


UNCLASSIFIED

**HISTORY OF THE
6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON
AND ITS DETACHMENTS**

January – June
1967



The EC-47 History Site



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HISTORY
 OF THE
 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON
 1 January 1967 - 30 June 1967
 RCS: AU-D5 (USS-1)

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
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HISTORY

OF THE

6994th SECURITY SQUADRON

1 January - 30 June 1967

RCS: AU-D5 (USS-1)

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
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FOREWORD

This history covers the operational activities of the 6994th Security Squadron during the reporting period of 1 January - 30 June 1967. The histories of the detachments are presented as appendices; however, in some instances the material contained in the basic document is all inclusive. This was necessary to provide the reader with a complete account of the subject/activity.

This history has been divided into four chapters: Chapter I - Mission and Organization, Chapter II - Tasking and Collection, Chapter III - Processing and Reporting, and Chapter IV - Mission Accomplishment. The addition of Chapter IV is a deviation from the "Revised Format for USS-1 History," published by Hq USAFSS. This deviation was made to facilitate the portrayal of the unit's effectiveness in accomplishing its unique mission in direct support of the Vietnam conflict. Also included as an appendix is a brief history of the activities of the Airborne Radio Direction Finding Coordination Center (ACC).

This history was prepared primarily from files, interviews and project folders available at the unit. Many of the messages referenced as 6994th Security Squadron messages are quoting other correspondence to higher headquarters. Many of the activities reported were coordinated with local agencies (i.e., MACV, 7th Air Force, 509th Radio Research Group, etc.) in person by 6994th staff personnel and, consequently, may not be fully documented. This could not be avoided.

The research and writing was accomplished by Sgt Odom. The historian was mainly concerned with editing and style.

All suggestions and comments concerning this history should be directed to the Office of Information.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Foreword	iv
List Of Illustrations	vii
Chronology	viii
I MISSION AND ORGANIZATION	
Mission	1
Organization	2
Organizational Changes	5
Internal Organizational Changes	10
II TASKING AND COLLECTION	
Tasking	11
SIGINT Collection	12
SIGINT Collection Facilities	12
SIGINT Collection Policies	18
Special Collection Projects	19
III PROCESSING AND REPORTING	
Processing	22
Reporting	22
IV MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENTS	
Compass Dart	23
Drill Press	29

Page

FOOTNOTES

39

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

41

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

APPENDICES

History, Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron
History, Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron
History, ARDF Coordination Center



DISTRIBUTION

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Chart One	Geographical Locations, 6994th Security Squadron Activities	3
Chart Two	Organizational Chart	4
Chart Three	Reference Map	7
Chart Four	Compass Dart EC-47	13
Chart Five	Drill Press EC-47	14
Chart Five A	Aircraft Arrivals In-Country	15
Chart Six	Drill Press Manual Morse Intercept	30
Chart Seven	Messages Intercepted By Drill Press	31
Chart Eight	Drill Press Radio Telephone Intercept	32
Chart Nine	Compass Dart Mission Summary	33
Chart Ten	ARDF Summary	34
Chart Eleven	Det 1 Compass Dart Mission Summary	35
Chart Twelve	Det 1 ARDF Summary	36
Chart Thirteen	Det 2 Compass Dart Mission Summary	37
Chart Fourteen	Det 2 ARDF Summary	38
Chart Fifteen	Tasking Cycle	Page 8 (ACC history)

C H R O N O L O G Y

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
Jan	Drill Press continues operations from Hue/Phu Bai Airfield.
Jan	Discussion begins for establishing ARDP/Airborne Collection operations in Thailand.
Jan	Major difficulties were encountered in the coordinate converter digitizer in ARD-18 system.
Jan	Drill Press was directed into Tiger Hound/Steel Tiger areas of Laos by 7th Air Force.
Jan	Magnetic tape recordings of target signals were forwarded to Sanders Associates.
15 Jan	Drill Press capability was reduced as aircraft 43-16254 deploys to Taiwan for IRAN.
Feb	MACV ARDP areas expanded to include coastal area of southern North Vietnam.
18 Feb	Aircraft 43-49679 destroyed in ground accident.
9 Mar	Aircraft 43-49201 lost to probable enemy action.
Mar	Action was instituted locally proposing deletion of A20210 authorizations and was disapproved by operations officer.
Apr	Project name "Phyllis Ann" was changed to "Compass Dart."
Apr	Four Compass Dart aircraft were transferred to Pleiku AB from Tan Son Nhut to balance resources.
Apr	PACAF approved increase in allocated airframe utilization hours for Drill Press.

- 
- 17 Apr 6994th Security Squadron celebrated its first anniversary.
- 21 Apr Action initiated to secure KY-8 equipment for Drill Press.
- 22 Apr Action was instituted to reduce use of ARDF air/ground frequencies by unauthorized subscribers.
- Jun Drill Press deployed one aircraft to Pleiku AB to support Tri-border area activities.
- Jun Proposal instituted to relocate Detachment 2.
- 21 Jun First aircraft scheduled for modification 2000/270 departs for Itazuke.
- 

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER I - MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

Mission

[REDACTED] The specific mission of the 6994th Security Squadron was to perform the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) role in the Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) program in South Vietnam, Laos, and the adjacent coastal areas of South Vietnam, north to approximately 20 nautical miles north of the DMZ. The unit accomplished its mission through the resources of projects Compass Dart (formerly Phyllis Ann) and Drill Press. Through these facilities the unit provided intelligence support of combat operations of the Vietnamese conflict by:


(1) accomplishing close tactical support for major offensive operations through establishing the location and identity of enemy forces and passing the information to Direct Support Units (DSU's) collocated with combat elements,


(2) providing ARDF of enemy transmitters in support of SIGINT activities of United States Intelligence units, and


(3) augmentation of SIGINT intercept facilities through material collected by the ARDF acquisition equipment and the Drill Press airborne collection platforms.


* The project name "Phyllis Ann" was changed to "Compass Dart" during April. CSAF MSG AFRDEMT 76508 Mar 67 applies.


Organization


 The 6994th Security Squadron was located at Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam. The squadron was directly subordinate to the 6922d Security Wing located at Clark AB, Philippines. Units subordinate to the squadron were its two detachments: Detachment 1, located at Nha Trang; and Detachment 2, located at Pleiku. Operationally, the unit was subordinate to Headquarters, Seventh Air Force, also located at Tan Son Nhut. However, due to its close tactical support mission to ground operations, operational control was normally accepted as being exercised by Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV-J2).

 The squadron provided administrative and logistical support to the USAFSS Liaison Office (SSLO); and to the USAFSS personnel assigned to the National Security Agency's SIGINT Support Group (SSG Det). These activities functioned independently of the squadron and played no role in the mission accomplishment. The USAFSS manning of the ARDF Coordinating Center (ACC) was provided from the squadron's resources.

 The squadron maintained an operating location at Hue/Phu Bai. Consisting of the entire contingent of Drill Press personnel and equipment, the activity was collocated with the 8th Radio Research Field Station and tasked with accomplishing mission commitments in Northern Quang Tri Province. Only operational and maintenance personnel were assigned to the activity. Generally, these personnel were TDY from the 6994th Security Squadron. However, linguistic personnel were provided, in TDY status, by the 6988th Security Squadron. In two instances, the detachments of the 6994th Security Squadron were tasked with providing limited personnel assistance.





GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS
6994th SECURITY SQUADRON ACTIVITIES



6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

Operations Division

Organizational Chart



[REDACTED]

Organizational Changes

[REDACTED] No organizational changes were effected during this period; however, two major and highly significant changes were proposed and considered. The final disposition of these proposed changes had not been resolved during this reporting period.

[REDACTED] During early June a proposal for the relocation of Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron from its location at Nha Trang to Cam Ranh was instituted. The proposal was originated after knowledge was gained of a MACV intent to partially or completely vacate Nha Trang to curtail the steadily increasing infiltration in that area.¹ Major operational disadvantages would evolve from the move; therefore, the idea of relocating the unit to Cam Ranh was abandoned, and, if in fact the unit was required to move, the decision was made to relocate the unit to a location that would improve mission effectiveness.² Since ARDF and Drill Press missions were losing valuable mission time in transmitting from Pleiku, Nha Trang and Tan Son Nhut to mission areas and/or other staging locations,³ Hue/Phu Bai and Da Nang were selected as the most logical locations for providing coverage of northern South Vietnam (SVN) and Laos. Drill Press had maintained an operating location at Hue/Phu Bai since October 1966. Collocated with USM-808, the data base and processing center for the area, this location was highly desirable from an operational standpoint; however, logistics and security were prime considerations. During late June, Colonel Edwin H. Garrison, commander, Pacific Security Region, and Lieutenant Colonel Wyman M. Bridges, commander, 6994th Security Squadron, visited Hue/Phu Bai to investigate the feasibility of the proposed relocation. They determined that the support facilities were

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

totally inadequate, nullifying the operational advantages expected to be achieved through the move.⁴ Da Nang was given slight consideration; however, the facilities there were extensively overcrowded and inadequate, therefore it was eliminated as a choice. Although the amount of on-target time could be greatly increased by relocating the detachment to the northern portion of SVN, no satisfactory site for the location could be established.⁵ The entire proposal was dropped for the present, at least.

This redacted portion contains footnotes 6-8, which are not redacted:

- 6. Msg, CINCPACAF, DI 23840, 09 Aug 66.
- 7. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq, OPR 01008, 30 Nov 66.
- 8. Msg, AFSSO PACAF, DI 14372, 14 Dec 66, Doc. 4.

However, Document #4 (note 8 above) is redacted in its entirety.

PACAF and/or USAFSS mounted a nearly six months long "sales campaign" to station at least one DRILL PRESS and one ARDF aircraft in Thailand.* The debate, if such it was, went all the way to the Joint Chiefs. (Note 16.) Interestingly, the asserted need came, not from the CIA as might be expected, but from within the USAF itself. ("CAS requirements not relevant - we have stated unilateral USAF ARDF requirement in Thailand.")

The redacted text -- and Document #4 -- may contain the rationale behind the USAF's perceived need for Thailand-based SIGINT support. (Document #5 hints that security of Thai bases may have been at least one factor. Udorn was in fact attacked in July, 1968.)

* See pages 8-10 following the map, which itself appears to help illustrate the "problem."

[REDACTED]


This block appears to be a quotation, probably from Doc. #4.

In a 14 December 1966 message, the DI, PACAF engaged the assistance of

[REDACTED]

Chart Three
REFERENCE MAP

7



[REDACTED]

7th and 13th Air Forces, AFSSO Udorn and PACSCTYRCN in assessing the scope of the problem and identifying the ARDF resources required, present and future.⁹ As a result, an estimate of the enemy forces was accomplished;¹⁰ requirements for Compass Dart/Drill Press logistical support were promulgated; and a concept for employment of the ARDF/Collection equipment readied. Deployment of a minimum of one Drill Press and one Compass Dart aircraft to Thailand appeared imminent. Tentative follow-on plans were to divert an unspecified number of the attrition (NOA) aircraft, which were in actuality excess to MACV requirements to Thailand to replace the temporarily deployed aircraft. On 3 January 1967, the commander, USMACV, in reference to earlier correspondence, informed CINCPACAF of MACV opposition to the idea.¹¹

"By reference C the importance of the ARDF program in RVN was made clear. ARDF resources available in RVN and those programmed but not delivered are needed to meet MACV requirements. Any degradation of existing or programmed capabilities by diversion of these resources is unacceptable."

USAFSS, however, indicated emphatic approval of the idea as stated in a 14 January message to CSAF¹² and, in view of the excellent opportunities

"AFSS fully supports the immediate deployment of one of the two Drill Press aircraft to Udorn in support of ARDF EW mission requirements in Thailand."

presented by the proposal, unhesitatingly continued planning.

"While it is recognized that some objections may be raised to the movement of one Drill Press aircraft, feel that it is within the prerogatives of the CSAF to so direct. In February 1967, we will have sufficient Phyllis Ann aircraft with acquisition positions capable of meeting the majority of Drill Press intercept capability. Additional intercept capabilities will be provided by 1QFY68 on 12 Phyllis Ann which will remove the PACAF requirement for 2 Drill Press by 1QFY68."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In a 20 January follow-on message to their 14 January proposal, USAFSS expanded on their views on the six NOA aircraft programmed for the Compass Dart program and indicated a firm stand on their proposal.¹³ On 23 January 1967, CSAF informed USAFSS of their concurrence to the proposal and forwarded their recommendations to JCS for consideration.¹⁴ JCS in turn aired the proposal to concerned agencies. In stating the MACV, MACTHAI and USARPAC positions on the proposal, General Westmoreland stated:¹⁵

"It has not been concluded that the ARDF assets programmed for SVN will meet increasing MACV requirements. Since January 1966 when requirements were stated for the currently programmed ARDF aircraft, the MACV battle area has been extended, more enemy units have come to SVN, there has been an increased demand for close tactical support, and a growing need for development effort both for COMINT and planning for combat operations... It is essential that the Drill Press aircraft be retained in SVN until MACV has determined that this capability is no longer required."

Although some additional correspondence was exchanged on the subject, CINCPACAF in a 9 March 1967 message to JCS recommended that the deployment of the Phyllis Ann aircraft to Thailand be held in abeyance until all programmed aircraft had been delivered to SVN and MACV had accomplished a complete evaluation of their potential.¹⁶ On 11 March 1967, PACAF in a message to CSAF reiterated the still existing USAF requirement for ARDF in Thailand, stating:¹⁷

"CAS requirements not relevant - we have stated unilateral USAF ARDF requirement in Thailand."

and:

"If possible, urge MACTHAI to reclaim and submit Air Force requirements in terms of desired hours of coverage."

On 9 May 1967, AFSSO Udorn informed AFSSO 7th AF that:¹⁸

"Twice repeated discussions with J-2 MACTHAI have been unproductive in terms of persuading them to restate requirements

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

in terms of Compass Dart aircraft. In essence the MACTHAI position is that the requirements for exploration of clandestine/insurgent communications can be met by ground system general search with U-8 being used to pinpoint authentic unidentified or suspect transmitters."

The situation remained unresolved.

Internal Organizational Changes

■ The Standardization/Evaluation function became a responsibility of the Mission Control Branch. Analysis and Reporting and Technical Data/Reporting functions were transferred to Airborne Operations where they became the responsibility of the Tech Data and Reporting Section. These changes placed all functions common to local airborne operations within their responsibility, and squadron functions under the Mission Control Branch.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER II - TASKING AND COLLECTION

Tasking

[REDACTED] The unit's ARDF resources (Compass Dart) were tasked by MACV-J2 against Viet Cong and PAVN/NVA targets. The tasking was accomplished by weighing the ARDF requirements submitted by tactical commanders and SIGINT units, in light of their relative importance, against the resources available. All concerned agencies/activities were represented at the proceedings.

[REDACTED] On 23 June, the MACV ARDF target priority system was revised.¹ This revision resulted in a general realignment of priorities. The emphasis was increased for targets that had been found to have a tactical mission and decreased for others. Also, the fix rate for each priority was increased.

[REDACTED] During February, MACV ARDF areas were expanded to include the area off the coast of North Vietnam from the DMZ north to Dong Hoi.² This area was added in response to a III Marine Amphibious Force requirement for the locating of major terminals of the PAVN 324B NVA Division and the MID-65 division that were suspected of being located north of the DMZ just beyond range of the ARDF missions operating south of the DMZ. Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron commenced flying the area in mid-February.

[REDACTED] The unit's Airborne Collection resources (Drill Press) were tasked by 7th Air Force (DIOW) through coordination with MACV-J2 and the 509th Radio Research Group. Specific tasking was against PAVN/NVA targets in the DMZ area that passed traffic in low-level (readable) crypto systems.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIGINT Collection

[REDACTED] The SIGINT collection capability of the unit consisted of acquisition, monitor, record and ARDP of HF signals through the facilities of Compass Dart ARD-18 equipped aircraft (Chart 4), and search, monitor and record of HF and VHF signals through the facilities of the Drill Press collection aircraft (Chart 5).

SIGINT Collection Facilities


[REDACTED] The SIGINT collection facilities of the unit consisted of 11 Compass Dart aircraft, five of which were HF acquisition equipped, at the onset of the period; increasing to 37 aircraft, 27 of which were HF acquisition equipped, by 30 June (Chart 5A). Also in the inventory were the two Drill Press aircraft which were HF/VHF intercept equipped (Chart 5). A continual increase in capability was experienced by the arrival of additional aircraft and the installation of HF acquisition equipment in many of the existing aircraft. A decrease in capability was injected by the loss of two of the Compass Dart aircraft.

[REDACTED] Compass Dart aircraft 43-49201 was lost to probable ground fire at approximately BS 821 428 on 9 March 1967.³

[REDACTED] On 18 February 1967, Compass Dart aircraft 43-49679 was involved in a ground accident that damaged it beyond repair.⁴ The unoccupied aircraft was parked adjacent to a ramp access taxiway when an Air America aircraft taxiing along the ramp experienced a brake malfunction and veered into the parked Compass Dart aircraft. All ARDP equipment was undamaged and was salvaged.

[REDACTED] During January and February the unit experienced an abnormally low ARD-18 in-commission rate due to problems encountered

[REDACTED]



Compass Dart EC-47

"Y" Console

Navigator's Table

"X" Console

Chart Four

13





Chart Plate



AIRCRAFT ARRIVALS IN-COUNTRY

Serial Number	Date Arrived	Location
43-49679	24 Jan 1967	TSN
43-48402	4 Feb 1967	TSN
42-24313	6 Feb 1967	TSN
43-49009	18 Feb 1967	TSN
42-93814	3 Mar 1967	TSN
42-24300	4 Mar 1967	TSN
43-49260	11 Mar 1967	TSN
43-49547	14 May 1967	TSN
42-08980	31 Dec 1967	NHA
45-50925	6 Mar 1967	NHA
43-49491	10 Mar 1967	NHA
42-00665	16 Mar 1967	NHA
43-48702	31 Apr 1967	NHA
43-15133	11 Apr 1967	NHA
42-00950	2 Jan 1967	PKU
43-15980	16 Mar 1967	PKU
43-49013	21 Apr 1967	PKU
43-15979	16 Apr 1967	PKU

[REDACTED]

with the coordinate converted digitizer and a lack of supply support for the item.⁵ Technical representatives of Sanders Associates reported that the indications were that the system developed major problems after approximately 600 hours of operation. This was occurring after the system had been in use for less than four months and was creating a loss of approximately 15 per cent of the assigned aircraft strength.⁶ Production of the component for use in producing the ARD-18 systems was consuming all parts being produced and supply could not meet this unexpected demand. Consequently, it was necessary to remove eight complete units from the production line to alleviate the existing situation. Sanders Associates dispatched an engineer to the unit during March to assist in resolving the problems with the component.⁷

[REDACTED] Twenty-three Compass Dart aircraft were programmed to be equipped with wiring components that would facilitate the installation of the "Z" consoles.⁸ It was determined that this modification would have to be accomplished in the field and Itazuke AB, Japan was selected as the location best suited to accomplish the project. The modification encompassed the installation of the wiring components (Group "A") for the "Z" consoles and the KY-8 system. The "Z" modification was identified as MOD 270.⁹ The two modifications were to be accomplished simultaneously. Two aircraft were programmed to be in modification at one time. The loss of the aircraft for an estimated 10-day period was expected to induce a loss of seven per cent in the unit's ARDF capability; or a reduction of 15 seven-hour sorties per week.¹⁰ By programming the aircraft for the modification so that each of the units had only one aircraft undergoing modification and possibly one enroute at any given time, the reduction in capability would be negligible. The initial aircraft to receive the modification were 42-93814,¹¹ which departed Tan Son Nhut on 21 June, and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

43-48158,¹² which departed Pleiku on 24 June. The team tasked with accomplishing the modification arrived at Itazuke AB from CONUS without the wiring schematics and consequently could not commence the modification until their arrival.¹³ At the closure of this report, the modification had not begun.

[REDACTED] Drill Press experienced a period of reduced mission capability from 15 January through 25 February that was incurred by the deployment of aircraft 43-16254 to Taiwan for corrosion control and JBAN.¹⁴ During this period it was necessary to reduce the mission duration to five hours to preclude exceeding the monthly flying hour limitation of 125 hours per airframe. Although this reduction in mission time was detrimental to mission effectiveness, skillful manipulation of scheduling to cover the most productive times resulted in a minimal loss of desired target coverage.

[REDACTED] During April, PACAF authorized an increase in the maximum monthly flying hour allocation for Drill Press from 125 hours to 150 hours per airframe.¹⁵ This increase aligned the Drill Press airframe flying hour allocation with that of the Compass Dart aircraft. The capability of Drill Press was increased significantly by this 50 hour per month increase in airframe availability.

[REDACTED] On 21 April, the unit initiated a request for the installation of KY-8 communications equipment in the Drill Press aircraft.¹⁶ This request was invoked by the extremely high volume of traffic that Drill Press was collecting that contained highly significant perishable intelligence of immediate value to Tactical Commanders and the delay that was occurring in the delivery of this information to the consumers. The

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

delay was occurring due to the non-availability of a secure communications media for passing the traffic to the processing station. The request was favorably considered at all echelons and the equipment was subsequently programmed for 4QFY67 installation in the aircraft.¹⁷ The 8th Radio Research Field Station, Hue/Phu Bai AB was to provide a compatible ground station to complement the system. The programmed date for installation of the airborne components was not met.

[REDACTED] During late April, four Compass Dart aircraft, 43-49865, 43-48933, 42-93166 and 44-76668 were transferred from Tan Son Nhut AB to Pleiku AB.¹⁸ The purpose of the transfer was to provide a distribution of resources more compatible with mission requirements. The aircraft strengths after the transfer were 13 at Tan Son Nhut and 15 each at Nha Trang and Pleiku.

SIGINT Collection Policies

[REDACTED] Considerable discussion transpired relative to the impending advent of the air/ground/air secure voice network in SVN and the installation of the KY-8 communications equipment in the Compass Dart aircraft. Those problems resolved were:¹⁹ (a) establishing procedures for coordinating with the services involved to resolve operational problems, (b) developing operating instructions for the Compass Dart KY-8 operators, and (c) establishing the key list to be utilized by all subscribers to the net. Also, a KY-8 maintenance course was conducted at the 6922d Security Wing for selected maintenance personnel from the 6994th Security Squadron and its detachments.²⁰

[REDACTED] During March, a proposal was initiated locally suggesting that the UMD authorizations for A202X0 Airborne Analysis personnel for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

the Compass Dart program be changed to A292X1 Airborne Radio Intercept Operator authorizations.²¹ The proposal was directed at the forthcoming "Z" or Phase II aircraft and was based largely on the theory that the A292X1 would have constant technical assistance available through the use of the KY-8 to contact the data base. In rebutting the proposal, the fact was pointed out that the KY-8/T-217 system had an optimum effective range of approximately 50 miles.²² Also, attention was invited to the success of Drill Press during the previous 13 months, which is justifiably accreditable to the airborne analysis support. The proposal was subsequently discarded by the unit's operations officer.²³

[REDACTED] Due to an increasing amount of interference on the ARDF air/ground frequencies of 40.8 and 42.7 MHz by unauthorized stations, the 6994th Security Squadron in coordination with the 509th Radio Research Group and MACV-J6 implemented procedures wherein violators of the frequencies were reported to MACV.²⁴ The reports, titled INTORAD, were submitted in accordance with MACV directive 105-21 (Communications Electromagnetic Interference) from 22 April through 15 May. Obviously, the effort was successful since a sharp decline in interfering stations was noted.

Special Collection Projects

[REDACTED] During early January, a post mission test procedure was established by the maintenance section at the 6994th Security Squadron, which enabled an operational analysis of the performance of each ARD-18 system. Two doppler check points were established for the test and the HF transceiver installed in the maintenance section was the target transmitter. Travelling between the two doppler points, the aircraft

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

obtained three LOP's off the nose of the aircraft and LOP's off the wing at 45 second intervals. The LOP's were plotted and the angle of error of each was recorded and a history maintained of each ARD-18 system. Analysis of this history revealed deterioration in equipment capability that could have otherwise been overlooked. The procedure proved quite valuable, and was, therefore, recommended to, and adopted by each of the detachments.²⁵

[REDACTED] During a January visit to the unit, Mr Harold Wing of Sanders Associates requested that the organization record the signals of target transmitters as they were being worked on the ARD-18.²⁶ The recordings were desired to be utilized in conjunction with the printer tapes by the engineers of Sanders Associates in performing a study of the equipment performance in an operational environment. USAFSS approved the request and the unit forwarded approximately 20 of the tapes to Sanders.

[REDACTED] On 8 January, Drill Press commenced providing tip-off to U.S. Army ARDF aircraft and Compass Dart aircraft when priority targets were noted active. Since Drill Press had the capability to identify targets being intercepted, the idea provided the ARDF aircraft with the tip-off of 348 priority targets.* Only 34 fixes resulted from the effort; however, the feasibility of the air-to-air tip-off was validated and indications were that the effectiveness of the procedure could be greatly improved by the use of KY-8 communications and more compatible scheduling of the aircraft.²⁷

* Information was compiled from Drill Press daily performance profile.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During mid-January, the Director of Intelligence, 7th Air Force requested that Drill Press accomplish missions in Laos in an effort to develop and exploit overland infiltration complexes²⁸ for tactical purposes. Three missions were accomplished by the aircraft from their operating location at Hue/Phu Bai on 13, 14, and 15 January. However, the effort was aborted in favor of the higher priority intelligence requirements in the DMZ/Quang Tri Province area. Mission results of the endeavor were highly encouraging; 441 minutes of manual morse intercept associated with the overland infiltration complex was collected, 80 per cent of which was unique. Two previously unknown terminals were also reflected in the traffic.*

[REDACTED] During mid-June, in response to a MACV/7th AF requirement, Drill Press deployed one aircraft to Pleiku AB to accomplish missions in the Tri-Border area. Flagged Operation Sam II, the effort was directed against the development of an unidentified element of suspected division level that was forming in the area. Drill Press accomplished 10 missions during the 11 through 20 June deployment, providing USM-604 with sufficient data to assign case notations to two target complexes and originating 62 tip-offs to ARDF aircraft in the area.*

* This information was compiled from Drill Press weekly operational summaries.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER III - PROCESSING AND REPORTING

Processing

[REDACTED] The unit's processing mission consisted of cursory analysis of the traffic and operator logs for identification purposes and extracting messages of possible significance for electrical forwarding, and the maintenance of forms and records, as necessary, to accomplish reporting and resource managerial duties.

Reporting

[REDACTED] The unit's reporting mission consisted of (a) the reporting of ARDF fixes via air/ground radio, which was accomplished with a 96 per cent effectiveness; (b) the issuance of the Electronic Warfare Daily Operational Management Report HILITE; (c) Position Status Reporting; (d) Master Program change actions; (e) ARDF Recovery reporting; (f) Drill Press Operational Summary reporting, and (g) USAF Special SENSOR reporting.* No significant changes occurred in the reporting mission.

* Details of each report is contained in RCS: AU-B5 (AFS-1), History of the 6994th Security Squadron, 1 July - 31 December 1966.

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER IV - MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENTS

[REDACTED] This chapter was inaugurated to provide the reader with a comprehensive review of the Air Force ARDF (Compass Dart) and Airborne COMINT Collection (Drill Press) contributions to the intelligence support of combat operations of the Vietnam conflict. It summarizes the operational activities of the 6994th Security Squadron and its detachments.

Compass Dart

[REDACTED] Compass Dart aircraft accomplished 5,251 ARDF missions. A total of 2,924 missions provided close tactical support for allied operations, and 2,327 were accomplished for continuity and development. ARDF results totalled 24,431 fixes and cuts. A total of 7,692 fixes were identified to specific VC/NVA transmitters and 3,488 were predesignated MACV priority targets. Much of the planning and execution of both ground and air actions stemmed from this ARDF information.

[REDACTED] ARDF results were passed from the aircraft to Direct Support Units (DSU's) collocated with combat elements; Army and Air Force ARDF results fused for reporting; and, the intelligence gleaned from ARDF associated intercept reported in Army intelligence reports; consequently, it was almost impossible to isolate the numerous contributions of Compass Dart. Local and National level consumers did, however, indicate constant awareness to the importance of their ARDF effort. Brigadier General Jammie M. Philpott, DCS Intelligence, 7th Air Force, in a letter dated 5 April 1967, cited MACV acknowledgement of the continually increasing productivity of ARDF and the large volume of useable and reliable information of considerable military value that ARDF was providing to field commanders;

[REDACTED]

General Philpott added:

"I would like to take this opportunity to add my appreciation for the contribution that you are making to the overall intelligence program here in Vietnam."

On 6 May 1967, Lieutenant General William W. Momyer, commander, 7th Air Force, in a conversation with Colonel R. G. Williams, commander, 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, commented:

"I was visiting Pleiku the other day and noted that the morale was extremely high. I want all personnel in this mission to know that the primary and basic source of intelligence of the enemy in this country comes from Compass Dart, and I want the people in those squadrons to know it."

[REDACTED] The following chronological brief conveys an overall account of the applications of ARDF to combat activities and the ensuing results. It also provides a glimpse of some accomplishments that were, in effect, a mission by-product.

[REDACTED] From 13 September 1966 through 11 February 1967, 778 ARDF fixes were obtained and passed to combat elements in support of Operations Thayer I and II, and Irving. At least two B-52 strikes were targeted against a VC Division Headquarters from this information. Also, numerous fixes were fired on by artillery and naval gunfire. One significant engagement resulted from ARDF information. A total of 3,132 VC/NVA enemy were killed in the action and more than 3,300 suspects detained. ARDF results were utilized extensively in the overall planning and execution of the operations.

[REDACTED] During January, CTS was provided for Operations Fairfax and Lanikai, joint RVN/Allied operations. ARDF results were not acted upon immediately, but rather were utilized to plan operations on a day-to-day basis. More than 600 casualties were inflicted on the

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

enemy during these operations.

[REDACTED] During January and February, CTS provided for Operation Gadsden. The planning of the operation was accomplished through an area study of transmitters located by ARDF within the area of interest. Four hundred and eighty fixes were obtained in support of the operation of which 295 were of immediate value to the combat elements. One B-52 strike was executed against a VC Regimental Headquarters located by ARDF. More than 375 enemy were killed in the action.

[REDACTED] During January, CTS was provided for Operation Cedar Falls, an operation designed to destroy the enemy's secure base in Binh Duong Province from which he launched operations to the Saigon/Cholon areas. The operation was planned through an area study of ARDF results. ARDF guided the friendly forces directly to the enemy and continued locating his camps and staging areas throughout the operation. The enemy sustained more than 720 casualties, lost 555 individual and 23 crew-served weapons, and more than 3,700 tons of rice to the friendly forces. Of the 574 ARDF fixes passed in support of the operation, 362 were of immediate value to the combat elements. The operation was termed one of the most successful of the conflict.

[REDACTED] On 13 January, a Det 1 mission obtained ARDF of a waterborne target and visual sighting of four medium size VC cargo vessels at the fix location. A Market Time policeman was called in and boarded the vessels. The enemy transmitter and the VC crew members were captured.

[REDACTED] On 17 January 1967, a Compass Dart mission from Tan Son Nhut intercepted a "beeper" signal. Utilizing the aircraft RDF and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ARDF associated navigational equipment to determine the approximate location of the signal, they entered the area and established radio contact with the downed aircrew member. The mission called in rescue and orbited the area until the rescue had been effected.

[REDACTED] On 31 January 1967, a Compass Dart mission from Tan Son Nhut intercepted a "beeper" signal northwest of Phan Rang. Locating the crash site of a downed helicopter, they called in rescue and stood by while the safe recovery of the 10 crew members was effected.

[REDACTED] From 31 January through 15 February 1967, CTS was provided for Operation Big Spring. A total of 335 ARDF fixes of enemy transmitters were provided the tactical elements during this relatively small, but highly successful, search and destroy operation that netted more than 100 enemy casualties.

[REDACTED] From 26 January through 23 March 1967, CTS was provided for Operations Farragut and Gatling. Executed for the purpose of eliminating VC domination of National Route 1, the 101st Airborne Division relied heavily on ARDF to determine the areas of enemy activity; also, several B-52 strikes were executed against targets located by ARDF. More than 150 casualties were inflicted upon the enemy during the operations, and more than 135 suspects detained.

[REDACTED] On 15 February 1967, a Compass Dart mission out of Pleiku Airfield made visual sighting of a fleet of seven barges/sampans. An air strike was called in and one of the vessels was destroyed and the remaining damaged and sunk.

[REDACTED] On 22 April 1967, a Compass Dart mission out of Pleiku Airfield reported visual sighting of two suspected enemy vehicles. An

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

air strike subsequently confirmed the vehicles as enemy trucks and destroyed each; one resulted in a secondary explosion.

[REDACTED] On 25 April 1967, a Compass Dart mission out of Pleiku Airfield reported visual sighting of two suspected enemy trucks; both were destroyed by air strikes.

[REDACTED] On 27 April 1967, a Compass Dart mission out of Pleiku Airfield reported visual sighting of three sampans, they were confirmed as enemy, and an air strike was launched to destroy them. However, the results of the strike were not returned.

[REDACTED] On 1 April 1967, a Compass Dart mission fixed a waterborne target, then obtained visual sighting of four VC vessels in the Saigon River at the fix location. The vessels were attacked by helicopters and A1E aircraft; one was sunk, one blown up, and the remaining two beached and sunk.

[REDACTED] On 17 April 1967, a Compass Dart mission made a visual sighting of a suspected VC vehicle. The target was reconnoissanced by a FAC and confirmed to be enemy. An air strike was called in and the vehicle destroyed.

[REDACTED] During April 1967, CTS was provided for Operation Summerall. In planning the operation, an area study of 134 ARDF fixes was conducted. The 101st Airborne Division, who executed the operation commented:

"ARDF support was a great factor in the planning and executing the operation. ARDF once again proved the most valuable source of useable intelligence."

[REDACTED] During April 1967, CTS was provided for Operation Francis Marion. On 23 April, the Headquarters, 1st PAVH Division was located by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ARDF, the 4th Infantry Division immediately sent a patrol into the area. However, the patrol withdrew upon making contact. On 30 April, a target associated with the 630th Military Front was located. The 4th Infantry Division made contact with the enemy at the location. They confirmed 12 NVA troops killed in action. Pursuing the enemy forces, which was estimated to be company size, they inflicted more than 90 casualties on the fleeing force, destroyed 200 bunkers and tunnels, and captured a large number of weapons.

[REDACTED] During February, March, April and May, CTS was provided for Operation Junction City, one of the largest operations of the conflict. Specific results of the operation were not available; however the following information should convey a general idea of the significance of the ARDF support:

"The most valuable COMINT product was airborne radio direction finding provided by the 146th Aviation Company and the 6994th Security Squadron. During phase II of the operation a total of 1,558 ARDF fixes were received of which 903 were of immediate value to the supported command."

"Brigadier General McChristian visited the 11th ACP (FWD). The Commanding General indicated that he was very satisfied with ARDF support and credits timely ARDF with preventing one VC assault against the fire support base."


"Brigadier General Knowles explained to Lieutenant General Seaman that the 196th Infantry plans to react immediately to all ARDF cuts and fixes."

"Major General Johnson asked Brigadier General Knowles about the effectiveness of ARDF and other SIGINT support. General Knowles stated that it was a very important factor in his operational planning."

"The headquarters of the Military Intelligence Bureau COSVN was struck by B-52's on 5 March 1967. Target was located by ARDF."


[REDACTED]


Drill Press

 From 24 September 1966, Drill Press maintained uninterrupted surveillance of low echelon NVA communications in the DMZ area. Staging from their operating location at Hue/Phu Bai, the project provided USM-808 with an invaluable source of intelligence relevant to tactical activities in the area. On 26 May, the Commanding General, USASA, in a message to the Director, National Security Agency commented:

"Current Drill Press operations, flying against VC comms in and near the DMZ with USM-808 acting as CMA, are proving to be invaluable. Traffic, encrypted in readable systems, is intercepted on every sortie and immediately turned over to the cryptanalytic and linguistic personnel in the P&R section at USM-808 following the flight."

Targeted against those NVA targets known or suspected to be passing traffic in readable, low level, crypto systems (PAVN 324B NVA Division and associated communications), Drill Press collected more than 78,000 minutes of manual morse traffic. Eighty per cent of this traffic was unique to USM-808 sources and 83.5 per cent of the traffic was mission intercept. More than 3,150 messages were contained in the traffic, 64 per cent of which were readable and resulted in the generation of more than 2,160 intelligence reports.



Drill Press Manual Morse Intercept






Chart Seven



Messages Intercepted By Drill Press








Chart Nine

6994th Security Squadron
Compass Dart Mission Summary



— Missions scheduled  Missions accomplished





+ Total targets worked not available
* Total identified fixes/cuts not available





Chart Eleven

Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron
Compass Dart Mission Summary




▬ Missions scheduled

▭ Missions accomplished



Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron

ARDF SUMMARY




+ Total targets worked not available
* Total identified fixes/cuts not available



Chart Thirteen

Detachment 2, 699th Security Squadron


Compass Dart Mission Summary



— Missions scheduled  Missions accomplished



ARDF SUMMARY



+ Total targets worked not available.
 * Total identified fixes/cuts not available

FOOTNOTESChapter I

1. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq CDR 28316, 28 May 67, Doc. 1.
2. Msg, 6922d Scty Wg OPS 02722, 3 Jun 67, Doc. 2.
3. Ibid.
4. Msg, PACSCTYRGN, CDR 17594, 17 Jun 67, Doc. 3.
5. Interview by Sgt Odom with Capt R. V. Barnett, assistant operations officer, 6994th Scty Sq.
6. Msg, CINCPACAF, DI 23840, 09 Aug 66.
7. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq, OPR 01008, 30 Nov 66.
8. Msg, AFSSO PACAF, DI 14372, 14 Dec 66, Doc. 4.
9. Msg, AFSSO PACAF, DI 14121, 14 Dec 66.
10. Msg, AFSSO UDORN, DI USSO 00016, 9 Jan 67.
11. Msg, SSO MACV, MAC 0061, INTEL, 3 Jan 67.
12. Msg, USAFSS, ODC 54507, 14 Jan 67, Doc. 5.
13. Msg, USAFSS, OPD 51284, 20 Jan 67.
14. Msg, AFSSO USAF, AENICAC 00386, 23 Jan 67, Doc. 6.
15. Msg, AFSSO PACAF, DI 11212, 03 Mar 67, Doc. 7.
16. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq, OPS 10124, 10 Mar 67, Doc. 8.
17. Msg, AFSSO PACAF, DIP 11243 Mar 67.
18. Msg, AFSSO UDORN, USSO 0409, 9 May 67, Doc. 9.

Chapter II

1. Msg, MACV (cite UNK) DTG 200848F Jun 67.
2. Msg, MACV MAC 1419 INTEL, 10 Feb 67.

3. Report, 6994th Scty Sq, DTD 20 Apr 67, final summary of loss of acft.
4. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq, OPS-2 19407 Feb 67 PSR 23.
5. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq, CDR 21519, 21 Jan 67, Doc. 10.
6. Ibid.
7. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq MNT 19407, 19 Feb 67, Doc. 11.
8. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq MAT 20212, 19 Jun 67.
9. Interview by Sgt Odom with Capt Edward E. Smith, Jun 67.
10. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq CDR 31344, 31 May 67.
11. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq, OPS-2-22316 Jun 67, PSR51.
12. Msg, Detachment 2, 6994th Scty Sq, OPS 25355 Jun 67, PSR 46.
13. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq, MAT 30344 28 Jun 67.
14. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq, OPR-2-15344 Jan 67, PSR 07.
15. Msg, CINCPAC (U) DOOT 38014, 11 Mar 67.
16. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq OPS 21368, 21 Apr 67.
17. USAFSS Master Program Vol II, DTD 1 Jun 67.
18. 6994th Scty Sq Position Status Reports, numbers 43, 44, 47 and 48.
19. Msg, USAFSS TTD/TTS 47071, 30 Jun 67.
20. Interviewed by Sgt Odom with Capt Edward E. Smith, Jun 67.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq OPS-3 22384, 22 Apr 67.
25. Interview by Sgt Odom with Capt Edward E. Smith, June 67.
26. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq CDR 18452, 18 Jan 67, Doc. 12.
27. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq OPS 14215 14 Mar 67.
28. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq OPS 19459 Jan 67.


GLOSSARYA

AB Air Base

ACC Airborne Radio Direction Finding Coordination Center

AFSSO Air Force Special Security Officer

ARDF Airborne Radio Direction Finding

B

BC Body Count

C

C&D Continuity and Development

CINCPACAF Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Force

COMINT Communications Intelligence

CONUS Continental United States

GSAF Chief-of-Staff, Air Force

CTS Close Tactical Support

D

DMZ Demilitarized Zone

DSU Direct Support Unit

H

HF High Frequency

I

IRAN Inspect and Repair as Necessary

INTORAD Report of Radio Frequency Interference

J

JCS Joint Chiefs-of-Staff




K

KIA Killed in Action

L

LOP Line of Position

M

MACTHAI U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand

MACV U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

N

NVA North Vietnamese Army

P

PACAF Pacific Air Force

PAVN People's Army, Vietnam

R

RRC Radio Research Company

RRFS Radio Research Field Station

RRG Radio Research Group

S

SSLO USAFSS Liaison Office


SVN South Vietnam


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
USARPAC U.S. Army Pacific Command

UMD Unit Manning Document

U.T.M. Universal Transverse Mercator


USASA U.S. Army Security Agency



V
VC Viet Cong
VHF Very High Frequency
X
"X" ARD-18 Position
Y
"Y" D.F. Acquisition Position
Z
"Z" Phase II Compass Dart Aircraft



SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

(The "Air Force Eyes Only" handling afforded certain supporting documents was withdrawn. Document six applies.)



PRIORITY

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
DO NOT DESTROY
0408219

6994 SCTY SQ TAN SON NHUT AB ~~VIETNAM~~

6922 SCTY WG CLARK AB PHIL



CDR 28316 MAY 67. SUBJ: MOVE FROM

NHA TRANG. AT 0900, 28 MAY 67, MAJOR MELLOTT AND OTHER LOCAL COMDR'S WERE CALLED INTO A BASE CONFERENCE AND TOLD TO GATHER DATA APPLICABLE TO OUR REQUIREMENTS IF FORCED TO MOVE FROM NHA TRANG. MEETING WAS CHAIRED BY A LT COL KELLEY, WHO HAD JUST SPENT SEVERAL DAYS AT SEVENTH AF AND WITH MACV J-4 DISCUSSING MOVES FROM NHA TRANG FOR REASONS OF INFLATION, ETC. ALL GIVEN THE WORKSHEET BELOW AND ASKED TO FILL IN THE REQUIRED INFORMATION NO LATER THAN ~~\$\$\$~~TUESDAY, 30 MAY. UNITS WERE ALSO TOLD WHERE THEY WOULD BE RELOCATED. THE 361ST AND OUR UNIT WERE TOLD THAT THEY WOULD MOVE TO CAM RANH, IF AND WHEN IT WAS DECIDED BY MACV TO VACATE NHA TRANG EITHER PARTIALLY OR COMPLETELY. LT COL KELLEY STATED THAT HE HAD OK'D THIS MOVE TO CAM RANH WITH COL WILLIAMS OF THE 460TH TRW. HAVE REPRODUCED REFERENCED WORKSHEET BELOW AND INDICATED IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES INTENDED RESPONSE. WE WILL CONSULT WITH OTHER OFFICES CONCERNED WITH OUR MISSION AT SEVENTH AIR FORCE AND MACV.

26

MAY 1967

1

4



4644

Lt Col Gilbert



[Signature]
WYMAN M. BRIDGES, Lt Col, USAF
Commander

ZCZCDNA634

PP YADNQO

DE YMZADL 121 1540538

P 030515Z

FM 6922SCTYWG

TO PACSCTYRGN

INFO 6994SCTYSQ

ZEM

758 / 94
 B / 030755

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
DO NOT DESTROY

No 0408220

██████████ CHANNELS SECTION ONE OF THREE

OPS 02722 JUN 67.

SUBJ: ██████ MOVE OF DET 1, 6994SS.

REFS: A. OUR OPS 02659 30 MAY 67 (6994 DGR 28316 QUOTED)


B. USAFSS OED 52027 31 MAY 67 (NOTAL)

C. 6994 OPS X1003 (CITE GARBLED) 01 JUN 67 (ACC IAPV 53/ACC 7152 3631 QUOTED)

D. 6994 CDR 01003 01 APR 67 (NOTAL)

E. YOUR OPS 17039 02 JUN 67

THIS HQ VIEW IS THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF ARDF INFO TO SEA FIELD COMMANDERS OVERRIDES ANY OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE PLACEMENT OF COMPASS DART/DRILL PRESS ACFT. THE VIET CONG HIT AND RUN TACTICS MAKE A HIGHLY FLUID TACTICAL SITUATION WHICH NECESSITATES INCREASED USE OF MOBILE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS BY BOTH SIDES. USAFSS CONTINUING INNOVATIONS IN TRANSEC/COMINT MISSION ARE INCREASINGLY MEETING THE CHALLENGES PRESENTED. OUR DEPLOYMENT AND UTILIZATION OF THE 6994 ELECTRONIC WARFARE RESOURCES HAVE PROVIDED OUTSTANDING SUPPORT



[REDACTED]

TO MACV, AS ATTESTED BY NUMEROUS FAVORABLE COMMUNICATIONS. ACTIONS TO IMPROVE AIR TO GROUND COMMUNICATION AND AIRBORNE COLLECTION EQUIPMENT WILL FURTHER ENHANCE OUR PRODUCT. HOWEVER, WE ARE DAILY LOSING VALUABLE MSN RESULTS THROUGH REDUCED TIME OVER TGT CAUSED BY THE LONG TRANSIT TIMES NECESSARY TO REACH/RETURN FROM MISSION AREAS FROM PRESENT BASES IN NHA TRANG AND PLEIKU. NOT INFREQUENTLY, THE 6994TH HAS REFLECTED AS MUCH AS THREE HOURS AND THIRTY MINUTES TRAVEL TIME FOR A MAXIMUM SEVEN HOUR MISSION. CONSEQUENTLY, SHOULD A MOVE OF DET 1, 6994SS, BE REQUIRED BY SEA AUTHORITIES OR BECOME FEASIBLE THROUGH OUR OWN VIOLATION, DESIRE TO GO ON RECORD WITH THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. HAVE FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO REF BRAVO:

A. THUS FAR, ONLY INFO PROVIDED CONCERNING MOVE IS REF ALFA.

B. WHILE THIS HQ DID NOT INITIATE A PROJECT TO RELOCATE DET 1, 6994SS, SUCH A MOVE HAS MERIT AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR IMPLEMENTATION IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER 7AF AND MACV J-4 MAKE IT MANDATORY OR NOT. ARDF REQUIREMENTS IN SVN CAN BEST BE SATISFIED BY MOVE OF DET 1, 6994SS TO PHU BAI RATHER THAN CAM RANH BAY.

THIS HQ COMMENTS REF ALFA WERE INTENDED TO MERELY POINT OUT THAT SINCE A MOVE WAS IMMINENT, WE SHOULD PLAN TO MAKE THE MOST OF THE SITUATION TO ENHANCE THE OPERATIONAL POSTURE OF USAFSS ARDF RESOURCES IN SEA.

C. THE MAJOR DISADVANTAGE OF RELOCATION DET 1, 6994SS, AT CAM RANH BAY IS THE FACT THAT WE WOULD BE MOVING THAT UNIT'S STAGING AREA EVER FARTHER SOUTH FROM THE AREAS IN WHICH THE MAJORITY

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

OF ITS MISSIONS ARE FRAGGED. AS AN EXAMPLE, DET 1, 6994SS, WAS FRAGGED TO FLY SORTIES IN THE FOLLOWING UTM BLOCKS DURING THE PERIOD 27 MAY - 2 JUN 67: (READ NR OF SORTIES TASKED/UTM FRAG BLOCK): 7/YB, 1/AT, 14/BS, 14/ZB, 11/ER, 14/AZ, 7/ZV, 5/ZU, 2/BP AND 4/AN. AS CAN BE NOTED, OF THE TOTAL 79 SORTIES TASKED, ALL BUT 14 ARE IN AREAS NORTH OF 14 DEGREES LATITUDE (PARALLEL WITH PLEIKU). THEREFORE, CONSIDERABLE MISSION TIME IS REQUIRED FOR TRANSIT TO/FROM TARGET AREA (AS MUCH AS ONE HOUR AND FORTY-FIVE MINUTES EACH WAY), WITH RESULTING LOSS OF PRODUCTIVE TIME IN THE TARGET AREA, WITH DET 1, 6994SS LOCATED AT NHA TRANG. LOCATING AT CAM RANH BAY WOULD ADD FURTHER TO THIS ALREADY LENGTHY TRANSIT TIME.

D. OBVIOUSLY, ANY MOVE TO ANOTHER LOCATION WILL REQUIRE RE-ESTABLISHMENT ACTIONS. HOWEVER, TAKE EXCEPTION TO USAFSS INFERENCE THAT RE-ESTABLISHMENT AT PHU BAI WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT OR CAUSE MORE RELOCATION PROBLEMS THAN AT CAM RANH BAY OR OTHER LOCATION. FIRST OF ALL, ANY MOVE WILL REQUIRE RELOCATION OF ALL DET 1, 6994SS RESOURCES REGARDLESS OF WHAT LOCATION IS SELECTED FOR THE MOVE. SECONDLY, TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, THERE ARE NO EXISTING CRITICOMM OR ASA/USAFSS OPS-COMM CKTS AT CAM RANH BAY. THEREFORE, COMPLETE NEW CKT PATHS WOULD HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED BEFORE DET 1, 6994SS MOVE TO THAT SITE COULD BE MADE OR COMPLETE DISRUPTION OF THEIR CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ARDF OPERATIONS WOULD BE INCURRED. THIS IS NOT TRUE OF PHU BAI. SINCE USM-808 IS SITUATED AT PHU BAI, CRITICOMM CKTY FROM THAT LOCATION, TO 6994SS, DET 2, 6994SS AND 509RRG (ACC), IS ALREADY AVAILABLE. ALSO, AND OF PRIME IMPORTANCE, USM-808 HAS AN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

OPS-COMM CKT TO USA-32 WHO, IN-TURN, HAS DIRECT OPS-COM CKT TO THE WARNING CENTER IN THE 7AF AFSSO COMPOUND. SECTION TWO OF THREE THIS-CKT CAN BE PATCHED TO PERMIT 6994SS USAGE, THUS WOULD PROVIDE ANOTHER IMMEDIATE COMM PATCH. ARDF OPERATIONS COULD BE CONDUCTED FROM PHU BAI USING THESE COMMUNICATIONS EVEN IF SOLE USE USAFSS OPS-COMM CKTRY WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. IN ADDITION USM-808 OPS-COMM TO SAIGON ACC IS ALREADY PROPOSED AND IS RECEIVING FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION. (REF D). THIRDLY, THERE IS NO DATA BASE AT CAM RANH BAY TO SUPPORT DET 1, 6994SS; THERE IS AT PHU BAI. AS YOU ARE AWARE, USM-808 IS ONE OF THE MAJOR ASA TECH DATA BASE UNITS SUPPORTING OUR ARDF EFFORT IN SVN. IF DET 1, 6994SS WERE MOVED TO PHU BAI, THEN A REALIGNMENT OF TASKING WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD OCCUR IN WHICH DET 1 WOULD LOGICALLY BE ASSIGNED MSNS THAT USM-808 WOULD PREDOMINATELY SUPPORT WHILE DET 2, 6994SS WOULD RECEIVE TASKING ON MSN PREDOMINATELY SUPPORTED BY USM-604 AT PLEIKU. HENCE, RELOCATION OF DET 1, 6994SS AT PHU BAI, AND CORRESPONDING REVISION OF TASKING THAT WOULD OCCUR, WOULD GIVE ADDED BENEFIT OF EACH 6994SS DETACHMENT BEING COLLOCATED WITH THE ASA UNIT THAT WOULD PROVIDE THE MAJORITY OF THE TECH DATA APPLICABLE TO THEIR TASKED MSNS. GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY AS FOLLOWS: (A) DET 1, 6994 (HUE/PHU BAI) - AREA NORTH OF 15 DEGREES NORTH TO DMZ, COSTAL WATERS & LACS; (B) DET 2, 6994 (PLEIKU) - AREA NORTH OF 12 DEGREES NORTH & SOUTH OF 15 DEGREES NORTH; (C) 6994 (SAIGON) - AREA SOUTH OF 12 DEGREES NORTH (REF D). FURTHERMORE SUCH COLLOCATION WOULD ENABLE OUR OPERATOR PERSONNEL TO RECEIVE PRE AND POST MISSION BRIEFINGS ON MISSION TGTS BY TECH DATA BASE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ANALYTICAL PERSONNEL FULLY FAMILIAR WITH TGT ENTITIES, THUS ENHANCING AIRBORNE MISSION SUCCESS. THIS ALSO HAS ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF ALLOWING TIMELY FUSION WITH GROUND BASED INTERCEPT, WHICH SHOULD INCREASE THE IMMEDIATE IDENTIFICATION RATE SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE NORTH AREA. FURTHER, THIS WOULD PERMIT FREE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN DET OPERATOR PERSONNEL WITH USASA PERSONNEL WHO WORK DIRECTLY WITH THE TGT'S ASSIGNED TO ARDF MISSIONS ON A DAY TO DAY BASIS. THIS WOULD ENSURE THAT THE MOST TIMELY, ACCURATE AND IN-DEPTH TECH DATA IS ALWAYS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO OUR DET ARDF OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION, IT WOULD ENHANCE TIMELY REPORTING TO CONSUMERS. AS YOU RECALL, THIS TYPE COLLOCATION WAS ORIGINALLY PLANNED, EXCEPT DET 2, 6994SS INSTEAD OF DET 1, 6994SS WAS TO BE AT PHU BAI: BUT THIS SUBSEQUENTLY FAILED TO MATERIALIZE. PARAS 1D AND 3 OF REF CHARLIE FULLY SUPPORT THE NEED FOR SUCH COLLOCATION.

2. WE REALIZE THAT NORMALLY IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF ECONOMY AND UNIT OPERATIONS TO REMAIN AT AN ESTABLISHED LOCATION. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF ARDF SUPPORT TO TACTICAL GROUND OPERATIONS IN SVN, BELIEVE A MOVE OF DET 1, 6994SS SHOULD BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION EVEN IF IT IS NOT FORCED BY MACV/7AF FOR REASONS STATED IN REF ALFA. OFFER THE FOLLOWING RATIONALE TO SUPPORT THIS CONTENTION: FINAL SECTION OF THREE

A. AT THE PRESENT TIME, GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS OF THE 6994SS AND ITS DETS DOES NOT PERMIT BEST POSSIBLE FULFILLMENT OF NORTHERN SVN AND LAOS SORTIES DUE TO TRANSIT TIME REQUIRED TO/FROM TGT AREAS. (PARA 6, REF CHARLIE SUPPORTS THIS STATEMENT). WE CAN EXPECT MORE AND MORE REQUIREMENTS FOR SORTIES IN NORTHERN SVN AREAS AS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EVIDENCED BY THE RECENT MACV J-2 REQUIREMENT WHICH RESULTED IN REDISTRIBUTION OF COMPASS DART ACFT TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ASSETS TO PLEIKU. THEREFORE, FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT IF TAN SON NHUT, PLEIKU AND PHU BAI WERE MADE THE THREE 6994SS OPERATING LOCATIONS, WE COULD BETTER FULFILL MACV AND FIELD COMMANDER PRESENT AND ANTICIPATED FUTURE REQUIREMENTS FOR TACTICAL ARDF SUPPORT.

B. AS INDICATED IN PARA ONE C ABOVE, ESTABLISHMENT OF PHU BAI AS A 6994SS DET WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY REQUIRE A REVISION OF TARGET AREAS FOR WHICH EACH DET IS RESPONSIBLE BUT PROBABLY NO SIGNIFICANT REDISTRIBUTION OF COMPASS DART ACFT ASSIGNED BY UNIT. SUCH RELOCATION WOULD RESULT IN MORE EFFECTIVELY POSITIONED COLLECTION RESOURCES, PERMIT MORE TOT IN THE FRAGGED AREA PER SORTIE FLOWN, AND COLLOCATE FLYING UNITS DIRECTLY WITH TECH DATA BASE ELEMENTS THAT SUPPORT MISSIONS FLOWN. MACV J-2 HAS REPEATEDLY VOICED ITS DESIRE TO 6994 FERS TO LOCATE A COMPASS DART/DRILL PRESS UNIT AT PHU BAI FOR THESE REASONS (REF D).

C. ESTABLISHMENT OF 6994SS DET AT PHU BAI WOULD HAVE THE NEEDED BENEFIT OF PERMITTING THE TWO DRILL PRESS ACFT TO BE MAINTAINED/STAGED FROM THAT LOCATION ON A PERMENANT BASIS WITH COMPLETE USAFSS SUPPORT THUS NEGATING NEED FOR CONTINUED SHUTTLING OF THESE ACFT TO/FROM TAN SON NHUT. (MY OPS 01762/22 AER 67, OPS 02175/2 MAY 67 REFERS).

1620

NNNN

[REDACTED]

CON: 138
M.G. [Signature]
[Signature]
[Signature]



HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY



COMINT CHANNELS
~~AIR FORCE EYES ONLY~~

ATTACH 3

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
DO NOT DESTROY
NO 040822L

/ROUTINE/
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO USAFSS
INFO 6922SW
6994SS
6924SS
TDTG 170231Z
ZEM

[Redacted] CHANNELS CDR 17594 JUN 67.
SUBJ: COMPASS DART/DRILL PRESS AT PHU BAI. REF COM
A. PACSCTYRGN OPS5892, 4 MAY 67 (NOTAL 6924/6994).
B. USAFSS OPD51949: 6 MAY 67 (NOTAL 6922/6924/6994).
C. USAFSS OPD52074: 8 JUN 67 (NOTAL 6924).

1. I VISITED PHU BAI THIS MONTH TO EXAMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF
COMPASS DART/DRILL PRESS WORK LOCATION AT THIS BASE. THE FLIGHT
LINE IS ALREADY TAXED TO THE BREAKING POINT AND CANNOT ACCOMMODATE
ANOTHER AIRCRAFT OF ANY TYPE. HEAVY RAINS AND WATER RUN-OFF HAVE
SEVERELY UNDERCUT EMBANKMENTS ALONG TAXI-WAYS, MAKING AIRCRAFT
GROUND MOVEMENTS HAZARDOUS. UNLESS IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION IS



TAKEN TO REBUILD THESE EMBANKMENTS, IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME Doc. BEFORE TAXI-WAYS COLLAPSE. ADDITIONAL PARKING SPACE IS NON-EXISTENT; THE ONE DRILL PRESS AIRCRAFT AT PHU BAI IS BEING PARKED AT THE END OF THE RUNWAY WITH ITS NOSE TEN FEET FROM THE RUNWAY. FLIGHT LINE BUILDINGS ARE DILAPIDATED; NO HANGAR OR OUT-OF-WEATHER AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE. TO ACCOMMODATE OUR AIRCRAFT AT PHU BAI WOULD REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE FLIGHT LINE CONSTRUCTION FOR OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE.

2. THE TROOP SUPPORT FACILITIES OUTLOOK IS EQUALLY DISCOURAGING. ARMY PERSONNEL ARE ALREADY CROWDED. THE MESS FACILITY WAS DESIGNED TO SUPPORT HALF AS MANY AS ARE NOW BEING SUPPORTED. ALL OTHER TROOP SUPPORT/RECREATION FACILITIES ARE EQUALLY OVER-TAXED.

3. ALTHOUGH I RECOGNIZE THE OBVIOUS OPERATIONAL ADVANTAGES OF LOCATING COMPASS DART/DRILL PRESS DETACHMENT AT PHU BAI I CANNOT RECOMMEND SUCH A MOVE UNTIL COMPLETE SUPPORT FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE AND THE FACT THAT C-130 ACFT WILL BE PROVIDED FROM DANANG; IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER DANANG AS AN OPERATIONAL LOCATION FOR COMPASS DART/DRILL PRESS. IF YOU CONCUR, I WILL EXPLORE THIS POSSIBILITY WITH PACAF.

DOCUMENT 4

8. Msg, AFSSO PACAF, DI 14372, 14 Dec 66, Doc. 4a

See comments on p. 6 of the narrative. Document #4 is presumably redacted because of its originator and/or addressee. (PACAF Directorate of Intelligence to ???)

Doc4a7.com

DTG: 1400Z
FM USAFSS
TO AFSSO USAF
AFSSO PACAF
AFSSO 7AF
PACSCYRGE
6994SS
6922SW

PROJECT [REDACTED]
DO NOT DESTROY
No 448223
3866/94 WC
14 0215Z
J

DRILL PRESS/DEPLOYMENT

[REDACTED] CHANNELS/AIR FORCE EYES ONLY

ODG 54507 JAN 67. AFSSO USAF: PASS TO AFNIC, AFKPDG, AND AFKCP.
6994SS: PASS TO GENERAL STAPLETON. REFERENCE PACAF MSG D/I 11031,
DTG 131031Z JAN 67. AFSS FULLY SUPPORTS THE IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT
OF ONE OF THE TWO DRILL PRESS AIRCRAFT TO UDORN IN SUPPORT OF
ARDF EQ MISSION IN THAILAND. THE DRILL PRESS AIRCRAFT WERE
ORIGINALLY TASKED BY AF AND PLACED UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL
OF NRV (C) FOR 120-DAY TEST. SUBSEQUENTLY, THEY REVERTED TO
COMPLETE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE 7AF. WHILE IT IS RECOGNIZED
THAT SOME OBJECTIONS MAY BE RAISED TO THE MOVEMENT OF ONE DRILL
PRESS AIRCRAFT, FEEL THAT IT IS WITHIN THE PREROGATIVES OF CSAF TO
SO DIRECT. IN FEBRUARY 1967, WE WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT PHYLIS
ANN AIRCRAFT WITH ACQUISITION POSITIONS CAPABLE OF MEETING THE
MAJORITY OF DRILL PRESS INTERCEPT CAPABILITY. ADDITIONAL
INTERCEPT CAPABILITIES WILL BE PROVIDED BY 1QFY68 ON 12 PHYLIS
ANN WHICH WILL REMOVE THE PACAF REQUIREMENT FOR 2 DRILL PRESS
AIRCRAFT BY 1QFY 68. LOOKING AT THE LONGER RANGE THAI REQUIREMENT,
FEEL IT ESSENTIAL THAT A MINIMUM OF 2 PHYLIS ANN AIRCRAFT BE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

MADE AVAILABLE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. FEEL THAT PREFERABLY THE ENTIRE OF CIA USAGE SHOULD BE USED TO OUR ADVANTAGE AT THIS TIME AND DIVERT 2 PHYLIS ANN AIRCRAFT FROM WITHIN THE NEXT DELIVERIES WITHOUT HAVING ANY MAJOR EFFECT ON MACV. 2 DRILL PRESS AIRCRAFT SHOULD THEN BE RETURNED TO ZI FOR IRAN/RETROFIT TO UPGRADED PHYLIS ANN CONFIGURATION. ONE OTHER CONSIDERATION THAT MAY BE APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME WOULD BE TO DIVERT PHYLIS ANN IMMEDIATELY TO THAILAND PRIOR TO ITS ENTRY INTO MACV AREA. THIS WOULD ACTUALLY PROVIDE A BETTER CAPABILITY THAN THE DRILL PRESS FOR ACTUAL SEARCH AND LOCATION OF INSURGENT TRANSMITTERS. AS YOU MAY KNOW, WE HAVE DET 4, 6922SW WITH AFSS CAPABILITY AT UDORN THAT CAN BE AUGMENTED BY EXPERTS IN ARDF ROLE FROM 6994SS. WITH DRILL PRESS AID, THESE EXPERTS COULD ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP THE DATA BASE TO SUPPORT AN ARDF MISSION. THIS HQS STANDS READY TO PROVIDE ANY ASSISTANCE REQUIRED TO MEET THIS URGENT AF EW MISSION.

600

[REDACTED]

DOCUMENTS 6 - 9 REDACTED

14. Msg, AFSSO USAF, AFNICAC 00386, 23 Jan 67, Doc. 6.

15. Msg, AFSSO PACAF, BI 11212, 03 Mar 67, Doc. 7.

16. Msg, 6994th Scty Sq, OPS 10124, 10 Mar 67, Doc. 8.

18. Msg, AFSSO UDORN, USSO 0409, 9 May 67, Doc. 9.

See comments on page 6 of the narrative.

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DOCUMENTS 6 - 9 REDACTED

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XX

PRIORITY

6994SCTYSQ TA

6922SCTING

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
DO NOT DESTROY

No 0408228

CHANNELS CDR 21519 JAN 67

FOR COL SMALL FROM LT COL WALLANDER.

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. THIS MSG IN TWO PARTS. PART I. REF MY MAT 31706 31 DEC 66, SUP 31689 31 DEC, SUP 14331 14 JAN 67, PACSCTY RGN MSG LOGMPA 00434 JAN 67 AND 6922 SW MSG MAT 00010 JAN 67. THE ARD-18 IN COMMISSION RATE IS BEING SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY LACK OF SUPPLY SUPPORT AND UNACCEPTABLY SLOW REACTION TIME TO NORS AND RED ARROW REQUESTS. AT ONE TIME THE REACTION TIME TO OUR TELEPHONE REQUESTS TO SANDERS WAS AVERAGING 5 DAYS. RECENTLY WE HAVE HAD TO WAIT AS LONG AS THIRTY DAYS AND THE AVERAGE HAS BEEN FIFTEEN. AT PRESENT, ACFT 044 AT NHA TRANG HAS BEEN NORS FOR COORDINATE CONVERTER SINCE 3 JAN.

PART II. UR MAT 00010 JAN 67 INFORMED PACSCTYRGN OF OVERALL PROBLEM. MY SUP 31689 SPECIFICALLY ^{ADDRESSED} ~~APPROACHED~~ THE SLOW REACTION ASPECT AND REQUESTED ASSISTANCE. THERE HAS BEEN NO EVIDENCE OF ACTION TAKEN TO ALLEVIATE THE SITUATION. ON 14 JAN MY SUP 14331 REQUESTED LATEST STATUS ON NORS REQUESTS. TO DATE NO REPLY RECEIVED. I FEEL THAT

21 0440Z
JAN 67
1

4644

Col Wallander



ROBERT L WALLANDER, Lt Col, USAF
Commander





 PRIORITY

COL WALLANDER

COL WALLANDER

4644

PACSCTYRGN MSG LOGMPA 00434 JAN 67 WAS COMPLETELY UNSATISFACTORY AND DID NOT REFLECT AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION. WE CANNOT MAINTAIN THE 28 AIRCRAFT PRESENTLY IN THEATER AND TWO MORE ARE EXPECTED MOMENTARILY. WE ARE MEETING OUR PRESENT IN COMMISSION RATE THROUGH CANNIBALIZATION, HOWEVER, THIS CANNOT CONTINUE MUCH LONGER. THE NUMBER OF MAJOR ARD-18 DISCREPANCIES JUMPED FROM 56 IN NOVEMBER TO 109 IN DECEMBER WITH AN INCREASE OF AIRCRAFT FROM 17 TO 27. OUR AIR ABORTS FOR ARD-18 INCREASED FROM 5 TO 21 AND OUR DAYS NORS JUMPED FROM 44 TO 97. SO FAR THIS MONTH WE ARE AIREADY 104 DAYS NORS. THE TREND IS CLEARLY EVIDENT. DURING THE PAST FIVE DAYS WE HAVE HAD 5 AIRCRAFT OUT FOR ARD-18 WHILE NONE HAVE BEEN OUT FOR AIRCRAFT GENERAL. ~~FIVE~~ ^{FOUR} AIRCRAFT REPRESENTS ~~TWENTY-FIVE~~ ^{APPROXIMATELY 15 (FIFTEEN)} PERCENT OF THE POSSESSED AIRCRAFT AND THIS RATE IS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT WILL ONLY COMPOUND THE PROBLEMS UNLESS IMMEDIATE SUPPLY SUPPORT IS FORTHCOMING AND THE REACTION TIME TO AND FROM THE FACTORY ON REPAIR PARTS IS CONSIDERABLY DECREASED: THEY MIGHT JUST AS WELL KEEP THE AIRCRAFT AND SEND THE PARTS. THE TECH REPS REPORTED TODAY THAT IT IS BEGINNING TO APPEAR THAT THE SYSTEMS DEVELOP MAJOR PROBLEMS AFTER AROUND 600 HOURS OF OPERATION. AT OUR PRESENT AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION RATE THIS WILL OCCUR IN LESS THAN FOUR MONTHS AFTER ARRIVAL. I BELIEVE BOTH REGION AND COMMAND HAVE BEEN LULLED INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY



4644

BY THE INITIAL SUCCESS OF THE EQUIPMENT, AND ARE NOT REACTING TO OUR
MESSAGES. IN ORDER TO INSURE COMPLETE AWARENESS TO PROBLEM, I AM
INITIATING SPECIAL SUPPLY SUPPORT EMERGENCY ACTION SECTION IN DOMR
TODAY. WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE ANYTHING YOU CAN DO IN REEMPHAZING
THE PROBLEMS OUTLINED IN YOUR MAT 00010 JAN 67 AND MY SUP 31689 TO
REGION AND COMMAND.





MAINTENANCE
ACTIVITIES

PRIORITY

6994 SCTY SQ, TAN SON NHUT AB, VIETNAM

PACSCITYRGN, WHEELER AFB, HAWAII

INFO: 6922 SCTY WG, CLARK AB, PHIL

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
DO NOT DESTROY
No. 0408229



MNF 19407 FEB 67.

FOR LOG-MP. INFO MAT. REF PSR MSG LOG-MP 12799 FEB 67.

ORIGINAL PROCUREMENT OF COORDINATE CONVERTERS WAS FOR 57

UNITS. 53 UNITS FOR A/C. 1 UNIT FOR GOODFELLOW INSTALLATION

3 UNITS FOR SHOP MOCK-UPS. WRAMA AUTHORIZED SANDERS TO

ORDER 16 ADDITIONAL UNITS EARLY DECEMBER. ORDER PLACED ON

7 DECEMBER. DELIVERY ANTICIPATED 1 MAY 67. MEANWHILE 8

UNITS HAVE BEEN PULLED FROM PRODUCTION LINE TO ALLEVIATE

CURRENT SITUATION. IN ADDITION, THE NECESSARY NEW PARTS TO

EFFECT FIX IN 57 SYSTEMS HAS BEEN ORDERED WITH DELIVERY TO

SANDERS SCHEDULED ON 1 MARCH. ALSO, 50 SPARE CLUTCHES AND

15 SPARE BRAKES HAVE BEEN ORDERED FOR COORDINATE CONVERTERS.

DIGITIZER MODULES WITH DELIVERY TO SANDERS SCHEDULED 26

FEB. SOLUTIONS TO THE RANDOM FAILURES STILL UNDER STUDY.

19

60 PERCENT OF FAILURES RANDOM. SANDERS ENGINEER ANTICIPATED

FEB

67

AT THIS SITE TO EFFECT MODIFICATIONS MID-MARCH. FAILURES WILL

1


2

4182

SMS Neyland/flg



EDWARD E. SMITH, Capt, USAF
Chief of Maintenance



[REDACTED]

SMS Neyland

CONTINUE AT PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED RATE UNTIL FIX IS IMPLEMENTED.
MODIFICATION OF DOPPLER TWO-SPEED SERVO STILL UNDERWAY.
DISCREPANCY RATE NOW ALMOST NIL. NON-AVAILABILITY OF CERTAIN
ARD-18 ASSEMBLIES STILL HAMPERS MAINTENANCE BY INCREASING
CANNIBALIZATION AND MINIMUM TIME TO REPAIR. TYPICAL UNITS ARE
RECEIVER ASSEMBLIES. WE ARE LOOKING FOR AN AVERAGE OF 30 MINUTES TURN-
AROUND TIME. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON DELIVERY OF SUCH ITEMS.
SUGGEST YOU QUERY USAFSSC OR SANDEBS ON PRODUCTS TO BE FURNISHED
UNDER RECENT FUNDING FOR SPARES. OTHER MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES
ARE RATHER ROUTINE. NO SIGNIFICANT TREND HAS BEEN NOTED IN THE
PAST TWO MONTHS, OTHER THAN ITEMS DISCUSSED ABOVE. WE HAVE RECEIVED
BULK OF SSE. GP 1.



X

PRIORITY

6994SCTYSQ

6922SCTYWG

STUDY OF OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

CHANNELS CDR 19452 JAN 67.

DURING VISIT MR HAROLD WING 6994TH WAS REQUESTED TO TAPE ACTUAL RADIO SIGNALS THAT ARE BEING FIXED IN ORDER TO GIVE SANDERS ASSOC ENGINEERS A FEELING FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ENCOUNTERED IN THEATER. THE TAPE RECORDING WILL BE MATCHED WITH THE ACTUAL PRINTER TAPE TO GIVE A COMPLETE PICTURE. ADDITIONAL DATA WILL BE FORWARDED AS THE ELECTRONIC PROBLEMS ARE SOLVED. ALTHO TAPES AND PRINT OUTS ARE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL THEY WOULD BE USED ONLY BY CAT III CLEARED PEOPLE AT SANDERS. REQUEST PERMISSION TO SEND THEM DIRECT TO SANDERS IN CARE OF MAJOR EDDY.

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST DO NOT DESTROY No. 448234

18 10092 JAN 1967 1 1




ROBERT L. WALLANDER, LT COL, USAF COMMANDER

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ON

APPENDIX 1

HISTORY

DETACHMENT 1, 6994th SECURITY SQUADRON



HISTORY

OF THE

DETACHMENT 2, 6994th SECURITY SQUADRON

1 January - 30 June 1967

RCS: AU-D5 (USS-1)

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, USC, Sections 793 and 794) the transmission or revelation of which, in any manner, to an unauthorized person, is prohibited by law.



Approved by:

SIGNED

GARY F. OBECK

Capt, USA
Commander

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
DO NOT DESTROY
No 408231



FOREWORD

This historical study is a record of Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron, covering the period 1 January - 30 June 1967. All references to dates are within this period unless otherwise indicated.

The majority of the information contained herein was taken from files and records maintained at the unit. Additional information was gained from personal interviews with members assigned to the unit.

All suggestions and comments should be directed to the Unit Historian who is responsible for preparing this report.

RICHARD H. WALL, SSgt, USAF
Unit Historian

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I ORGANIZATION AND MISSION	
Activation.....	1
Organization.....	1
Aircraft Arrivals.....	1
II ARDF OPERATIONS	
SIGINT Collection Facilities.....	3
SIGINT Collection.....	3
III LOSS OF AIRCRAFT 201	5

C H R O N O L O G Y

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
1 Jan 1967	Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron became fully operational.
3 March 1967	The first aircraft arrived for the "Y" position.
9 March 1967	Aircraft 201 was lost.
11 March 1967	Aircraft 201 was located.
6 May 1967	Detachment 1 was recommended for the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award.
1 June 1967	The operations administration was relocated.

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER I - MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

Activation

[REDACTED] Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron was activated on 1 July 1966 to conduct Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) operations against low powered enemy ground transmitters in South Vietnam. Fixes obtained are immediately passed air to ground and in post electrical reports for use by tactical combat elements and are of very high value to these commanders in determining the location and maintaining surveillance of enemy units.

Organization

(U) By 1 January 1967 the unit was fully operational, the various internal functions had been organized, and the basic facilities had been acquired or constructed. The administrative and maintenance functions were located on Nha Trang AB, Republic of Vietnam. The Airborne Operations Section and communications facilities were co-located with the 313th RR Battalion (ASA) at Camp McDermott, adjacent to the air base.

Aircraft Arrivals

[REDACTED] The mission and organization of Det 1 remained basically unchanged from the previous period although the arrival of additional aircraft and personnel did allow for expansion of the ARDF mission. On 3 March 1967 the first aircraft with a "Y" DF acquisition position was declared operational. Additional aircraft with the same equipment arrived and were declared operational as follows:

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
42-0980	3 March 1967
45-50925	6 March 1967
43-49491	9 March 1967

42-00665	16 March 1967
43-48702	31 March 1967
43-15133	12 April 1967
42-23882	14 April 1967

With these additional seven aircraft the unit reached its full complement of 15 aircraft and began to fly an average of 79 sorties each week, mostly in the II Corps Tactical Zone.

In early June 1967, part of the operations section, namely the operations administrative section, the OIC and NCOIC, the Training Section, and the two flights' working areas, was moved into an adjacent quonset hut within the 313th RR Battalion compound. The original quonset is now used for the communications center and the analytical technical support and reporting functions. Two training positions originally installed in the first quonset were later moved into the second building. The additional space and the subsequent reduction in noise and congestion enabled all of the sections to perform their duties in a more efficient manner. It also provided room for briefing visitors without disturbing the normal daily operation.

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER II - ARDF OPERATIONS

SIGINT Collection Facilities

[REDACTED] Although the original concept of operations specified that the "Y" position would be used to tip off the "X" position, in actual operations there were deviations. Since the "Y" position utilizes a long wire antenna, its reception capability was far superior to the doppler - antenna - fed "X" position. Therefore, the great majority of targets picked up on "Y" could not be transferred to "X" because they were normally not in the mission area. The "X" position with its oscilloscope, which enables the operator to view signals within 2,000 KCS of the setting, acquired the targets in most instances. The "Y" position was used as an assist to "X" -- copying the traffic, working the radios, and accomplishing all the encryptions on the hestia pads for passing fixes to the ground. During active periods, these by themselves were found to be full-time functions.

SIGINT Collection

[REDACTED] The unit began keeping more detailed data to record its accomplishments and also to identify areas for improvement. Noticeable reductions were accomplished in the handling time before fixes were passed air to ground, the number of errors in the air-to-ground reports, and the number of errors in post mission fix reports. The average handling time between the last line of bearing and receipt of the fix by the ground station was about 20 minutes by June 1967. The number of errors in all reports was negligible - less than 1 per cent. These improvements can be attributed to the increased experience of the reporters and operators and to the emphasis placed in these areas by supervisory personnel.

[REDACTED] Feedback from consumers for the benefit of 361st TEWS aircrews and our own personnel was a recurring problem. Despite efforts to obtain [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

feedback data from various Army and Navy units, response was minimal. No systematic procedure for feedback could be established and any information was strictly on an irregular, ad hoc basis. Coordination with the 6994th Security Squadron, Det 2 and Army ARDF units revealed that this particular problem was widespread. .

[REDACTED] On 6 May 1967, Detachment 1, 6994th and the 361st Tactical Electronics Warfare Squadron were recommended for the first award of the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award for Exceptionally Meritorious Achievement from 1 July 1966 to 31 May 1967. During this period numerous congratulatory letters from General Westmoreland, COMUS MAC-V, General Norton, Commander 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), and General Momyer, 7th Air Force commander. This unit also received a letter commending the excellent cooperation and assistance in Operation Blackjack 25. This was a special COMINT Development Mission involving ARDF aircraft and elements of the 403rd Radio Research, Special Operations Detachment (Airborne), 5th Special Forces Group. The operation involved the passing of tip-offs, ground to air and air to ground and very close coordination between the ARDF aircraft and the Special Forces troops on the ground. The operation covered the period 15 April to 26 May 1967. (On 19 May, one fix reported by the unit resulted in 117 North Vietnamese killed in action and a valuable storage of rice confiscated.) The following major operations were given close tactical support by the unit: Operations Greeley, Parshing, San Houston, Francis Marion and Bird. Numerous other ground operations of smaller scope and shorter duration were supported.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER III - LOSS OF AIRCRAFT 201

[REDACTED] On 9 March 1967, Aircraft 43-49201 departed Nha Trang at 1355L. It was to have been a normal Phyllis Ann mission returning to Nha Trang in approximately seven hours. From evidence found at the crash site everything was going along normally until the seventh target of the day was picked up. Target golf found on the navigator's map proved to be a Market Time target. Hand transcribed traffic had been copied on this target at 1013Z. When the aircraft was two hours overdue appropriate action was taken. At 2300 hours the 361st TEWS contacted Air Sea Rescue and informed them that 201 was overdue at Nha Trang. Extremely poor weather, which severely hampered visual reconnaissance of the area, made it virtually impossible to locate the supposedly downed aircraft. One C-130 Rescue Aircraft stayed in the area as long as possible and reported negative results. The aircraft's main job was to listen for signals from survival radios carried by crew members. On 11 March 1967, after extensive search operations had been conducted, an Air Force forward air controller located the downed aircraft at 0945 local time at coordinates BS 820235. Infantry units of the 1st Air Cavalry Division arrived at 1300 local time and secured the area around the crash site. An immediate sweep of the area was made and all classified material found was properly secured.

[REDACTED] Technical Sergeants Donald A. Bernard and Thomas Echols assigned to Det 1 volunteered to be a part of the rescue team which left Nha Trang to try to secure the downed aircraft and the classified material on board. On arrival at the scene it was revealed that people, probably Viet Cong, had already been in the immediate area. The bodies of the downed aircrew

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

members had been searched and several articles had been taken including watches, rings and wallets. The survival equipment each man was carrying along with his boots were also missing. Further investigation of the scene showed many of the Viet Cong were barefooted and poorly equipped. From the numerous leaflets covering the area it is believed the Viet Cong may have thought it was a leaflet dropping, psywar mission because none of the equipment inside the aircraft was disturbed in any way. The constant threat of enemy hostile action, coupled with heavy fog and the coming of nightfall limited time in the area. When it was no longer possible to remain in the area, a fifty-pound charge of heavy explosives was placed in the aircraft and it was blown up. This secured the rest of the aircraft and the classified material that was not removed. For their actions during the operation, both Sergeants Bernard and Echols were recommended for the Bronze Star with "V" for Valor. (This award was subsequently approved at Headquarters USAFSS.)

[REDACTED] It is presumed that the aircraft was downed by enemy fire. The pilot and co-pilot were the most competent assigned. The flight mechanic was a highly capable veteran and was an instructor mechanic. The navigator was also an instructor. One of the radio operators was a flight commander and another of the radio operators was an instructor with over sixty missions. The entire crew was among the best assigned and capable of handling any airborne emergency. Results of the autopsy later showed the two radio operators and the navigator had metal fragments foreign to the aircraft in their bodies. This confirmed the presumption that the aircraft was downed by hostile ground fire. The following is a list of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

the recovered items from the aircraft:

1 422 Oscilloscope	Mission Map Area
1 Receiver Control	Tech Support Data Sheet
1 Buffer Logic Assembly	AFTO 781, Part I
6 Modules	Blank Operators' Logs
2 ID 250 Compasses	Blank Market Time Reporting Logs
2 Gap Servo Pax	Hestia Pad CFI50067 Reg 1
Crew Notebook	

The aircrew members from Det 1 were:

TSgt Raymond F. Leftwich, AF17695652

A1C Charles D. Land, AF17634813

A1C Daniel C. Reese, AF13795155

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX 2

HISTORY

DETACHMENT 2, 6994th SECURITY SQUADRON



HISTORY
OF THE
DETACHMENT 1, 6994th SECURITY SQUADRON

1 January - 30 June 1967

RCS: AULD5 (USS-1)

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
Approved by:

SIGNED

JAMES D. CAGLE
Major, USAF
Commander

**PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
DO NOT DESTROY**

No. 408232



FOREWORD

This historical summary of the background and operations of Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron, has been written to include unit activities from 1 January - 30 June 1967.

All information was taken from files, PADS, and correspondence maintained within the unit.

All suggestions and comments should be directed to the Office of Information.

WILLIAM J. PORTER, 1st Lt, USAF
Unit Historian

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I MISSION AND ORGANIZATION	
Organizational Changes.....	1
Internal Organizational Changes.....	1
II TASKING AND COLLECTION	
Tasking.....	2
Collection.....	2
Reporting.....	2

C H R O N O L O G Y

Date

Event

9 April 1967

Lt William J. Porter replaced Lt Thad A. Wolfe as operations officer of Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron.

29 April 1967

"Integrated Crew" system began in conjunction with the 362d TEWS.

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER I - MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

Organizational Changes

No major organizational changes occurred during the reporting period. However, several organizational changes were effected.

Internal Organizational Changes

(U) On 9 April, Lt William J. Porter replaced Lt Thad A. Wolfe as Operations Officer. Lt Porter arrived from Tan Son Nhut AB in TDY status. He became PCS on 20 June 1967.

[REDACTED] On 29 April, the unit began an "Integrated Crew" system in conjunction with the 362d TEWS. Under this system, the USAFSS crew members were scheduled consistently with one navigator which, in effect, created one permanent crew.

[REDACTED] The Integrated Crew system destroyed the Administrative Flight Organization, therefore, to replace Flight Commander functions, the Flight Scheduling section was beefed up and made a permanent position. Additionally, a Duty Supervisor position was created to supervise the daily operations functions of details, crew pickups, check flights, etc. Manned by the senior NCOs on a rotating basis, this post inherited the responsibilities that had formerly been assigned to the Flight Commanders.

CHAPTER II - TASKING AND COLLECTION

Tasking

█ In January average tasking was four (4) missions per day. These missions were fraged into the Laction (Tigerhound) and DMZ areas. By June the unit received a full complement of aircraft. The average tasking in June had increased ten (10) missions per day. These missions covered all of I Corps and Tigerhound, and portions of the Steel Tiger and Talley Ho areas.

█ The majority of the missions accomplished during the period of this report were for continuity and development. Some were, however, tasked as Close Tactical Support (CTS) missions in support of specific ground operations. During January 41 missions were accomplished in support of operations Pickett and Prairie. As of 30 June 450 missions had been flown in CTS for 25 ground operations.



Collection


█ The monthly fix total in January was 465. By June this had increased to 2,000; due mainly to the increased number of aircraft and missions. Operator experience was also a contributing factor. The fix-per-mission rate increased from 3.9 in January to 6.1 in June. The total fixes for the period were 7,652.


█ The identification rate increased as Army and Air Force improved the Tech Data system. In January identification was .04 per cent against 26 per cent in June.


Reporting

█ Only format changes were experienced in air-ground and final fix reporting during the period. The quality increase, however, was quite evident. █


 The air-ground reporting error rate dropped to zero, however, the fix-pass rate increased from 70 per cent to 92 per cent.

 The time lapse in plotting and reporting a fix a/g dropped from a high of 60 minutes (average) in January to 25 minutes (average) in June.

 The final fix reporting error rate dropped to zero in June, however, a significant increase in the number of reports issued occurred.



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APPENDIX 3

HISTORY

AIRBORNE RADIO DIRECTION FINDING COORDINATION CENTER




HISTORY
OF THE
AIRBORNE RADIO DIRECTION FINDING
COORDINATION CENTER
(ACC)

1 January - 30 June 1967

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, USC, Sections 793 and 794) the transmission or revelation of which, in any manner, to an unauthorized person, is prohibited by law.

Prepared By:
Tom E. Odom
TOM E. ODOM
MSgt, USAF
Operational Historian

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
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C H R O N O L O G Y

Date

Event

11 May 1967

Proposal was made to centralize the ARDF control and establish it as a function of MACV.

March 1967

Project Mustard wideband intercept was incorporated into the ARDF support program as a supplement to fix identification methods.

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER I - MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

Mission

[REDACTED] The mission of the Airborne Radio Direction Finding Coordination Center (ACC) was to provide for the coordinated management of the ARDF program in South Vietnam, and other areas as directed by COMUSMACV.

Organization

[REDACTED] The ACC was collocated with the 509th Radio Research Group (RRG) at Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam. The activity was established on 1 July 1966 by agreement between the Commanding Officer, 509th RRG and the Commander, 6994th Security Squadron. It is staffed by members of both organizations.

[REDACTED] The ACC on 30 June 1967, consisted of 26 personnel. There were 14 U.S. Army and 12 USAF personnel assigned. No formal recognition of the ACC and its assigned personnel had been achieved. The actual existence of the ACC was still on an ad hoc basis as formulated by the agreement of the commanders of the 509th RRG and the 6994th Security Squadron. (See Chapter I).

[REDACTED] The ACC was divided into three sections: Tasking, Reporting, and Administrative, as follows:

TASKING. This section converted true unit designators targeted by MACV J2 into cryptologic language and tasked Army aviation and Air Force units with sorties to be flown during the tasking period.

REPORTING. The Reporting section compiled all incoming ARDF Recovery Reports into a comprehensive summary for dissemination to consumers. ARDF Recovery Reports were being received in the ACC via

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CRITICOM and OPSCOMM circuits from ARDF units. There were three Air Force OPSCOMM circuits and one Army circuit on 30 June 1967. Several additional OPSCOMM circuits were projected to be installed in the future.

ADMINISTRATIVE. This section performed all administrative functions required and provided guidance and direction to the Tasking and Reporting sections.

[REDACTED] Considerable discussion evolved around the function of the ACC and its role in ARDF management. In general, it was felt that more effective control and utilization of ARDF resources could be achieved by centralizing the ARDF control and establishing it as a function of MACV. Subsequently, a staff study* of the subject was conducted by the Reconnaissance Branch of MACV, and its proposals presented to the Chief of Staff, MACV-J2. The study concluded that a centralized system of control (the present ACC) was probably the most effective and should be expanded to assume more of the functions presently being accomplished by MACV-J2. The 6994th Security Squadron and the 509th RRG were in concurrence with the MACV proposal. However, the 6994th Security Squadron desired that the ACC should be headed by a MACV staff officer. Both the NSA Pacific representative, Vietnam (C), and the 509th RRG opposed this idea. The proposal was presented to Major General McChristian on 11 May 1967. The General disapproved any change in the existing system. He said:

"MACV-J2 will always establish ARDF target priorities and determine weight of effort to be allocated to given areas.

* This study considered three methods of ARDF control and contained many points of interest. (See document 1).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

It is up to the 'Operators,' Air Force and Army to determine all else on basis of tech data, etc., via ACC. If ever he gave ACC any of his above responsibility, it would be headed by J-2 MACV officer."

[REDACTED] Since the inception of the ACC in 1966, it continued in strength, size, productivity, and equipment. Growing demands of expansion have resulted in the allocation of floor space to the ARDF Coordination Center at the new 509th Radio Research Group headquarters building, under construction at Whitebirch Station within the confines of the Joint General Compound. The move to the new location was scheduled for approximately 1 September 1967. Upon completion of the move, additional OPSCOMM circuits with subordinate Army units were projected to be installed. More timely input of ARDF Recovery Reports to the ACC was expected to be produced with the added circuits. Also in the near future and probably after the move to Whitebirch Station, the ACC was to receive a Litton Computer for automatic data processing of ARDF information. Data processing specialists of the U.S. Army were already in country awaiting arrival of the computer.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER II - TASKING

[REDACTED] The ACC was tasked with receiving general ARDF tasking from MACV-J2 and translating it into specific ARDF cryptologic tasking. The MACV tasking was, in actuality, an outline of ARDF requirements that was formulated based on the consumer requirements and the ARDF resources available. The ACC was responsible for insuring that the resources were utilized to the maximum effectiveness in fulfilling these requirements. To achieve this, they established specific time-over-targets; selected specific Radio Arbitrary Designators (RAD's) for designated priority targets; arranged for the proper distribution of technical data by the appropriate Data Base; monitored and managed the distribution and assignment of HESTIA pads to the proper subscribers of the air/ground communications nets; and forwarded tasking to the U.S. Army aviation units and the 7th Air Force, TACC. (See Chart 1).

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER III - PROCESSING AND REPORTING

[REDACTED] The AGC received ARDF recovery reports issued by the units accomplishing the ARDF missions and prepares the Daily ARDF Fix Report for dissemination to consumers. No significant changes in these procedures occurred during this period.

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER IV - ACCOMPLISHMENTS

[REDACTED] During this historical period, several noteworthy managerial improvements were implemented in the ARDF program.

[REDACTED] ARDF Recovery Reports were re-evaluated and revised into a more comprehensive and readily usable vehicle. The revised reports reduced high precedence message transmissions by over 130,000 groups monthly.

[REDACTED] Fix requirements were redefined to eliminate unnecessary information and to render a more qualitative input via Recovery Reports, thus enhancing the overall value of the outgoing ACC ARDF Fix Report.


[REDACTED] In March 1967, Project Mustard wideband intercept was incorporated into the ARDF support program as a supplement to fix identification methods. The project was located at the 330th Radio Research Company in Fleiku. Under its concept, all identified wideband intercept is matched with as many unidentified ARDF fixes as possible. On the basis of these correlations, many unidentified fixes contained in ARDF Recovery Reports were identified. The correct identifications were then passed on to all recipients of the ACC ARDF Fix Reports on a daily basis.

[REDACTED] The consolidation of ARDF Communications Nets also took place during this period. There were twenty ARDF nets in the communications structure of the ARDF program on 30 June 1967. A plan was developed to rebuild and consolidate the system into eleven nets. The revised netting was to have been implemented on 1 September 1967 and was expected to result in a more efficient communications structure. It was also designed to make maximum utilization of cryptographic Hestia pads which




are used to encrypt ARDF fixes for transmission from the aircraft to the Direct Support Radio Research units.

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TASKING CYCLE



The redacted pages which follow appear to be the staff study (Document #1) referenced on page 2 of the ACC history (below).

██████████ Considerable discussion evolved around the function of the ACC and its role in ARDF management. In general, it was felt that more effective control and utilization of ARDF resources could be achieved by centralizing the ARDF control and establishing it as a function of MACV. Subsequently, a staff study* of the subject was conducted by the Reconnaissance Branch of MACV, and its proposals presented to the Chief of Staff, MACV-J2. The study concluded that a centralized system of control (the present ACC) was probably the most effective and should be expanded to assume more of the functions presently being accomplished by MACV-J2.

* This study considered three methods of ARDF control and contained many points of interest. (See document 1).

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PRIORITY

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BRIEFING CONCERNING
ARDF PRIORITIES

CHANNELS *OPS 12157* MAY 67.


THIS MSG IN II PARTS. PART I. RE MY OPS 07097 MAY 67. BRIEFING WAS GIVEN 11 MAY BY MACV J-2 ARDF STAFF TO GEN MCCHRISTIAN, MACV J-2, ON PROPOSED REVAMP OF ARDF TASKING, ETC. GEN MCCHRISTIAN DISAPPROVED ANY CHANGE IN EXISTING SYSTEM. HE SAID (A) MACV J-2 WILL ALWAYS ESTABLISH ARDF TARGET PRIORITIES AND DETERMINE WEIGHT OF EFFORT (I.E. NUMBER OF MISSIONS) TO BE ALLOCATED TO GIVEN AREAS; (B) IT IS UP TO THE "OPERATORS", AIR FORCE AND ARMY, TO DETERMINE ALL ELSE ON BASIS OF TECH DATA, ETC VIA ACC; (C) IF EVER HE GAVE ACC ANY OF HIS ABOVE RESPONSIBILITY, IT WOULD BE HEADED BY J-2 MACV OFFICER. PART II. DOESPECREP EFFORT AT BRIEFING TO SELL DATA-BASE CONTROL PRODUCED FLAT STATEMENTS FROM GEN MCCHRISTIAN THAT THIS WOULD NEVER HAPPEN. OTHER COMMENTS BY DOESPECREP ALLEGING SYSTEM SHORTCOMINGS WITHOUT GREATER CMA ROLE, ETC. WERE COUNTERED BY THE GENERAL IN EVERY CASE WITH FACTS DISPUTING THE ALLEGATIONS. RAPPORT BTWN 6994TH SS AND MACV ARDF STAFF ON ALL ISSUES HAS NEVER BEEN BETTER. 509TH RRG

12
MAY 1967
1 2

4697

Lt. Col Gilbert

REGINALD G. M. GILBERT, Lt Col, USAF
Operations Officer



Doc. 2 Cont.


PRIORITY

Lt Col Gilbert

Lt Col Gilbert

4697

IS TRYING TO PLAY BOTH SIDES OF STREET, BUT ON SHOW DOWN TENDS TO
GO ALONG WITH 6994TH EXCEPT FOR J-2 MACV OFFICER HEADING ACC. BLV
SUBJ OF ARDP TASKING SYSTEM CHANGES IS DEAD UNTIL AFTER GEN
DAVIDSON (GEN MCCHESTER'S REPLACEMENT) GETS SETTLED IN. ALSO
BLV WE CAN THEN EXPECT RENEWED DODSPECREP EFFORT IN TRYING TO SELL
ITS POINTS TO GEN DAVIDSON.



Handwritten signature or initials.

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