

UNCLASSIFIED

Supporting Documents
6994th Security Squadron History

July – December
1969



The EC-47 History Site

[REDACTED]

LIST OF SUPPORT DOCUMENTS

1. Movement Order 22, HQ PACAF 10 July 69.
2. Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) 2-1). Between 460th TRW and 6994th Scty Sq , 4 January 70.
3. 6994th Scty Sq MAT, Hue/Phu Bai Trip Report (U), 4 July 1969.
4. Message HQ 7AF 212325Z Jul 69, Subject: Redeployment of EC-47s to Hue/Phu Bai [REDACTED].
5. Message SSO MACV 140952Z August 1969. Relocation of EC-47 Aircraft.
6. 6994 Scty Sq OPS Ltr, undated, Subject: Relocation of EC-47 Aircraft.
7. 6994 Scty Sq OPS Ltr, 4 October 1969, Subject: Relocation of ARDF resources From Pleiku AB, RVN.
8. Message 6994 Scty Sq 060355Z (no subject stated).
9. Message PACSCTYRGN 010345Z November 1969, Subject: Disposition of ARDF Assets.
10. Message PACSCTYRGN 080600Z October 1969, Subject: Disposition of ARDF Assets.
11. 6994 Scty Sq OPS, 2 Oct 69, Subject: Report of TDY Visit.
12. Message 6922 Scty Wg 160230Z August 1969, Subject: ARDF for SEA.
13. Message 7AF 231000Z August 1969, Subject: Basing of EC-47 Aircraft In Thailand [REDACTED].
14. Message PACSCTYRGN 260332Z September 1969.
15. Message 6994 Scty Sq 300805Z August 1969, Subject: Additional Aircraft at NKP.
16. Message 460TRW 300220Z August 1969, Subject: NKP Deployment.
17. Message MACV 122352Z October 1969, Subject: Move of Additional EC-47s To Thailand.
18. Message 6994 Scty Sq 140710Z October 1969, Subject: Move of Additional EC-47s PCS to Thailand.
19. Message [REDACTED] 180435Z October 1969. Subject: Move of Additional EC-47 Acft to Thailand.

20. Message [REDACTED] 240524Z December 1969, Subject: Extension of EC-47's at NKP RTAFB.
21. Message 6994 Scty Sq SSL0 290545Z August 1969, Subject: Reorganization of the ACC.
22. Message PACSCTYRGN 140630Z September 1969, Subject: ACC Reorganization.
23. Message 6994 Scty Sq 250845Z September 1969, Subject: Discussion of Current ACC Situation.
24. Message 6994 Scty Sq 120807Z September 1969, Subject: ARDF Calibration Site, Cam Ranh Bay.
25. Message PACSCTYRGN 162130Z September 1969, Subject: Requirement For Calibration Facility.
26. Message 7AF 010145Z September 1969, Subject: PACAF Life Support School (PLSS) Training Quotas.
27. Message PACSCTYRGN 060125Z September 1969, Subject: PACAF Life Support School (PLSS).
28. Message USAFSS 171945Z December 1969, Subject: Life Support Tng for 6994SS.
29. Message 6994 Scty Sq 310635Z December 1969, Subject: Capture of Enemy COMINT Collection Unit.
30. 6994 Scty Sq GDR 5 December 1969, Subject: Vietnamization of ARDF Program [REDACTED].
31. Message Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq 300822Z, Subject: Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq AIR 3-69.
32. 6994 Scty Sq OPS-2, 29 December 1969, Subject: Master Program Review Board.
33. Message PACSCTYRGN 110307Z September 1969, Subject: Removal of "Q" Jamming Equipment Aboard EC-47 Aircraft.
34. Message SSO MACV 022341Z, Subject: Removal of "Q" Jamming Equipment.
35. 6994 Scty Sq Ltr, OPS, 8 October 1969, Subject: Removal of the "Q" Consoles from Five EC-47 Aircraft [REDACTED].
36. Message NSAPACREP Vietnam [REDACTED] 150520Z, October 69, Subject: ABN Coll Msns.
37. Message 6994 Scty Sq 150848Z October 1969, subject not listed.
38. Message SSO MAGV 272346Z October 1969, Subject: In-Country EC-47 Relocation.
- [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

39. Message Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq 280200Z October 1969, Subject: Redistribution of ARDF Aircraft.
40. Message 7AF 291040Z October 1969, Subject: In-Country EC-47 Relocation (U).
41. Message 46OTRW 120836Z November 1969, Subject: Movement of Aircraft (U).
42. Message PACSCTYRGN 060041Z September 1969, Subject: Accomplishment of Scheduled TOT.
43. Message 46OTRW 161203Z Subject: Aircraft Utilization.
44. Message 6994 Scty Sq 180845Z September 1969, Subject: Opnl Requirement for Unit A/G/A KY-8 FOCS.
45. Message 6994 Scty Sq 220902Z November 1969, Subject: Removal of 6994th Complex A/G/A COMM FACS.
46. Message, 6994 Scty Sq 100955Z October 1969, Subject: ARDF Manpower Reduction.
47. Message 6994 Scty Sq 080830Z November 1969, Subject: UDL, 6994SS After 703 Reduction.
48. Message 6994 Scty Sq 180340Z November 1969, Subject: 6994SS UDL.
49. Message 6994 Scty Sq SSL0 210315Z November 1969, Subject: MACV ARDF Weekly Meeting 19 November 1969.
50. Message PACSCTYRGN 200223Z December 1969, Subject: Low Frequency Collection.
51. Message 6994 Scty Sq 220857Z December 1969, Subject: Low Frequency ARDF Capability.
52. Message SSO MACV 190318Z September 1969, Subject: Elec Chng to MACV Dir 381-23.
53. Message SSO MACV 200716Z September 1969, Subject: Evaluation of Man 999.
54. Message 6994 Scty Sq 250834Z September 1969, Subject: Evaluation of Man 999.
55. Message 6994 Scty Sq 100545Z July 1969, Subject: Joint Courier Activity Da Nang (JCAD)/OPS Stops at Hue Phu Bai.
56. Message 6994 Scty Sq 280441Z July 1969, Subject: Joint Courier Activity Da Nang (JCAD)/OPS Stops at Phu Bai.
57. Message 7AF 080450Z October 1969, Subject: Operations Stops - Hue.
58. Message SSO MACV 260806Z October 1969, Subject: OPSTOPS at Phu Bai/ Da Nang by EC-47s.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
6994 SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

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REP/ TO
ATT. F: MAT

4 Jul 1969

ops for file/USAF

SUBJECT: Hue - Phu Bai Trip Report (U)

TO: CDR

1. On 29 Jun 1969, I visited the Hue - Phu Bai complex to ascertain present and future requirements to move our operation into the area.
2. Hue - Phu Bai is a joint army marine camp and living conditions are austere. Personnel who are generally in the field would consider the barracks good. However, for USAF personnel, they will be sub-standard. The barracks are located in a very sandy area. Any vehicles which go into that area will have to be four wheel drive. The barracks area was occupied so we were unable to perform a close inspection of the area. We did not see any shower facilities or latrine facilities. Based on observation at other areas in the complex, latrines will probably be slit trenches.
3. The barracks will house both the TEWS and USAFSS personnel. These barracks are not air conditioned and crew rest may pose a problem.
4. Construction for the EC-47 area is not completed. The extension of the taxiway to the EC-47 area has been graded but not paved. The parking apron for the aircraft has not been started. The revetments have not been started. The 800 square foot air conditioned building for maintenance and supply has no status. The building has neither been approved or disapproved.
5. Transportation for TDY personnel is non-existent. Telecon with USM 808 (509th Radio Research Group) was the only effective means of communication with these personnel. The operations officer stated that our operators can have access to the army analysts for mission briefing and debriefing, we can use their area to store our mission pouches and we can have access to their communication facility to pass our reports.
6. Estimates given by 7AF personnel on this trip indicated it would probably be late September before we could begin operations there. With the maintenance concept we will be operating under (black box change only), recommend we not go into operation there until our building is completed. The heavy dust in the area could induce failures in the electronic gear.
7. In the area of aircraft maintenance, we discussed the differences between our operation at Det 3 and Phu Bai. The biggest

SMR - Hold for near future discussion of experience

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ASR 5 Jul 69



[REDACTED]

problem that we could foresee was that Phu Bai has only parts and equipment to support light aircraft such as O-1E's. A simple action such as changing a tire could cause an aircraft to stay on the ground for several days awaiting equipment. NKP was equipped to handle larger aircraft so no problems were encountered.

8. [REDACTED] In view of the austere conditions and the possibility of maintenance problems, 7AF is studying the feasibility of deploying to Da Nang rather than Phu Bai. This action requires staffing at 7AF and then at MACV so it will probably be 30 to 45 days before a decision is made.

Donald E. Keese

DONALD E. KEESE, Captain, USAF
Chief of Maintenance

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Relocation of EC-47 Aircraft

7AF DIO

1. In consideration of MACV msg 10595 Intel 140952Z Aug, Subject same as above. In response to request from Col Franco the following opinions/considerations are forwarded:

a. The first thing that must be considered is that USAFSS has only two complete sets of ALR-35 Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) so any consideration of continued three site operation must include the fact that only two of those sites can contain ALR-35 equipped aircraft.

b. The second consideration is the Mini-mod (ALR-38). These are currently based at Pleiku due to their compatibility with the intelligence/signal environment. There are only three of these equipments but they are mounted in the "Q" model EC-47 of which there are eight, the remaining five (after ALR-38) are configured with ALR-35's. It would be necessary to move all eight aircraft together.

2. With these two considerations, it is readily apparent that a shift of eight aircraft to Phu Cat would add 5 ALR-35's and 3 ALR-38's to their current ALR-34's which would then require similar moves of the equipment from TSN and Phu Cat to preclude three ALR-35 locations.

3. At this point it would become necessary for the 6994th to move all the ALR-35/38 AGE and other associated equipment to Phu Cat and acquire approximately 1,000 sq ft of added maintenance space. We suspect this same difficulty would also pertain to airframe maintenance when the "Q"s are mixed with present aircraft at Phu Cat.

4. An additional consideration would then be the training of maintenance people, operators, and navigators into new equipment.

5. The alternate to the above would of course be to move the 362/Det 2 to Phu Cat and the 361/Det 1 to Pleiku with all their associated equipment and continue present operations in new locations.

FOR THE COMMANDER

JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF

Operations Officer



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4 OCT 1969

Relocation of ARDF Resources from Pleiku AB, RVN (S)


7AF DPLG (Lt Col Sillwell)

1. With the closure of Pleiku AB to the USAF, it will be necessary to relocate those EC-47's presently assigned to Pleiku to other in/out country locations. To best satisfy consumer requirements, the present Pleiku ARDF assets should, ideally, be relocated to Nakh Phanom RTAFB and DaNang AB. That proposal will not be considered at this time, but will, however, be addressed at a later date. This paper, then, will address our first and second alternate proposals for the relocation of the Pleiku ARDF assets.

2. Our first alternate for Pleiku ARDF resource relocation is to increase the NKP effort to 5 ALR34Z's and 5 ALR34CC's. The Phu Cat realignment would then consist of 27 aircraft (9 ALR35/38Z's, 2 ALR34Z's, 2 ALR35CC's, 14 ALR34CC's). USAFSS will require 117 personnel at NKP to support the 10 aircraft operation. We will also require a 2400 square foot maintenance and supply area and a 5600 square foot operations and communications area. The operations/communications function can, on an emergency basis, be carried out by adding four additional vans in the TFA compound. The maintenance/supply function requires a permanent type building to house mock-ups, test equipments and bench stock. The Phu Cat expansion will require the addition of approximately 100 USAFSS personnel. With the exception of dormitory space, existing facilities at Phu Cat can absorb the proposed expansion. The second alternate would be to leave the present NKP structure as is and relocate all remaining resources to Phu Cat. This alternate proposal would require additional construction for the maintenance/supply and operations/communications function. It would add approximately 150 personnel to the current Phu Cat authorizations.

FOR THE COMMANDER

JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF
Operations Officer



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PRIORITY

6994SCTYSQ

PACSCYIRGN

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OCT 69

1. AS YOU KNOW THERE HAVE BEEN MANY MEETINGS RECENTLY ON DISPOSITION OF
PLEIKU ASSETS WHEN THE BASE CLOSES. WE HAVE REVIEWED THE PRESENT
ASSETS AND ADDED THE PROGRAMMED UPGRADE TO BRING TEN AIR-38'S IN
THIRTEEN Q MODEL EC47'S. DURING THE REVIEW WE CONSIDERED THE FOLLOW-
ING FACTORS:

File

A. CURRENT AIR-38'S INCREASE FROM THREE TO TEN ALL OF WHICH ARE
IN A "Q" MODEL EC47. IN ADDITION THAT UNIT WILL HAVE THREE MORE "Q"
MODEL EC47'S. EQUIPPED WITH AIR-35.


B. IT IS DESIRABLE TO RETAIN ALL OF THESE AIRCRAFT AT ONE LOCATION.

C. THESE AIRCRAFT ARE EQUIPPED TO PERFORM BEST (SINGLE ENGINE,
TAKE OFF, ETC) AT HIGHER ALTITUDE AIRFIELDS.

D. THE CURRENTLY EXPRESSED REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AIR38 ARE IN
STEEL TIGER AND DMZ AREAS. CAS HAS EXPRESSED REQUIREMENTS (AS YET
unfulfilled) for VHF CAPABILITY IN BARREL ROLL AREA.

E. TO MEET REQUIREMENTS IN ALL THREE OF THESE AREAS REQUIRES

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4891

JAMES W JOHNSON, JR., 1stCol, USAF
Operations Officer



EITHER SPLIT RESOURCES OR A CENTRAL LOCATION.

F. BY THE ROUTES THAT MUST BE FLOWN THE DMZ MISSION AREAS ARE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME DISTANCE FROM PLEIKU AS FROM NKP.

G. IF WE WERE TO SPLIT THE AIR-38, BETWEEN NKP AND DANANG/PHU CAT, THE SECOND SET OF AGE COULD NOT BE DELIVERED IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO ACCOMPANY THE PROJECTED MOVES OR REQUIREMENTS. (REF PDR LOG/OPS 302355Z SEP).

H. GENERAL BROWN HAS STATED THAT HE DOES NOT WANT ANY PLEIKU ASSETS MOVED TO DANANG. *However this could change. JD*

I. CSAF STATED POSITION IS THAT AIR FORCE EC47 ASSETS IN THAILAND SHOULD BE BASED AT NKP VICE UDORN.

J. CAS, [REDACTED] AND MACV FAVOR BASING EC47 AIRCRAFT AT UDORN FOR BARREL ROLL SUPPORT TO CAS.

2. IN FULL CONSIDERATION OF ALL THE FACTORS LISTED ABOVE OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION IS TO AUGMENT THE CAT WITH THREE AIR-34 AIRCRAFT FROM TAN SON NHUT, MOVE THREE OF THE PRESENT PLEIKU AIR -35 AIRCRAFT TO TAN SON NHUT, THEN MOVE THE REST OF THE DETACHMENT TWO ASSETS TO NKP. THIS WOULD PUT 14 AIRCRAFT AT NKP WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY BE THE TEN AIR-38 PLUS FOUR AIR-35'S IN THE Q MODEL EC47'S. AT THIS POINT WE WOULD HAVE THAT ONE LOCATION FROM WHICH WE COULD SUPPORT BARRELL ROLL, STEEL TIGER AND THE DMZ.

THE AIR-38'S AND THE Q MODEL AIRCRAFT WOULD HAVE BEEN RETAINED AS A SINGLE MAINTENANCE ENTITY. THE EC-470 WILL BE PLACED IN OPTIMUM OPERATING POSITION. THE FOUR AIRCRAFT ADDED TO THE PHU CAT FLEET COULD SERVE TO WORK THOSE MISSIONS FLAGGED IN AREAS 8 AND 10. WE WOULD HAVE ACHIEVED A MERGER OF TWO DETACHMENTS WHICH WOULD OFFER LIMITED MANPOWER SAVINGS AND IN ADDITION WOULD OFFER A THREE UNIT SQUADRON VICE FOUR.

3. PERHAPS THE BIGGEST CONSIDERATION IS THAT ONCE PLACED AT NKP THIS PROPOSED SQUADRON WOULD HAVE THE DMZ AND STEEL TIGER AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THE NUMBER OF MISSIONS WOULD PROBABLY CLOSELY EQUATE THOSE FLOWN INTO BANG-EL ROLL. THIS WOULD ESTABLISH A SOLID OPERATIONAL REASON FOR LOCATION AT NKP AND IN ADDITION WOULD PROTECT THE AIR STAFF POSITION OF LOCATING AT NKP VICE UDORN.

4. WE WOULD LIKE TO APPROACH 7AF WITH THIS PROPOSAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BEFORE FIRM PLANS ARE MADE. HOWEVER, WE WILL WITHHOLD ANY ACTION PENDING YOUR COMMENTS. PLEASE ADVISE.

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SUBJ: DISPOSITION OF ARDF ASSETS
1. AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF SEA ARDF REQUIREMENTS ALONG WITH THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS LOCATIONS TO POSITION THOSE ASSETS HAS JUST BEEN COMPLETED. THE PLANNED COLLECTIVE OF FLEIKU IN DEC 69 AND INCREASED LAOTIAN COVERAGE ARE THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WHICH CAUSED THIS REVIEW OF ARDF RESOURCES. THIS STUDY RECOGNIZES THE EVENTUAL ATTAINMENT OF 62 ARDF AIRCRAFT IN SEA FIVE OF WHICH WILL BE HQA. OUR PRESENT ASSETS ARE 54 ALR 34, 10LR 33 AND 3 MINIMOD FOR A TOTAL OF 57 ACFT. UPON RECEIPT OF FIVE ALR 33 AND ONE ALR 34, ALONG WITH CONVERSION OF THREE MINIMOD AND TWO ALR 33'S TO ALR 33'S, WE WILL HAVE 55 ALR 34, 12 ALR 33 AND 18 AIR 33. FOR A TOTAL OF 62 ACFT OF WHICH 25 WILL BE 2 UNDEVELOPED. AS A RESULT WE RECOMMEND THE ARDF UNITS/ASSETS BE REALIGNED AT THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:

- A. DANANG, FIFTEEN ACFT: TEN ALR 33 ECAT99 AND FIVE ALR 33 ECAT97 ACFT.
- B. TAN SON NHUT, EIGHTEEN ALR 34 ECAT99 ACFT.
- C. PHU CAT, SEVENTEEN ALR 33 ECAT99 ACFT.
- D. THAILAND, TWELVE ACFT: TWELVE ALR 33 ECAT99.

2. THE ABOVE ALIGNMENT IS BASED ON OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND PERSONNEL. IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT USAFSS CANNOT SUPPORT MORE THAN FOUR SEPARATE LOCATIONS. THE ABOVE DISPOSITION OF RESOURCES WILL PROVIDE APPROX 50 PER CENT MORE TOW IN THE STEEL TIGER, DMZ, AND 3 BUMP AREA WITH EITHER RESOURCES THAT IS NOW BEING PROVIDED IN THOSE AREAS BY 2 BIKU BASED ACFT. SINCE APPROX 95 PERCENT OF THE VHF SIGNALS INTERCEPTED BY COMBAT 2000 ACFT ARE TAKEN IN THE DMZ AND 3 BUMP AREAS, WE SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ASSEMBLE ALL ALR 33 AND 34 ASSETS AT THE BASE CLOSEST TO THOSE TARGET AREAS FOR OPERATIONAL AS WELL AS SUPPORT MANAGEMENT.

3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT CONSIDERATION IS NOW BEING GIVEN TO THE LOCATION OF THE 18 ALR 33 ECAT99 ACFT AT NKP WITH THE BALANCE OF 52 ACFT SPLIT BETWEEN PHU CAT AND TSN. THIS REALIGNMENT WILL NOT REPEAT NOT ENHANCE THE ARDF EFFORT. AS OUTLINED ABOVE, THE MAJORITY OF THE VHF MISSION IS IN THE DMZ/3 BUMP AREA AND WE WOULD NOT REALIZE ANY LONG TOW FROM NKP THAN WE DO NOW FROM FLEIKU. THE REQUIREMENTS IN CENTRAL SVN CAN ADEQUATELY BE SUPPORTED FROM PHU CAT WITH 17 ACFT. TO FLY MISSIONS FROM PHU CAT IN THE DMZ, STEEL TIGER OR LASS WILL BE LESS PRODUCTIVE BECAUSE OF LOSS IN FLYING TIME TO TARGET AREA. IN ADDITION WE WERE RECENTLY BRIEFED BY THE COMNAV AIR TRN THAT PHU CAT WILL HAVE CROSS WIND COMPONENT IN EXCESS OF 1000 OPERATION AT LEAST THREE MONTHS A YEAR; THEREFORE, WE CAN NOT AFFORD ADDITIONAL ACFT BEING OPERATED FROM THIS LOCATION.

4. WE ARE AWARE OF THE NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS CONCERNING THE FUTURE LOCATIONS OF THE ARDF FLEET IN THAILAND AND AFTER EXTENSIVE STUDY/CONSIDERATION, OUR RECOMMENDATIONS ARE TO CONSOLIDATE OUR THAILAND RESOURCES AT ONE BASE, WITH EITHER UDORN OR NKP AS THE THAILAND ARDF LOCATION. WE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO SATISFY CAS REQUIREMENTS IN LAOS



DISPOSITION OF ARDF ASSETS

AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF SEA ARDF REQUIREMENTS ALONG WITH THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS LOCATIONS TO POSITION THESE ASSETS HAS JUST BEEN COMPLETED. THE PLANNED CLOSURE OF FLEIKU IN DEC 69 AND INCREASED LAOTIAN COVERAGE ARE THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WHICH CAUSED THIS REVIEW OF ARDF RESOURCES. THIS STUDY RECOGNIZES THE EVENTUAL ATTAINMENT OF 62 ARDF AIRCRAFT IN SEA FIVE OF WHICH WILL BE NGA. OUR PRESENT ASSETS ARE 30 ALR 34, 19LR 35 AND 3 MINIMOD FOR A TOTAL OF 33 ACFT. UPON RECEIPT OF FIVE ALR 35 AND ONE ALR 34, ALONG WITH CONVERSION OF THREE MINIMOD AND TWO ALR 33'S TO ALR 35'S, WE WILL HAVE 35 ALR 34, 17 ALR 35 AND 19 ALR 35, FOR A TOTAL OF 62 ACFT ON WHICH IT WILL BE 2 CONFIGURED.

AS A RESULT WE RECOMMEND THE ARDF UNITS/ASSETS BE REALIGNED AT THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:

- 1. DANANG, FIFTEEN ACFT: TEN ALR 35 EQ4790 AND FIVE ALR 35 EQ4710 ACFT.
- 2. TAN SON NHUT, EIGHTEEN ALR 35 EQ 47N/P ACFT.
- 3. PHU CAT, SEVENTEEN ALR 35 EQ 47N/P ACFT.
- 4. THAILAND, TWELVE ACFT: TWELVE ALR 35 EQ47 N/P.

THE ABOVE ALIGNMENT IS BASED ON OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND PERSONNEL. IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT USAFSS CANNOT SUPPORT MORE THAN FOUR SEPARATE LOCATIONS. THE ABOVE DISPOSITION OF RESOURCES WILL PROVIDE APPROX 98 PER CENT MORE TOT IN THE STEEL TIGER, DMZ, AND 1 CORP AREA WITH FEWER RESOURCES THAN IS NOW BEING PROVIDED IN THOSE AREAS BY FLEIKU BASED ACFT. SINCE APPROX 90 PERCENT OF THE VHF SIGNALS INTERCEPTED BY COMBAT AIRCRAFT ARE TAKEN IN THE DMZ AND 1 CORP AREAS, WE SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ASSEMBLE ALL ALR 35 VHF ARDF ASSETS AT THE BASE CLOSEST TO THOSE TARGET AREAS FOR OPERATIONAL AS WELL AS SUPPORT MANAGEMENT.

WE UNDERSTAND THAT CONSIDERATION IS NOW BEING GIVEN TO THE LOCATION OF THE 10 ALR 35 EQ4790 ACFT AT NKP WITH THE BALANCE OF 22 ACFT SPLIT BETWEEN PHU CAT AND TSN. THIS REALIGNMENT WILL NOT REPEAT NOR ENHANCE THE ARDF EFFORT. AS OUTLINED ABOVE, THE MAJORITY OF THE VHF MISSION IS IN THE DMZ/1 CORP AREA AND WE WOULD NOT REALIZE ANY MORE TOT FROM NKP THAN WE CAN NOW FROM FLEIKU. THE REQUIREMENTS IN CENTRAL SVN CAN ADEQUATELY BE SUPPORTED FROM PHU CAT WITH 17 ACFT. TO FLY MISSIONS FROM PHU CAT IN THE DMZ, STEEL TIGER OR LAOS WILL BE LESS PRODUCTIVE BECAUSE OF LOSS IN FLYING TIME TO TARGET AREA. IN ADDITION WE WERE RECENTLY BRIEFED BY THE COMR 462 TRS THAT PHU CAT WILL HAVE CROSS WIND COMPONENT IN EXCESS OF EQ47 OPERATION AT LEAST THREE MONTHS A YEAR. THEREFORE, WE CAN NOT AFFORD ADDITIONAL ACFT BEING OPERATED FROM THIS LOCATION.

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WE ARE AWARE OF THE NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS CONCERNING THE FUTURE LOCATIONS OF THE ARDF FLEET IN THAILAND AND AFTER EXTENSIVE STUDY/CONSIDERATION, OUR RECOMMENDATIONS ARE TO CONSOLIDATE OUR THAILAND RESOURCES AT ONE BASE, WITH EITHER UDORN OR NKP AS THE THAILAND ARDF LOCATION. WE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO SATISFY OUR REQUIREMENTS IN LAOS AND TAMP/NOV/MAOT REQUIREMENTS IN NORTHERN THAILAND AND THE STEEL TIGER AREA.

WE SOLICIT YOUR SUPPORT IN THE STAGING OF ARDF AIRCRAFT AS OUTLINED IN PARA 3 ABOVE. REQUEST YOU KEEP US ADVISED OF YOUR ACTION.

Lt Colonel Johnson (OP8/4891)

Report of TDY Visit

Commander

1. Purpose of Visit. To represent 6994 Security Squadron at a [REDACTED] ARDP Conference.

2. Names of Attendees. Lt Colonel James W. Johnson Jr.

3. Personnel Contacted.

[REDACTED]

MACVNAI J-2

Col Smith
Capt Kerr

MACV J2114-4

Lt Col Doerer
Capt Layman

[REDACTED]

CUSASAPAC

LTC GARRANT

AMEMB VIENTIANE

Mr. Devlin
Mr. Weber
Mr. Ross

AMEMB BANGKOK

Mr. Cooper

AMEMB SAIGON

Mr. Spigner

7/13th AF

Col Wootton
Maj Beaver

ARMA VIENTIANE

LTC Duskin
Maj Durant

83RD RR SOU

LTC ULMEN

6994TH SCTY SQ

LTC Johnson
Maj Borff
Capt Wheeler

7th AF

Maj Kagarise
Capt Lombardi
Capt Krebs

7th BRFS

Maj Swift
WO1 Sanderson

509th RR GP

CW4 Newell

[REDACTED]

about
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4. Comments. This conference was called by [redacted] and was chaired by Mr Dal Lang of that organization.

After all introductions the floor was given to representatives of MACV J2114, who then undertook, for the benefit of CAS Udorn and CAS Vientiane afterwards, a description of the Tasking procedures presently used in SVN by MACV. The explanation was primarily aimed at the value of the SVN system as compared to the system currently being used in Laos. The main point of the J2114 pitch was that good, bad or indifferent there was a system in South Vietnam and single management was mandatory to ensure that CAS got all that they should. His point was that CAS Vientiane should accept the current MACV system and become a part of it. The J2 representative pointed out that change proposals could be entertained at some later date but that entry into the system was the main point at this time.

Mr. Devlin (CAS Vientiane) took the floor and concluded that he had the distinct impression that he was being told what he would have and not being asked. He finally accepted that and said he would reluctantly go along with the proposal. CAS has continually advocated their having operational control. In fact another strong pitch was made later in the day. The first session was adjourned and regrouped after lunch. It was during the afternoon session that the subjects of (1) The 5th ACF at NKP (2) Move of Commando Forge to Udorn (3) OPS COM to CAS, came up. These were addressed with considerable emotion and these topics carried on through the next day.

These discussions came to no conclusions, but did expose the direction and magnitude of the feelings on these subjects.

Mr. Devlin CAS Vientiane definitely feels he is being slighted. He expressed that he had justified a fourth and fifth aircraft and that five had been approved but he is only getting four. He did not care about NKP's inability to support them; he stated that he wanted them at Udorn anyway. At this time KBV, [redacted] ASA REP and MACV joined him in agreeing that Udorn was the place for the aircraft to be. It was then that a proposed move to Udorn was discussed and when the 7AF rep pointed out post hostilities planning, Mr Devlin assured everyone that Udorn Air Base was going to stay. After this discussion, CAS Udorn (Mr Ross and Mr Weber) made a long and plaintive plea for operational control of the aircraft. They feel that they need more control so they can use the resources to the best flexible tactical advantage. They expressed the basic desire for management data, i.e., if they got no fixes from a given area where an acft was frugged, did this mean the acft did not fly or that it flew and achieved no fixes. Strangely enough no one can presently offer that answer. This seemed to drive home MACV's point that once under their system with daily reporting of mission accomplishments, they (J2) could provide the type information that CAS wants.

Prior to adjourning the meeting a representative of the American Embassy was invited to speak to us relative to the US-THAI relations as they affect our troop and aircraft ceilings. The most significant point made was that the four top Thai political posts are friendly to the U.S. and are most cooperative but their opposition is continually attempting to demonstrate that Americans are allowed to use Thailand in any way they desire with impunity. They attempt to prove this by finding instances of troops or

[redacted]

[redacted]

[REDACTED]

American activities in country of which these people are not aware of. So American Embassy Bangkok must be very careful to keep these people informed. Since each day to day detail would be a communication burden, a continual evaluation of what is necessary to pass to them is being made. Occasionally, after the fact, it may be found that information should have been passed and wasn't, the case of the 4th aircraft at NIP was an example. It was allowed in by the Thai Gov't for one week, the American Ambassador took the liberty of extending it another week. Later, as he was attempting to get approval for another extended period, he found that the aircraft and crew were still in country and it became necessary to remove it even while attempting to get it back in country.

the second point that was made was that if we desire further TDY aircraft, we should plan as far in advance as possible and let them know so that permission can be properly and leisurely obtained.

Shortly thereafter the conference was adjourned.

I made no agreements or commitments for security service or the 699th Security Squadron during this conference.

JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF
Operations Officer

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ARDF CONFERENCE SCHEDULE

FRIDAY - 5 SEPTEMBER

0700 - BUS PICK-UP AT CHAO PHYA (SWING BY IMPERIAL HOTEL)

0810 - CONFEREES TO MAC THAI J2 CONFERENCE ROOM 2-101

0815 - INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND OPENING OF ARDF CONFERENCE BY CHAIRMAN (MR. LANG) - OVERVIEWS OF AGENDA AND AGENDAS ITEMS DESIRED

0830 - 0920 PRESENTATION OF AGENDA ITEM ALFA (MACV J211-4)

0920 - 0930 BREAK

0930 - 1020 DISCUSSIONS OF AGENDA ITEMS ALFA

1020 - 1030 BREAK

1030 - 1100 MACV RECAP AGENDA ITEM ALFA

1100 - 1130 CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS ON AGENDA ITEM ALFA

1130 - LUNCH (JUSMAG COMPOUND - GOLDEN TEAK)

1300 - RESUME CONFERENCE

1300 - 1350 AGENDA ITEM BRAVO

1350 - 1400 BREAK

1400 - 1450 AGENDA ITEM CHARLIE

1450 - 1500 BREAK

1500 - 1550 AGENDA ITEM DELTA

1550 - 1600 BREAK

1600 - 1630 AGENDA ITEM ECHO

1630 - 1645 BUS DEPARTS JUSMAG COMPOUND FOR HOTELS

1830 - 2030 COCKTAILS/DRINKS AND LIGHT SNACK - CHAO PHYA HOTEL (PAY AS YOU GO BAR - TWENTY-FIVE CENTS A DRINK)

ARDF CONFERENCE SCHEDULE

SATURDAY - 6 SEPTEMBER

0700 - BUS PICK-UP AT CHAO PHYA HOTEL

0810 - 0900 RESUME CONFERENCE NACTHAI J2 CONFERENCE ROOM - AGENDA ITEM FOX-TROT

0900 - 0910 BREAK

0910 - 1000 AGENDA ITEM GOLF

1000 - 1010 BREAK

1010 - 1115 AGENDA ITEM HOTEL

1115 - LUNCH (JUSMAG COMPOUND - GOLDEN TEAK)


1245 - 1400 RESUME CONFERENCE - OPEN FOR ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION OF ARDF PROCEDURES/REQUIREMENTS - RESUME OF AGENDA AND ITEMS NOT DISCUSSED IN ENOUGH DETAIL OR NEEDING EXPANSION

1400 - 1410 BREAK

1410 - 1530 CONFERENCE SUMMARIZATION/ACCOMPLISHMENTS/CLOSING REMARKS

1530 - 1545 BUS DEPARTS JUSMAG COMPOUND FOR HOTELS

ARDF CONFERENCE ATTENDEES



MACTHAI J-2

COL SMITH
CAPT KERR

MACV J211-4

LTC LOERER
CAPT LAYMAN



CUSASAPAC

LTC GARRANT

AMEMB VIENTIANE

MR. DEVLIN
MR. WEBER
MR. ROSS

AMEMB BANGKOK

MR. COOPER

AMEMB SAIGON

MR. SPIGNER

7/13TH AF

COL WOOTTEN
MAJ BEAVER

ARMA VIENTIANE

LTC BURNIN
MAJ DURANT

53RD RESOU

LTC ULLEN

698TH SQTY SQDN

LTC JOHNSON
MAJ WOFFET
CAPT WHEELER

7TH AF

MAJ KAGROUSE
CAPT LONARMI
CAPT KERR

718 RPTS

MAJ SWIFT
COL SANDERSON

505TH BN CP

CMR PISSELE

NRN200000302
FM 6922SCTYWG
TO 6924SCTYSQ/CDR
ZEM

SECRET DOCUMENT

104
16 Aug 69 05 37z

CORD
L2
Policy

SUBJECT: ARDF FOR SEA

REF OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION OF 16 AUG 69, THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS FORWARDED TO PACSCTYRGN/CDR ON 15 AUG 69. QUOTE

SUBJECT: ARDF FOR SEA

THERE IS ONE POINT IN THE ARDF PROBLEM THAT NEEDS CLARIFICATION AND THAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE AIRCRAFT AND THE CMA. PRACTICALLY EVERY MESSAGE DEALING WITH CURRENT PROBLEM OF IDENT RATES AND EFFECTIVENESS STATES PROBLEM COULD BE RESOLVED BY THE CO-LOCATION OF THE AIRCRAFT AND CMA, YET IN SOUTH VIETNAM TODAY WE CANNOT FIND WHERE ONE SINGLE AIRCRAFT IS PERMANENTLY CO-LOCATED WITH CMA (EITHER ARMY OR AIR FORCE). HAVE INFORMAL INFO THERE ARE APPROX 100 PLUS SUCH AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED. THIS PROVIDES SOME INDICATION THE ARMY DID NOT CONSIDER SUCH DEPLOYMENT ESSENTIAL IN THEIR ARDF/AIROBN COLLECTION PROGRAMMING. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE 6994TH AT TAN SON KHUT IS SOME 15 MILES FROM THE CMA WHICH IS LOCATED AT BIEN HOA. ALL THE OTHER STATIONS ARE ALMOST THE SAME AS NEAR AS CMA DETERMINE. EVEN IF THE NKP EFFORT WERE TO BE RELOCATED TO UDORN THE AIRCRAFT WOULD STILL BE SEPARATED APPROX 10 MILES FROM THE CMA AT USM-7. BELIEVE THIS POINT IS VERY IMPORTANT BECAUSE IF THE PRINCIPLE OF AIRCRAFT AND CMA CO-LOCATION IS RECOGNIZED BELIEVE IT WILL REDUCE OUR UNIT MISSION TO ONE OF PURE ARDF AND ELIMINATE ENTIRELY THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY TO DO THE VITAL FIRST ECHELON ANALYSIS AND REPORTING. THIS IS CONFIRMED IN PART 3 OF DIRMISA MSG 06-222, 120122Z AUG (TRANSMITTED TO PSR OPS BY 6994SS 050 140515Z AUG). UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THERE AN ARGUMENT THAT USAFSS TAKE OVER THE CMA FUNCTION; HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT TASKING AND RESPONSIBILITY RELATIONSHIP OF THE CMA UNIT SHOULD BE EXACTLY AS THEY ARE IN ANY OTHER COMINT STATION. AS AN EXAMPLE, IF DET 3, 6994 SS IS RELOCATED FROM NKP TO UDORN JR IF AN ARDF UNIT IS ESTABLISHED AT UDORN, IT SHOULD BE A COMPLETE SITE WITH A USA NUMBER LOCATED ON UDORN AIR BASE RATHER THAN ANY CONSOLIDATION WITH USA 29/USM 7 AT RAMASON STATION. REQUIREMENTS OF CMA WITH RESPECT TO FORWARDING OF INFORMATION CAN BE ACCOMMODATED IN SAME MANNER AS GROUND INTERCEPT SITE, I.E. ELECTRICAL FORWARDING OF PERISHABLE AND COURIER FOR ROUTINE. SAME PRINCIPLE WOULD BE APPLIED TO ANY OF THE OTHER RELOCATIONS OF ARDF UNITS NOW BEING CONSIDERED. IF THIS TYPE UNIT INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED, THE NEED AND RESPONSIBILITY TO DO FIRST ECHELON ANALYSIS AND REPORTING WILL BE INHERENT IN THE USAFSS STRUCTURE AND WE WILL BE ABLE TO DEVELOP THE REQUIRED EXPERTISE IN THIS AREA. PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU CONCUR AND THIS POINT WILL BE CONSIDERED IN ALL DISCUSSION AND PLANNING EFFORTS IN THE FUTURE." UNQUOTE. THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO QUOTE

P 152540Z
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO 6922SCTYWG/CDR/
ZEM

SUBJECT: ARDF FOR SEA

REF YOUR COR 75220Z AUG 69 (DTG GARBLED).

WE WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORT RATIONALE YOU HAVE PRESENTED. SOLICIT YOUR CONTINUED ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN CURRENT DISCUSSIONS OF THIS VITAL SUBJECT TO ENSURE FULL CONSIDERATION OF USAFSS VIEWS POSITION. BELIEVE FACTORS CURRENT-

*Col Johnson - gets program
can do det's & log some are
para of this position. Requests
Wing to me. CDR
DEA*

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MINNOCZCRDA371
PP YMRDR
DE YHLAKZ 29 269040Z
P 260332Z
FM PASSETYRGN
TO 69228W/CDR
INFO 6994SS/CDR/SLO



26 SEP 69 09 52z

169

Coe Johnson -
Consider this as
policy
CJR

SUBJ: A. 69228W CDR 190219Z SEP 69
REF: A. B. 6994SS SLO 170430Z SEP 69.

1. BELIEVE THE 7AF POSITION AS PORTRAYED BY SSLO IS DESIRABLE COURSE OF ACTION. OUR OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE TO PLACE ARDF RESOURCES WHERE THEY CAN BEST FULFILL THE MACV STATED REQUIREMENTS. APPEARS THAT TO ACCOMPLISH THIS GOAL IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT CAPABILITY BE ESTABLISHED AT TAN SON NHUT, PHO CAT, DANANG, NKP AND EVENTUALLY EVEN POSSIBLY UDORN. THE CAPABILITIES OF THE EC-47 DICTATE LOCATING AT THESE BASES IN ORDER TO BEST COVER TARGET AREAS.
2. BELIEVE THAT 7AF BASES WILL BE THE DETERMINING FACTOR ON WHERE AIRCRAFT CAN BEST BE LOGISTICALLY SUPPORTED. HOWEVER, IF FACILITIES WERE AVAILABLE AT A QMA BASE WE WOULD BE HARD PRESSED NOT TO COLLOCATE AS LONG AS WE MAINTAIN UNIT INTEGRITY WITH REPORTING CAPABILITY AND USA DESIGNATOR.
3. SINCE 7AF HAS TAKEN A MUCH STRONGER POSITION IN RUNNING ARDF BELIEVE IT BEHOVES ALL CONCERNED TO SUPPORT THEIR POSITION.

CJR
SSA



com

SUPPORT DOCUMENTS

OPS-1
2R

15

ROUTINE

6994SCTYSQ

30/0805 Z

6922SCTYWG

INFO: PACSCTIRGN

[REDACTED]

AUG 69.

REF PSR MSG OPS 280500Z AFG.

SUBJ: ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT AT NKP.

PSR MSG REFERENCED ABOVE AUTHORIZED US TO SUPPORT THE MOVE OF THE FOURTH AIRCRAFT TO NKP IF BOTH CRYPTOLOGIC AND PROGRAM VI CEILINGS WERE RAISED. WE HAVE MSG CONFIRMATION FROM [REDACTED] INCREASING CRYPTOLOGIC CEILING BY NINE SPACES AS REQUESTED, HOWEVER, 7AF DPL ADVISES THAT 13AF VERBALLY ASSUMES THAT APPROVAL OF ACFT ENTRY INCLUDED APPROVAL OF PEOPLE AND STATES THAT TDY IN THAILAND CONSTITUTES NO CEILING PROBLEM UNDER PROGRAM VI. REQUEST YOUR HQ COORDINATE WITH 13AF AND CONFIRM THAT WE ARE, IN FACT, AUTHORIZED TO INCREASE PRESENT PROGRAM VI CEILING BY NINE SPACES. PLEASE ADVISE.

30

AUG 1969

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4891

LT COL JOHNSON

[REDACTED]

JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF
Operations Officer

[REDACTED]

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SUPPORT DOCUMENT 18

18

File
200

File
9/11

PRIORITY

699430TY8Q

14/0710Z

INFO: 692230TY8G CLARK AB PHIL

PACSCOTIRON WHEELER AFB HAWAII

NRV

AFSSO 7AF (MESSENGER)

13AF CLARK AB PHIL

ZEN: Det 3, 699430TY8Q

File

OCT 69.

REF 380 MACV MSG MAC13288 INTEL 122342Z OCT 69. SUBJ: MOVE OF
ADDITIONAL RC47'S PGS TO THAILAND.

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 3 OF REF MSG, REQUEST YOU OBTAIN A PERME-
NANT CRYPTOLOGIC INCREASE OF 20 SPACES ABOVE OUR PRESENT CEILING OF
54 SPACES. WE PRESENTLY HAVE A PERMANENT CEILING OF 54, PLUS A
ROUNDING TRY OF 5 SPACES AND WHEN WE SENT THE FOURTH AIRCRAFT TOY
WE RECEIVED APPROVAL FOR A TEMPORARY INCREASE OF NINE SPACES. GIVING
US A CURRENT TOTAL INCREASED CEILING OF 68 SPACES.

14

2. THE NINE TEMPORARY SPACES ARE DUE TO EXPIRE on 27 DEC 69. THE

OCT

1969

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4891

LT COL JOHNSON

JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF
Operations Officer



PRIORITY

ACTION REQUESTED WHEN APPROVAL WOULD CANCEL THE RECURRING AND TEMPORARY TEST'S AND CREATE A NEW CRYPTOLOGIC GRILLING OF SEVENTY-FOUR (74) SPACES. THIS IS THE TOTAL REQUIRED TO OPERATE FIVE (5) ACFT ON A SUSTAINED BASIS. UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED WE WILL ASSUME THAT YOU ARE OBTAINING BOTH PROGRAM VI AND CRYPTOLOGIC HEADROOM SPACE INCREASES. 88

3. WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE 74 SPACES REQUESTED ABOVE ARE CRYPTOLOGIC SPACES FOR USAF'S PERSONNEL AND DO NOT INCLUDE "FRONT-END" AIRCRAFTS.

4. FOR OPTIMUM PLANNING REQUEST EARLIEST POSSIBLE REPLY.

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PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

1. THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO A FINAL DRAFT FOR COORDINATION WITH MACV J2/CO509TH RR GP, CO 6994TH SS, [REDACTED] VIETNAM AND 7TH AF.

3. REQUEST INFORMAL WRITTEN COMMENTS ON THE ATTACHED TO BE PROVIDED MACV J211 WLT 2 SEPT 69.

END QUOTE

QUOTE (OF ATTACHED)

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS CENTER

I GENERAL

1. THE JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS CENTER (JSOC) IS ESTABLISHED IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO PROVIDE ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND (COMUSMACV), SUBORDINATE COMMANDS, AND AUTHORIZED NON-DOD ACTIVITIES ON MATTERS RELATED TO THEIR MISSIONS AS DEFINED IN MACV DIR 381-23. THESE TERMS OF REFERENCE HAVE BEEN COORDINATED WITH CO, 509TH RRGP, CMDR 6994TH SS AND [REDACTED]

2. THESE TERMS OF REFERENCE WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL PROMULGATION OF AN APPROPRIATE OPINS FOR THE JSOC.

3. THE DIRECTIVES PROMULGATED FOR THE DIRECTION AND OPERATION OF THE MACV CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE PROGRAMS, AS THEY PERTAIN TO THE CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNITY, WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL SUPERSEDED BY AN APPROPRIATE TECHINS. SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVES, ADDRESSED TO NON-CRYPTOLOGIC UNITS WILL CONTINUE TO BE PUBLISHED BY MACV.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	6		
GRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SE [REDACTED]	

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
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INFO			

II- ACCREDITATION

4. JSOC IS ACCREDITED TO COMUSMACV.
5. THE JSOC IS A JOINT OPERATION UNDER THE DIRECTION AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MACV J2.
6. THE JSOC IS DESIGNATED A JOINT CRYPTOLOGIC ACTIVITY BY DIRNSA AND ASSIGNED THE CRYPTOLOGIC UNIT DESIGNATOR USJ.
7. THE JSOC WILL CONSIST OF AN OIC, A DEPUTY OIC, AND SUCH OTHER OFFICERS AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL AS MAY BE DETERMINED JOINTLY BY MACV J2, 509TH BRGP AND 6994TH SS.
8. THE JSOC IS MANNED JOINTLY BY PERSONNEL OF THE 509TH BRGP, AND 6994TH SS. WHERE POSSIBLE A BALANCE OF STRENGTH BETWEEN SERVICES WILL BE MAINTAINED.
9. NSA WILL ASSIGN TECHNICAL ADVISORS TO JSOC IN THE NUMBER AND SKILLS REQUESTED BY MACV J2 AND APPROVED BY NSA. NSA PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO JSOC WILL BE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND RATED BY THE OIC, JSOC.
10. THE BILLET OF OIC WILL BE FILLED ON A 6 MONTH ROTATING BASIS BY 509TH BRGP AND 6994TH SS. NOMINEES WILL BE SELECTED AND PRESENTED TO MACV J2 30 DAYS PRIOR TO ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES. DURING HIS TENURE, THE OIC WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF, AND RATED BY J2. THE DEPUTY OIC WILL BE ROTATED ON THE SAME BASIS AND WILL BE FROM THE UNIT NOT FURNISHING THE OIC.
11. JSOC PERSONNEL WILL REMAIN ASSIGNED TO, AND UNDER THE COMMAND OF, THEIR PARENT UNIT. JSOC PERSONNEL ARE AVAILABLE FOR NECESSARY

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		3	6		

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
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DEFENSE/FATIGUE DUTIES WITH THEIR PARENT UNIT, HOWEVER OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT WILL TAKE PRECEDENCE.

12. ALL PUBLICATIONS, DIRECTIVE IN NATURE, THAT ARE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE JSOC WILL BE PREPARED BY JSOC, COORDINATED IN DRAFT FORM WITH MACV J2 AND ISSUED IN THE MACV DIR 381-SERIES. INTERNAL WORKING AIDS WILL BE ISSUED BY THE OIC, JSOC.

IV- MISSION

13. THE MISSION OF JSOC IS TO ASSIST MACV J2 IN THE FULFILLMENT OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN REGARDS TO AIRBORNE COLLECTION AND ARDF MANAGEMENT. IN PARTICULAR, JSOC WILL:

- A. BASED ON CONSUMER REQUIREMENTS AND STATED FBI, SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AIRBORNE TASKING TO MACV J2.
- B. IMPLEMENT AIRBORNE TASKING.
- C. PERFORM EVALUATIONS AND STUDIES NECESSARY FOR MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS AND UTILIZATION OF MACV CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE RESOURCES, AND OTHER CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE RESOURCES WITHIN MACV AREA OF INTEREST AND AS DIRECTED BY MACV J2.
- D. DIRECT AND EVALUATE THE USE OF OPSCOM CIRCUITS AND AIR TO GROUND SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMMED/UTILIZED IN SUPPORT OF THE MACV CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE EFFORT.

V- FUNCTIONS

14. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JSOC ARE TO:

- A. BASED ON PREPLANNED REQUESTS FROM FIELD COMMANDERS, THE CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNITY AND OTHER AUTHORIZED AGENCIES, SUBMIT RECOMMENDED

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
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DEGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAWN BY	PHONE
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INFO			

ASKING FOR MACV J2 APPROVAL.

- B. IMPLEMENT PREPLANNED TASKING OF AIRBORNE RESOURCES AS DIRECTED BY MACV J2.
- C. APPROVE AND IMPLEMENT EMERGENCY CHANGES TO PREPLANNED TASKING IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING MACV DIRECTIVES.
- D. PERFORM EVALUATIONS OF CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES IN CONJUNCTION WITH, AND THE ASSISTANCE OF, DIPNSA [REDACTED].
- E. OPERATE OPSCOM CIRCUITS, AS REQUIRED, WITH CRYPTOLOGIC/AVIATION UNITS AS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE AIRBORNE COLLECTION AND ARDF PROGRAMS.
- F. PERFORM EVALUATIONS ON EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURE AIR TO GROUND COMMUNICATIONS UTILIZED BY CRYPTOLOGIC UNITS IN SEA IN SUPPORT OF THE CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE PROGRAMS.
- G. ADVISE, AND ASSIST CRYPTOLOGIC AND AVIATION UNITS ON SECURE COMMUNICATIONS RELATED TO CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE PROGRAMS.
- H. PREPARE FOR MACV J2 RELEASE, THOSE DIRECTIVES NECESSARY TO OPERATE ALL PHASES OF THE AIRBORNE COLLECTION AND ARDF PROGRAMS.
- I. ORGANIZE, AND PRESENT PROPOSED TASKING TO THE WEEKLY TASKING COMMITTEE MEETING.
- J. ORGANIZE AND CHAIR THE QUARTERLY ARDF/AIRBORNE COLLECTION CONFERENCE.
- K. CONDUCT SPECIAL BRIEFINGS ON THE ARDF/AIRBORNE COLLECTION PROGRAMS AS REQUIRED BY MACV J2.

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DEGRADING INSTRUCTIONS					

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

L. PERFORM FREQUENT TECHNICAL LIAISON VISITS TO THE CMA'S AND AVIATION UNITS TO INSURE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE OPERATIONS.

M. ADVISE MACV J2 ON ALL MATTERS RELATING TO THE MACV CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES. RECOMMEND NECESSARY ACTIONS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THESE PROGRAMS, UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES, AND THE SATISFACTION OF THESE PROGRAMS.

VI- ORGANIZATION AND SUPPORT

15. THE JSOC WILL BE ORGANIZED FUNCTIONALLY AS RECOMMENDED BY THE OIC, JSOC AND APPROVED BY MACV J2.

16. EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED IN PARA 8 ABOVE, ASSIGNMENTS OF PERSONNEL WITHIN THE JSOC WILL BE MADE ON A BASIS OF MISSION AND QUALIFICATIONS, AND THE RANKING MEMBER OF ANY ELEMENT WILL BE THE OIC/NOIC. WHERE FEASIBLE, INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS WILL ALSO REFLECT A BALANCE BETWEEN SERVICES. EXCEPT FOR THE OIC AND D/OIC, ALL INTERNAL ASSIGNMENTS WILL BE MADE BY THE OIC, JSOC.

END QUOTE.

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ZCZCRD8554L
YARDOR
DE YHAKZ 212378578
P 140650Z
FM PASSTYRON
TO 6994 SOTY SC/DMDR/SSLO
INFO 6922 SOTY MCVMDR/DPS
ZEM

11921
22

SUBJ: ACC REORGANIZATION
REF: A. WY. OPS 300325Z AUG 69.
B. 6994SS SSLO 290745Z AUG 69.
C. USAFSS 007 261947Z NOV 68.

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE THIS HQ'S COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS CENTER. REFERENCED BELOW RELATE TO PARA 3, REF BRAVO.
 - A. REQUEST YOU ATTEMPT TO HAVE THE TERM JOINT ELIMINATED FROM THE NEW FUNCTIONAL TITLE. YOU WILL RECALL CGC CONCERN OVER THE USE OF THIS TERM IN REFERENCE TO THE AGO AND HIS EXPRESSED DESIRE THAT ALL ACTIONS BE DIRECTED TOWARD MAINTAINING THE "COLLOCATED" STATUS OF EQUAL ARMY/AIR FORCE ELEMENTS AND ELIMINATION OF ANY CONNOTATIONS OF "JOINT" OPERATIONS. (REF CHARLIE REFER).
 - B. REFERENCE SECTION 11 - ACCREDITATION, PARA 6: DO NOT CONCUR WITH ASSIGNING A CRYPTOLOG SIG UNIT DESIGNATOR TO THE AGO (JSPO). THIS ACTION WOULD LESSEN THE EFFECTIVENESS AS A OPERATION ACCREDITED TO, AND UNDER THE DIRECTION AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MACV-J2. IT WOULD PLACE NSA IN A PREDOMINANT POSITION TO INTERFERE OR MACV PREROGATIVES IN THE DIRECTION OF TACTICAL SUPPORT TO COMMANDERS UNDER THE OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF MACV.
 - C. REF PARA 8: WHILE WE CONCUR THAT A BALANCE OF STRENGTH IS DESIRABLE, IT MUST BE REALIZED THAT THIS REQUIRES AN INCREASE IN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE AGO. IN VIEW OF THE LENGTHY PROCESS ENCOUNTERED WITH SV HEADROOM, THIS INCREASE WOULD MOST LIKELY BE SATISFIED WITH EXISTING RESOURCES AND AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER 6994TH REQUIREMENTS. IF THE AGO OVERALL STRENGTH IS TO REMAIN CONSISTENT WITH PRESENT LEVELS, THE ARMY WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ITS CURRENT STRENGTH IN PROPORTION TO THE NUMBERS OF AIR FORCE INCREASES. HOWEVER, AF PARTICIPATION MAY HAVE LITTLE MEANING IF NSA WERE TO GAIN A PREDOMINANT ROLE IN AGO OPERATIONS AS OUTLINED IN OUR COMMENTS TO PARA 6 ABOVE.
 - D. REF PARAS 10 AND 11: THESE PARAS ARE NOT COMPATIBLE IF THE DIO OF THE JSPO (AGO) IS TO BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THEIR PARENT UNIT (PARA 11), WHICH HE SHOULD BE, AND ALSO RATED BY MACV J2 (PARA 10). DO NOT CONCUR THAT MACV J2 RATES THE DIO.
 - E. REF SECTION 11 - MISSION: IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT BY AIRBORNE COLLECTION WE ARE REFERRING TO THOSE AIRBORNE PLATFORMS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE USMC (AGC). THIS SAME CLARIFICATION WOULD ENHANCE SECTION 11 FUNCTIONS, PARA 6.
 - F. REF SECTION 11 - FUNCTIONS, PARAS D AND L: THE EXTENT OF EVALUATION NEEDS CLARIFICATION. THERE IS A CONTINUING PROGRAM TO EVALUATE UNIT PERFORMANCE AND MISSION EFFECTIVENESS WITHIN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND OF THE 6994TH. THESE PROCEDURES ARE INHERENT TO THE COMMAND AUTHORITY OF USAFSS ORGANIZATIONS. SUCH A FUNCTION BEING PERFORMED BY THE JSOC (AGO) WOULD DUPLICATE THAT BEING ACCOMPLISHED. PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN THESE TWO PARAS WOULD USURP PREROGATIVES OF THE COMMANDERS OF 6994SS, PASSTYRON, AND USAFSS.
2. WE SEE NO MENTION OF 7AF PARTICIPATION IN THE TERMS OF REFERENCE. AS THE OPERATING AGENCY FOR THE AIR FORCE ARDF PROGRAM IN SEA, 7AF PARTICIPATION IS A NECESSITY. AS WRITTEN PERSONNEL NOT IN COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF AIRFRAME PROCEDURES COULD CAUSE CONFUSION AND CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THE AIRFRAME OPERATOR. SINCE 7AF HAS SHOWN AN INCREASED INTEREST IN MANAGEMENT OF AF ARDF, THEY SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN JSOC (AGO) OPERATIONS.
3. THE INTENT OF THE REORGANIZATION APPEARS TO BE TO INCREASE DIRECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY OF WHAT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST A COORDINATING BODY. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE ORGANIZATION DOES HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES DIRECTIVE IN NATURE; HOWEVER, IT IS STILL ONLY A COORDINATING BODY. THROUGH DIRECTIVES IT DOES ISSUE ARE A RESULT OF ARMY/AIR FORCE COORDINATION. THE SUBTLE CHANGE OF THE AGO TO A JSOC AND THE APPARENT INTENT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT COULD LEAD TO INCREASED LOSS OF COORDINATION AND CHANGES IN DIRECTION AND DIRECTIVES EVERY 6 MONTHS AS DIO ROTATES FROM ARMY TO AIR FORCE. MUST EMPHASIZE WE FEEL THE AGO BODY IS A COORDINATING BODY AND ALL FUNCTIONS BEST IN THAT ROLE AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A JOINT OPERATIONAL BODY.

PS 13500

SUPPORT DOCUMENT 23

OPS
JLH

23

301

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88
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Luf

PRIORITY

69945CTY90

69239CTY90

[REDACTED] SEP 69

SUBJ: DISCUSSION OF CURRENT ACC SITUATION.

- REFS: A. 6994/SBLG 290545Z AUG 69.
- B. PSR OPS 140630Z AUG 69.
- C. 6994 OPS 220935Z SEP 69.
- D. PSR CDF 240757Z SEP 69.

1. AFTER A REVIEW HERE OF ALL MSGS FURNISHED ON THE SUBJECT AND THE VIEW THAT OUR MSG CITE OPS 220935Z SEP 69 MAY HAVE BEEN TAKEN SLIGHTLY OUT OF CONTEXT WE FEEL MORE INFORMATION CAN BE ADDED THROUGH REFERENCE TO THE CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE ACC.

2. WHEN THE ARDF PROGRAM FIRST CAME INTO BEING ITS ONLY GOAL WAS TO OBTAIN FILES AND THERE WAS NO APPARENT PROBLEM WITH THE CAPABILITY OF THE ACC TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY. HOWEVER, ON 1 APRIL 1969 A NEW MACV DIR 361-23 WAS PUBLISHED AND IT ATTEMPTED TO REGULATE THE INCREASED FUNCTION OF COLLECTION AND PRESCRIBED THAT THE ACC SHOULD CONTINUALLY EVALUATE THE TECHNICAL OPERATION OF THE ARDF PROGRAM AND PROVIDE MACV J2 WITH THE RECOMMENDED METHODS OF IMPROVING EFFICIENCY

25

SEP

69

1

3623


LTCOL JAMES W JOHNSON

DUANE E RUSSELL, LtCol, USAF
Commander


AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM REQUEST. AT THIS POINT WE NOW HAD
A COMBINED ARMY/AF COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION ATTEMPTING, WITHIN THE
POLITICAL ARENA ASSOCIATED WITH ROLES AND MISSIONS IN THE ANDP
HASSE TO OPERATE AN INCREASINGLY COMPLEX MISSION. BEARING IN MIND
THAT THE WORKING AID IS THE GUIDE FOR ALL ACTION, WE NOW HAD A
SITUATION WHERE PROCEDURES NEEDED TO BE DEVELOPED FOR AIR FORCE
EQUIPMENT THAT WAS DUAL CAPABLE WHEN ARMY DID NOT HAVE THEIR DUAL
CAPABILITY YET. WE HAD TO ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE EVALUATIONS OF THESE
VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF REPORT. THE SUSPICIONS DERIVED FROM
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS MADE COORDINATION EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND
HAS TENDED TO WATER DOWN THE DIRECTIVES AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS.
MACV J211 ON THE OTHER HAND HAVING TASKED THE ACC TO EVALUATE
REQUEST INFORMATION FROM THEM. THIS HAS PLACED THE ACC IN THE
AWKWARD POSITION OF RECEIVING DIRECTION FROM MACV J2 AND YET THEY
ARE REQUIRED TO COORDINATE THEIR ANSWER. IN RECOGNITION OF THIS
PROBLEM MACV J21 SUBMITTED A PROPOSAL TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.
THIS PROPOSAL WAS FORWARDED TO YOU IN REF A.

3. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT A MEETING
TO BE HELD ON 3 SEP. COL BRANCO, 7AF DE, COL LIEBER, 7AF DE AND
LTCOL BENA DEGES ATTENDED IN ADDITION TO THE NEPS FROM 6994. AT
THIS MEETING COL BRADLEY FROM THE SOUTH BR GROUP TOOK EXCEPTION TO
THE J2 PROPOSAL FOR THE SINGULAR REASON THAT THEY ^{HAD} MADE IT. IT WAS

HIS POSITION THAT HE IS OUTSIDE THE SIGINT COMMUNITY AND SHOULD ASK
THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY I.E. 6994TH AND 509TH TO STUDY THE
PROBLEM (HE QUESTIONED THAT THERE WAS ONE) AND OFFER A SOLUTION.
COL FRANK TAP DID MAKE EXCEPTION TO HIS REF TO 6994TH AND STATED
THAT THE 509TH AND TAP WOULD WORK OUT THE PROBLEM. THROUGH THIS
AVENUE TAP AND 509TH GOT JC MACV APPROVAL TO SUBMIT THEIR JOINT
EVALUATION OF THE PROBLEM BY 1 OCT 69. SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WERE
HELD AT THE SOUTH BETWEEN AF AND ARMY REPRESENTATIVES (LTCOL
JOHNSON WAS REPRESENTED 6994/USAF AT ALL OF THESE MEETINGS). PER
POSITION AS STATED IN REF B WAS MADE KNOWN TO TAP. THE PURPOSE
OF THE MEETINGS WITH 509 WAS IN DIRECT CONCORD WITH PARA 3 OF
UR MSG (REF D) IN THAT THE PURPOSE WAS TO REVIEW, UPDATE OR
REVISE AS DEEMED NECESSARY. THE QUESTIONS EXAMINED WERE (1) IS
THERE A PROBLEM? (2) IS THE CURRENT ORGANIZATION ADEQUATE? (3)
DOES IT NEED REVISION ETC. THERE WAS MUTUAL AGREEMENT THAT THERE
WAS A PROBLEM. A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE
AND FUNCTIONS DEMONSTRATED THAT BOTH PARTIES WERE SATISFIED THAT
THIS WAS ADEQUATE EXCEPT FOR AVIATION UNIT REPRESENTATION IN SOME
MANNER. THE ONLY THING LEFT TO CONSIDER WAS THE SOURCE OF ORIGINAL
CONCEPT I.E. DOES THE MANAGEMENT OF THE AGC FUNCTION PROPERLY?
THROUGH THERE ARE SOME MINOR DIFFERENCES THIS SEEMS TO BE THE ONLY




POINT OF CONTENTION. THIS DIFFERENCE IN OPINION HAS PRECIPITATED AT THIS POINT TO TWO SEPARATE PROPOSALS, 7AF AND 509TH. BOTH PROPOSALS TREAT IDENTICALLY WITH FUNCTIONS, LOGISTICS ETC. AND ARE IN FACT VERY SIMILAR TO THE ORIGINAL MACV PROPOSAL. INTERESTINGLY, WE NOTE THAT ORGANIZATIONALLY THERE IS NO REAL CHANGE FROM THE PRESENT STRUCTURE. THE 509TH RE GROUP PROPOSAL INSISTS THAT THE OIC AND DEP OIC WILL REMAIN UNDER THE CONTROL OF AND BE RATED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE UNITS, WHEREAS THE AF PROPOSAL RELINQUISHES CONTROL AND RATING OF THE OIC TO MACV J2 AND THE DEPUTY RATING TO OIC. 7AF POSITION IS THAT THIS ALLOWS THE INDIVIDUALS TO BE OBJECTIVE IN REGULATING AND EVALUATING THE OVERALL ARDP PROGRAM FOR MACV. 509TH PROPOSAL IS INSISTING THAT THE OIC AND DEP OIC REMAIN UNDER THEIR RESPECTIVE UNITS, WHICH IN FACT, IMPLIES THAT NO CHANGE IS NECESSARY. A. THIS, OF COURSE, CONSTITUTES REASON FOR OUR COMMENT (REF C) ON OIC BEING AN O5. PRESENT 7AF PROPOSAL, ALSO INFORMALLY FAWORED BY MACV J21, IS THAT IF OIC'S ARE ROTATED, AF SHOULD BE INITIAL INCUMBENT. FURTHER REASON FOR ARMED TECHNICIANS IS EXPANDING ROLE IN EVALUATION CITED EARLIER THIS MSG. FULLY BELIEVE 7AF TO BE AGGRESSIVE IN THEIR ROLE/RESPONSIBILITY IN ACC. AT THIS POINT, WE NOW HAVE AN AGGRESSIVELY STAFFED 7AF POSITION SOMEWHAT OPPOSED TO A 509 POSITION. FEEL CERTAIN ARMED MEETINGS WILL BE HELD TO





ATTEMPT AGREEMENT BEFORE 1 OCT MACV SUSPENSE DATE. WILL ADVISE
FURTHER, AND WILL DISCUSS THOROUGHLY WITH COL PEESS 26 SEP.



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SUPPORT DOCUMENT 24

24

085
224

12/08/07

6994SCTYSQ

PAG8CTYBGN

INFO: DET 1, 6994SCTYSQ

6922SCTYWG

[REDACTED]

SEP 69.

SUBJ: ARDF CALIBRATION SITE, CAM RAHN BAY.

REF: CONVERSATION BETWEEN LT COL RUSSELL AND MAJ EDDY, SAME SUBJECT.

1. CALIBRATION/RECALIBRATION REQUIREMENTS FOR ARDF SYSTEMS ARE CONSIDERED INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT RETENTION OF EXISTING CALIBRATION FACILITY AT CAM RAHN BAY. DURING THE PERIOD 13 OCT 68 THRU 7 FEB 69, SEVEN AIRCRAFT WERE RECALIBRATION OF THESE SEVEN AIRCRAFT REVEALED INSIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO CALIBRATION CURVES WERE NECESSARY. AS A RESULT, NO FURTHER RECALIBRATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE 7 FEB 69, NOR ARE ANY ROUTINE RECALIBRATIONS ENVISIONED. THE ONLY POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR FUTURE RECALIBRATIONS IS AFTER AN AIRCRAFT HAS SUFFERED MAJOR STRUCTURAL DAMAGE; AND THEN ONLY AFTER POST MISSION TEST CHECKS ARE CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE IF EXISTING CALIBRATION CURVES ARE ERRONEOUS.

11

SEP 1969

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2

4891

MAJOR HOLMES

FRANK E RUSSELL, Lt Colonel, USAF

or

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ROUTINE

2. PART READILY AVAILABLE ATWFIELD/SUPPORT FACILITIES USED IN CON-
JUNCTION WITH CALIBRATION AND LOCATED IN IMMEDIATE AREA OF CALIBRA-
TION FACILITY ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE, SINCE DET 1, 6994SCTYSQ MOVE
TO PERCY.

3. RECORDED AND CALIBRATION SITE AT CAM BARR BAY BE REMOVED FROM
SITE AND STORED AT CLARK STB.

ec47.com

OR 12/18072-5/69

[REDACTED]

ROUTINE

25

PT 00143
RTTSZYUW RUHHWHA3739 2592140-SSSS- SQSNA.
ZNY SSSSS
R 162130Z SEP 69
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO RUMMWA/6922SCTYWG MAT CLARK AB PEI
INFO BUSQSNA/6994SCTYSQ MAT TAN SON NH AB HVN
BT

LOG

SUBJ: REQUIREMENT FOR CALIBRATION FACILITY

- REF: A. 6994 ~~REF~~ 120807Z SEP 69
B. PSR LOG-MFO 110235Z SEP 69
C. 6994 MAT 130857Z SEP 69
D. PSR LTR, SUBJ: PSR STAFF VISIT TO HQ USAFSS 2-5 SEP 69, DATED 10 SEP 69.
E. USAFSS TED 122100Z SEP 69, PARA C AND D.
F. 6922 SPT SQ MAT 150416Z SEP 69

1. REF D, WHICH IS ENROUTE YOUR ORGANIZATION STATES THAT USAFSS LDM IS NOW COMMAND OPR FOR REWRITING POST MISSION TEST PROCEDURES AND FOR DETERMINING REQUIREMENTS FOR A CALIBRATION FACILITY. 30 SEP 69 IS THE DATE FOR COMPLETING THE STAFF STUDY ON THE POST MISSION TEST PROCEDURES. LDM IS CONSIDERING POSSIBLE USE OF DSU AND OR OTHER FRIENDLY EMITTERS.

PAGE 2 RUHHWHA3739

2. LT COL HENNING MET WITH LDM AND TED MAJ EDDY AND THEY HAVE AGREED TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE CALIBRATION FACILITY AFTER SATISFACTORY POST MISSION TEST PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. LDM WILL ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP PMT PROCEDURES WHICH WILL ALSO SUFFICE FOR CALIBRATION. ASD AND USAFAS ARE WORKING TOWARD IMPROVED CALIBRATION PROCEDURES AS MENTIONED IN REF E.

3. CONCUR WITH YOUR PROPOSAL IN REF F. ESSENTIAL THAT UPPER AND LOWER GUY SYSTEMS BE REPLACED SOONEST. GP-1.

BT

N3739

NNNN/

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202004300055
AF WARD
DE WILKINS RD 2490159
F 890155Z
FM PACSTYRIN
TO 699453/OPS
INFO 692250/OPS
USAFSW/TED/PAD

[REDACTED]
DPS-1

SUBJ PACAF LIFE SUPPORT SQNGO. (PLSS)
REF: 699453/OPS 053140Z SEPT 69. (NOFAL USAFSS/692250)
1. REF MSG PASSED TAF MSG REQUESTING INCREASE IN PLSS
QUOTA FROM 5AF TO ACCOMMODATE 699453 PERSONNEL. 5AF REPLY
STATED THAT EARLIEST INCREASE IN CLASS QUOTAS WOULD BE IN
OY 70 SCHEDULE. AS RESULT, 699453 DESIRES WAIVER FOR
REMAINDER OF OY 69.
2. PACAF (DOTEFL) IS INFORMING TAF THAT WAIVER WILL BE
GRANTED FOR REMAINDER OF THIS YEAR, HOWEVER, PROVISIO IS
INCLUDED THAT TAF PROVIDE INTERIM INFORMAL TRAINING FOR
699453 PERSONNEL BY USE OF WATER SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT.
3. REQUEST YOU COORDINATE WITH LIFE SUPPORT OFFICE AT TAF
(MAJ LAYMON) TO ENSURE THAT TRAINING IS ACCOMPLISHED PENDING
ENTRY OF 699453 PERSONNEL INTO THE PLSS IN OY70. OP-1
BTB

[REDACTED]

Support Document

*Recd
6994
28
OPS/OPS-1*

ROUTINE

PT 00119
RTTCZYUW RWTEJA2274 3512217-CCCC--RUSQSN.
ZNY CCECC
R 171945Z DEC 69
FM USAFSS
TO RUHHABA/CINCPACAF/DO/
INFO RUHHWA/PACSCTYRGN/OPS-A/WHEELER AFB HAWAII
RUSQSN/6994SCTYSO/OPS/TAN SON NHUT AFLD VIETNAM
RUMWTA/6922SCTYW6/OPS/CLARK AB PHIL
BT

PTD 7

SUBJ: LIFE SUPPORT TNG FOR 6994SS.
REF UR DO 152030Z NOV 69 (NOTAL).

1. QUOTAS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AND LIFE SUPPORT TNG WILL COMMENCE AT PERRIN AND TYNDALL AFB IN JAN 70 FOR AIR CREWS ENROUTE TO 6994SS AND DETS.
2. SINCE APPROX ONE-THIRD OF THE RESOURCES FOR THESE UNITS COME COT FROM UNITS WITHIN PSR, HIS HQ HAS SUGGESTED THE REGION OBTAIN QUOTAS AT KADENA FOR THESE PERSONNEL IN-THEATER PRIOR TO RETURNING TO CONUS FOR OTHER TNG. THIS WILL REDUCE THE EXCESSIVE TNG AND LEAVE TIME IN THE CONUS.
3. PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN YOUR HQ AND PSR PROPOSED THE METHOD FOR TNG THOSE PERSONNEL ALREADY ON-BOARD

PAGE 2 RWTEJA2274 [REDACTED]
AT 6994SS AND DETS.

4. THE ABOVE ACTIONS SHOULD ASSURE THAT ALL PERSONNEL EXCEPT ISOLATED CASES GET LIFE SUPPORT TNG. SCHEDULING PROBLEMS WILL PREVENT SOME FROM RECEIVING THIS TNG PRIOR TO ARRIVAL AT THE UNITS. THESE PERSONNEL WILL HAVE TO BE SENT TOY TO KADENA AFTER ARRIVAL AT THE UNIT. RP-3

BT
#2274

NNNN#

ROUTINE

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SUPPORT DOCUMENT
30

File OPS
A/23
30

5 DEC 1969

Victimization of ARDF Program

VAF (SI)

1. For initial requirements as a result of conversation between Colonel Frank M. Johnson, VAF DI and Lt Colonel Russell, 674th Security Squadron, the following concept for Victimization of the VAF ARDF program is forwarded.

2. ASSUMPTIONS

a. There will be a requirement for VNAF forces to expand their ARDF program concurrent with the withdrawal of U.S. forces in the RVN.

b. Appropriate defense department agencies will authorize delivery of EC-47 aircraft and ARDF equipment to the VNAF.

c. Approval for the VNAF to participate in the ARDF program will be given by the Senior U.S. Cryptologic Agency.

d. VNAF requirements for ARDF coverage will approximate those of the current Air Force fleet insofar as geography is concerned.

3. DISCUSSION

With the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Vietnam, the VNAF will continue to have an intelligence requirement regarding disposition of PVA and VC forces in South Vietnam. The primary and most effective method of locating these forces is through employment of ARDF techniques as operated by the U.S. Air Force in the current time-frame. Because of the increased requirement for ARDF effort, the limited capability of the current VNAF fleet (Three U-6 aircraft) will be entirely inadequate to satisfy the need for ARDF. The Aural Hull system contained in the U-6 aircraft presently in use by the VNAF ARDF effort is inferior to the 360 degree time differential measurement technique used by the U.S. Air Force. VNAF requirements can be satisfied by using the current AIR-31 ARDF system with fewer aircraft than would be required if the Aural Hull system were to be employed.

[REDACTED]

1. AIRFRAME

The most effective airframe for use in conjunction with the AIF-34 system is the C-47. Weight limitations preclude use of the AIF-34 system with U-6 or U-8 aircraft. Aircraft will be configured with ARDF and acquisition positions. The ARDF and navigator positions will be configured the same as the current AIF-34 system. The acquisition position will be the same as the current acquisition except that the G-124, G-126 and G-176 equipments will not be included. Secure air/ground communications capability will be provided with the KI-2 encryption devices being used.

2. DISSEMINATION

Approximately 30 - 35 aircraft will be required to fulfill the ARDF requirements of the VNAF. The aircraft will be deployed at various bases within South Vietnam. Ideally, there would be no less than three units equally divided in number and deployed so that maximum time could be obtained in desired area of coverage. Possible locations for ARDF units include Nhatrang, Da Nang, and Tan Son Nhut.

3. MAINTENANCE

The sophistication of the AIF-34 system would require a U.S. maintenance advisory technician at each location that possesses full maintenance capability.

4. TRAINING

Training of operators on the ARDF fix techniques can be accomplished in no more than 1 - 2 months assuming proficient radio operators are provided as inputs. Training of the aircrew will be accomplished by the VNAF. Training of proficient navigators in the techniques employed in the AIF-34 system can be accomplished within a maximum period of 1 - 2 months. Training would be accomplished in-country through ground school on theory of the system. Checkout of operators and navigators will be accomplished through check flights on VNAF assigned aircraft flown and operated by VNAF crews. U.S. crews would accompany the VNAF forces for approximately 10 missions prior to certifying VNAF crews.

5. PHASING

Crew training and assumption of the ARDF operational mission will be accomplished over a period of approximately one year. Specific phasing will be determined at a later date.

WALTER S. RUSSELL, Lt Col, USAF
Commander

[REDACTED]

31 015-1
204



(W8)

08422
2064

(NRP)




... MISSION

... SUBJECT AIR-
... TAKEOFF AFTER MAKING OPS STOP AT

... LOCAL.
... EDGE OF RUNWAY.
... DUNN, CURTIS A.
... GILLY, G.
... WAYNE E.
... ROBERT B.

... CREW WERE
... INJURIES TO THE
... THIS TIME.

... CRASHED ON TAKE-OFF OF
... STOP. APPARENTLY
... EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO ROFT, FROM FIRE. AT ACTUAL EXTENT UNKNOWN. ADET
... SECURITY ASSIS-
... EQUIP IS



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
4304 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON (USAFSS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

32



29 December 1969

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: OPS-2

Subject: Master Program Review Board

By: CDR

1. The Master Program Review Board convened at 0945 hours, 26 December 1969 in Squadron Operations. The following members were present:

Major Holmes	Assistant Operations Officer
Captain Lewis	Chief of Maintenance
CMS Norwood	NCOIC Operations
SMS Robbins	NCOIC Mission Management
MSgt Foti	Recorder

2. MSgt Foti read the minutes of the previous meeting.

3. The Board examined the two outstanding Squadron-wide Master Program deviations. The following changes are necessary to accurately reflect present conditions:

a. Page 55, Row 2, YFO 100. Delete one position to reflect the permanent loss of EDFX 103. Page 55, Row 4, YFO 110. Delete one position to reflect the permanent loss of EDFY 103. Mission equipment was destroyed and burned beyond recognition when aircraft 43-49100 crashed and burned. Loss was reflected in USA-562 PSR 157. Destruction team completed destruction of remaining portions of the aircraft.

b. Page 57, Row 2, YFO 101. Delete one position to reflect the permanent loss of EDFI 218. Page 57, Row 8, YFO 110. Delete one position to reflect the permanent loss of EDFY 218. Page 57, Row 10, YFO 120. Delete two positions to reflect the permanent loss of EDFZ 229-230. Loss of equipment resulted from the crash of aircraft 43-49959 at Hue Phu Bai on 30 September 1969. (USA-563 PSRs 296 & 298 refer.) Mission equipment was removed and returned to Pleiku. Captain Lewis reported to the Board that equipment was subsequently shipped to the depot.

Master Program Change Requests on the above items have been submitted to USAFSS by PACSCTRGN (see PSR OPS-R 142031Z OCT 69). Final USAFSS approval is pending.

4. Consideration was given to a request made by the Detachment 1 Master Program Review Board concerning the transfer of ground calibration equipment accountability from Detachment to Squadron level. Though the

with Revisions Required
OK [Signature]
29 Dec 69



request had sufficient merit, the Board felt that a decision on the matter should be deferred until a final resolution is made on the disposition of the calibration site. A decision on accountability for calibration equipment will be made at that time.

5. Major Holmes suggested that Detachments may not be aware of the USAFSS view on submitting Master Program Change Requests for permanent changes only. Since the Detachments were not addressees on the message which expressed this view, the Board agreed that paragraph 2 of 6922 Security Wing OPFM 200849Z August 1969 should be quoted to the Detachments for their guidance in holding future Master Program Review Boards.

6. The matter of the Master Program Change Request submitted by Detachment 3 on 6 October 1969 concerning deletion of one Radio Telephone Processing position (TAP 001D) was discussed. The Board agreed with the view expressed by 6922 Security Wing (see 6922 SCTWING OPFM 100737Z Nov-69, Subject: Master Program Change Request) that this Master Program Change Request should be held in abeyance until a firm decision is reached regarding the number of aircraft to be based at NKP subsequent to the projected re-location of Detachment 2.

7. Captain Lewis reported that all CONJAN(2) equipment, Page 52, Line 10, YFO 130 has been down loaded and all except one console stored in the warehouse. The one console not stored in the warehouse is used as a mock-up in 6994 Scty Sq Maintenance. The Master Program will continue to show the availability of the equipment. Captain Lewis restated the official position that equipment could be re-installed within 48 hours if needed.

8. There being no further business to discuss, the meeting was adjourned at 1035.

J. W. Johnson Jr.
JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt. Col., USAF
Operations Officer

Cy to:
6922 SW OPS
Det 1
Det 2
Det 3

91 / 10456

ZCZORDA115
PP YIRDOR
DE ZHLAKZ 39 2540589
P 110507Z
FM PACSOTYR BN
TO 699483/CDR
ZFI

[REDACTED] VCD
SUBJECT: REMOVAL OF "Q" JAMMING EQUIPMENT ABOARD EC-47
AIRCRAFT
DURING RECENT VISIT TO COMMAND WE WERE ADVISED THAT THE
"Q" JAMMING EQUIPMENT COULD BE REMOVED FROM THE FIVE (5)
EC-47S. THESE AIRCRAFT WOULD THEN REVERT TO A PRIMARY
MISSION OF ARDF ONLY, WITH NO "Z" COLLECTION CAPABILITY
ABOARD. AS YOU MAY RECALL, THE MASTER PROGRAM WAS TO
REFLECT THESE AIRCRAFT AS BEING EQUIPPED BUT NOT MANNED,
WITH A FOOTNOTE TO THE EFFECT THAT EQUIPMENT WOULD BE
REMOVED AND STORED WITH REINSTALLATION CAPABILITY OF 48
HOURS. WE WERE IN THE PROCESS OF ADVISING YOU TO REMOVE
THE EQUIPMENT AND PLACE IT IN STORAGE, HOWEVER, PRIOR TO
THE RELEASE OF THE MESSAGE THIS WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE
HEADQUARTERS (TED) AND WE WERE REQUESTED TO DETERMINE
WHETHER IT WOULD HAVE ANY IMPACT UPON MACV OR 7AF IF THIS
POSITION WAS IN FACT IMPLEMENTED. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR
DISCUSSING THIS WITH 7AF AND, DEPENDING UPON THE OUTCOME OF
THESE DISCUSSIONS, THEN PROCEED TO OBTAIN A J2 MACV
CONCURRENCE TO THE REMOVAL OF THIS EQUIPMENT. AS YOU WELL
KNOW WE WILL OBTAIN ABOUT 1 1/2 HOURS MORE PER SORTIE WITH THE
REMOVAL OF THIS EQUIPMENT. WE WILL WITHHOLD ANY FURTHER
ACTION UNTIL RECEIPT OF YOUR REPLY.

ops/cdr

[REDACTED]

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SECRET DOCUMENT 38

35

S. Miller
Wilmington 11/63

OPS

8 October 1969

Removal of the "Q" Consoles from Five EC 47 Aircraft (C)

Lt Col Shorne
10-69

460 TFW (DCCW)
Attn: Lt Col Thurber

CLDR


1. [REDACTED] This letter is to confirm our telecon regarding the removal of the "Q" consoles from five EC 47 aircraft.

2. [REDACTED] MCV has approved the removal of these equipments and the subsequent utilization of these aircraft as straight combat cougar aircraft. However, the requirement remains that we be capable of reinstalling and flying in the original configuration within 48 hours. Since the residual configuration (i.e. wiring etc) of these aircraft is peculiar, they must remain together and at Tan Son Nhut. This precludes their being used in any other capacity or being sent as replacement aircraft to NKP.

3. (S) Should you desire any further information on this subject, please advise.

FOR THE COMMANDER

JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF
Operations Officer



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37

OPS-1
224

ROUTINE

15/0848Z

6994SCTYSQ

6922SCTYWG


PAOSCTYBCH



FOLLOWING RESUME OF INFO IS FORWARDED FOR UR INFORMATION.

File

1. Prior TO OUR FORWARDING THE MSG TO J2 REQUESTING DELETION OF THE JAMMING POSITIONS FROM THE BC47 MEV EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN OVER THE LOSS OF THIS COLLECTION CAPABILITY.
2. AT THAT TIME WE ADVISED THEIR REP THAT WE WOULD SEND A MSG TO J2 AND THEY SHOULD MAKE THEIR VIEWS A PART OF HIS CONSIDERATION FOR APPROVAL OR DISSAPPROVAL. AS YOU KNOW WE SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED J2'S CONCURRENCE AND HAVE REMOVED THE POSITIONS. AT THE NEXT WEDNESDAY MEETING AFTER THAT ACTION (8 OCT 69) J2114 EXPRESSED THAT THEY HAD MISUNDERSTOOD AND THOUGHT THAT THE REQUEST CONCERNED ONLY THE JAMMER AND NOT THE ENTIRE POSITION. When ADVISED OF WEIGHT AND FLT TIME DIFFERENCE, THEY RELENTED AND THE INCIDENT WAS DROPPED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WITH THE CONVERSION OF THE JAMMER ACFT TO STRAIGHT ARDY, THERE ARE ONLY THREE ZULU CONFIGURED ACFT ASSIGNED AT TSN.




15
OCT 1969

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4891

JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF



ROUTINE

WE HAD PREVIOUSLY POINTED OUT THIS FACT TO J2 AND HAVE ASKED FOR AN ASSESSMENT ON POSSIBLY RELOCATING ZULU RESOURCES. ON 14 OCT 69, WE NOTED WITH SOME CONCERN THAT ONLY ONE COLLECTION MISSION HAD BEEN FLOWN IN THREE DAYS.

3. WE THEN APPROACHED [REDACTED] WITH THE VIEW OF REASSESSING AND MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING RELOCATION OF ZULU ACFT. OUR CONCERN IS THAT THE FEW ACFT IN THE TSM AREA WILL BEGIN TO AFFECT OUR CONTINUITY AND SUBSEQUENT IDENTIFICATION CAPABILITY. IT WAS AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS DISCUSSION THAT WE FOUND THAT [REDACTED] HAD NOT BEEN COORDINATED BY J2 ON REMOVAL OF THE JAMMING POSITIONS. THEY STATED SOME FAIRLY SEVERE OBJECTIONS TO ^{the positions} ~~THEIR~~ HAVING BEEN REMOVED AND BEGAN TO QUERY US REGARDING THE REPLACEMENT ASAP. OUR POSITION WAS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN LEGALLY REMOVED. REINSTALLATION WOULD HAVE TO BE A MATTER BETWEEN NSA AND USAFSS SINCE OTHER PROGRAMMING ACTIONS HAVE BEEN PRECIPITATED BY THIS ACTION. FROM THE TONES AND SINCERE FEELINGS, BELIEVE [REDACTED] WILL PURSUE MATTER FURTHER WITH NSA WITH VIEW TO THEIR SUPPORT FOR REINSTALLATION. IN THE MEANTIME THEY WILL EVALUATE THE RELATIVE MERITS OF RELOCATION OF ZULU RESOURCES. WE WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.


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DISTRIBUTION OF ADF ASSETS
WERE SENT TO OPS 270300Z OCT 69. CONSIDERED A PROPOSAL TO MOVE
FROM CONSIDERED ASSET FROM THIS UNIT TO THE... RELATIVELY UN-
NALLY BEAR FRAGILE FOR EFFECTIVE COVER...
OPERATIVE AREAS WERE TASKED WITH COPYING...
COMMUNICATIONS. THE MAJORITY OF COPY...
MISSION IS A HIGH LEVEL...
CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT...
OTZ AREA IN ACCOMPLISHING THEIR DESIGNED MISSION.



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Support Document #4

PP 14800
DET 502 2491305
R 0500 ZBK
PA PROBA YRGN
TO 6904 59 55L O/OPS
INFO 6922 5W CPS

SUBJ: ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SCHEDULED TOT.

REF: DET 2, 699466 DURMIS 03099.

RECENT REPORTS THAT 362 TEWS WILL NO LONGER MAKE THE FUEL STOPS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE 7 HOUR SORTIES. AS A RESULT, THEY EXPECT A DECREASE IN ACCOMPLISHED FRAGGED TOT.

2. BELIEVE THIS DEVELOPMENT IS INDICATIVE OF THE CURRENT STATE OF EVENTS AND HIGHLIGHTS THE CRITICAL NEED FOR BETTER MACV/ACC UNDERSTANDING OF EC-47 FLIGHT CAPABILITIES/LIMITATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE COMBAT COUGAR OPERATIONS ORDER (A50-69) DOES NOT CALL FOR 7 HOUR SORTIES, 7AF APPARENTLY HAS NOT INFORMED MACV THAT SHORTER SORTIES WILL BE PROVIDED (WITH A CORRESPONDING DECREASE IN SCHEDULED TOT REQUIRED). IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT MACV BE PROVIDED AN AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT OF THE IMPACT OF TAKE-OFF WEIGHT RESTRICTIONS ON EC-47 CRUISE DURATION.

UNLESS MACV IS SO ADVISED AND SCHEDULED TOT'S ARE REDUCED TO MATCH AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY, THE RECORD WILL CONTINUE TO REFLECT THAT ARDY ARDF AIRCRAFT ARE MEETING THEIR COMMITMENTS WHILE USAF AIRCRAFT ARE NOT.

3. REQUEST YOU POINT THIS OUT TO THE MISSION PLANNERS AND FRAGGING ACTIVITIES AT 7AF AND STRONGLY PUSH FOR COORDINATION WITH MACV TO OBTAIN MORE REALISTIC TOT SCHEDULES. 7AF AND ACC SHOULD BE AWARE THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING THIS A SERIOUS PROBLEM AND ARE EXPLORING EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES FOR INCREASING MISSION TIME. THESE INCLUDE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF FLYING WITH ONLY THOSE OPERATORS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH PRIMARY MISSION (E.G. IF THE MISSION IS TASKED AS PRIMARY COLLECTION, THE ARDF OPERATOR WOULD NOT FLY; IF TASKED AS ARDF, THE Z POSITION WOULD NOT BE MANNED). ADVISE RESULTS OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS ASAP.

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Support Document
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180845Z Jan 69

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ROUTINE

6994SCTYB

PACBCTYRGN

SUBJ: OPNL REQUIREMENT FOR UNIT A/G/A X-SPOCS.

REFUR OPS/COM 12044SZ.

1. CONCUR THAT PRESENT USE OF UNIT A/G/A COMM FACs DOES NOT JUSTIFY THEIR RETENTION FROM A PURE OPERATIONAL STANDPOINT.
2. PLANNED OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES TO BE IMPLEMENTED WITH THE EXPANDED ANALYTICAL EFFORT COULD, HOWEVER, NECESSITATE SECURE A/G/A COMMS AT THE 6994TH. FOR EXAMPLE, WE PLAN TO PASS ALL EXPLOITABLE MSGS/FIXES TO THE LOCAL ANALYSIS SECTION FOR IMMEDIATE EXPLOITATION AND RELAY TO THE CMA. THAT REQUIREMENT WILL NOT EXIST AT DET 1/2 UNLESS THOSE UNITS' AREAS OF COVERAGE ARE REVERSED (I.E. DET 2'S AND WITH MINOR EXCEPTION DET 1'S AREAS OF COVERAGE ARE TOO FAR FROM THEIR HOME BASE TO PERMIT EFFECTIVE A/G/A COMMS.)
3. FURTHER BE ADVISED THAT THE LOCAL AFCS EXPENDS LESS THAN THREE HPT, THREE MAINTENANCE HOURS PER MONTH ON OUR GRC-27/KY-8 UNIT.
4. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, FEEL IT IS IN OUR BEST INTEREST TO RETAIN

18

SEP

1969

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4891

SMSGT MILLER

JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF
Operations Officer

ROUTINE

THOSE FACTS RATHER THAN RELINGUISH THEM AT THIS TIME AND POSSIBLY
HAVE TO REJUSTIFY AND WAIT FOR THEIR RE-INSTALLATION WHEN OPERATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS DICTATE THEIR NEED.

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2210902Z Nov 69
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[REDACTED]

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PRIORITY

6994SCTYSQ

PACSCTYLGN/OPS/COM/

INFO: 6922SCTYMG

DET 1 6994SCTYSQ

DET 2 6994SCTYSQ

[REDACTED]

SUBJ: REMOVAL OF 6994TH COMPLEX A/G/A COMM PACS.

REF: A. UR COM-6 210018Z NOV 69.

B. UR OPS/COM 120448Z SEP 69 (NOTAL)

C. MY O/S/COMM 180845Z SEP 69 (NOTAL)

1. REQUEST IMMEDIATE ACTION BE TAKEN TO RECIAMA THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REF A. FEEL THE 6994TH COMPLEX, AFTER NEARLY FOUR YEARS OF EFFORT, IS WELL ON ITS WAY TO OBTAINING A SANCTIONED ANALYSIS AND REPORTING EFFORT. DET 3 NOW HAS AUTHORIZED TACREP REPORTING RESPONSIBILITY, DET 2 IS PRESENTLY TESTING TRANSCRIPTION AND ALL 6994TH UNITS ARE CURRENTLY TASKED WITH FULL EMR REPORTING. THEREFORE, IT WOULD APPEAR LOGICAL THAT OUR NEXT STEP OF PROGRESSION WOULD BE TACREP AUTHORITY AT ALL LOCATIONS. IF/WHEN DET 2 RELOCATES TO DANANG THEY WILL BE IN THE NECESSARY GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION TO ACCEPT A/G TRAFFIC FROM THE LARGER MAJORITY OF THEIR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY; THE

22
NOV 69
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SMSGT MILLER

[REDACTED]

JAMES W JOHNSON, JR, LtCol, USAF
Operations Officer

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6994TH IS ALREADY IN THAT POSITION AND CURRENTLY HAS THE ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY OF TACREP REPORTING. HOWEVER, WITHOUT A/G/A COMMS, WE WOULD NEVER HOPE TO JUSTIFY A FULLY SANCTIONED ANALYSIS AND REPORTING EFFORT. ON THE BASIS OF THE POTENTIAL OF ACQUIRING A TIMELY REPORTING FUNCTION IT WOULD APPEAR THAT USAFSS SHOULD BE EXERTING EFFORT TO OBTAIN BETTER A/G/A COMM FACs RATHER THAN DIRECTING THE REMOVAL OF THOSE FACs PRESENTLY PROCESSED.

2. FOR DET 1 AND DET 2. UNTIL OTHER WISE ADVISED, TAKE NO ACTION ON INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REF A.

3. FOR 69223K. IN THE INTEREST OF EFFICIENCY, THIS WFO HAS COORDINATED DIRECTLY WITH WING CDRM DURING HIS TDY THIS WEEK.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

6994 SCTY SQDN

PACSCTYRGN (OPS)

INFO: 6922 SW (OPS)

SUBJ: ARDF MANPOWER REDUCTION

REF: PACSCTYRGN OPS 020825Z OCT

PHONECON COL WOOD? LTCOL RUSSELL, 03 OCT 69

1. FOLLOWING SHREDOUT BY AFSC WAS PROVIDED TO LTCOL RUSSELL DURING
PHONECON THIS DATE:

READ/AFSC/TSN/PHU/PKU/NKP/TOTAL

292X1/74/66/84/21/245

203X1/22/14/24/05/65

202X0/25/13/15/12/65 TOTAL: 375

2. CAN ACCOMODATE UP TO 40 MISSIONS PER DAY, USING FOUR MEN PER
ZULU AIRCRAFT WITH FOLLOWING SHREDOUT:

292X1/91/64/84/21/260

203X1/18/09/17/05/49

202X0/32/09/13/12/66 TOTAL: 375

THE ABOVE FIGURES INCLUDE RETENTION OF TWELVE R202X0 ANALYST AT ACC OCT 69

AND FOUR ~~292S~~ 292S and SIE 202S (FOUR R202, TWO A202) FOR SQUADRON

4891

MAJ HOLMES

James W. Johnson, Major
JAMES W. JOHNSON, LT, COL, USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER

39557

Priority
ROUTINE

LTCOL JOHNSON

MAJ HOLMES

4891

MISSION MANAGEMENT/ SHEDOUT OF PERSONNEL/BILLETS IS BASED ON AIRCRAFT
CONFIGURATION AND DEPLOYMENT OUTLINED IN USAFSSMP.

3. WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT MANPOWER FIGURES REPRESENTED ABOVE ARE
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS BASED UPON FULL 100 PERCENT MANNING. LESS THAN
100 PERCENT MANNING WILL RESULT IN MISSION DEGRADATION. THE FORTY
MISSIONS PER DAY IS BASED UPON USAFSS MSG OPD 011846Z. INCREASE IN
NUMBER OF MISSIONS PER DAY BEYOND FORTY WOULD REQUIRE AUGMENTATION
OF MANNING.

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PRIORITY

6994SCTYSJ

03/0531 E

PACSCITYRGN/VCO

INFO: 6922SCTYWG/CFS

[REDACTED]

SUBJ: UDL, 6994SS AFTER 703 REDUCTION.

1. REF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PSR AND 6994SS. FOLLOWING RESPONSES WERE SUBMITTED IN BRIEF, TOTAL BREAKOUT FOLLOWS BY COURIER. THE BASED ON 557 SPACES ALLOCATED BY PSR.

2. PARA 3 CONTAINS OUR PLACEMENT OF PERSONNEL FOR A ~~SOME~~ TOTAL OF 557 MANPOWER SPACES. OUR PLACEMENTS ARE BASED ON:

A. 22 ACFT (10 CC AND 12 ZULU) AT 6994SS TSN; 13 ACFT (ALL CC) AT DET 1, PHU CAT; 15 ACFT (4 CC, 11 ZULU) AT DET 2, DANANG AND 5 ACFT (ALL ZULU) AT NAKHON PHANOM.

B. DELETION OF THE CAM RANH CAL SITE.

C. DELETION OF THE AFSCC G1575Z SPACE (FC 3510ZK).

D. CHANGING THE E3034 CPT SPACE (FC 2600) TO A E7024 CPT SPACE (FC 1100).

E. DANANG LOCATION DELETES DET 2'S COMM AND SCTY FUNCTIONS AS

8
NOV 1969

4891

SMS MILLER

Marlan Holmes
MARLAN HOLMES, MAJOR, USAF

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PRIORITY

RESULT COLLOCATION WITH 6924SS. OBVIOUSLY, IF PLANNED FOR DANANG DOES NOT MATERIALIZE, WE WILL HAVE TO REPROGRAM WAGE. FURTHER, REDUCTIONS IN PERSONNEL (732XO) CONTINUED FOR DET 1 AND 2 FOR THIS UDL.

F. ALL DATA COMPUTED ON BASIS OF 40 MSNS A DAY. MUST RE-EVALUATE NEED FOR 100 PERCENT MANNING TO MEET MSN COMMITMENTS UNDER EXISTING PERSONNEL CEILING.

3. PERSONNEL STATISTICS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

AFSC	699A	DET 1	DET 2	DET 3	TOTAL
G0026 LTC	1	0	0	0	1
E7024 CPT	1	0	0	0	1
E3234C MAJ	1	0	0	0	1
E3234C CPT	0	1	1	0	2
E6424A CPT	1	0	0	0	1
G8035 LTC	1	0	0	0	1
G8035 MAJ	0	1	1	0	2
E8035 MAJ	2	0	0	0	2
E8035 CPT	1	1	1	2	5
R10070 MSG	1	0	0	0	1
R702XO	11	4	4	2	21
R732XO	2	1	1	1	5
R751XO ²	1	0	0	0	1

PRIORITY

R311X0	1	5	0	0	6
R202X0	10	12	0	0	22
A202X0	26	0	14	20	60
A203X1 MD	22	0	20	9	51
A203X1 MU	0	0	0	2	2
A292X1	106	52	79	34	271
R291X0	12	5	0	5	22
A301/4XX	28	16	19	7	69
R645X0	4	2	2	2	10
TOTAL	232	100	141	84	557

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PRIORITY

6994SCTYSQ

PACSCTYRGN/VCO

INFO; 5922SCTYWG/OPS



SUBJ: 6994SS UDL.

REF MY OPS 080830Z NOV 69.

1. PARA 2 CONTAINS REVISED UDL BASED ON:

A. DANANG BEING OA O/L WITH SIX ACFT AND REMAINDER OF PLEIKU RESOURCES BEING COMBINED WITH DET 1 AT PHU CAT.

B. ENTIRE DET 2 OPNS COMBINING WITH DET 1. BY COMBINING THE ENTIRE DET 2 OPNS WITH DET 1, WE COULD MOVE THE CURRENT DET 2 COMMANDER AND MAINTENANCE OFFICER SLOTS TO NKP, DET 2 OPS OFFICER SLOT TO PHU CAT AND THE SECOND E8035 SLOT PROGRAMMED TO NKP WOULD BE RETURNED TO THE 6994SS.

2. PERSONNEL STATISTICS ARE:

A. FOR SPLIT OF PLEIKU RESOURCES WITH AIRCRAFT ALIGNMENTS AS FOLLOWS: TSN010CC AND 12Z; PHC-17CC AND 5Z; DNG-6Z; NKP-5Z.

READ:	AFSC	TSN	PHC	DNG	NKP
	G0026	1	0	0	0



E7024	1	0	0	0
E3234C	1	1	1	1
E6424	1	0	0	0
G8035	1	1	1	0
E8035	3	1	1	1
R10070	1	0	0	0
R702X0	11	4	3	2
R732X0	2	1	1	1
R751X2	1	0	0	0
R811X0	1	5	0	0
R202X0	10	0	0	0
A202X0	26	20	6	20
A203X1M0	22	9	11	9
A203X1M0	0	0	0	2
A292X1	106	98	35	34
R291X0	12	5	0	5
A30XX	23	25	9	7
R645X0	4	2	1	2
TOTALS	232	172	69	84
				557

B. FOR CONSOLIDATION OF PLEIKUS RESOURCES WITH AIRCRAFT ALIGNMENT
AS FOLLOWS: TSN-10CC ADN 12Z; PHC-17CC AND 11Z; NKP-5Z. READ --

AFSC	TSN	PHC	NKP	
G0026	1	0	0	
E7024	1	0	0	
E3234C	1	1	1	
E6424A	1	0	0	
G3035	1	1	1	
E8035	4	2	1	
R10070	1	0	0	
R702X0	11	8	2	
R732X0	2	2	1	
R751X2	1	0	0	
R811X0	1	5	0	
R202X0	10	0	0	
R202X0	26	26	20	
A203X1MD	22	20	9	
A203X1MD	0	0	2	
A292X1	106	131	34	
R292X0	12	5	5	
A30XX	28	34	7	
R645X0	4	4	2	
TOTALS	233	239	85	557



SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
 [REDACTED]
 TYPE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
 PRECEDENCE
 ACTION **PRIORITY**
 INFO

Support Document 49
 BTG

FROM: 69330CPTSQ(SSLO)
 TO: PLACER/CEC-4/100
 INFO: 69220CPTSQ
 ZRU/69330CPTSQ

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
 [REDACTED]

SUBJ: MACV ARDF WEEKLY MEETING 19 NOV

1. ONLY SUBJECT OF NOTE IS THAT THERE ARE SOME IR-COMM UNITS/TELECOMMUNICATIONS USING COMMUNICATIONS IN THE 1.2 - 2.0 Mhz RANGE. THE ARMY HAS EXPERIMENTED WITH A TRAILING WIRE AND FOUND IT IMPROVED THEIR CAPABILITY TO COPY BY SEVERAL ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE. SOME EXPERIMENTS WERE DESCRIBICALLY LENGTHENING THE WIRE ANTENNAS BY ADDITION OF Wires HAVE NOT PROVED SUCCESSFUL. THE ARMY'S FIXING CAPABILITY IS CURRENTLY LIMITED BELOW THREE Mhz. THE COMBAT COURAGE CAN INTERCEPT DOWN TO TWO HUNDRED KILOCYCLES BUT EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THEY MUST BE LOCATED ON TOP OF THE TARGET TO HEAR IT. AS FOR FIXING, SOME OF THE COURAGE CAN FIX SLIGHTLY BELOW TWO Mhz IF VERY NEAR THE TARGET.

2. REQUEST THE COURAGE TO BE TASKED WITH FIXING THESE LOW FREQUENCY COMMUNICATIONS WHERE POSSIBLE. IF FEASIBLE, WOULD REQUESTED STEPS BE TAKEN TO OPTIMIZE EXISTING COLLECTION ANTENNA OR TO INSTALL


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TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE			
[Name]			1ST LT R. R. KERR JR. CAPT USAF SSLO

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]
 REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

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ACTION ROUTINE		NEES	4427
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ADDITIONAL ANTENNAS FOR THE ONE TO TWO MEZ RANGE. BELIEVES THE
 JAMMING AIRCRAFT HAS PROVISIONS FOR USE OF A TRAILING LONG WIRE
 ANTENNA - THIS MIGHT BE WORTHY OF INVESTIGATION AS CAPTURED ENEMY
 SOCS MENTION REGULAR WORKING IN THE LF SPECTRUM FOR SOME ^{ELEMENTS} ~~REASONS~~ AND
 MACV HAS REQUESTED AVIATION UNITS DO WHAT THEY CAN TO INTERCEPT
 THESE COMMUNICATIONS.



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GRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY	

FORM 173-1
 1 NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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Subject Docu [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
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RR YMRDQR
DE YHLAKZ 19 3540223
R 200223Z
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO 6994SCTYSQ/SSLO/OPS
INFO /22SCTYWG/OPS
ZEM
[REDACTED]

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OPS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
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SSLO

(124) FILE

SUBJ: LOW FREQUENCY COLLECTION

REF: A. YOUR 210315Z NOV 69.

B. YOUR 270230Z NOV 69.

C. YOUR 180145Z NOV 69.

1. REF A STATED THAT SOME IN-COUNTRY NVA/VC UNITS ARE COMMUNICATING IN 1.2 - 2.0 MHZ RANGE AND RECOMMENDS MODIFICATION OF CCZ ANTENNA SYSTEM TO OPTIMIZE COLLECTION IN LOW FREQUENCY (LF) SPECTRUM. REF B INDICATES THAT "F INTERCEPT PROBLEMS AGAIN SURFACED AT WEEKLY AROF MEETING. REF C INDICATES THAT USAFSS RESPONSE TO MACV IS OUTSTANDING.
 2. DO NOT BELIEVE THAT REQUIREMENT FOR LF COLLECTION HAS BEEN ADEQUATELY STATED TO JUSTIFY MODIFICATION OF COUGAR ANTENNA SYSTEM. IT WOULD SEEM THAT LF PROPAGATION CHARACTERISTICS WOULD PERMIT TARGETING BY GROUND SITES. IN ADDITION, INSTALLATION OF LONG-WIRE ANTENNA EC-47 COULD CHANGE THE CALIBRATION ENVELOPE. FOR THESE REASONS, WE ARE RELUCTANT TO RECOMMEND ANY CHANGES IN CCZ ANTENNA CONFIGURATION.
 3. IN REGARD TO FIXING LF TARGETS, WISH TO POINT OUT THAT ALR-34/35 OF CAPABILITY DOES NOT EXTEND BELOW 2 MHZ.
- 215
- [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ROUTINE

6994 SCTY SQ

PACSCTYBGN

[REDACTED]

SUBJ: LOW FREQUENCY ARDF CAPABILITY

REF: PACSCTYBGN OPS-A 200223Z DEC 69

1. THE REQUIREMENT FOR MODIFICATION/REDESIGN OF THE COMBAT COUGAR ARDF SYSTEM IS BASED UPON THE FACT THAT THE NVA/VC UNITS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COMBAT AGAINST ALLIED FORCES IN VIETNAM ARE KNOWN TO BE USING RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OPERATING IN THE 1.202.0 MHZ FREQUENCY RANGE. SINCE JULY 1969, THE 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON RESOURCES HAVE BEEN TASKED WITH ARDF AND COLLECTION OF NVA/VC UNITS SUCH AS THE 1ST NVA REGT , 7TH NVA REGT AND SR-2 MORSE/VOICE COMMUNICATIONS. THESE UNITS OPERATE IN THE 1.202.0 MHZ PORTION OF THE SPECTRUM.
2. WHILE THE G-133F RECEIVER CAN EFFECT COLLECTION OF THESE SIGNALS, THE ARD-18 SYSTEM RECEIVER DOES NOT PROVIDE CAPABILITY FOR ARDF BELOW 2.0 MHZ, ACCORDING TO DESIGN CRITERIA. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, A FEW AIRCRAFT ON WHICH THE CAPABILITY EXISTS TO TUNE THE ARD-18 RECEIVER DOWN TO APPROXIMATELY 1.7 MHZ. THESE AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN USED IN ATTEMPTING TO SATISFY THE ARDF TASKING LEVIED BELOW 2.0 MHZ. THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THIS METHOD OF ARDF ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO RELIABILITY. THIS IS THE ONLY CAPABILITY IN-COUNTRY TO PROVIDE ARDF BELOW 2.0 MHZ.

3. REF MSG REFERS TO SERIES OF SSLO MESSAGES WHICH POINTED OUT MACV EXPRESSED NEED FOR DEVELOPMENT OF A CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE ARDF BELOW 2.0 MHZ. WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT WITH CURRENT RESOURCES, THIS UNIT CANNOT FULFILL THE TASKED MISSION SINCE THERE IS NO ARDF CAPABILITY BELOW 2.0 MHZ.

4. REQUEST YOU RECONSIDER INVESTIGATION OF DESIGN CHANGES TO ANTENNA CONFIGURATION AND/OR ARD 18 RECEIVER CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD ALLOW THIS UNIT TO PERFORM ITS MISSION AS TASKED.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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PRIORITY

USA-561

USM-704 (ACC) R-8

25/0834 Z

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SUBJ: EVALUATION OF MSN 999.

1. IN ANSWER TO YOUR IAPVACC ^{211040Z} ~~210700~~ SEP, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE ^{R-8} PROVIDED.

A. TARGET SIGNALS ARE SCATTERED FAIRLY CONSISTENTLY THROUGHOUT THE FRAG AREA, WITH A SLIGHT CONCENTRATION IN THE SOUTHERN AREA NEAR THE DMZ. THIS SLIGHT TARGET CONCENTRATION IS WITHIN RANGE OF 902 ALFA MISSIONS.

B. THE ENTIRE FRAG ROUTE (XE9060.20 ^{VE}3020) IS FLOWN, WEATHER ^{LSZ} PERMITTING.

C. COASTAL STANDOFF RESTRICTION IS PROBABLY THE MAJOR PROHIBITIVE factor affecting this mission. however, we have no STANDARDS FOR COMPARISON ON WHICH TO BASE THIS STATEMENT.

D. THE 12 MILE STANDOFF RANGE WOULD PROHIBIT MOVING THE FRAG WEST, FUEL REQUIREMENTS WOULD PROHIBIT MOVING IT NORTH (~~UNLESS AIR-^{25 29}~~ ~~CRAP REVEALED AT HUB/DEL-DAT-TIFF-D-ENTRY~~), AND STANDOFF FROM TIGER SEP ²¹ 69 ISLAND WOULD PROHIBIT MOVING IT SOUTH. 1 2

4891

TSGT JANIZ ^{LSZ}



JAMES W JOHNSON, JR., LtCol, USAF
Operations Officer



[REDACTED]

E. NO STATISTICS ARE AVAILABLE TO INDICATE THE VALUE OF NIGHT MISSIONS IN THIS AREA, BUT FROM ALL INDICATIONS THIS WOULD NOT ENHANCE THE VALUE OF THIS MISSION.

F. SINCE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING NORTH OF THE DMZ, WE QUESTION THE NEED FOR RAPID FIXING OF TARGETS IN THIS AREA. TROOP MOVEMENTS IN AND AROUND THE DMZ ARE ADEQUATELY MONITORED BY MISSION 902 ALFA.

G. RADAR MONITORING OF THIS MISSION HAS BEEN SEVERELY DOWNGRADED SINCE RECENT STORM DAMAGE TO WATERBURY FACILITY. PANAMA IS CURRENTLY BEING USED BUT IS NOT CONSIDERED RELIABLE. WOULD CONSIDER DELETION OF MISSION ON THIS BASIS ALONE.

H. FROM STANDPOINT OF OVERALL PRODUCTIVITY AND ACTIVITY LEVEL THERE DOES APPEAR TO BE SUFFICIENT REASON TO CONTINUE THIS MISSION. A "Q" ENGINE AIRCRAFT IS CONSISTENTLY FLOWN TO THIS AREA BECAUSE OF FUEL AND DISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS. THIS AIRCRAFT COULD BE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED ELSEWHERE.

I. THE AMOUNT OF DUPLICATION OF COPY AND FILMS OBTAINED FROM MISSION 999 AND 902 ALFA, ALONG WITH GROUND SITE INTERCEPT DUPLICATION WOULD BE A STRONG FACTOR IN DETERMINING JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS MISSION.

2. THIS HQS WOULD BE HIGHLY INTERESTED IN USM-308'S COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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OPS-8
2014

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ROUTINE

6994SCTYSQ

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ



SUBJ: JOINT COURIER ACTIVITY DA NANG (JCAD)/OPS STOPS AT PHU BAI.
WE ARE IN RECEIPT OF YOUR PROPOSAL AND IT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH
J2114 MACV. NO ACTION CAN BE TAKEN AT THIS TIME DUE TO FACT THAT
JCAD IS EXPERIMENTAL AND PRESENTLY A TEMPORARY OPERATION. SHOULD
IT BECOME A PERMANENTIZE OPERATION, YOUR PROPOSAL WILL BE RECONSID-
ERED AT THAT TIME. G-P-4.

28 0441Z

JUL 1969

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LT COL JOHNSON

JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF
Operations Officer



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ROUTINE

13/0415Z

6994 SCTYSQ

~~PACSTERN~~ *6922 SW.*

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[REDACTED]

SUBJ: DET 2, 6994SS TRANSCRIBE TEST.

File by

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE THE 460TRN HAS CONSISTENTLY OBJECTED TO MAKING OPS STOPS TO DROP OFF TRAFFIC. IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF ELEMENATING OPS STOPS, MACV, THRU NRV (C), DIRECTED DET 2 TO CONDUCT A SIX WEEK TRANSCRIBE TEST TO DETERMINE IF DET 2'S TRANSCRIPTIONS WOULD FULFILL USM-808 TIMELY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. THE TEST OFFICIALLY STARTED 22 NOV 69 AND INITIAL USM-808 feedback WAS MOST UNFAVORABLE. DUE TO THE UNFAVORABLE FEEDBACK WE SENT AN OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE TO DET 2 AND USM-808 IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE HOW THE DET 2 TEST COULD BE MADE SUCCESSFUL. HIS FINDINGS WERE: A. THE EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF DET 2 LINGUISTS WAS INADEQUATE TO ENSURE FULL, ACURATE, TRANSCRIPTIONS. B. USM-808 WAS BEING OVERLY CRITICAL IN THEIR FEEDBACK/EVALUATION AS THEY WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT IF THE TEST PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL THAT THE AIR FORCE WOULD MOVE A CONTINGENT OF AIRCRAFT TO DANANG TO PROVIDE THEM WITH TIMELY SUPPORT. OUR REP EXPLAINED THAT THE TEST OUTCOME WOULD HAVE

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[REDACTED]

JAMES W JOHNSON, JR., LtCol, USAF
Operations Officer

[REDACTED]

NOTHING TO DO WITH MOVING AIRCRAFT TO DANANG AND IT WOULD BE TO USM-808'S ADVANTAGE, FROM A TIMELINESS ASPECT, TO RECEIVE THE DET 2 TRAFFIC ELECTRICALLY. USM-808 PERSONNEL READILY AGREE TO THIS, HOWEVER, STATED SERIOUS DOUBT THAT DET 2 COULD EVER PRODUCE A FULLY RELIABLE/ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT OF THEIR INTERCEPT. THIS BASED ON PROVEN DIFFICULTIES THAT AMERICAN LINGUISTS HAVE IN TRANSCRIBING THE VARIOUS REGIONAL DIALECTS/JARGONS ENCOUNTERED IN VC/NVA PLAIN TEXT. IT WAS ALSO LEARNED THAT THE ACTUAL MESSAGE CONTEXT WAS BEING ACCURATELY REPORTED BY DET 2 BUT THE RELATED CHATTER/PLAIN TEXT PASSED BEFORE/DURING/AFTER MESSAGES WAS, FOR THE MOST PART, COMPLETELY UNRELIABLE. USM-808 PERSONNEL POINTED OUT THAT IT IS AN ABSOLUTE MIST FOR THEM TO RECEIVE FULL, ACCURATE TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL UNTERCEPTED TRAFFIC AS THE RELATED CHATTER OFTEN CONTAINS EXTREMELY VALUABLE AND PERISHABLE INTELLIGENCE. IN VIEW OF ABOVE FACTS, WE HAVE DETERMINED THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM IS TO HAVE DANCER (NATIVE LINGUISTS) PERSONNEL COLOCATED WITH THE DET 2 TRANSCRIBE EFFORT.

2. WE DISCUSSED OUR PROBLEM, AND SUGGESTED SOLUTION, WITH NRV WHO AGREED WITH THE DANCER APPROACH. IN THE INTERIM, USM-808 HAS STATED AN EMERGENCY REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL DANCER PERSONNEL TO TRANSCRIBE A NEW SOURCE OF VOICE INTERCEPT. WE ARE PRESSING NRV

[REDACTED]

CAS SAIGON FOR DANCER ASSISTANCE, HOWEVER, DUE TO THE EXTREME
SHORTAGE OF THOSE PERSONNEL, AND IN VIEW OF THE NEW USM-808 REQUIRE-
MENT, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT WE WILL NOT RECEIVE THE REQUIRED DANCER
ASSISTANCE. SHOULD THIS PROVE TRUE, IT IS VERY LIKELY THAT THE
FINAL EVALUATION OF THE DET 2 TEST WILL BE UNSATISFACTORY--WHICH
WILL UNDOUBTABLY DICTATE THAT MACV DIRECT REINSTATEMENT OF DANANG
OPS STOPS.

3. WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS OUR NRV/CAS CONTACTS FOR ASSISTANCE
AND WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

61

2sg

UNCL

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE
INFO ROUTINE

DTG

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ (SSLO)
TO: PACSCTYRGN/OPS-A/COM
6922 SW/OPS/COMM
ZEN/6994 SCTY SQ/OPS/COMM

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[Redacted]

SUBJ: SIGINT ARDF/COLLECTION PROGRAM
THE FOLLOWING IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

QUOTE
P 290858Z
FM SSO MACV
TO SSO I FFV
SSO IIFV
CG III MAF
SSO CAN IHO
SSO XXIV CORPS
INFO SSO USARV
CO 509TH REGP
CO 303RD RR BN
CO 313TH RR BN

DATE	TIME
30	0430
MONTH	YEAR
SEP	69
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
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TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE
4427

[Redacted]

RELEASE

SIGNATURE
R. Krebs Jr.

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
ROY R. KREBS JR. CAPT., USAF, SSLO

REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

ATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

CO 179TH RR CO

CO 6994 SS

AFSSO 7AF

NRV

8TH RRFS

J2 SENDS FOR: CG IPFV, CG IIPFV, CGIIIMAF, CG DMAC AND CG XXIV CORPS

SUBJ: SIGINT ARDF/COLLECTION PROGRAM

1. THE AIRBORNE RADIO DIRECTION FINDING (ARDF) AND COLLECTION PROGRAM IS A PRIMARY SOURCE OF TIMELY TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO THIS AND COMPONENT COMMANDS. THROUGH THE COMBINED EFFORTS OF SIGINT FIELD STATIONS, DIRECT SUPPORT UNITS AND AIR FORCE AND ARMY AVIATION UNITS, YOU ARE RAPIDLY PROVIDED LOCATIONS AND IDENTIFICATIONS OF ENEMY UNITS (ARDF), FURTHER, THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF AIRBORNE SIGINT COLLECTION AND GROUND PROCESSING OF ENEMY EXPLOITABLE COMMUNICATIONS (WHICH CANNOT BE HEARD AT GROUND BASED SITES), INFORMATION ON INTENTIONS AND CURRENT OPERATIONS OF THE ENEMY ARE PROVIDED. A SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF THIS PERISHABLE INTELLIGENCE IS PASSED VIA RADIO FROM THE AIRCRAFT TO THE SIGINT DIRECT SUPPORT UNIT WHICH IN TURN PASSES THE INFO TO THE TACTICAL COMMANDERS FOR THEIR ACTION/INFO. SOME OF THIS INFO, HOWEVER, IS NOT REACHING YOU IN AS TIMELY OR COMPLETE A MANNER AS IS POSSIBLE. THIS IS DUE TO THE EXTREMELY LIMITED NUMBER OF RADIO

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 2	NO. OF PAGES 3	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
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REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 5

ABBREVIATE JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

FREQUENCIES ALLOCATED TO THE ARDF/COLL PROGRAM. ONLY FIVE
FREQUENCIES ARE AVAILABLE COUNTRY-WIDE TO BE USED BY SOME 135
AIRCRAFT. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE BOTTLENECK THIS FREQUENCY SHORTAGE
CREATES; IF FIVE AIRCRAFT HAVE FIXES TO BE PASSED TO TWO DSU'S
LOCATED IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA, ONLY ONE AIRCRAFT AT A TIME MAY
PASS TRAFFIC BECAUSE ONLY ONE FREQUENCY IS AVAILABLE. IN SOME CASES
THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CANNOT BE MADE AVAILABLE UNTIL THE
AIRCRAFT HAVE RECOVERED FROM THE MISSION.

2. UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE PAST TO OBTAIN MORE
FREQUENCIES IN THE RECOGNIZED CROWDED RADIO SPECTRUM. FEEL CON-
FIDENT YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT IS MOST URGENT THAT ALL DATA OF THIS
NATURE, ACQUIRED WITHIN YOUR ~~LAOR~~ IS PASSED TO YOUR TACTICAL
COMMANDERS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

I AM CONVINCED THAT ADDITIONAL FREQUENCIES WILL SPEED AND INCREASE
THE FLOW OF THIS PERISHABLE INTELLIGENCE. I SOLICIT YOUR ASSISTANCE,
THEREFORE, IN PROVIDING ADDITIONAL SOLE USER FREQUENCIES FOR THE
ARDF/COLL PROGRAM. AT ~~LEAST~~ LEAST TWO ADDITIONAL FREQUENCIES (WITH 40-
50 MZH RANGE DUE TO EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS) ARE NEEDED PER CTZ.

3. REQUEST TECHNICAL DATA ON FREQUENCIES BE PROVIDED TO MACV J211-4.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TO: USAFSS/TDC/TSD
INFO: 6922 SGT YRG/OPS
6954 SGT YSQ/OPS

[REDACTED]

CITE: OPS-A

NAN
[Signature]

- SUBJ: GET 3-TEMPO AUTHORITY.
REF 69988 OPS-2 020522 SEP 69 (ROTAM USAFSS)
1. THE REF MSG STATES THAT ONE OF THE MAJOR REASONS FOR THE LOW I.D. RATE AT USA-564 IS A LACK OF ASSIGNED NOTATIONS ON A NUMBER OF TARGET NETS. USM-7, THEIR OMA, IS VERY RELUCTANT TO ISSUE TEMPO ON USA-564 DEVELOPED TARGETS, AND NSA IS WORKING APPROXIMATELY 90 DAYS BEHIND.
 2. BELIEVE THAT THE GETD I.D. RATE COULD BE INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY, AND THE RESULTS OF THEIR ANALYSIS WOULD BE DEPICTED IF THEY WERE GRANTED TEMPO AUTHORITY.
 3. REQUEST USAFSS INITIATE ACTION WITH NSA TO AUTHORIZE USA-564 TEMPO AUTHORITY. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE REQUESTED AUTHORITY IS AVAILABLE IN THE COMMENTS PORTION OF THE USA-564 STATE (SALVING IN ADD) IN WHICH CONTINUITY ON A NUMBER OF TARGETS HAS BEEN POINTED OUT BUT NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN BY USM-7 OR NSA TO ISSUE TEMPO ON THEM. PERHAPS FOR EXPEDIENCY, SGT HAMD COULD DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO NSA.
 4. PLEASE ADVISE.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NNNN

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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66

SEC	[REDACTED]
TYPE MSG	MULTI SINGLE
PRECEDENCE	
ACTION ROUTINE	
INFO	

DTG 211005Z OCT 69

FROM: 6994SCTY SQ TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN

TO: USAFSS/ISL

INFO: PACSCTYRGN/OPS-A

6922SCTYWG/OPS

DET 1 6994SCTYSQ

DET 2 6994SCTYSQ

DET 3 6994SCTYSQ

[REDACTED]

SUBJ: WAIVER FOR USE OF WATER SOLUBLE PAPER.

REF: USAFSSM 205-7, CHAPTER 11 PARA 11-3B.

1. REQUEST YOU GRANT 6994 SCTY SQ AND DETS ONE, TWO AND THREE, 6994 SCTY SQDN EXCEPTION FOR REQUIREMENT TO HAVE FOLLOWING SIGINT TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENTS PRINTED ON WATER SOLUBLE PAPER.

- A. CHERRY SHEETS.
- B. RAW TRAFFIC.
- C. NSA CALLSIGN LISTING
- D. HESTIA PADS.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[REDACTED]

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MONTH	YEAR
OCT	1969
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
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DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	MAJ HOLMES	4891	
SECURITY	[REDACTED]	REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS	

DD FORM 173, NOV. 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH MAY BE USED

☆ GPO 1969-204-282

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET




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E. SCRATCH BOOKS.

F. NSA B-64 WORKING AID 05-69 UTF-729 AND SUPERSEDING DOCUMENTS.


2. JUSTIFICATION:

A. CHERRY SHEETS - CHERRY SHEETS ARE COMPILATIONS OF TECHNICAL DATA PRODUCED BY THE COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AUTHORITIES AND FORWARDED TO THE 6994 SCTY SQDN AND DETACHMENTS BY ELECTRICAL MEANS ON A DAILY BASIS. THESE DATA ARE HIGHLY PERISHABLE AND VOLUMINOUS. TO TRANSFER THESE DATA ONTO WATER SOLUBLE PAPER WOULD REQUIRE EXCESSIVE MAN-DAYS THROUGHOUT THE SQUADRON ON A DAILY BASIS. (ESTIMATED TEN MAN DAYS PER DAY FOR ALL UNITS INVOLVED). IN ADDITION TO THE APPROXIMATELY SEVEN MAN DAYS PER DAY REQUIRED TO RECEIVE THE DATA, PROCESS SUFFICIENT COPIES OF THE CHERRY SHEETS AND INSERT THEM INTO THE PROPER MISSION BAGS. COST INVOLVED WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 80 SHEETS OF WATER SOLUBLE PAPER PER DAY PLUS MANPOWER. CONSIDER MANPOWER AND PAPER COSTS EXCESSIVE IN VIEW OF PERISHABLE DAILY CHANGING NATURE OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT DATA INVOLVED.



B. NSA CALL SIGN LISTING- THIS DOCUMENT, PRINTED BY NSA ON A MONTHLY BASIS CONTAINS AN ALPHABETIC CALLSIGN LISTING OF ALL KNOWN CALLSIGNS OF USERS OF HIGH LEVEL CRYPT SYSTEMS AND/OR NON-TACTICAL UNITS. THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PRIMARY DOCUMENT USED TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT AN INTERCEPT SHOULD BE COPIED AND DF'ED IF THE

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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
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CALLSIGNS ARE NOT LISTED ON THE CHERRY SHEETS OR CHERRY SHEET SUPPLEMENTS. THIS DOCUMENT IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL AND IS USED EACH TIME AN INTERCEPT IS MADE UNLESS CALLS ARE LISTED ON CHERRY SHEETS.

C. RAW TRAFFIC THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 325 INTERCEPTS, MADE DAILY ON ALL SQUADRON AIRCRAFT. EACH INTERCEPT IS RECORDED ON ONE OR MORE SHEETS OF 6 PLY PAPER IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHINS 1002. USE OF WATER SOLUBLE PAPER WOULD BE PROHIBITIVE IN COST IN THIS FUNCTION AS WELL AS OPERATIONALLY IMPRACTICAL.

D. HESTIA PADS HESTIA PADS PRESUMABLY PRINTED BY AFCD DIR NSA ARE ONE-TIME PADS USED AS AN ALTERNATE ENCRYPTION SYSTEM FOR PASSING DATA ON TO GROUND WHEN KY-8 ENCRYPTION IS INOPERATIVE. PRINTING OF THIS DOCUMENT IN BOTH WATER SOLUBLE AND NORMAL PAPER WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL.

E. SCRATCH BOOKS SAME AS RAW TRAFFIC. CALLSIGNS ARE INITIALLY COPIED IN SCRATCH BOOKS TO DETERMINE CALLS AND WHETHER OR NOT COPY IS DESIRED.

F. NSA B-64 WORKING AID 05-69 VTF-729 AND SUPERSEDING DOCUMENTS (DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQDN). THIS DOCUMENT SERVES THE SAME PROPOSE AS THE NSA CALLSIGN LISTING FOR DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQDN AIRCRAFT FLYING IN NORTHERN LAOS. THE CALLS LISTED IN THE NSA CALLSIGN LISTING DO

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NOT NECESSARILY APPLY TO THE NORTHERN LAOS AREA. THIS DOCUMENT IS PUBLISHED BY NSA.

3. REPRODUCTION OF CHERRY SHEETS, THE NSA CALLSIGN LISTING, HESTIA PADS AND NSA B-64 WORKING AID 05-69 WOULD COST AN EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF MANHOURS TO REPRODUCE IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITY TO SATISFY REQUIREMENTS AND WOULD REQUIRE AUGMENTATION OF CURRENT MANPOWER STRENGTH. USE OF WATER SOLUBLE PAPER FOR SCRATCH BOOKS AND RAW TRAFFIC WOULD BE EXTREMELY COSTLY AND FOR RAW TRAFFIC IMPRACTICAL SINCE SIX COPIES ARE REQUIRED.

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ZCZCPDS049CDR3385
RR YNRDOR
DE YMQADK 15 3011015
R 201557Z
FM USAFSS
TO 699450TYSQ/SP
INFO PAUCCTYRQM/OPS
83225CTYWS/OPS

1. REF. UR MSG 211005Z [REDACTED] P-5 THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT IN CNAB 11, PARA 11-3D FOR RAW TRAFFIC COPIED ON 6 PLY PAPER TO BE PLACED ON WATER SOLUABLE PAPER. IT IS ASSUMED THAT YOU REFER TO QUOTE 2 UNQUOTE POSITIONS FOR THIS REQUEST.
2. CHERRY SHEETS SHOULD BE COMPILED FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL MISSION AND LIST ONLY THE PRIORITY TARGETS FOR THAT MISSION AREA. THESE WILL BE COMPILED UPON WATER SOLUABLE PAPER.
3. REF. THE NSA CALLSIGN ZLISTING, NSA B-54 WORKING AID AND VIF-72D. IF THESE DOCUMENTS ARE CAT III COMINT DOCUMENTS, FORWARD COPIES OF SAME TO THIS HQ FOR STUDY PRIOR TO CARRYING THEM ABOARD MISSION AIRCRAFT.
4. EXTRACTS OF HESTIA PADS REQUIRED FOR BACKUP FOR KY-8 OPERATIONS MAY BE CARRIED ABOARD WITHOUT PREPARATION ON WATER SOLUABLE PAPER.
5. SCRATCH BOOKVOC, 1451 73D ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF CATCHING CALLSIGNS AND FIRST FIVE GROUPS BY THE X AND Y OPERATORS, THIS COPY MAY BE OBTAINED ON NON-SOLUABLE PAPER.
6. IT IS REALIZED THAT THE COSTS IN PREPARING TECH SUPPORT MATERIALS ON WATER SOLUABLE PAPER, BOTH IN MANHOURS AND MONEY ARE HIGH; HOWEVER, THE TIME AVAILABLE TO EFFECT DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIALS DURING AN AIR EMERGENCY IS ALSO PRECIOUS AND THE MORE TECH MATERIALS THAT ARE ON WATER SOLUABLE PAPER, THE EASIER THE TASK OF ENSURING THAT THESE MATERIALS DO NOT FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



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ROUTINE
ROUTINE

6994 SCTY SQ

6922 SCTY WG (OPS)

INFO: DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ

DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ

DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

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SUBJ: WATER SOLUBLE PAPER

REF: A. USAFSS CSP-S 281357Z OCT 69 (NOTAL DETS)

B. MY OKS 310827Z OCT 69 (NOTAL DETS)

C. MY ADM/SP 080250Z NOV 69 (NOTAL DETS)

1. BECAUSE OF WEIGHT PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED ON ARDF AIRCRAFT, THE 460TH TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE WING HAS DIRECTED THEIR SUBORDINATE SQUADRONS TO REMOVE EVERY ITEM FROM EACH AIRCRAFT THAT IS NOT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE MISSION. AMONG THE ITEMS REMOVED WAS A FIVE GALLON JERRY CAN OF WATER.

2. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE AND ADDITIONAL REASONS OUTLINED BELOW, REQUEST THIS UNIT AND SUBORDINATE DETACHMENTS BE GRANTED A WAIVER OF PARAGRAPH 11-3 BRAVO, CHAPTER 11, USAFSSM 205-7.

A. THE USUAL SOURCE OF WATER ABOARD ARDF AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN REMOVED.

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Nov 69


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4891

CMSGT NORWOOD



JAMES W JOHNSON JR., LT COL, USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER



ROUTINE
ROUTINE

JAMES W JOHNSON JR, LT COL CMSGT NORWOOD

4891

THE FLIGHT MECHANIC NORMALLY CARRIES APPROXIMATELY ONE-HALF GALLON OF WATER ABOARD FOR DRINKING AND MAKING COFFEE. HOWEVER, DEPENDING ON CONSUMPTION RATE, THIS SMALL WATER SUPPLY MAY OR MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE DURING AN EMERGENCY SITUATION.

B. NONE OF THE ARDF AIRCRAFT FLY AN OVERWATER PROFILE.

C. ALTHOUGH CREWS ARE BRIEFED TO FLY OVERWATER IF POSSIBLE FOR BAILOUT/RESCUE EFFORT, BELIEVE IT UNLIKELY FOR GREAT MAJORITY OF AIRCRAFT TO DO SO BECAUSE OF SLOW SPEEDS, MISSION AREAS, AND LOW ALTITUDES FLOWN.

3. REFS ALFA, BRAVO AND COCOA REFERS.



Support Document 69

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ROUTINE

6994SCTYSQ

6922SCTYWG

INFO: PACSCTYRGN

USAFSS (TEO)

275



SUBJ: FM INTERFERENCE.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, THIS UNIT HAS BEEN RESEARCHING AND TESTING MEANS OF RESOLVING THE FM INTERFERENCE PROBLEM ON THE EC-47 AIRCRAFT. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED TO ADVISE YOU OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF THIS PROJECT:


A. RESEARCH BEGAN ON THIS PROJECT IN JULY 69. A THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF THE FM622A, FEEDLINES AND ANTENNA COUPLER WERE CHECKED AGAINST PUBLISHED SPECIFICATIONS. TO DETERMINE IF THE EQUIPMENT WAS OPERATING PROPERLY. DURING THIS ANALYSIS IT WAS FOUND THAT THE ANTENNA COUPLER (P/N CU-943) WAS THE MAJOR CAUSE OF FM INTERFERENCE. THE FOLLOWING STEPS WERE TAKEN TO ELIMINATE COUPLER INTERFERENCE:

(1) CU-943 WAS SHIELDED TO ELIMINATE STRONG INDUCTION FIELD AROUND COUPLER. THIS ACTION DID REDUCE INTERFERENCE, BUT CAUSED VOLTAGE STANDING WAVE RATIO (VSWR) TO RISE TO AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL AND REDUCED TRANSMISSION RANGE.

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OCT 69
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TSGT SPENCER



JAMES W JOHNSON, JR., LtCol, USAF
Operations Officer

(2) COUPLER WAS REMOVED FROM AIRCRAFT AND CLEANED. ALSO, SURFACE OF AIRCRAFT WAS CLEANED TO PROVIDE A PERFECT ELECTRICAL BOND. UNIT WAS REMOUNTED AND TESTED. THIS ACTION DID NOT PROVIDE EXPECTED RESULTS.

(3) ANTENNA COUPLER AND ITS ANTENNA ELEMENT WAS REORIENTED TO CHANGE ITS INDUCTION FIELD FROM VERTICAL TO HORIZONTAL. THIS ACTION CAUSED A HIGH RISE IN VSWR AND DECREASED RANGE, BUT DID PROVIDE SOME ATTENUATION OF FM INTERFERENCE. THIS CHANGE OF FIELDS DID CAUSE CANCELLATION OF INTERFERENCE ON ARDF DIPOLES.

(4) THE ANTENNA ELEMENT (AS-1703/ARC) IS $4\frac{1}{2}$ FEET, WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY $2\frac{1}{2}$ FEET SHORTER THAN ACTUAL QUARTERWAVE AT FM622A OPERATING FREQUENCY (30.0 MHZ). ANTENNA ELEMENT WAS INCREASED TO APPROXIMATELY $7\frac{1}{2}$ FEET. THIS LENGTH PROVIDED A GOOD VSWR READING AT COUPLER, BUT DID NOTHING TO REDUCE INTERFERENCE.

(5) ANTENNA COUPLER WAS REMOVED AND BENCH CHECKED TO CHECK ALIGNMENT OF COILS. HIGH BAND AND LOW BAND COILS WERE CHECKED WITHIN PUBLISHED SPECIFICATIONS.

(6) ANTENNA COUPLER WAS DETACHED AND OPERATED FROM DIFFERENT POSITIONS ON AIRCRAFT SURFACE. VARIOUS LOCATIONS 25 TO 50 FEET FROM AIRCRAFT WERE TESTED. EVEN AT THESE DISTANCES, THE SIGNALS EMITTED FROM COUPLER/ANTENNA OVERLOADED G133F RECEIVERS AND COMPLETELY BLANKED DF SYSTEM.

(7) VARIOUS OTHER TESTS WERE TRIED, BUT NOS SUCCESS.

B. DATA COLLECTED FROM OUR TEST PROVED TO OUR SATISFACTION THAT THE ANTENNA COUPLER (CU-943) WAS AT FAULT AND PROVED THAT A DIFFERENT ANTENNA SYSTEM WOULD HAVE TO BE EMPLOYED. TESTING ALSO PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT ANY TRANSMITTING DEVICE OPERATING IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO ARDF DIPOLES WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS OVERLOADING OF DIPOLES AND COLLECTION SYSTEMS. THIS OVERLOADING IS DUE IN PART TO OUR EQUIPMENT UTILIZING VERY SENSITIVE PREAMPLIFIERS. DUE TO THE VHF RANGE (30 TO 75 MHZ) A SUITABLE LOCATION AS FAR AWAY AS POSSIBLE FROM ARDF AND HF ANTENNAS WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND.

C. A VHF/FM BLADE ANTENNA, P/N 437S-1, S/N 5821-054-6374, WAS OBTAINED FROM AN ARMY UNIT TO CONDUCT TEST ON EC47 AIRCRAFT. THIS TYPE ANTENNA UTILIZES BIPOLARIZATION AND USED LOGIC, SERVO CIRCUITS TO TUNE ANTENNA TO EXACT FREQUENCY. THIS ANTENNA WAS MOUNTED IN ORIGINAL COUPLER MOUNTING HOLE AND PROVIDED 50% LESS INTERFERENCE. IT WAS MOUNTED JUST FORWARD OF THE MAIN CARGO DOOR AND PROVIDED 85 TO 90 PERCENT LESS INTERFERENCE TO MISSION EQUIPMENT THAN CU-943. THROUGH TEST IT WAS FOUND THAT VHF/FM BLADE ANTENNA MOUNTED 32 INCHES FORWARD OF THE TAIL WHEEL WELL PROVIDED NELIGIBLE INTERFERENCE TO MISSION EQUIPMENT.

D. THIS VHF/FM BLADE ANTENNA WAS POSITIONED 32 INCHES FORWARD

OF THE TAIL WHEEL WELL (STATION 609.62) ON BELLY OF EC47, AIRCRAFT
NUMBER 43-49703. AIRCRAFT HAS FLOWN 14 MISSIONS TO DATE AND INITIAL
TEST RESULTS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY SATISFACTORY. THIS PROPOSAL IS
RECORDED IN MILITARY SUGGESTION NUMBER 70-94042 BEING HELD ON FILE
AT THIS STATION.

E. WE HAVE ONE MORE PROPOSAL TO TEST. THIS CONSTITUTES MOUNTING
THE CU-943 ON THE VERTICAL STABILIZER BEHIND THE ANTICOLLISION LIGHT.
THIS POSITION, UTILIZING PRESENT COUPLER, HAS PROVIDED NEGLIGIBLE
INTERFERENCE TO MISSION EQUIPMENT ON GROUND. WE WILL HAVE THE
TUNER MOUNTED AND FLOWN TO TEST OVERALL PERFORMANCE.

F. WE WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED OF PROGRESS. GP-1.



and OP
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(4)

ROUTINE

280551Z Nov 69

6994SCTYSQ

DET 1, 6994SCTYSQ

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ

DET 3, 6994SCTYSQ

ZEN: 6994SS (OPS-3)



SUBJ: PRE-MISSION BRIEFINGS.

File

1. DURING THE RECENT VISIT OF THE WING COMMANDER, THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF OUR PRE-MISSION BRIEFINGS WAS STRESSED. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT ALL ASPECTS OF PRE-MISSION BRIEFINGS ARE CAREFULLY SCRUTINIZED. THIS INCLUDES BOTH THE SIGINT BRIEFING PRESENTED TO 6994TH CREW MEMBERS AND THE SANITIZED BRIEFING PRESENTED BY THE SRO TO THE FRONT END CREWS.
2. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, THE SIGINT BRIEFING PRESENTED TO 6994TH AIRCREWS WILL INCLUDE, AT A MINIMUM:

A. A REVIEW OF THE PREVIOUS DAY'S MISSION TO THE AREA CONCERNED. THIS WILL INCLUDE NUMBER OF TARGETS WORKED AND FIXED; NUMBER OF PRIORITY AND/OR SPECIAL EMPHASIS TARGETS LOCATED, THEIR LOCATION

28


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
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JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF
Operations Officer



ROUTINE

AND THEIR IDENTIFICATION; SIGNIFICANT COLLECTION RESULTS; ANY PECULIAR OR SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS OR ACHIEVEMENTS ON THE PREVIOUS DAY'S MISSION.

b. TECHNICAL SIGINT INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE CURRENT MSN. (LOCATIONS AND TECH DATA RELATED TO SPECIAL EMPHASIS AND HIGH PRIORITY TARGETS IN THE MISSION AREA.)

c. DSU INFORMATION TO INCLUDE PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE DSU'S, FREQUENCIES AND CALL-SIGNS TO BE UTILIZED, ETC.

d. GENERAL INTELLIGENCE PICTURE OF TACTICAL ACTIVITY IN THE MSN AREA. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ENEMY OB, OPERATIONS OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE AREA AND ANY FEEDBACK RECEIVED FROM SUPPORTED COMMANDS.

e. A SHORT BRIEFING BY THE SRO TO INCLUDE:

(1) A REVIEW OF THE LATEST CIF'S AND ANY SPECIAL EMPHASIS AREAS AS DIRECTLY BY THE OPERATIONS OFFICER.

(2) ASSIGNMENT OF CREW POSITIONS.

(3) CHECK FOR PROPER CLOTHING, PROPER IDENTIFICATION, AND PERSONAL EQUIPMENT.

(4) REVIEW OF ANY INTERCEPT/FIX TECHNIQUES PECULIAR TO THE MISSION AREA.

3. THE SRO WILL PRESENT A SANITIZED VERSION OF ITEMS MENTIONED IN PARA 2A THROUGH D ABOVE TO THE FRONT END CREWS. THIS BRIEFING

ROUTINE

SHOULD INCLUDE THE FREQUENT USE OF TRUE UNIT DESIGNATORS OF ENEMY UNITS WHENEVER KNOWN. THE BRIEFING SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ON A MAP AND GIVEN TO THE ENTIRE CREW. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT EACH SRO REALIZE THAT HE IS SERVING AS THE SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE OF USAFSS IN LIAISON WITH ANOTHER MAJOR AIR COMMAND. AS SUCH, THE PROFESSIONALISM AND EFFECTIVENESS REFLECTED IN HIS PRE-MISSION BRIEFING PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ENHANCING THE IMAGE OF THE 6994TH AND SECURITY SERVICE.

4. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF BOTH PRE-MISSION BRIEFINGS IS TO PROVIDE ALL MEMBERS OF THE CREW WITH AS MUCH CURRENT INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE TO ENABLE THEM TO EFFECTIVELY PERFORM THE MISSION. PARAGRAPHS TWO AND THREE OUTLINE ONLY THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS, WHICH SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY. WE SOLICIT YOUR SUGGESTIONS AND COMMENTS AS TO ADDITIONAL TECHNIQUES THAT MAY BE USED OR INFORMATION THAT MAY BE INCLUDED.

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File
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1. FOR DIRNSA: REQUEST YOUR ACTION TO INCLUDE USA-564 IN THE COMINT CATALOGUE - PACIFIC AREA (PACCAT) FOR THE PURPOSE OF TACREP REPORTING. A DISTRIBUTION SYMBOL FOR USA-564 WILL HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED. TECHINS 1055 AND TECHINS 4015 DO NOT REFLECT A PRODUCT REPORTING DESIGNATOR, THIS HQ WILL INFORM USA-564 END PRODUCT REPORTING DESIGNATOR, THIS HQ WILL INFORM USA-564 THE PROCEDURE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THEIR TACREP DISTRIBUTION LIST IQW T-4015, SECTION III, PARAS 3 ALFA AND BRAVO.
2. FOR PACSCTYRGN: REQUEST YOUR ACTION TO INCLUDE USA-564 IN THE U-154 AND INITIATE NECESSARY ACTION TO PROVIDE USA-564 WITH THE ABOVE MENTIONED TECHINS.
3. FOR USA-561 : REQUEST YOU PROVIDE PACSCTYRGN, INFO THIS HQ, WITH A LIST OF THE NECESSARY MUSSO PUBLICATIONS REQUIRED FOR USA-564.

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


Supporting Document
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FM 6922SCTYWC
TO 6994SCTYSQ/OPS
ZCZ

SUBJ: TACREP REPORTING AT USA-564
REFS: A. YOUR OPS 330510Z SEP 69
 B. OUR OPSP 350205Z SEP 69
 C. DIRNSA B675-115, 051746Z SEP 69
 D. USAFSS TEO 242248Z JUN 69

1. THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY DIRNSA IN REF CHARLIE CONTRADICTS THE GUIDANCE IN THE DIRNSA MSG QUOTED IN REF DELTA. WE HAVE QUERIED PACSCTYRGN FOR CLARIFICATION. REGION, IN TURN, HAS BROUGHT THE MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF HQ USAFSS AND REQUESTED THEY APPROACH DIRNSA TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT IN GUIDANCE.
 2. DO NOT TAKE ANY ACTION OF REF BRAVO UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED.
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OPS-2 action
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[REDACTED]
SUBJ: WEEKLY COMBAT COUGAR REPORT
REFS: A. 6994SS/OPS-2 082244Z OCT 69.
B. 6922SW/OPS-4 090710Z OCT 69.

IAW REFS A & B, 6994SS WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PREPARATION OF WEEKLY COMBAT COUGAR REPORT EFFECTIVE
25 OCTOBER 1969.

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ABN MSN ROUTINE
MGTG ~~EX~~ ROUTINE

6994 SCTY SQ

6922 SCTY WG (OPSM)

INFO: ZEN DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ

ZEN DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ

ZEN DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

SUBJ: USAFSSM 200-4 VOLUME XV

A. DURMIS CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT THIS UNIT 22 AND 23 AUG WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM DETS 1, 2 AND 3, 6994 SCTY SQ.

THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS WERE AGREED ON:

ØIX SECTIONS:

1. A SEPARATE ENTRY WITH AMOC WILL BE MADE FOR EACH AREA FLOWN WHEN MISSIONS ARE DIVERTED. APPROPRIATE REMARKS WILL BE MADE IN ØIX SECTION.

2. BELIEVE ZZ DIGRAPH SHOULD READ "USED ONLY WHEN "2" POSITION IS USED" VICE "IS NOT USED".

3. COLLECTION ON "X" POSITION SHOULD BE ENTERED IN Ø11 SECTION WHEN MISSION IS FLOWN WITH NO ARDF CAPABILITY,

I.E. NO COMPUTER ABOARD BUT POSITION IS MANNED.

23

AUG 1969

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SSGT CLARK

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JAMES W. JOHNSON, JR., LT COL, USAF,
OPERATIONS OFFICER

ROUTINE
ROUTINE

LT COL JOHNSON

SSGT CLARK

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4. ✓REQUEST CLARIFICATION IF FIELD NINE OF Ø12 AND Ø13 SHOULD BE TOTAL TARGETS IDENTIFIED OR FIXES IDENTIFIED?
Ø5Ø SECTION: QUERY IF CONTINUED REPORTING OF AUTHORIZED/ASSIGNED FOR EACH SKILL LEVEL AND AUTH/ASSIGNED/PRESENT ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ FOR DUTY FOR TOTAL IS DESIRED OR ~~X~~ AUTHORIZED/AVAILABLE AND ASSIGNED/AVAILABLE FOR SKILL LEVELS/TOTALS RESPECTIVELY.
ALSO, FEEL PERSONNEL REPORTED AVAILABLE (OR PRESENT) FOR DUTY SHOULD NOT INCLUDE PERSONNEL ON LEAVE/R&R. PERSONNEL LOST TO ONE UNIT FOR TDY IN EXCESS OF SEVEN DAYS SHOULD BE REPORTED AS AVAILABLE FOR DUTY AT THE GAINING UNIT. E.G. DET 1 CURRENTLY HAS 1Ø PEOPLE TDY TO DET 3. DET 3 WILL THEN REPORT THESE PERSONNEL AS AVAILABLE FOR DUTY UNDER THE APPROPRIATE AFSC.

B. THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS ARE NEEDED.

- DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ - USAFSSM 2ØØ-4 VOLUME VII.
- DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ - USAFSSM 2ØØ-4 VOLUME VII.
- DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ - USAFSSM 2ØØ-4 VOLUMES VI AND VII.

C. UPON RESOLVING THESE POINTS WOULD BE ABLE TO IMPLEMENT NEW FORMAT WITH NO FORESEEABLE PROBLEMS.

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Supporting Documents
6994th Security Squadron History

July – December
1969



The EC-47 History Site



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