while demonstrating the necessity for closer coordination between collection and processing units (NRV [redacted] 131150Z Jan 70). Also during the test tapes had been forwarded to 330RRC for transcription of the plain-text traffic by Vietnamese translators. This proved highly successful to the extent that tapes were no longer required to be forwarded to 8 RRFS for transcription.

38. Hist., OPS-2, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Msg, USAFSS, TMA 171855Z Oct 69 (Doc 20).

43. Hist., OPS-2, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.

44. Hist., MAT, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.

45. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS-2 240321Z Dec 69 (Doc 21).

46. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS-2 080848Z Sep 69 (Doc 22).

47. Hist., OPS-2, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.

48. Msg, USM-704, IAPV/ACC 220011Z Dec 69 (Doc 23).

49. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS-2 090608Z Dec 69 (Doc 24).

50. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS-2 130900Z Dec 69 (Doc 25).

51. Hist., OPS-2, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.

52. Ibid.

53. TSgt Kenneth B. Smith.

54. Msg, DIRNSA, B6-222 122122Z Aug 69 as referenced in Msg, USA-561, OPS-2 160855Z Aug 69 (Doc 26).

55. Msg, USAFSS, CCG 012110Z Aug 69 as quoted in Msg, PACSCTYRGN, CDR 041930Z Aug 69 (Doc 27).

56. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS-2 010910Z Sep 69 (Doc 28).

57. Msg, AFSSO 7AF, DICW 030915Z Oct 69 (Doc 29).

58. Msg, MAC 12238, INTEL 190318Z Sep 69 as quoted in Msg, USM-704, IAPVACC 250330Z Sep 69 (Doc 30).

59. Ibid.

60. Hist., OPS-3, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.

61. Msg, DIRNSA, B64-3919 012032Z Oct 69 (Doc 31).

62. Msg, DIRNSA, B64-3955 032128Z Oct 69 (Doc 32).

63. Msg, DIRNSA, B65-2618 150043Z Nov 69 (Doc 33).

64. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS 070438Z Nov 69 (Doc 34).

65. Msg, DIRNSA, ADP-654 051910Z Dec 69 as quoted in Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS 060906Z Dec 69 (Doc 35).

66. Ibid.

67. Report of quarterly ARDF/Collection Conference dated 26 July 1969 (Doc 36). Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq representative was MSgt Donald H. Ritter, NCOIC, Analysis.

68. Report on ARDF Conference, 15-16 Sep 69 dated 25 Sep 69 (Doc 37). Det 2, 6994 Security Squadron representatives were MSgt Donald H Ritter, and SSgt Daniel W. Bright, Analysis.

69. Hist., OPS-4, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.

70. Ibid.

71. Minutes of the SEFE Conference dated 7 Oct 69. Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq representative was SSgt Philip L. Ehrhorn, NCOIC, Stand/Eval (Doc 38).

72. SSgt James T. Lamont.

73. Hist., OPS-4, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.

74. Ltr, Unit PCS Movement Plan dated 3 Nov 69 (Doc 39).

75. Annex GG, 633 Sp Ops Wg Movement Plan 400-1 dated 15 Nov 69 (Doc 40).

76. Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq DOI 28-1 dated 16 Nov 69.

77. Hist., OPS-5, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.

78. Msg, Det 2, OPS 020615Z Dec 69 (Doc 41).

79. Msg, USAFSS, CSP-S 042046Z Dec 69 (Doc 42).

80. Hist., OPS-5, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.

81. Interview by author with Capt Kenton E. Lammers, Operations Officer, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 5 Mar 70.

82. Msg, 7AF, CS 121041Z Nov 69 as quoted in Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, SSLO 140230Z Nov 69 (Doc 43).

83. Msg, 6924 Scty Sq, CDR 150537Z Nov 69 (Doc 44).

84. Major Brian D. Cornett.

85. Msg, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, CDR 160635Z Nov 69 (Doc 45).

86. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, SSLO 160900Z Nov 69 (Doc 46).

87. Msg, 366 TFW, CDR 190301Z Nov 69 as quoted in Msg, 6924 Scty Sq, CDR 190638Z Nov 69 (Doc 47)

88. As the complexity of the problems involved became increasingly apparent, word was received delaying the move until June 1970 "to provide 7AF adequate time to study the most suitable location for the unit",

[redacted]

CHAPTER III

MATERIAL

(U) The Material Section provided logistical support for the Detachment. Integrated within the function was BRAVO maintenance, which had responsibility for testing, installation, repair, and upkeep of USAFSS mission equipment.[1]

Manning

(U) Section manpower improved steadily throughout the 1 July - 31 December period, reaching approximately 100 percent of the authorized strength. A significant contributing factor to this manning was the high rate of in-place extensions. Over 20 percent of Material Section personnel including Supply and Maintenance had extended their one year tours for an additional six months.[2] As a result, a depth of experience and continuity rare in Vietnam was enjoyed by the section.

ALR-38 Systems

[redacted] The principle subject of interest during the first two months of this period was the capability of the ALR-38 mini-mod system to perform the assigned VHF ARDF mission. Maintained by civilian contractor personnel and supported directly by Sanders Associates through Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD), Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio and Warner-Robins AFB Air Material Area, Georgia, the mini-mod system had been continually plagued with "erratic" and "weak" write-ups. To resolve the question of the system's effectiveness, an in-country test was scheduled for September.[3]

[redacted]

[redacted] The ALR-38 maxi-mod system was originally due in-country during the latter part of this period with a portion of the 2235 modification to be performed locally. The entire project was rescheduled for the third and fourth quarters, fiscal year 1970.[4]

[redacted] By August, the entire fleet of EC-47 aircraft was computerized with either the ALR-35 or ALR-38 mini-mod system. This facilitated the streamlining of maintenance procedures, OJT, and supply functions.[5]

Recovery of Consoles

[redacted] After the crash of aircraft 48959,[6] a party of Detachment personnel traveled to Hue Phu-Bai and effected removal of all equipment possible, commensurate with the weight requirement to return it to Pleiku AB.[7] Only the empty consoles were left with the understanding that Da Nang or Pleiku host base would see to their removal and return. Unfortunately, as soon as the security guards assigned to the aircraft were released, unidentified Army elements surreptitiously removed the Z and Y consoles.[8]

[redacted] After a number of messages between the Detachment, Tan Son Nhut, and Hue Phu-Bai, the Army Criminal Investigations Division (CID) was asked to investigate, and the consoles were eventually found on the perimeter in Army bunkers.[9] One apparently made a rather suitable, if small, closet. Both consoles were retrieved by maintenance personnel.[10] The majority of the removed equipment was made serviceable locally and returned to stock; the rest was sent to Depot for overhaul.[11]

Maintenance

Mini Mod Tests

[redacted] The mini-mod tests were originally scheduled for July 1969, but due to various problems including aircraft availability and NCRS conditions

[redacted]

for the 16K computer, the test did not begin until 13 September. Four flying days were involved with the "least successful aircraft at that time" chosen as the test aircraft.[12] A complete transmitting ground station was set up utilizing a spare FM 622 asset in the BRAVO maintenance shop and several frequencies were allotted by MACV for the VHF frequency range.[13] Specific areas to be tested included:[14]

a. Sensitivity: This portion was to specifically compare the sensitivity of the Z1 collection position to the sensitivity of the ALR-38 mini-mod ARDF position.

b. Accuracy: This part of the test was designed to test the mini-mod's effectiveness against VHF signals flying different ARDF patterns under varying weather conditions.

[redacted] The test results were compiled by the Materiel Officer with the technical assistance of the Sanders Technical Representative.[15] Generally, the tests indicated that the mini-mod was comparable to the ALR-34/35 systems and its sensitivity was nearly as high as the Z1 position. As an example, the mini-mod was capable of fixing a two watt transmitter as far as 58 nautical miles (NM) standoff with good accuracy. In comparison, the Z1 position against the same transmitter signal lost its capability to understand the VHF voice at 62 NM.

[redacted] The accuracy of the mini-mod system was also acceptable and comparable to the ALR-34/35 systems. The APN-179 doppler and C-12 compass were also discussed in regards to accuracy. A series of recommendations for improved operation concluded the test results.[16]

ALR-35 System Reliability

[redacted] The reliability of the ALR-35 system appeared to level off at about

[redacted]

75 percent overall with occasional ups and downs from this figure.[17] This was still low, but includes between 25 to 33 percent of all maintenance actions being declared "can not duplicate" (CND). Only a very small portion of those writeups signed off CND ever repeated. The causes for this high CND rate varied, but the more significant include:

a. Sensitivity of the ALR-35: The computerized ARDF system is highly sensitive to power fluctuations or transient voltages. This can cause random malfuntions which do not recur, particularly in the computer electronics/digital interfacing rather than the receiver sections.

b. Breakdown of the navigator's converter power supply due to overheating which partially corrects itself after cooling.[18]

c. Some operator/navigator errors, although this area has vastly improved in the past six months.

d. Some CNDs which are probably caused by dirty contacts in circuitry cards, relays, and connector pins. These can be very random a nd often were corrected without realizing it.

Phase

[redacted] A new concept was introduced 21 September concerning phase maintenance. Until this time, the aircraft phase for Security Service equipment was merely a "clean and secure" type. Realizing that the equipment was being rapidly turned around and flying nearly every day, and that at some point a thorough, power-on, equipment-on inspection should be performed, shift personnel developed the principles and criteria for the present 100 hour (approximately every 20 days) Phase Inspection. Along with the routine cleaning, a two pronged "power-on" approach was conducted which included both the left side equipment (ARDF system) and also the right (Y and Z consoles, including G equipment and cabling).

[redacted]

a. The left side phase included an internal Input Simulator Test to verify X console operation, bearing accuracy and system alignment. The flight line diagnostic tape was used to verify the computer timing and display functions.

b. The right side phase was built around using the 606 Signal Generator as an input signal to the cables from the antennas to the receivers as well as a direct input to the receivers. Initially, some losses in the cables and at the connectors of the various audio lines were found. Additionally, the standard for the G-133s and G-175s was increased to close to shop standards by use of the 606 on the flight line. Manhour documentation increased tremendously on the G-133s initially, but has dropped back significantly as the period drew to a close.[19]

Logistics

Computers

[redacted] The problems previously reported in prior Operations histories with the NDC 1060 computers were partially alleviated during this period. Tighter quality control by the manufacturers and several small modifications appeared to help their reliability. For a short period of time, the manufacturer charged that the causes of computer failures reported through the Air Force Deficiency Program were due to field abuse and/or shipping damage. The former charge was strongly challenged by the field, and this issue seems to have resolved itself for the moment. Material personnel began extensive inspections on computers being received as well as shipped to include photos.[20] Our spares level on computers increased greatly, precluding a high cannibalization rate while improving individual reliability.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Test Equipment

[redacted] The problem of getting proper test equipment issued to improve overall maintenance plagued the section throughout this period.[21] One specific example was the request for two each Frequency Counters, FSN 6625-999-5364. These were required to properly align and check out the ARDF modules at a very low signal strength input. These counters were originally ordered as early as December 1968, but due to the problems in the host Base Supply during the transition to the Univac 1050-II computer, they were reordered in May 1969. The section was still without these counters at the end of this period and has had to borrow a frequency counter from other base functions on a hit and miss basis to keep the quality of maintenance up.

Asset Control

(U) The reconciliation of all Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) assets into Host Base Control was culminated at the end of this period when the maintenance shop was designated as Host Base Supply Warehouse 13 for rapid turnaround items. This made all the high consumption assets readily available but also ensured proper consumption and demand data as well as Document in for Maintenance (DIFM) control. By ensuring that all these assets were under Univac 1050-II control, lateral assistance requests were more expeditiously filled and total asset control was improved. This was most opportune as Command began using the normal PACAF procedures for lateral assistance in December.[22]

[redacted]

Footnotes

CHAPTER III

1. Hist., MAT Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69

2. Ibid. Extendees included Capt Thomas G Wallace, TSgt Thomas F Gebro, TSgt Howard S Poyas, SSgt Ronald G Hodgin, Sgt Raymond M Beauregard, and A1C Philip M Cook.

3. A narrative concerning the results of this test is contained in the section dealing with Maintenance.

4. Hist., MAT, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69

5. Ibid.

6. For a narrative depicting the crash, see CHAPTER II.

7. Capt Brian D Cornett, SSgt Robert W Just, amd A1C Philip M Cook.

8. Msg, Det 2, MAT 160800Z Oct 69 (Doc 49)

9. Msg, Det 2, MAT 250650Z Oct 69 (Doc 50) and subsequent msg, Det 2, MAT 060615Z Nov 69 (Doc 51).

10. Msg, Det 2, MAT 100455Z Nov 69 (Doc 52)

11. Msg, WRAMA Robins AFB, Ga, WRMT 212005Z Oct 69 (Doc 53)

12. Msg, Det 2, MAT 280145Z Jul 69 (Doc 54)

13. Msg, SSO MACV, MAC 11956 INTEL 120953Z Sep 69 (Doc 55) and subsequent msg, Det 2, CPS 140830Z Sep 69 (Doc 56)

14. Msg, Det 2, MAT 210841Z Jul 69 (Doc 57)

15. Capt Thomas G Wallace; Mr Gene Carlson

16. Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq Report, Mini-Mod tests, 13-19 September 1969.

17. Reliability is defined as the percent of missions without a malfunction of any kind for the system rated.

18. Msg, Det 2, MAT 270720Z Oct 69 (Doc 58)

19. Msg, PACSCTYRGN, LOG-MPA 310022Z Dec 69 (Doc 59) and subsequent msg, Det 2, MAT 120620Z Jan 70 (Doc 60).

20. Msg, PACSCTYRGN, LOG-MPA 190126Z Nov 69 (Doc 61) and subsequent msg, 6994 Scty Sq CDR 040822Z Dec 69 (Doc 62)

21. Hist, MAT, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69

22. Msg, PACSCTYRGN, LOG-L 040127Z Dec 69 (Doc 63)

[redacted]

CHAPTER IV

Communications

(U) The Detachment Communications (COMM) Center directed the flow of all classified and non-classified mission-related correspondence to and from this unit.[1] COMM Center personnel prepared, transmitted, and receipted for all electrical messages, maintained daily read-files, and served as cryptological custodians.

[redacted] In addition to manning communications equipment within the Detachment Operations building, the COMM Center provided three personnel to operate a "pony" circuit between this unit and the 330 HRG.[2] The circuit served as a critical communications (CRITICOMM) outlet and as an Ops Comm link (Fig. 4-1).



Figure 4-1, Circuit Profile

AUTOSEVOCOMM

[redacted] On 30 August 1969, the Detachment COMM Center was tasked by PACSCTYRGN to provide the 6924 Security Squadron, Da Nang AB, RVN with two KY-3 systems.[3] These systems were to be removed from the Detachment and 362 TEWS circuit upon implementation of the Automatic Secure Voice Communications

[redacted]

(AUTOSEVOCOM) System. The KY-3s, spare boards, and keying material were transfered to the 6924 Security Squadron on 16 September.

[redacted] The Detachment AUTOSEVOCOM terminal became operational on 1 September. This circuit is linked to the Secure Cordboard (SECORD) 24 (Fig. 4-1), operated by Company A, 43 Signal Battalion, United States Army. The Detachment drop number was 16.

AIR/GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

[redacted] Information received on 26 November indicated the decision by Hq USAFSS to remove the Air/Ground/Air Communications system from the Detachment Operations building.[4] The Communications Electronics (CE) Scheme 033AOKO-TWCZ-R-9447, which would have provided secure voice capability, was cancelled by PACSCTYRGN.[5] Disposition instructions were received from the Air Force Cryptologic Depot (AFCD) on 17 November for the two KY-8s that would have been installed under this scheme.[6] Two KY-8s were transfered to Detachment 4, AFCD on 4 December. On 31 December, the Detachment was still awaiting disposition instructions for the GRC-27.

ASRs

[redacted] Requirements of the Commando Mercury Support Program in December dictated that PACSCTYRGN task the Detachment with providing the 6918 Security Squadron, Hakata, Japan with two automatic send-receive (ASR) teletype systems.[7] This equipment would have been removed from the Detachment/Engineering Hill circuit.[8]

IG Visit

[redacted] During the USAFSS IG Team inspection 6 through 10 September, one minor discrepancy was noted. The priorities contained in the unit Cryptographic Emergency Plan were not in accordance with those listed in KAG-1D. This

[redacted]

[redacted]

was corrected on 15 September. There were no physical or cryptographic violations charged to this Detachment throughout 1969.[9]

Statistics

[redacted] COMM Center traffic volume and circuit efficiency ratings for the 1 July - 31 December period are depicted in Figure 4-2.[10]

	Circuit	Groups Sent	Circuit Reliability	Groups Received	Circuit Reliability
July	509RRGp	177,097	97%	253,987	97%
	Det 1	300,297	98%	85,604	98%
	330RRC	201,314	100%	467,046	100%
	Total	678,708		806,637	
August	509RRGp	186,288	94%	250,537	97%
	Det 1	127,069	100%	40,269	99%
	330RRC	154,535	100%	447,423	100%
	Total	467,892		738,229	
September	509RRGp	335,519	100%	250,029	100%
	Det 1	96,900	97%	51,660	97%
	330RRC	292,830	100%	402,810	100%
	Total	725,249		704,499	
October	509RRGp	339,007	99%	285,890	99%
	Det 1	100,572	99%	32,586	99%
	330RRC	273,389	100%	399,497	100%
	Total	712,968		717,973	
November	509RRGp	402,168	99%	326,654	99%
	Det 1	81,886	98%	25,124	98%
	330RRC	280,980	100%	396,810	100%
	Total	765,034		748,588	
December	509RRGp	442,360	99%	337,031	99%
	Det 1	71,343	99%	32,670	99%
	330RRC	385,392	100%	438,681	100%
	Total	899,095		808,382	

Figure 4-2, Traffic Volume and Circuit Efficiency

[redacted]

Footnotes

CHAPTER IV

1. Hist., CCMM, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69
2. Ibid.
3. Msg, PACSCTYRGN, COM-S 300140Z Aug 69 (Doc 64)
4. Msg, PACSCTYRGN, CBR 261758Z Nov 69 (DOC 65)
5. Msg, PACSCTYRGN, COM-S 210016Z Nov 69 (Doc 66)
6. Msg,AFCD, DMCC 172105Z Nov 69 (Doc 67)
7. Msg PACSCTYRGN, COM-S 292326Z Dec 69 (Doc 68)
8. It was later determined by Army Security Agency, Pacific (ASAPAC)(Msg, CUSASAPAC, IAPSIG 021840Z Jan 70 (Dec 69) that they had sufficient equipment to satisfy the two terminals they required, and Detachment equipment was no longer needed.
9. Hist., CCMM, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69
10. Ibid.

GLOSSARY

A

AB	Air Base
ACC	AEDF Coordination Center
ADMIN	Administration
AF	Air Force
AFB	Air Force Base
AFCD	Air Force Cryptologic Depot
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSSO	Air Force Special Security Officer
APR	Airman Performance Report
ARDF	Airborne Radio Direction Finding
ASA	Army Security Agency
ASAPAC	Army Security Agency, Pacific
ASD	Aeronautical Systems Division
AUTOSEVOCCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications
AVN	Aviation

B

BAQ	Bachelor Airman's Quarters
BLMPS	Base Level Military Personnel System

C

CAMS	Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron
CBPO	Consolidated Base Personnel Office
CE	Communications Electronics
CID	Criminal Investigations Division

CIL	Crew Information Letter
CMA	Communications Management Authority
CND	Can Not Duplicate
COCDC	Consolidated Operational Career Development Course
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
COMM	Communications
CRITICOMM	Critical Communications
D	
DF	Direction Finding
DIFM	Document In for Maintenance
DIOWA	Directorate, Intelligence Operations Warning Analysis
DIRNSA	Director, National Security Agency
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOI	Detachment Operational Instructions
DSU	Direct Support Unit
DURMIS	Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary
E	
EAP	Emergency Actions Plan
EMR	Exploitable Message Report
EWPSR	Electronic Warfare Position Status Report
F	
FM	Frequency Modulation
G	
GDRS	General Directorate of Rear Services
H	
HF	High Frequency

HQ	Headquarters
I	
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspect and Repair As Needed
IRO	Instructor Radio Operator
J	
J2	Intelligence Section
M	
MAC	Military Assistance Command
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MUSSO	Manual of United States SIGINT Operations
N	
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NCOIC	Noncommissioned Officer In Charge
NKP	Nakhon Phanom
NORS	Non-Operationally Ready, Supply
NRV [redacted]	NSA Representative, Vietnam [redacted]
NSA	National Security Agency
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
O	
OJT	On-the-Job Training
OP	Operational
OPSCOMM	Operations Communications
P	
PAD	Program Action Directive

PMT	Post Mission Test
PRE	Progress Review Exercise
R	
RD	Reference Designators
RRC	Radio Research Company
RRFS	Radio Research Field Station
RRG	Radio Research Group
RTAFB	Royal Thai Air Force Base
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
S	
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SEA	Southeast Asia
SEATS	Southeast Asia Technical Summary
SECCRD	Secure Cardboard
SEFE	Stand/Eval Flight Examiner
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIT	Situation
STAND/EVAL	Standardization and Evaluation
T	
TDY	Temporary Duty
TECH	Technical
TECHINS	Technical Instructions
TECH WKCAP	Technical Weekly Recapitulation
TEWS	Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron
TRW	Tactical Recon Wing

U

UGF	Upgrade Training
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
USAFSS	United States Air Force Security Service
USAFSSM	United States Air Force Security Service Manual
USAFSSR	United States Air Force Security Service Regulation

V

VC	Viet Cong
VHF	Very High Frequency
VOL	Volume

W

WAPS	Weighted Airman's Promotion System

X

X	XRAY (DF position)

Y

Y	YANKEE (Target acquisition position)

Z

Z	ZULU (Collection position)
Z1	ZULU ONE (VHF/HF configured collection position)
Z2	ZULU TWO (HF/HF configured collection position)

Attachment I

Commander: A Biographical Sketch

Major Brian D Cornett was born in Muskegon, Michigan on 23 March 1933. He attended public schools there until 1950 when he moved to Grand Rapids, Michigan, graduating from Grand Rapids Central High School in 1951.

Major Cornett entered active military service as an enlisted man in February 1952. He was assigned to USAFSS in May 1952 and attended the Cryptanalysis Training Course at Brooks AFB, Texas. His first overseas assignment was the 3 Radio Squadron Mobile, Alaska, where he served from January 1953 to December 1955, when he separated from the service.

Major Cornett reenlisted in April 1957, and was assigned to March AFB, California as an instructor at the USAFSS school. He was accepted for Officer Candidate School in September 1958 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in March 1959. After completion of the Communications Intelligence Officer's Course at Goodfellow AFB, Texas in December 1960, he was assigned to USAFSS units in England and subsequently in Germany, and was reassigned to Hq, USAFSS, Kelly AFB, Texas in August 1964. Since that time he has served in AFSCC, as a member of the USAFSS IG Team, and in the Directorate of Plans and Programs office. He assumed command of Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron in July 1969, and achieved his current rank on 1 November 1969.

Major Cornett is a holder of the Air Force Commendation Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Army Good Conduct Medal, and various service and campaign medals. He is married to the former Marilyn Ann Wyns of Shelby, Michigan. They have two daughters, Tracie, 10, and Shelley, 6.

NNNN
NA3 0090RA016
//PRIORITY//
SSN 691
P 210840Z
FM 6994SCTYSQ
TO DET 1 6994SCTYSQ
DET 2 6994SCTYSQ
DET 3 6994SCTYSQ
ZEM
UNCLAS E F T O
THE FOLLOWING MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO AND/OR ACTION.
P 181701Z
FM USAFSS
TO AIG 7374/CBPO/PER
ZEN/6960SPTGP/CBPO/
ZEN/DL 1 EURSCTYRGN/CBPO
ZEM
UNCLAS E F T O PVP
THIS MSG IN FIVE PARTS.
SUBJ: WAPS READINESS SURVEY
PART I. THIS IS AN AIR FORCE DIRECTED SURVEY. REQUEST EACH ADDRESSEE OF THIS MSG DETERMINE WHETHER YOU ARE PREPARED TO EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENT AND MANAGE THE WEIGHTED AIRMAN PROMOTION SYSTEM (WAPS), WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS IN THE AREAS OF:

A. STUDY REFERENCE MATERIAL (ALL UNITS),

B. PROMOTION TESTING (ALL UNITS), AND DATA COLLECTING/REPORTING (CBPOS).

PART II. AVAILABILITY OF GUIDANCE AND APPLICABILITY OF THE SPECIFIC GUIDANCED IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL AS SHOWN BELOW:

A. USAFSS MSG PMP-3 052001Z JUN 69 TO ALL UNITS (AIG 7374), ON RECOUPMENT OF ECI MATERIALS FOR SUPPORT OF WAPS. MSG REQUIRED AGGRESSIVE ACTION AT ALL LEVELS TO RECOVER ECI MATERIAL FROM INDIVIDUALS BEING RELAEASED FROM ACTIVE DUTY, OR FOR ANY OTHER REASON HAVING NO FUTURE REQUIREMENT FOR THE MATERIAL. RECOUPED MATERIAL TO SUPPLEMENT THAT ORDERED/SHIPPED FROM ECI.

B. HQ USAF (AFPDPW) LTR, 20 JUN 69, FORWARDED TO ALL USAFSS UNITS BY OUR LTR, PMP-3, 30 JUN 69 SAME SUBJECT. LTR DISSEMINATED A LISTING OF SKTS TO BE ADMINISTERED DURING SEP 69, IN SUPPORT OF WAPS.

C. ALL TCO LTR 69-3, 10 JUN 69 FROM AFHRL, LACKLAND AFB. INCLUDED SKTS AND PFES AUTHORIZED FOR USE DURING SEP 69.

D. USAFMPC (AFPMDCA) LTR, 15 JUL 69, STUDY REFERENCE

DOCUMENT ... CFN 739
TOP
21/09/18?
18 Aug 69

SAME SUBJECT, ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES FOR CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF WAPS STUDY MATERIAL, AND GUIDANCE FOR THE FIRST WAPS PROMOTION/TESTING CYCLE.

E. OSAF (AFPDPMC) MSG W/21/69 221924Z JUL 69, TO ALL OSPOS ON TEST ADMINISTRATORS AND TEST ADMINISTRATION, ESTABLISHED GRADE/ASS REQUIREMENTS FOR TEST EXAMINERS AND PRTORS, PROVIDED FD A SPECIAL TEST CONTROL OFFICER FOR GSUS AND PROVIDES FOR OFF-SCHEDULED TESTING IN ADVANCE OF AUTHORIZED TESTING PERIOD.

F. USAFMPC (AFPMDC00) MSG 8/111/69, 222135Z JUL 69, TO ALL OSPOS, ON ACCURACY OF DATA COLLECTION FOR THE WEIGHTED AIRMAN PROMOTION SYSTEM (WAPS). IDENTIFIED SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES IN DATA COLLECTION FOR WAPS AND PROVIDED GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCTING THE DATA COLLECTION PHASE.

G. PUBLICATIONS BULLETIN NO 309)25 JUL 69 WHICH ADVISED THAT AF FORV 1566, JUL 69, TEST VERIFICATION, WAS AVAILABLE FOR ORDERING. SEE ALSO OUR MSG, PMPAEN 311822Z JUL 69 TO ALL UNITS (AIG 7324).

H. TEST DISTRIBUTION BOOKLET, AFPT 249.

I. CHAPTER 2, VIL II, AFM 30-3. THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE AVAILABLE AT BASE DA:

(1) BASE LEVEL PROGRAMS AM5263 OR NONSTANDARD"

(2) PART RR, VOL IV, AFM 171-13.

PART III. REF PART I ABOVE. GSUS WILL REVIEW, SURVEY, AND ASSESS THEIR STATUS AND STATE OF READINESS AND REPORT THEIR ASSESSMENT TO INCLUDE CURRENT OR FORESEEN PROBLEMS TO THEIR OSPO BY 21 AUG 69.

PART IV. OSPOS WILL AFTER RECEIPT OF INPUT FROM THEIR GSUS, REPORT THEIR ASSESSMENT TO THIS HEADQUARTERS (PMP) TO ARRIVE NLT 25 AUG 69.

PART V. EACH OSPO WILL DESIGNATE A WAPS PROJECT OFFICER AND FURNISH HIS NAME, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE NUMBER TO THIS HEADQUARTERS (PMP). EXTENSION TO SUSPENSE CANNOT BE GRANTED AS OUR REPORT DUE USAFMPC ON SAME DATE. UNQUOTE.

222

NNNN

DOCUMENT 2

TWC Ace
21/1/2020
(initials)

ccw: 745

21 aug 69

NA3014
0RA324
//PRIORITY//
SSN699
211500Z
FM 6994 SCTYSQ
TO DET 1 6994 SCTYSQ/CDR
DET 2 6994 SCTYSQ/CDR
DET 3 6994 SCTYSQ/CDR
ZEM
UNCLAS E F T O PER AUG 69
SUBJ: WAPS PROGRAM.
1. REF USAFSS MSG PMP 181721Z AUG 69, SUBJ: WAPS READINESS SURVEY.
2. REF PACSCTYRGN MSG CBPO-OJT/111/69, 200039Z AUG 69, SUBJ: CDC
   MATERIAL.
BOTH REFERENCED MSGS HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED TO YOUR UNIT. SUBMIT DATA REQUIRED BY PART III OF USAFSS MSG 181721Z AUG 69 DIRECT TO PACSCTYRGN CBPO-OJT WITH INFO THIS UNIT. PSR HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT YOUR UNIT WAS NOT AN ORIGINAL ADDRESSEE OF USAFSS MSG PMP 181721Z AUG 69, AND THAT YOU WOULD RESPOND DIRECTLY TO THEM. SHORT SUSPENSE IMPOSED MAKES IT IMPERATIVE THIS MATTER BE ACTED UPON WITH UTMOST DISPATCH.
FOR DET 1: INCLUDE ANY PROBLEMS RELATED TO YOU FORTHCOMING MOVE.
FOR DET 2: INCLUDE ANY PROBLEMS CAUSED BY RETIRMENT OF MSGT BLAIR
FOR DET 3: INCLUDE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY LATE RECEIPT OF YOUR PFE STUDY REFERENCE MATERIAL.
FOR ALL ADDRESSEES: IF APPLICABLE, INCLUDE:
1. DISADVANTAGE YOUR PERSONNEL MAY BE AT AS A RESULT OF LONG WORK HOURS, ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH SELF STUDY MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED, ETC.
2. SHORTAGES OF CDCDC STUDY MATERIAL AND/OR PFE DIRECTIVES.
3. LACK OF TEST BOOKLETS AT YOUR HOST CBPO.
215

NNNN

6 DOCUMENT 5

[redacted]

IHA893 //FOR 00//

RR YMLAKZ YMZADL YMOADY
DE YMODLH #6 1830054
ZNY RR NBL DE
R 020095Z
FM DET 3 6994TH SCTY SQ
TO ZEN/6994TH SCTY SQ/OPS
INFO 6922ND SCTY WG/OPS-4
PACSCTYRGN/OPS-A
USAFSS/TMA/TMP
BT
[redacted] OPS-2 JUL 69
SUBJ: EMERGENCY DEPLOYMENT OF OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT.
REF: A) IARV/ACC 0132 2482 (CHANGE TO TASKING)
B) IARV/ACC 0132 2433 (DEPLOYMENT OF ACFT AND CREW)
C) IARV/ACC 0132 2409 (CORRECTION TO REF B)
1. REF "A" REPROGRAMMED MISSION 983 FOR THE REST OF THE TASKING PERIOD TO FLY THREE SORTIES IN NORTHEAST LAOS IN RESPONSE TO CAS VIENTIANE REQUIREMENTS. THIS FIRST MSG CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE TO UDORN, THAILAND.
2. REF "B" STATED THAT 7AF WOULD TAKE NECESSARY ACTION TO PROVIDE ONE EC ACFT AND CREW FOR DEPLOYMENT TO UDORN, THAILAND FOR A TDY PERIOD OF TWO WEEKS EFFECTIVE 01 JUL 69.
3. REF "C" STATED THAT REF "B" WAS IN ERROR AND THAT ACFT AND CREW WOULD BE DEPLOYED TO NAKHON PHANOM, THAILAND VICE UDORN, THAILAND.
4. ACFT 53-3155, A COMBAT COUGAR CONFIGURED ACFT, DEPARTED AT 0045Z ON 01 JUL 69 FOR DEPLOYMENT TO NAKHON PHANOM, THAILAND. THE CREW ON ACFT 53-3155 WAS NOT NOTIFIED THAT THEY WERE GOING TO BE DEPLOYED UNTIL AFTER THEY WERE ABOARD THE ACFT DUE TO NON-AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION. DUE TO THE CREW NOT BEING PREPARED FOR A LENGTHY DEPLOYMENT ANOTHER THREE MAN CREW WILL FLY MISSION 981 ON 03 JUL AND MAKE AN OPS STOP AT NAKHON PHANOM AND RELIEVE THE CREW WHICH IS PRESENTLY THERE. THE CREW PRESENTLY AT NAKHON PHANOM WILL FLY MISSION 981 ON ITS RETURN TO PLEIKU.
5. TDY ORDERS WILL BE PROVIDED FOR ALL PERSONNEL CONCERNED. THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL WILL BE TDY TO DET 3, 6994TH FOR THE TWO WEEK DEPLOYMENT PERIOD:
A. SSGT COOLEY, HIRAM L., SSAN 480-44-6740
B. SGT BOETTCHER, JOHN A., SSAN 293-46-3709
C. SGT LEVKULICH, JOHN, SSAN 173-40-6749
BT

[redacted]

[redacted]

XNNNIHA023
//PRIORITY//
SSN 58
623725Z
FM DET 2 6994SCTY SQ
TO 6994 SCTY SQ
ZEM
[redacted] OPS 2 JULY 69.
SUBJ: TDY ORDERS
1. REQUEST TDY ORDERS BE PUBLISHED ON THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS:
(A) SSGT COOLEY, HIRAM L., [redacted]
(B) SGT BOETTCHER, JOHN A., [redacted]
(C) SGT LEVKULICH, JOHN, [redacted]
2. THEY WILL BE GOING TO NKP ON TDY STATUS FOR APPOX. 15 DAYS.
3. IF TSN CAN HAVE THE ORDERS READY, SGT MAC COLLOUGH COULD PICK THEM UP ON HIS MECCA RUN. EFFECTIVE ON OR ABOUT 3 JUL 69.
11C

[redacted]

Document 7

[redacted] TOT d 23/1200Z (6)

IPA217
//ROUTINE//
SSN 591
231200Z
FM USA-56R
TO USA-561
ZEM
[redacted] OPS JUL 69
SUBJ: RON NKP CONCEPT
1. WE HAVE PERFORMED A DETAILED STUDY OF OUR TASKING/ FRAGGED TOT, AND ACTUAL TOT. A COMPARISON OF THE ACCOMPLISHED TOT IN AREA 2018 WHEN THIS MISSION RON'S AT NKP AND STAGES OUT OF THERE THE FOLLOWING DAY, AND WHEN THE MISSION STAGES OUT OF PKU REFLECTS HIGHLY FAVORABLY UPON STAGING OUT OF NKP. SPECIFICALLY, THE AVERAGE TIME TO AND FROM TOT AREA WITH RON AT NKP IS 2 HRS 11 MINS. AVERAGE TIME TO AND FROM TOT AREA WITHOUT RON AT NKP IS 4 HRS 7 MINS. A GAIN OF ONE HOUR TARGET TIME EACH MISSION COULD BE ACHIEVED IF WE RON AT NKP.
2. RECOMMEND THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO RON NKP EVERY OTHER DAY, RETURNING TO PKU OPPOSITE DAYS FOR ALL 9015 MISSIONS. DO NOT BELIEVE THAT TECH DATA, REPORTING, ETC WOULD BE ANY PROBLEM.
3. PLEASE ADVISE.
ZEM

[redacted]

[redacted]

July

Document 8

p.5 1106077 ⑥

Aug

IHAC14
//R UTINE//
SSN 25
112605Z
FM DET 2 6994SCTYSQ
T 6994SCTYSQ
ZEM
UNCLAS E F T O PS AUG 69
SUBJ: R N NKP
REF OUR PS 231300Z JUL 69. PLEASE REPLY.
#33

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[redacted]

Document 9

NAP???
RA???
RA???
//ROUTINE//
SSN ?99
FM 6994 SS
TO DET 2 6994 SS
INFO DET 3 6994 SS
ZEM
[redacted] OPS AUG 69.
SUBJ: RON NKP
REF YOUR 231300Z
YOUR 110605Z
1. FORMALIZATION OF NKP CONCEPT OUTLINED IN REF BEING HELD IN ABEY-
ANCE PENDING RESOLUTION OF PROBLEM AREA WITH 7AF.
2. PROBLEM AREAS CURRENTLY BEING ENCOUNTERED AT NKP ARE (1) AIR-
CRAFT MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FACILITIES AND (2) PARKING SPACE LIMITATION
IMPOSED BY BASE.
3. REALIZE NKP RON IS CURRENTLY NOW BEING ACCOMPLISHED TO SOME EX-
TENT. THIS HAS CAUSED CURRENT PROBLEM BETWEEN DET 2, 460TRW AND
NKP BASE ACTIVITIES. WILL ADVISE OF ANY FAVORABLE RESULTS.
111

[redacted]

NNNN

6.

[redacted]

DOCUMENT 10

X 01/00202

INTERMEDIATE -

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ

USAFSS/TMP/TMA/TMD/TMO

INFO: PACSCTYRGN/CDR

6922SCTYWG/CDR

6994SCTYSQ/CDR

[redacted]/CDR OCT 69.

1. FOLLOWUP REPORT NUMBER ONE TO DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ AIR 3-69 (OUR CDR 30/0822Z SEP 69).

2. WE HAVE VERIFIED THAT ONLY ONE USAFSS CREWMEMBER RECEIVED MINOR INJURIES, A CUT NOSE. MEMBER WAS SGT ROSTAD, WAYNE E., [redacted]

3. ALL CLASSIFIED MISSION MATERIAL WAS REMOVED FROM THE AIRCRAFT BY CLEARED CREWMEMBERS AND IS STORED IN A SECURE AREA.

4. USN-803 IS PROVIDING SI CLEARED PERSONNEL TO GUARD THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE UNTIL A PARTY OF DET 2 COMMANDER AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL CAN GET TO EPE TO INVESTIGATE DAMAGE AND SUBSEQUENT REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED EQUIPMENT. DET 2 PERSONNEL ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART

1 0820L
Oct 69
1 2

3291

SNS Seals
NCOIC, Operations

[redacted]

BRIAN D CORNETT, Capt, USAF
Commander

[redacted]

[redacted]

PLEIKU AT 0100Z (0900L) THIS DATE. IF THE INVESTIGATION TEAM WILL RELEASE THE EQUIPMENT, IT WILL BE REMOVED AND RETURNED TO PLEIKU THIS DATE.

5. ALL CREWMEMBERS WERE EVACUATED TO DANANG SEVERAL HOURS AFTER THE ACCIDENT AND WILL REMAIN THERE PENDING INTERVIEW BY THE INVESTIGATION TEAM.

6. NO FURTHER INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME. NEXT FOLLOWUP REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED AS SOON AS INFO BECOMES AVAILABLE.

[redacted]

[redacted]

D

[redacted]

Document 11

PP YHLAKZ YWZADL YWOADK YWCALV
DE YWRDIH 045 2450310
ZNZK PP NRL DE
P 020300Z
FM DET 2 6994SCTYSQ
TO ZEN/6994SCTYSQ
INFO USAFSS/TMA/TMD
PACSCTYRGN/OPS-A
6922SCTYWG/OPS-M
6940SCTYWG [redacted]
ZEM
[redacted] OPS-2 SEP 69
SUBJ: DURMIS DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ
DATE: 02099
021 29 00 00 304 000 020 00 00 00 00 00
031 02 02 20 00 00 00 02
032 12 02 00 00 02 00 00
033 03 30 00 02 30 00 20
021 MSN 9043M CANX WX-1 5.1 HRS
021 MSN 902AM CANX WX-1 4.3 HRS
021 MSN 903AM CANX WX-1 4.5 HRS
021 MSN 902DV CANX WX-1 4.3 HRS
021 MSN 9996M CANX WX-1 4.0 HRS
021 MSN 922AA CANX WX-1 4.3 HRS
021 MSN 922LA CANX WX-1 4.3 HRS
021 MSN 902KA CANX WX-1 4.3 HRS
021 MSN 902DA CANX WX-1 4.5 HRS
031 ACFT 43702 TDY TSN, VIETNAM FOR MODIFICATION
031 ACFT 15972 TDY NKP, THAILAND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
031 ACFT 16029 A/M (ENG VAL, CLARK AB, PHILIPPINES)
032 ACFT 15133 A/M (ENG CHANGE)
03X ACFT 43072 AWAITING FCF
03X ACFT 51131 OR
03X ACFT 43090 A/M (ENG CHANGE)
03X ACFT 23372 OR
03X ACFT 49491 OR
03X ACFT 93704 OR
03X ACFT 48402 OR
03X ACFT 30730 OR
03X ACFT 77234 OR
03X ACFT 50771 OR
03X ACFT 49223 OR
03X ACFT 60957 OR
03X ACFT 49570 OR
XXX ACFT 48402 AND 30730 RECEIVED MINOR
XXX SHRAPNEL DAMAGE IN ROCKET ATTACK THIS
XX DATE. REPAIRS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.
BT

[redacted]

[redacted]

Document 14

PRIORITY

161015Z/SEP 69

USA-963

USM-808

[redacted] CHANNELS OPS-2

REF YOUR 160830Z

1. WATER BOY OUTAGE HAS EFFECTED THE WESTERN PORTION OF AREA TWO (ALPHA). PANAMA CAN NOT PAINT OUR ACFT AT THIS DISTANCE. IN VIEW OF THIS, SAFETY IS THE MAIN CONCERN.

2. PANAMA CAN ONLY PICK UP IFF/SIF FROM OUR ACFT IN AREAS TWO (ALPHA) AND 999. THIS MEANS THEY ARE UNABLE TO PAINT ANY OTHER ACFT IN THE VICINITY; THUS SAFETY IS JEPORDIZED.

3. IF THE FACILITY CONTINUES TO BE NON-OPERATIONAL, THE EFFECT ON THE TWO (ALPHA) MISSION WILL CONTINUE, PLUS SAFETY FACTORS. IT IS FELT IF THE SITUATION CONTINUES, THAT THESE TWO MISSION AREAS BE REFRAGGED UNTIL WATER BOY BECOMES OPERATIONAL.

16 SEP 69

01 01

3291

RAYMOND R. MILLER, SSGT., USAF.
OPS-2

Raymond R. Miller

KENTON E. LAMMERS, CAPT., USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Document 15 C

PRIORITY

20/0615Z

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ

69943CTYSQ

Honolulu
Vietnam
Comint
Channels
Only

[redacted] CHANNELS ops

SUBJ: FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS/MISSION COVERAGE

1. THE 3620 TECHS HAS JUST ADVISED US THAT THEY ARE RESTRICTED FROM FLYING OVERLAND ABOVE 16-40N LATITUDE WITHOUT POSITIVE RADAR CONTROL. PRESENT RADAR COVERAGE BY PANAM GOES APPROX 17 MI WEST OF QUANG TRI.

2. THIS RESTRICTION WILL PREVENT COVERAGE OF AREAS 909 MIKE AND 909 LIMA.

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, RECOMMEND THESE AREAS BE CANCELLED AND WE BE RETRACKED ELSEWHERE.

20 1400Z
Oct 69

1 1

3291

SMSgt Seals, NCOIC, Ops

[redacted]

KENNETH E LAWRENCE, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer

[redacted]

[redacted]

Document 12

ROUTINE

Capt Lammers 3291

FROM: DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ

16/1300Z

TO: 6994SCTYSQ/OPS

[redacted] CHANNELS/OPS SEP 69.

SUBJ: REDUCED FRAGS FOR EC47 N/P ACFT

REF: 460 DCODE MSG 16/1203Z SEP 69.

1. ABOVE REF STATED THAT EFFECTIVE 2Ø SEP ALL EC-47 N/P AIRCRAFT CONFIGURED CCZ/Q WILL BE FRAGGED FOR ONLY FIVE HOUR MISSIONS.

2. WISHED TO ENSURE THAT YOU WERE AWARE OF ABOVE POLICY CHANGE. QUERY WHETHER THE Q-MODEL ACFT WILL BE FRAGGED SEPARATELY NOW OR WHETHER IT WILL BE LEFT TO LOCAL UNITS TO DESIGNATE WHICH AREAS TO FLY LARGE ENGINE ACFT.

[redacted]

1 1

[redacted]

[redacted]

Document 17

CRB-3/CRB-5 15 Oct 69

Resume of GDRS Seminar, 3-4 Oct 69

CRB

1. The seminar convened at 0830 hours, 3 October with a greeting from Lt Col Cornell, [illegible], who was the seminar monitor. The seminar was designed to gather all collector, processing, and reporting agencies concerned with the problem of the General Directorate of Rear Services (GDRS), North Vietnam, to discuss the GDRS problem, to clarify present operating procedures, and to resolve any difficulties presently being encountered.

2. GDRS is one of the most important things determining the political outcome of the war. The highest officials in Washington, including the President, are briefed on GDRS events. The SIGINT effort against GDRS provides a much more complete view of what the enemy is doing.

3. From the SIGINT view, the GDRS problem has been around a long time. A General Directorate of Rear Services was established in 1954 during the French-Indochina War. In 1966 it was rediscovered in COMINT, but the activity was very obscure due to NSA's inability to decrypt the codes being used at that time. In February, 1968, the breakthrough came when a readable crypt system began to be used. Since that time, the history of GDRS was pieced together from all the traffic that had been intercepted.

4. At present, NSA is trying to enter all GDRS data into computer banks. They have determined that the voice callsign and frequency [illegible] are reporting, and with further analysis hope to be able to predict [illegible]. The GDRS reporting format was implemented to facilitate their usage of a data bank. In addition, all translations issued by USM-808 and USM-90 are being entered into a computer. "Pipeline Postscripts", a message of technical information issued by DIRNSA, was designed mainly to maximize intercept. It was noted by DIRNSA representatives that only 25% of message externals was being obtained, i.e., callsigns and preambles.

5. [illegible] noted that the translations issued by USM-808 and USM-90 had increased greatly in quality. Their main concern was the differences noted between field translations and NSA translations. One big problem is the differences noted by field stations and NSA in the [illegible] of North Vietnamese designators and of kilometer [illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]

6. TACREPS were discussed at length. It was noted that the use of TACREPS on COMIN information could be used only if a position, an activity, and a time (in the future) were mentioned in the traffic.

7. ARC-LITE targeting was discussed in length. ARC-LITES were begun in 1965. Each strike (consisting of 6 B-52s) costs $250,000. 10 strikes are made each day. Thus a target must be selected that will yield the most as far as damage inflicted. All sources of intelligence are used to develop ARC-LITE targets. COMINT plays a big part in determining how much material is stored where, thus aiding in determining the worth of the target. It was noted that ARDF fixes in Laos are not used for immediate targeting. It has been determined that the transmitting terminal is actually is quite a distance from the HQ's elements/units, etc., and that these terminals usually move quite often. Another problem is that 60% of terminals fixed in Laos are unidentified. It was stressed that all information is put together to try to determine the best targets for ARC-LITE missions.

8. Acquisition of Tactical targets. Reconnaissance by Acoustics was discussed at length. Sensors are used to a great extent in the Steel Tiger area of Laos in acquiring Tactical targets. This program was implemented at UBP in 1967. Sensors are dropped by F-4's into an area believed to active with truck movement. Either an Acoustic or a seismic sensor is used. The seismic sensor detects tremors. It is activated whenever a certain level of movement is reached. One of its drawbacks is the fact that overflying planes and even rainfall can activate it. The Acoustic sensor detects sounds. It is quite effective in determining exactly what activity is going on. The sensors are read by orbiting EC-121's, and this data is relayed digitally to Task Force Alpha. Sophisticated equipment is used to break out the data and to determine the best place for a Tactical strike.

9. COMINT information is also used for acquiring Tactical targets. The rumbles in traffic of vehicles on a certain road at a certain time can lead to a Tactical strike. A sanitized listing of ARDF fixes is provided to Forward Air Controllers on a daily basis, and in some cases has resulted in the sighting of a target by a FAC.

10. As the rainy season draws to an end in Laos, DIRNSA expects large-scale preparations to begin for the movement of troops and material south. This is expected to begin about the 20th of October. Almost a complete reconstruction of the road system will be necessary, as the rains have almost completely destroyed existing roads.

11. Thus an increase in COMINT is foreseen. But DIRNSA is concerned about the possibilities of the North Vietnamese using land lines. The Communists almost certainly will attempt to establish complete land lines, and if they succeed, COMINT will be almost non-existent in Laos. For that reason, efforts will be made to interdict landlines as they are built.

[redacted]

[redacted]

12. A briefing was given on the configurations of all aircraft being utilized in the GDRS problem. Personnel from the 6990SS were leery of the altitude Combat Cougar aircraft fly. Most personnel from other units had no conception of the actual mission of the 6994th.

13. The main specifics concerning the 6994th:

a. One of the things discussed was the role the Mini-pod would play in the GDRS problem. DIRNSA officials hope it will play a big part in the coming months in locating major elements of the GDRS organization. For example, at the present time, Binh Tram 41 is unlocated, although it is believed to be in the general area of Ban Dong, Laos. By locating such major elements, it would aid in developing strikes at a later date. It was noted that at the present time no Mini-pods were flying a Laotian orbit. Steps were taken to immediately correct that situation.

b. USM-808 complimented USA-565 for the quality of their recordings, saying they were of the highest quality of any other of the intercept platforms. They were concerned, however, with the time it takes to deliver tapes to them, even when Ops Stops are made. They realize it would be very difficult to pass all traffic air-to-ground. It was noted that much of the Combat Cougar traffic is used to clarify or correct translations already issued. USA-565 would receive much more credit if their traffic were sent to USM-808 on a more timely basis.

c. The 6990SS Form O-10 (GDRS Handlog) was endorsed by all, and its use was encouraged. It was decided that all intercept operators should note on the handlog whether the handlog is completely perfect or whether groups, callsigns, or other items are missing. Operators should attempt to correct handlogs by replaying tapes, providing no intercept is lost. If a perfect handlog is obtained, the letters HT (hand transcribed) should be entered on the handlog and on the tape jacket.

14. The seminar was very helpful in realizing the problems each unit has, from the collector to the reporter. It reassured me as to the contribution Det 2 is making, and in the ways in which we can contribute further. It has aided the processors and reporters in understanding our problems. Each piece of information aids in solving the GDRS problem; each operator should be aware of this, and should realize the great importance of GDRS.

DES J FRAWLEY, SSgt, USAF
[redacted]

JOHN D PRIOR, SSgt, USAF
[redacted]

[redacted]

OPS
2.11
C.

Document 18

Nea

ROUTINE 19/0835Z

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ

6994SCTYSQ/OPS

[redacted] OPS NOV 69.

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF VE121 GRADUATES.

REF: A. USAFSS MSG 102115Z NOV 69, B. UR OPS 120905Z NOV 69, C. OUR OPS 271043Q AUG 69.

1. EIGHT AIRMEN (SGTS CARLTON, COX, GRIJALVA, JOHNSON, PECK, SNYDER, TEITZEL AND WILLIAMS) WERE GRADUATES OF COURSE VE121 AND WERE ASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT TDY FOR 90 DAYS. THEY RETURNED TO 6990 SCTY SQ O/A 1 NOV 69.

2. FEEL THAT THE QUESTIONS ASKED IN USAFSS MSG 102115Z NOV 69 CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ANSWERED IN A COLLECTIVE VERSUS AN INDIVIDUAL MANNER. AN EVALUATION WAS PROVIDED PREVIOUSLY IN REF C. FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE OFFERED IN ADDITION. SUBJECT AIRMEN WERE TASKED AT THIS UNIT WITH THE INTERCEPT OF GDRS AND TACTICAL VOICE COMMS. THEY WERE NOT REQUIRED TO PERFORM TRANSCRIPTION DUTIES. THE VE 121 TRAINING ENABLED ALL THE SUBJECT AIRMEN TO PERFORM VIETNAMESE COLLECTION IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER. DUE TO THE FACT THAT COMBAT COUGAR ZULU-

19 NOV 1969

1

K.E. LAMMERS, CAPT, USAF
Operations Officer

[redacted]

KEL

KENTON E. LAMMERS, CAPT, USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER

[redacted]

[redacted]

ROUTINE K.E. LAMBERS, CAPT, USAF OPERATIONS OFFICER K.E. LAMBERS, CAPT, USAF OPERATIONS OFFICER

CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT HAVE ONLY ONE VOICE INTERCEPT POSITION, THESE PERSONNEL PERFORMED THEIR DUTIES IN A RELATIVELY UNSUPERVISED MANNER. IN ALL CASES, THEY HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN DISTINGUISHING NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMS FROM SOUTH VIETNAMESE. THE HANDCOPY ABILITIES OF THESE PERSONNEL VARIED WITH THE INDIVIDUAL. SGT JOHNSON'S HANDCOPY OF DIGITAL TRAFFIC WAS COMPARABLE TO THAT OF A LONG COURSE GRADUATE. SGTS COX, GRIJALVA, SNYDER, AND TEITZEL PRODUCED ACCEPTABLE HANDCOPIES. HANDCOPIES OF SGTS CARLTON, PECK AND WILLIAMS WERE OFTEN INCOMPLETE. FEEL THAT ADDITIONAL OR DIFFERENT TRAINING IN VE121 WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. OF COURSE ADDITIONAL TRAINING WOULD BE BENEFICIAL IF THE LINGUIST WOULD IMMEDIATELY BE REQUIRED TO PERFORM TRANSCRIPTION DUTIES. THE VE121 GRADUATES WERE CERTAINLY ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTES FOR LONG COURSE GRADUATES TO PERFORM OUR BASIC COLLECTION MISSION WHERE MANNING SHORTAGES OCCURRED.

[redacted]

[redacted]

0RA015
//ROUTINE//
SSN 17
010636Z
FM 6994SS
TO DET 2 6994SS
ZEM

[redacted] SECTION ONE OF TWO OPS NOV 69.

SUBJ: COURIER STOPS AT DANANG.

1. FLWG MSG IS QUOTED FYA: QUOTE.

P 310459Z
FM NSAPACREP VIETNAM [redacted]
TO SSO MACV
INFO AFSSO 7TH AF
[redacted]
F46-6621

CO 509TH HOLD AND PASS TO ACC; AFSSO 7AF FOR DOCR; SSO MACV FOR J211-4

COURIER-STPOS AT DA NANG BY EC-47S

1. AS REQUESTED, HAVE EXAMINED IN CONJUNCTION WITH 7TH AF, 6994TH SCTY SQ, AND 509TH RRGP. THE FEASIBILITY OF DISCONTINUING THE EC-47 COURIER-STPOS AT DA NANG. THIS EXAMINATION WAS MADE WITH THE GROUND RULE THAT NO ACTIONS WOULD BE RECOMMENDED OR TAKEN WHICH WOULD ADVERSLY AFFECT THE DISSEMINATION OF TIME-SENSITIVE INFORMATION TO FIELD COMMANDERS. ADDITIONALLY, IT WAS DECIDED THAT NO PROPOSAL WOULD BE OFFERED THAT COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED EXPEDITIOUSLY.

2. TO KEEP MATTER IN PERSPECTIVE, WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT ONLY THOSE EC-47 MISSIONS TASKED BY USM-808'S MISSION CONTROL DIRECTIVE TO COURIER-STPO AT DA NANG WERE CONSIDERED; THEREFORE ANY RECOMMENDATION, UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED, APPLIES SOLELY TO THOSE MISSIONS. THE FOLLOWING FACTORS ARE GERMANE:

A. BASING: THESE MISSIONS ALL STAGE OUT OF PLEIKU.
B. SEA AREA: MISSIONS ARE FRAGGED IN SAE AREA 9 OR SOMETINES 11.
C. AVERAGE NUMBER OF SORTIES FRAGGED: 22 PER WEEK OR BETWEEN 3 AND 4 PER DAY.
D. COLLECTION TASKING: TACTICAL COMMS ONLY, NO GDRS
E. AVERAGE INTERCEPT PER DAY, IN MINUTES: 340 MANUAL MORSE AND 99 VOICE.
F. AVERAGE INTERCEPT PER SORTIE, IN MINUTES: 105 MANUAL MORSE ADN 30 VOICE.
G. AVERAGE FLIGHT TIME, MSN AREA TO DA NANG: 30 - 45 MINUTES.
H. AVERAGE TIME OF GROUND AT DA NANG: 30 MINUTES
I. AVERAGE FLIGHT TIME, DA NANG TO PLEIKU: 1 HR 05 MINUTES
J. AVERAGE TOTAL EPAPSED TIME FOR G,H, AND I: 2 HOURS 25 MINUTES - 2 HOURS 40 MINUTES
K. AVERAGE FLIGHT TIME, MSN AREA TO PLEIKU: 1 HOUR 15 MINUTES.
L. AVERAGE TIME DELAY FROM TIME OF COUREIR STOP AT DA NANG TO DELIEVEY AT PHU BAI: 5 HOURS.

3. RECALLING THE GROUND RULE ESTABLISHED AT THE BEGINNING THAT THE TIMELY DELIVERY OF PERISHABLE INFORMATION MUST NOT BE JEPPARDIZED, IT IS APPARENT, FROM A PURELY CRYPTOLOGIC OUTLOOK, THAT THE BEST SIGINT SOLUTION WOULD BE COLLOCATION OF THE AVIATION UNIT WITH THE CMA. UNFORTUNATELY, RECALLING THE

[redacted]

SEC. STIPULATION THAT [redacted]
THEREFORE, THE BEST ALTERNATIVE
WOULD BE THE ELECTRICAL FORWARD
CMA IMMEDIATELY UPON RECOVERY AT PLEIKU PROVIDED THE TIMELI-
NESS OF THE DELIVERY TO USM-808 WAS AT LEAST AS GOOD AS THAT
PROVIDED BY COURIER. THE TIMES REFLECTED IN PARA 2 INDICATE
THAT ELECTRICAL FORWARDING TO USM-808 COULG BEGIN APPROXIMATELY
1 HOUR AND 15 MINUTES AFTER DEPARTURE FROM THE MISSION AAREA IF
THE MISSION AIRCRAFT RETURNED DIRECTLY TO PLEIKU INSTEAD OF
STOPPING AT DA NANG. THIS IS IN COMPARISON WITH THE AVERAGE OF
5 HOURS AND 30 MINUTES TO 5 HOURS AND 45 MINUTES FOR THE COURIER
MATERIAL TO REACH PHU BAI.
4. THEERE IS MUCH TO RECOMMEND THIS APPROACH, NOT JUST AS AN
ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE COURIER-STPO, BUT, FOR THE LONG
TEM, AS AN EVEN BETTER OPTION THAN THE COUIER-STOP. TO
ILLUSTRATE:
660

[redacted]

NNNN

[redacted]

QSL
NAB011

ORA016
//ROUTINE//
SSN 18
010636Z
FM 6994SS
TO DET 2 6994SS
ZEM
[redacted] FINAL SECTION OF TWO OPS NOV 69
A. WHILE THE COURIER TIME FROM DA NANG TO PHU BAI HAS IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY IN RECENT WEEKS, IT IS STILL AN UNSTABLE SITUATION THAT CAN AND OFTEN DOES, FLUCTUATE DRASTICALLY FORM DAY TO DAY. IT IS ESPECIALLY AGGRAVATED DURING BAD WEATHER SUCH AS EXISTS NOW IN NORTHERN I CTZ. ELECTRICAL FORWARDING, OVER THE LONG RUN, WILL BE STATISTICALLY MORE REALIZABLE. FURTHER, ELECTRICAL FORWARDING SHOULD, BASED ON THE TIME FACTORS PREVIOUSLY SHOWN, DELIVER THE MATERIAL NOT ONLY FASTER TO USM-808 BUT ALSO IN AN IMMEDIATELY USEABLE CODITION. AS TRANSCRIPTION WILL HAVE ALREADY TAKEN PLACE.
B. FOR SOME TIME NOW, AVIATION UNITS HAVE BEEN PREPARING AND FORWARDING TO NSA AND THE CMAS, THE SOUTH EAST ASIA TECHNICAL SUMMARY (SEATS) WHICH PROVIDES TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON THE COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY OF ASSIGNED TARGETS. THIS HAS RESULTED IN IMPROVING THE TIMELINESS OF TECH INFO FROM THE AVIATION UNITS TO THE CMA AND TO NSA; IN INCREASING THE INITIAL IDENT RATE OF ARDF FIXES; IN RAISING THE PRECENTAGE OF FIXES CONTAINING CALLSIGNS; AND IN INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF INTERCEPT. THIS CONFIRMS THE VIEW THAT WHEN IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO COLLOCATE THE AVIATION UNIT WITH THE CMA, THAT PERFORMANCE EFFECTIVENESS IMPROVES WHEN TRAFFIC IDENTIFICATION AND DATA PREPARATION IS DONE BY THE COLLECTOR.
5. IF THE COURIER STPOS OF THESE AIRCRAFT AT DA NANG WERE DISCONTINUED, COMPLETE ELECTRICAL FORWARDING OF REQUIRED DATA WOULD HAVE TO BE IMPLEMENTED AS FOLLOWS:
A. ELECTRICAL FORWARDING, IMMEDIATELY AFTER RECOVERY, OF ALL MATERIAL NOT PREVIOUSLY PASSED AIR-TO-GROUND.
B. TRANSCRIPTION OF ALL TAPES, IMMEDIATELY UPON RECOVERY, AND ELECTRICAL FORWARDING OF ALL POSSIBLE EXPLOITABLE TRAFFIC.
C. CONTINUED PREPARATION AND FORWARDING OF SEATS ON ALL INTERCEPT.
6. BELIEVE THESE PROCEDURES NOT ONLY WOULD OBVIATE THE REQUIREMENT FOR A COURIER-STPO AT DA NANG BUT WOULD ALSO SPEED THE DELIVERY OF EXPLOITABLE TRAFFIC TO USM 808; THEREBY ENHANCING OVERALL RESPONSIVENESS TO THE TIME-SENSITIVE REQUIREMENTS OF MACV.
7. ASSUMING USA-563'S CAPABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH ELECTRICAL FORWARDING AS DEFINED ABOVE, AND DEPENDENT ON ITS IMPLEMENTATION, RECOMMEND COURIER-STOPS OF EC-47S AT DA NANG BE DISCONTINUED

[redacted]

[redacted]

CONCERNED, WILL EVALUATE THE [redacted]
ELECTRICAL FORWARDING VIS-A-VIS THE [redacted]
APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS. IF YOU CONCUR WITH THIS APPROACH,
RECOMMEND 6994TH ADVISE EARLIEST DATE ELECTRICAL FORWARDING AT
PLEIKU COULD BE STARTED.
600

[redacted]

NNNN

Document 20

[redacted]

IHB 0C9
ZCRDA 660
RR YWRDIH
DE YWOADK 51 2902100
ZKZK RR RNT DE
R 171855Z
FM USAFSS
TO CHIEF USAFSS/FM
EURSCTYRGN/OODE/
PACSCTYRGN/OPS/
6921SCTYWG/OPS/
DET 1 6921SCTYWG/OPS/
6922SCTYWG/OPS/
DET 4 6922SCTYWG/OPS/
6994SCTYSQ/OPS/
DET 1 6994SCTYSQ/OPS/
DET 2 6994SCTYSQ/OPS/
AFSSO NKP/OPS/
ZEM

TOR 0530Z 3 CEN 604

[redacted]

[redacted] CHANNELS TWA
AFSSO NKP: PASS TO DET 3, 6994SS.
1. MAKE FOLLOWING PEN AND INK CHANGES TO USAFSSM 200-4, VOLUME (PROVISIONAL DRAFT), 29 JUL 69:
A. PAGE 7, LINE 22:
AFTER "MISSION FUNCTION" INSERT THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE: "AT LEAST ONE LINE ENTRY WILL BE REPORTED FOR EACH MANNED POSITION."
B. PAGE 7, LINE 22:
AFTER "(X) POSITIONS" INSERT: "UNLESS THAT POSITION IS USED STRICTLY FOR COLLECTION."
C. PAGE 8, LINES 16, 17, AND 18:
DELETE AND INSERT: "'ZZ' COLLECTION ONLY - USED ONLY WHEN NO ARFP IS PERFORMED DURING THE MISSION."
D. PAGE 10, LINES 25 AND 26:
DELETE ALL AFTER "EDFX802" AND INSERT THE FOLLOWING:
(4)
"360 340 10/08/08 04/03 02/02 06/02"
(5) (6) (7-8-9) (10-11) (12-13) (14-15)
E. PAGE 11, LINE 2:
ON THE NEXT LINE INSERT: "(5) 360 - FRAGGED TOT IN MINUTES (PUT A DASH IN THIS FIELD FOR 013 ENTRIES)."
F. PAGE 11, LINES 3 THROUGH 14:
RENUMBER SUBPARAGRAPHS 1-UP.
G. PAGE 11, LINE 7:
CHANGE "TARGETS" TO READ "FIXES/CUTS"
H. PAGE 11, LINE 8:
CHANGE "TARGETS" TO READ "FIXES/CUTS"
I. PAGE 12, LINE 10:
ON NEXT LINE INSERT : "023 SPECIAL MISSION SUMMARY."
J. PAGE 12, LINE 13:
AFTER "022" INSERT: "/023"
K. PAGE 12, LINE 14:
DELETE "IN THIS ENTRY" AND INSERT: "IN ENTRIES 021 AND 022."
L. PAGE 12, LINE 19:
DELETE "WILL NOT BE INCLUDED" AND INSERT: "AND SPECIAL [illegible]

[redacted]

M. PAGE 12, LINE 23: [redacted]
DELETE "MISSIONS SCHEDULED" AND [redacted]
SCHEDULED FOR THAT DAY AS SPAC [redacted]."
N. PAGE 12, LINES 21 AND 22:
DELETE ENTIRE EXPLANATION AND INSERT: "NUMBER OF THOSE MISSIONS REPORTED IN (2) ABOVE ACTUALLY ACCOMPLISHED, EITHER IN FULL OR IN PART. IF THE MISSION AIRCRAFT FAILS TO REACH EITHER ITS PRIMARY OR ALTERNATE MISSION AREA (AS DEFINED IN ATTACHMENT 1 OF THIS MANUAL) PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF THE FRAGGED TIME OVER TGT, IT WILL NOT BE INCLUDED IN THIS TOTAL."
O. PAGE 12, LINE 27:
AFTER "(TOT)" INSERT: "AS SPECIFIED IN ACC WEEKLY TASKING MESSAGES."
P. PAGE 12, LINE 28:
DELETE "ACTUAL TIME FLOWN OVER TARGET" AND INSERT: "THAT PORTION OF THE FRAGGED TOT REPORTED IN (5) ABOVE THAT WAS ACTUALLY ACCOMPLISHED. TIME SPENT IN AN ALTERNATE AREA DURING THE FRAGGED TOT WILL BE INCLUDED IN THIS ENTRY, AND AMPLIFYING REMARKS MADE IN SECTION 021, 022, OR 023."
Q. PAGE 21, LINE 12:
BETWEEN LINES 12 AND 13 INSERT THE FOLLOWING ENTRY:
"5. FRAGGED TOT 26-28 36D
29 BLANK"
R. PAGE 21, LINES 13 THROUGH 31:
RENUMBER ENTRY NUMBERS 1-UP AND RENUMBER FIELDING POSITIONS @-UP.
S. PAGE 22, LINE 2:
AFTER "021/022" ADD "/023"
T. PAGE 27, LINE 15:
BETWEEN LINES 14 AND 19 INSERT: "ALTERNATE MISSION AREA. ANY MISSION AREA TO WHICH A MISSION AIRCRAFT IS DIVERTED BY FORMAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM EITHER ACC OR THE APPROPRIATE CMA."
U. PAGES 46 AND 47:
DELETE ALL ENTRIES.
2. REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN USAFSSM 203-4, VOLUME XV (PROVISIONAL DRAFT), 29 JUL 69, INCLUDING THE AFOREMENTIONED CHANGES, BE IMPLEMENTED EFFECTIVE WITH THE AJOF DURMIS FOR 25 OCT 69. FNA PEDT
EDITIONS OF VOLUME XV WILL BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE NEXT 60 TO 90 DAYS.
65G

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[redacted]

[redacted]

Document 21

NAS 003
OBA 096
//ROUTINE//
SSN 750
FM 6994SCTYSQ
TO DET 1 6994SCTYSQ
DET 2 6994SCTYSQ
DET 3 6994SCTYSQ
R 240521Z
FM 6994SCTYSQ
TO ZEN/DET 1 6994SCTYSQ
ZEN/DET 2 6994SCTYSQ
ZEN/DET 3 6994SCTYSQ
INFO USAFSS (TMA/TAG)
PACSCTYRGN (OPS-A)
6922 SCTYWG (OPS-V)
ZEM

TOR 24/0452Z
9
CCN: 1000

[redacted] CHANNELS ONLY OPS-2 DEC 69
SUBJ: ARDF DURMIS REPORTING
REQUEST THE FOLLOWING INFO BE INCLUDED DAILY IN THE REMARKS SECTION OF DURMIS: FIX RADIUS 0-0500M/0501-1000M.
THESE FIGURES WILL EQUAL TOTAL IN FIELD 15 OF 012 ENTRIES.
EXAMPLE:
001 FIX RADIUS 13/12
REQUEST THIS IMPLEMENTED IN DURMIS FOR 251269. THIS WILL BE A CONTINUING REQUIREMENT UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTIFIED
170

[redacted]

Document 7

CLN: 263

8/10/08

[redacted]

[illegible]

[illegible]

//PRIORITY//

SSN [illegible]

P [illegible]

FM 6981 SPTYSQ

TO DET 1 6994 SPTYSQ

DET 2 6994 SPTYSQ

DET 3 6994 SPTYSQ

[redacted]

BT

[redacted] CHANNELS [illegible] [redacted]

SUBJ: POSITION STATUS REPORT, [illegible]

REQUEST YOU IMPLEMENT ANNEX [illegible] TO TECHINS [illegible], [illegible]

[illegible] AND APPLICABLE USAFSS SUPPLEMENT FOR PREPARING

SUBJECT REPORT UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE. FOLLOWING

IS AN EXAMPLE PSR.

[illegible]

XXXX

[illegible] POINT [illegible]

[illegible] (TE [illegible]) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] EFF: [illegible]

[illegible] IS OPERATIONAL READY

XXXX

[illegible] PSR [illegible]

PSR'S WILL BE FORWARDED AT ROUTINE PRECEDENCE TO USA-[illegible]

(OPSM) FOR ACTION AND INFO DIRNSA ([illegible]) USAFSS (TMA/

[illegible]), [illegible] (OPSP), USA-[illegible] ([illegible]) USA-[illegible] (OPS-2)

AND APPROPRIATE DET WHEN APPLICABLE.

BT

[redacted]

[redacted]

Document 24
TOR 09/0637Z
①
CCN 342

[redacted]

[illegible]

[illegible]
//ROUTINE//
[illegible]
[illegible]
FM [illegible] SOTYSO
TO DET 1, [illegible] SOTYSO
DET [illegible] SOTYSO
[illegible]

[redacted] [illegible]
1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR YOUR ACTION: QUOTE
[illegible]
FM [illegible] SOTYSO
TO [illegible] SOTYSO OPS
DET 1 [illegible] SOTYSO OPS
DET 2 [illegible] SOTYSO OPS
DET 3 [illegible] SOTYSO OPS
[illegible]

[redacted] [illegible]
[illegible] RESPONSIBLE FOR [illegible] ANNEX HOTEL
[illegible] TECH [illegible] SOTYSO [illegible] MAY [illegible]
[illegible]
1. UPON RECEIPT OF ANNEX HOTEL TO [illegible], REQUEST YOUR REVIEW OF
THIS DOCUMENT AND [illegible] ALL CHANGES TO UNITS
TECHNICAL MATERIAL DISTRIBUTION [illegible] WEEKLY RECAPITULATION
OF [illegible]. EACH UNIT IS TO FORWARD A TECH RECAP TO THIS HQ,
ELECTRICALLY, ON THURSDAY OF EACH WEEK. THIS HQ WILL COMPILE A
REPORT OF ALL CHANGES TO OUR SUBORDINATE UNITS TECHNICAL MATERIAL
DISTRIBUTION. WE WILL FORWARD THIS CONSOLIDATED TECH RECAP,
ELECTRICALLY, AT ROUTINE [illegible], ON FRIDAY OF EACH WEEK TO THE
[illegible] PLUS OTHER [illegible] REQUIRED. ALL SUB-UNITS WILL ISSUE
TECH RECAPS EACH WEEK. NEGATIVE TECH RECAPS ARE REQUIRED FOR UNITS
SUBORDINATE TO THIS HQ. NUMBER YOUR TECH RECAP IN A [illegible] SERIES.
[illegible] THIS SERIES TO [illegible] EACH CALENDAR YEAR. THE FIRST TECH RECAP
ISSUED FOR THE NEW YEAR WILL CONTAIN A STATEMENT INDICATING THE
NUMBER OF THE LAST TECH RECAP FOR THE PREVIOUS YEAR. TO PREPARE
[illegible], FOLLOW THE OUTLINE IN THE ANNEX OF [illegible] ABOVE.
[illegible] HAS INFORMED US THAT THEIR SUPPLEMENT TO [illegible] IS BEING
REVISED AND PRESENTLY AT [illegible] FOR PUBLICATION. PENDING RECEIPT
OF THE NEW SUPPLEMENT, THE SAMPLE TECH RECAP IN THE ANNEX MAY BE
FOLLOWED.
2. UPON RECEIPT OF A TECH RECAP FROM THIS HQ, APPLY THAT PORTION
THAT PERTAINS ONLY TO YOUR UNIT. [illegible] A TECH RECAP, LIST
REFERENCES AND AUTHORITY FOR ALL CHANGES TO YOUR TECHNICAL REPORTS.
3. REQUEST ALL QUERIES TO THE ABOVE BE HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL
RECEIPT/REVIEW OF ANNEX HOTEL TO [illegible] AND [illegible] TECH RECAP. [illegible]
4. [illegible] SOTYSO HAS QUERIED STATUS OF THE WEEKLY TECH RECAP AT
YOUR UNITS. HAVE YOU RECEIVED [illegible] ANNEX HOTEL? IF NOT NOTIFY
THIS HEADQUARTERS [illegible] [redacted] [illegible]
[illegible] IN YOUR TECH [illegible]
[illegible]

1

RA 916
//ROUTINE//
SSN 406
150900Z
FM 6994SS
TO DET 2 6994SS
DET 3 6994SS
ZEM

[redacted]

CN-5

[redacted] OPS-2 DEC 69.

SUBJ: COMMANDO FORGE OPERATIONS/EXPLOITATION SUMMARY.

1. STARTING 22 DEC 69 THIS OFFICE IS TASKED WITH PROVIDING 7AF WITH INFO CONCERNING ARDF AND ACRP OPERATIONS IN LAOS. THIS IS DUE TO THE ELIMINATION OF THE AFSSO NKP COMMANDO FORGE DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT. IN ORDER TO FULFILL REQUIREMENTS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WILL BE REQUIRED AS SOON AFTER THE END OF THE TASKING WEEK, BUT NLT 0600Z SUNDAY.

2. FOR DET 2 (STEEL TIGER ONLY)
A. NUMBER OF MISSION TO STEEL TIGER:
B. TOTAL TIME FRAGGED:
C. TOTAL TIME FLOWN:
D. TOT FRAGGED:
E. TOT FLOWN
F. NUMBER OF FIXES:
G. PERCENT IDENTIFIED:
H. PASSED AIR-TO-GROUND:
I. MORSE COLLECTED (MINUTES):
J. VOICE COLLECTED (MINUTES):
K. NUBER OF EXPLOITABEL MESSAGES:

3. FOR DET 3 (BARREL ROLL AND STEEL TIGER):
A. TOTAL TIME FRAGGED:
B. NUBER OF EXPLOITABEL MESSAGES:
(1) NUMBER EXPLOITED BY DET 3:
(2) NUMBER OF MESSAGES FROM DET 2 ACFT EXPLOITED BY DET 3:
C. ACRP OPERATIONS:
(1) NUMBER OF TACREP'S RECEIVED A/G BY DET 3:
(1) FROM COMBAT APPLE:
(2) FROM COMMANDO LANCE:
(3) FROM COMFY ECHO:
D. SUPPORT PROVIDED TO 7/13AF AND CAS:
(1) NUMBER OF FIXES PROVIDED:
(A) FIXES 0-1000M:
(B) FIXES 1000-2000M:
(C) FIXES OVER 2000M:
(2) NUMBER OF TACREPS:
(3) NUMBER OF EC-47 EXPLOITABLE MESSAGES:
E. SUPPORT PROVIDED TO TFA AND 7AF:
(1) NUMBER OF FIXES PROVIDED:
(A) FIXES 0-1000M:
(B) FIXES 1000-2000M:
(C) FIXES OVER 2000M:
(2) NUMBER OF TACREP'S
(3) NUMBER OF EXPLOITABLE MESSAGES:

4. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE THIS OFFICE WITH STIMATED MAN-HOURS REQUIRED TO PRIVIDE THIS INFO. FIRST REPORT WILL ARRIVE THIS OFFICE NLT 0600Z 21 DEC 69.

ZZZ

[redacted]

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[redacted]

IHB628
RR YMRDIH
DE YMRDOR 19 2280557
ZKZK RR ARL SCA DE
R 1307552
FM USA561
TO USA-563
INFO DIRNSA/B6-222
USAFSS/TED
PACSCTYRGN/OPS-A
USA-57
USM-606
ZEN
[redacted] CHANNELS OPS-2 AUG 69.
PART I: FOLLOWING PACSCTYRGN OPS-A 151856Z AUG 69 QUOTED FOR UR INFO: QUOTE.
SUBJ: SEATS
REFS: A. DIRNSA/B6-222 122122Z AUG 69.
B. USAFSS/TED 141936Z AUG 69.
1. REF B QUOTED REF A- (PASSED 5922SM BY SSLO 140515Z AUG 69) AN[illegible] REQUESTS IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SEATS PROGRAM AT DET 2, 6994SS. REQUEST 5922SM/6994SS TAKE ACTION TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. INITIALLY IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO TDY SUFFICIENT 202'S FROM DET 1 TO ACCOMPLISH SEATS TASK UNTIL DET 2 PERSONNEL DEVELOP THIS CAPABILITY.
2. TED INFORMS THAT DET 1, IS SKED TO HAVE 16 202'S BY END OF AUG AND MASTER PROGRAM/UDL CHANGES FOR 6994SS/DETS ARE IN FINAL COORDI-NATION. CHANGES WILL REALIGN SEVERAL FUNCTIONS ARE PERMIT EXPANDED ANALYTICAL EFFORT THROUGHOUT 6994SS COMPLEX. UNQUOTE.
PART II. INITIATE ACTION TO IMPLEMENT SEATS ASAP. ADVISE ALL ADDEES OF SKED IMPLEMENTATION DATE. REF UR OPS 130755Z AUG 69: CONTINUE OPSTOP AT PHU BAI TO DROP OFF TRAFFIC AND TAPES. FOR FORWARDING. IF ALL CYS OF TRAFFIC ARE NEEDED ONLY FOR CASE-NOTING, SUGGEST USM-606 MAY BE ABLE TO DO THIS BASED ON UR SEATS, OR DROP OFF TAPES AND RETAIN TRAFFIC FOR DIRECT FADING AFTER CASING, COORDINATE WITH USM-606 AND ADVISE. REF UR OPS 140330Z AUG 69. A1C SHORT WILL RETURN THIS UNIT AT EXPIRATION OF TDY. PLS ADVISE IF ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED BEFORE OR AFTER HIS RETURN.
250

[redacted]

[redacted]

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SUS- [redacted] TR Hell 7/12022 (1F) Document 27 CCN: 221

RR YHLAKZ 3 2161932
R 041935Z ZFD
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO 6994SCTYSQ/CDR
INFO DET 1, 6994SCTYSQ
DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ
AFSSO NKP
6922SCTYWG/OPS
ZEM
[redacted] CHANNELS CDR
AFSSO NKP PASS TO DET 3, 6994SS
SUBJ: IDENTIFICATION EFFECTIVENESS
REF: USAFSS/CCS 012110Z AUG 69.
1. REF MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO. QUOTE:
R 012110Z
FM USAFSS
TO PACSCTYRGN
ZEM
[redacted] CHANNELS CCS
SUBJECT: IDENTIFICATION EFFECTIVENESS
SINCE THE INSTITUTION OF THE EXPANDED IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM AT THE 6994SS, DET 1, DET 2 AND DET 3, THE FIX IDENTIFICATION RATE HAS SHOWN A STEADY INCREASE AND HAS, AS A RESULT, PROVIDED OUR CONSUMERS WITH MORE MEANINGFUL INFORMATION. CONSIDER THIS DEDICATION AND PERSEVERENCE ON THE PART OF THE ANALYSTS AND FLYING CREWS MOST COMMENDABLE. PLEASE INSURE THAT ALL RESPONSIBLE ARE INFORMED OF MY APPRECIATION.
UNQUOTE.
2. WISH TO ADD OUR APPRECIATION TO THAT OF GEN STAPLETON. CONGRATULATIONS ON A JOB WELL DONE AND KEEP UP THE GOOD WORK.
27

[redacted] HA [redacted]

NNNN [redacted]

CON: 0017

NAB012
CRA024
//ROUTINE//
SSN 24
010910Z
FM 6994 SS
TO DET 2 6994 SS
ZEN/6994 SS COMM
INFO ZEN/6994 SS SSLO [redacted]
ZEM
[redacted] CHANNELS OPS-2 SEP 69.
SUBJ: SPECIAL REPORTING
1. 7AF HAS REQUESTED SPECIAL REPORTING BY EC-47 MSNS FLOWN IN AREAS 611.
2. FOLLOWING EACH ACFT RECOVERY FROM AN AREA 611 MSN, PASS VIA OPS-COMM AT IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE TO 7AF(DIOWA) SPECIAL REPORTS LISTING ALL FIX LOCATIONS, CEPS, AND KNOWN IDENTIFICATIONS.
3. THIS INFO IS REQUIRED TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 7AF TASKING AND OBTAIN TIMELY TARGETING INFORMATION. IF THIS INFO APPEARS LUCRATIVE, UR UNIT MAY BE TASKED WITH AIR/GROUND REPORTING AND IMMEDIATE RELAY TO 7AF.
4. FLAG ALL REPORTS "SPECIAL REPORT AREA 611." FOR 6994 COMM: PASS ALL REPORTS SO FLAGGED TO 7AF(DIOWA) IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIFIED PRECEDENCE.
5. THIS TASKING IS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT AND UNTIL SUPERSCEDED OR RESCINDED.
155

[redacted]

Document 34

TOP 07/09427 6

CCN-229

[redacted]

B

NAB008

ORA022
//PRIORITY//
SSN 249
P 070457Z
FM 6994SCTYSQ
TO DET 2 6994SCTYSQ
INFO DET 3, 6994SCTYSQ
ZEM
[redacted] OPS NOV 69
EFFECTIVE 17 NOV 69, ADD DET 3, 6994SS AS AN ADDRESSEE TO ALL EXPLITABLE MSG REPORTS (EMR) RESULTING FROM INTERCEPT ORIGINATING IN THE STEEL TIGER AREA.
055

[redacted]

[redacted]

IAPV313-S3 26 July 1969
SUBJECT: Report of Quarterly ARDF/Collection Conference

and stated his objective to have battalion units strive for such improvements.

3. Cpt Marquis, Operations Officer of the 330th RR Co, made the opening statement on behalf of the Collection Management Authority. Cpt Marquis explained that the conference would be an informal discussion. The objective of the conference would be to surface problem areas for discussion and obtain solutions on them either during the conference or if the problems could not be solved by this headquarters or members of this conference, they would be forwarded to higher headquarters.

4. Sp5 Jonathan Miller from the 330th RRC, spoke on ARDF Tasking and generation of tech data by the CMA to the aviation units. He pointed out that the "Cherry Sheets" reflected terminals that have at least a 33 1/3% probability of making their respective schedules, however, the tactical situation will frequently require terminals to be reflected on the "Cherry Sheets" that have less than 33 1/3% probability of being heard. Additionally new tech data is added to the "Cherry Sheets" based on a daily review of intercept. A new schedule is considered a valid schedule if met three times. If a terminal remains active on a schedule five out of twelve days, the resulting tech data will be reflected continuously on the "Cherry Sheets". Sp5 Miller also mentioned the tech data should be received by all aviation units 24-30 hours prior to the respective mission. If a aviation unit is not in receipt by this time they should call the CMA by phone and ask for immediate retransmission of the data.

5. Sp5 Miller reviewed the ground to air and air to ground tip off procedure. Regarding ground to air procedures, tip offs should be passed in the blind, if no contact can be made. The frequency should always be given first, IAW current ACC Working Aids. From air to ground the information should also be passed in the blind if contact can not be made. The Army aircraft and ground stations are to remain in cipher at all times. The Air Force will make initial callups in plain text then remain in cipher. This is a current problem area for ground monitor stations which is expected to be resolved by the modified KY-8 cypto gear. Trigraph utilization is also a current problem area. A decision will be made by CMA as to the possible elimination of Trigraphs in the tip off procedure. It was brought to the attention of the members of the conference that all priority one targets will be tipped off from ground to air if the station is active. Cpt Parrin and Major Dorffi will establish whether CMA special emphasis targets take precedence over the J2/MACV designated priority targets. Both Air Force and Army aviation units desire a change in the format of the Cherry Sheets. They request the time, UTM, and priority be the first three entries for operational ease of completing the mission. CMA agrees and will implement this change in the Cherry Sheets. A question

[redacted]

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arose as to what action should be taken by the aircraft personnel if more than one priorty one target is scheduled to be fixed at the same time. The decision reached was that the priorty one target which has the largest nil heard time will take precedence over the other. Discussions arose as to whether traffic copied in the air, to include plain text, readable and perishable intelligence, should be passed to the ground during the mission. The conclusion reached was collection missions are for collection and unless the intelligence value is extremely critical and perishable, copy or collection would not be sacrificed for time spent on transmission of the traffic to the ground.

6. Sp4 Manning reviewed recovey reports and daily fix reports, their use and format. Sp[illegible] pointed out that special emphasis should be placed on accuracy [illegible]e reports, i.e. frequency and time, for wide band extraction.

7. The tasking cycle was covered by Sp5 Miller. The CMA for Southern I Corp and all of II Corp is responsible for; requesting ARDF/ABN collection aircraft for analytical areas of responsibility, providing aviation units with tech data when missions are allocated, and for reporting and evaluating results of the tasked missions. The mission requests are based on pattern analysis composed of clusters of enemy terminals. Special requests from DSU's and CMA are forwarded to HQ 509th RR Gp for a review at MACV on Tuesday prior to the tasking period. The allocations of frag points and aircraft are then sent to the CMA which then provides the required TOT's in the form of mission control directives. The time over targets and frag points are based on the productivity of the area, targets most reliable sked times, aircraft availability and weather. The TOT information is forwarded to J2 MACV and the weekly tasking message is then prepared. Techsupport is prepared by the CMA analysists for the MACV tasking. The most timely action onchanges of frag points and reviewing TOT effectiveness will be taken by sending requests to CMA direct. It was recommended that all stations with opscom use this means to discuss problems in detail. These discussions will be followed by a formal exchange resolving the problem. There will be times when aircraft will be forced out of the tasked area due weather, artillery, etc. The aircraft will contact the CMA or DSU in frag area and notify the unit of the request for refragging. The CMA will notify ACC of the diversion request. In most cases the pilot or navigators suggestions in regards to diverts will be a major factor in the CMA decision for the new frag point. There are inherent difficulties in refragging. All productive areas already have missions. The CMA can not always be reached by aircraft in II Corp and Southern I Corp. Additionally the CMA is not aware of the overall weather situation or the artillery being fired. The generation of additional tech data is beyond the current CMA capabilities. It was suggested that the pilots be given pre-flight briefings on concentrations of enemy terminals in their area and the location

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[redacted]

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SUBJECT: Report of Quarterly ARDF/Collection Conference

of other ARDF frag points and sorties. Generally, if another frag point cannot be found, effective coverage for search and development will be directed. The aircraft must contact homebase, CMA, or the DSU in their area so that ACC will be aware of locations of all aircraft. A great amount of progress was made in clarifying ACC directives and in reducing the number of interpretations to the various directives. The next ARDF/Collection Conference is expected to be held in October 1969.

ANDREW E. LITTLE
LTC, SigC
Commanding

[redacted]

[redacted]

DISTRIBUTION:

509TH RRGP	3 Cys
6994TH SCTY SQ	2 Cys
USF-794	2 Cys
224TH AVN BN	2 Cys
138TH AVN Co.	1 Cy
Det 2, 6994TH SCTY SQ	2 Cys
Det 3, 6994TH SCTY SQ	2 Cys
265TH RR Co.	1 Cy
407TH RR Det	1 Cy
1ST PLT, 138TH AVN Co.	1 Cy
HQ, 1ST MAR Radio BN	2 Cys
Sub-unit One, 1ST MAR Radio BN	1 Cy
INTERNAL	10 Cys
TOTAL	30 Cys

[redacted]

[redacted]

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REPORT ON THE CMA ARDF CONFERENCE 15-16 SEPT 1969

1. The CMA working level ARDF Conference, sponsored by the Airborne Systems Management Section, 8th Radio Research Field Station, was convened at 0900 hours, 15 September 1969, at the 8th Radio Research Field Station, Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam. Personnel listed below participated in the conference:

Mr. Hugh F. Ferry, GS-13, DODSPECREP
Major Richard W. Mock, 509th RRGP
Major Thomas F. Stokes, 224th Avn Bn (RR)
Major Edward E. Groff, MACV J211-4
Major William E. Dorffi, 509th RRGP (ACC)
Major Edward C. Brinkley, 1st Marine Radio Bn
Major Levi Goldfarb, DODSPECREP
Captain Frank M. Perrin, 509th RRGP (ACC)
Captain Michael Brennan, 138th Avn Co. (RR)
CW4 John F. Holterman, 8th RRFS
CW2 Donald C. Lanson, 1st Marine Radio Bn
WO1 Alvin L. Long, 138th Avn Co. (RR)
MSG Donald H. Ritter, Det 2, 6994th Scty Sq
SFC Jay C. Clay, 8th RRFS
SSG Randolph S. Mitchell, 1st Marine Radio Bn
SSG Daniel W. Bright, Det 2, 6994th Scty Sq
SSG George Stallard, 138th Avn Co. (RR)
SP4 Martin D. Jenkins, 265th RRC
SP4 Jesse Temple, 407th RR Det
SP4 Paul Ayars, (Recorder) 8th RRFS

2. LTC Kenneth F. Coykendall, Commanding Officer, 8th RRFS, opened the conference and welcomed the Conferees. He stressed the importance of ARDF to the tactical commander and expressed the hope that the conference would result in an improved ARDF product.

3. Major Joseph F. Short, Operations Officer, 8th RRFS, greeted the delegates and assured them that the full facilities of the field station were at their disposal. He also stated that his office was prepared to cooperate in every way possible to insure the success of the Airborne Systems program in I Corps.

4. CW4 John F. Holterman, OIC, Airborne Systems Section, stated that although previous conferences had been devoted solely to ARDF, due to the growing interrelationship of ARDF and Airborne Collection, several subjects pertaining to collection had been placed on the agenda. He then introduced SFC Jay C. Clay, the moderator of the conference.

5. To begin a comprehensive survey of all aspects of tip-offs, SFC Clay reviewed tip-off procedures from the moment of intercept on the ground to the passing of the fix by the aircraft via A/G radio. In the ensuing discussion CPT Brennan pointed out that the present ARDF frequency in I Corps area is overloaded.

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would be studied by ACC [redacted] but that it could be implemented informally by USM-808. Major Stokes recommended that to make the tip-off system more efficient separate sole user tip-off and report frequencies should be used. Major Dorffi and CPT Perrin said that ACC was trying to get additional frequency allocations for this purpose. SFC Clay stated that the aircraft should QSL for tip-offs whenever possible.

6. MSG Ritter observed that OPS STOPS at Phu Bai consume time and fuel and should be eliminated if possible. Major Dorffi suggested that perhaps they could be minimized. In the ensuing discussion, with SFC Clay and Major Stokes presenting the opinion of the CMA, it was decided that since rapid release of the product is the overriding factor, the OPS STOPS were fully warranted and should be continued.

7. In a brief discussion concerning the colocation of aviation units with the supported CMA, it was the general opinion that colocation is most desirable due to the close rapport which can be engendered. However, Major Groff ventured the opinion that due to the minimal facilities at Phu Bai airport, colocation of Air Force units with USM-808 was highly unlikely.

8. The afternoon session began with a discussion on the value of copying identifying factors on unidentified intercept which is being fixed by AFDF. SFC Clay delineated the CMA viewpoint, saying that when callsigns are not copied anything is valuable--methods of collating, call-up procedures, chatter, peculiar use of "Q" and "Z" signals, etc. SSG Bright raised the objection that, at present, there exists no firm guidelines for what and how much should be copied. SFC Clay responded that the preamble, the first five and last five groups were the most desireable items to copy and would aid in wideband recovery. Major Stokes added that any groups copied are worthwhile, provided the time of intercept is given. SFC Clay stated that normally this information will not be passed A/G unless specifically requested by the CMA.

9. Technical data (cherry sheets) supplied to the aircraft was the next topic for discussion. That a number of problems exist in the preparation and use of cherry sheets was admitted by all concerned. MSG Ritter stated that sometimes the last location given on the cherry sheet was out of date. SFC Clay pointed out that this was due to the fact that the data must be prepared two or three days in advance and that the aviation units could update the cherry sheets by using the latest [redacted]

USM-808 [redacted] produced, leaving it to the aviation units to tailor it to their own needs. MSG Ritter and SSG Bright both felt this would increase unduly the workload at the aviation unit analytic section.

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It was pointed out by SFC Clay that the technical tasking by individual aircraft, as supplied by USM-808, was in strict accordance with ACC directives and was considered the most effective method of tasking yet devised. Major Dorffi raised the question of diverts. He suggested a broad area cherry sheet be produced to cover areas not normally tasked but to which diverted aircraft are often sent. SFC Clay explained that the amount of man-hours which would be expended in compiling and forwarding the additional tech data would be out of proportion to the expected returns, as it would seldom be used. Major Brinkley asked why Radio Designators (RD's) were not used on cherry sheets instead of trigraphs. He maintained this would simplify work in the aircraft as some RD's have several, or even many, trigraphs. Major Dorffi reminded the gathering that DIRNSA would not approve the carrying of RD's in the aircraft. SFC Clay observed that the analysts work with RD's, only using the trigraphs for ARDF tasking purposes. He cited one RD as having 19 trigraphs. CPT Perrin said that ACC would approach DIRNSA on the question once again. CW4 Holterman brought up the question of the value of cherry sheets, observing that USM-808's cherry sheets are 75-80% accurate, yet returns averaged only about 10%. Several reasons were advanced to explain this situation and CPT Perrin stated that many unidentified fixes may well be targets on the cherry sheets but since no call signs or other identifying factors were copied the identification cannot be substantiated. It was the consensus of opinion that cherry sheets are being used and are of real value. SFC Clay suggested that targets not heard for thirty days be dropped from tasking. Most of the delegates agreed with this proposal and CPT Perrin said he would consult MACV and advise all participants as to the results. Major Stokes observed that one of the best ways to increase the effectiveness of ARDF would be to streamline tip-off procedures and rely on tip-offs solely and do away with cherry sheets. CPT Perrin advanced the opinion that slow adjustment to the tip-off program prohibits that step at this time and that emphasis should be placed on having the air crew pay more attention to tip-offs. Major Stokes said that efforts are being made to simplify cockpit procedures, allowing greater capacity to receive tip-offs.

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10. As regards the proper utilization of frequencies on the ARDF net, SFC Clay cautioned that the net was to be used only for the passing of tip-offs G/A and return of fixes A/G; that the net should not be tied up with chatter and extraneous transmission. Major Stokes added that tip-offs should take precedence over A/G returns. MSG Ritter asked how four figure exploitable traffic was to be passed A/G. SFC Clay suggested that the Laffing Eagle frequency be used and CPT Perrin and Major Dorffi concurred in this, saying they would coordinate with USM-704 S3/Coll.

11. Recovery Reports. CPT Perrin reported to the conference that forthcoming changes to the Daily Fix Report would require the coded reporting of diverts, the reasons therefore, cuts, tip-offs, etc., in the Recovery Report. CPT Brennan expressed concern over the added workload on the aviation unit that this would entail.

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how to improve the tip-off program and not [illegible] the purpose of [illegible] up on the aviation units. In regards to collection tech data, SFC Clay observed that as long as the statistical totals at the bottom were valid, a Recovery Report giving only those totals would be sufficient for reporting purposes.

12. MSG Ritter requested that tasking for low level tactical and VHF targets be more specific. It was agreed generally that a description of low level tactical traffic is difficult to formulate. SFC Clay suggested an exchange of operators between the Air Force aviation units and the CMA and/or Army aviation units so that the more experienced operators might share their knowledge of that type of traffic with others. All agreed this proposal should be implemented. It was also suggested that the search band be narrowed to 2.5-3.5 MHZ vice the present 3-6 MHZ. Major Mock said that anything in this range is likely to be low level tactical material and very valuable. SFC Clay also suggested that the CMA provide "negative tasking" in the form of lists of targets not to copy in order to avoid duplicate copy.

13. The second day's session opened with a discussion of fix timeliness vs accuracy. It was stated that accuracy on fixes passed A/C is imperative because the tactical commanders react rapidly to ARDF information and when the information is not valid there is a terrific waste of both personnel and material resources. Major Dorffi said navigators at the 460th TRW stated that recent inaccuracies were due to new navigators and the fact that one bad LOP in a series of shots can cause error as the computer cannot differentiate as to the quality of the LOP. WO Long added that replotting on the ground is standard procedure with the Army before releasing recovery report, although it was noted that the problems arise from inaccurate fixes passed A/C. Major Brinkley asked how it was possible for the same target to be fixed at two locations 10-20 kms apart on the same day. Major Dorffi replied that the ACC checks situations such as these through its quality control program and queries the reporting CMA. The question of reporting single LOP's (line bearings) arose and MSG Ritter said that they are reported in the comments section of the Recovery Report along with the position of the aircraft. He added that a compilation of LOP's may be valuable in pattern analysis. CPT Perrin noted that care must be taken so that inexperienced personnel do not misinterpret this information. Pursuing the problem of failing to fix Priority One targets when they have been reported as observed in communications, Major Goldfarb offered several explanations. He said there might not be aircraft in the air at the time, the aircraft may be unable to hear the target, or the use of vague terminology may be part of the problem. He explained that to say a target was up in communications does not specify whether the target was actually transmitting or only receiving traffic.

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14. On the topic of collection quantity and quality SSG Bright again mentioned the lack of specific guidelines on what to copy. MSG Ritter said operator guides are in the process of being prepared by the Air Force aviation unit in an effort to systemize the collection effort. He also stated that having a traffic identifier on board the aircraft would be very useful, but that currently the weight problem is prohibitive. Major Dorffi and CPT Perrin said that alloted TOT's are being reduced to make the actual TOT more realistic. CPT Perrin went on to say that, hopefully, the ACC will soon be sending quality control feedback on Recovery Reports, cherry sheets, and DFR's to the applicable unit, with no requirement for response unless the receiving unit considers a reply would be useful.

15. CW4 Holterman requested the participants to offer any comments they desired before the conference adjourned. The following comments were forthcoming. Major Groff announced that MACV planned to change the existing eleven MACV areas to eighteen SEA areas which would include Laos. MSG Ritter asked him why some targets last heard in 1968 are still carried on MACV EEI listings. Major Groff explained that MACV J211-4 manages the requirements for the listings but does not itself have the authority to make deletions; that requests for additions and deletions must originate with the CMA. Mr. Ferry commented that NRV has requested that a "Last Heard In Communications" date be included on the listing but that no reply had been received. Major Groff added that an effort must be made to reduce the number of Priority One targets. He said that originally ten per cent of the listed targets were Priority One but that the number had tripled. CPT Perrin stated the CMA should take care to request deletions on unheard targets to aid in updating the listing. As a final comment Major Dorffi announced that ACC would hold an ARDF Conference in Saigon on or about 20 Oct. 69. He said ACC hopes to hold conferences every six months and that he thought the CMA's should continue their quarterly conferences. CW4 Holterman and SFC Clay suggested that quarterly was too often and requested CMA conferences be held semi-annually. Major Dorffi said perhaps the frequency could be reduced and that he would look into the matter. He cited the need for more specific directives concerning the conferences.

16. CW4 Holterman gave a brief wrap up of the topics discussed by the conference and adjourned the meeting after thanking all concerned for their participation and assistance in making the conference a success.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
6994th SECURITY SQUADRON (USAPSS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

Document 38

OPS-2 (SEFE) 7 October 1969

Minutes of the SEFE Conference

OIC Mission Management

1. On 6 October 1969 the 6994th Security Squadron SEFE conference convened with the following personnel in attendance:

SSgt James T. Lalont	Squadron SEFE	6994th Scty Sq
TSgt George B. Montague	Local SEFE	6994th Scty Sq
SSgt Donald Faye	Local SEFE	6994th Scty Sq, Det 1
SSgt Phil Ehrhorne	Local SEFE	6994th Scty Sq, Det 2
TSgt Donald L. Whitman	Local SEFE	6994th Scty Sq, Det 3

2. The first subject discussed pertained to the standardization of the mission checklist:

a. Each unit will use the abbreviated checklist as published in accordance with the C-47-1. This will consist of a seperate checklist for each position (X,Y,Z1,Z2) along with a standardized emergency checklist.

b. In addition to a standardized checklist, each unit will make up a flimsy to supplement the abbreviated checklist as required by their particular unit. Flimsies should contain such items as Market Time/Game Warden (where needed), inflight maintenance, communication procedures, etc.

c. It was decided that the Squadron SEFE would obtain, from the 360 TEWS, the published abbreviated checklists and forward copies to the Detachments.

3. Stan/Eval and Emergency Procedures examinations:

a. The Stan/Eval exam was reviewed and changed accordingly to make a standardized 80 question test. An exception was Det 3 who will have only 76 standardized questions due to operating procedures. Each unit will still be required to add 20 optional questions to make a 100 question exam. (Det 3 will require 24 questions)

b. The Emergency Procedures exam was reviewed and found to be adequate except for one question which was changed during the conference.

4. Appointing of IRO's:

a. A review of the IRO narrative exam was made and found to be inadequate and not needed. It was determined to delete the narrative exam and to chose prospective IRO's from the highest qualified Cat III operators. The prospective IRO must obtain a 95% or higher on the Stan/Eval exam, meet a SEFE board consisting of the appropriate SEFE and two (2) qualified IRO's, and pass a Stan/Board checkride while instructing a student.

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5. 202/203 SEFE's:

a. A review was made to determine the need for local 202/203 SEFE's for the Squadron and Detachments. The Squadron, Det 1, and Det 2 will not require a 202 SEFE due to the small number of 202's presently on airborne status. Det 3 will require a 202 SEFE due to their large number of 202's in airborne slots.

b. The Squadron and Det 2 presently have a local 203 SEFE and Det 3 is in the process of appointing one. There is no requirement for a 203 SEFE at Det 1 due that there are no 203's assigned.

c. It was agreed that the 202 SEFE can administer a Stan/Eval check flight on 202's and 203's when required. This check flight can only cover emergency procedures, airborne and equipment procedures, etc while the ground training section will have to check on career field qualifications.

6. Form 74's:

a. It was agreed to put more emphasis on adding comments in the remarks section. In the past this section has been greatly ignored.

b. It was standardized to have entered in the position block those positions that the student was evaluated on.

7. It was decided that more emphasis is needed in having a better coordination between the Squadron and Detachment SEFE's. All changes and suggestions to the Standardization program will be directly coordinated with the Squadron SEFE before any action is taken.

8. The conference was adjourned at 1600 hours 7 October 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER

JAMES T LAMONT, SSgt, USAF
Squadron SEFE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
6994th SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96207

1st Ind to 6994 Security Squadron SEFE Letter, Minutes of the SEFE Co[illegible] 7 Oct 1969.

OPS-2

15 OCT 1969

TO: OPS

1. Ref para 2b. These flimsies must contain minimum information required to perform the mission in the fragged area. Appropriate guidance is contained in USAFSCM 205-2, chapter 4 and the forthcoming squadron regulation on Airborne Mission Security.

2. Ref para 4a. The revised squadron regulation 50-1, Aircrew Categorization and Proficiency Training, specifies selection criteria for Instructor Radio Operators and Instructor Maintenance Technicians.

3. Although a 292 SEFE may be fully qualified to perform a Stand/Eval check on an Airborne Analyst (292 or 202) if he is personally qualified as an Airborne Analyst, I do not believe that a 292 SEFE can adequately checkout a 203 Radio Operator. A critical part of evaluating any airborne operator is the judgement by the SEFE of the operator's ability to hear, recognize and copy the targets while in the airborne environment. The ground training section can only estimate a linguist's capability, it cannot evaluate his ability to handle all facets of operating an airborne position under actual conditions. If possible, I would prefer to see a 203 appointed as a squadron SEFE. He need not necessarily be assigned Tan Son Nhut, nor would he be considered as part of the squadron SEFE section. The same rationale applies also to the A301X3's assigned to the units.

4. Ref para 7. The need for closer coordination between all units in relation to the Stand/Eval program was recognized when the governing regulation was rewritten. The SEFE conference which this letter summarizes is a direct result of the revised program concepts. Such meetings are now a quarterly requirement at the local and squadron levels.

Richard T. Osborne

RICHARD T OSBORNE, Capt, USAF
OIC Mission Management

Cy to: 6994 Scty Sq (OPS-3)
Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq (OPS)
Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq (OPS)
Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq (OPS)

[redacted]

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Document 41

X

020615Z DEC 69

ROUTINE

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ

USAFSS/CSP

INFO: PACSCTYRCN

6922SCTYWG/OPS

6994SCTYSQ/OPS

[redacted]/OPS DEC 69. SECTION I OF II SECTIONS

[redacted]

SUBJ: CONTROL PROCEDURES/EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION PLANS.

REF: A. CSP MSG 131335Z OCT 69

B. CSP 101537Z NOV 69

1. INFORMATION LISTED BELOW SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, PARA 4.

A. COMINT AND COMINT-RELATED MATERIAL BY DOCUMENT:

NAME	NO OF COPIES	PORTIONS MAINTAINED
INTRODUCTION TO MUSSO	1	ALL
TECHINS 1ØØ1	1	ALL
TECHINS 1ØØ2	1	ALL
TECHINS 1ØØ3	1	ALL
TECHINS 1Ø42	1	ALL

Dec 69

1 4

2189

TSgt McCoy
Training

[redacted]

KENTON E LAMBERS, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer

[redacted]

[redacted]

TECHINS 1Ø43	1	ALL
TECHINS 1Ø56	1	ALL
TECHINS 2Ø2Ø	1	ALL
TECHINS 2Ø37	2	ALL
TECHINS 6ØØ2	1	ALL
TECHINS 7Ø13	1	ALL
TECHINS 9ØØ1	1	ALL
TECHINS 9ØØ3	1	ALL
TECHINS 9Ø1Ø	1	ALL
TECHINS 981Ø	1	ALL
ASC WORKING AID 01-69	2	ALL
ASC WORKING AID 02-69	2	ALL
ASC WORKING AID 03-69	2	ALL
ASC WORKING AID 04-69	2	ALL
ASC WORKING AID 05-69	2	ALL
ASC WORKING AID 06-69	2	ALL
DIRNSA B61INFORMAL TECH NOTES 18-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA TECH SIGINT REPORT 10-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA TECH SIGINT REPORT 12-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA TECH SIGINT REPORT 13-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA TECH SIGINT REPORT 17-69	1	ALL

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

DIRNSA TECH SIGINT REPORT 19-69	2	ALL
DIRNSA TECH SIGINT REPORT 21-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA WORKING AID 04-67	1	ALL
DIRNSA WORKING AID 08-67	1	ALL
DIRNSA WORKING AID 13-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA WORKING AID 17-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA WORKING AID 20-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA WORKING AID 21-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA WORKING AID 23-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA WORKING AID ND-37-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B62 CTR 25-67	1	ALL
DIRNSA B62 WORKING AID 24-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT ØØ1/38-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT ØØ5-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT ØØ6-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT ØØ7-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT ØØ7-69	3	SORT RX
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT ØØ7-69	3	SORT TX
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT ØØ7-69	3	CASE
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT Ø16-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT Ø17-69	1	ALL

[redacted]

[redacted]

DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT Ø18-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT Ø46-69	1	SORT 1
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT Ø46-69	1	SORT 2
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT Ø46-69	1	SORT 4
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT Ø46-69	1	SORT 7
DIRNSA B64 WORKING AID Ø4-69	2	ALL
DIRNSA B64 WORKING AID Ø5-69	2	ALL
DIRNSA B64 WORKING AID Ø6-69	2	ALL
DIRNSA B64 WORKING AID Ø7-69	2	ALL
DIRNSA B64 WORKING AID Ø8-69	2	ALL
DIRNSA B64 WORKING AID Ø9-69	2	ALL
DIRNSA B64 WORKING AID 34-68	2	ALL
DIRNSA B64 WORKING AID 34-68	2	SUP 1
DIRNSA B644 WORKING AID ØØ1-68	1	ALL
DIRNSA B644 WORKING AID Ø1-69	2	ALL
DIRNSA B644 WORKING AID Ø2-69	2	ALL
DIRNSA B644 WORKING AID Ø5-69	2	ALL
DIRNSA B65 WORKING AID Ø4-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B65 TP 1-69	1	PART 3
DIRNSA B65 TP 1-69	1	PART 8

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ROUTINE 02 0615Z DEC 69

[redacted]

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ

USAFSS/OSP

INFO: 2ACSCTYKM

6922SCTYKG/CPS

6994SCTYSQ/CPS

[redacted]/CPS DEC 69, SECTION II OF II SECTIONS

NAME	NO OF COPIES	PORTIONS MAINTAINED
DEFENSA E22 TECHNICAL SUP	2	VOL III
DEFENSA E22 TECHNICAL SUP	1	VOL II
DEFENSA E5 DICTIONARY	1	ALL
VIETNAMESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (A-M)	2	ALL
VIETNAMESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (N-Y)	2	ALL
VIETNAMESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (GLOSSARY)	2	ALL
VIETNAMESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (ALPHEN)	2	ALL
DEFENSA CIRCULAR 93-7	2	ALL
DEFENSA CIRCULAR 93-11	1	ALL
DEFENSA COC-1/62	1	ALL
DIA CONSOLIDATED SCO ADDRESS BOOK	1	ALL

DEC 69

[redacted]

[redacted]

Capt McCoy
Plans

KENNETH E LATHEM, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer

[redacted]

DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.17	1	ALL
DOD DIRECTIVE S-5200.17	1	ALL
USAF INTEL 201-1	1	ALL
USAF INTEL 201-6 & USAFSS Sup 1	1	ALL
INITIAL SECURITY INDOCTRINATION BOOKLET	1	ALL
COMMUNICATIONS INTEL INDOCTRINATION	1	ALL
AFI 101-5/USAFSS SUP 2	1	ALL
USAFSSM 9-1	1	VOL II
USAFSSM 26-1	2	VOL II
USAFSSM 50-1	1	ALL
USAFSSM 55-7	2	ALL
USAFSSM 100-1	1	VOL II
USAFSSM 200-4	1	VOL I
USAFSSM 200-4	1	VOL VI
USAFSSM 200-4	1	VOL VII
USAFSSM 200-4	1	VOL IX
USAFSSM 200-4	3	VOL XV
USAFSSM 205-1	1	ALL
USAFSSM 205-2	1	ALL
USAFSSM 205-7	1	ALL
USAFSS MSG NUMBER 7	2	ALL

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

USAFSSP 178-1-2	1	ALL
USAFSSP 200-3		ALL
USAFSSR 11-6	1	ALL
USAFSSR 55-18 AND 6994SCTYSQ SUP 1	1	ALL
USAFSSR 55-35	1	ALL
USAFSSR 60-1	1	ALL
USAFSS CCODC STUDY VOLUMES	1	VOL 1-7
USAFSS CCODC STUDY GUIDES	68	ALL
USAFSS CCODC PRE [illegible] 381-23	82	ALL
PACSCTYRGN CDCR 100-69	1	ALL ALL
PACSCTYRGN REG 50-1	1	ALL
PACSCTYRGN REG 55-6	1	ALL
PACSCTYRGN SUMMARY	1	ALL
PACSCTYRGN WGP 4-68	1	ALL
6994SCTYSQ HISTORY (1 JAN-30 JUN 66)	1	ALL
6994SCTYSQ HISTORY (1 JUL-31 DEC 66)	1	ALL
6994SCTYSQ HISTORY (1 JAN-30 JUN 67)	1	ALL
6994SCTYSQ HISTORY (1 JUL-31 DEC 67)	1	ALL
6994SCTYSQ HISTORY (1 JAN-30 JUN 68)	1	ALL
6994SCTYSQ HISTORY (1 JUL-31 DEC 68)	1	ALL
6994SCTYSQ REG 50-1 (TRAINING PROCEDURES FOR ARDF AIRCREW MEMBERS)	1	ALL

[redacted] [redacted]

6994SCTYSQ RWO 55-1 (ARDF RECOVERY REPORTING)	1	ALL
6994SCTYSQ/REG 55-3 (AIRCREW DUTIES)	1	ALL
6994SCTYSQ/REG 55-4 (FLIGHT MISSION BOLDING)	1	ALL
6994SCTYSQ/REG 55-15 (ELECTRONIC WARFARE POSITION STATUS REPORT)	1	ALL
DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ OOI 50-4 (VOICE RADIO PROFICIENCY TRAINING)	1	ALL
DET 2, 6994SCTY SQ OOI 55-1 (ELECTRONIC WARFARE POSITION STATUS REPORT)	1	ALL
DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ/REG COI 55-2 (SENIOR RADIO OPERATOR)	1	ALL
DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ/REG COI 55-3 (AIRBORNE COMMUNICATION GUIDELINES)	1	ALL
DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ/COI 55-7 (HANDLING CRYPTICAL MATERIAL)	1	ALL
DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ/COI 55-13 (TRAFFIC AND MAGNETIC TAPE DISTRIBUTION)	1	ALL
DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ/COI 55-14 (TECHNICAL AND EVALUATION SUPPORT)	1	ALL
DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ/COI 55-26 (ANALYSIS AND REPORTING)	1	ALL

[redacted]

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ, OOI 200-2 (IN-STATION EVALUATION PROGRAM) 1 ALL

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ OOI 200-4 (CONTROL OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL CARRIED ON ARDF MISSION AIRCRAFT) 1 ALL

B. TOTAL NUMBER OF CUBIC FEET OF COMINT AND COMINT RELATED DOCUMENTS ON HAND: 28 CU FT.

C. TOTAL NUMBER OF CUBIC FEET OF COMINT AND COMINT RELATED CORRESPONDENCE ON HAND: 39.6 CU FT

D. TOTAL NUMBER OF CUBIC FEET OF COLLATERAL MATERIAL ON HAND: 14 CU FT.

E. THIS UNIT HAS NO CLASSIFIED EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN THAT WHICH IS REPORTED UNDER THE CRYPTO INVENTORY. HOWEVER, IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION SITUATION, ALL TEST EQUIPMENT WILL BE DESTROYED BY MUTILATION.

F. SUFFICIENT DOCUMENT DESTROYERS/EQUIPMENT ARE ON HAND TO ACCOMPLISH EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION WITHIN TIME GOALS ESTABLISHED BY REF A, PARA 3B(6).

[redacted]

[redacted]

Document 42

[illegible]7CFJA[illegible]
RTTEZYUW RUMTEJA0354 3382235-EEEE--RUMLJFA.
ZNY EEEEE
R [illegible]Z DEC 69
FM USAFSS
TO DET 2 6994 SCTYSQ SP PLEIKU AB VIETNAM
BT
UNCLAS E F T O CSP-3
REF UR MSG 020615Z DEC 69.REQUEST YOU FORWARD FOLLOWING
INFORMATION:
A. NUMBER AND TYPE OF CLASSIFIED CRYPTO EQUIPMENT ON
HAND.
B. NUMBER AND TYPE OF DOCUMENT DESTROYERS ON HAND.
BT
0354

[redacted]

Document 43

INFO 19
[redacted]

[redacted]NOV 69
THE FOLLOWING QUOTED MSG IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO
QUOTE
TO [redacted]
[redacted]

SUBJ: 362 TEWS OPERATING LOCATION
1. THE COMMANDER 7AF HAS APPROVED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SIX AIRCRAFT EC-47 OPERATING LOCATION (OL) OF THE 362 TEWS AT DANANG AB. IT IS PLANNED TO ACTIVATE THIS OL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE DEACTIVATION OF THE 8 SOS OLAC IN DEC 69. // SSLO COMMENT: DEACTIVATION OF 8 AC-47S//
2. AN OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS EXISTS FOR AROF COVERAGE IN I CTZ, PARTICULARLY ALONG THE DMZ, AND APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS MORE TOT CAN BE REALIZED BY LAUNCHING SORTIES FROM DA NANG VICE PHU CAT OR PLEIKI. THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE PROPOSED OL INCLUDES AN AVERAGE OF 31.5 SORTIES PER WEEK WITH ONLY A MINIMUM MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY AT DANANG.
3. [redacted] ARE THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF PARENT UNIT

[redacted]

[redacted]

(?) [illegible] OF FLIGHT LINE [illegible]
(4) COMMUNICATIONS
AIR TO GROUND UHF/HF
HOT LINE TO SOC
(5) TRANSPORT
FLIGHT LINE MAINTENANCE VEHICLE
CREW TRANSPORT
COMMANDER'S VEHICLE
(6) NORMAL 11-4 SUPPORT
B. 4994 SS
(1) PERSONNEL: 2 OFFICERS, 82 ENLISTED, 1 CIVILIAN
(2) 3600 SF OPS/COM FACILITY (IN SECURE AREA)
(3) 1200 SF MAINTENANCE/SUPPLY FACILITY
(4) COMMUNICATIONS
NORMAL TELEPHONE
KY23 TELEPHONE LINES
(5) TRANSPORTATION
2 VEHICLES
(6) NORMAL 11-4 SUPPORT
4. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MEETING REQUIRE[illegible]
[illegible] FORWARDED TO TAF OPL BY COB 27 NOV 69. CONSTRUCTION OF N[illegible]
[illegible] WILL [illegible] ADDRESSED. DIRECT CONTACT WITH 4[illegible] [redacted] [illegible]L
[illegible] 4994 SS IS AUTHORIZED AND ENCOURAGED. [redacted]
S[illegible]S. DPLG, 592[illegible]. GP-4
END QUOTE
[illegible]

Document 44

153014

ZCZCRRA739RDC302

RR YNRDIH

DE YNRDZI 47 3190548

P 1????2Z

FM 6994SS

TO PACSCTYRGN/OPS

6922SCTYWG/OPS

6994SCTYSQ/CDR/OPS

DET 2 6994SCTYSQ

ZEM

[redacted] CHANNELS CDR

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

REF A. 6994SS/OPS 15?1??Z

B. 6994SS/SSLO 14??5?Z

SUBJ: DET 2 6994 SS RELOCATION.

WAS CALLED BY 7?6 TFW PLANS PEOPLE FOR AN INVITATION TO ATTEND A PAD MEETING ON SUBJECT ON 16 NOV, 1300 HOURS LOCAL. I ACCEPTED AND INFORMED THAT THE CDR OF DET 2, 6994 SS AND OPS OFFICER, 6994 SS WOULD ALSO BE PRESENT AT THAT TIME. INITIAL CONTACTS WITH BASE ON SUBJECT PORTENDS AN ATTITUDE OF HOW THEY CAN BEST SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT RATHER THAN A NEGATIVE, "CANNOT DO" APPROACH. THE FACT THAT THEY INTEND TO ESTABLISH A PAD IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THIS ATTITUDE. THEY DO HOWEVER HAVE A NUMBER OF OBSTACLES TO OVER COME, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH ARE VEHICLES, BILLETING SPACE, REVETED RAMP SPACE AND FLIGHT LINE MAINTENACE AREAS.

230

[redacted]

NNNN

3.

TOR 1135Z 13

Nov

CON 0544

[redacted]

TO Document 4

SAVK 16/07 15Z 9

IHA019
//PRIORITY//
SSN 202
O 162577Z
FM DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ
TO 6994 SCTY SQ/COR
ZEM
[redacted] CHANNELS COR NOV 69.
SUBJECT: CURRENT SECURITY POSTURE OF PLEIKU AB.
1. FOLLOWING IS A GIST OF INFORMATION GATHERED AT A MEETING OF THE PLEIKU AIR BASE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 15 NOV 69. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THERE WILL BE A LARGE SCALE PHASE DOWN OF USAF PERSONNEL AT PLEIKU BEGINNING ON OR ABOUT 1 DEC 69 AND CONTINUING UNTIL THE BASE IS TURNED OVER TO THE VNAF IN JULY 70. MOST UNITS ARE TAKING CUTS IN ASSIGNED STRENGTH AT THIS TIME. FOR EXAMPLE, THE 633 CMS WILL BE REDUCED BY 200 PEOPLE BETWEEN NOW AND 15 DEC 69. AS THE UNITS ARE DECREASED IT BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO PROVIDE AUGMENTEES FOR BASE SECURITY FORCES DURING HIGH THREAT PERIODS. WE HAVE BEEN ASKED UNOFFICIALLY TO PROVIDE PERIMETER DEFENSE TEAMS AND I HAVE REFUSED BUT IT IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT, SINCE WE ARE THE THIRD LARGEST UNIT ON BASE, WE WILL BE TASKED WITH SUPPORT BASE DEFENSE.
2. IN ADDITION TO THE USAF REDUCTIONS THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT GROUND FORCES CHARGED WITH SECTOR DEFENSE AROUND PLEIKU PROPER HAVE BEEN OR WILL BE EITHER SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED OR WITHDRAWN. THE THIRD ARVN RANGER UNIT HAS ALREADY BEEN TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER AREA. THEY HAD FORMERLY BEEN TASKED WITH THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTHEASTERN SECTOR OF THE PLEIKU DISTRICT.
3. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES HAVE INDICATED A VERY LARGE BUILDUP OF NVA/VC FORCES WITHIN A 25 KILOMETER RADIUS OF PLEIKU AB. BESIDES THE THREAT OF ROCKET/MORTAR ATTACKS THERE IS NOW AN INCREASED THREAT OF SAPPER ACTIVITY OR EVEN OF ATTACKS BY LARGER FORCES. LOCAL SECURITY ESTIMATES ARE THAT BASE DEFENSE CAPABILITY IS NOW AT THE LOWEST LEVEL SINCE 1965 WHILE THE IMMEDIATE THREAT IS AT ITS HIGHEST LEVEL.
4. WE ARE NOW SUPPORTING BASE SECURITY FORCES WITH ASSISTANCE IN REBUILDING PERIMETER DEFENSE POSITIONS. WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT PROVIDE AUGMENTEES FOR PERIMETER GUARDS.
5. IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT THERE IS VERY LITTLE IN WRITING CONCERNING REDUCTIONS, MOVEMENTS, ETC. ALMOST ALL OF THIS INFORMATION IS WORD-OF-MOUTH BUT FROM RELIABLE SOURCES I.E., CHIEF OF SECURITY POLICE, COR, 633 CAMRON, ETC.
BT

SAVK

[redacted]

[redacted]

/PRIORITY/
SSN [redacted]
[redacted]
FM [redacted](SSLO)
TO 7SN/[redacted]
INFO 7SN/[redacted]
7SN/[redacted]
7ET 1 [redacted]
7SN/7ET 2, [redacted]

7SN/
[redacted] CHANNELS USAFSS PRIVACY SSLO NOV 69.
DELIVER FIRST DUTY HOUR
SUBJ: RELOCATION OF 7ET TWO
REF YOUR [redacted] PARAGRAPH THREE M
1. THE PLANS ACTION OFFICER INFORMS THAT NOTHING FIRM CAN BE PLANNED UNTIL PANAMA BASE AUTHORITIES DETERMINE THIER CAPABILITIES TO ACCEPT EC-135S. THIS IS TO BE RECEIVED 28 NOV. THEREAFTER SEVENTH AIR FORCE WILL HOLD A SERIES OF PLANNING MEETINGS. THIS NOTHING EVEN TENTATIVE CAN BE FORETOLD UNTIL THE END OF THIS MONTH AT THE EARLIEST. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES CAN PANAMA RECEIVE EC-135S UNTIL THE AC-135S LEAVE (15 DECEMBER). HOWEVER, NEED TO PREPARE PANAMA TO ACCEPT EC-135S PLUS [redacted] CONSIDERATIONS MAY WELL SLIP THE MOVE UNTIL MARCH 1970.

2. A SEVENTH AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE DIRECTS PANAMA TO PREPARE FOR A NUMBER (BELIEVE THIRTEEN) OF C-135S EXPECTED FROM THE 71 IN THE LATTER PART OF NEXT YEAR. UNOFFICIALLY, HAVE LEARNED THE WING ALSO WISH TO MOVE A WING THERE. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THIS WILL FORCE PANAMA COMMANDER TO REPORT HE CANNOT SUPPORT ANY EC-135S UNLESS ACTIONS ARE TAKEN TO REMOVE OTHER KINDS OF AIRCRAFT OR TO CONSTRUCT RAMP SPACE, ETC. SEVENTH AIR FORCE DOES NOT VIEW CONSTRUCTION FAVORABLE AT THIS TIME EVEN THOUGHT AUTHORIZED UNDER CURRENT MACV RULES.

3. PLANNERS HERE RECOGNIZE THAT MOVING SIX AIRCRAFT SOON FROM RICHI TO PANAMA, THEN LATER CLOSING RICHI AND MOVING RESIDUAL TO OKI CAT, AND THEN STILL LATER TRANSFERRING SOME RESOURCES FROM OKI CAT TO PANAMA TO BUILD UP THE SIX OPERATION LOCATION INTO A [redacted] UNIT INVITES CONFUSION, HARASSES LOCAL MANAGEMENT AND MAY LEAD TO REDUCED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. THEREFORE, THE SEVENTH PLANNING ACTION OFFICER STATES HE WOULD LOOK FAVORABLY ON A PLAN WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE NUMBER OF MOVES AND LESSEN THE CHANCES AND

[redacted]

5 for 17/06582 Document 46
CCN 0595

THE KEY TO SUCH A [illegible] IS TO DELAY THE MOVE TO NA[redacted] CLOSES, THUS ALLOWING ONLY ONE PERIOD OF MOVEMENT IN WHICH PLEIKU RESOURCES COULD BE SPLIT AMONG OR BETWEEN A COMBINATION OF DANANG, PHU CAT AND NAKON PHANOM.

4. OF CONCERN TO INTELLIGENCE, OPERATIONS AND PLANS DIRECTORS IS THE LACK OF A MACV STATED FORMAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE FUTURE. INCREASINGLY THE COMMAND SECTION IS QUESTIONING THIS POINT. MACV PLANS TO CALL A GROUP TOGEATHER SHORTLY TO LOOK THREE YEARS IOE THE FUTURE AND, HOPEFULLY, FORMULATE A REQUIREMENTS STATEMENT. (SSO MACV 1500757 ONLY TO DACSOTYSON REFERS) USAFSS DESIRES IN THIS TIMEFRAME, SHOULD BE KNOWN BY SEVENTH AIR FORCE PRIORO TO THIS MEETING.

5. UNKNOWN HERE ARE MACV'S INTENTIONS REGARDING NKP, UDORN AND NORTH LAOS. WITH RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL ALR-34 ACE, SIX MORE EC-47 (ALR-3?), AND AN INCREASING NUMBER OF ZULU AIRCRAFT (THROUGH FIELD MODIFICATION) MACV MAY WELL ALTER EMPHASIS IN SEVENTH AIR FORCE ARDF TASKING.

6. SEVENTH PLANS OFFICER STATED THAT IT WOULD APPEAR MOST LOGICAL FOR ALL PLANNING TO WAIT UNTIL THE FOLLOWING ARE KNOWN:
A. DANANG CAPABILITY.
B. MACV STATED THREE YEAR REQUIREMENTS.
C. AIR FORCE/PACAF/SEVENTH AIR FORCE DESIRES FOR NKP AND COMMANDO FORCE. FOR INSTANCE, IS IT AIR FORCE POLICY TO FREEZE ARMY ARDF OUT OF LAOS?
D. NKP CAPABILITY (INCLUDING THAI GOVERNMENT AND MACTHAI CONSTRAINTS).
E. 846/690A CAPABILITY TO OPERATE IN VARIOUS POSTURES FROM VARIOUS AREAS IN FUTURE TIMEFRAMES WITH RESOURCES/ACE THEN HELD.
F. EXPECTED TENURE OF PHU CAT AND ITS CAPABILITY UNTIL THEN.
G. IMPACT OF ??? REDUCTIONS ON BOTH FRONT AND BACK END CAPABILITY.
7. ONLY WHEN PARA SIX QUESTIONS ARE ANSWERED OFFICIALLY TO SEVENTH BY PACAF AND OTHERS CAN THE PLANNERS GIVE US ANYTHING BUT TEMPORARY MAKESHIFT SUPPORT IN THEIR OPINION.

8. REALIZE THE ABOVE ASKS MORE QUESTIONS THAN IT ANSWERES, BUT SEVENTH'S BIGGEST PROBLEM IS THAT PACAF AND MACV APPEAR TO BE PLANNING INDEPENDENTLY WITH AN UNKNOWN SEA POSTURE AS A FINAL GOAL. WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED AS THINGS CLARIFY AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADVANCED INFO YOU CAN SUPPLY.
9??

[redacted]

IHS 05

[redacted]

Document 4

19 Nov

8

IHS 3073
RR YKRCIH
DE YKRCZI
ZUI YKRCIC SVC024/305 3231147 ZUK
DE YKRCZI 92 3236639
R 192043Z
FM 6994SCTYSQ
TO PACSCTYRGN/OPS/LOG
6922SCTYWG/OPS/MAT
6994SCTYSQ/CDR/SSLO
DET 2 6994 SCTYSQ/CDR
BT

TOR 2243Z

CCN 6715

[redacted] CHANNELS ONLY
REF MY CDR 192043Z NOV
1. THE FOLLOWING MSG FM 366TFW CDR TO 7AF IS QUOTED.
QUOTE
192001Z
PRIORITY
[redacted]
SUBJECT: 362 TEWS OPERATING LOCATION (U).
1. REFERENCE YOUR MSG 191041Z NOV 69, SAME SUBJECT.
2. COMMENTS ARE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTION:
A. THE 4SOS AND 12SOS WILL LEAVE DANANG PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF THE 362 TEWS AND 6994SS.
B. THAT AIR CONDITIONED QUARTERS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR THE ENLISTED PERSONNEL OF 6994 SS, BUT ARE REQUIRED FOR 10 ENLISTED PERSONNEL OF THE 362 TEWS. THE 37 OFFICERS OF THE 362 TEWS WILL [illegible] AIR CONDITIONED QUARTERS.
C. IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO BILLET THE 6994SS ENLISTED PERSONNEL ON THE WESTSIDE OF DANANG AB.
3. COMMENTS:
A. PERSONNEL. QUARTERS ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE COMBINED 42 OFFICERS, 157 ENLISTED AND 1 CIVILIAN.
B. TRANSPORTATION. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 1 MB-4, AIRCRAFT TOWING TRACTOR, NO ASSETS ARE AVAILABLE DANANG AB TO FILL THE TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE 2 UNITS.
C. CIVIL ENGINEERING.
(1) REVETMENTS AVAILABLE FOR 8 AIRCRAFT.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

SECURITY [illegible]

ONLY. NEW CONSTRUCTION WILL BE REQUIRED. POSSIBILITY OF USING MINI-GYMS OR QUONSETS IF AVAILABLE. 2 QUONSETS MAY BE AVAILABLE DANANG AB FOR RELOCATION.

(3) REMAINING FACILITY REQUIREMENTS CAN BE MET BY RELOCATING PRESENT UNIT [illegible].

C. COMMUNICATIONS.

(1) REFERENCE 3A(4).

(A) WHAT EQUIPMENT FOR UHF/HF REQUIREMENT WILL BE FURNISHED BY THE 362 TEWS?

(B) WHERE IS THE RCC LOCATED?

(2) REFERENCE 3B(4). WILL THE 6994 SS PROVIDE THE [illegible]?

(3) UPON REPLY TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS, 1960SG (3RD) WILL DETERMINE AND FORWARD CAPABILITY TO MEET REQUIRED SERVICE. [illegible]. UNQUOTE

DURING MEETING ON

2. MSG NOT COORDINATED WITH THIS UNIT. [illegible] BASE PROPOSED SOLVING THE BILLETING PROBLEM BY EXPANDING EXISTING UTILIZATION OF OUR TWO MODULUX BARRACKS TO INCLUDE [illegible]. THE OTHER 52 TO BE BILLETED ON EAST SIDE OF BASE.

3. PARA 3C(2) ABOVE MSG. THE STOP GAP CAPABILITY THEY REFER TO [illegible] QUONSET. MINI-GYMS ARE THE MODULUX TYPE STRUCTURES. TWO QUONSETS THEY REFER TO ARE PRESENTLY [illegible] BY INFORMATION OFFICE AND JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL. THESE FUNCTIONS WILL SOON BE MOVED TO PRESENT WING HQ WHEN WING HQ BLDG COMPLETED APPROX 1[illegible] DEC.

4. ABOVE MSG RESPONDS ONLY TO [illegible] 191[illegible] FOR SIX ACFT [illegible]. THEY OF COURSE DO NOT HAVE ANY IDEA OF CONTENTS OF PSR [illegible] 1[illegible]1692 OR OF ANY OTHER PLANS FOR DANANG/PLEIKU/PHU CAT.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Document 11, TOR 03/2005 (8)

CCN 98

[illegible]
[illegible]
//ROUTINE//
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[redacted] [illegible]
SUBJ: RELOCATION OF [illegible] TEMS/DET 2, [illegible]
[illegible] IS QUOTED FYI: QUOTE:
[illegible]
[illegible]
TO [illegible]
INFO: [illegible]
[illegible]
[redacted]
SUBJECT: RELOCATION OF [illegible] TEMS (U)
[illegible] 0001217 DEC [illegible] MOVE OF [illegible] TEMS FROM [illegible]
[illegible] HAS OCCURRED [illegible] DELAY [illegible] ADEQUATE TIME TO STUDY THE
[illegible] TO [illegible] (UNIT) TO PROVIDE [illegible]
MOST SUITABLE LOCATION FOR THE UNIT. UNQUOTE.
[illegible]
[illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]

16/0800Z

Document 49

PRIORITY
PRIORITY

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ

USAFSS/LSO/LME/TDA/TDD/TAD

INFO: PACSCTYRGN/LOG

6922SCTYWG/IME/OPS

6994SCTYSQ/MAT/OPS

[redacted] MAT Oct 69

Ref LOG-MP 141105 Oct 69 and Det CBR 050825Z Oct 69 and Det 2 MAT 0?0055Z Oct 69. 633rd Host Base arranged for Base C-47 to go to Ba/Phu Bai to remove additional aircraft parts and Det 2 MAT sent a technician along to assist in recovery of consoles. However, our technician found two of the consoles missing (1 ea Z console S/N 31 and 1 ea Y console S/N 53). The other Z console S/N 13 and the X console were still in the aircraft although it was evident that unidentified personnel had tried to move them and had taken several inverters and a power supply from the consoles. However, the recording racks and internal mount plates from the missing consoles were left on the aircraft. In similar fashion, a large part of the aircraft electronic systems had been removed as well as some of the

16 Oct 69

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Capt Wallace 3738

[redacted]

THOMAS S. WALLACE, Capt, USAF
MATERIEL OFFICER

[redacted]

MAT 69-555

MAT FILE COPY

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PRIORITY
PRIORITY

Capt Wallace

Capt Wallace

instruments, etc. We have sent a message to the 6903th requesting their assistance in locating the missing consoles but have not yet discovered their whereabouts. We have also queried the 460th S.W. to see if they had removed any equipment without advising us with negative results. It appears that shortly after the guards were withdrawn, the Army entered the wreckage and removed anything of even remote use. Of the consoles recovered, the X console has been returned to Sanders for overhaul and the Z console is still on station but needs an overhaul. A line filter has been cannibalized from Z console S/N 13 to fill our NORS 21-69 request.

Part II: All items of AIR-35 equipment initially recovered have been repaired and made serviceable with the exception of the antenna preamps which were NRTS. The serviceable assets with the exception of the cable harness were turned into Supply. Some of the G equipment was made serviceable but 3 ea G133's, 2 ea G175's, 2 ea G176's, 1 ea G124B and 1 ea G1863 were returned to TEMCO for overhaul.

Part III: We will continue to try and recover the consoles but the chances seem slim. It is apparent that no other agency took

[redacted]

2-3

AIR-69-35

[redacted]

PRIORITY
PRITOKEY Capt Wallace Capt Wallace 3738

action in response to our CDR message of the 3rd nor were we notified that action was not going to be taken as recommended.

Part IV: Additionally, we have 1 ea Z1 and 1 ea Z2 console, serviceable for installation in ACFT 402 upon its return from Correction Control.

GP-4

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED EFTO

Document 5c

ROUTINE
ROUTINE

DET 2, 6994TH SCTYSQ

6994SCTYSQ/1AT

UNCLASS E F T O OCT 69 MAT FOR CAPT REESE

SUBJECT: Missing Consoles from Aoft 959

For your information, my discussions with Major Possin, Officer In Charge of the 808th at Phu Bai indicates that the Army CID is investigating the missing consoles. Additionally, we have sent unclassified pictures of the Y and Z consoles for the CID's information.

MAT FILE COPY

25
Oct 69
1 1

Capt Wallace 3738

THOMAS C. WALLACE, Capt, USAF
MATERIEL OFFICER

UNCLASSIFIED EFTO

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F.16.2.2

[redacted]

06/0615Z

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ROUTINE
ROUTINE

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ

USAFSS/LLA

INFO: PACSCTYRGN/LOG-LP/WHEELER AFB, HAWAII

6922SCTYWG/MAT/CLARK AFB, PI

6994SCTYSQ/MAT

MAT FILE COPY

[redacted] MAT Nov 69

SUBJECT: Missing Z and Y Console on Acft 959

We are advised by the 8 RR, FS, at Phu Bai that the Army CID personnel have found the "Y" and "Z" consoles, three of the five "backend" chairs and the Nav table/console. The 362nd and 633rd have been advised and they are trying to have the base C-47 pick up the equipment. The 8 RR, FS is presently storing this equipment. Condition unknown at this time. GP-4

[redacted] 6 Nov 69

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Capt Wallace 3738

THOMAS G. WALLACE, Capt, USAF
MATERIEL OFFICER

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ROUTINE
ROUTINE

10/0455Z

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ/PLEIKU AB, RVN

USAFSS/LGO

INFO: PACSCTYRGN/LOG-LS/WHEELER AFB, HAWAII

6922SCTYSQ/MME/CLARK AB, PI

6994SCTYSQ/MME/TAN SON NHUT AB, RVN

HAGTIR/NASHUA, NH

[redacted] MAT Nov 69

SUBJECT: Missing Consoles on Acft 959

Both the "Z" and "Y" consoles have been recovered. Both are in rather bad shape as they were apparently converted to storage lockers by person or persons unknown. We will ship all consoles back to the Sanders. The Nav Console/Table was also recovered and will return this also. Pls advise if you desire other action.

GP-4

[redacted]

9
Nov 69
1 1

Capt Wallace 3758

THOMAS C. WALLACE, Capt, USAF
MATERIEL OFFICER

[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted] MAT

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Mini Mod Test

Ref my MAT 210841Z July 69, NORS msg 210738Z, PSR msg 161815Z and my MAT 150830Z Jul 69. We still have one Mini Mod out of commission in a NORS status for a 16K computer and, as of 26 July 69, for a Null T as well. We had previously been down two (2) Mini Mods but have received one computer, SN 101, since that time. However, with both a Null-T and a computer back ordered NORS, it will not, repeat not, be possible to meet 1 August test date with three Mini Mods in commission. One Mini Mod will be out of commission for at least three weeks. Therefore, recommend that start date for Mini Mod Test be delayed until 1 September 69. It is extremely unlikely we will have all three Mini Mods in commission prior to that time. Pls advise, also coordination with 6922 will be necessary if date is delayed.

28 Jul 69

CP-4

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Capt Wallace 3738

THOMAS G. WALLACE, Capt, USAF
Material Officer

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#7

MAT 69

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IHA215
//ROUTINE//
SSN 025
140330Z
FM DET 2 6994SCTYSQ
TO 6994SCTYSQ/OPS
ZEM

[redacted]

Document 56.
14/0910Z

[redacted]

[redacted] OPS SEP 69
SUBJ: MINI-MOD TEST.
REF SSO VACV MAC 11036 INTER DTG: 12/0953Z
1. RECEIVED ADDITIONAL ALLOCATED TEST FREQUENCIES AND USED 45.15MHZ EXTENSIVELY ON TEST FLOWN 13 SEP 69. HOWEVER, WISH TO POINT OUT THAT FREQ OF 57.45MHZ IS OF LITTLE USE FOR TEST PURPOSES SINCE WE CANNOT DF ABOVE 50MHZ ANYWAY. DO NOT FEE IT IS NECESSARY TO PROCURE REPLACEMENT FREQ AS TWO (35.95MHZ AND 45.15MHZ) SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT FOR TEST PURPOSES.
12

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[redacted]

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Document 57

PRIORITY

DET 2, 6994 SCTSQ/PLEIKU AB, VIETNAM

6994 SCTSQ/MAT/TAN SON NHUT AB, VIETNAM

INFO: PACSCTYRCH/OPS-LOG/WHEELER AFB, HAWAII

6922 SCTWG/MAT/CLARK AFB, PI

[redacted] MAT

SUBJECT: Mini-Mod Test

Ref my msg MAT 150C30Z Jul 69 and PACSCTYRCH msg 161815Z Jul 69.

A Mini Mod Test will be performed by Det 2, 6994th Scty Sq in coordination with the 362nd TEWS. The start date for the test will be 1 August 69, providing that there are three (3) Mini Mod aircraft available; two (2) to satisfy MACV tasking requirements and one (1) for the test itself. It is understood that our tasking will be reduced by one (1) Mini Mod during the test period.

1. Objective: To determine the DF capability of the Mini Mod in the VHF band. The following specific factors will be checked:

a. Maximum standoff range against transmitted signals varying from 5W to one watt.

21 Jul 69

1

Capt Wallace 3758

THOMAS G. WALLACE, Capt, USAF
Materiel Officer

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

PRIORITY Capt Wallace Capt Wallace 3738

b. Sensitivity of DF system compared to C-175J receivers in the "Z" positions.

c. Effects of weather at various ranges and output power settings.

d. Minimum length of time required for a signal to be acquired and fixed.

2. Test Equipment: One Mini Mod aircraft and a locally controlled ground station transmitting on 35.95 MHz. The ground station includes:

a. FM 622 receiver/transmitter with a variable power output from one to ten (10) watts.

b. A vertically polarized antenna.

3. Procedures: One Mini Mod aircraft will be defragged for a period of five (5) days commencing 1 Aug 69. The test may be completed prior to the end of this period but weather factors must be taken into consideration. The test aircraft will be thoroughly checked out by Sandare Tech Reps prior to each day's test. The crew will be thoroughly briefed prior to each day's test. Secure communication air/ground/air will be used through Hostin Pad as required. The following basic flight procedure will

[redacted]

[redacted]

be utilized:

1. Attenuators

(a. The aircraft will fly a straight line pattern at approximately 9500 ft altitude, starting and finishing at 25 NM at standoff from the ground station. When the ground site is directly off off the wing, the standoff range will be 5 NM. A minimum of 12 IOPS, approximately 10 degrees apart, will be taken. The following specific tests will be performed using the above pattern.

(1) The aircraft will make one or more DF runs with the ground site putting out one (1), five (5) and ten (10) watts. This basic test will be attempted in both good and poor weather conditions as determined locally.

(2) Purpose is to check accuracy and capability of the Mini Mod on various signal strengths (i.e. power output). Effects of weather may also be calulated somewhat.

b. The aircraft will look onto the signal at approximately six miles standoff using the straight line pattern and the time required to fix the target from look on will be determined.

2.

(1) Purpose is to determine length of time to look on and fix a given signal (Athirty degree spread is required

[redacted] [redacted]

for a fix).

c. With an output of one (1) watt, the aircraft will fly a straight line DF pattern beginning at 5 NM and continuing away from the ground site until the DF system becomes erratic.

(1) DF cuts will be taken every zero-point-five (0.5) NMs and the maximum distance at which the system is capable will be recorded.

(2) The aircraft will continue to fly away from the transmitter until the signal becomes unreadable on the Z1/Z2 positions.

(3) This procedure will be reversed with the aircraft flying back toward the station.

(4) Purpose is to determine "Z" position sensitivity versus the DF system.

4. Data requirements for each test will include, but not be limited to:

a. Ground station output

b. Location of Doppler Zero Point (DZP)

c. Doppler correction after each phase of a test.

d. Weather conditions

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. Acf't altitude.

5. Request that knowledgeable individual from 6922nd be sent TDY to observe test and assist in our analysis. Data derived from the tests will be analyzed after each flight, recorded and forwarded after the completion of the test to 6994th Scty Sq for complete analysis and distribution.

GP-4

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Document 58

PRIORITY
PRIORITY

27 0720Z

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ/PLEIKU AB, VIETNAM

WRAMA/WRNT/ROBBINS AFB, GA

INFO: USAFSS/LSM

USAF DIRECTOR OF AEROSAPCE SAFETY (AFIDI-AS2),

NORTON AFB, CALIF

AFLC/ATTN: MCMT/WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB, OHIO

PACSCTYRGN /LOG M/WHEELER AFB, HAWAII

6922SCTYWG/MAT/CLARK AFB, PI

[redacted] MAT/TAN SON NHUT AB, VIETNAM

[redacted] MAT Oct 69

SUBJECT: EUR

The following EUR is submitted IAW T.O. 00-35D-54

A. M-Mission Failure

B. EC47P/N/Q, Nav Converter, 016-22-D000PWR Supply

C. FJ

D. A

E. 001-Spares 2   001-GAP 20

003 - Spares 1   MN001 GAP 12.

27
Oct 69

TSgt Cribbet   3738

[redacted]

[redacted] WALLACE, CAPT, USAF
OFFICER

[redacted]

414

~~T-69-349~~

MAT FILE COPY

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PRIORITY
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3738

aircraft. The power Supply assembly had overheated and in a bench check of the unit had an excessive ripple on all voltage outputs.

b. Unit failed on 17 Oct 69, SN MN003-12

Symptoms: The navigational inputs of aircraft position, heading, roll were being displayed erratically. The case of the converter was extremely hot. The power supply assembly was checked and the +5 volt output was 0 volts. The assembly had been extremely hot and had caused CR-17 to open.

c. Unit failed on 21 Oct 69, SN 007-GAP-17

Symptoms: A sensor fault message appeared whenever main function was initiated. The case of the converter was extremely hot. During a bench check of the converter, the power supply assembly +5 volt DC supply was 4.802 volts with 1.5 volts ripple. The +15VDC and -15VDC supplies also had 1.5 volts of ripple.

d. Unit fail on 22 Oct 69, SN 025-30

Symptoms: Improper erratic conversion of all navigational inputs (max roll was a constant 90 degree). The case of the converter was extremely hot. On a bench check the output of the +5VDC supply read +5.138V with 520M/V of ripple; the +15V supply read +15.09V with 520M/V of ripple; the -15V supply read -14.88V with 520M/V of

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PRIORITY
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3738

ripple. Tolerance on the +5VDC is 200 M/V maximum. Tolerance on the +15VDC is 50 M/V maximum. Tolerance on the -15VDC is 50 M/V maximum.

e. Unit failed on 24 oct 69, SN 001- Spares 2

Symptoms: After 30 minutes of flight the along course co-ordinate of the doppler, printer and displayed, began to disagree with the doppler dials and caused large across course corrections during Nav up dates. On bench check the power supply assy +5VDC read +4.87 volts with with 400 M/V of ripple, the +15VDC read +16.86 volts with 1000 M/V of ripple, the -15VDC read -15.02 volts with 350 M/V of ripple.

f. Unit failed 25 Oct 69, SN 003-Spares 1

Symptoms: After 30 minutes of flight the aircraft position data of along course and across course began to fluxuate and not follow the doppler dials. The case of the convertor was extremely hot. On bench check the +5VDC read +4.971V with 320 M/V of ripple; the +15VDC read +15VDC with 300 M/V of ripple and the -15VDC read -15.02VDC with 300 M/V of ripple. The conformative coating of both the A12 and A13 cards had turned a dark brown and the solder runs of A12,aR6 and R19 had melted from extreme heat.

U. N

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PRIROTY
PRIORITY

Capt Walk [redacted]

V. Recommendations: 1. A cooling fan be installed and holes drilled in the case of the converter to provide adequate cooling of the power supply assembly in the converter along with increased filtering to eliminate the ripple. 2. complete isolation via a separate power supply with sufficient cooling to prevent recurrence.

W. Units AMP no exhibit required.

X. Myron e. Cribbet, TSgt, Det 2, 6994Safty Sq. Duty Phone - 3738, barracks phone - 3967.

Y. Validation: Chief of Maintenance. Indications are that continued usage over a period of time causes power supply to break down. More failures can be expected with a commensurate problem in Supply keeping pace with our consumption.

Z. Items not under warranty.

GP-4

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

ROUTINE

Document 59 Stuart

CZCFJA581
RTTSZYUW RUHHWHA6584 3650047-SSSS--RUMLJFA.
ZNY SSSSS
R 310022Z DEC 69
FM PACSCTYRGN WHEELER AFB HAW
TO RUSQSNA/6994SCTYSQ MAT TSN AFLD RVNTION
INFO RUMLJGA/DET 1 6994SCTYSQ MAT PHU CAT RVN 699485
RUMLJFA/DET 2 6994SCTYSQ MAT PLEIKU AB RVN
RUMTEJA/USAFS LMM
RUMMWTA/6922SPT SQ MAT M CLARK AB PI
BT
[redacted] LOG-MPA
SUBJECT: G-133 RECEIVER MAINTENANCE. AN ANALYSIS ON THE G-133 RECEIVER, USING REPORT 5, HAS BEEN PERFORMED AND THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS EXTRACTED:
1. IN THE 6994 SCTY SQ COMPLEX A STEADY INCREASE FROM 162.2 MANHOURS IN JULY TO 592.5 MANHOURS IN OCT WAS NOTED. DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ ACCOUNTED FOR MOST OF THIS INCREASE. 56.9 HOURS IN JULY TO 415.0 HOURS IN OCT.
2. BASED ON THE ABOVE, AN ANALYSIS OF THIS RECEIVER AT THE 6994TH COMPLEX WAS PERFORMED REVEALING THE FOLLOWING: DET 2 ACCOUNTED FOR 42.9PCT OF THE TOTALG-133 MAINTENANCE PERFORMED IN THE RGN. IN ADDITION THEY ACCOUNTED FOR 46.6PCT

PAGE 2 RUHHWHA6584 [redacted]
OF REMOVE AND REPLACE ACTIONS, 45.8PCT OF BENCH CHECK AND REPAIRED, 35.2PCT OF ACTIONS WITH HOW MALFUNCTION CODE "NO DEFECT," AND 80.6PCT OF ACTIONS WITH HOW MALFUNCTIONS "NO OUTPUT."
3. OUR RECORDS DO NOT SHOW THAT DET 2 HAS ANY MORE G-133 RECEIVERS THAN ANY OTHER TO MAKE THIS GREAT AMOUNT OF DIFFERENCE. THEY CONSUME ALMOST TWICE AS MANY MANHOURS PER UNIT OF EQUIPMENT AND PER MISSION AS THE OTHER UNITS.
4. OF MAJOR CONCERN IS THAT DET 2, WITH 26.5PCT OF THE RGN G-133 INVENTORY, DOCUMENTED 46.6PCT OF ALL REMOVE AND REPLACE ACTIONS.
5. BASED ON DATA EXTRACTED, WE CANNOT DETERMINE WHY DET 2 IS EXPENDING SO MANY MANHOURS ON THIS RECEIVER. PERHAPS ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WILL IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC PROLBEM(S).
A. SINCE THIS UNIT HAS ALL OF THE EC-47Q TYPE A/C, COULD CABLING, POWER, ETC CAUSE REPETITIVE FAILURES?
B. ARE CERTAIN TRENDS ESTABLISHED ON PARTS BEING REPLACED THAT MAY REQUIRE ENGINEERING STUDY?
C. ARE TECHNICIANS ADEQUATELY TRAINED ON THE MAINTENANCE

PAGE 3 RUHHWHA6584 [redacted]
OF THIS EQUIPMENT?
D. ARE SUPERVISORS PERFORMING REQUIRED PRODUCTION INSPECTIONS?
E. IS TRAVEL TIME TO AND FROM THE JOB INCLUDED IN THE MANHOURS DOCUMENTED AGAINST THE G-133? IF SO, WHAT IS THE AVERAGE MANHOURS PER ACTION FOR TRAVEL TIME? [redacted]

MAT 69-496

[redacted]

File: 12

12/06202 Document 60

ROUTINE

DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ/MAT

6994 SCTY SQ/MAT

[redacted]MAT.

Ref PSR LOG-MPA 310022Z DEC 69. Subject G-133 Receiver Maintenance. The following information is submitted to assist you in analyzing the G-133 maintenance at Det 2.

1. In late August and throughout September and October we were experimenting with a new 100 hour phase procedure on the EC-47 aircraft. This entailed a right side Z and Y console power-on phase as well as a power-on phase of the X console. After some experimentation, the basic approach was to use a signal generator (606) to imput a signal into the HF and VHF cables and record actual values at the receivers, then input the 606 directly into the receiver. The purpose was to not only check the actual performance of the receiver but also to verify the cabling, etc on the right side. A good many minor (slightly less than specifications) malfunctions were noted during September and October with both the cables and receivers, hence the large increase in "Off Equipment" and "On

12 1420
JAN 1970
1 3

3738

Captain Wallace

THOMAS G. WALLACE, Captain, USAF
Materiel Officer

[redacted]

MAT 70-20

5

[redacted]

Equipment, Fail" in September and October. This has dwindled in November and December as can be noted from the Report #5 as the aircraft were brought up to a higher standard of performance.

2. The reports also show a large increase in manhours for "Off Equipment, Non Fail" in October and November which is attributable to the fact that as our technicians became more experienced using the signal generator and realizing that their "ear" was not as good a standard as the 606, they began removing and replacing G-133's and running them through the shop instead of just using CND on the flight line when dealing with audio type problems. It should be noted that the 606 signal generator is too bulky and sensitive to use as a flightline piece of test equipment for routine writeups. A high portion of these receivers were in fact satisfactory during the shop checkout and hence the high "Off Equipment, Non Fail" rate.

3. As the entire fleet was brought up to the higher standard, our "weak" and "audio" writeups were reduced and a signal generator not necessary, as reflected by the drop in these categories on December's Report #5.

4. We fully realize that it would be preferable to use some type of signal generator on the flightling rather than the, at times, needless R&R actions noted during November and December, however the 606 is unsuitable as noted above. We are presently exploring the possibilities of a unit the size of a model 200CD with sufficient frequency coverage for our needs.

[redacted]

MAT 70-20

5. The large increases in C-133 manhour consumption are therefore primarily due to an attempt to raise the flightline standard of our 133's to what is really a shop standard.

6. As to the "How Malf" codes, we do routinely have a high number of " "No defect" actions which do not recur. As to the "No Output, Incorrect Output" code, this is an internal problem and will be remedied as it appears the technicians are not describing the malfunctions as fully as they should, but rather generally using "255" on any type of audio writeup.

7. The following specific answers are provided to your referenced questions:

a. No.

b. No.

c. Extremely well qualified.

d. Yes.

e. Yes, approximately twenty minutes on a work order for travel both ways.

8. Greatly appreciate your interest and concern.

GP-1.

[redacted]

19/0832Z

Document 61
H-4211

ROUTINE

NNNNCZCFJA543
RTTSZYUW RUHHWHA4061 3230155-SSSS--RUMLJFA.
ZNY SSSSS
R 190126Z NOV 69
FM PACSCTYRGN WHEELER AFB HAWAII
TO RUSQSNA/6994SCTYSQ MAT TSN AB RVN
RUMLJFA/DET 2 6994SCTYSQ MAT PLEIKU AB RVN
INFO RUMMWTA/6922STPSQ MAT CLARK AB PI
BT
[redacted] L/OG MPA
SUBJ: ALR-35 COMPUTERS
THE COMBAT COUGAR PROGRAM IS STILL EXPERIENCING NUMEROUS FAILURES IN THE COMPUTER AND THE MISSION IS BEING IMPARIED. INFORMATION FROM SANDERS AND NORTRONICS INDICATES HARD FAILURES OF THE COMPUTER ARE RANDOM IN NATURE. DURING THE PERIOD MAY THROUGH AUGUST (16) COMPUTERS ERE RETURNED FROM SEA. 9 OF THESE COMPUTER FAILURES WAS DUE TO PHYSICAL HANDLING. AFTER STUDYING THE INDIVIDUAL REPORTS FOR THE (16) COMPUTERS THAT WERE RETURNED DURING THE MAY-AUG TIME FRMAE THE FOLLOWING IS APPARENT. THE COMPUTERS ARE BEING MISHANDLED, DIRTY, AND SOME EVEN HAD GRAVEL INSIDE. ASD RECOMMENDS THAT A FILED REPRESENTATIVE FROM NOTRONICS BE

ACTION
INFO

PAGE 2 RUHHWHA4061 [redacted]
SENT TO SEA TO ASSIT IN FIELD OPERATIONS AND COLLECT INFORMATION. THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY NORTONICS TO PROVIDE PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT.
A. PROVIDE A THERMAL AND VIBRATION BURN-IN CYCLE ON ALL NEW AND REPARIED COMPUTERS.
B. MODIFICED POWER SUPPLY WIRING TO REDUCE NOISE PICK-UP.
C. CHANGED POWER SUPPLY SWITCHING TRANSISTORS.
D. DEVEOPLED MORE STRINGENT TEST PROCEDURES IN THE FINAL TEST AREA. MAXIMUM SUPPORT IN THE CARE AND HANDLING, AREA WILL IMPROVE THE ALR-35 COMPUTER PROBLEMS. REQUEST YOU TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES TO INSURE COMPUTERS ARE PROPERLY HANDLED AND PREPARED FOR SHIPMENT. GP-1
BT
4061

[redacted]

MAT 69-414

NNNN

PRIORITY [redacted]

NNNN

CZCFJA927
PTTSZYUW RUSQSNA0876 3381044-SSSS--RUMLJFA.
ZNY SSSSS
P 040822Z DEC 69
FM 6994SCTYSQ TSN AB RVN
TO RUHHWHA/PACSCTYRGN/LOG WHEELER AFB HAW
RUMLJFA/DET 2 6994SCTYSQ/MAT/CDR PLEIKU AB RVN
INFO RUMMMTA/6922SPTSQ/MAT CLARK AB PI
BT
[redacted] CDR DEC 69
(DELIVER DURING FIRST DUTY HOURS) SUBJ: COMPUTERS.
REF: A. WRNT 281515Z NOV 69
B. WRNT 281516Z NOV 69
C. WRNT 282056Z NOV 69
D. WRNT 282057Z NOV 69
E. DET 2 6994SS CDR 030723Z DEC 69 (NOTAL)
WE ARE CONDUCTING A THROUGH EXAMINATION OF COMPUTER DAMAGE TO ITEMS SHIPPED FROM DET 2. PLEIKU IS IN A DUSTY/DIRTY AREA AND EQUIPMENT INSTALLED ON AIRCRAFT WILL NATURALLY BECOME DIRTY AND GRIMY DURING THE COURSE OF OPERATION. THERE ARE SEVERAL HOLES IN THE COMPUTER WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR COOLING. IF DUST AND DIRT ARE CAUSING DAMAGE, SUGGEST DESIGN CHANGES/PLASTIC CASES BE ENGINEERED TO PRECLUDE THIS. WE HAVE NO FACILITIES AVAILABLE FOR

ACTION 6994
INFO

MAT 69-455

REMOVING ALL DIRT FROM COMPUTERS. BROKEN SEALS CAN HARDLY BE CLASSED AS DAMAGE AS THEY MUST BE BROKEN TO EXCHANGE MODULES DURING COURSE OF NORMAL REPAIR. ANY EQUIPMENT EXCHANGED INHSP AIRCRAFT WITH ANY REGULEMITY AS COMPUTERS ARE WILL BE SUBJECT TO SOME SCRATCHES AND NICKS AND THIS WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ELIMINATE ENTIRELY. WE HAVE DIRECTED THAT PROPER HANDLING AND PACKING BE STRESSED BY ALL CONCERNED WITH THE MAINT/SUPPLY OIC/NCOIC INSPECTING EACH COMPUTER PRIOR TO PACKING FOR ANY DAMAGE OR DIRT. IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL OF THIS SQUADRON WOULD MISHANDLE ANY TYPE OF ELECTRONIC GEAR. THE COMPUTERS ARE BEING REPACKED AND SHIPPED IN ORIGINAL CONTAINERS. FOR DET 2 THE MAINTENANCE OFFICERS OF THIS SQUADRON WILL INSPECT EACH INCOMING COMPUTER FOR DAMAGE AND REPORT IT TO THIS HEADQUARTERS. PHOTOGRAPHS OF DAMAGE WILL ACCOMPANY THIS REPORT. IN ADDITION, REQUEST SANDERS TECH REP BE PRESENT DURING OPENING/PACKING OF COMPUTERS/MODULES. GP-4
BT
0876 [redacted]

NOZOFJA878
EZYUW RUHHWHA1844 3380323-EEEE--RUMJFA.
EEEEE.
A 040127Z DEC 69
FM PACSCTYRGN WHEELER AFB HAWAII
TO AIG 5510
BT

ROUTINE

Document 63

UNCLAS E F T O LOG-L
SUBJ: LATERAL ASSISTANCE FOR NORS ITEMS.
1. PSR SUP 1 TO USAFSSR 67-11 IS BEING RESCINDED AND NEW PROCEDURES WILL BE DISTRIBUTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IN THE INTERIM THE FOLG PROCEDURES WILL APPLY: UNITS WILL REQUEST HOST SMC NORS CONTROL SECTION TO COMPLY WITH PACAFR 67-2 IN OBTAINING LATERAL ASSISTANCE, USING PACAF SNUD LISTING TO FULLEST EXTENT. LATERAL ASSISTANCE IN SUPPORT OF "G/ EQUIP WILL BE REQUESTED ONLY FR UNITS WITH FX ACCOUNTS. ITEM 12 OF NORS MSG WILL INCLUDE LATERAL ASSIST ACTION TAKEN. FOR 6988/6987SCTYGP SMO. USE PACAF SNUD LISTING TO DETERMINE LATERAL ASSIST CONTACTS AND INCLUDE ACTION TAKEN IN ITEM 12 OF NORS MSG.
2. REQUEST EA UNIT ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT NLT 11 DEC 69.
BT
1844

Received From Host Suppl

Sgt Haga[?] Msg sent to PSR 6 Dec 69 [initials]

4/18

CCN: 1080
of Document 64
3/09037
8

[redacted]

IHB018
RR YMRDIH
DE YHLAKZ 23 2420302
R 300140Z
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO 6924 SCTYSQ (COM)
DET 2, 6994 SECTYSQ (COM) [redacted]
USAFSS (TTP)
INFO YMZADLC/6922 SPTSQ [redacted]
6994 SCTYSQ (COM)
DET 1, 6921 SCTYWG (COM)
AFCD (DMCP/DMCC)
YADAOLC/6989 SPTSQ (COM)
ZEM
[redacted] COM-S
SUBJ: SECURE VOICE HOTLINE 6924SS/DET 10
REF: A. USAFSS TTP 142127Z AUG 69. (NOTAL).
B. PSR COM-S 230006Z AUG 69 (NOTAL).
C. USAFSS TTP 281835Z AUG 69 (NOTAL).
FOR DET 2 6994 SVTYSQ. REQUEST YOU SHIP TWO EACH KY-3S VIA ARMED FORCES COURIER SERVICE TO THE 6924 SCTYSQ, COMSEC ACCOUNT 616277. AUTHORITY FOR SHIPMENT IS REF "C" SHIPPING DIRECTIVE 69-3 FDDD00U-94/2-24-101 APPLIES. ADVISE ABOVE ADDEES OF SHIPPING INFO. FOR 6924 SCTYSQ. ADVISE RECEIPT OF THE ABOVE EQUIPMENT. ISSUE ON OF THE KY-3'S TO DET 10, 100TH SRW ON A HAND RECEIPT. INFORMATION AVAILABLE HEREHIS THAT THE 1972 COMM SQ HAS ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THIS EQUIP. ADVISE OF ANY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN SECURING SUBJ HOT LINE. FOR USAFSS: SHIPPING DIRECTIVE ASSIGNED IN REF "A" WAS USED FOR SHIPMENT. SHIPPING UNIT DESIGNATOR WAS CHANGED TO COMPLY WITH NEW INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REF "C"
243

[redacted]

NNNN

#1

[redacted]

Document 65

[illegible]
[illegible] Y[illegible]ASI[illegible]
[illegible] YKLA[illegible] [illegible] 1[illegible]
[illegible] 17[illegible]
[illegible] PA[illegible]SCTY[illegible]
T[illegible] 6994 SCTYSQ
INFO [illegible] SCTY.[illegible]
[illegible] 1 6994 SCTYSQ
[illegible] 6994 SCTYSQ

[redacted] CHANNELS [illegible]

SUBJ: REMOVAL OF 6994 A/G/A COMM FACS.
REFERENCES: 1. 6994 SCTY SQ [illegible] NOV 69
2. [illegible] 21 [illegible] NOV 69

1. THE DECISION HAS BEEN MADE BY USAFSS AND CON- CURRED IN BY THIS HQ TO DEACTIVATE AND REMOVE THE SECURE VOICE A/G/A COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES AT 6994 SCTY SQ AND [illegible] 1 [illegible] 2. USAFSS HAS ALSO TAKEN ACTION [illegible] CANCEL FUTURE UHF/VHF CONVERSION [illegible] SITES SINCE, AS STATED, [illegible] HAS BEEN MADE [illegible] ILITIES ARE NO LONGER REQUIRED. IN VIEW OF THESE ACTIONS, [illegible] FACILITIES WILL BE REMOVED.

2. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT AFCS HAS ISSUED DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS FOR KY-[illegible] AT THESE SITES (REF [illegible]). ADDITIONALLY, WE HAVE REQUESTED [illegible] WITH THE REMOVAL OF AN/ARC-[illegible] RADIO EQUIPMENT. (THESE ARE [illegible] ASSETS). REQUEST [illegible] 1 TAKE ACTION [illegible] DISCONTINUE WEEKLY INSTALLATION [illegible] AT [illegible], 6994, SUBMIT [illegible] INSTALLED [illegible] FORM [illegible] DIRECTLY TO [illegible] EXECUTE AFTO FORM [illegible].

[illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]

ROUTINE [redacted]

NNNNCZCPJA372
RTTSZYUW RUHHWHA4763 3252033-SSSS--RUMLJFA.
ZNY SSSSS
R 210018Z NOV 69
FM PACSCTYRGN WHEELER AFB HAWAII
TO ZEN/PACGEEIARGN GEPOI WHEELER AFB HAWAII
ZEN/PACCOMMAREA XP WHEELER AFB HAWAII
RUWTEJA/AFCD DCSP
RUSOSNA/7AF DE TSN AB RVN
RUWTEJA/USAFSS TTP
RUSOSNA/6994SCTYSQ COM TSN AB RVN
RUMLJGA/DET 1 6994 SCTYSQ COM PHU CAT AB RVN
RUMLJFA/DET 2 6994 SCTYSQ COM PLEIKU AB RVN
RUMMWTA/6922 SPT SQ COM CLARK AB PI
BT
[redacted]

SUBJECT: REMOVAL OF KY-8/GRC-27 A/G/A FACILITIES AT 6994SS, DET 1, 6994SS AND DET 2 6994SS.

1. HQ USAFSS HAS MADE A DECISION TO DEACTIVATE AND REMOVE THE SECURE VOICE A/G/A FACILITIES AT 6994SS AND DETS 1 AND 2. DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS FOR KY-8'S WERE PROVIDED BY AFCD IN THEIR MSG DXCC 172105Z NOV 69 (NOTAL. PACCOMMAREA WILL PROVIDE DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS TO THE LOCAL AFCS SQUADRON FOR AN/GRC-

PAGE 2 RUHHWHA4763 [redacted]
27 RADIO EQUIPMENT.

2. IN VIEW OF USAFSS DECISION, THE SCFEL F84C61() PACKAGES PROGRAMMED UNDER AF FORM 524 CCN: USO-69-0209 ARE NO LONGER REQUIRED AND ARE TO BE DELETED FROM THE AF FORM 524 AND C-E SCHEME 3026AOKO-ZYZZ-9290 USING THIS MSG AS AUTHORITY.

3. FOR 6994 SS: REFUR. COMM 130248Z NOV 69. THE SUBMISSION OF AFTO FORM 89 FOR C-E SCHEME 3026AOKO WILL ACCOMPLISH THE NECESSARY NOT BE REQUIREMENT FOR DET 1 TO SUBMIT AN AF FORM 1146 SINCE THE FACILITIES ARE TO BE REMOVED.

4. FOR DET 1 6994SS: REQUEST YOU DISCONTINUE WEEKLY INSTALLATION PROGRESS REPORTING ON SCHEME 3026AOKO AND, IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, SUBMIT "USER INSTALLED" AFTO FOR 89 DIRECTLY TO PAC GEEIA RGN ON THIS SCHEME. IN ADDITION, EXECUTE AFTO FORM 89 WITHOUT THE 1983 COMM SQ ASSISTANCE AND DISTRIBUTE ACCORDING TO T O 31-1-8. ABOVE ACTIONS ARE TO PURGE SCHEME FROM GEEIA SYSTEM ONLY. GP-1.
BT
4763 [redacted]

ACTION 6994
INFO MDC 9118

Document 66
16 OPS 4679
MAT 69-424
ADM 69-301

[redacted]

DCN

1P[illegible]3925
[illegible]
[illegible] 1[illegible]
[illegible]
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO USAF[illegible]/TTP[illegible]
ASAPAC/IAPSIG
[illegible]
[illegible] SCTYSQ
DET 1 6990 SCTYSQ
DET 2 6990 SCTYSQ
[illegible] SCTYSQ
USNSGFS HAKATA
[illegible]
[redacted]
SUBJ: COMMAND [illegible] SUPPLY
ASAPAC HAS ADVISED [illegible] FURNISH [illegible] EQUIP-
MENT TO SATISFY [illegible] REQUIREMENT AT HAKATA, BUT IS
UNABLE TO PROVIDE [illegible] TO [illegible]
[illegible] WILL [illegible] FLEIKU, SINCE FLEIKU IS [illegible]
FOR CLOSURE APPROXIMATELY [illegible] TRAFFIC TO/FM [illegible]
2 CAN BE PASSED VIA [illegible] UNTIL ACTIVATION OF DET 1, 6990/[illegible]
[illegible] TRANS [illegible] SCHEDULED FOR [illegible] DET 2 [illegible] TRAFFIC
CAN THEN BE PASSED FROM DET [illegible] DET 1 FOR [illegible]
[illegible] TRANS FOR [illegible] ASAPAC HAS [illegible]
[illegible] KITS TO LOW-LEVEL TTY EQUIPMENT. [illegible] IS
[illegible] STORAGE AND STATION [illegible] LEVEL UNTIL [illegible]
IS COMPLETED.
FOR USAFSS: SUBJECT TO ASAPAC CONCURRENCE TO HANDLE DET 2,
[illegible] TRAFFIC AT [illegible] MENTIONED ABOVE,
REQUEST YOUR CONCURRENCE TO [illegible] FLEIKU ASN'S TO
HAKATA. SHIPPING DIRECTIVE REQUIRED. [illegible] WILL
[illegible] LINE FACILITY SHOULD REMAIN AT [illegible]
[illegible] FINAL DETERMINATION IS [illegible] FLEIKU.
[illegible] EXTRA TTY [illegible] LOW-LEVEL KITS [illegible]
FOR ASAPAC: REQUEST CONCURRENCE FOR DET 2, [illegible] TO PROCESS
[illegible] TRAFFIC VIA [illegible] UNTIL DET 1, 6990/[illegible]
[illegible] IS ACTIVATED. WITH USAFSS CONCURRENCE [illegible] FLEIKU
ASSETS AT HAKATA, REQUEST YOU ARRANGE FOR [illegible]
FOR USAFSS/ ASAPAC: SINCE TIME [illegible] TO ACTIVATE HAKATA [illegible]
IS EXTREMELY SHORT, AN EXPEDITIOUS REPLY WILL BE [illegible]

APPRECIATED.
[illegible]
[illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]

10472
2

0087

UNC 2230Z ... 17
... YNSU IR
... YMLAHH 1000 ...

... SCTY SQ
CO DET 1 6994TH SCTY SQ
CO DET 2 6994TH SCTY SQ
CO 6915TH SCTY SQ
[redacted] ... INT CHANNELS
...
FOR CO'S AND SIOO
SUBJ: COMMAND MERCURY SUPPORT (U)
THIS MSG IN TWO PARTS. PART ONE FOR RADSCTYSQ. ... SATISFY REQUIRE ...
1. THIS HQ HAS ACQUIRED SUFF ASR EQUIPS TO
... ACCORDINGLY.
... IMMEDIATE REACTIVATION OF CKT
... FILL/FLT LINE PLEING. CKT SHOULD REMAIN
... WILL/FLT LINE ... DET 1 6994TH/CMS ... TRANS
... UNTIL ACTIVATION OF ... REQUIRED.
CKT. NO FURTHER ASSIST REQUIRED.
PART TWO FOR FS ... ASR'S YOUR HQ TO FULFILL
2. THIS HQ WILL SHIP TWO ... WILL BE FURNISHED
... REQUIRE. SHIPPING DATA
AVAILABLE.
[redacted]